Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 14 Jul 2014, at 20:43, meekerdb wrote: On 7/14/2014 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote: On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their substitution level. Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction. That would be a nice result. How does it differentiate different sorts existence? ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that ExP(x) is true if there is number n such that P(n). It is the chosen ontology, although we could have taken any other first order specification of a universal base) Modal nuances: []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) With either [] () being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G, G*, S4Grz, , Z, Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*. Notions of physical existences are given by []Ex[]P(x) in the S4Grz1, Z1*, and X1* logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They are graded, as the logic of []p p, or [][]p p, and any []^n p ^m p gives a quantum logic when n m. Hmmm. I think I will have to take your course in modal logic before those become clear to me. I think I could explain without using the modal logic. At step seven, it seems that you can intuitively understand that physics is somehow already reduced to a statistics on all computations, relative to your state, and the shape of that mathematics gives the core of the physical laws (for all universal machine). The modal logic sum up in fact long series of theorems translating that measure question in arithmetical relations. I have to go, and tomorrow is still busy, but I will try to say more later. Bruno Brent In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical existence of numbers, and the physical existence is given by the quantization provided by incompleteness on the consistent RE or sigma_1 extensions, as viewed from some machine points of view. Physics is the science of measurement of possibly alternated results (like W and M, in step 3 and 4, and like other computational states in the step seven generalization where the FPI is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality). All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in arithmetic, or in higher level arithmetical term, like the []p p. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote: On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their substitution level. Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction. That would be a nice result. How does it differentiate different sorts existence? ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that ExP(x) is true if there is number n such that P(n). It is the chosen ontology, although we could have taken any other first order specification of a universal base) Modal nuances: []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) With either [] () being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G, G*, S4Grz, , Z, Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*. Notions of physical existences are given by []Ex[]P(x) in the S4Grz1, Z1*, and X1* logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They are graded, as the logic of []p p, or [][]p p, and any []^n p ^m p gives a quantum logic when n m. In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical existence of numbers, and the physical existence is given by the quantization provided by incompleteness on the consistent RE or sigma_1 extensions, as viewed from some machine points of view. Physics is the science of measurement of possibly alternated results (like W and M, in step 3 and 4, and like other computational states in the step seven generalization where the FPI is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality). All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in arithmetic, or in higher level arithmetical term, like the []p p. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/14/2014 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote: On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their substitution level. Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction. That would be a nice result. How does it differentiate different sorts existence? ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that ExP(x) is true if there is number n such that P(n). It is the chosen ontology, although we could have taken any other first order specification of a universal base) Modal nuances: []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) []ExP(x) []Ex[]P(x) With either [] () being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G, G*, S4Grz, , Z, Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*. Notions of physical existences are given by []Ex[]P(x) in the S4Grz1, Z1*, and X1* logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They are graded, as the logic of []p p, or [][]p p, and any []^n p ^m p gives a quantum logic when n m. Hmmm. I think I will have to take your course in modal logic before those become clear to me. Brent In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical existence of numbers, and the physical existence is given by the quantization provided by incompleteness on the consistent RE or sigma_1 extensions, as viewed from some machine points of view. Physics is the science of measurement of possibly alternated results (like W and M, in step 3 and 4, and like other computational states in the step seven generalization where the FPI is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality). All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in arithmetic, or in higher level arithmetical term, like the []p p. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 13 July 2014 17:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/12/2014 9:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If you can explain what axiomatic means, I think you'll find it on the circle. For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers The Origin of Reason). Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK to me. But you can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle relies on the previous one. So by your own definition there is nothing there that can seem necessarily true. Only as *seems* necessarily true to human beings. As opposed to what? Do you have access to something other than human beings to check what seems necessarily true to them? That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise *anything* about reality. Interestingly I am also engaged today in editing and essay by Vic Stenger, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian which is intended to clarify the relation between philosophy and physics. Something that was stirred up by Larry Kruass denigrating philosophy, at least as applied to physics. In it, Stenger, who is as reductionist materialist as they come, says we can't know anything about reality; we only know our models. I tried to get him to change it. ??? I thought you'd agree with that. What else can we know except our models (plus experimental data used to test them) ? No it's not, because it's not just words. For example, the explanation of biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are hypothesized and test in laboratories. I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way that Pomo suggests all our explanations are. Each step relies on the previous one. There is no point at which you can claim the circle is anchored in reality. Do you thing strings are suitable to anchor reality? Or set theory? I think they are anchored in experience and reason. That's how you'd explain string theory to someone; you'd tell them about the particle data and mathematics. But the truth of string theory is much shakier than the existence of what it purports to explain. I think parts of the circle, where science is well developed, are anchored in correspondence with facts. Well, perhaps you can explain in more detail. This is looking a bit like that hand waving I was worried about, when you start asking rhetorical questions as though they explain something. Never mind what I think, explain what you think. Post Modernism is more than Coherentism ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/). Pomos hold that reality is a social construct which varies with society. I was talking about a particular branch of pomo, I guess what should be called Wittgensteinian (I forget if it's the early or late W). But what pomo does or doesn't do doesn't make the free floating ontology (as you originally presented it) any better anchored. then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else you've said, some of which I thought at the time was quite sensible. Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is sensible. No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks. Too bad. Yes, sorry not to just agree but kick back. Must mean I exist or something. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 4:51 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to the point where maybe the circle closes. However at that point you appear to have veered off into fantasy (or at least you want to have you cake and eat it too). It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the air, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way to show this is using something that appears at least equally ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others will have the same reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which *nothing* is considered axiomatic. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise *anything* about reality. I rejected that viewpoint a few decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at least until I managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some VERY convincing evidence. Then you might like this: http://xkcd.com/451/ That being said, I tend to become a postmodernist when the word explanation shows up. I see science as pure description. I find it is easy to fall into the trap of seeing explanation where none is given. People say to kids: the moon orbits the earth because the earth has more mass and generates a stronger attractive force. But if we look at the equations, this is not what they say. They contain no because. They just describe. The why? is a human construct. Possibly a language construct. I don't find it so unthinkable that it throws us into an ontological loop like Brent describes. I don't agree with postmodernist epistemology. I bet that truth can be approximated by the scientific method. But still, I cannot do more than bet on this. The problem is that I'm not convinced that explanations or causations are part of The Truth. I see them more as tricks that the human mind uses to navigate reality, not so different from the ad hoc conventions we use to communicate. Cheers Telmo. This gives me, at least, the same problem I would have with a time travel story in which a time traveller takes something
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 12 Jul 2014, at 21:17, meekerdb wrote: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there is a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Not at all. First, it is the physicalist, or metaphycaily naturalist which speculate on a primary physical universe. As much I agree that there are evidence for a physica reality, there are no evidence for a primary physical reality. Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their substitution level. Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. UD* is full of many circles. If some circle win, that needs to be explained. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. With mechanism, you have a nice simple ontology, and besides, physics becomes machine-independent. It does not depend which universal base of phi_i you start with. You appreciate how Vic Stenger (and Emmy Noether) derive some physical laws by postulating their invariance for some transformation. Comp gives a very strong invariance principle: indeed it redefines and explain physics in a new way which is invariant for universal base ontology. Useless in practice, but conceptually coherent with the canonical machine's sciences and correct theologies. But again, my point is not that comp gives a better theory. My point is that you cannot have both comp and primitive matter, and that if you keep comp, matter is refined as an computer-science-theoretical observational modality. We can test it, refute it, and measure our degree of non-computability, or improve it, etc. No problem with physics. Only a problem
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/13/2014 8:51 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: That being said, I tend to become a postmodernist when the word explanation shows up. I see science as pure description. I find it is easy to fall into the trap of seeing explanation where none is given. People say to kids: the moon orbits the earth because the earth has more mass and generates a stronger attractive force. But if we look at the equations, this is not what they say. They contain no because. They just describe. The why? is a human construct. Possibly a language construct. I don't find it so unthinkable that it throws us into an ontological loop like Brent describes. I don't agree with postmodernist epistemology. I bet that truth can be approximated by the scientific method. But still, I cannot do more than bet on this. The problem is that I'm not convinced that explanations or causations are part of The Truth. I see them more as tricks that the human mind uses to navigate reality, not so different from the ad hoc conventions we use to communicate. I agree. What we generally call a scientific explanation is just a description in terms of something we understand better than the thing being explained. It includes things we can imagine being different or manipulating and it provides a model that predicts the result of such changes. In the example of Newtonian gravity, the two masses and the distance between them are things we understand and can imagine manipulating. But notice that this was not immediately considered a good explanation at the time. Newton was asked, But what provides the force? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their substitution level. Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction. That would be a nice result. How does it differentiate different sorts existence? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level), not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there /is/ a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this: maths = physics = consciousness = human maths There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle back ISTM. Quentin as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
Quentin, I appreciate your sequencing: *maths = physics = consciousness = human maths* except for the obvious question that arose in my (agnostic) mind: what OTHER maths can we, humans think of with our (human) minds that would not qualify as human maths? Even - as I believe - Bruno leaves the question open and assigns such to his unidentified (universal?) machines WITHOUT atempting to verify, 'understand' or 'explain' those marvels. The most is: 'which MAY BE true (or not). On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this: maths = physics = consciousness = human maths There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle back ISTM. Quentin as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time,
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
2014-07-12 22:01 GMT+02:00 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com: Quentin, I appreciate your sequencing: *maths = physics = consciousness = human maths* except for the obvious question that arose in my (agnostic) mind: what OTHER maths can we, humans think of with our (human) minds that would not qualify as human maths? When I said human maths, I wanted to say Maths human discovered so far... (and maths we can discover) Even - as I believe - Bruno leaves the question open and assigns such to his unidentified (universal?) machines WITHOUT atempting to verify, 'understand' or 'explain' those marvels. The most is: 'which MAY BE true (or not). On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this: maths = physics = consciousness = human maths There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle back ISTM. Quentin as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
RE: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 12:18 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?] On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there is a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. Brent ~ I like how you bring in biology (and our biological being) into this grand cycle. It seems natural to me that we are emergent vast-network phenomena dancing upon a self-replicating organic chemistry base, itself emerging from physical reality that, speculatively perhaps, can be hypothesized to emerge itself from an even more fundamental abstract mathematical reality. It would seem natural then to me that our brain functioning and the mind -self-aware consciousness that emerges out of this underlying massively parallel network would itself be predisposed towards stumbling upon the actions and objects of math and eventually developing a theory of a mathematical universe. If we *are* math then aren’t our minds, emergent from within also math and would naturally *think* in mathematical ways, developing a theory that *fit* the underlying biological-physical-fundamental-reality nature of our being. Pardon my tangential excursion… for, one question leads to others. What about question such as these: what was the first mover; the first root fundamental action (or elementary entity)? Or if there is no first mover; no beginning; no foundational root… then what? Even if all you need is a single bit and one, two or (?) basic operations to trigger a math emergence… from whence does that come? Is the possibility that we will someday figure things out to this level or is an attempt to do so pure theoretical unobtanium? This is the “god” boundary where many invoke some kind of inexplicable principal and leave it as unexplored terra-incognita. , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to the point where maybe the circle closes. However at that point you appear to have veered off into fantasy (or at least you want to have you cake and eat it too). It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the air, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way to show this is using something that appears at least equally ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others will have the same reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which *nothing* is considered axiomatic. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise *anything* about reality. I rejected that viewpoint a few decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at least until I managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some VERY convincing evidence. This gives me, at least, the same problem I would have with a time travel story in which a time traveller takes something back in time to the person who was supposed to have originated it and lets them crib it. Hence no one created whatever it is (Doctor Who did this with Shakespeare, with the Doctor quoting odd Shakespearisms and Will saying Mind if I use that? It's fine as a humorous device in fantasy, but less so when proposed as a serious basis for everything we know, or can know). , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge. So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining. As I said, I don't have my own TOE. I didn't suggest you did. That isn't what I'm asking for. I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls. Sorry, as yet I don't see how it can work. It isn't a virtuous circle (which is generally taken to mean something like compound interest working on something which was generated, originally, by
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 13 July 2014 08:27, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Or… perhaps it could it be like the mythical snake eating its tail. By, invoking retro-causality Brent isn't invoking retro-causality, but circular explanation. As he was at pains to point out to me, the arrows are explanatory, NOT causal. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 7:53 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?] On 13 July 2014 08:27, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: Or… perhaps it could it be like the mythical snake eating its tail. By, invoking retro-causality Brent isn't invoking retro-causality, but circular explanation. As he was at pains to point out to me, the arrows are explanatory, NOT causal. I wasn’t suggesting he was, and apologize if you mistook, pure conjecture – on my part -- for being a misunderstanding of what he said. In truth I am agnostic on reality, realizing clearly that I operate in some relative degree of ignorance. I also however like conjecture… and airships too J (the steam punk esthetic) A question for you… At some point doesn’t the search for a base level of fundamental reality lead you into an endless recursion or an arbitrary assignment of some, non-reducible fundamental quality to some entity, whether this be particle or pure math. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/12/2014 7:51 PM, LizR wrote: Sorry, as yet I don't see how it can work. It isn't a virtuous circle (which is generally taken to mean something like compound interest working on something which was generated, originally, by some other process) - it's a vicious circle, i.e. one that pretends to explain something but in fact doesn't have any foundation. And it is, in fact, like infinite Russian dolls, in that the explanatory chain doesn't begin or end anywhere. The point is that explanation must always begin from something you understand. The sense in which this circle is 'virtuous' is that if you understand anything at all then it is somewhere on the circle and so explanation can begin from there. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/12/2014 7:51 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote: Brent, You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm interested in finding out more about. On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation. To refresh your memory, you said: OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there /is/ a fundamental explanatory level) It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's comp and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics. The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things. At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in language. Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics. So maybe the circle closes. The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y. But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you. OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to the point where maybe the circle closes. However at that point you appear to have veered off into fantasy (or at least you want to have you cake and eat it too). It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the air, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way to show this is using something that appears at least equally ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others will have the same reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which /nothing/ is considered axiomatic. If you can explain what axiomatic means, I think you'll find it on the circle. For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers The Origin of Reason). That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise /anything/ about reality. No it's not, because it's not just words. For example, the explanation of biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are hypothesized and test in laboratories. I rejected that viewpoint a few decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at least until I managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some VERY convincing evidence. This gives me, at least, the same problem I would have with a time travel story in which a time traveller takes something back in time to the person who was supposed to have originated it and lets them crib it. Hence no one created whatever it is (Doctor Who did this with Shakespeare, with the Doctor quoting odd Shakespearisms and Will saying Mind if
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If you can explain what axiomatic means, I think you'll find it on the circle. For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers The Origin of Reason). Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK to me. But you can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle relies on the previous one. So by your own definition there is nothing there that can seem necessarily true. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise *anything* about reality. No it's not, because it's not just words. For example, the explanation of biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are hypothesized and test in laboratories. I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way that Pomo suggests all our explanations are. Each step relies on the previous one. There is no point at which you can claim the circle is anchored in reality. then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else you've said, some of which I thought at the time was quite sensible. Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is sensible. No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]
On 7/12/2014 9:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If you can explain what axiomatic means, I think you'll find it on the circle. For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers The Origin of Reason). Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK to me. But you can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle relies on the previous one. So by your own definition there is nothing there that can seem necessarily true. Only as *seems* necessarily true to human beings. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise /anything/ about reality. Interestingly I am also engaged today in editing and essay by Vic Stenger, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian which is intended to clarify the relation between philosophy and physics. Something that was stirred up by Larry Kruass denigrating philosophy, at least as applied to physics. In it, Stenger, who is as reductionist materialist as they come, says we can't know anything about reality; we only know our models. I tried to get him to change it. No it's not, because it's not just words. For example, the explanation of biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are hypothesized and test in laboratories. I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way that Pomo suggests all our explanations are. Each step relies on the previous one. There is no point at which you can claim the circle is anchored in reality. Do you thing strings are suitable to anchor reality? Or set theory? I think they are anchored in experience and reason. That's how you'd explain string theory to someone; you'd tell them about the particle data and mathematics. But the truth of string theory is much shakier than the existence of what it purports to explain. I think parts of the circle, where science is well developed, are anchored in correspondence with facts. Post Modernism is more than Coherentism (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/). Pomos hold that reality is a social construct which varies with society. then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else you've said, some of which I thought at the time was quite sensible. Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is sensible. No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks. Too bad. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 17:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:40 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote: Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in entropy. I don't get why a known state is important here. I certainly don't see why it's a decrease in entropy. (I assume you mean known to someone?) If you just left it in some unknown state you wouldn't be erasing it. Entropy decreases because before the bit was in one of two possible states; after it's in only one. So it was in an unknown state before - what does that mean? To whom or what was it unknown? Sorry to be obtuse but I can't see how someone's knowledge of a bit's state can affect its entropy. http://www.nature.com/news/the-unavoidable-cost-of-computation-revealed-1.10186 Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Yes I do. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 01 Jul 2014, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote: On 7/1/2014 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. That's is exactly why I have no complains on physicists. Most are neutral on this. Some are christians. I complain only about physicalist. And I don't complain, I just show them epistemologically inconsistent if they assumes comp together with physicalism. I certainly complain when they eliminate person and consciousness. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it works. That is your right, but that is not an argument to defend this or that theory when the goal is the search of the truth. I'm all for searching for what is true. I'm suspicious of searches for THE truth. I am suspicious only for those who claims to know the truth. Bruno Brent Is that the truth? No, but it's a lot simpler. --- Walt Kelly in Pogo -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it works. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and having and eating your cake... Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case please fill in a few more details. and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you think it's a possible model then that's *all* you can ever claim for it, well, unless some evidence comes along that disproves it, when you can't even do that. I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way. Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. Well, I think Bruno thinks it's more an unconscious assumption for most physicists, rather than something explicitly stated. For example your statement about your mother implicitly assumes her mind is nothing but what her brain does. That's a primitive materialist assumption (and one that may be right, of course) but my point is that no one stops to make it explicit, because nowadays it's deeply ingrained in the thought processes of anyone who isn't strongly religious, and goes without saying. They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it works. So why the century-long kerfuffle about the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote: On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and having and eating your cake... Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case please fill in a few more details. Why? The details are no different than in the linear case. In the details you look at each - separately. What's different about the circular case is that you don't suppose that one of the levels is fundamental or primitive. But I generally consider ontolgy to be derivative. You gather data, create a model, test it. If it passes every test, makes good predictions, fits with other theories, then you think it's a pretty good model and may be telling you what the world is like. THEN you look at and ask what are the essential parts of it, what does it require to exist. But that's more of a philosophical than a scientific enterprise, because, as in QM, there maybe radically different ways to ascribe an ontology to the same mathematical system. Even Bruno's very abstract theory is ambiguous about whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation. You can probably show they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and Feynman paths give the same answers but are ontologically quite different. and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you think it's a possible model then that's /all/ you can ever claim for it, well, unless some evidence comes along that disproves it, when you can't even do that. I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way. Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. Well, I think Bruno thinks it's more an unconscious assumption for most physicists, rather than something explicitly stated. For example your statement about your mother implicitly assumes her mind is nothing but what her brain does. That's a primitive materialist assumption But it's not an assumption. There's lots of evidence for it and practically none against it. I don't think Bruno contests that. He just supposes that this mind/body relation can be explained from a level he considers more
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 01 Jul 2014, at 06:35, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). Shannon's notion of information, and Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Solovay notions of information are purely mathematical (and usually definable in arithmetic, but non computable). But quantum information, despite a rather precise mathematical formulation, will be considered as much physical as the quantum reality can be, and might be more primitive in some attempt to unify the physical laws. PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). The question is to interpret that correctly. usually I just prefer to ignore the word information as it is a tricky word, having many sense, from the 3p Shannon notion to the 1p human content-full beliefs informed with the news, called in french information, like in TV information. I would see a lot of intermediate 3p information coming logically before consciousness. The UD, and thus the sigma_1 sentences can be said to handle a lot of information in the 3p sense, but consciousness, or just the 1p creates the information when it differentiates, like looking at an alternate possibilities of the type W v M, in self-multiplication (on all relevant sigma_1 sentences). Roughly, the difference between classical and quantum information is that the classical information is entirely determined above your substitution level, and the quantum information is entirely determined by the infinities of computations below your substitution level. QM becomes an empirical evidences that there is a very stable first person plural reality, of the type we have to justify by the person points of view modalities. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... Beautiful mathematics, and I tend to believe in this and E8, and the Monster group, Moonshine, ... Normally the arithmetical quantization should justify those groups. The advantage of comp is that it unifies not just all what we see, but also all a large part of what we don't see. (By the Solovay G/G* difference and its intensional variants). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 01 Jul 2014, at 07:59, meekerdb wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic Arithmetic, even one diophantine equation can supports loop of that kind. There is a paradoxal combinator which provides solution to such loop Yx = x(Yx). Y provides semantical fixed point, and you can get the second recursion theorem too. Like in general relativity Gödel show the existence of circular time loop. Any way the - are not temporal, but logical, or epistemological. and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way. The criteria remains the same. That's why I insist that comp + some definition of knowledge can be tested. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. That's is exactly why I have no complains on physicists. Most are neutral on this. Some are christians. I complain only about physicalist. And I don't complain, I just show them epistemologically inconsistent if they assumes comp together with physicalism. I certainly complain when they eliminate person and consciousness. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it works. That is your right, but that is not an argument to defend this or that theory when the goal is the search of the truth. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles are nothing more than what satisfies particle equations. Bruno complains about Aristotle and primitive matter, but I don't know any physicists who go around saying,I've discovered primitive matter. That's is exactly why I have no complains on physicists. Most are neutral on this. Some are christians. I complain only about physicalist. And I don't complain, I just show them epistemologically inconsistent if they assumes comp together with physicalism. I certainly complain when they eliminate person and consciousness. or Let's work on finding primitive matter. They just want a theory that is a little more comprehensive, a little more accurate, a little more predictive than the one they have now. And they couldn't care less what stuff is needed in their theory - only that it works. That is your right, but that is not an argument to defend this or that theory when the goal is the search of the truth. I'm all for searching for what is true. I'm suspicious of searches for THE truth. Brent Is that the truth? No, but it's a lot simpler. --- Walt Kelly in Pogo -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 05:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote: On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? I'd appreciate an answer to this question, if you have one. I can't see the connection and am genuinely interested, I wasn't being rhetorical. PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and having and eating your cake... Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case please fill in a few more details. Why? The details are no different than in the linear case. In the details you look at each - separately. What's different about the circular case is that you don't suppose that one of the levels is fundamental or primitive. OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, it's a bit of a chicken and egg situation (though luckily evolution can answer that one). Some more information would be appreciated. But I generally consider ontolgy to be derivative. You gather data, create a model, test it. If it passes every test, makes good predictions, fits with other theories, then you think it's a pretty good model and may be telling you what the world is like. THEN you look at and ask what are the essential parts of it, what does it require to exist. But that's more of a philosophical than a scientific enterprise, because, as in QM, there maybe radically different ways to ascribe an ontology to the same mathematical system. Even Bruno's very abstract theory is ambiguous about whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation. You can probably show they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and Feynman paths give the same answers but are ontologically quite different. OK. How you get to it is, of course, via empiricism (how else?). But so far most physicists (that I've come across) have considered that a reductionist ontology is most likely to be correct. Of course the majority doesn't rule in physics, and it's fine that you prefer a circular ontology, I'd just like to know how it's actually supposed to work, (preferably sans waffle, if you can manage it). and I'm not so inclined to take it as more than another possible model of the world. We aren't in a position to do more than build models of the world. If you think it's a possible model then that's *all* you can ever claim for it, well, unless some evidence comes along that disproves it, when you can't even do that. I think of it as a way to describe and predict and think about the world; but without supposing that it's possible to prove or to know with certainty the world must be that way. Of course, we can't know for certain what the world is like. As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... In a way, all of fundamental physics posits information theoretic entities. Particles
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 05:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 1:01 AM, LizR wrote: On 1 July 2014 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/30/2014 9:35 PM, LizR wrote: ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). That's the Landauer limit, which isn't really relevant at a fundamental level. It's a thermodynamic law which is reducible to statistical mechanics. Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? I'd appreciate an answer to this question, if you have one. I can't see the connection and am genuinely interested, I wasn't being rhetorical. Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in entropy. Since overall entropy cannot decrease this must be transferred to the environment. If the environment is at temperature T the work required to do this is ST, or for one bit kTln(2). This is a very small number because Boltzmann's constant k is very small. So real computers use many orders of magnitude more energy per bit. Feynman noted that it can be avoided by using reversible computing. PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). OK, except I think the chain is: arithmetic - information - matter - consciousness - arithmetic That doesn't make sense to me. I mean everything except the last term is OK, but you're apparently claiming that arithmetic is fundamental AND an invention of the human mind. Which at first glance looks suspiciously like fence sitting and having and eating your cake... Unless you have a theory of circular ontology, of course, in which case please fill in a few more details. Why? The details are no different than in the linear case. In the details you look at each - separately. What's different about the circular case is that you don't suppose that one of the levels is fundamental or primitive. OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. it's a bit of a chicken and egg situation (though luckily evolution can answer that one). Some more information would be appreciated. But I generally consider ontolgy to be derivative. You gather data, create a model, test it. If it passes every test, makes good predictions, fits with other theories, then you think it's a pretty good model and may be telling you what the world is like. THEN you look at and ask what are the essential parts of it, what does it require to exist. But that's more of a philosophical than a scientific enterprise, because, as in QM, there maybe radically different ways to ascribe an ontology to the same mathematical system. Even Bruno's very abstract theory is ambiguous about whether the ur-stuff is arithmetic or threads of computation. You can probably show they are empirically equivalent - just like Hilbert space and Feynman paths give the same answers but are ontologically quite different. OK. How you get to it is, of course, via empiricism (how else?). But so far most physicists (that I've come across) have considered that a reductionist ontology is most likely to be correct. What would a non-reductionist ontology look like? Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks about The One, but what good is that. If you stop taking this stuff so seriously (searching for THE TRUTH) and think of these theories as different models for an unknowable reality, then you see that a model with ONE part isn't very useful. You immediately then
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote: Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in entropy. I don't get why a known state is important here. I certainly don't see why it's a decrease in entropy. (I assume you mean known to someone?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: What would a non-reductionist ontology look like? The explanatory chain you gave earlier would look like one if I could make sense of it. Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks about The One, but what good is that. If you stop taking this stuff so seriously (searching for THE TRUTH) and think of these theories as different models for an unknowable reality, then you see that a model with ONE part isn't very useful. You immediately then have to start explaining why it seems to have parts in spite of being The One. Any chance of you explaining what you meant without all the waffle? I'm actually interested to know. Please could you start with that diagram which goes from arithmetic to arithmetic and explain how it makes sense, or is reductionist, or SOMETHING. I am starting to get a tronnies feel as I keep asking for clarification and none appears... Anyway I hve to go now kids to feed etc hope to hear somethijng sensible next time! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 9:40 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 7/1/2014 6:52 PM, LizR wrote: Interesting. How is the energy required to erase a single bit reducible to statistical mechanics? Erasing a bit means putting it in a known state, which is a decrease in entropy. I don't get why a known state is important here. I certainly don't see why it's a decrease in entropy. (I assume you mean known to someone?) If you just left it in some unknown state you wouldn't be erasing it. Entropy decreases because before the bit was in one of two possible states; after it's in only one. http://www.nature.com/news/the-unavoidable-cost-of-computation-revealed-1.10186 Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory -. Sorry I should have said explains although I thought it was obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please continue the explanation. You don't understand what is meant by physics - biology or biology - evolution - mathematics or mathematics - physics? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 7/1/2014 9:47 PM, LizR wrote: On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: What would a non-reductionist ontology look like? The explanatory chain you gave earlier would look like one if I could make sense of it. Some kind of Holism. Plotinus talks about The One, but what good is that. If you stop taking this stuff so seriously (searching for THE TRUTH) and think of these theories as different models for an unknowable reality, then you see that a model with ONE part isn't very useful. You immediately then have to start explaining why it seems to have parts in spite of being The One. Any chance of you explaining what you meant without all the waffle? I'm actually interested to know. Please could you start with that diagram which goes from arithmetic to arithmetic and explain how it makes sense, or is reductionist, or SOMETHING. I am starting to get a tronnies feel as I keep asking for clarification and none appears... Anyway I hve to go now kids to feed etc hope to hear somethijng sensible next time! Each step - is whole field of science and you want me to explain it? It's not a worked out, unified causal theory. It's just a way of seeing that there isn't necessarily some ur-stuff that explains everything else. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 29 Jun 2014, at 21:20, LizR wrote: On 29 June 2014 20:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the qubits (quantum logic) from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural). It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if arithmetic is real...? What do you mean by real here? The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is primitively real. With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and * are primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms. Information is derived from it, both the classical one, and the quantum one. But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that information is real because it is an essentially physical things: (*) http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf (If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-) I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of physical information, ISTM. Maybe I jumped the gun here, or something. I should have written: It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of *primitive* physical information, ISTM. Deriving the entropy of a black hole seems to me - upon reflection - to show that information is physically real, That's not clear to me. deriving the number of items in my fridge might makes those items real, but not necessarily the number itself real. I mean that a physicalist can argue in that sense. so it makes it as real as the physical world. Not for a primitive materialist, who will say that the information are only in your mind. According to comp the physical world is not primitively real, so information would be not primitively real either. No. Although you get shannon information quasi directly with the self- duplication, and get some trace of the quantum information in the first person plural. OK. However, it WOULD be physically real, The quantum one, yes. which is a step away from just something convenient for humans to use (like temperature, as mentioned elsewhere). I agree. This seems to accord with fundamental particles appearing to be little bundles of information, which I think is roughly A Garrett Lisi's view, amongst others (JA Wheeler?) JA Wheeler, sure. Garret Lisi? If you can give a quote. I don't see him even addressing the question of the nature of his particles. He proposed a very cute and quasi-convincing theory (except it does not work), very mathematical. But he does not address the reality question. May be I am wrong on this, but then I would be happy with a reference. The fact that only erasing information needs energy is fascinating, and still a bit weird in the comp perspective. It might be a very fundamental fact, and the shadow of it in arithmetic might be the symmetry of the logic of observable on the atomic (sigma_1) proposition, and the antisymmetry just above. But I don't want get too much technical. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
ISTM... In primitive materialism, what exists are space / time and matter / energy. Information is an emergent property of the arrangements of those things, like entropy. Neither of these exist at the level of fundamental particles, or Planck cells, or strings, or whatever else may be the primitive mass-energy/space-time) involved. There are problems with this view if information has primitive status, which would indicate that the real picture is something like it from bit or what might be called primitive informationism. Evidence for PI come from the entropy of black holes, the black hole information paradox, the Landauer limit, the Beckenstein bound, the holographic principle, and (unless I already covered that) the requirement that erasing a bit of information requires some irreducible amount of energy. (And maybe some other things I don't know about ... perish the thought). PI isn't equivalent to comp, but from what you said above PI might be a necessary consequence of comp, which would give the ontological chain arithmetic - consciousness - information - matter (I think ... this is all ISTM of course). As for A Garrett Lisi, I was under the impression that his particles were something like a point in a weight diagram - or something - which sounds to me at least like some form of information theoretic entity. But I have to admit my understanding of how birds and flowers could emerge from the E8 group or whatever it's called is, well, about like this... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 26 Jun 2014, at 03:55, LizR wrote: On 26 June 2014 03:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like complexity. Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818 As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information. Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't just (imho) in the eye of the beholder ? Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below the computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability issues and above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability shown to exists by using machine + oracles (for example). Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they are the same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that they are machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the change of the base of the phi_i. With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the qubits (quantum logic) from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural). It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if arithmetic is real...? What do you mean by real here? The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is primitively real. With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and * are primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms. Information is derived from it, both the classical one, and the quantum one. But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that information is real because it is an essentially physical things: (*) http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf (If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-) I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of physical information, ISTM. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 29 June 2014 20:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the qubits (quantum logic) from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural). It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if arithmetic is real...? What do you mean by real here? The question is not so much about what is real, but about what is primitively real. With computationalism, and the TOE chosen, 0, s(0), ... and + and * are primitively real, as we assume the RA axioms. Information is derived from it, both the classical one, and the quantum one. But a physicist like Landauer(*) would say that information is real because it is an essentially physical things: (*) http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~biophy09/Biophysik-Vorlesung_2009-2010_DATA/QUELLEN/LIT/A/B/3/Landauer_1996_physical_nature_information.pdf (If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-) I don't see why. It would be consistent with Landauer's notion of physical information, ISTM. Maybe I jumped the gun here, or something. Deriving the entropy of a black hole seems to me - upon reflection - to show that information is physically real, so it makes it as real as the physical world. According to comp the physical world is not primitively real, so information would be not primitively real either. However, it WOULD be physically real, which is a step away from just something convenient for humans to use (like temperature, as mentioned elsewhere). This seems to accord with fundamental particles appearing to be little bundles of information, which I think is roughly A Garrett Lisi's view, amongst others (JA Wheeler?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 28 May 2014, at 04:36, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 14:12, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall probably try again. Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation ... Just to make this more precise, the starting idea is not really that consciousness arises from a computation, but more that consciousness is invariant for the change of universal machines below its local machine substitution level. but I guess some relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge theory ... Yes. maybe when (or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some features of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on the matter, Do you understand that the reversal occurs at step seven, if you accept the protocol? In step seven, we have already the basic shape of the physical laws: they have to be a statistic (a mean of quantifying uncertainty) on all computations going through your state (defined indexically with Gödel's/Kleene's method, cf Dx =: 'xx' = DD =: 'DD'). Of course, a physicalist can still save the identity mind-brain link by making the physical universe small (= without concrete UD running in it forever). But already at this stage, the move seems to be motivated only by avoiding looking at a possible (and testable) explanation of the origin of the physical laws, and such a move does not solve neither the problem of consciousness, nor the problem of matter. So step 8, despite its intrinsic interest, is used in the UDA only for the nitpicking mind who believe such move can make sense rationally; Step 8 shows that it endows the primitive matter with magical properties, whose role in both matter and consciousness has to be made magical on purpose. It makes primitive matter isomorphic to a god-of- the-gap, and here it is made to avoid a problem whose testable solution would solve the mind-body problem, or refute comp (assuming we are not dreaming or in an emulation). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like complexity. Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818 As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information. Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't just (imho) in the eye of the beholder ? Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below the computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability issues and above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability shown to exists by using machine + oracles (for example). Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they are the same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that they are machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the change of the base of the phi_i. With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the qubits (quantum logic) from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 26 June 2014 03:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 May 2014, at 00:17, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like complexity. Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818 As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information. Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't just (imho) in the eye of the beholder ? Computer science provides a lot of definition for complexity, below the computable, like SPACE or TIME needed, related to tractability issues and above the computable, like the degree of unsolvability shown to exists by using machine + oracles (for example). Those notion are typically not in the eye of the beholder, as they are the same for all universal numbers. Computer scientist says that they are machine-independent notion. They remain invariant for the change of the base of the phi_i. With comp, what i showed is that we have indeed to extract the law of the qubits (quantum logic) from the laws of the bits (the laws of Boole, + Boolos). IMO, Everett + decoherence already shows the road qubits to bits. But comp provides a double (by G/G*) reverse of that road, which separates quanta and qualia (normally, although quanta must be a first person plural). It sounds to me as though you are saying that information is real if arithmetic is real...? (If so, deriving the entropy of a black hole would be support for comp :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 08 Jun 2014, at 23:42, LizR wrote: On 9 June 2014 09:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote: Yes comp strikes me as highly controversial, which is why have been trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic. If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding of the notion of universal number when written in some (Turing universal) base. I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if phi_u(x,y)= phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes Löbian when he proves p - []p for all p sigma_1. What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually arithmetical definition of beweisbar, the []p hypostase which is the one which explains the presence of all its rivals, the []p p, notably. The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the universal machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and which does bring some amount of mess in Platonia. Well I believe I understand Godel's theorem - in its word-based form, at least. Understanding it arithmetically (i.e. properly) is more of a challenge. OK. I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff. Nobodies does. Thank you for those kind words. (Also I feel nobodies is an interesting word and should be a crossword solution, because it contains quite a few other words ... no/bo/dies ... I will add it to my collection.) I will ask copyrights for my typo errors! I will get rich! More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines) entities does. Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more computable) can solve much more, but are still incomplete with respect to the arithmetical truth. But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you might have good manuals with you like the Mendelson, Boolos, Smorynski, and you might need to see by your own eyes the equivalence between a bunch of universal numbers/languages/machines/ systems. I haven't given up! But things keep happening ... distractions ... work, housework, children, husband ... Take it easy. I ask myself if the confusion between p-q and q-p should not be punished by laws, as propaganda. Probably, if stated a little more wordily. I encounter that often enough. I think the confusion of p-q and q-p might be an example of something which can have an advantage in Darwinian selection, yet a disadvantage in the long run. That's why evolution eventually invented the brain. Legalized drugs, make propaganda, and lies in advertising, punishable perhaps ... Yeah! (Swinging sixties here I come!) Well hippies were against war. Here I suggest a war against those who lies systematically and I want they to pay for all the stress, the pain and the death they are responsible for. But the sixties were not bad :) Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, June 8, 2014 4:41:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue... On 8 June 2014 10:08, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides, so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist objections (amongst others) and feel that they refute it THUS! PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud. Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why time symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum theory. YANA.You are not alone. And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very convincing (Jim Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he told me). But anyway consensus views get short thrift on this forum You touch on something plausibly near the root and heart of the 'worldsense' ever more predominant at the frontiers of knowledge. That *is* a consensus, and short shrift is what the dissenters get much more I should say. That's the consensus that matters sweet fruit. I perceive te consensus as profoundly rigid...as like a foreign country with its own language, translation services fully serviced 24 hours Arthur dents disused filing cabinet cellar stairs missing. Self contained/referencing, explanation good, nice body boat race can't understand a bloody word, one avoids translation so dull. an It isn't necessarily a virtue dismissing long standing time tested scientific knowledgedismissing method as 'philosophical overlay' is deeply flawed. The component of consensus due short shrift is the hear today gone tomorrow notions what it's all about. But I was talking about something that has been there since the beginning. I don't think it'll be falsification gone tomorrow of what's laid across this stall. What else? Oh yesI still fancy you nuts all the same...intellectually speaking of course.fleeting memoryI was in Sydney in 1976 just a little kid, some babysitter showed up like I'd never met before, stuck 'Barbarella' on the telly for me and disappeared upstairs with some chick. A deal I could buy for a dollar. Aussie's are just so fabulous. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, June 8, 2014 4:41:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue... On 8 June 2014 10:08, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides, so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist objections (amongst others) and feel that they refute it THUS! PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud. He speaks from behind a veneer. Average to writers block. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, June 8, 2014 9:13:28 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2014, at 00:08, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. It is not the first time you explode. It's not even the first time you read the falsification description that you had demanded. Are you connected enough to reality to actually see how disrespectful and insulting this is? You are one set of traits for when its about coddling people through your steps and selling your theory. But you sat there and let me sweat trying to repeat myself endlessly. I think you think, a lot different than you've managed to sell to people. Don't bother denying and pretending you did read...do it for non-judgemental rapture of the others. I know you didn't, because I know you never changed your line one bit...never acknowledged the position, never explained why it wrong, or right. Never even tried...even superficiously to walk me or anyone through your claims, and my theory in parallel, demonstrating the connectors. There's a bit more, or less, to you than the angelic self-depracting front. Something of the Night But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 08 Jun 2014, at 00:08, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. It is not the first time you explode. But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? But you have not succeeded that comp + the arithmetical theaetetus is not experimentally testable in that very sense. Unless you introduce wordplay-difficulties just to prevent the admittedly naive but precise interview of the löbian number to take on. I really would not like being patronizing but let me give you an advise: never complains when people says I don't understand you. Just reply by making the point clearer. You did not
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote: Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue... On 8 June 2014 10:08, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite interested in this argument, too! Nice. That is, I believe I can see both sides, so I am interested in evidence for either. Exactly like me. And later things aggravate: exactly like all löbian number in some consciousness state. As I jokingly say, on days with an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist objections (amongst others) and feel that they refute it THUS! THUS!. Yes. You see the problem. PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud. Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why time symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum theory. YANA.You are not alone. And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very convincing (Jim Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he told me). But anyway consensus views get short thrift on this forum. These are really really controversial claims, and there's no way it's reasonable to think that if someone accepts comp as some high level proposal, that if they were forced to choose between that and all of the above, they can be relied on to stick with comp. And if they can't be relied on...if there's a reasonable prospect scientists will rather reject comp than accept infinities of dreams, and eternal life, and consciousness outside the body...if there's a reasonable chance they'll rather reject comp than accept that, then the thing to do WITH INTEGRITY is acknowledge that, and not be going around saying they accept something. Yes comp strikes me as highly contraversial, which is why have been trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic. If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding of the notion of universal number when written in some (Turing universal) base. I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if phi_u(x,y)= phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes Löbian when he proves p - []p for all p sigma_1. What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually arithmetical definition of beweisbar, the []p hypostase which is the one which explains the presence of all its rivals, the []p p, notably. The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the universal machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and which does bring some amount of mess in Platonia. I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff. Nobodies does. More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines) entities does. Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more computable) can solve much more, but are still incomplete with respect to the arithmetical truth. But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you might have good manuals
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 9 June 2014 09:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2014, at 05:41, LizR wrote: Yes comp strikes me as highly controversial, which is why have been trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic. If you get step 3 I am already glad. Step 7 needs the understanding of the notion of universal number when written in some (Turing universal) base. I recall the number u is universal (in the base phi_i), if phi_u(x,y)= phi_x(y). Such u is sigma_1 complete, and becomes Löbian when he proves p - []p for all p sigma_1. What you miss, and many miss, is the mathematical, actually arithmetical definition of beweisbar, the []p hypostase which is the one which explains the presence of all its rivals, the []p p, notably. The creative bomb is Gödel's theorem, and the discovery of the universal machine (hated and loved by different mathematicians, and which does bring some amount of mess in Platonia. Well I believe I understand Godel's theorem - in its word-based form, at least. Understanding it arithmetically (i.e. properly) is more of a challenge. I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff. Nobodies does. Thank you for those kind words. (Also I feel nobodies is an interesting word and should be a crossword solution, because it contains quite a few other words ... no/bo/dies ... I will add it to my collection.) More precisely. No sigma_1 complete and pi_1 incomplete (machines) entities does. Pi_1 complete set (which are still arithmetical, but no more computable) can solve much more, but are still incomplete with respect to the arithmetical truth. But come on! All you need is a good diary, patience, and well, you might have good manuals with you like the Mendelson, Boolos, Smorynski, and you might need to see by your own eyes the equivalence between a bunch of universal numbers/languages/machines/systems. I haven't given up! But things keep happening ... distractions ... work, housework, children, husband ... I ask myself if the confusion between p-q and q-p should not be punished by laws, as propaganda. Probably, if stated a little more wordily. I encounter that often enough. Legalized drugs, make propaganda, and lies in advertising, punishable perhaps ... Yeah! (Swinging sixties here I come!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. These are really really controversial claims, and there's no way it's reasonable to think that if someone accepts
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 8 June 2014 10:08, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:49:30 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I obviously shouldn't have said this, so am sorry for doing so. That's OK. We all get a bit carried away at times. But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. These are really really controversial claims, and there's
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
Oops. I meant to say more but hit a wrong key and somehow sent that above one-liner. And there's no way to edit your posts...oh well, to continue... On 8 June 2014 10:08, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: But...the truth is no one minded too much PGC's attacks on me. Not responding to my responses. In the most recent response, I even invited him to choose one of Bruno's objections that I hadn't responded to, and I would demonstrate the reason I'd stopped responding was that Bruno presented 'no case to answer'. Silence from PGC. I'm afraid I missed this. I don't have time to read everything and especially tend to skip those incredibly long posts with stuff interpolated (is that the word?) into the text and nested 15 levels deep. And I am quite interested in this argument, too! That is, I believe I can see both sides, so I am interested in evidence for either. As I jokingly say, on days with an R in them I feel Bruno has the answer to life, the universe and everything, on the other days I feel the force of the materialist objections (amongst others) and feel that they refute it THUS! PGC said a fair bit worse about me than simple liar. What is it...the guy's flamboyant use of language gets him a free pass in here? When has he ever described anything he believes in, in plain English? I'm sure I've seen some plain English posts from PGC, and some that seem to me to make good points. But I can't quote chapter and verse on that. But flowery language abounds here, methinks, so I try to parse it and either it looks like a camel to me, my lord, or a cloud. Why am I the guy that has to put up writing dozens of efforts at explaining what I mean, put down's from people like PGC who value their dizzy comp experiences, my arguments ignored by Brunoand all of this despite it being me to be mentioning a take on falsification that the vast majority of science, historically and now would agree with? You should see me on the Tronnies thread, or trying to explain why time symmetry in physics may be important for understanding quantum theory. YANA.You are not alone. And now this new issue, with PGC and Bruno making constructive arguments about scientists accepting certain arguments, and so by some sort of logic accepting Bruno's theory. Which happens to involve things like eternal life for us, consciousness not being generated by our brains...direct links to MWI. That latest argument, I simply rejected by pointing out that not everyone does accept MWI, who accept QM. No, indeed not. Although sometimes the reasons aren't very convincing (Jim Al Khalili just really likes Bohm's take, or so he told me). But anyway consensus views get short thrift on this forum. These are really really controversial claims, and there's no way it's reasonable to think that if someone accepts comp as some high level proposal, that if they were forced to choose between that and all of the above, they can be relied on to stick with comp. And if they can't be relied on...if there's a reasonable prospect scientists will rather reject comp than accept infinities of dreams, and eternal life, and consciousness outside the body...if there's a reasonable chance they'll rather reject comp than accept that, then the thing to do WITH INTEGRITY is acknowledge that, and not be going around saying they accept something. Yes comp strikes me as highly contraversial, which is why have been trying to get to grips with it, to decide where I stand. But I have got stuck at the MGA and (I think) some Kripkean logic. I can't get even an infinity of computations to grok some of that stuff. I'm dropping this now. I'm technically saying sorry for calling someone a liar, but for everything else I think the integrity issues are somewhere else. And it really doesn't matter if you all want to gang up and not see any of these issues. Collective blindspots are hardly anything new in the world. I think gang up is probably the last thing the members of this forum will do! (Die, my dear Doctor? Why, that's the last thing I shall do!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 5 June 2014 07:49, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I don't believe Bruno is a liar. Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see where you differ? I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does. As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one. So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it? I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously consider doing the following: Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might welcome that too. Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of I am right; you are wrong - that merely reveals your deep emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you. If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just move on. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 5 June 2014 07:49, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I don't believe Bruno is a liar. Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see where you differ? I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does. As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one. So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it? I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously consider doing the following: Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might welcome that too. Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of I am right; you are wrong - that merely reveals your deep emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you. If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just move on. Well, my impatient reaction might have something to do with it. If so, apologies. It's simply hard for me to see a notion of falsification eroding the notions made precise for Church Thesis, Turing Universality, incompleteness, QM and QL, Löb, the link to Plotinus, by extension UDA etc; just as it's hard to see space time curvature supplanted by p-time or the statement that two peoples' watches will stay the same traveling at different speed. There is a lot of great work and a lot of logic to fit any taste as precedence for standards of falsification. Why the QL question is avoided, I cannot understand. Why/how Ghibbsa perceives falsification without referencing the appropriate math under attack is also beyond me. You'd have to show where these gentlemen who's work is referenced here, went wrong regarding falsification, or where Bruno, who has been nothing but a gentleman in this thread, catering to every attack with care/respect as a sincere scientific question, did the same. My patience ran out a while ago, like when somebody says something serious, but then starts bantering and moving to meta-and seemingly unrelated psychological levels and attacks, which is why the thread may have turned sour; but I can always flip a switch and give it another shot, as I can always be wrong, quite simply. I can understand Kim's why would he answer at all? After this much time spent replying to Ghibbsa's posts and dealing with all the claims and personal attacks without reference, at some point a person will just leave the room; which is not to imply that this is such a point, nor that Bruno is such a person. But at some point this is understandable. PGC Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 05 Jun 2014, at 11:49, Kim Jones wrote: On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 5 June 2014 07:49, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I don't believe Bruno is a liar. Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see where you differ? I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does. As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one. So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it? I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously consider doing the following: Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might welcome that too. Sure. Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of I am right; you are wrong - that merely reveals your deep emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you. If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just move on. Yes, I asked him to explain again its falsification notion, and why he thinks comp+the classical theory of knowledge is not testable, given that it provides the logic of uncertainty, and that it can be compared to quantum logic. For me it is already a miracle that the two material logics (Z1*, X1*) and even the soul logic (S4Grz1) get an arithmetical quantization when the logic is restricted to the sigma_1 sentences. But you are right, when people insult, answering is very difficult and probably unnecessary. Bruno Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 05 Jun 2014, at 15:02, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Thu, Jun 5, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 5 Jun 2014, at 8:13 am, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 5 June 2014 07:49, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I don't believe Bruno is a liar. Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see where you differ? I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does. As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one. So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it? I strongly doubt that Bruno will respond to this. I wouldn't if I were him; not because there is nothing to respond to but because the manner of the communication appears to have reached the nadir at least from Al. Al, take your meds or whatever you need to destress and maybe seriously consider doing the following: Instead of blathering on a-treat, summarise in no more than four or five concise bullet points your notion of falsifiability. Could you do that, mate? I for one would welcome this. It has been an enormous thread and I think in such cases a revisitation of the main points in as simple a format as humanly possible makes sense and would help many, including yours truly. Perhaps the plot has been lost. Nobody would seriously doubt the seriousness and the passion of your approach - that leaps off the screen. You are however, given to raving on in a rhapsodic manner about stuff. I simply want to see how simply and clearly you can put it all down. Perhaps Bruno might welcome that too. Following that, if you both don't see eye to eye then that will be apparent and the nature of the disagreement will be clearly revealed. There is no law which requires people to see eye to eye about things. Your differences of opinion about falsifiability are indeed very interesting and instructive. Stop living in a world of I am right; you are wrong - that merely reveals your deep emotional need for others to agree with you on what you consider core issues. Perhaps Bruno means what he says: he doesn't get you. If you do what I ask, you can give him his last chance. If he fails it in your eyes - well, maybe just get over it, man. Move on. Just move on. Well, my impatient reaction might have something to do with it. If so, apologies. It's simply hard for me to see a notion of falsification eroding the notions made precise for Church Thesis, Turing Universality, incompleteness, QM and QL, Löb, the link to Plotinus, by extension UDA etc; just as it's hard to see space time curvature supplanted by p-time or the statement that two peoples' watches will stay the same traveling at different speed. There is a lot of great work and a lot of logic to fit any taste as precedence for standards of falsification. Why the QL question is avoided, I cannot understand. Why/how Ghibbsa perceives falsification without referencing the appropriate math under attack is also beyond me. You'd have to show where these gentlemen who's work is referenced here, went wrong regarding falsification, or where Bruno, who has been nothing but a gentleman in this thread, catering to every attack with care/respect as a sincere scientific question, did the same. My patience ran out a while ago, like when somebody says something serious, but then starts bantering and moving to meta-and seemingly unrelated psychological levels and attacks, which is why the thread may have turned sour; but I can always flip a switch and give it another shot, as I can always be wrong, quite simply. I can understand Kim's why would he answer at all? After this much time spent replying to Ghibbsa's posts and dealing with all the claims and personal attacks without reference, at some point a person will just leave the room; which is not to imply that this is such a point, nor that Bruno is such a person. But at some point this is understandable. PGC Good analysis. I should not reply to insults, simply. It is slef- deafeating. But ghibbsa was usually polite. That burst astonsihed me. That is
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. the infinite multiverse of dreams? If you agree that the natural numbers obeys to the axioms (with s(x) intended for the successor of x, that is x+1): 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you get the multiverse of dreams by comp. Keep in mind the most fundamental theorem of computer science (with Church Thesis): Universal machines exist. And that theorem is provable in Robinson arithmetic (in a weak sense), and in Peano Arithmetic (with a stringer sense). What are the other consequences of the theory. Run me through them. If it helps you to doubt a little bit of physicalism and Aristotelianism, I am happy enough. The consequence is more a state of mind, an awe in front of something bigger that we thought (the internal view of arithmetic on itself). An awe in front of our ignorance, but also the discovery that such ignorance is structured, productive, inexhaustible. So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and special interests and all that, so I admit the results are still rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by them also, hard to say). No that's not right. There are huge chains of unrefuted logic out there. People don't sign up to those chains, they sign up to what they accept. Scientists might reject comp if they hear what you've got to say. A large number would not find that you sought to dominate their options in comp very scientific. The problem here Bruno, is you act like they have responsibility to automatelly go into that
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Wednesday, June 4, 2014 8:33:28 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Jun 2014, at 02:33, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: My theory is comp. I just make it precise, by 1) Church thesis (en the amount of logic and arithmetic to expose and argue for it), and 2) yes doctor (and the amount of turing universality in the neighborhood for giving sense to artificial brain and doctor. By accepting that this is true only at some level, I make the hypothesis much weaker than all the formulation in the literature. This does not prevent me to show that if the hypothesis is weak with respect to what we know from biology, it is still a *theologically* extremely strong hypothesis, with consequence as radical as reminding us that Plato was Aristotle teacher, and that his theory was not Aristotelian (at least in the sense of most Aristotle followers, as Aristotle himself can be argued to still be a platonist, like some scholars defends). So, let us say that I have not a theory, but a theorem, in the comp theory (which is arguably a very old idea). Usually, the people who are unaware of the mind-body problem can even take offense that we can imagine not following comp. Because they might not. This is a problem, because the other thing you do is tell people they assume not-comp if they don't accept you r theory. So you are dominating people. Of course. I *prove* (or submit a proof to you and you are free to show a flaw if you think there is one). I show comp - something. Of course, after 1500 years of Aristotelianism, I don't expect people agreeing quickly with the reasoning, as it is admittedly counter-intuitive. Do you think the majority of scientists think consciousness goes on in extre dimensional reality? First, I don't express myself in that way. For a platonist, or for someone believing in comp, and underatdning its logical consequence, it looks like it is the physicists which think that matter goes on in extradimensional reality. With comp, it is just absolutely undecidable by *any* universal machine if its reality is enumerable (like N, the set of the natural numbers) or has a very large cardinal. Conceptual occam suggests we don't add any axioms to elementary arithmetic (like Robinson arithmetic). I then explain notions like god, consciousness (99% of it), matter, and the relation with Plato and (neo)platonist theology. Do theybelieve in MWI This is ambiguous. In a sense you can say that comp leads to a form of super-atheism, as a (consistent) computationalist believer will stop to believe (or become skeptical) on both a creator and a creation. So, at the basic ontological level, it is a 0 World theory. What happens, is that the additive-multiplicative structure determine the set of all emulations, indeed with an important redundancy. They exist in the sense that you can prove their existence in elementary arithmetic. That is not mine, that is standard material. You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. the infinite multiverse of dreams? If you agree that the natural numbers obeys to the axioms (with s(x) intended for the successor of x, that is x+1): 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you get the multiverse of dreams by comp. Keep in mind the most fundamental theorem of computer science (with Church Thesis): Universal machines exist. And that theorem is provable in Robinson arithmetic (in a weak sense), and in Peano Arithmetic (with a stringer sense). What are the other consequences of the theory. Run me through them. If it helps you to doubt a little bit of physicalism and Aristotelianism, I am happy enough. The consequence is more a state of mind, an awe in front of something bigger that we thought (the internal view of arithmetic on itself). An awe in front of our ignorance, but also the discovery that such ignorance is structured, productive, inexhaustible. So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and special interests and all that, so I admit the results are still rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by them also, hard to say). No that's not right. There are huge chains of unrefuted logic out there. People don't sign up to those chains, they
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 5 June 2014 07:49, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: You manage one or the other to avoid my argument, pretty much since the beginning. Not on purpose. I don't get your argument. Not sure anyone get it. You're a liar. You didn't even read my definition of falsification. Russell Standish read it...he understood. So you're fucking liar and you've wasted my fucking time for months. I don't believe Bruno is a liar. Can't you restart the discussion, politely, from first principles, and see where you differ? I haven't read the entire exchange - it's been huge - but it seems you claim comp makes no testable predictions, while Bruno says it does. As I understand it, comp makes more testable predictions than string theory! Not sure that puts it into the refutable club, though. I've claimed that comp isn't a theory but a logical argument, but apparently I was wrong about that. As a theory it needs to be testable, which means it can be falsified... So a definition of falsification would seem like a good place to start, certainly. And I remember you gave a rather comprehensive one. So I guess I should ask Bruno, did you read it? If so, did you agree with it? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 5:14 AM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: It looks like I was counter-bitching something he threw at me. It's a problem being custard pied. I notice you don't step in...so you seem to tacitly support this behaviour toward me. All tempest in a tea pot. Who cares that I don't find your arguments convincing at this point, concerning the issue of falsification/prediction you raised? This cycle of apologizing, attacking on personal level, playing everybody's shrink, and then talking in friendly mate register and constantly switching the way somebody flicks through radio stations; it gets tedious and even when/if I do see you raising some interesting question, which you often do, I'd have to deal with a mountain of personal attacks, psychology etc. to converse with you in polite manner on said question. I'd have rather spent my few minutes of free time today following the chess championship in Norway or reading up on what Russell could have meant with cardinality of virtual and baseline environments, but won't trouble him or anybody else in the forum to spoon feed, because it might be off topic and everybody is busy enough. Also, I appreciate deeply whenever anyone puts a thoughtful post out there that enriches the content of the list, yours included, especially when they are concise and polite with readers' time. But do I mention it every time? No, because as musicians we get sensitive to when one of us overplays, as this tends to diminish the value of the entire group's/band's effort, no matter how hard everybody else works, contributes, and tries. Just trying not to clog/overplay with limited success. I have no axe to grind with you on a personal level, but I will disagree when I do and refuse to entertain posts that have authoritative, interrogative quality, as I see it as a waste of people's precious time. Sorry. PGC ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 02 Jun 2014, at 17:58, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: so I offered a test event tailored to a specific and probably fairly central to most others, charge relating to my positioning with Bruno in not responding to all or most counter arguments and objections or criticisms of something I have actually or effectively done. I constructed a basic test event, obviously it had to be tied to a very specific argument, involving a specific charge or suspicion, in a situation featuring possible two of us. It isn't a problem to construct a falsifiable prediction that is in keeping with the criteria of step one of the definition. So he chooses one of the Bruno counter points I did not answer, and goes for the knock down hardest one he thinks I'll find. And I will say why that point did not make a case to answer. And why I have dug my heels and stopped showing him the courtesy of answering anyway. This is because I don't he has even now read my definition seriously, because his own objections are clearly illegitimate or misconceived, and his own offers of events of testing or whatever clearly do not meet the critieria of definition. In fact his positions have not changed at all. I cannot reconcile this with a serious reading. And there's actually no point in continuing unless and until Bruno does make the decision to read my definition, which he requested and I supplied for. And absorb it, and be able to distinguish where any position he has does or does meet a criteria. He doesn't have to agree with any of it. But he had to know where the argument is, if he's serious. Because one way that his theory NOW ACTUALLY IS, falsifiable is in terms of the status he claimed for it, of falsifiability. The reason that isn't actually falsifiability is because every theory at a falsifiable status has spent a long time in a pre-falsifiable stage. And may well still be that phase, because to falsifiable the process itself has to not only start but finish, and there are a lot of constraints what a delay has to meet in criteria to be legitimate. Most delays quickly correspond to falsification events, but of the status only. Which never falsifies the theory and can never. Because IT'S DECOUPLED and never knows much what the fuck the theory is !! Anyway, here was example,. So for example, Bruno has argued that I failed address an he has said saw what he regards as a successful test., He then infers from my silence that I have effectively rejected it, and he concludes I must therefore be in contradiction with myself because I said I didn't have the skills to be doing things like that. So everything connects and is logical in what he says and his conclusion. But once again he's still on the inside of his theory, and still being driven along by the influence of the same misconception that the dichotomy which seems to regard the interaction between the falsification structure as an end to process - and in this setting the interaction is via me obviously, in that the action I took in not responding amounts to a rejection of some element in his theory. Which on its own its perfectly correct. not responding is a response. But the same problematic misconception remains in his thinking here, which best illustrated here, amounts to believing decoupling between anything to do with the process of falsification, and anything to do with anything in his theory theory is a dichotomy of correct interaction with the interior of his theory, in this case that if I am going to effectively reject something by not addressing it, I am immediately contradicting myh own position thatI do not have skills to be making judgement calls about elements of his theory. So it's clearly perfectly sound reasoning he's got in play there. But falsification doesn't care what is reasoned correct or not, within a theory. It doesn't care and will never care. Because it can never care about one particular theory, when it is process that runs across the entirety of science through the entirety of the history of science. How can anything like that have any dependence on a particular logical reasoning that on its own terms demands a reason why it can't be heard? It's all good though, because the logical that is correct can be clearly stated as the consequence of the definition and my response to Bruno, which proxies for the interaction of the falsification structure to the theory. Bruno is right in act that silence is not an adequate response to the issues that he raising. Because the part of the falsification, if it is to deaf to all theories is also to deliver explicit and simple criteria to that theory. This is only connection possible. It is one way to the interface, the outer surface of the theory, from the structure to the theory. That must be a very simple request for, initially a condition that meets the criteria of the
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 03 Jun 2014, at 04:23, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth Nice. Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread! Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. ? Nice like yummy, I would say. Or I misunderstand you even when we agree? What about the issue itself though? It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti- comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace organA with majorRevolutioninFieldA + majorRevoltion in field B+..+...major revolution in field N In practice? Perhaps. But the reasoning is theoretical. It has to be, to be genuinely testable. The only major scientific discovery that you need is the discovery of the universal (Turing) machine, and some idea how it works. One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place, ? (that is ambiguous). never becomes conscious. If there are universal computation, we cannot exclude that some consciousness can be associated to it, but is it playing a role in our consciousness? Well, if yes, it means that we have to lower the substitution level, and ask to the doctor to copy also the liver and the heart, at the right level (which exist by the comp assumption). Keep in mind that the reasoning does not put any bound on the level. You might need to copy the moon too, if not the entire physical universe. This does not change the reversal consequence of computationalism. This follows from the step 7 in the UD Argument. If your mind state is a computational state (and thus belongs to infinitely many computations), the UD will go through that states infinitely often. Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver? That is cultural. The early greeks thought consciousness is experienced in the liver-stomach-belly. Some yoga technic makes it feels like that. I don't think I experience consciousness where I might feel to experience it (even John Clark seems to agree on this). Actually, you will find many reports of different type in which people describes a feeling that their consciousness is attached to object out of the body, or even to nothing. The idea that we are in our body is also a mental construct. Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else? Not at all. I am saying that they believe in comp, when they argue that biological organism are machines. They use that assumption to prove the existence of god, because they believe also (wrongly) that a machine needs a designer. This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects. The expression composed on comp-object does not make sense to me. You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. When I succeed to connect on the net, I can give you many videos on youtube where creationist shows something biological looking
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 03 Jun 2014, at 05:14, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth Nice. Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread! Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. What about the issue itself though? It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti- comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace organA with majorRevolutioninFieldA + majorRevoltion in field B+..+...major revolution in field N One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver? Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else? This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in terms of comp at all. What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way now from they believe in comp. I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a zebra? Or do I miss the point? and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)? Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: Scientist believes comp= -- Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -- brunos's UDA follows -- Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows -- MWI follows -- Infinite dreams follows * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1- views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 05:46:32PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly from these first two? FWIW, by the AP, I simply mean the principle that observed reality is consistent with our existence in that reality. We can conceive of realities (virtual or otherwise) in which the AP is violated eg Deutsch's chess reality example from FoR, or some of the dreaming argument examples Bruno gives. I'm not sure whether the AP has ever really been violated in a dream (Bruno has studied dreams more than me, so perhaps he could comment, moreso even from his Salvia experiences), and VR technology is still too primitive to do the experiment (and may, in any case, be unethical to perform). The link between the AP and many universes has to do with the strong AP, which states that the universe has to be compatible conscious life, and the rather unlikely probability of that happening by chance. You either have to accept a divine creator, that the laws of physics are just so (for inexplicable reasons), or many universes. People of an atheistic bent will tend to prefer many universes, I suppose, and theistic people will plug for the creator. Some people have attacked the idea that the AP is unlikely by chance - Victor Stenger wrote a book on that topic, for instance. I'm not exactly convinced, but at least he tried. But in any case, there are many other arguments in favour of many universes, which I outline in my book. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 6/2/2014 7:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 05:46:32PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly from these first two? FWIW, by the AP, I simply mean the principle that observed reality is consistent with our existence in that reality. We can conceive of realities (virtual or otherwise) in which the AP is violated eg Deutsch's chess reality example from FoR, or some of the dreaming argument examples Bruno gives. I'm not sure whether the AP has ever really been violated in a dream (Bruno has studied dreams more than me, so perhaps he could comment, moreso even from his Salvia experiences), and VR technology is still too primitive to do the experiment (and may, in any case, be unethical to perform). The link between the AP and many universes has to do with the strong AP, which states that the universe has to be compatible conscious life, and the rather unlikely probability of that happening by chance. You either have to accept a divine creator, that the laws of physics are just so (for inexplicable reasons), But that only works if the creator is constrained to create using a physics consistent with conscious life. As Ikeda and Jefferys point out a supernatural creator could create conscious life in a universe physically incompatible with conscious life (that's what *super*natural means). So then observing that your universe is physically compatible with your existence cannot count as evidence for a supernatural creator. Brent or many universes. People of an atheistic bent will tend to prefer many universes, I suppose, and theistic people will plug for the creator. Some people have attacked the idea that the AP is unlikely by chance - Victor Stenger wrote a book on that topic, for instance. I'm not exactly convinced, but at least he tried. But in any case, there are many other arguments in favour of many universes, which I outline in my book. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 5:48:10 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Jun 2014, at 05:14, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth Nice. Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread! Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. What about the issue itself though? It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace organA with majorRevolutioninFieldA + majorRevoltion in field B+..+...major revolution in field N One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver? Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else? This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in terms of comp at all. What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way now from they believe in comp. I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a zebra? Or do I miss the point? and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)? Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: Scientist believes comp= -- Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -- brunos's UDA follows -- Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows -- MWI follows -- Infinite dreams follows * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth. Nice. It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having mention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)? Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1- views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a philosopher who judged the thesis not receivable (which means not even a private defense: they have never heard me, even in private) from his personal conviction (and later invoke the free-exam principle for that, like if the free-exam is the right for professor to give bad note to student without questioning them). So here I would say that PGC was just saying the normal thing. Most rationalists believe in comp, and what follows has been peer reviewed enough. (Then humans are humans, and the notoriety of some people makes ideas having to wait they died before people talk and think, and special interests and all that, so I admit the results are still rather ignored, though some people seems to be inspired by them also, hard to say). The so-called radicality of what I say is in the mind of those who thought that science has solved all problem, and that it has notably decided between Plato and Aristotle (almost the genuine difference believer/non-believer), and that comp explains the mind and its relation with matter. I show that this is not true, and that if we can accept that comp and computer science does indeed explain a large part of the mind, including knowledge and perhaps consciousness, it can only succeed on this if it explains the observable by a complex sum on all computations seen from the possible machine's points of view. (and that can be handled mathematically if we accept some definitions). you are the one's being less than honest, intellectually. Not me. I disagree, because you insinuate that there is a problem without showing one, besides the fact that you may dislike comp, bet it is false, etc. At least Richard has the honesty to recognize his use of a god of the gap. And please don't take my word for comp and its consequences, just try to understand. It is not easy, due to our quasi-instinctual aristotelianism, but it is neither that much difficult (probably easier for those who remember their dreams, and dig on the spiritual side). Sometimes, I think you got the main point, but have a critics at some metalevel. That might be right, but up to now, you did not succeed in making it clear for me, nor others, I think. You acknowledge that, so good luck for being more understandable. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
so I offered a test event tailored to a specific and probably fairly central to most others, charge relating to my positioning with Bruno in not responding to all or most counter arguments and objections or criticisms of something I have actually or effectively done. I constructed a basic test event, obviously it had to be tied to a very specific argument, involving a specific charge or suspicion, in a situation featuring possible two of us. It isn't a problem to construct a falsifiable prediction that is in keeping with the criteria of step one of the definition. So he chooses one of the Bruno counter points I did not answer, and goes for the knock down hardest one he thinks I'll find. And I will say why that point did not make a case to answer. And why I have dug my heels and stopped showing him the courtesy of answering anyway. This is because I don't he has even now read my definition seriously, because his own objections are clearly illegitimate or misconceived, and his own offers of events of testing or whatever clearly do not meet the critieria of definition. In fact his positions have not changed at all. I cannot reconcile this with a serious reading. And there's actually no point in continuing unless and until Bruno does make the decision to read my definition, which he requested and I supplied for. And absorb it, and be able to distinguish where any position he has does or does meet a criteria. He doesn't have to agree with any of it. But he had to know where the argument is, if he's serious. Because one way that his theory NOW ACTUALLY IS, falsifiable is in terms of the status he claimed for it, of falsifiability. The reason that isn't actually falsifiability is because every theory at a falsifiable status has spent a long time in a pre-falsifiable stage. And may well still be that phase, because to falsifiable the process itself has to not only start but finish, and there are a lot of constraints what a delay has to meet in criteria to be legitimate. Most delays quickly correspond to falsification events, but of the status only. Which never falsifies the theory and can never. Because IT'S DECOUPLED and never knows much what the fuck the theory is !!Anyway, here was example,. So for example, Bruno has argued that I failed address an he has said saw what he regards as a successful test., He then infers from my silence that I have effectively rejected it, and he concludes I must therefore be in contradiction with myself because I said I didn't have the skills to be doing things like that. So everything connects and is logical in what he says and his conclusion. But once again he's still on the inside of his theory, and still being driven along by the influence of the same misconception that the dichotomy which seems to regard the interaction between the falsification structure as an end to process - and in this setting the interaction is via me obviously, in that the action I took in not responding amounts to a rejection of some element in his theory. Which on its own its perfectly correct. not responding is a response. But the same problematic misconception remains in his thinking here, which best illustrated here, amounts to believing decoupling between anything to do with the process of falsification, and anything to do with anything in his theory theory is a dichotomy of correct interaction with the interior of his theory, in this case that if I am going to effectively reject something by not addressing it, I am immediately contradicting myh own position thatI do not have skills to be making judgement calls about elements of his theory. So it's clearly perfectly sound reasoning he's got in play there. But falsification doesn't care what is reasoned correct or not, within a theory. It doesn't care and will never care. Because it can never care about one particular theory, when it is process that runs across the entirety of science through the entirety of the history of science. How can anything like that have any dependence on a particular logical reasoning that on its own terms demands a reason why it can't be heard? It's all good though, because the logical that is correct can be clearly stated as the consequence of the definition and my response to Bruno, which proxies for the interaction of the falsification structure to the theory. Bruno is right in act that silence is not an adequate response to the issues that he raising. Because the part of the falsification, if it is to deaf to all theories is also to deliver explicit and simple criteria to that theory. This is only connection possible. It is one way to the interface, the outer surface of the theory, from the structure to the theory. That must be a very simple request for, initially a condition that meets the criteria of the first step of falsification. Now I have asked Bruno for this a few times, and I have explained each time why this is all I ever
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non- virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs. With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of real environments experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would include all the CantGoTu environments. We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you possibly distinguish those two situations? We can't. But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) environment/video-game. By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian consistent deception. Bruno I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. Hmmm I see what you mean, and in that sense we are at the base level. yet, we can still belong to an emulation build on the top of that base level, so that it inherits of the measure on all computations. If that was not possible, we would not been able to survive with an artificial brain. If we can, we can survive with the right relative measure in virtual environment, like the emulation of Washington and Moscow in step six. But this is also what makes it possible for us to discover that we are in virtual environment, or that we are dreaming. Therefore if we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must be falsified. Not necessarily. I might have given you a pill, and then put you in a very well done emulation, without you noticing any difference (before comparing the comp physics and the physics of your environment). Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our phenomenological physics. Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. I am not sure we can make something falsifiable into something non falsifiable by an act of faith, ... except indeed by invoking a dream, or a Daemon, but this is of course is a very weak refutation. I would say that it is better to bet we are not in a second order dream/ emulation by default. If the comp-QL differ from the empiric-QL, it will be time to hesitate between the truth of comp, or of the the classical theory of knowledge, or if we are in a simulation (that might depends on the way the comp-QL is violated). The fact in dispute with ghibbsa is that I am giving a precise way to test comp (with nuance due to the vague character of test applied to reality) when translated in
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Monday, June 2, 2014 5:06:07 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Jun 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non- virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs. With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of real environments experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would include all the CantGoTu environments. We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you possibly distinguish those two situations? We can't. But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) environment/video-game. By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian consistent deception. Bruno I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. Hmmm I see what you mean, and in that sense we are at the base level. yet, we can still belong to an emulation build on the top of that base level, so that it inherits of the measure on all computations. If that was not possible, we would not been able to survive with an artificial brain. If we can, we can survive with the right relative measure in virtual environment, like the emulation of Washington and Moscow in step six. But this is also what makes it possible for us to discover that we are in virtual environment, or that we are dreaming. Therefore if we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must be falsified. Not necessarily. I might have given you a pill, and then put you in a very well done emulation, without you noticing any difference (before comparing the comp physics and the physics of your environment). Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our phenomenological physics. Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. Yo Russell, I was just wondering...what do you include when you reference Anthropic Principle. Like above. I mean...I can see that if we're talking about AP as the explanation for our universe and us here within it, then just for that, there the inference of large number of other universes. Is this roughly as far as things go, or are there further inferences directly from these first two? What I'm
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth Nice. Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread! Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. What about the issue itself though? It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace organA with majorRevolutioninFieldA + majorRevoltion in field B+..+...major revolution in field N One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver? Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else? This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in terms of comp at all. What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way now from they believe in comp. I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a zebra? Or do I miss the point? and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)? Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: Scientist believes comp= -- Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -- brunos's UDA follows -- Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows -- MWI follows -- Infinite dreams follows * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1-views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a philosopher who judged the thesis not receivable (which means not even a private defense: they have never heard
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Tuesday, June 3, 2014 3:23:25 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth Nice. Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread! Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it. What about the issue itself though? It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist Jacques Arsac who said As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti-comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view. Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level. Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace organA with majorRevolutioninFieldA + majorRevoltion in field B+..+...major revolution in field N One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place, never becomes conscious. Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver? Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations. So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else? This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects. You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that. Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in terms of comp at all. What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way now from they believe in comp. I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a zebra? Or do I miss the point? and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)? Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me? What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this: Scientist believes comp= -- Bruno's criteria is assuming-com -- brunos's UDA follows -- Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows -- MWI follows -- Infinite dreams follows * So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI? Even the jury in Brussels acknowledge not one error. One did, actually, but changed his mind since (he was stopping at step three and acknowledged that he was counting the 3-views instead of the 1-views (like John Clark). In brussels, they have invoked a
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 31 May 2014, at 22:40, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point. But it is also a relatively trivial (conceptually simple) point, embedded already in the Dream argument and that lucidity is a relative notion, even a graded one, like in Inception (a less nice movie by the author of the prestige (in my opinion and taste)). But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an environment disobeying the physical laws. Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order dream, the one emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can observe in the virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*). If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the one in Alice in Wonderland! So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure makes sense). But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown real theory. So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others. The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström. Bruno I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127 and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a CantGoTu environment. Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Assuming comp, yes. At least in some sense. We can defend that idea. But it is hard to say if that is confirmed by the observation of the physical reality, in the sense that we have not yet marry gravitation and the quantum, and so have not yet a coherent empiric theory of space-time. I think. Bruno Brent But we can never know that we're in one. DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of chess. This is because the rules of physics of such an environment are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But provided the rules of physics are
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au javascript: wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to dreaming, second-order reality)?ma It doesn't matter that it is a standard consequence of somethingnot in the narrow issue of falsifiability. I'm still not convinced by the falsification attacks of late; they seem to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up do you take Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then? As if this standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing. Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic prancing around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post appearing designed to get people to lower their defenses, so they can be attacked for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting btw; and the related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across different threads lately, ending in insults and useless I know what you're thinking via label- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with the theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things were decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections instead of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what distinguishes crusading from sciethance and makes it problematic. PGC Well, first of all, it's meaningless to leave my addy out when you are clearly speaking about me. It's also important to be clear that you are continuing your argument by other means in what you are saying, and that when an individual attempts to discredit another individual on bad-motivation grounds, and addresses other individuals which he has interacted with for longer, that is a serious escalation and extremely personal. There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth. It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, you are the one's being less than honest, intellectually. Not me. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, Jun 1, 2014 at 6:22 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to dreaming, second-order reality)?ma It doesn't matter that it is a standard consequence of somethingnot in the narrow issue of falsifiability. In what context? I have not seen you clarify. I'm still not convinced by the falsification attacks of late; they seem to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up do you take Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then? As if this standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing. Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic prancing around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post appearing designed to get people to lower their defenses, so they can be attacked for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting btw; and the related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across different threads lately, ending in insults and useless I know what you're thinking via label- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with the theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things were decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections instead of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what distinguishes crusading from sciethance and makes it problematic. PGC Well, first of all, it's meaningless to leave my addy out when you are clearly speaking about me. It's also important to be clear that you are continuing your argument by other means Nope. Still asking the same question. Not even defending comp or Bruno's work at this point and merely asking: where is yours? Where do you stand concerning falsification? I am genuinely curious and willing to listen if you have found a flaw with Bruno's work. I'm ready to listen if you have even something vaguely interesting to say about falsification. Apologies, but a claim to a problem with falsification, without reference to clear assumptions and precise target within the constraints of the work in question, even with your great skill in rhetoric, does not convince me. I don't believe comp is true either, as you seem to assume. in what you are saying, and that when an individual attempts to discredit another individual on bad-motivation grounds, and addresses other individuals which he has interacted with for longer, that is a serious escalation and extremely personal. Sure, carrot soup is harder to bite than chicken soup. Most posts with you lately are, to detriment of clarity, extremely personal, when there is disagreement (what is science proper about this?). I already stated you contradict the opening statement of FoR in which DD shoots down falsification/prediction fetish from his end, after which you switched to linguistic pal register, and laughed it off, after unloading all manner of psychological personal arguments (which still surprises me, because all I did was disagree with the absolute status you attached to your falsification argument, given that you never presented it fully or even sketch it out; this in line with your salvia thread humility statement to Richard today btw) or some projection of comp you are entertaining, but not even clarifying. I can only shrug and repeat: So what? Does quantum logic satisfy your falsification notion or not?
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs. With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of real environments experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would include all the CantGoTu environments. We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you possibly distinguish those two situations? We can't. But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) environment/video-game. By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian consistent deception. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, Jun 01, 2014 at 09:19:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2014, at 01:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs. With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of real environments experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would include all the CantGoTu environments. We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you possibly distinguish those two situations? We can't. But this is similar to the fact that, for accepting that we can at least refute a theory, we still need to bet that we are not dreaming or that we are not in some emulation (made normal by being physical, that is built on the top of the sum on all computations). So, to answer the question more precisely, we will need to describe more precisely how much the physical phenomenon depart from the comp physics, like for the case with the natural physics. If the emulation is gross (too big pixel) we can see quickly we are dreaming or emulated, or branched to a virtual (programmed) environment/video-game. By default, when I say that comp is falsifiable, I suppose we are at the base level, and that QL and QM does describe the base levels. Comp (and QL) saves us (normally) from the diabolical white rabbits, but it does not save us from the human and indeed universal Löbian consistent deception. Bruno I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. Therefore if we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must be falsified. Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our phenomenological physics. Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:50 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. What kind of set theory are you referring to here, when you specify all environments and virtual ones? PGC Therefore if we do discover ourselves in such a virtual variety (eg Deutsch's chess world) violating the laws of physics derived from COMP, then COMP must be falsified. Whilst COMP could be rescued by stating that it's just bad luck that we are in one of these virtual worlds, there is no epistemological benefit in doing so, because then COMP would not provide a description of our phenomenological physics. Just the same is if we ever found the Anthropic Principle to be violated (and didn't immediately wake up and realise it to be a dream), then we'd have to declare the AP falsified, because it no longer has any epistemological value. We could alternatively conclude that we're living in a Sim (DD's argument), but that would be simply a statement of faith, making the AP unfalsifiable. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Mon, Jun 02, 2014 at 02:19:49AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:50 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I would say that COMP predicts we must be at the base level, and not in a virtual reality, by virtue of the cardinality difference between the set of all environments and the set of virtual ones. What kind of set theory are you referring to here, when you specify all environments and virtual ones? PGC The usual one. The axiom of choice is not relevant here. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point. But it is also a relatively trivial (conceptually simple) point, embedded already in the Dream argument and that lucidity is a relative notion, even a graded one, like in Inception (a less nice movie by the author of the prestige (in my opinion and taste)). But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an environment disobeying the physical laws. Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order dream, the one emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can observe in the virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*). If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the one in Alice in Wonderland! So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure makes sense). But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown real theory. So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others. The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström. Bruno I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127 and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a CantGoTu environment. Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never know that we're in one. DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of chess. This is because the rules of physics of such an environment are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above. The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to be geography. The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail. Cheers --
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point. But it is also a relatively trivial (conceptually simple) point, embedded already in the Dream argument and that lucidity is a relative notion, even a graded one, like in Inception (a less nice movie by the author of the prestige (in my opinion and taste)). But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an environment disobeying the physical laws. Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order dream, the one emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can observe in the virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*). If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the one in Alice in Wonderland! So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure makes sense). But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown real theory. So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others. The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström. Bruno I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one. It is basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all possible virtual realities. With that ambiguity. Consider the discussion between pages 127 and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a CantGoTu environment. If the CantGoTu contains all partial function, then UDA proves in a finite amount of time that we are in there. If the cant'Goto contains only total function, then we can't be there with comp. We can be in a special programs, but that is indeed impossible to prove, even with an infinite amount of time. Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never know that we're in one. What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*? UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should, to get rid of the
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 10:07:00AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote: I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one. Neither. A CantGoTu environment by construction is not the result of any program. ... Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never know that we're in one. What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*? UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should, to get rid of the white rabbits). I think the way virtual reality is defined in FoR, there can only ever be a countable number of them. It is the environment that is simulated, not the observer. By contrast with the UD, it is the observer that is simulated, leading to a continuum of environments by FPI. DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of chess. This is because the rules of physics of such an environment are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above. But DD ignores the FPI. Sure - but I'm not sure of the relevance... The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to be geography. The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail. You need to take into account the comp RSSA, based on the FPI. All computations emulating an observer, even if contradicting the physical laws, have to be taken into account, and that is why physics is a sum on all computation (going through your states), OK - but how does the following follow? so you can (in principle) find out if you are in a simulation (assuming comp all along). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. Is this not, as you have stated before on this list if I remember correctly, a standard consequence of Turing Machines (I'm referring to dreaming, second-order reality)? I'm still not convinced by the falsification attacks of late; they seem to me just reductionism in disguise of pursuit of clarity. We are doubting now falsification as laid out by our advances in computability in the last century? I don't see the alternatives many posts of late here apparently are assuming, while most seem to ignore the elephant follow-up do you take Quantum Logic then to be empirical; how do you manage then? As if this standard were leveraged against other TOEs seriously on all levels (which ones satisfy such things completely btw?), and therefore comp should abide concerning personal ultimate answers, falsification, prediction, and all this stuff that appeals to my insecurity and bad sci-fi writing. Smells like prohibition/authoritative argument. Like the academic prancing around of labels, qualification histories, the Salvia post appearing designed to get people to lower their defenses, so they can be attacked for speaking not literally/correctly, apologies for not biting btw; and the related posturing of meta-arguments and psychology across different threads lately, ending in insults and useless I know what you're thinking via label- stuff. This I consider unscientific and ties in with the theological discussion in the other thread: posing as if these things were decided, set, and going on personal crusade for fancy projections instead of sticking to the relevant points in discussion. That's what distinguishes crusading from science and makes it problematic. PGC But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 31 May 2014, at 13:21, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 10:07:00AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2014, at 08:45, Russell Standish wrote: I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is unclear if this contains only total functions or partial one. Neither. A CantGoTu environment by construction is not the result of any program. I reread DD on this, but it is unclear. But a part of this is made non relevant by the FPI. As the DU dovetails on the oracles (the real) too. We can come back on this. On the partial functions, we have the closure for the diagonalization. The way the CantgTu are defined, it is unclear what complexity it can have in the arithmetical hierarchy. I can stretch in different way to get different correct sense, but it is unclear which one is meant. ... Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But we can never know that we're in one. What is a non-virtual reality environments in the UD*? UD* is not a set, so cardinality notion does not apply. But with the rule Y = II, we can associate a set of computations which has the cardinality of the continuum to UD*, but this can make the virtual reality environments into a continuum (and I think it should, to get rid of the white rabbits). I think the way virtual reality is defined in FoR, there can only ever be a countable number of them. It is the environment that is simulated, not the observer. In his glossary, he propose a more general definition, but in some paragraph it looks it is like you say. He is not at ease with logic/computability theory. By contrast with the UD, it is the observer that is simulated, leading to a continuum of environments by FPI. The UD emulates all the 3p observers, in all environment (computable or not a priori). This leads to a continuum of environment by FPI (being enough naive, and open for equivalence classes of computations and states, notably structured by the use of the Theaetetus definitions. DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of chess. This is because the rules of physics of such an environment are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above. But DD ignores the FPI. Sure - but I'm not sure of the relevance... An environment is defined by the probability on the computations, or the sigma_1 sentences, as believe, ([]p), known ([]p p), observe ([]p p), felt ([]p p p). Physics is given by the laws governing our consistent extensions, which is describable in terms of elementary machine's beliefs (like the belief in Robinson arithmetic and the induction axioms). The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to be geography. The only way we can prove we're actually in a simulation is if the Anthropic Principle were to suddenly fail. You need to take into account the comp RSSA, based on the FPI. All computations emulating an observer, even if contradicting the physical laws, have to be taken into account, and that is why physics is a sum on all computation (going through your states), OK - but how does the following follow? so you can (in principle) find out if you are in a simulation (assuming comp all along). It is like in the lucid dream. You believe that the physical laws prevent you to fly by will, then you observe yourself flying at will, and conclude that you are dreaming (i.e. you are in a second order simulation, sustained by the physical reality). But now, imagine I want fake you more subtly, by making an emulation of the known physics. Well in that sense we will have the []p p together and you are not failed. Indeed, from the 3-1 view, you are in all computations, and no more in that second order than in the first order (relatively to the UD*). Now, I have to fail you at some level in that simulation, because I can't emulate all the computations done in UD* to get all the decimal correct in the FPI on the whole Sigma_1 truth, so, in principle, if you have all the time, and if I don't make change to the system (except adding the needed memories for your exploration, you (from my 1-view of your 3p being in the computer) will at some point get the decimal wrong from the
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 06:17:40PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point. But it is also a relatively trivial (conceptually simple) point, embedded already in the Dream argument and that lucidity is a relative notion, even a graded one, like in Inception (a less nice movie by the author of the prestige (in my opinion and taste)). But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an environment disobeying the physical laws. Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order dream, the one emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can observe in the virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*). If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the one in Alice in Wonderland! So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure makes sense). But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown real theory. So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others. The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström. Bruno I gather you think it might be possible to distinguish between being in a virtual reality, and being in the real reality. David Deutsch introduced the concept of a CantGoTu environment. It is basically an environment formed by diagonalising on the list of all possible virtual realities. Consider the discussion between pages 127 and 130 of Fabric of Reality. He goes on to prove that it is not possible to prove within a finite amount of time that one is in a CantGoTu environment. Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Brent But we can never know that we're in one. DD does later in the chapter speculate about VR environments that one can know one is trapped in a VR, such as being inside a game of chess. This is because the rules of physics of such an environment are inconsistent, especially with the presence of an observer. But provided the rules of physics are consistent with yourself as an observer, then there doesn't appear to be any way of knowing whether you're in a simulation of not, as per the CantGoTu argument above. The rules of physics (whether under COMP or not) must be those that allow the presence of observers, and of observation. All else _has_ to be geography. The only way we can prove we're actually in a
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sat, May 31, 2014 at 01:40:58PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 5/30/2014 11:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Yet it seems to me that CantGoTu environments and other non-virtual reality environments have measure one in the space of environments hosted by the UD, as UD* has the cardinality of the continuum, whereas virtual reality environments are strictly aleph_0. But aren't we as physically instantiated beings, also of the cardinality of the continuum? Yes, we are, but not the virtual reality environments, which must be countable by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs. With COMP, and via the UDA, the number of real environments experienced must be the cardinality of the continuum, and would include all the CantGoTu environments. We could therefore conclude (contra Bostrom), that we are most likely not in a simulation, but that we can never prove it by any finite observation (Deutsch's CantGoTu argument). I agree that sometimes we can know we're in a virtual reality - Deutsch's chess VR example, for instance - but only by it being logically incompatible with our existence as an observer. The question remains - suppose someone finds a physical phenomenon that contradicts the laws of physics derived from COMP. Does that falsify COMP, or does it imply we're in a virtual reality? How can you possibly distinguish those two situations? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point. But it is also a relatively trivial (conceptually simple) point, embedded already in the Dream argument and that lucidity is a relative notion, even a graded one, like in Inception (a less nice movie by the author of the prestige (in my opinion and taste)). But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an environment disobeying the physical laws. Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second order dream) or in the physical reality (first order dream, the one emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if the laws of physics that you can observe in the virtual environment differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all* worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*). If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the one in Alice in Wonderland! So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure makes sense). But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an emulation of the standard theory in some unknown real theory. So it is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging from that can still lie to each others. The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
No. 2014-05-18 18:47 GMT+02:00, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com: On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 9:12 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 May 2014, at 16:52, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 09:36, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 12 May 2014, at 16:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, May 11, 2014 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I guess one could start from is physics computable? (As Max Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a materialist-type way from the operation of the brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition. Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something obvious? Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so trivial to disprove: even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) 2. brain generates consciousness but 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) so comp = ~comp I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology for participating to the discussion with a shift. What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with comp (say yes to the doctor), but only because he attributes consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical reality. Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can predict the physical behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, then, although a virtual emulation would do (with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical computation would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter. I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use here becomes magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious if there is primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can always reify some mystery to block an application of a theory to reality. Ok, I tried to think about this for a while. It appears that it also connects with the issue can there be computation without a substrate?. Please see what you think of my thoughts, sorry if they are a bit rough and confusing: In a purely mathematical sense, it seems to me that computation is simply a mapping from one value to another. Well, it is a special sort of mapping. There are 2^aleph_0 mapping in general, but only aleph_0 computational mapping. So it is a bit more than a mapping. Any computer program p can be represented as a value under some syntax. Any program + some data, Why + some data? Any additional data can be made part of the program, no? Sure. But it helps to think in both ways. Yes, especially if one actually has to write computer programs :) I am not trying to be pedantic, I am just trying to remove the incidental to examine the matter is fundamental claim. I'm aware that you're kind of playing devil's advocate here, which is part of the serious scientific stance, of course. And then what is matter? What obeys this or that equations? Known one are Turing emulable, and it is like saying it is this universal numbers and no other one, where comp asks OK, shows it wins the computation of the infinitely many computations of basically all universal machine to get your here and now computational states. It is a problem for comp. It has to justify the laws of stable observation from the invariance for the universal machine. With UDA, at
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the possibility of falsification of COMP. But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of physics for dreaming or second order reality? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 14:12, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall probably try again. Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. If that *is* established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to derive it from bit. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 14:12, ghib...@gmail.com mailto:ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall probably try again. Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like complexity. Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818 Brent If that /is/ established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to derive it from bit. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 28 May 2014, at 02:59, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 1:13:38 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: -Original Message- From: LizR liz...@gmail.com To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com gt; wrote: So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific sense. Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its logic of the observable) and its actual testing? Because you don't have one. But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis. So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism. And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the quantum facts to argue against mechanism. The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex. If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the computations going through our states (computational states), and so that logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the physics of the machines. Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a subpart of it. Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or retrodicts that the observable have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the hamiltonian under a symmetry conditions. It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to progress. You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems. And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process. My interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul. If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck (or bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find quantum logic. If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL, well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp. Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*) have axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get information not available. In their first order arithmetical extensions, there is an infinities of such information. Hi Bruno - you can definitely rest easy about the 'rumours'.I've no access to such things and don't seek them out. So far as I'm concerned a 'list' - even a public one like this - is sacrosanct and private. Like fight club geezer...that silly film: what happens on everything list, stays on everything list. My blood my pledge
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality) On 28 May 2014 14:12, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong... I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall probably try again. Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation ... but I guess some relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge theory ... maybe when (or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some features of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on the matter, It is always a relief to see that some people can stay rational on the fundamental matter. It is not always easy to distinguish genuine non understanding from the nitpicking some philosophers seemed to be trained for. Then ghibbsa seems to believe that computationalism is false, so he wants it not even refutable, as it gives sense that it might be true. I don't know. John Clark is clearer in his refutation of step three, where everyone can see that no matter he get his conclusion, at some point he has to confuse the first person discourse with the third person discourse (when seeing this, Clark usually said don't come back on 1p and 3p again (mixed with some vulgar word). I can understand the comp shock for people unaware of Everett, but in this list people are aware of Everett, or of QM without collapse. Without the Everett embedding of the subject in the physical reality is prolonged into a embedding of the subject in the arithmetical reality. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 28 May 2014 19:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable. Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the reification of information it on, though. As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor minimum information/entropy but something like complexity. Here's recent survey of ways to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818 As usual I don't have time to read that paper, at least not immediately. However I see that defining complexity appear to require coarse graining. If so, I would take this to mean that there isn't anything fundamental being defined - or at least that we're in a grey area where nothing is known to be fundamental. On the other hand, entropy used to require coarse graining but as I mentioned above has now been defined for black holes, so assuming BHs really exist (and the things we think are BHs aren't some other type of massive object of an undefined nature) that would at least suggest that fundamental physics involves entropy, and hence information. Is there any complexity measure that doesn;t involve CG and hence isn't just (imho) in the eye of the beholder ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Monday, May 26, 2014 12:45:50 AM UTC+1, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 25, 2014 at 10:02:37AM -0700, ghi...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: qualify for forgiving :O). I mean.I don't know about you but I agree with Russel Standish's moderation philosophy on this list...or how it looks.which speaking of killing people.you'd have to kill someone here to get a ban from Russell, so it looks. For a start, the everything list is not my list - Wei Dai is the official owner, but I haven't seen him posting in a while! As for FOAR, you don't need to kill someone. Posting obvious spam is enough. Several spammers have been banned from FOAR already. But so long as it's vaguely on topic to the eclectic tastes of the lists, and so long as people exercise a little bit of courtesy and moderation in their language, I'm fine with what is posted. There's always a handy delete button for that stuff I don't want to read :). Cheers You're still the boss Russell...ownership is for wimps -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Pr... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: -Original Message- From: LizR liz...@gmail.com To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com gt; wrote: So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific sense. Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its logic of the observable) and its actual testing? Because you don't have one. But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis. So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism. And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the quantum facts to argue against mechanism. The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex. If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the computations going through our states (computational states), and so that logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the physics of the machines. Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a subpart of it. Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or retrodicts that the observable have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the hamiltonian under a symmetry conditions. It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to progress. You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems. And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process. My interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul. If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck (or bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find quantum logic. If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL, well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp. Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*) have axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get information not available. In their first order arithmetical extensions, there is an infinities of such information. Hi Bruno - you can definitely rest easy about the 'rumours'.I've no access to such things and don't seek them out. So far as I'm concerned a 'list' - even a public one like this - is sacrosanct and private. Like fight club geezer...that silly film: what happens on everything list, stays on everything list. My blood my pledge! SeriouslyI'm always aware arguing with you
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 1:13:38 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, May 26, 2014 8:19:01 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 May 2014, at 19:02, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, May 23, 2014 6:46:47 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 May 2014, at 15:52, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 22, 2014 8:12:59 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 May 2014, at 22:02, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: -Original Message- From: LizR liz...@gmail.com To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, May 18, 2014 9:26 pm Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List lt;everyt...@googlegroups.com gt; wrote: So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific sense. Could you tell me why? I have answered this to hibbsa since. What is wrong with the equation which provides the propositional physics (its logic of the observable) and its actual testing? Because you don't have one. But this is factually false. I do provide the complete propositional physics extracted from the classical computationalist thesis. So all physical experience which confirms QL, and refute Boolean logic, like Bell's equality, is actually testing computationalism. And that can also be used to provide counter-example for people using the quantum facts to argue against mechanism. The set of those testable comp-physical tautologies is decidable, and infinite. At the first order logical level, things are more complex. If you agree that quantum logic is empirical, like most people in the field, you should understand that comp explains that the laws of the possible empirical are equal to the laws which govern the structure of the computations going through our states (computational states), and so that logic is determined by the mental ability of the universal machine. Mathematically, we can limit ourselves to machine having simple (true) beliefs, like 0+x = x, etc. Is anyone independent working on a prediction unique to your work? Everyone trying to guess a law empirically, automatically test the physics of the machines. Have you follow the thread with Quentin Anciaux? He made a critics that I do understand. There was a possibility that the comp physics collapse into boolean logic. In that case, either comp would have been refuted, or show trivial, and QM would have been refuted altogether, at least as a physical laws. The real physics would be boolean, and QM would only describe a subpart of it. Well, but this did not happen. Comp (well classical comp) predicts or retrodicts that the observable have to be non boolean and indeed obeys quantum or quantum-like logic. It predicts or retrodicts also a part of the hamiltonian under a symmetry conditions. It misses important things like the linearity. It is easy to add it, but that would be treachery, and so there are tuns of problems to solve to progress. You just need to understand the technics. It is had, and I have done the best I could. A student and friend of mine, the late Eric Vandebusche did solve the first mathematical problems. And there is no ambition of comp to substitute itself with physics, which's use of the empiry accelerates the learning process. My interest is in theology, in what is the destiny of souls and soul. If they aren't, you don't have one. Doesn't mean you won't have one. But does mean you don't currently have a falsifiable theory. They are, some explicitly. But if QM is correct, and if by luck (or bad luck), the comp QL (one of them, as we got three of them) is exactly the quantum QL, then we will not need to test no more that. And it will remain open if that is a correct explanation of the origin of the quantum principle. It might be just a coincidence that where UDA and machines told us where the logic of physics can be, we find quantum logic. If, as it is probable, such comp QL differ crucially from quantum QL, well, we have to test to evaluate if it is fatal or not for comp. Oh, but I forget to mention one more things. The comp QL has more axioms, and if it is not defeated by empiry, it does provide new theorems and new physical predictions, like the comp knower S4Grz is not just the classical knower S4, the comp QL (S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*) have axioms inherited from the Löb formula, from which we get information not available. In their first order arithmetical extensions, there is an infinities of such information. Hi Bruno - you can definitely rest easy about the 'rumours'.I've no access to such things and don't seek them out. So far as I'm concerned a 'list' - even a public one like this - is sacrosanct and private. Like fight club geezer...that silly film: what happens on everything list, stays on everything list. My blood
