subject:"Re\: \[MD\] The Quality of Free Will"

Hi Dan

On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 10:47 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote:

 Well, again, I think RMP has moved past James in ways that agree with
 James' work. James (for one thing) never postulated that reality is
 composed of value. He seemed to feel that experience HAD value but he
 didn't make the connection that experience IS value. So, yes, they
 might well be on the same page but RMP is further along in his
 thinking.

Personally I do not think that James and Pirsig belong in the same
category.  Sure, there are some similarities in terms of Experience,
but this is also true of all religions.  Pirsig does comment on
similarities, but I believe this is more like his similarities with
Poincare.  Starting from opposite ends and meeting in the middle or
top of the mountain.  James starts from the ground up;  he is the
father of modern Western psychology.  This is pure induction.  Pirsig
starts with the Grand, and then breaks it down: deduction.  Both, of
course, subscribe to mystical interpretations, but while James
attributes it to a function of the brain, Pirsig attributes it to a
function of Quality.  James subscribes to a Pluralistic universe,
Pirsig subscribes to a Monistic universe.

Just my 2 cents, thanks for your posts.

Mark

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread MarshaV



Hello again Ham,

If you will forgive me for quoting from Miri Albahari's book, here's the crux 
of the issue:  ... Awareness purports to exist as a witnessing presence that 
is unified, unbroken and yet elusive to direct observation.  As something whose 
phenomenology purports to be unborrowed from objects of consciousness, 
awareness, if it exists, must exist as _completely unconstructed_ by the 
content of any perspectivally ownable objects such as thoughts, emotions or 
perceptions. If _apparent_ awareness, perhaps by virtue of one or more of its 
defining features (that form part of its content or 'aboutness'), turned out to 
owe its existence to such object-content rather than to (unconstructed) 
_awareness itself_, then that would render awareness constructed and illusory 
and hence laking in independent reality...

There!  

I have mentioned before that I can identify with some of your statements about 
'self', mainly because of this witnessing capacity.   To me, freedom, too, is 
in this kind of presence:  witnessing/mindfulness.  I cannot identify the flow 
of thoughts, emotions or perceptions with an independent self, but what of 
this witnessing experience?  What of this intimate awareness?  -  But this book 
is dense and complex, with lots to think about, and I will need to read it 
again, but it seems to be on the right trail.   
 
I hope you are well.  
   

Marsha 





On Jul 21, 2011, at 2:22 AM, MarshaV wrote:

 
 Hi Ham,
 
 This is the most interesting topic.   It's a constant question, but I have 
 not found an answer.  
 
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 12:28 AM, Ham Priday wrote:
 
 
 Dear Marsha --
 
 On Tuesday, July 19, you said to Joe:
 
 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.
 
 Did you not read Dave Thomas's post recounting a recent TV appearance of the 
 Dalai Lama?
 
 [David on 7/18]:
 I once paraphrased to Marsha that I saw him in a TV clip snap
 at a questioner who asked him some question about the Buddhist
 principle of no-self.I said, because I did not have access to the
 clip, He said something like (and this really pissed her off),
 If you have no self, who is it that is going to change?
 
 Ham:
 You don't observe the experience of subjective awareness because it's what 
 you ARE.  
 
 Marsha:
 The question is am I an 'autonomous' self.  There certainly is experience of 
 awareness, but that seems to be just a pattern that occasionally occurs 
 within consciousness awareness.  
 
 
 Ham:
 Like it or not, you are a conscious subject, and subjects can't observe or 
 witness themselves as objects.  
 
 Marsha:
 There is conscious awareness, and there sometimes is a 'sense of self' that 
 occurs, but that is not proof that the 'sense of self' is a real 'autonomous 
 self.'   As you admit there is not way the witnessing becomes the object of 
 observation.  
 
 
 Ham:
 The subjective self and its conscious stream of passing experiences is 
 permanent only as long as the being of that self is alive.
 
 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there 
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way 
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems 
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.
 
 
 Ham:
 Now, you can say that your self is not real or is only interconnected 
 patterns, does not exist in the sense that objects exist, and cannot be 
 directly observed in the sense that objects are observed.  Nonetheless, if 
 Marsha's self were removed, Marsha and her reality would disappear.
 
 Marsha:
 I am questioning your use of autonomous  self, and you are begging the 
 question here by assuming Marsha's self exists to be removed or disappear.  
 
 
 Ham:
 I'm curious as to what investigation has convinced you that your self is 
 not autonomous.  How does one go about investigating herself?   Brain 
 scanning?  Hypnosis?  Psychotherapy?   And if, as the Dalai Lama suggested, 
 you have no self, who or what is it that makes Marsha's choices and 
 preferences?  Quality patterns?  DQ?  Collective consciiousness?
 
 Marsha:
 Meditation and mindfulness are the tools I use to investigate 
 mind/consciousness.  My experiences are co-dependent on many conditions 
 (patterns), conscious awareness may be one of those conditions.  I do not 
 have the exact quote or context for the Dalai Lama statements, so I cannot 
 guess what he meant.  But everyone, even the Dalai Lama accepts the 
 conventional use of the term self.  The question is what is behind that 
 convention?  That's my interest.  And your assumptions are not evidence. 
 
 
 Ham:
 Do you really believe yourself to be

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread david buchanan


dmb said to Dan:
You're reading James as if he subscribed to subject-object metaphysics but 
quite the opposite is true. The central point of his pure experience theory is 
to oppose that.  ...As Pirsig describes it, James's radical empiricism says 
...subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience. Subjects 
and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more 
fundamental... In this basic flux of experience the distinctions of reflective 
thought, such as those between consciousness and content, subject and object, 
mind and matter have not yet emerged in the forms which we make them. PURE 
EXPERIENCE cannot be called either physical or psychical. It logically proceeds 
this distinction. In his last unfinished work, Some Problems in Philosophy, 
James had condensed this descriptions to a single sentence: 'There will always 
be a discrepancy between concepts and reality, because the former are static 
and discontinuous, while the latter is dynamic and flowing.'  Here James had 
chosen exactly the same words Phaedrus had used for the basic subdivision of 
the Metaphysics of Quality. ... The metaphysics of quality says PURE EXPERIENCE 
IS VALUE.  ...Through this identification of PURE VALUE WITH PURE EXPERIENCE, 
the metaphysics of quality paves the way for an enlarged way of looking at 
experience which can resolve all sorts of anomalies that traditional empiricism 
has not been able to cope with.  (Lila 364-6) This is the basis for my 
contention that when James is talking concrete experience and abstract thought, 
he's basically talking about DQ and sq. As you can see, it is Pirsig himself 
who thinks he and James are using the terms in the same way.


Dan:

He says that James used the same words that Phaedrus used for the basic 
division of his metaphysics but I don't think he believes James is using the 
terms in the same way. ... He said the same words. Words can and do have 
different meanings and I don't see that James meant dynamic in the same sense 
that Robert Pirsig means Dynamic Quality. Can we at least agree on that?

dmb says:
Seriously???! I baffled by your denial. As far as explicit textual evidence 
goes, this is as convincing as it gets and yet you seem to be denying for no 
particular reason. I don't get that. 

The author you quoted yesterday (Joel Krueger) has written an online article 
titled The Varieties of PUre Experience: William James and Kitaro Nishida on 
Consciousness and Embodiment. Maybe that's where you got the quote. In any 
case, Krueger says, Nishida felt that James's idea of pure experience was able 
to preserve some of the more important features of Buddhist thought that 
Nishida looked to incorporate into his own system. Though he was only to 
practice Zen meditation for a relatively short time, the distinctively Zen 
concern with cultivating an intuitive, pre-reflective insight into the nature 
of reality and experience was conjoined, in Nishida, with the Western emphasis 
on logic and argumentative rigor in a somewhat unlikely alliance. Nishida's 
life-long project was thus to wed the immediacy of experience as lived (what he 
termed concrete knowledge) with a more formal-rational analysis of the 
structures of lived experience, an analysis utilizing the concepts and 
categories of the western philosophical tradition as Nishida understood it. 
Very simply, Nishida in this way believed that he was attempting to synthesize 
the philosophical worlds of east and west into a new form of inquiry that would 
prove mutually enriching to both traditions. And like James, then, Nishida's 
understanding of pure experience came to occupy the center of his entire life's 
work.

Add this to what David Scott says and add the scholar who says the Buddha was a 
pragmatist and a radical empiricist and a whole batch of other secondary 
sources and one begins to see that Pirsig's Dynamic Quality (pure Value) and 
James's pure experience are two names for a mystic reality for which many names 
have been used. 

Dan said:
...I doubt they both arrived at the same conclusions. RMP goes further than 
does James in formulating a metaphysics centered on value.

dmb says:
Why do you doubt it? Quality is the centerpiece of Pirsig's work. Pure 
Experience is the centerpiece of James's work. And Pirsig IDENTIFIES pure 
experience with pure Value. They both say reality is dynamic while concepts are 
static. They both say subjects and objects are concepts rather than reality. 
They are both rejecting SOM and reformulating a static-dynamic metaphysics to 
replace it. I don't see any important difference. What difference do you see in 
their conclusions? Can you think of anything important or relevant that they 
disagree about?

Dan said:
Well, again, I think RMP has moved past James in ways that agree with James' 
work. James (for one thing) never postulated that reality is composed of value. 
He seemed to feel that experience HAD value but he didn't make the

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread Joseph Maurer

Hi MarshaV

My attention is limited.  I find it fortunate that I have two names Joseph
Maurer.  I connect those names with Pirsig's DQ/SQ.  Joe is DQ.  Maurer is
SQ.

Joe


On 7/26/11 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread MarshaV

Greetings Joe,

What happen to: do re me fa so la ti?   


Marsha  


On Jul 26, 2011, at 2:16 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:

 Hi MarshaV
 
 My attention is limited.  I find it fortunate that I have two names Joseph
 Maurer.  I connect those names with Pirsig's DQ/SQ.  Joe is DQ.  Maurer is
 SQ.
 
 Joe
 
 
 On 7/26/11 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.
 
 



 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread Joseph Maurer

Hi MarshaV,

There are a couple of ways to talk about reality: Manifestation and Order.
A rule for Order is Do, Re, Mi, Fa, Sol, La, Ti.  The difference in quality
of Mi-Fa, and Ti-Do adds excitement to reality, nothing boring about
metaphysics.  A single manifestation has three aspects: Active, Passive and
Neutral.  DQ SQ manifest the / reality.

Joe


On 7/26/11 11:57 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 Greetings Joe,
 
 What happen to: do re me fa so la ti?
 
 
 Marsha  
 
 
 On Jul 26, 2011, at 2:16 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi MarshaV
 
 My attention is limited.  I find it fortunate that I have two names Joseph
 Maurer.  I connect those names with Pirsig's DQ/SQ.  Joe is DQ.  Maurer is
 SQ.
 
 Joe
 
 
 On 7/26/11 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And
 there
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ___
  
 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi Marsha,
This witnessing capacity would fly straight in the face of Buddhism,
since it would require an inherent arrising of the witness.  Your
thoughts?
Mark

On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:


 Hello again Ham,

 If you will forgive me for quoting from Miri Albahari's book, here's the crux 
 of the issue:  ... Awareness purports to exist as a witnessing presence that 
 is unified, unbroken and yet elusive to direct observation.  As something 
 whose phenomenology purports to be unborrowed from objects of consciousness, 
 awareness, if it exists, must exist as _completely unconstructed_ by the 
 content of any perspectivally ownable objects such as thoughts, emotions or 
 perceptions. If _apparent_ awareness, perhaps by virtue of one or more of its 
 defining features (that form part of its content or 'aboutness'), turned out 
 to owe its existence to such object-content rather than to (unconstructed) 
 _awareness itself_, then that would render awareness constructed and illusory 
 and hence laking in independent reality...

 There!

 I have mentioned before that I can identify with some of your statements 
 about 'self', mainly because of this witnessing capacity.   To me, freedom, 
 too, is in this kind of presence:  witnessing/mindfulness.  I cannot identify 
 the flow of thoughts, emotions or perceptions with an independent self, but 
 what of this witnessing experience?  What of this intimate awareness?  -  But 
 this book is dense and complex, with lots to think about, and I will need to 
 read it again, but it seems to be on the right trail.

 I hope you are well.


 Marsha





 On Jul 21, 2011, at 2:22 AM, MarshaV wrote:


 Hi Ham,

 This is the most interesting topic.   It's a constant question, but I have 
 not found an answer.


 On Jul 21, 2011, at 12:28 AM, Ham Priday wrote:


 Dear Marsha --

 On Tuesday, July 19, you said to Joe:

 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.

 Did you not read Dave Thomas's post recounting a recent TV appearance of 
 the Dalai Lama?

 [David on 7/18]:
 I once paraphrased to Marsha that I saw him in a TV clip snap
 at a questioner who asked him some question about the Buddhist
 principle of no-self.I said, because I did not have access to the
 clip, He said something like (and this really pissed her off),
 If you have no self, who is it that is going to change?

 Ham:
 You don't observe the experience of subjective awareness because it's 
 what you ARE.

 Marsha:
 The question is am I an 'autonomous' self.  There certainly is experience of 
 awareness, but that seems to be just a pattern that occasionally occurs 
 within consciousness awareness.


 Ham:
 Like it or not, you are a conscious subject, and subjects can't observe or 
 witness themselves as objects.

 Marsha:
 There is conscious awareness, and there sometimes is a 'sense of self' that 
 occurs, but that is not proof that the 'sense of self' is a real 'autonomous 
 self.'   As you admit there is not way the witnessing becomes the object of 
 observation.


 Ham:
 The subjective self and its conscious stream of passing experiences is 
 permanent only as long as the being of that self is alive.

 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there 
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way 
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems 
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.


 Ham:
 Now, you can say that your self is not real or is only interconnected 
 patterns, does not exist in the sense that objects exist, and cannot be 
 directly observed in the sense that objects are observed.  Nonetheless, if 
 Marsha's self were removed, Marsha and her reality would disappear.

 Marsha:
 I am questioning your use of autonomous  self, and you are begging the 
 question here by assuming Marsha's self exists to be removed or disappear.


 Ham:
 I'm curious as to what investigation has convinced you that your self is 
 not autonomous.  How does one go about investigating herself?   Brain 
 scanning?  Hypnosis?  Psychotherapy?   And if, as the Dalai Lama suggested, 
 you have no self, who or what is it that makes Marsha's choices and 
 preferences?  Quality patterns?  DQ?  Collective consciiousness?

 Marsha:
 Meditation and mindfulness are the tools I use to investigate 
 mind/consciousness.  My experiences are co-dependent on many conditions 
 (patterns), conscious awareness may be one of those conditions.  I do not 
 have the exact quote or context for the Dalai Lama statements, so I cannot 
 guess what he meant.  But everyone, even the Dalai Lama accepts the

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi Joe,
I like that!  Personality lies in the first name, responsibility lies
in the last.
Mark

On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 11:16 AM, Joseph  Maurer jh...@comcast.net wrote:
 Hi MarshaV

 My attention is limited.  I find it fortunate that I have two names Joseph
 Maurer.  I connect those names with Pirsig's DQ/SQ.  Joe is DQ.  Maurer is
 SQ.

 Joe


 On 7/26/11 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi Marsha,
It sounds like you are requesting sexual favors.  You can write to
Anthony Weiner for those.
Ha, Ha,
Mark

On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 11:57 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 Greetings Joe,

 What happen to: do re me fa so la ti?


 Marsha


 On Jul 26, 2011, at 2:16 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:

 Hi MarshaV

 My attention is limited.  I find it fortunate that I have two names Joseph
 Maurer.  I connect those names with Pirsig's DQ/SQ.  Joe is DQ.  Maurer is
 SQ.

 Joe


 On 7/26/11 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And 
 there
 are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way
 can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems
 more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.






 ___


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread MarshaV


Hi Mark,

It is still speculation and under investigation, but I cannot find anything 
INHERENTLY existing.  Nada.  And I'm not sure what face of Buddha you think I 
am aiming for.  What do you think of the witnessing experience?  


Marsha





On Jul 26, 2011, at 5:50 PM, 118 wrote:

 Hi Marsha,
 This witnessing capacity would fly straight in the face of Buddhism,
 since it would require an inherent arrising of the witness.  Your
 thoughts?
 Mark
 
 On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 12:49 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 
 Hello again Ham,
 
 If you will forgive me for quoting from Miri Albahari's book, here's the 
 crux of the issue:  ... Awareness purports to exist as a witnessing 
 presence that is unified, unbroken and yet elusive to direct observation.  
 As something whose phenomenology purports to be unborrowed from objects of 
 consciousness, awareness, if it exists, must exist as _completely 
 unconstructed_ by the content of any perspectivally ownable objects such as 
 thoughts, emotions or perceptions. If _apparent_ awareness, perhaps by 
 virtue of one or more of its defining features (that form part of its 
 content or 'aboutness'), turned out to owe its existence to such 
 object-content rather than to (unconstructed) _awareness itself_, then that 
 would render awareness constructed and illusory and hence laking in 
 independent reality...
 
 There!
 
 I have mentioned before that I can identify with some of your statements 
 about 'self', mainly because of this witnessing capacity.   To me, freedom, 
 too, is in this kind of presence:  witnessing/mindfulness.  I cannot 
 identify the flow of thoughts, emotions or perceptions with an independent 
 self, but what of this witnessing experience?  What of this intimate 
 awareness?  -  But this book is dense and complex, with lots to think about, 
 and I will need to read it again, but it seems to be on the right trail.
 
 I hope you are well.
 
 
 Marsha
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 2:22 AM, MarshaV wrote:
 
 
 Hi Ham,
 
 This is the most interesting topic.   It's a constant question, but I have 
 not found an answer.
 
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 12:28 AM, Ham Priday wrote:
 
 
 Dear Marsha --
 
 On Tuesday, July 19, you said to Joe:
 
 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.
 
 Did you not read Dave Thomas's post recounting a recent TV appearance of 
 the Dalai Lama?
 
 [David on 7/18]:
 I once paraphrased to Marsha that I saw him in a TV clip snap
 at a questioner who asked him some question about the Buddhist
 principle of no-self.I said, because I did not have access to the
 clip, He said something like (and this really pissed her off),
 If you have no self, who is it that is going to change?
 
 Ham:
 You don't observe the experience of subjective awareness because it's 
 what you ARE.
 
 Marsha:
 The question is am I an 'autonomous' self.  There certainly is experience 
 of awareness, but that seems to be just a pattern that occasionally occurs 
 within consciousness awareness.
 
 
 Ham:
 Like it or not, you are a conscious subject, and subjects can't observe or 
 witness themselves as objects.
 
 Marsha:
 There is conscious awareness, and there sometimes is a 'sense of self' that 
 occurs, but that is not proof that the 'sense of self' is a real 
 'autonomous self.'   As you admit there is not way the witnessing becomes 
 the object of observation.
 
 
 Ham:
 The subjective self and its conscious stream of passing experiences is 
 permanent only as long as the being of that self is alive.
 
 Marsha:
 There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And 
 there are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In 
 what way can it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of 
 self 'seems more a pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.
 
 
 Ham:
 Now, you can say that your self is not real or is only interconnected 
 patterns, does not exist in the sense that objects exist, and cannot be 
 directly observed in the sense that objects are observed.  Nonetheless, if 
 Marsha's self were removed, Marsha and her reality would disappear.
 
 Marsha:
 I am questioning your use of autonomous  self, and you are begging the 
 question here by assuming Marsha's self exists to be removed or disappear.
 
 
 Ham:
 I'm curious as to what investigation has convinced you that your self is 
 not autonomous.  How does one go about investigating herself?   Brain 
 scanning?  Hypnosis?  Psychotherapy?   And if, as the Dalai Lama 
 suggested, you have no self, who or what is it that makes Marsha's choices 
 and preferences?  Quality patterns?  DQ?  Collective consciiousness?
 
 Marsha:
 Meditation and mindfulness are

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-26 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 6:59 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 dmb said to Dan:
 You're reading James as if he subscribed to subject-object metaphysics but 
 quite the opposite is true. The central point of his pure experience theory 
 is to oppose that.  ...As Pirsig describes it, James's radical empiricism 
 says ...subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience. 
 Subjects and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something 
 more fundamental... In this basic flux of experience the distinctions of 
 reflective thought, such as those between consciousness and content, subject 
 and object, mind and matter have not yet emerged in the forms which we make 
 them. PURE EXPERIENCE cannot be called either physical or psychical. It 
 logically proceeds this distinction. In his last unfinished work, Some 
 Problems in Philosophy, James had condensed this descriptions to a single 
 sentence: 'There will always be a discrepancy between concepts and reality, 
 because the former are static and discontinuous, while the latter is dynamic 
 and flowing.'  Here James had chosen exactly the same words Phaedrus had used 
 for the basic subdivision of the Metaphysics of Quality. ... The metaphysics 
 of quality says PURE EXPERIENCE IS VALUE.  ...Through this identification of 
 PURE VALUE WITH PURE EXPERIENCE, the metaphysics of quality paves the way for 
 an enlarged way of looking at experience which can resolve all sorts of 
 anomalies that traditional empiricism has not been able to cope with.  (Lila 
 364-6) This is the basis for my contention that when James is talking 
 concrete experience and abstract thought, he's basically talking about DQ and 
 sq. As you can see, it is Pirsig himself who thinks he and James are using 
 the terms in the same way.


 Dan:

 He says that James used the same words that Phaedrus used for the basic 
 division of his metaphysics but I don't think he believes James is using the 
 terms in the same way. ... He said the same words. Words can and do have 
 different meanings and I don't see that James meant dynamic in the same sense 
 that Robert Pirsig means Dynamic Quality. Can we at least agree on that?

 dmb says:
 Seriously???! I baffled by your denial. As far as explicit textual evidence 
 goes, this is as convincing as it gets and yet you seem to be denying for no 
 particular reason. I don't get that.

Dan:

So I take that as a no. And I am not sure exactly what I'm denying.

 The author you quoted yesterday (Joel Krueger) has written an online article 
 titled The Varieties of PUre Experience: William James and Kitaro Nishida on 
 Consciousness and Embodiment. Maybe that's where you got the quote.

Dan:

Well, yes, it is. I posted the url so you could check it out. You must
have missed that part too...

dmb:
 In any case, Krueger says, Nishida felt that James's idea of pure
experience was able to preserve some of the more important features of
Buddhist thought that Nishida looked to incorporate into his own
system. Though he was only to practice Zen meditation for a relatively
short time, the distinctively Zen concern with cultivating an
intuitive, pre-reflective insight into the nature of reality and
experience was conjoined, in Nishida, with the Western emphasis on
logic and argumentative rigor in a somewhat unlikely alliance.
Nishida's life-long project was thus to wed the immediacy of
experience as lived (what he termed concrete knowledge) with a more
formal-rational analysis of the structures of lived experience, an
analysis utilizing the concepts and categories of the western
philosophical tradition as Nishida understood it. Very simply, Nishida
in this way believed that he was attempting to synthesize the
philosophical worlds of east and west into a new form of inquiry that
would prove mutually enriching to both traditions. And like James,
then, Nishida's understanding of pure experience came to occupy the
center of his entire life's work.

 Add this to what David Scott says and add the scholar who says the Buddha was 
 a pragmatist and a radical empiricist and a whole batch of other secondary 
 sources and one begins to see that Pirsig's Dynamic Quality (pure Value) and 
 James's pure experience are two names for a mystic reality for which many 
 names have been used.

Dan:

So you are saying that Dynamic Quality and experience as value and
Quality as reality is and was common knowledge before Robert Pirsig
wrote about it in ZMM and LILA... that he really isn't saying anything
new at all... he is merely parroting what others have been saying for
hundreds or even thousands of years. I have to say I am more than a
bit disappointed in hearing this. Here I was thinking that he was an
original thinker.


 Dan said:
 ...I doubt they both arrived at the same conclusions. RMP goes further than 
 does James in formulating a metaphysics centered on value.

 dmb says:
 Why do you doubt it? Quality is the centerpiece

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi Marsha,
Your finding Nada may be a function of how you are looking for it.  If
you use standard Subject/Object metaphysics, then of course you will
find nothing.  In the same way that Atman cannot be found in that way.
 This is one reason why Pirsig does not like that metaphysics.
However, if you look beyond that metaphysics, believe me you will find
it.  Keep hunting, you will see it at at some totally random normal
time, this is called enlightenment.  There is nothing special about
finding it.  You will wonder why you didn't see it before since it is
so simple.  It really does exist.  I cannot help you since you are far
away.

Good Luck,
Mark

On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 3:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 Hi Mark,

 It is still speculation and under investigation, but I cannot find anything 
 INHERENTLY existing.  Nada.  And I'm not sure what face of Buddha you think I 
 am aiming for.  What do you think of the witnessing experience?


 Marsha



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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-25 Thread david buchanan


Dan said to dmb:
What is a concrete experience? ... The acting agent seems independent from 
the world as a thing experienced. ... The intellectual structures seem to 
emerge from the (material) world; this is not what the MOQ says. 

dmb says:
Well, no. You're reading James as if he subscribed to subject-object 
metaphysics but quite the opposite is true. The central point of his pure 
experience theory is to oppose that. It's been a long time since I quoted from 
the end of chapter 29 and now seems like a good time. As Pirsig describes it, 
James's radical empiricism says...
...subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience. Subjects 
and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more 
fundamental which he described as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes 
the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. In this 
basic flux of experience the distinctions of reflective thought, such as those 
between consciousness and content, subject and object, mind and matter have not 
yet emerged in the forms which we make them. Pure experience cannot be called 
either physical or psychical. It logically proceeds this distinction. 
In his last unfinished work, Some Problems in Philosophy, James had condensed 
this descriptions to a single sentence: 'There will always be a discrepancy 
between concepts and reality, because the former are static and discontinuous, 
while the latter is dynamic and flowing.'  Here James had chosen exactly the 
same words Phaedrus had used for the basic subdivision of the Metaphysics of 
Quality.
... The metaphysics of quality says pure experience is value. Value is at the 
very front of the empirical procession. ... It adds that this good is not a 
social code or some intellectualized Hegellian absolute. It is direct everyday 
experience. ...Through this identification of pure value with pure experience, 
the metaphysics of quality paves the way for an enlarged way of looking at 
experience which can resolve all sorts of anomalies that traditional empiricism 
has not been able to cope with.  (Lila 364-6)

dmb:
This is the basis for my contention that when James is talking concrete 
experience and abstract thought, he's basically talking about DQ and sq. As you 
can see, it is Pirsig himself who thinks he and James are using the terms in 
the same way. Exactly the same terms, he says. I don't think Robert Pirsig 
adopts James's ideas or adds them to his own. It more like they both arrived at 
the same conclusions independently but WE can use James to further explore the 
meaning of the MOQ. This is going to be helpful because people have been 
writing about and thinking about James's work for a hundred years. 

So anyway, concrete experience is just the immediate flux of life, the basic 
flux of experience, direct everyday experience, as described above. That is the 
Dynamic reality, which is distinguished from secondary static concepts. There 
are differences, of course, but in this respect, Pirsig tells us, they are on 
the exact same page.






  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-25 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 11:50 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Dan said to dmb:
 What is a concrete experience? ... The acting agent seems independent from 
 the world as a thing experienced. ... The intellectual structures seem to 
 emerge from the (material) world; this is not what the MOQ says.

 dmb says:
 Well, no. You're reading James as if he subscribed to subject-object 
 metaphysics but quite the opposite is true.

Dan:

This is a tough one... James doesn't seem to subscribe to what RMP
named subject/object metaphysics but like RMP he makes use of it:

If one were to make an evolutionary construction
of how a lot of originally chaotic pure
experience became gradually differentiated
into an orderly inner and outer world, the
whole theory would turn upon one's success in
explaining how or why the quality of an experience,
once active, could become less so, and,
from being an energetic attribute in some
cases, elsewhere lapse into the status of an
inert or merely internal 'nature.'  This would
be the 'evolution' of the psychical from the
bosom of the physical, in which the esthetic,
moral and otherwise emotional experiences
would represent a halfway stage. [Essays in
Radical Empiricism
http://wiretap.area.com/Gopher/Library/Classic/empiricism.txt]

Dan comments:

Do you see what I am saying? Note particularly: This would
be the 'evolution' of the psychical from the bosom of the physical.

He is saying ideas (the psychical) evolve from matter (the bosom of
the physical). This is not what the framework of the MOQ subscribes
to, but rather the other way around.


dmb:
The central point of his pure experience theory is to oppose that.

Dan:

That is entirely possible. But he is not opposing it the same way that
Robert Pirsig opposes it with his MOQ, at least not in my opinion.

dmb:
It's been a long time since I quoted from the end of chapter 29 and
now seems like a good time. As Pirsig describes it, James's radical
empiricism says...
 ...subjects and objects are not the starting points of experience. Subjects 
 and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more 
 fundamental which he described as 'the immediate flux of life which furnishes 
 the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. In this 
 basic flux of experience the distinctions of reflective thought, such as 
 those between consciousness and content, subject and object, mind and matter 
 have not yet emerged in the forms which we make them. Pure experience cannot 
 be called either physical or psychical. It logically proceeds this 
 distinction.
 In his last unfinished work, Some Problems in Philosophy, James had condensed 
 this descriptions to a single sentence: 'There will always be a discrepancy 
 between concepts and reality, because the former are static and 
 discontinuous, while the latter is dynamic and flowing.'  Here James had 
 chosen exactly the same words Phaedrus had used for the basic subdivision of 
 the Metaphysics of Quality.
 ... The metaphysics of quality says pure experience is value. Value is at the 
 very front of the empirical procession. ... It adds that this good is not a 
 social code or some intellectualized Hegellian absolute. It is direct 
 everyday experience. ...Through this identification of pure value with pure 
 experience, the metaphysics of quality paves the way for an enlarged way of 
 looking at experience which can resolve all sorts of anomalies that 
 traditional empiricism has not been able to cope with.  (Lila 364-6)

 dmb:
 This is the basis for my contention that when James is talking concrete 
 experience and abstract thought, he's basically talking about DQ and sq. As 
 you can see, it is Pirsig himself who thinks he and James are using the terms 
 in the same way.

Dan:

He says that James used the same words that Phaedrus used for the
basic division of his metaphysics but I don't think he believes James
is using the terms in the same way.

dmb:
Exactly the same terms, he says.

Dan:

Again, no. That isn't what he said. He said the same words. Words can
and do have different meanings and I don't see that James meant
dynamic in the same sense that Robert Pirsig means Dynamic Quality.
Can we at least agree on that?

dmb:
 I don't think Robert Pirsig adopts James's ideas or adds them to his
own. It more like they both arrived at the same conclusions
independently but WE can use James to further explore the meaning of
the MOQ.

Dan:
Sure. But I doubt they both arrived at the same conclusions. RMP goes
further than does James in formulating a metaphysics centered on
value.

dmb:
This is going to be helpful because people have been writing about and
thinking about James's work for a hundred years.

 So anyway, concrete experience is just the immediate flux of life, the basic 
 flux of experience, direct everyday experience, as described above. That is 
 the Dynamic reality, which is distinguished from secondary static

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-23 Thread david buchanan



Dan said to dmb:
The phenomenal level of concrete experience must refer to inorganic/biological 
patterns of quality. Abstract ideas are not concrete! And again, she seems to 
be saying experience is reduced to the activity of brain cells.

dmb says:
Oh, no. Please read that post again. But this time, as I should have pointed 
out, think of the phenomenal level of concrete experience as equal to Pirsig's 
direct everyday experience or primary empirical reality. James doesn't use 
concrete in any materialist sense of the word, like cement. He means 
experience as it's actually felt and lived, and so he's talking about 
concrete experience as opposed to abstract thought. Please read that post 
again, but this time realize that when James is talking concrete and abstract, 
he's basically talking about DQ and sq. I think you'll find that it does 
address your original question. Where is the will?

Think about what James is saying in comparison to what Pirsig was saying about 
Karma and the negative face of Quality. I'm saying the will is the name for 
that striving and suffering and so the idea refers to something concretely 
lived and felt. It's not meaningless at all. And it's only an illusion, I 
think, to the extent that this idea stopped referring to actual experience and 
instead becomes some kind of metaphysical entity or ontological category. 
That's what reification is. You know, like when subjects and objects are taken 
as the starting points of reality rather than concepts derived from experience. 
For James and Pirsit, ideas can only come from experience. That's what ideas 
are about, that's where they are tested and tried and where they function. The 
abstract always has to come back down to the concrete, to experience as such. 

I think you'll find that you mostly agree with James and Seigfried, if you 
re-read that post with this stuff in mind. 



  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-23 Thread David Thomas

All 
 Dave T said: 
 ...The MoQ is Zen in a Pendleton blanket.
 
 dmb says:
 Zen in a Pendleton. That's pretty good. Wish I'd thought of that.
Dave
Does have a catchy ring to it, but in retrospect it is probably pretty
obscure for most people. My family moved from New York to the Crow
Reservation in Montana in 1949. (about 50 miles east of Busby where RMP
participated in Cheyenne peyote ceremony) So all my growing up experience
from five until I graduated from high school was on the res. At that time
there were still many blanket Indian women. Rather than wear a coat many
traditional older women always wore a blanket as their outer layer of
clothing, winter or summer. Light weight in the summer, heavy in the winter
The primary trading post for the reservation was Hardin, Montana and it
had a saddle shop that was also the biggest Pendleton outlet in the state. I
still remember the smell of leather tack coupled with a huge number of
colorful Pendleton blankets lining the walls at the ceiling. But what was
strange is that colorful ones on the wall were primarily for display because
the Montana Indian women only wore solid or lightly patterned ones in dark
muted colors.
It's kind of ironic that Pendleton was an early supplier of the military for
blankets that were handed out to the Indian tribes. They later did some
market research and designed blankets that the Indians really wanted.
Particularly ones without the smallpox!
http://www.pendleton-usa.com/custserv/custserv.jsp?pageName=IndianTradingpa
rentName=Heritage
So yeah, the image does wrap up the whole East/West Indian thingy nicely.

 Northrop's fusion of East and West is the main inspiration for ZAMM. In fact,
 Pirsig said ZAMM is a kind of popularization of Northrop's thick and difficult
 book. And then the title is a reference to Zen in the Art of Archery, which
 Pirsig and his pal John Sutherland had both read back in the road tripping
 days. And then of course there was some graduate school. He studied Eastern
 Philosophy at Benares University in India. All this was before he wrote his
 first book, which, he openly admits, doesn't really have much to say about Zen
 or motorcycles. 
Dave
My point was that other than intellectual pursuits Pirsig's experience with
Eastern cultures in general is limited to a brief military tour in Korea and
the short time in Benares. And until ZaMM was written he had little or no
direct experience with Zen. But Buddhism in general and Zen even more so
claims that no understanding of it's principles can be achieved without
directly experiencing it.

And his little forward to ZaMM was to some degree was ass covering for both
books as they walk (Lila more than ZaMM) the very fine line between fiction
and memoir. Think of that author the Oprah ripped a new one when he
published his fictionalized life story as a memoir. Primarily it later turns
out at the insistence of his publisher.
 
 Not only is it compatible with the MOQ, at least one scholar thinks that
 Buddha was a pragmatist and a radical empiricist. James was getting it from
 Emerson and he used to bring Buddhists in from abroad to lecture at Harvard.
 After one such lecturer give his talk, James not only thanked and praised the
 man, he said something like, You sir, are a much better psychologist than I
 will ever be. At the time, James had just written a 1200 page text book on
 psychology and with it he had practically invented the discipline. Yea, I
 exaggerate things sometimes, but it really is 1200 pages.
Dave
As a page-master yourself, I can see your inherent attraction to James
quantity. But James point is a good one. There is no doubt Buddhism is good
at psychology and Zen practices, particularly for highly intelligent people
with debilitating cases of monkey mind, is effective if one has or
develops the discipline to follow them.
 
 And then there is the perennial philosophy and philosophical mysticism. Both
 of these stances make the MOQ compatible with mystic philosophies, as well as
 mystic religions like Taoism and Buddhism. Jan-Anders posted a quote from one
 of Pirsig's letters to McWatt and it not only gets at one of the differences
 between the MOQ and Buddhism, it also seems to shed light on this free will
 debate.
Dave
Your advisor's Guidebook to Zen.. unpacks the changes resident in Zen from
it's 1000 year evolution from India to Japan but what concerns me is not the
difference but that under both Zen and the MoQ, in the end they both claim
that mystic experience trumps all. It is as close anyone can get to
experiencing reality as it really is. As I read your recent posting on
mysticism I noted your quote's from Stanford's SEP neglected this first
section:

 1.1 The Wide Sense of Mystical Experience¹
 
 In the wide sense, let us say that a mystical experience,¹ is:
 
 A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual experience
 granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not
 accessible by way of

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-23 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 5:51 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:


 Dan said to dmb:
 The phenomenal level of concrete experience must refer to 
 inorganic/biological patterns of quality. Abstract ideas are not concrete! 
 And again, she seems to be saying experience is reduced to the activity of 
 brain cells.

 dmb says:
 Oh, no. Please read that post again. But this time, as I should have pointed 
 out, think of the phenomenal level of concrete experience as equal to 
 Pirsig's direct everyday experience or primary empirical reality. James 
 doesn't use concrete in any materialist sense of the word, like cement.

Dan:

I was referring to your use of reify: To regard or treat (an
abstraction) as if it had concrete or material existence. Material
existence, to me, signifies materialism and the notion that all
experience arises from the material that constitutes the grey matter
that is our brain. So if James (and I got the distinct feeling from
your post that we were talking more about Siegfried than James) isn't
using reify in that manner, then it is my mistake.

dmb:
He means experience as it's actually felt and lived, and so he's
talking about concrete experience as opposed to abstract thought.

Dan:
What is a concrete experience? I googled William James concrete
experience and found this. I don't know if you've read it or if it
holds any value but it seems to sum up what James is on about when he
writes about concrete experience:

The starting point of James's thought is a deeply (though not
exclusively) empirical concern. His work as a whole is founded upon a
consideration of concrete experience: the world as experienced by an
embodied, embedded, and acting agent. Explicating the lived structures
that constitute our uniquely human way of being in the world, James
insists, is the key to understanding the antecedent categorizations,
conceptualizations, and other intellectual ways of organizing the
world that are founded upon these experiential structures, and which
emerge through our action within the world. These intellectual
structures ultimately reflect the practical concerns of human beings
as they simultaneously shape and are shaped by the world they inhabit
and act within. His concrete analysis, as he terms it, thus provides
the methodological trajectory of his philosophical considerations.
James writes that concreteness as radical as ours is not so obvious.
[http://williamjamesstudies.org/1.1/krueger.html]

Dan comments:
I have concerns with this. The acting agent seems independent from the
world as a thing experienced. I don't understand how James could know
what constitutes the uniqueness of the human way of being in the world
when he could never experience anything but the human way of being in
the world. The intellectual structures seem to emerge from the
(material) world; this is not what the MOQ says. Rather, intellectual
patterns emerge from social patterns. And those intellectual patterns
we call ideas come before the material world, not after.

dmb:
 Please read that post again, but this time realize that when James is
talking concrete and abstract, he's basically talking about DQ and sq.
I think you'll find that it does address your original question. Where
is the will?

Dan:

Reading the post again, I am unsure if I am reading James or
Siegfried. I suspect the latter more than the former. So I found this
from Essays in Radical Empiricism:

The dualism connoted by such double-barrelled terms as * experience,
phenomenon,
datum, Vorfindung* terms which, in philosophy at any rate, tend more
and more to replace the single-barrelled terms of thought and thing
that dualism, I say, is still preserved in this account, but
reinterpreted, so that, instead of being mysterious and elusive,
it becomes verifiable and concrete. It is an affair of relations, it
falls outside, not inside, the
single experience considered, and can always be particularized and defined.

Dan comments:

I suspect what James is saying is that when experience becomes
verifiable and concrete, it is part and parcel of our cultural
mores... it becomes social quality patterns that we all know and
recognize. He seems to be saying there is no single experience, as
such, which agrees with the MOQ. Experience is synonymous with Dynamic
Quality. But I don't see James going that direction. He specifically
states experience is an affair of relations. And it is, but only
afterwards, after we categorize and intellectualize it into that
which we can verify as concrete.

I think Robert Pirsig goes beyond what James is saying when he states
that experience (Dynamic Quality) is both undefined and infinitely
definable. We are constantly defining experience yet it is never
exhausted.

dmb:
 Think about what James is saying in comparison to what Pirsig was saying 
 about Karma and the negative face of Quality. I'm saying the will is the name 
 for that striving and suffering and so the idea refers to something

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will



Sorry everyone my atrocious typing  edition skills presented the Textbook 
quote incorrectly.  




Dave,

I've offered quotes on Buddhism from the MoQ Textbook.  Maybe you think 
Anthony is confused and nihilistic?  In the MoQ Textbook Anthony writes that 
the fundamental nature of the static is the Dynamic:  Moreover, Nagarjuna 
(1966, p.251) shares Pirsig’s perception that the indeterminate (or Dynamic) 
is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static).  -  It is the 
Prajnaparamita
Heart Sutra that states: form is emptiness; emptiness is form or as I 
consider 
it: sq is DQ, DQ is sq.  

Western Philosophy can be every bit as convoluted and nihilistic as Eastern 
Philosophy. I've read that if you read Kant as he wrote it in German, you'd 
find 
many contradictions. Consider 'Thus Spake Zarathustra'.   And what did 
Wittgenstein write:  My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed 
out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the 
ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

So please do not make any apology for Buddhism. Exploring the MoQ together 
with Buddhism is very valid.  


Marsha  

 
___
 

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread Jan-Anders Andersson

Hi Marsha

Before you dive into the deep. Have you ever read this? It's an excerpt from a 
letter written by RMP to Anthony McWatt, March 23, 1997:

 ... 
The MOQ is in agreement with the Buddhist law of Dependent Origination and 
regards this law as an excellent explanation of how Dynamic Quality becomes 
static patterns of quality. The Buddhists however, say that the source of 
patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says the source of the patterns is the 
nothingness of Dynamic Quality. It seems to me that this is 
self-contradictionary for the Buddhists to say that that the world is all 
nothingness and then in almost in the same breath say that everything we know 
arises from something that is not nothingness. This separates nothingness and 
not-nothingness into a deadly dualism. When it is said that the static patterns 
arise from Dynamic Quality the non-dualistic view of the world so 
characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.
  The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of everyday 
life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart that is going 
somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and biological 
patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that percieve the 
quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no evidence of 
this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, does not pay 
attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. The suffering 
which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be escaped, is seen by the 
MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression toward Quality (or, just as 
accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without the suffering to propel it, the 
cart would not move forward at all.
...

I just would like to say that I think it is useless, of no value, no quality at 
all, to equate DQ and SQ.

I remember when I was a kid, me and my brother playing a word game. We took one 
word, just any word, overall or jumper for example, and repeated it to each 
other again and again till the word totally lost its meaning and we cracked up 
like lunatics. 

Jan-Anders


22 jul 2011 kl. 13.31 Marsha wrote:

 On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:07 PM, David Thomas wrote:
 
 On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.
 
 Dave
 I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
 the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
 Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
 the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
 Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
 experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
 seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.
 
 As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
 dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
 again.
 
 
 
 Marsha:
 Today there are, intelligent Buddhist scholars that present Buddhist 
 philosophical 
 ideas clearly and succinctly for Westerners.  I think it is more in keeping 
 with the 
 MoQ to learn something new than rehash the already known.  And meditation, 
 concentration and mindfulness techniques offer first-hand empirical 
 experiences 
 for validation, rather than just words.   It is a shame that I am a minority. 
  It has been 
 said that the shift from a subject-object reality to a Quality reality takes 
 more than 
 intellectually understanding the words on a page. While there is a religious 
 aspect  
 to Buddhism, to become a Buddhist is not to accept a bundle of doctrines and 
 dogma on the basis of faith.  You are NOT suppose to accept claims based on 
 what the Buddha said, but are to examine the arguments and determine for 
 yourself if the arguments are true.  There is no place for psychological 
 bullies 
 within Buddhism.   
 
 Buddhism does have cultural trappings to watch out for, but they are more 
 likely to be questioned by a Westerner.  And lets face it, the West comes 
 with  
 its own set of cultural glasses which often blindsight us to a new more 
 dynamic 
 perspective.  Science, for instance, may be more accepted dogma than fresh 
 investigation.  I am trying say that Buddhism is much, much more than a 
 religion.  

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


J-A,

And?  That was 1996.  Published in 2005, in the Textbook,  Anthony writes that 
the fundamental nature of the static is the Dynamic:  Moreover, Nagarjuna 
(1966, p.251) shares Pirsig’s perception that the indeterminate (or Dynamic) is 
the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static).  Buddhist nothingness 
is not nothingness like 'nothing there' it is Emptiness, that is empty of 
inherent existence.  

 
On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:23 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:

 Hi Marsha
 
 Before you dive into the deep. Have you ever read this? It's an excerpt from 
 a letter written by RMP to Anthony McWatt, March 23, 1997:
 
  ... 
 The MOQ is in agreement with the Buddhist law of Dependent Origination and 
 regards this law as an excellent explanation of how Dynamic Quality becomes 
 static patterns of quality. The Buddhists however, say that the source of 
 patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says the source of the patterns is the 
 nothingness of Dynamic Quality. It seems to me that this is 
 self-contradictionary for the Buddhists to say that that the world is all 
 nothingness and then in almost in the same breath say that everything we know 
 arises from something that is not nothingness. This separates nothingness and 
 not-nothingness into a deadly dualism. When it is said that the static 
 patterns arise from Dynamic Quality the non-dualistic view of the world so 
 characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.

  The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
 the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of everyday 
 life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart that is going 
 somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and biological 
 patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that percieve the 
 quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no evidence of 
 this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, does not pay 
 attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. The suffering 
 which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be escaped, is seen by 
 the MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression toward Quality (or, 
 just as accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without the suffering to 
 propel it, the cart would not move forward at all.
 ...
 

And?  That was 1996.  Published in 2005, in the Textbook,  Anthony writes that 
the fundamental nature of the static is the Dynamic:  Moreover, Nagarjuna 
(1966, p.251) shares Pirsig’s perception that the indeterminate (or Dynamic) is 
the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static).  Buddhist nothingness 
is not nothingness like 'nothing there' it is Emptiness, that is empty of 
inherent existence.   A better understanding of Buddhism has been emerging 
since 1996.   . 


 I just would like to say that I think it is useless, of no value, no quality 
 at all, to equate DQ and SQ.  

And?  Try reading the Heart Sutra.  Maybe you might, at least, get a better 
understanding.  

 I remember when I was a kid, me and my brother playing a word game. We took 
 one word, just any word, overall or jumper for example, and repeated it 
 to each other again and again till the word totally lost its meaning and we 
 cracked up like lunatics. 

Now this bit is useless.   

You may be interested in Buddhism or not, that is up to you.  I have every 
right, though, to pursue the connections.  


 Jan-Anders

Marsha 


 
 
 22 jul 2011 kl. 13.31 Marsha wrote:
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:07 PM, David Thomas wrote:
 
 On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.
 
 Dave
 I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
 the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
 Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
 the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
 Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
 experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
 seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.
 
 As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
 dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
 again.
 
 
 
 Marsha:
 Today there are, intelligent Buddhist scholars that present Buddhist 
 philosophical 
 ideas clearly and succinctly for Westerners.  I think it is more in keeping 
 with the 
 MoQ to learn something new than rehash the already known.  And meditation, 
 concentration and mindfulness techniques offer first-hand empirical 
 experiences 
 for validation, rather than just words.   It is a shame that I am a 
 minority.  It has been 
 said that the shift from a subject-object reality to a Quality reality takes 
 more than 
 intellectually understanding the

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


J-A,

On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:23 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:

 Hi Marsha
 
 Before you dive into the deep. Have you ever read this? It's an excerpt from 
 a letter written by RMP to Anthony McWatt, March 23, 1997:
 
  ... 
 The MOQ is in agreement with the Buddhist law of Dependent Origination and 
 regards this law as an excellent explanation of how Dynamic Quality becomes 
 static patterns of quality. The Buddhists however, say that the source of 
 patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says the source of the patterns is the 
 nothingness of Dynamic Quality. It seems to me that this is 
 self-contradictionary for the Buddhists to say that that the world is all 
 nothingness and then in almost in the same breath say that everything we know 
 arises from something that is not nothingness. This separates nothingness and 
 not-nothingness into a deadly dualism. When it is said that the static 
 patterns arise from Dynamic Quality the non-dualistic view of the world so 
 characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.

 The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
 the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of everyday 
 life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart that is going 
 somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and biological 
 patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that percieve the 
 quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no evidence of 
 this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, does not pay 
 attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. The suffering 
 which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be escaped, is seen by 
 the MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression toward Quality (or, 
 just as accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without the suffering to 
 propel it, the cart would not move forward at all.
 ...
 

And?  That was 1996.  Published in 2005, in the Textbook,  Anthony writes that 
the fundamental nature of the static is the Dynamic:  Moreover, Nagarjuna 
(1966, p.251) shares Pirsig’s perception that the indeterminate (or Dynamic) is 
the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static)  -Buddhist 
nothingness is not nothingness like 'nothing there' it is Emptiness, that 
is empty of inherent existence.   A better understanding of Buddhism has been 
emerging since 1996.   . 


 I just would like to say that I think it is useless, of no value, no quality 
 at all, to equate DQ and SQ.  

And?  Try reading the Heart Sutra.  Maybe you might, at least, get a better 
understanding.  

 I remember when I was a kid, me and my brother playing a word game. We took 
 one word, just any word, overall or jumper for example, and repeated it 
 to each other again and again till the word totally lost its meaning and we 
 cracked up like lunatics. 

Now this bit is useless.   

You may be interested in Buddhism or not, that is up to you.  I have every 
right, though, to pursue the connections.  


 Jan-Anders

Marsha 


 
 
 22 jul 2011 kl. 13.31 Marsha wrote:
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:07 PM, David Thomas wrote:
 
 On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.
 
 Dave
 I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
 the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
 Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
 the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
 Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
 experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
 seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.
 
 As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
 dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
 again.
 
 
 
 Marsha:
 Today there are, intelligent Buddhist scholars that present Buddhist 
 philosophical 
 ideas clearly and succinctly for Westerners.  I think it is more in keeping 
 with the 
 MoQ to learn something new than rehash the already known.  And meditation, 
 concentration and mindfulness techniques offer first-hand empirical 
 experiences 
 for validation, rather than just words.   It is a shame that I am a 
 minority.  It has been 
 said that the shift from a subject-object reality to a Quality reality takes 
 more than 
 intellectually understanding the words on a page. While there is a religious 
 aspect  
 to Buddhism, to become a Buddhist is not to accept a bundle of doctrines and 
 dogma on the basis of faith.  You are NOT suppose to accept claims based on 
 what the Buddha said, but are to examine the arguments and determine for 
 yourself if the arguments are true.  There is no place for psychological 
 bullies 
 within Buddhism.   
 
 Buddhism does have

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Did the Wright brother pursue flight because of suffering?  I don't think so... 
  


On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:46 AM, MarshaV wrote:

 
 J-A,
 
 On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:23 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:
 
 Hi Marsha
 
 Before you dive into the deep. Have you ever read this? It's an excerpt from 
 a letter written by RMP to Anthony McWatt, March 23, 1997:
 
  ... 
 The MOQ is in agreement with the Buddhist law of Dependent Origination and 
 regards this law as an excellent explanation of how Dynamic Quality becomes 
 static patterns of quality. The Buddhists however, say that the source of 
 patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says the source of the patterns is 
 the nothingness of Dynamic Quality. It seems to me that this is 
 self-contradictionary for the Buddhists to say that that the world is all 
 nothingness and then in almost in the same breath say that everything we 
 know arises from something that is not nothingness. This separates 
 nothingness and not-nothingness into a deadly dualism. When it is said that 
 the static patterns arise from Dynamic Quality the non-dualistic view of the 
 world so characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.
 
 The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
 the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of 
 everyday life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart 
 that is going somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and 
 biological patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that 
 percieve the quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no 
 evidence of this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, 
 does not pay attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. 
 The suffering which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be 
 escaped, is seen by the MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression 
 toward Quality (or, just as accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without 
 the suffering to propel it, the cart would not move forward at all.
 ...
 

 

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Sometimes it is good just to put the top down on that cart and just FLY!!!


On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:49 AM, MarshaV wrote:

 
 Did the Wright brother pursue flight because of suffering?  I don't think 
 so...   
 
 
 On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:46 AM, MarshaV wrote:
 
 
 J-A,
 
 On Jul 22, 2011, at 10:23 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:
 
 Hi Marsha
 
 Before you dive into the deep. Have you ever read this? It's an excerpt 
 from a letter written by RMP to Anthony McWatt, March 23, 1997:
 
  ... 
 The MOQ is in agreement with the Buddhist law of Dependent Origination and 
 regards this law as an excellent explanation of how Dynamic Quality becomes 
 static patterns of quality. The Buddhists however, say that the source of 
 patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says the source of the patterns is 
 the nothingness of Dynamic Quality. It seems to me that this is 
 self-contradictionary for the Buddhists to say that that the world is all 
 nothingness and then in almost in the same breath say that everything we 
 know arises from something that is not nothingness. This separates 
 nothingness and not-nothingness into a deadly dualism. When it is said that 
 the static patterns arise from Dynamic Quality the non-dualistic view of 
 the world so characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.
 
 The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma 
 is the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of 
 everyday life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart 
 that is going somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and 
 biological patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that 
 percieve the quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was 
 no evidence of this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, 
 accordingly, does not pay attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so 
 uninformed. The suffering which the Buddhists regard as only that which is 
 to be escaped, is seen by the MOQ as merely the negative side of the 
 progression toward Quality (or, just as accurately, the expansion of 
 quality.) Without the suffering to propel it, the cart would not move 
 forward at all.
 ...
 
 
 
 
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___
 

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread Andre Broersen


J-A to Marsha:

The Buddhists however, say that the source of patterns is ignorance, whereas the MOQ says 
the source of the patterns is the nothingness of Dynamic Quality.

When it is said that the static patterns arise from Dynamic Quality the 
non-dualistic view of the world so characteristic of Buddhism is preserved.

The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of 
karma is the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the 
gyration of everyday life.


J-A concludes:

I just would like to say that I think it is useless, of no value, no quality at 
all, to equate DQ and SQ.

Andre:
And what is Marsha's response,(so characteristic)?: So what? That was 1996.

What an absolutely brilliant response!

Confusing a photo of the scenery with the actual scenery. The map with the 
territory. The menu with the food. The MOQ with experience (DQ), (as Bodvar 
claimed).

Marsha to J-A:
I have every right, though, to pursue the connections.

Andre:
Yes you have that right. The connections, or not, are for you to explore and 
persue. But do you have to bother us with your soliloquize of quest? I mean, 
you don't give a shit about anything or anybody one way or another. You are 
just (ab)using this discuss (and the various contributors who really care) to 
satisfy your own adolescent misgivings.

If you try to find the conflation of DQ/sq, I can tell you now that you will 
not! Unless you keep on deceiving yourself...of which I have no doubt.




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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread david buchanan


dmb says to Dan:
I'm asking about the notion you've been hammering upon: the notion that it is 
our behavior that is without choice, and not us. What is the difference between 
our behavior being without choice and us being without choice. How is that NOT 
the same thing? The question was, if our behavior is controlled, how does that 
fail to count as controlling us? I didn't recognize anything you said as an 
answer to that question. How do you figure that what we do and say and think is 
not us? That's what doesn't make sense, as far as I can tell.


Dan said to dmb:
...Your will is an illusion, an idea. Point to it. Where is it?

dmb addresses that question again, just in case you missed it:


Well, the idea of the will is derived from experience. If this concept is NOT 
reified or otherwise turned into a metaphysical entity, then the idea simply 
refers to actual, concrete experiences. As Siegfried puts it, To call this 
phenomenal experience of activity a MERE ILLUSION is to prefer a hidden 
ontological principle, that can never experienced and thus never verified, to 
an experientially verifiable level of investigation.

As Charlene Siegfried explains it, The first step in the investigation must be 
to seek 'the original type and model of what it means' in the stream of 
experience. She is telling us that concrete experience - as opposed to 
abstract thought - is the only place to look for the meaning of our activity. 
To find out what words like freedom and causality mean, the first thing to do 
is return to the stream of experience to see what they are in the originally 
felt and lived experience. That is where our concepts and abstractions come 
from and that's where they are tried and tested. That's what our ideas are 
about; life as it's lived. 
William James offers this concrete description of human activity: 'But in this 
actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes with 
definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes 
complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the 
efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex 
experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passivity as 
opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal activity comes to 
birth. (ERE, 81-2) James points out that our ideas about about causality and 
freedom are abstractions or generalizations about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 
lived experience. These ideas refer to experiences of process, obstruction, 
striving, strain, or release' and James concludes that we cannot conceive of it 
as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt 
purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcom
 e'. (Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of 
Philosophy, page 319.) 

This are not questions about the number of angles that can fit on a pinhead. 
This is about human life. Big time.

As Charlene says, ...We want to know whether we are responsible for our 
activities or are determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. 
The phenomenal level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right 
questions or frame the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether 
events which we experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be 
reductively attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical 
question James defends the position that the nature, meaning and location of 
causality can be determined only at the phenomenal level of concrete experience 
(Essays in Radical Empiricism, 91). It it thus not a metaphysical question at 
all, but a concrete one, or one answerable within the parameters of radical 
empiricism. Not only does he show that the metaphysical question must be 
dropped as unanswerable on its own terms, but taking activity at its 
face-value, or as we experience it, we also discover 'the very power that makes 
facts c
 ome and be'. In arguing that facts are interactively constituted by us, he has 
finally explicitly drawn the consequences of his break with the empiricist 
assumption that our percepts passively mirror reality as it is in itself. 
(Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, 
page 322.)

To the objection that our felt activity is only an impression and the facts 
are to be found elsewhere he [James] responds with the principle of the 
radically empiricist philosophy according to which anything, to be considered 
real, must be located within experience. If creative activities are to be found 
anywhere, 'they must be immediately lived' (ERE, 92). 

To call this phenomenal experience of activity a MERE ILLUSION is to prefer a 
hidden ontological principle, that can never experienced and thus never 
verified, to an experientially verifiable level of investigation. 



  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread david buchanan


All interested MOQers:

Dave T said:


...The MoQ is Zen in a Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the 
confusion in the MoQ is the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is 
an attempt by a Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen 
of Zen experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind.


dmb says:
Zen in a Pendleton. That's pretty good. Wish I'd thought of that.
Northrop's fusion of East and West is the main inspiration for ZAMM. In fact, 
Pirsig said ZAMM is a kind of popularization of Northrop's thick and difficult 
book. And then the title is a reference to Zen in the Art of Archery, which 
Pirsig and his pal John Sutherland had both read back in the road tripping 
days. And then of course there was some graduate school. He studied Eastern 
Philosophy at Benares University in India. All this was before he wrote his 
first book, which, he openly admits, doesn't really have much to say about Zen 
or motorcycles. 

Not only is it compatible with the MOQ, at least one scholar thinks that Buddha 
was a pragmatist and a radical empiricist. James was getting it from Emerson 
and he used to bring Buddhists in from abroad to lecture at Harvard. After one 
such lecturer give his talk, James not only thanked and praised the man, he 
said something like, You sir, are a much better psychologist than I will ever 
be. At the time, James had just written a 1200 page text book on psychology 
and with it he had practically invented the discipline. Yea, I exaggerate 
things sometimes, but it really is 1200 pages. 

And then there is the perennial philosophy and philosophical mysticism. Both of 
these stances make the MOQ compatible with mystic philosophies, as well as 
mystic religions like Taoism and Buddhism. Jan-Anders posted a quote from one 
of Pirsig's letters to McWatt and it not only gets at one of the differences 
between the MOQ and Buddhism, it also seems to shed light on this free will 
debate.


Pirsig wrote:

The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of everyday 
life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart that is going 
somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and biological 
patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that percieve the 
quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no evidence of 
this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, does not pay 
attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. The suffering 
which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be escaped, is seen by the 
MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression toward Quality (or, just as 
accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without the suffering to propel it, the 
cart would not move forward at all.

Did you catch that. Evolutionary progress is the key difference. Instead of 
seeking escape from karma and suffering, it is accepted as a necessary feature 
of the progress toward Quality. I think this is a pretty big difference and the 
consequences of it are a pretty bid deal. 



  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread John Carl

Hi J-A,

You ask a good question.   I like good questions

Is there a way, is it possible to make classic and romantic oriented people
 to understand each other?



I think yes.  Two things are necessary - first, realization.  When classic
people understand that romantic people think differently, and vice - versa,
it helps.  But only helps.  The other thing you have to have is caring.  You
have to want to be understood and you have to want to understand.  You have
to work at it, and you have to care in order to work.  I think ZAMM itself
comes out as an answer to this conundrum - Think of it as a classically -
oriented Phaedrus, through the narrator, trying to get John and Sylvia to
understand.  He knew there was a difference in their thinking, and he cared
enough to get it all written down.  And in the end, I think he succeeded for
many people.  I think more romantic people understand classic ones (and the
classic in themselves as well - for we're all a mixture in the end) and vice
versa, because of that work, that caring. So there's an answer.

Altho, imo, Lila took this problem up much more explicitly and directly, and
thus is my fave of the two books - but they go together so that's kinda
silly.

Thanks for asking.

 Where do we put Bodvar?

 Jan-Anders


Ha!  Almost a good question.  The real question, is where does Bodvar put
himself?
Bo is alive and communicating avidly in another venue and recently Tim
commented there: (about somebody saying Bo hit the nail on the head)

[Tim]
Maybe he hit the nail on the head, but it is one of those nails that is
all bent from a previous mis-hit and he's hitting it on the head,
pointing it into the wood all away from the nail hole, just to avoid the
effort of extracting the nail and using a new one.


 Priceless, this stuff.


John



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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will



Dmb,

Interesting because James's radical empiricism and pragmatism turns into 
ethical relativism without the evolutionary help of the four levels. It seems 
it was evolutionary progress  that James needed too.  Remember the discussion 
about the holocaust producing satisfaction for the Nazis?  Evolutionary 
progress is the big difference between Jamesian philosophy and the MoQ too. You 
didn't catch that?  


Marsha 



On Jul 22, 2011, at 7:24 PM, david buchanan wrote:

 
 All interested MOQers:
 
 Dave T said:
 
 
 ...The MoQ is Zen in a Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the 
 confusion in the MoQ is the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is 
 an attempt by a Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and 
 smidgen of Zen experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the 
 Western mind.
 
 
 dmb says:
 Zen in a Pendleton. That's pretty good. Wish I'd thought of that.
 Northrop's fusion of East and West is the main inspiration for ZAMM. In fact, 
 Pirsig said ZAMM is a kind of popularization of Northrop's thick and 
 difficult book. And then the title is a reference to Zen in the Art of 
 Archery, which Pirsig and his pal John Sutherland had both read back in the 
 road tripping days. And then of course there was some graduate school. He 
 studied Eastern Philosophy at Benares University in India. All this was 
 before he wrote his first book, which, he openly admits, doesn't really have 
 much to say about Zen or motorcycles. 
 
 Not only is it compatible with the MOQ, at least one scholar thinks that 
 Buddha was a pragmatist and a radical empiricist. James was getting it from 
 Emerson and he used to bring Buddhists in from abroad to lecture at Harvard. 
 After one such lecturer give his talk, James not only thanked and praised the 
 man, he said something like, You sir, are a much better psychologist than I 
 will ever be. At the time, James had just written a 1200 page text book on 
 psychology and with it he had practically invented the discipline. Yea, I 
 exaggerate things sometimes, but it really is 1200 pages. 
 
 And then there is the perennial philosophy and philosophical mysticism. Both 
 of these stances make the MOQ compatible with mystic philosophies, as well as 
 mystic religions like Taoism and Buddhism. Jan-Anders posted a quote from one 
 of Pirsig's letters to McWatt and it not only gets at one of the differences 
 between the MOQ and Buddhism, it also seems to shed light on this free will 
 debate.
 
 
 Pirsig wrote:
 
 The MOQ says, as does Buddhism, that the best place on the wheel of karma is 
 the hub and not the rim where one is thrown about by the gyration of everyday 
 life. But the MOQ sees the wheel of karma as attached to a cart that is going 
 somewhere - from quantum forces through inorganic forces and biological 
 patterns and social patterns to the intellectual patterns that percieve the 
 quantum forces. In the sixth century B.C. in India there was no evidence of 
 this kind of evolutionary progress, and Buddhism, accordingly, does not pay 
 attention to it. Today it's not possible to be so uninformed. The suffering 
 which the Buddhists regard as only that which is to be escaped, is seen by 
 the MOQ as merely the negative side of the progression toward Quality (or, 
 just as accurately, the expansion of quality.) Without the suffering to 
 propel it, the cart would not move forward at all.
 
 Did you catch that. Evolutionary progress is the key difference. Instead of 
 seeking escape from karma and suffering, it is accepted as a necessary 
 feature of the progress toward Quality. I think this is a pretty big 
 difference and the consequences of it are a pretty bid deal. 
 
 
 
 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-22 Thread Dan Glover

On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 4:30 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 dmb says to Dan:
 I'm asking about the notion you've been hammering upon: the notion that it is 
 our behavior that is without choice, and not us. What is the difference 
 between our behavior being without choice and us being without choice. How is 
 that NOT the same thing? The question was, if our behavior is controlled, 
 how does that fail to count as controlling us? I didn't recognize anything 
 you said as an answer to that question. How do you figure that what we do and 
 say and think is not us? That's what doesn't make sense, as far as I can tell.


 Dan said to dmb:
 ...Your will is an illusion, an idea. Point to it. Where is it?

 dmb addresses that question again, just in case you missed it:


 Well, the idea of the will is derived from experience.

Dan:

That is what I said: will is an idea.

dmb:
 If this concept is NOT reified or otherwise turned into a
metaphysical entity, then the idea simply refers to actual, concrete
experiences.

Dan:
I don't get this. To reify means to make the abstract concrete. So to
reify a concept is to turn it into actual, concrete experience. You
seem to be saying the opposite here.

dmb:
As Siegfried puts it, To call this phenomenal experience of activity
a MERE ILLUSION is to prefer a hidden ontological principle, that can
never experienced and thus never verified, to an experientially
verifiable level of investigation.

Dan:
I didn't call it a mere illusion. An idea or a concept isn't
concrete experience. It will never hit you upside the head because you
didn't open the door far enough before you tried to walk through it or
trip you up when you're walking down the stairs. In the MOQ, an idea
is static intellectual quality... non-physical.

dmb:
 As Charlene Siegfried explains it, The first step in the investigation must 
 be to seek 'the original type and model of what it means' in the stream of 
 experience. She is telling us that concrete experience - as opposed to 
 abstract thought - is the only place to look for the meaning of our activity.

Dan:

Then she is contradicting the MOQ. In the MOQ, ideas come before
matter. Concrete experience of matter arises from abstract thought,
not the other way around.

dmb:
To find out what words like freedom and causality mean, the first
thing to do is return to the stream of experience to see what they are
in the originally felt and lived experience. That is where our
concepts and abstractions come from and that's where they are tried
and tested. That's what our ideas are about; life as it's lived.

Dan:
Experience is synonymous with Dynamic Quality. As such, experience
doesn't arise in the material brain. The idea that matter comes before
ideas is a high quality idea. We for the most part live our lives by
that idea. And this is to what Siegfried seems to be alluding to.

dmb:
 William James offers this concrete description of human activity: 'But in 
 this actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes 
 with definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes 
 complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the 
 efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in 
 complex experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of 
 passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal 
 activity comes to birth. (ERE, 81-2) James points out that our ideas about 
 about causality and freedom are abstractions or generalizations about the 
 'ultimate Qualiia' of lived experience. These ideas refer to experiences of 
 process, obstruction, striving, strain, or release' and James concludes that 
 we cannot conceive of it as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of 
 something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or 
 being overcom
  e'. (Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of 
 Philosophy, page 319.)

Dan:

Yes... I would say James' ultimate Qualia might be seen as
synonymous with RMP's Dynamic Quality although process, obstruction,
striving, strain, or release must refer to static quality patterns.

dmb:
 This are not questions about the number of angles that can fit on a pinhead. 
 This is about human life. Big time.

Dan:
I agree.

dmb:
 As Charlene says, ...We want to know whether we are responsible for our 
 activities or are determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. 
 The phenomenal level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right 
 questions or frame the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether 
 events which we experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be 
 reductively attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical 
 question James defends the position that the nature, meaning and location of 
 causality can be determined only at the phenomenal level of concrete 
 experience

Dan:

The

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


 Hi Ham,

This is the most interesting topic.   It's a constant question, but I have not 
found an answer.  


On Jul 21, 2011, at 12:28 AM, Ham Priday wrote:

 
 Dear Marsha --
 
 On Tuesday, July 19, you said to Joe:
 
 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.
 
 Did you not read Dave Thomas's post recounting a recent TV appearance of the 
 Dalai Lama?
 
 [David on 7/18]:
 I once paraphrased to Marsha that I saw him in a TV clip snap
 at a questioner who asked him some question about the Buddhist
 principle of no-self.I said, because I did not have access to the
 clip, He said something like (and this really pissed her off),
 If you have no self, who is it that is going to change?
 
 Ham:
 You don't observe the experience of subjective awareness because it's what 
 you ARE.  

Marsha:
The question is am I an 'autonomous' self.  There certainly is experience of 
awareness, but that seems to be just a pattern that occasionally occurs within 
consciousness awareness.  

 
 Ham:
 Like it or not, you are a conscious subject, and subjects can't observe or 
 witness themselves as objects.  

Marsha:
There is conscious awareness, and there sometimes is a 'sense of self' that 
occurs, but that is not proof that the 'sense of self' is a real 'autonomous 
self.'   As you admit there is not way the witnessing becomes the object of 
observation.  


 Ham:
 The subjective self and its conscious stream of passing experiences is 
 permanent only as long as the being of that self is alive.

Marsha:
There is no way to know what goes on before birth or after death.  And there 
are plenty of times when I am not aware of a 'sense of self'.  In what way can 
it be permanent when it often isn't there.  This 'sense of self 'seems more a 
pattern that sometimes occur within consciousness.


 Ham:
 Now, you can say that your self is not real or is only interconnected 
 patterns, does not exist in the sense that objects exist, and cannot be 
 directly observed in the sense that objects are observed.  Nonetheless, if 
 Marsha's self were removed, Marsha and her reality would disappear.

Marsha:
I am questioning your use of autonomous  self, and you are begging the 
question here by assuming Marsha's self exists to be removed or disappear.  
  

 Ham:
 I'm curious as to what investigation has convinced you that your self is 
 not autonomous.  How does one go about investigating herself?   Brain 
 scanning?  Hypnosis?  Psychotherapy?   And if, as the Dalai Lama suggested, 
 you have no self, who or what is it that makes Marsha's choices and 
 preferences?  Quality patterns?  DQ?  Collective consciiousness?

Marsha:
Meditation and mindfulness are the tools I use to investigate 
mind/consciousness.  My experiences are co-dependent on many conditions 
(patterns), conscious awareness may be one of those conditions.  I do not have 
the exact quote or context for the Dalai Lama statements, so I cannot guess 
what he meant.  But everyone, even the Dalai Lama accepts the conventional use 
of the term self.  The question is what is behind that convention?  That's my 
interest.  And your assumptions are not evidence. 


 Ham:
 Do you really believe yourself to be subservient to the reality you create, 
 Marsha?  

Marsha:
No. I would use the word interconnected rather than subservient.   



 Ham:
 Or are you still puzzling it out?  I would like to believe you KNOW you are a 
 real person with a personna and a self of your own, just like the rest of us. 
  But your proclaimed self-denial has me confused.

Marsha:
I am a conventionally real person.  I have never denied this conventional 
'sense of self.'   But isn't metaphysics a search beyond the conventional?  

You have not answered either of my questions, and I do not find any evidence of 
an autonomous self. 



 
 Please restore my confidence, Marsha.
 
 Best wishes,
 Ham
 


Thank you. 


Marsha


 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Hi Dan,

How to pay better attention?  Maybe Mindfulness is not the only tool for paying 
attention, but I find it a very valuable technique.  I recently sent this paper 
to a friend, but maybe some on the list might find it helpful.  It is 'The 
Power of Mindfulness' by Ven. Nayaponika Thera.  It's a very good paper on the 
subject.   


http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/powermindfulness.pdf


For what it's worth.   



Marsha



On Jul 21, 2011, at 1:41 AM, Dan Glover wrote:

 Hello everyone
 
 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 1:48 PM, Steven Peterson
 peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
 Hi Dan,
 
 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 2:33 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote:
 Hello everyone
 
 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 11:46 AM, Steven Peterson
 peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
 In the MOQ,
 this dilemma doesn't come up. Instead, in the MOQ the issue of
 freedom is about static versus dynamic Quality. To the extent we
 follow static patterns we are not free, to the extent we are acting in
 response to DQ, we are free.
 
 But to exactly what extent IS that? What is interesting to me is that
 what we seem to have here is a whole new MOQ Platypus after the SOM
 Platypi have been dissolved. Because Pirsig says we cannot distinguish
 degeneracy from DQ until long after the fact we just can't say to what
 extent we are free.
 
 Dan:
 You're phrasing your rephrasing of RMP wrongly, in my opinion. He is
 not saying we are free. He is saying to the extent we follow Dynamic
 Quality, our behavior is free... our actions and our reactions to
 inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual stimuli. We are not
 free to the extent our behavior is controlled by those static quality
 patterns.
 
 Steve:
 I wasn't trying to create any controversy on that point. The exact
 quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is
 controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to
 the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable,
 one’s behavior is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free
 will to the extent we follow DQ and are determined to the extent that
 WE are controlled by static patterns. I'm not sure that I understand
 the distinction you are making, but I do notice in RMPs reformulation
 of the issue the notion of we as well as the will is conspicuously
 absent. dmb sees these notions as implied. I see them as deliberately
 left out.
 
 Dan:
 
 The Will seems to be something like the Spirit, so I can see why it is
 absent. It doesn't exist except as an idea.
 
 
 
 Dan:
 We know to what extent our behavior is controlled. If we did not, I
 doubt we'd be talking right now. We follow the law. We do what is
 expected. And we do this to seek approval from others. Yet, we yearn
 for freedom even if we don't really understand what it is that we're
 yearning for.
 
 Steve:
 We do know that our behavior is controlled to some extent, but I would
 say that we have no idea how far that goes.
 
 Dan:
 Then we haven't been paying attention.
 
 Steve:
 As for yearning for freedom, I think Pirsig substitutes the positive
 goal of yearning for quality for the negative goal of freedom from
 constraint.
 
 Dan:
 Freedom from constraint is a negative goal? How so? As to yearning for
 quality, we all do that anyway. That's why RMP used quality as a basis
 for his metaphysics. Right?
 
 
 
 
 Dan:
 What you seem to be asking is: how can we be free without sinking into
 some sort of degeneracy? The short answer is: we can't. But there is a
 longer answer that says: by seeking an understanding of the
 biological, social, and intellectual ramifications of our actions and
 reactions to stimuli, we are better able to chart a course away from
 all patterns and avoid for example the biological degeneracy that did
 in the hippies and the social degeneracy that devoured communism and
 the intellectual degeneracy that destroyed Nietzsche.
 
 Huh?
 
 Steve:
 What I was trying to do is move the conversation forward. Instead of
 arguing whether or not Pirsig's statement is a middle ground between
 free will and determinism [dmb] or better viewed as a rejection of
 both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma in
 favor of a whole new reformulation of the question of freedom [steve],
 we might move forward toward discussing Pirsig's reformulation itself.
 
 Pirsig says, “To the extent that one’s behavior is controlled by
 static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to the extent
 that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one’s behavior
 is free.” So our behavior is free to some extent and not free to some
 extent. Ok, but...
 
 (1) ...to exactly what extent IS that? Isn't THAT the question we need
 to know about freedom? Everyone knows that our behaviors are
 constrained to some extent, but how far does that go?
 
 Dan:
 
 In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
 into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
 patterns and

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread Andre Broersen


Steve to Dan:

(1) ...to exactly what extent IS that? Isn't THAT the question we need
to know about freedom? Everyone knows that our behaviors are
constrained to some extent, but how far does that go?

(2) How do we come to know the difference (if we ever do) between
being controlled by static patterns and following DQ?

(3) Why are static patterns thought of as controlling our behavior
while DQ is thought of as being followed?

Andre:
What I have missed, in a possible answer/finger pointing to, in this discussion 
is the story of Lila as it is told by Pirsig in LILA. Why did Pirsig give her 
that surname and how did she blew it? He says:
Biologically she's fine, socially she's pretty far down the scale, [as an 
intellectual] she's nowhere. But Dynamically...Ah! That's the one to watch. There is 
something ferociously Dynamic going on with her.( Can this be regarded as her 'will to be 
free?') All that aggression, that tough talk, those strange bewildered blue 
eyes.(LILA, p 165)

Lila is clearly not happy with her situation. She finds herself, like the 
amoeba, in a low quality environment.

Does she have Quality? Biologically she does, socially she doesn't

And she is determined to do something about that. She is following DQ in search 
of acceptance, status, security, comfort... Richard Rigel! You name it. All 
social patterns of value. That is all she sees from her vantage point. And this 
is the reason she 'blew it'.

Pirsig, from the AHP tapes:

She wasn't ready to emerge from her static patterns. She was still locked into 
them. She still longed for this man she slept with in childhood, immorally. She was still 
longing for her child. She still longed for social acceptance. For Lila, Quality was 
acceptance by society. And so she wasn't ready to keep on going. And she went back to 
Rigel.

So it appears as well that to follow Dynamic Quality means to keep on going. To 
not be constrained by biological patterns, nor social patterns nor intellectual 
patterns.

the MOQ...denies any existence of a self that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual 
patterns. There is no self that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with 
both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to big self and small self. 
Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality.
(Annotn. 29)

It seems to me that, what Pirsig calls follow Dynamic Quality he means following a path 
towards enlightenment. But, as Anthony observes in his PhD (pp44-5)...one should not be 
seeking to arrive at just recognizing Dynamic Quality but to a more profound understanding: 'The 
teaching of emptiness is actually an affirmation of the dynamic interconnectedness of all 
things'...The treatment of Quality through ZMM (its formlessness) and LILA (its forms) can, when 
taken together, be read as reflecting the circle of enlightenment...To use Pirsig's terminology, 
enlightenment as such entails an awareness of Dynamic Quality through static quality patterns.

Clearly Lila Blewitt has a way to go yet.

Hope this helps somewhat.



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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi dmb,

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 4:16 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Steve said to Dan:

 ...The exact quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is 
 controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to the 
 extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one’s behavior 
 is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free will to the extent we 
 follow DQ and are determined to the extent that WE are controlled by static 
 patterns. ... I do notice in RMPs reformulation of the issue the notion of 
 we as well as the will is conspicuously absent. dmb sees these notions as 
 implied.  ...Instead of arguing whether or not Pirsig's statement is a middle 
 ground between free will and determinism [dmb] or better viewed as a 
 rejection of both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma 
 in favor of a whole new reformulation of the question of freedom [steve], we 
 might move forward toward discussing Pirsig's reformulation itself. Pirsig 
 says, “To the extent that one’s behavior is controlled by static patterns of 
 quality it is without choice.  But to the extent that one follows Dynamic 
 Quality, which is undefinable, one’s behavior is free.” So our behavior is 
 free to some extent and not free to some extent.



 dmb says:
 As far as I can tell, you're the only one who is NOT talking about Pirsig's 
 reformulation. You keep pretending that I'm not talking about freedom and 
 constraint within the terms of Pirsig's reformulation no matter how many 
 times I tell you otherwise. My claims have nothing to do with the claims of 
 the straw man you've invented. As a result, you are arguing with nobody about 
 nothing. One can only wonder why, I suppose, but I'd guess that it's a 
 desperation move aimed at avoiding the actual claims.

Steve:
Instead of shifting to the straw man defense, why not just say that
you now understand and agree with what I have been saying all
along--that the MOQ denies both horns of the traditional free
will/determinism debate by denying the fundamental premise upon which
it rests? That would be the honest and honorable thing to do here.

Best,
Steve
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi dmb,

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 6:00 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Marsha said to dmb:

 Now you seem to understand why I've stated that I neither accept free-will, 
 nor deny free-will.  It's irrelevant within the MoQ.

 dmb says:
 Nothing could be further from the truth. I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates 
 the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the MOST relevant 
 thing in the universe. I'm correcting the distortion which render it 
 irrelevant and meaningless, such as your's and Steve's. I'm saying freedom 
 and constraint go all the way down and I'm saying that AGAINST your vacuous 
 nihilism.

 Like Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as 
 opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no 
 self at all.

Steve:
But that's not at all what I have been saying. This debate has been
going on since April, and I've been consistent with my position since
then. Here is what I said on my original entry into the debate back in
April:

The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the
reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands
behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit
an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and
the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred
to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I
have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent
that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is
such a thing as I that has important ontological status that
transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes
no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question
that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can
reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns
(small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for
change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all
the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and
destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what
Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current
patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not
free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our
preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate,
sustain, or destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and
better ones. To the extent we do we are free. Cultivating practices
such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death
and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is
striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns
that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought
not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with
improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free.

dmb:
In Pirsig's formulation, the one who is free to some extent and the
one controlled to some extent is that dependent self. That is the
self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's
what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.

Steve:
That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free
(independent)? That is a simple logical contradiction. Please refer to
my post from April to understand how self comes into the this issue.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

 

Hi Steve,

Dmb is full of baloney.  I've for years stated my recognition of a conventional 
self, but denied the existence of an inherently existing, independent self.   
And he knows that.  He's changed the vocabulary and the issues of the 
discussion without explanation, and thinks nobody has noticed.  

Marsha 






On Jul 21, 2011, at 8:49 AM, Steven Peterson wrote:

 Hi dmb,
 
 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 6:00 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com 
 wrote:
 
 Marsha said to dmb:
 
 Now you seem to understand why I've stated that I neither accept free-will, 
 nor deny free-will.  It's irrelevant within the MoQ.
 
 dmb says:
 Nothing could be further from the truth. I'm saying that the MOQ 
 reformulates the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the 
 MOST relevant thing in the universe. I'm correcting the distortion which 
 render it irrelevant and meaningless, such as your's and Steve's. I'm saying 
 freedom and constraint go all the way down and I'm saying that AGAINST your 
 vacuous nihilism.
 
 Like Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - 
 as opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there 
 is no self at all.
 
 Steve:
 But that's not at all what I have been saying. This debate has been
 going on since April, and I've been consistent with my position since
 then. Here is what I said on my original entry into the debate back in
 April:
 
 The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the
 reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands
 behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit
 an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and
 the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred
 to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I
 have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent
 that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is
 such a thing as I that has important ontological status that
 transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes
 no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question
 that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can
 reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns
 (small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for
 change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all
 the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and
 destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what
 Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current
 patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not
 free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our
 preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate,
 sustain, or destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and
 better ones. To the extent we do we are free. Cultivating practices
 such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death
 and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is
 striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns
 that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought
 not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with
 improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free.
 
 dmb:
 In Pirsig's formulation, the one who is free to some extent and the
 one controlled to some extent is that dependent self. That is the
 self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's
 what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.
 
 Steve:
 That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free
 (independent)? That is a simple logical contradiction. Please refer to
 my post from April to understand how self comes into the this issue.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


5.6  THE NOTION OF THE SELF

An example of sammuti-sacca is the concept of self.  Pirsig follows the 
Buddha's teachings about the 'self' which doesn't recognize that it has any 
real existence and that only 'nothingness' (i.e. Dynamic Quality) is thought to 
be real.  According to Rahula, the Buddha taught that a clinging to the self as 
real is the primary cause of dukkha (which is usually translated as 
suffering').  Having said this, Rahula (1959, p.55) makes it very clear that 
it's not incorrect to 'use such expressions in our daily life as 'I', 'you' 
'being', 'individual', etc' as long as it is remembered that the self (like 
anything else conceptualised) is just a useful convention.  
 
  (McWatt, Anthony, 'AN INTRODUCTION TO ROBERT PIRSIG’S METAPHYSICS OF 
QUALITY', 2010)  


 Sammuti-sacca is the 'static conventional truth.   
 
 
On Jul 21, 2011, at 10:02 AM, MarshaV wrote:

 
 
 Hi Steve,
 
 Dmb is full of baloney.  I've for years stated my recognition of a 
 conventional self, but denied the existence of an inherently existing, 
 independent self.   And he knows that.  He's changed the vocabulary and the 
 issues of the discussion without explanation, and thinks nobody has noticed.  
 
 Marsha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 8:49 AM, Steven Peterson wrote:
 
 Hi dmb,
 
 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 6:00 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com 
 wrote:
 
 Marsha said to dmb:
 
 Now you seem to understand why I've stated that I neither accept free-will, 
 nor deny free-will.  It's irrelevant within the MoQ.
 
 dmb says:
 Nothing could be further from the truth. I'm saying that the MOQ 
 reformulates the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the 
 MOST relevant thing in the universe. I'm correcting the distortion which 
 render it irrelevant and meaningless, such as your's and Steve's. I'm 
 saying freedom and constraint go all the way down and I'm saying that 
 AGAINST your vacuous nihilism.
 
 Like Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - 
 as opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there 
 is no self at all.
 
 Steve:
 But that's not at all what I have been saying. This debate has been
 going on since April, and I've been consistent with my position since
 then. Here is what I said on my original entry into the debate back in
 April:
 
 The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the
 reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands
 behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit
 an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and
 the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred
 to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I
 have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent
 that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is
 such a thing as I that has important ontological status that
 transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes
 no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question
 that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can
 reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns
 (small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for
 change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all
 the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and
 destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what
 Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current
 patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not
 free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our
 preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate,
 sustain, or destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and
 better ones. To the extent we do we are free. Cultivating practices
 such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death
 and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is
 striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns
 that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought
 not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with
 improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free.
 
 dmb:
 In Pirsig's formulation, the one who is free to some extent and the
 one controlled to some extent is that dependent self. That is the
 self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's
 what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.
 
 Steve:
 That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free
 (independent)? That is a simple logical contradiction. Please refer to
 my post from April to understand how self comes into the this issue.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


dmb said:
... I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates the issue so that freedom and 
constraint are just about the MOST relevant thing in the universe. I'm 
correcting the distortions which render it irrelevant and meaningless, such as 
Steve's. I'm saying freedom and constraint go all the way down Steve, you 
don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as opposed to an 
independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no self at all.


Steve replied:
...I've been consistent with my position since my original entry back in April: 
...The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the 
patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are 
collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to 
ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the 
extent that it needs to be unasked. ... We can identify with our current 
patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We 
are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ...

dmb says:
Right, this is the position I'm complaining about. I think you're way off the 
mark and the fact that you've pressed it consistently since April only makes 
matters worse. Your defense would only lead me to expand the charges against 
you from assault to aggravated assault. It's true that the MOQ does not posit 
an independent self above and beyond DQ and sq. We agree on that much but then 
you make the crucial mistake that I'm complaining about. Because the 
independent Cartesian self has been rejected, you say, questions about freedom 
and constraint couldn't possibly make sense and we have to unask those 
questions. That's the move that renders freedom and constraint irrelevant and 
meaningless. That's the move that leads you to such nihilistic conclusions. I'm 
saying that these questions could not be more relevant or more meaningful. 
You're saying the very opposite BECAUSE you don't seem to understand that the 
MOQ's dependent self is the one (the person, the individual) who is
  free to some extent and controlled to some extent in Pirsig's reformulation. 
Like I said, that is the self for whom freedom and control is anything but 
irrelevant. That's what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.

Steve replied:
That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free (independent)? 
That is a simple logical contradiction.



dmb says:
Oh, I see. You're equating free and independent. That conflates two 
different senses of the word independent. In that case, it's no wonder you're 
confused. By extension, I suppose you are also equating dependence with 
unfreedom or with being controlled like a slave. If I were using the terms that 
way, my claim would be nonsense. But I'm not using them that way.
The Cartesian self was seen as independent in the sense that it stood apart and 
was ontologically distinct from the external and objective reality. It was 
independent in the sense of being an entity that is discontinuous with the 
outer world and stands over or against it. This is what Pirsig calls the 
metaphysics of substance wherein reality is made of two distinctly different 
kinds of substance, namely mind and matter or mental substance and physical 
substance. In the MOQ, this independent gets ditched in favor of a dependent 
self.
When I say dependent self, it does NOT mean this self is unfree or that it is 
a slave. It means just means that this self is NOT discontinuous with the rest 
of reality. It's not made of a different kind of substance or a metaphysical 
entity. Instead, this self is dependent in the sense that it exists in relation 
to the evolutionary moral framework of the MOQ. Mind and matter are not opposed 
ontological categories, they are names for the levels of evolution. As Pirsig 
puts it, they have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship, which is to say 
mind DEPENDS upon the social, biological and inorganic patterns from which it 
evolved. These patterns contain the MOQ's dependent self and that is the self 
about whom we are asking questions. That's the one whose will is both free 
and determined to some extent. That is the one who is free to follow DQ to 
some extent and the one who is controlled static patterns to some extent, as 
in the Pirsig quote you like so well. 

the MOQ...denies any existence of a self that is independent of inorganic, 
biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no self that contains 
these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both 
religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to 
big self and small self. Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic 
Quality. (Annotn. 29)


  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Dan said:
The Will seems to be something like the Spirit, so I can see why it is absent. 
It doesn't exist except as an idea.

dmb says:
Well, the idea of the will is derived from experience. If this concept is NOT 
reified or otherwise turned into a metaphysical entity, then the idea simply 
refers to actual, concrete experiences. As Siegfried puts it, To call this 
phenomenal experience of activity a MERE ILLUSION is to prefer a hidden 
ontological principle, that can never experienced and thus never verified, to 
an experientially verifiable level of investigation.

As Charlene Siegfried explains it, The first step in the investigation must be 
to seek 'the original type and model of what it means' in the stream of 
experience. She is telling us that concrete experience - as opposed to 
abstract thought - is the only place to look for the meaning of our activity. 
To find out what words like freedom and causality mean, the first thing to do 
is return to the stream of experience to see what they are in the originally 
felt and lived experience. That is where our concepts and abstractions come 
from and that's where they are tried and tested. That's what our ideas are 
about; life as it's lived. 
William James offers this concrete description of human activity: 'But in this 
actual world or ours, as it is given, a part at least of activity comes with 
definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal; it comes 
complicated with resistances which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the 
efforts which the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex 
experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of passivity as 
opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of causal activity comes to 
birth. (ERE, 81-2) James points out that our ideas about about causality and 
freedom are abstractions or generalizations about the 'ultimate Qualiia' of 
lived experience. These ideas refer to experiences of process, obstruction, 
striving, strain, or release' and James concludes that we cannot conceive of it 
as lived through except 'in the dramatic shape of something sustaining a felt 
purpose against felt obstacles, and overcoming or being overcom
 e'. (Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of 
Philosophy, page 319.) 

This are not questions about the number of angles that can fit on a pinhead. 
This is about human life. Big time.

As Charlene says, ...We want to know whether we are responsible for our 
activities or are determined by events outside of our knowledge and control. 
The phenomenal level cannot be superseded if we are even to ask the right 
questions or frame the experiments correctly. The issue is precisely whether 
events which we experience as ours are in fact so, or whether they should be 
reductively attributed to brain cells. In returning to the metaphysical 
question James defends the position that the nature, meaning and location of 
causality can be determined only at the phenomenal level of concrete experience 
(Essays in Radical Empiricism, 91). It it thus not a metaphysical question at 
all, but a concrete one, or one answerable within the parameters of radical 
empiricism. Not only does he show that the metaphysical question must be 
dropped as unanswerable on its own terms, but taking activity at its 
face-value, or as we experience it, we also discover 'the very power that makes 
facts c
 ome and be'. In arguing that facts are interactively constituted by us, he has 
finally explicitly drawn the consequences of his break with the empiricist 
assumption that our percepts passively mirror reality as it is in itself. 
(Charlene Seigfried in William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, 
page 322.)

To the objection that our felt activity is only an impression and the facts 
are to be found elsewhere he [James] responds with the principle of the 
radically empiricist philosophy according to which anything, to be considered 
real, must be located within experience. If creative activities are to be found 
anywhere, 'they must be immediately lived' (ERE, 92). 

To call this phenomenal experience of activity a MERE ILLUSION is to prefer a 
hidden ontological principle, that can never experienced and thus never 
verified, to an experientially verifiable level of investigation. 





  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

Hi dmb,

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 dmb said:
 ... I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates the issue so that freedom and 
 constraint are just about the MOST relevant thing in the universe. I'm 
 correcting the distortions which render it irrelevant and meaningless, such 
 as Steve's. I'm saying freedom and constraint go all the way down Steve, 
 you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as opposed to 
 an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no self at 
 all.


 Steve replied:
 ...I've been consistent with my position since my original entry back in 
 April: ...The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond 
 the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are 
 collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense 
 to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the 
 extent that it needs to be unasked. ... We can identify with our current 
 patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We 
 are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ...

 dmb says:
 Right, this is the position I'm complaining about. I think you're way off the 
 mark and the fact that you've pressed it consistently since April only makes 
 matters worse. Your defense would only lead me to expand the charges 
 against you from assault to aggravated assault. It's true that the MOQ does 
 not posit an independent self above and beyond DQ and sq. We agree on that 
 much but then you make the crucial mistake that I'm complaining about. 
 Because the independent Cartesian self has been rejected, you say, questions 
 about freedom and constraint couldn't possibly make sense and we have to 
 unask those questions.


Steve:
You are bending over backwards to disagree with me. I most certainly
did NOT say that questions about freedom and constraint don't make
sense in the MOQ. In fact, you've made this false accusation of me
about 20 times now and each time I've corrected you on this point.

Above you have me quoted as saying that the traditional formulation of
the question of freedom in term of free will versus determinism
doesn't make sense in the MOQ. The MOQ rejects the premise upon which
that debate rests. It reformulates the question in terns of sq and DQ
rather than in terms of the will of an free subject.



dmb:
That's the move that renders freedom and constraint irrelevant and
meaningless. That's the move that leads you to such nihilistic
conclusions. I'm saying that these questions could not be more
relevant or more meaningful. You're saying the very opposite BECAUSE
you don't seem to understand that the MOQ's dependent self is the
one (the person, the individual) who is free to some extent and
controlled to some extent in Pirsig's reformulation. Like I said, that
is the self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant.
That's what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.

Steve:
This is such B.S. You have just snipped out from the above quote that
you are responding to where I said back in April, Instead, in MOQ
terms we can
reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns
(small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for
change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all
the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and
destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what
Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current
patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not
free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our
preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate,
sustain, or destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and
better ones. To the extent we do we are free.

And then, as if you were teaching me a lesson, you quote this to me
In Zen, there is reference to big self and small self. Small self
is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. Now isn't that exactly
what I just said???


 Steve replied:
 That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free (independent)? 
 That is a simple logical contradiction.


 dmb says:
 Oh, I see. You're equating free and independent. That conflates two 
 different senses of the word independent. In that case, it's no wonder 
 you're confused. By extension, I suppose you are also equating dependence 
 with unfreedom or with being controlled like a slave. If I were using the 
 terms that way, my claim would be nonsense. But I'm not using them that way.

Steve:
Dependent self means that it depends on something. It doesn't mean
controlled like a slave, but it does mean not free, i.e., not DQ.
The dependent self (small self is Pirsig's term) DEPENDS on
inorganic, biological, social and intellectual patterns. Small self
does not contain these patterns. These patterns contain small self
This small

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

 Steve:
 I wasn't trying to create any controversy on that point. The exact
 quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is
 controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to
 the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable,
 one’s behavior is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free
 will to the extent we follow DQ and are determined to the extent that
 WE are controlled by static patterns. I'm not sure that I understand
 the distinction you are making, but I do notice in RMPs reformulation
 of the issue the notion of we as well as the will is conspicuously
 absent. dmb sees these notions as implied. I see them as deliberately
 left out.

 Dan:

 The Will seems to be something like the Spirit, so I can see why it is
 absent. It doesn't exist except as an idea.

Steve:
It also exists as a subjective experience. We have the sense of
willing some of our acts, but when we think of the will as an
experience, it just doesn't make sense to ask is this experience
free?


 Dan:
 We know to what extent our behavior is controlled. If we did not, I
 doubt we'd be talking right now. We follow the law. We do what is
 expected. And we do this to seek approval from others. Yet, we yearn
 for freedom even if we don't really understand what it is that we're
 yearning for.

 Steve:
 We do know that our behavior is controlled to some extent, but I would
 say that we have no idea how far that goes.

 Dan:
 Then we haven't been paying attention.

Steve:
 As for yearning for freedom, I think Pirsig substitutes the positive
 goal of yearning for quality for the negative goal of freedom from
 constraint.

 Dan:
 Freedom from constraint is a negative goal? How so? As to yearning for
 quality, we all do that anyway. That's why RMP used quality as a basis
 for his metaphysics. Right?

Steve:
I was referring to this quote from the 1984 afterword of ZAMM:

The hippies had in mind something that they wanted, and were calling
it “freedom,” but in the final analysis “freedom” is a purely negative
goal. It just says something is bad. ...This book offers another, more
serious alternative to material success. It’s not so much an
alternative as an expansion of the meaning of “success” to something
larger than just getting a good job and staying out of trouble. And
also something larger than mere freedom. It gives a positive goal to
work toward that does not confine. That is the main reason for the
book’s success, I think. The whole culture happened to be looking for
exactly what this book has to offer. That is the sense in which it is
a culture-bearer.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread Andre Broersen

Steve to dmb:

That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free (independent)?
That is a simple logical contradiction.

Andre:
Not read my latest post I presume? A 'dependent self' can be free (independent)
and indeed within the MOQ this seemingly logical contradiction is true and has
a very simple resolution. As Pirsig says (for goodness sake Steve I thought you
knew this!) biologically she's fine, socially she's way down the ladder. This
is taking the so called (SOM) 'logical contradiction' by the throat and
explaining it within a value centered metaphysics.

She has quality and she hasn't.

Let me give you the simplest example: parents and child. The child is dependent
on parents...for some time and then finds his/her own way...free. His/her path
is partially determined by mum and dad's legacy (i.e. genes, social
connections, intellectual interests) and then finds its own way. There is
freedom in this. It's as simple as that.

Lila wanted to shed herself of her own legacy/history (i.e static patterns). She succeeded to some extent. And the 'to some extent' refers to the fact that she wanted to 'come clean' of her biological quality and get herself accepted socially. That is why she failed and succeeded at the same time: with Rigel she established her position within the acceptable social patterns. For Lila Quality meant social acceptance. She failed because she did not continue to follow DQ.

She's after Quality, like everybody else. (LILA,p 218)

This, for me expresses 'free will' or much rather (in Jamesian terms) 'the will
to be free'. It is part and parcel of our make up. And when this gets violated
our values react, at all levels. When you find yourself in a low quality
situation/environment you react, just like the amoeba reacts...except with more
choices.

If the baby ignores this force of Dynamic Quality it can be speculated that he
will become retarded, but if he is normally attentive to Dynamic Quality he will
soon begin to notice difference and then correlations between differences and then
repetitive patterns of the correlations' (LILA, p 123).

Perhaps what I am saying is simply this: the capability of apprehending DQ and
acting on it is free, unconditioned will (DQ/sq)...an inborn, natural state.

The capability of apprehending DQ and not acting on it is conditioned
will.(SQ/dq)

The capability of apprehending DQ and not acting on it leads to the funeral
procession Sylvia lamented. (SQ/dq)

And Lila defines her choice in biological terms...she doesn't see intellectual
quality at all. It's outside her range. She does glimpse social quality
though...in the end. And she got her way: She goes with Rigel, who accepts her
and Lila has her way.

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:05 AM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
 Steve:
 I wasn't trying to create any controversy on that point. The exact
 quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is
 controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to
 the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable,
 one’s behavior is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free
 will to the extent we follow DQ and are determined to the extent that
 WE are controlled by static patterns. I'm not sure that I understand
 the distinction you are making, but I do notice in RMPs reformulation
 of the issue the notion of we as well as the will is conspicuously
 absent. dmb sees these notions as implied. I see them as deliberately
 left out.

 Dan:

 The Will seems to be something like the Spirit, so I can see why it is
 absent. It doesn't exist except as an idea.

 Steve:
 It also exists as a subjective experience. We have the sense of
 willing some of our acts, but when we think of the will as an
 experience, it just doesn't make sense to ask is this experience
 free?

Dan:
Experience is synonymous  with Dynamic Quality. So yes, I agree with
you, which is why I've been hammering on the notion that it is our
behavior that is without choice when it is controlled by static
quality patterns and not us. Does that make sense?



 Dan:
 We know to what extent our behavior is controlled. If we did not, I
 doubt we'd be talking right now. We follow the law. We do what is
 expected. And we do this to seek approval from others. Yet, we yearn
 for freedom even if we don't really understand what it is that we're
 yearning for.

 Steve:
 We do know that our behavior is controlled to some extent, but I would
 say that we have no idea how far that goes.

 Dan:
 Then we haven't been paying attention.

Steve:
 As for yearning for freedom, I think Pirsig substitutes the positive
 goal of yearning for quality for the negative goal of freedom from
 constraint.

 Dan:
 Freedom from constraint is a negative goal? How so? As to yearning for
 quality, we all do that anyway. That's why RMP used quality as a basis
 for his metaphysics. Right?

 Steve:
 I was referring to this quote from the 1984 afterword of ZAMM:

 The hippies had in mind something that they wanted, and were calling
 it “freedom,” but in the final analysis “freedom” is a purely negative
 goal. It just says something is bad. ...This book offers another, more
 serious alternative to material success. It’s not so much an
 alternative as an expansion of the meaning of “success” to something
 larger than just getting a good job and staying out of trouble. And
 also something larger than mere freedom. It gives a positive goal to
 work toward that does not confine. That is the main reason for the
 book’s success, I think. The whole culture happened to be looking for
 exactly what this book has to offer. That is the sense in which it is
 a culture-bearer.

Dan:

Ah, yes. Thank you for the explanation. As I see it, this correlates
well with what I said about the degeneracy of biological quality. The
hippies wished to Dynamically advance social quality patterns but in
retrospect, they only reverted to biological patterns. In the MOQ,
this is seen as immoral, or negative quality.

Thank you,

Dan
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 12:52 PM, Andre Broersen
andrebroer...@gmail.com wrote:
 Steve to dmb:

 That is utter nonsense. How could a dependent self be free (independent)?
 That is a simple logical contradiction.

 Andre:
 Not read my latest post I presume? A 'dependent self' can be free
 (independent) and indeed within the MOQ this seemingly logical contradiction
 is true and has a very simple resolution. As Pirsig says (for goodness sake
 Steve I thought you knew this!) biologically she's fine, socially she's way
 down the ladder. This is taking the so called (SOM) 'logical contradiction'
 by the throat and explaining it within a value centered metaphysics.

 She has quality and she hasn't.


Steve:
Similarly, Pirsig dissolves the freedom question by distinguishing
what is meant by self. Big Self (DQ) is free, small self (sq, the
dependent self) is not.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Dan said:
Experience is synonymous  with Dynamic Quality. So yes, I agree with you, which 
is why I've been hammering on the notion that it is our behavior that is 
without choice when it is controlled by static quality patterns and not us. 
Does that make sense?

dmb says:
No, I don't think that makes sense. If our behavior is controlled, how does 
that fail to count as controlling us? Isn't the question whether or not we can 
act freely? Free will means you can act on your will. If your will is 
determined then you cannot act on your will. The MOQ gives a different answer 
to these questions than the MOQ does, but those are the questions. The whole 
issue is about whether or not you have any choice about what you do or say or 
think, which all count as acts. 



  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 12:04 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Dan said:
 Experience is synonymous  with Dynamic Quality. So yes, I agree with you, 
 which is why I've been hammering on the notion that it is our behavior that 
 is without choice when it is controlled by static quality patterns and not 
 us. Does that make sense?

 dmb says:
 No, I don't think that makes sense.

Dan:
Oh, but you're so modest and diplomatic! You'll make a great teacher.

dmb:
If our behavior is controlled, how does that fail to count as controlling us?

Dan:
Our behavior is controlled when we follow static quality. When we
follow Dynamic Quality our behavior is free. We are free to do either.

dmb:
 Isn't the question whether or not we can act freely?

Dan:
Yes!

dmb:
Free will means you can act on your will.

Dan:
No! Your will is an illusion, an idea. Point to it. Where is it?

dmb:
 If your will is determined then you cannot act on your will.

Dan:
What will?

dmb:
The MOQ gives a different answer to these questions than the MOQ does,
but those are the questions.

Dan:
Now this makes sense!

dmb:
 The whole issue is about whether or not you have any choice about
what you do or say or think, which all count as acts.

dmb:
Of course. But what we do and say and think are not us! They are our
actions. And as long as our behavior (what we do and say and think)
are controlled by static quality patterns, it is without choice.

Thank you,

Dan
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Steve said to dmb:
You are bending over backwards to disagree with me. I most certainly did NOT 
say that questions about freedom and constraint don't make sense in the MOQ. 
... It reformulates the question in terns of sq and DQ rather than in terms of 
the will of an free subject. ... You have just snipped out from the above quote 
that you are responding to where I said back in April, ...We can identify with 
our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not 
free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. Or we 
can identify with the capacity to generate, sustain, or destroy existing 
patterns in favor of (we hope) new and better ones. To the extent we do we are 
free.  And then, as if you were teaching me a lesson, you quote this to me In 
Zen, there is reference to big self and small self. Small self is the 
patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. Now isn't that exactly what I just 
said???

dmb says:
You're still not getting it, Steve. The part of the quote that you put back in 
does not help you. You're making the same crucial mistake in that part too, or 
rather it's just another way to assert the same position that I'm complaining. 
I think value determinism is a good name for it. 

Your reasoning goes roughly like this: 1) The small self is made of static 
patterns. 2) We are not free to the extent that we are controlled by static 
patterns. And then the invalid leap is, in your words, 3) we are not free. We 
are a slave to our preferences. 

The assumption behind this leap seems to be that since the small self isn't 
anything above and beyond the patterns, then the extent to which we are 
controlled by static patterns must be 100%. That's why I call it value 
determinism.

Then there is the Big Self, right? Apparently, you're taking the Dynamic self 
as something completely separate from the preferences to which we are slaves. 
Apparently, you seem to think there would be no overlap if the small self and 
Big self (sqDQ) were represented in a Venn diagram, as if it's all slavery and 
control in the little circle and it's all freedom in the big circle. As I 
imagine it, the small self exists entirely within the Big Self and there is 
nothing but overlap. We are both at the same time and these are conceptual 
distinctions, not distinct metaphysical compartments. Quality is what you like, 
what you prefer and static quality are stable patterns of preference, not a 
prison to be escaped from. These patterns are what increase your capacity to 
respond freely. DQ and sq are both Quality, after all.  


Steve said:
Dependent self means that it depends on something. It doesn't mean 
controlled like a slave, but it does mean not free, i.e., not DQ.

dmb says:
But Steve, you JUST said, to put it in your own words, that we are not free. 
We are a slave to our preferences. You seemed to think that both things were 
true five minutes ago and both sentences mean the same thing anyway. Why do you 
want to backtrack on your own words AND assert what is plainly nonsense anyway. 
I mean, is there any important difference between the claim that we're not 
free and we are slaves? Isn't that just what slave means, not free?


  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Oh, by the way, Steve, one more point;


You said to me:
And then, as if you were teaching me a lesson, you quote this to me In Zen, 
there is reference to big self and small self. Small self is the patterns. 
Big self is Dynamic Quality. Now isn't that exactly what I just said???

dmb says now:
I dished up the quote to teach you a lesson about a completely different 
point, my main point, which is one you apparently missed. Again. I dished the 
quote up in the context of explaining how your use of the word independent 
conflates two different senses of the word. The lesson wasn't about the MOQ's 
big self and small self. It was about the difference between SOM's self and the 
MOQ's self. Huge difference. It seems pretty obvious to me, but I'll repeat 
that point with some added emphasis. 

...When I say DEPENDENT self, it does NOT mean this self is unfree or that it 
is a slave. It means just means that this self is NOT discontinuous with the 
rest of reality. It's not made of a different kind of substance or a 
metaphysical entity [AS IN THE CARTESIAN MODEL OR SOME]. Instead, this self is 
DEPENDENT in the sense that it exists in relation to the evolutionary moral 
framework of the MOQ. Mind and matter are not opposed ontological categories 
[AS IN SOM], they are names for the levels of evolution. As Pirsig puts it, 
they have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship, which is to say mind 
DEPENDS upon the social, biological and inorganic patterns from which it 
evolved. These patterns contain the MOQ's DEPENDENT self and that is the self 
about whom we are asking questions.[NOT THE CARTESIAN SELF] That's the one 
whose will is both free and determined to some extent. That is the one who is 
free to follow DQ to some extent and the one who is controlled static p
 atterns to some extent, as in the Pirsig quote you like so well. 
the MOQ...denies any existence of a self that is INDEPENDENT of inorganic, 
biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no self that contains 
these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both 
religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to 
big self and small self. Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic 
Quality. (Annotn. 29)



  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

I think Dan is right. You'll make an amazing teacher some day.


On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:51 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Oh, by the way, Steve, one more point;


 You said to me:
 And then, as if you were teaching me a lesson, you quote this to me In Zen, 
 there is reference to big self and small self. Small self is the 
 patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. Now isn't that exactly what I just 
 said???

 dmb says now:
 I dished up the quote to teach you a lesson about a completely different 
 point, my main point, which is one you apparently missed. Again. I dished the 
 quote up in the context of explaining how your use of the word independent 
 conflates two different senses of the word. The lesson wasn't about the MOQ's 
 big self and small self. It was about the difference between SOM's self and 
 the MOQ's self. Huge difference. It seems pretty obvious to me, but I'll 
 repeat that point with some added emphasis.

 ...When I say DEPENDENT self, it does NOT mean this self is unfree or that 
 it is a slave. It means just means that this self is NOT discontinuous with 
 the rest of reality. It's not made of a different kind of substance or a 
 metaphysical entity [AS IN THE CARTESIAN MODEL OR SOME]. Instead, this self 
 is DEPENDENT in the sense that it exists in relation to the evolutionary 
 moral framework of the MOQ. Mind and matter are not opposed ontological 
 categories [AS IN SOM], they are names for the levels of evolution. As Pirsig 
 puts it, they have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship, which is to 
 say mind DEPENDS upon the social, biological and inorganic patterns from 
 which it evolved. These patterns contain the MOQ's DEPENDENT self and that is 
 the self about whom we are asking questions.[NOT THE CARTESIAN SELF] That's 
 the one whose will is both free and determined to some extent. That is the 
 one who is free to follow DQ to some extent and the one who is controlled 
 static p
  atterns to some extent, as in the Pirsig quote you like so well.
 the MOQ...denies any existence of a self that is INDEPENDENT of inorganic, 
 biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no self that contains 
 these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both 
 religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to 
 big self and small self. Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic 
 Quality. (Annotn. 29)
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread David Thomas

On 7/19/11 2:37 AM, Andre Broersen andrebroer...@gmail.com wrote:

 Andre to Dave:

 When Marsha uses this 'ever changing' stuff with regards to static patterns
 she uses it in the sense of precisely that: ever changing. Marsha does not
 accept a difference between DQ and sq. For her these are interchangeable. Now
 this, from a MOQ point of view is plain silly and very confusing and she
 continues to wriggle herself around it.
 
 You're one step away from nihilism when you continually claim that ultimately
 all is an impermanent illusion anyway. I mean, why bother? In 50 years we'll
 all be dead so what are we arguing about? It is so defeatist and kills
 discussion all the time. Perhaps you can appreciate the silliness of this
 stance.
Dave
Nihilism has been a primary Western criticism of Buddhism for ages. But
Marsha did not choose to use Zen Buddhist philosophy as a model for a
Western metaphysics, Pirsig did. She is merely exploring and translating her
understanding of the Eastern background of the work. The problem is that for
most Westerners, Eastern religion/philosophy is pretty convoluted and
obtuse. So if Marsha is confused, as well she might be, the confusion is a
result of the source material's.

 Or do you agree with Marsha that DQ is sq and sq is DQ?

Dave
I understand that if you look at the MoQ as a mystical monism where ultimate
reality is one and any metaphysical splitting is degenerate, then yeah those
statements make perfect sense-nonsense. This is the way of Zen.
 
 Just another insert Dave. When I talked about Leave it in the weather
 for a number of years and yeah, the changes are noticeable because
 dynamic influences occur at subatomic levels all the time.
Dave
But are these dynamic influences you speak of DQ or SQ? How do you know?

But for 
 pragmatic reasons the notion of using 'ever changing' when you mean
 'stable' or 'static' is confusing because misleading... I should also
 have added the 'forces' of regeneration, the stabilizing quality to
 latch the advances made. It are these repeated patterns that make them
 stable, recognizable.
 
 To add to the confusion Marsha has gotten herself into is that she now
 denies DQ as being change. She says: I consider DQ to be indeterminate
 - unknowable, undefinable, and undividable - unpatterned.
Dave
Again in attributing all change to Dynamic Quality, How do you know? Pirsig
at some point explained that static patterns can be lower case dynamic,
again how can a normal person tell whether change is Dynamic or
dynamic.? I mean short of being insane or a mystic. And how do you tell
the difference?
 
 Now, on its own this is a bit more like it. BUT she still considers
 DQ=sq and sq=DQ. She has said so repeatedly. She considers herself to be
 an ever changing pattern of...within a stable whatever. You work it out
 Dave because I can't anymore.
 
 I agree with dmb: sigh.

Sigh all both of you want but her interpretation is predicable extension
of Pirsig's work and Zen Buddhism.

Dave




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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:28 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Steve said to dmb:
 You are bending over backwards to disagree with me. I most certainly did NOT 
 say that questions about freedom and constraint don't make sense in the MOQ. 
 ... It reformulates the question in terns of sq and DQ rather than in terms 
 of the will of an free subject. ... You have just snipped out from the above 
 quote that you are responding to where I said back in April, ...We can 
 identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we 
 do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our 
 preferences. Or we can identify with the capacity to generate, sustain, or 
 destroy existing patterns in favor of (we hope) new and better ones. To the 
 extent we do we are free.  And then, as if you were teaching me a lesson, 
 you quote this to me In Zen, there is reference to big self and small 
 self. Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. Now isn't 
 that exactly what I just said???

 dmb says:
 You're still not getting it, Steve. The part of the quote that you put back 
 in does not help you. You're making the same crucial mistake in that part 
 too, or rather it's just another way to assert the same position that I'm 
 complaining. I think value determinism is a good name for it.

 Your reasoning goes roughly like this: 1) The small self is made of static 
 patterns. 2) We are not free to the extent that we are controlled by static 
 patterns. And then the invalid leap is, in your words, 3) we are not free. 
 We are a slave to our preferences.

Steve:
As soon as I said that I corrected it, Rather we ARE our
preferences. But of course you snipped that because it is easier to
misrepresent what I said.

Also, in your 3), the we here is just small self. We can identify
with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do
so we are not free.

dmb:
 The assumption behind this leap seems to be that since the small self isn't 
 anything above and beyond the patterns, then the extent to which we are 
 controlled by static patterns must be 100%.

Steve:
Pretty much Did you notice the extent to which we do part?

Small self is nothing other than a collection of static patterns. The
extent to which small self is controlled by static patterns is better
put as the fact that small self literally IS the static patterns. (It
doesn't make any sense to say we are controlled by our values (as you
keep trying to portray me as saying) when we ARE our values.) This is
only true TO THE EXTENT THAT and ONLY to the extent that we identify
with small self. But that's not the whole picture...


dmb:
That's why I call it value determinism.

Steve:
Yes, I noticed how self-satisfied you are about that one, but it is an
oxymoron. We do what we value doing, we do what we want, we do what we
like. That is what it means for us to be our values and is pretty much
the opposite of opting for the determinism horn of the SOM dilemma
which says that we do what we are caused by mechanistic forces to do.
The only caveat here which prevents the MOQ from affirming the free
will horn of the SOM dilemma (besides denial of the underlying premise
of the Cartesian self)  is that though we act on our values we (as
small self) don't CHOOSE to value what we value since we ARE our
values, so it doesn't make sense to say that in addition to be capable
of willing acts this willing is somehow free of something.


dmb:
 Then there is the Big Self, right? Apparently, you're taking the Dynamic self 
 as something completely separate from the preferences to which we are slaves.

Steve:
Why do you insist on calling small self a slave? Small self is not a
slave his preferences. Small self literally IS his preferences.

dmb:
 Apparently, you seem to think there would be no overlap if the small
self and Big self (sqDQ) were represented in a Venn diagram, as if
it's all slavery and control in the little circle and it's all freedom
in the big circle.

Steve:
Yes, that is exactly how I see it. Or maybe one big circle divided
into two parts.

dmb:
As I imagine it, the small self exists entirely within the Big Self
and there is nothing but overlap.


Steve:
Good for you. Is the rest of the world under some obligation to
imagine it the way that you imagine it?

dmb:
We are both at the same time and these are conceptual distinctions,
not distinct metaphysical compartments.


Steve:
Wrong. DQ/sq is definitely intended as a metaphysical distinction.

dmb:
Quality is what you like, what you prefer and static quality are
stable patterns of preference, not a prison to be escaped from. These
patterns are what increase your capacity to respond freely. DQ and sq
are both Quality, after all.

Steve:
Sure. DQ/sq is how Pirsig divides Quality. In Zen terms it is
equivalent to diving self into Big Self/small self.


 Steve said:
 Dependent self means that it depends on something. It doesn't mean 
 controlled

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will



Dave,

I've offered quotes on Buddhism from the MoQ Textbook.  Maybe you think 
Anthony is confused and nihilistic?  In the MoQ Texbook Anthony writes that 
the fundamental nature of the static is the Dynamic:  Moreover, Nagarjuna 
(1966, p.251) shares Pirsig’s perception that the indeterminate (or Dynamic) 
is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static).  It is the 
Prajnaparamita
Heart Sutra that states: form is emptiness; emptiness is form or as I 
consider 
it: sq is DQ, DQ is sq.  

Western Philosophy can be every bit as convoluted and nihilistic as Eastern 
Philosophy. I've read that if you read Kant as he wrote it in German, you'd 
find 
many contradictions. Consider 'Thus Spake Zarathustra'.   And what did 
Wittgenstein write:  My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed 
out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the 
ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together 
with Buddhism is very valid.  


Marsha  



On Jul 21, 2011, at 5:59 PM, David Thomas wrote:

 On 7/19/11 2:37 AM, Andre Broersen andrebroer...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 Andre to Dave:
 
 When Marsha uses this 'ever changing' stuff with regards to static patterns
 she uses it in the sense of precisely that: ever changing. Marsha does not
 accept a difference between DQ and sq. For her these are interchangeable. Now
 this, from a MOQ point of view is plain silly and very confusing and she
 continues to wriggle herself around it.
 
 You're one step away from nihilism when you continually claim that ultimately
 all is an impermanent illusion anyway. I mean, why bother? In 50 years we'll
 all be dead so what are we arguing about? It is so defeatist and kills
 discussion all the time. Perhaps you can appreciate the silliness of this
 stance.
 Dave
 Nihilism has been a primary Western criticism of Buddhism for ages. But
 Marsha did not choose to use Zen Buddhist philosophy as a model for a
 Western metaphysics, Pirsig did. She is merely exploring and translating her
 understanding of the Eastern background of the work. The problem is that for
 most Westerners, Eastern religion/philosophy is pretty convoluted and
 obtuse. So if Marsha is confused, as well she might be, the confusion is a
 result of the source material's.
 
 Or do you agree with Marsha that DQ is sq and sq is DQ?
 
 Dave
 I understand that if you look at the MoQ as a mystical monism where ultimate
 reality is one and any metaphysical splitting is degenerate, then yeah those
 statements make perfect sense-nonsense. This is the way of Zen.
 
 Just another insert Dave. When I talked about Leave it in the weather
 for a number of years and yeah, the changes are noticeable because
 dynamic influences occur at subatomic levels all the time.
 Dave
 But are these dynamic influences you speak of DQ or SQ? How do you know?
 
 But for 
 pragmatic reasons the notion of using 'ever changing' when you mean
 'stable' or 'static' is confusing because misleading... I should also
 have added the 'forces' of regeneration, the stabilizing quality to
 latch the advances made. It are these repeated patterns that make them
 stable, recognizable.
 
 To add to the confusion Marsha has gotten herself into is that she now
 denies DQ as being change. She says: I consider DQ to be indeterminate
 - unknowable, undefinable, and undividable - unpatterned.
 Dave
 Again in attributing all change to Dynamic Quality, How do you know? Pirsig
 at some point explained that static patterns can be lower case dynamic,
 again how can a normal person tell whether change is Dynamic or
 dynamic.? I mean short of being insane or a mystic. And how do you tell
 the difference?
 
 Now, on its own this is a bit more like it. BUT she still considers
 DQ=sq and sq=DQ. She has said so repeatedly. She considers herself to be
 an ever changing pattern of...within a stable whatever. You work it out
 Dave because I can't anymore.
 
 I agree with dmb: sigh.
 
 Sigh all both of you want but her interpretation is predicable extension
 of Pirsig's work and Zen Buddhism.
 
 Dave
 
 
 
 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-21 Thread David Thomas

On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.

Dave
I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.

As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
again.

Dave


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will







On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:07 PM, David Thomas wrote:

 On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.
 
 Dave
 I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
 the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
 Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
 the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
 Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
 experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
 seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.
 
 As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
 dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
 again.
 


Marsha:
Today there are, intelligent Buddhist scholars that present Buddhist 
philosophical 
ideas clearly and succinctly for Westerners.  I think it is more in keeping 
with the 
MoQ to learn something new than rehash the already known.  And meditation, 
concentration and mindfulness techniques offer first-hand empirical experiences 
for validation, rather than just words.   It is a shame that I am a minority.  
It has been 
said that the shift from a subject-object reality to a Quality reality takes 
more than 
intellectually understanding the words on a page. While there is a religious 
aspect  
to Buddhism, to become a Buddhist is not to accept a bundle of doctrines and 
dogma on the basis of faith.  You are NOT suppose to accept claims based on 
what the Buddha said, but are to examine the arguments and determine for 
yourself if the arguments are true.  There is no place for psychological 
bullies 
within Buddhism.   

Buddhism does have cultural trappings to watch out for, but they are more 
likely to be questioned by a Westerner.  And lets face it, the West comes with  
its own set of cultural glasses which often blindsight us to a new more dynamic 
perspective.  Science, for instance, may be more accepted dogma than fresh 
investigation.  I am trying say that Buddhism is much, much more than a 
religion.  


 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will




On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:53 PM, MarshaV wrote:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 21, 2011, at 11:07 PM, David Thomas wrote:
 
 On 7/21/11 9:29 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 So please do not make any apology for Buddhism, Exploring the MoQ together
 with Buddhism is very valid.
 
 Dave
 I'm not making any apologies for Buddhism. And I'm surely not challenging
 the validity of exploring them together. How could I? The MoQ is Zen in a
 Pendleton blanket.  Most, not all, but most of the confusion in the MoQ is
 the confusion with and within Buddhism. The MoQ it is an attempt by a
 Westerner with a tiny amount of Eastern experience and smidgen of Zen
 experience to rewrite Zen in a way that is palatable to the Western mind. It
 seem to be working for you, but as you are aware you are in a minority here.
 
 As for me I'm not looking for a new religion. The old ones have such a
 dismal track record I just can't see making the same mistakes all over
 again.
 
 
 
 Marsha:
 Today there are, intelligent Buddhist scholars that present Buddhist 
 philosophical 
 ideas clearly and succinctly for Westerners.  I think it is more in keeping 
 with the 
 MoQ to learn something new than rehash the already known.  And meditation, 
 concentration and mindfulness techniques offer first-hand empirical 
 experiences 
 for validation, rather than just words.   It is a shame that I am a minority. 
  It has been 
 said that the shift from a subject-object reality to a Quality reality takes 
 more than 
 intellectually understanding the words on a page. While there is a religious 
 aspect  
 to Buddhism, to become a Buddhist is not to accept a bundle of doctrines and 
 dogma on the basis of faith.  You are NOT suppose to accept claims based on 
 what the Buddha said, but are to examine the arguments and determine for 
 yourself if the arguments are true.  There is no place for psychological 
 bullies 
 within Buddhism.   
 
 Buddhism does have cultural trappings to watch out for, but they are more 
 likely to be questioned by a Westerner.  And lets face it, the West comes 
 with  
 its own set of cultural glasses which often blindsight us to a new more 
 dynamic 
 perspective.  Science, for instance, may be more accepted dogma than fresh 
 investigation.  I am trying say that Buddhism is much, much more than a 
 religion.  


Marsha:
One thing I learned from meditation is that these quality patterns don't come 
to 
our minds whole.  The move through in bits and pieces, and they are slightly 
different with each event.  That's first-hand experience; more than just words 
on 
a page.  They are ever-changing, interdependent and impermanent.  


 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will



Hi Joe, 

My conclusions are never as interesting as your explanations, 
so it feels right to ask questions.  

What do you know about averages?  


Marsha 





On Jul 19, 2011, at 8:15 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:

 Hi Marsha
 
 I know DQ by perception.  Take the word 'ONE'.  It has two meanings. 'One'
 in metaphysics, and 'One' in mathematics.  The 'One' of metaphysics stands
 alone. It is the perception of indefinable individuality that enables
 definition for speech along with the perception of an indefinable True and
 Good.  
 
 The 'One' of mathematics is definable, the beginning of the logical
 perception of order, followed by 'Two' etc.
 
 I am sorry for the delay in responding, I was away from my computer.
 Joe
 
 On 7/19/11 2:43 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 
 Joe,  
 
 Okay, you say you know DQ?  Can you explain that
 knowing?  Do you know DQ by inference, or do you
 know DQ by perception?  Can you explain to me what
 you mean when you say DQ is knowable?   And what
 do you know about it?
 
 
 Marsha 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 19, 2011, at 3:43 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi Marsha,
 
 I don't like the adjective subjective modifying consciousness as the locus
 of my awareness.  There is no proper distinction between thought
 (mathematics) and emotions (dynamic) in the adjective subjective.  It is
 very confusing as it overwrites the evolutionary supposition for an
 indefinable/definable basket of goodies.  This leaves logic floundering.
 Logic in the rest of the paragraph is diluted by subjective.
 
 Joe  
 
 
 On 7/19/11 11:48 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 
 Hi Joe, 
 
 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.
 
   Marsha
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 19, 2011, at 2:28 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi MarshaV and all,
 
 Practice makes perfect!  DQ is knowable, but it is not definable.  That
 reminds me of emotions. E.G., Define Love!
 
 The habits that I purposefully develop, enable me to more or less find the
 role that I must assume in each instance to maintain the dynamic reality 
 in
 existence.  I think such preparation is called work.  Once I lose my way, 
 I
 find myself repeating mechanically, for a whole lifetime, a set of
 activities which keep me alive.  I explain them to my neighbor who then
 agrees that I am a good fellow, and I stay out of dynamic trouble because
 it
 is too hard to keep attention at such a trigger point for the decision
 making necessary for evolution to heroic levels of behavior which heroes
 have achieved down through history, e.g., Pirsig.
 
 Joe  
 
 
 On 7/18/11 6:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 I do not consider DQ to be change. I see it as indeterminate, as
 unknowable,
 undefinable, and undividable, or as unpatterned.


 
___
 

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Jan-Anders Andersson

Hi Andre

Marsha is right in her opinion that a tool of steel like a monkey wrench is by 
time a ever-changing set of molecules. 

But as long as the nut is also still having its set of molecules and its 
pattern are static and stable enough, then a skilled mechanic can use the 
wrench to tight the nut. The idea of static patterns and static quality are 
then useful and constructive that connects it with dynamic quality.

As long as it is Possible to Have a view like Marsha have, she got the free 
right and free will to have this view. But if you think that a monkey wrench is 
of soft material or you just never can't adjust it to fit the bolt perfectly, 
then you'll never be a good mechanic. I remember the different perspectives in 
ZAMM where Pirsig was pursuing his classic view on things and John and Sylvia 
kept a more romantic standpoint. I see Marsha as the romantic type of person 
and that is why this discussion catch my interest.

Is there a way, is it possible to make classic and romantic oriented people to 
understand each other? There was a question why didn't the MOQ catch more 
interest in the world? Was it only people of the classic side that liked it? 
What is the proportions in the world population between classic and romantic 
people? I can count up to around 20 here in MD. Is it 20/9 000 000 000? Where 
do we put Bodvar?

Jan-Anders


19 jul 2011 kl. 20.33 Andre wrote:

 Andre to Dave:
 Just another insert Dave. When I talked about Leave it in the weather 
 for a number of years and yeah, the changes are noticeable because 
 dynamic influences occur at subatomic levels all the time. But for 
 pragmatic reasons the notion of using 'ever changing' when you mean 
 'stable' or 'static' is confusing because misleading... I should also 
 have added the 'forces' of regeneration, the stabilizing quality to 
 latch the advances made. It are these repeated patterns that make them 
 stable, recognizable.
 
 To add to the confusion Marsha has gotten herself into is that she now 
 denies DQ as being change. She says: I consider DQ to be indeterminate 
 - unknowable, undefinable, and undividable - unpatterned.
 
 Now, on its own this is a bit more like it. BUT she still considers 
 DQ=sq and sq=DQ. She has said so repeatedly. She considers herself to be 
 an ever changing pattern of...within a stable whatever. You work it out 
 Dave because I can't anymore.
 
 I agree with dmb: sigh.

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


J-A,

Seems to me the romantics often concentrate on personality rather than 
concepts.  You, Andre and dmb seem fascinated with your conclusions about 
Marsha, though you know nothing about her.  You read some posts and think that 
is her.  How stuck are you?   (Who has the romantic interest?) There is much to 
her that is other-than-her-posts.   

Why don't facets of the MoQ catch your interest?   

Marsha 






On Jul 20, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Jan-Anders Andersson wrote:

 Hi Andre
 
 Marsha is right in her opinion that a tool of steel like a monkey wrench is 
 by time a ever-changing set of molecules. 
 
 But as long as the nut is also still having its set of molecules and its 
 pattern are static and stable enough, then a skilled mechanic can use the 
 wrench to tight the nut. The idea of static patterns and static quality are 
 then useful and constructive that connects it with dynamic quality.
 
 As long as it is Possible to Have a view like Marsha have, she got the free 
 right and free will to have this view. But if you think that a monkey wrench 
 is of soft material or you just never can't adjust it to fit the bolt 
 perfectly, then you'll never be a good mechanic. I remember the different 
 perspectives in ZAMM where Pirsig was pursuing his classic view on things and 
 John and Sylvia kept a more romantic standpoint. I see Marsha as the romantic 
 type of person and that is why this discussion catch my interest.
 
 Is there a way, is it possible to make classic and romantic oriented people 
 to understand each other? There was a question why didn't the MOQ catch more 
 interest in the world? Was it only people of the classic side that liked it? 
 What is the proportions in the world population between classic and romantic 
 people? I can count up to around 20 here in MD. Is it 20/9 000 000 000? Where 
 do we put Bodvar?
 
 Jan-Anders
 
 
 19 jul 2011 kl. 20.33 Andre wrote:
 
 Andre to Dave:
 Just another insert Dave. When I talked about Leave it in the weather 
 for a number of years and yeah, the changes are noticeable because 
 dynamic influences occur at subatomic levels all the time. But for 
 pragmatic reasons the notion of using 'ever changing' when you mean 
 'stable' or 'static' is confusing because misleading... I should also 
 have added the 'forces' of regeneration, the stabilizing quality to 
 latch the advances made. It are these repeated patterns that make them 
 stable, recognizable.
 
 To add to the confusion Marsha has gotten herself into is that she now 
 denies DQ as being change. She says: I consider DQ to be indeterminate 
 - unknowable, undefinable, and undividable - unpatterned.
 
 Now, on its own this is a bit more like it. BUT she still considers 
 DQ=sq and sq=DQ. She has said so repeatedly. She considers herself to be 
 an ever changing pattern of...within a stable whatever. You work it out 
 Dave because I can't anymore.
 
 I agree with dmb: sigh.
 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Marsha to Andre:

In the MoQ Texbook Anthony writes that the fundamental nature of the static is 
the Dynamic:...

Andre:
So? What point are you making?


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Ian to Andre:

Get over it Andre,

Marsha uses ever changing to remind us that the fundamental basis of even the 
static is in fact the dynamic.(You may find this annoying, I do too sometimes when she 
overdoes it, often in reaction to those too arrogant to see how static their own patterns 
are, but it's not the same as saying the static and dynamic are the same - Jeez)

Andre:
Yeah, well...swell Ian. Problem is that Marsha DOES conflate DQ/sq. She has 
said so repeatedly.

And I think you are being a bit unfair when you suggest that those who do try 
to point out the error of this position (and all the wriggling, evasion, 
distortion and abuse associated with it) are 'too arrogant' to notice their own 
static patterns.

The DQ/sq division expresses 'the fundamental division of the world...This 
first division of the Metaphysics of Quality now covered the spectrum of 
experience from primitive mysticism to quantum mechanics'.

Marsha appears to be reducing the reality, the importance of sq constantly to 
this fundamental DQ basis thereby (intentionally or not) nullifying any and 
every discussion carried out on this discuss within which she involves herself. 
She seems to be implying that all sq is an illusion anyway so what the heck are 
we talking about? What are we worried about?

And her latest little homer? MU!

'What remained for Phaedrus to do next was to fill in the gaps as carefully and 
methodically as he could...Life cannot exist on Dynamic Quality alone. It has 
no staying power. To cling to Dynamic Quality alone apart from any static 
patterns is to cling to chaos...static patterns...provide a necessary 
stabilizing force to protect Dynamic progress from degeneration...these 
patterns of static quality, the quality of order, preserve our world.(LILA, p 
124)

Ian:
(The bag of weasels however seems to think the point of the exercise is to keep 
coming back with attacks and counter-attacks against the next weasel.)

Andre:
Whatever Ian. I think the MOQ is a wonderful idea. I do not want it to 
degenerate in the hearts, hands and minds of the likes of Marsha.

If my (and other's) caring for Pirsig's MOQ and defending it in this fashion is 
regarded as 'arrogant' well so be it.

Ian:
PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding.

Andre:
I missed this at the end of your post.



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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Ian Glendinning

Hi Andre.

Mu.

Like I said, get over it.
Ian
PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ?

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 10:09 AM, Andre Broersen
andrebroer...@gmail.com wrote:
 Ian to Andre:

 Get over it Andre,

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Ian to Andre:

PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ?

Andre:
MU

(jeez we're getting deep now...it's s enlightening!)


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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Ian Glendinning

Joe and Marsha exchanged:

Joe said
There's a difference between mathematics and story telling.

Marsha responded
I'm not sure I'd say there was a difference.

I'd agree that a very large part of mathematics (and physical sciences
using mathematics) is story telling.
(Which isn't to say they are the same.)

Ian
PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ?
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


On Jul 20, 2011, at 6:38 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:

 Joe and Marsha exchanged:
 
 Joe said
 There's a difference between mathematics and story telling.
 
 Marsha responded
 I'm not sure I'd say there was a difference.
 
 I'd agree that a very large part of mathematics (and physical sciences
 using mathematics) is story telling.
 (Which isn't to say they are the same.)
 
 Ian
 PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ?


Hi Ian,

I agree that 'science' represent stories, and should be understood as stories.  
Stories built on the questions asked rather than thought to represent Truth.  
If the questions change from 'what gets more' to 'what is best,' we'd have 
better stories to share.  


Marsha 
 
 
 
___
 

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Jan-Anders to Andre:

Marsha is right in her opinion that a tool of steel like a monkey wrench is by 
time a ever-changing set of molecules.

Andre:
Over time anything made of steel begins to rust after which time you stop 
calling it a monkey wrench. It's just a rusty old piece of whatever and it 
loses its value as a monkey wrench. It needs replacement. I have no argument 
with this. Everybody knows that.

Jan-Anders:
As long as it is Possible to Have a view like Marsha have, she got the free 
right and free will to have this view.

Andre:
No one says she can't and she is indeed free to hold these views. BUT are these 
views helpful in sharing, clarifying and thereby improving our understanding of 
Pirsig's MOQ? I do not think so. And, no, Marsha does not hold the romantic 
view either as she is not the romantic type. She doesn't even know herself as 
it is an ever changing pov. It's the blowing in the nothing type as even wind 
is an illusion, ideas are an illusion, love is an illusion, preference is an 
illusion, probability is an illusion. Any reasonable discussion is an illusion. 
Relationships are an illusion. You are an illusion. I am an illusion. This MOQ 
is an illusion. I can go on forever. And why? Because the fundamental nature of 
static patterns of value is DQ.

Concern about Japan? Illusion! Concern about Africa? An illusion! Concern about 
anything? All is illusory! Great! And what does Marsha say:

'Seems to me the romantics often concentrate on personality rather than 
concepts.  You, Andre and dmb seem fascinated with your conclusions about 
Marsha, though you know nothing about her.  You read some posts and think that 
is her.  How stuck are you?   (Who has the romantic interest?) There is much to 
her that is other-than-her-posts'.

You know, this is the stuff you expect to come from a 12-year old adolescent. 
And not a very bright one either.

I mean, who has concluded anything about Marsha? Marsha is an illusion. Marsha 
will and can be permanently deleted.

Sorry Jan -Anders but I have no time for those type of patterns anymore. You 
can't build on them. They have no staying power. They are no use. Nothing to 
share, nothing to learn from, nothing to build on. They only degenerate. It 
must be very lonely at her top.



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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Dave T saw the Dalai Lama on television: 
... I saw him in a TV clip snap at a questioner who asked him a question about 
the Buddhist principle of no-self.  .., He said something like (and this 
really pissed her off), If you have no self, who is it that is going to 
change?


dmb says:

Right. And if you have no self, who is the one controlled by static patterns 
and who is the one that's free to the extent that DQ is followed? I'm 
referring to the one in Pirsig's reformulation of the old free will - 
determinism dilemma. 

That's what I'm talking about when I ask why the will cannot belong to the 
MOQ's self. Why does freedom and restraint have to be superglued to the 
Cartesian subject? Why is it that such freedom can only ever exist as the 
exclusive property of an independent entity? The crucial mistake seems to be an 
illegitimate leap, one that construes the rejection of SOM's self as a 
rejection of any self at all. If you have no self, who is it that is rejecting 
the self? No self at all? Think about it. How would THAT work? 

The MOQ resolves the relationship between intellect and society, subject and 
object, mind and matter, by embedding all of them in a larger system of 
understanding. Objects are inorganic and biological values; subjects are social 
and intellectual values. They are not two mysterious universes that go floating 
around in some subject-object dream that allows them no real contact with one 
another. They have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship. That 
evolutionary relationship is also a moral one. (Lila, 299)

This is the section where Pirsig gives us the MOQ's answer to the question of 
the independence of science and intellect. The answer it gives is, 'not at 
all.' A science in which social patters are of no account is as unreal and 
absurd as a society in which biological patterns are of no account. It's an 
impossibility, he says. See? This is also the section where he corrects 
Descrates' famous declaration: I think, therefore I am. Pirsig says, that 
Descrates' thoughts are not independent of the 17th century French culture in 
which they were expressed. They have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship 
and his culture is not independent of the biological values either because of 
that same evolutionary relationship. As James puts it, the problem is an 
artificial conception of the RELATION between knower and known, namely that 
they are two discontinuous entities. Rejecting the Cartesian self is to reject 
the self AS an independent entity. It simply doesn't follow that we cann
 ot have a legitimate alternative to the Cartesian conception of the self. And 
that's what Pirsig offers; an alternative. Think about this larger evolutionary 
framework and the way it denies the independence of subjects and objects and 
then look again at Pirsig's description of Lila:

Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession involved, it's 
Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a 
cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to 
her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she 
holds, are the end product of three and a half billion years of the history of 
the entireworld. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She 
doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it came 
to be.

Steve keeps saying since Lila just is her values and there is no added 
metaphysical entity beyond that. This is true enough as far as it goes, but 
this doesn't mean that selves have no existence at all. Steve and I and 
everyone else exist DEPENDENTLY within this larger evolutionary framework. 

In a subject-object understanding of the world these terms have no meaning. 
There is no such thing 'human rights'. There is no such thing as moral 
reasonableness. There are subjects and objects and nothing else. This ..can be 
straightened out by the MOQ. It says that what is meant by 'human rights' is 
usually the moral code of intellect-vs.-society, the MORAL RIGHT of intellect 
TO BE FREE of social control. ...According to the MOQ these 'human rights' have 
not just a sentimental basis, but a rational, metaphysical basis. They are 
ESSENTIAL TO THE EVOLUTION of a higher level of life from a lower level of 
life. They are for real. (Lila, 307)

There are no chains more vicious than the chains of biological necessity into 
which every child is born. Society exists primarily TO FREE PEOPLE from these 
biological chains. (Lila, 307)

The MOQ is structured to reflect this evolutionary morality and so are we. 
That's what Lila is. That's what we all are. And hopefully we're doing better 
than Lila, who's nowhere intellectually and pretty far down the scale socially 
too. The MOQ goes even further so that inorganic molecules are postulated to 
have created life because it better and the evolution of life depends on 
those spur of the moment decisions out

Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Steven Peterson

 dmb says:
 Steve keeps saying since Lila just is her values and there is no added 
 metaphysical entity beyond that. This is true enough as far as it goes, but 
 this doesn't mean that selves have no existence at all. Steve and I and 
 everyone else exist DEPENDENTLY within this larger evolutionary framework.

Steve:
To assert that the self exists DEPENDENTLY is to deny the free will
horn of the traditional free will versus determinism dilemma since the
whole big deal there was always about whether or not an INDEPENDENT
self can assert itself, i.e. exercise it's free will. Obviously a
value-based metaphysics also denies the determinism horn of the
traditional SOM dilemma as well. That's why I've said all along that
the MOQ denies both horns of the traditional SOM free will determinism
dilemma. In the MOQ freedom is not an issue of asserting the autonomy
of an independent agent, and therefore the traditional SOM free
will/determinism dilemma is dropped out of the picture. In the MOQ,
this dilemma doesn't come up. Instead, in the MOQ the issue of
freedom is about static versus dynamic Quality. To the extent we
follow static patterns we are not free, to the extent we are acting in
response to DQ, we are free.

But to exactly what extent IS that? What is interesting to me is that
what we seem to have here is a whole new MOQ Platypus after the SOM
Platypi have been dissolved. Because Pirsig says we cannot distinguish
degeneracy from DQ until long after the fact we just can't say to what
extent we are free.
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Marsha said to Jan-Anders:
 ...You, Andre and dmb seem fascinated with your conclusions about Marsha, 
though you know nothing about her.  You read some posts and think that is her.  
How stuck are you? ...There is much to her that is other-than-her-posts'.


dmb says:
Right, unlike the rest of us you are more than your posts. And even though we 
can only know you as you present yourself in your posts, we should respect and 
cherish the confused reversals we find there because the unknown and invisible 
person behind them is so wonderfully delightful and, um, well dressed? If I 
could only see your haircut, I'm sure your philosophical positions would make 
perfect sense. If I only knew how many greeting cards you get at Christmas, 
then I would accept your posts with open arms. Because, when it comes to 
discussing metaphysics, that's what matters most. 


  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Dan Glover

Hello everyone

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 11:46 AM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
In the MOQ,
 this dilemma doesn't come up. Instead, in the MOQ the issue of
 freedom is about static versus dynamic Quality. To the extent we
 follow static patterns we are not free, to the extent we are acting in
 response to DQ, we are free.

 But to exactly what extent IS that? What is interesting to me is that
 what we seem to have here is a whole new MOQ Platypus after the SOM
 Platypi have been dissolved. Because Pirsig says we cannot distinguish
 degeneracy from DQ until long after the fact we just can't say to what
 extent we are free.

Hi Steve

You're phrasing your rephrasing of RMP wrongly, in my opinion. He is
not saying we are free. He is saying to the extent we follow Dynamic
Quality, our behavior is free... our actions and our reactions to
inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual stimuli. We are not
free to the extent our behavior is controlled by those static quality
patterns.

We know to what extent our behavior is controlled. If we did not, I
doubt we'd be talking right now. We follow the law. We do what is
expected. And we do this to seek approval from others. Yet, we yearn
for freedom even if we don't really understand what it is that we're
yearning for.

What you seem to be asking is: how can we be free without sinking into
some sort of degeneracy? The short answer is: we can't. But there is a
longer answer that says: by seeking an understanding of the
biological, social, and intellectual ramifications of our actions and
reactions to stimuli, we are better able to chart a course away from
all patterns and avoid for example the biological degeneracy that did
in the hippies and the social degeneracy that devoured communism and
the intellectual degeneracy that destroyed Nietzsche.

Huh?

Dan
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Joseph Maurer

Hi Marsha,

Off the top of my head I would say that averages follow mathematical logic
where one is defined, while being forced to acknowledge a metaphysical logic
where one is indefinable existence.  The exception proves the rule.

Joe


On 7/19/11 11:22 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:

 
 
 Hi Joe, 
 
 My conclusions are never as interesting as your explanations,
 so it feels right to ask questions.
 
 What do you know about averages?
 
 
 Marsha 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 19, 2011, at 8:15 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi Marsha
 
 I know DQ by perception.  Take the word 'ONE'.  It has two meanings. 'One'
 in metaphysics, and 'One' in mathematics.  The 'One' of metaphysics stands
 alone. It is the perception of indefinable individuality that enables
 definition for speech along with the perception of an indefinable True and
 Good.  
 
 The 'One' of mathematics is definable, the beginning of the logical
 perception of order, followed by 'Two' etc.
 
 I am sorry for the delay in responding, I was away from my computer.
 Joe
 
 On 7/19/11 2:43 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 
 Joe,  
 
 Okay, you say you know DQ?  Can you explain that
 knowing?  Do you know DQ by inference, or do you
 know DQ by perception?  Can you explain to me what
 you mean when you say DQ is knowable?   And what
 do you know about it?
 
 
 Marsha 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 19, 2011, at 3:43 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi Marsha,
 
 I don't like the adjective subjective modifying consciousness as the
 locus
 of my awareness.  There is no proper distinction between thought
 (mathematics) and emotions (dynamic) in the adjective subjective.  It is
 very confusing as it overwrites the evolutionary supposition for an
 indefinable/definable basket of goodies.  This leaves logic floundering.
 Logic in the rest of the paragraph is diluted by subjective.
 
 Joe  
 
 
 On 7/19/11 11:48 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 
 Hi Joe, 
 
 I have been puzzling over the experience of subjective
 consciousness - awareness.  It is experience but I cannot
 observe it, like an eye cannot see itself.  It seems not to
 be permanent and seems to control nothing. It witnesses.
 On investigation this is NOT an autonomous self.  But
 it is experience and yet not an object of knowledge.
 
   Marsha
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 19, 2011, at 2:28 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
 
 Hi MarshaV and all,
 
 Practice makes perfect!  DQ is knowable, but it is not definable.  That
 reminds me of emotions. E.G., Define Love!
 
 The habits that I purposefully develop, enable me to more or less find
 the
 role that I must assume in each instance to maintain the dynamic reality
 in
 existence.  I think such preparation is called work.  Once I lose my way,
 I
 find myself repeating mechanically, for a whole lifetime, a set of
 activities which keep me alive.  I explain them to my neighbor who then
 agrees that I am a good fellow, and I stay out of dynamic trouble because
 it
 is too hard to keep attention at such a trigger point for the decision
 making necessary for evolution to heroic levels of behavior which heroes
 have achieved down through history, e.g., Pirsig.
 
 Joe  
 
 
 On 7/18/11 6:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
 
 I do not consider DQ to be change. I see it as indeterminate, as
 unknowable,
 undefinable, and undividable, or as unpatterned.
 
 
  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


dmb said:
Steve keeps saying Lila just is her values and there is no added metaphysical 
entity beyond that. This is true enough as far as it goes, but this doesn't 
mean that selves have no existence at all. Steve and I and everyone else exist 
DEPENDENTLY within this larger evolutionary framework.

Steve replied:
To assert that the self exists DEPENDENTLY is to deny the free will horn of 
the traditional free will versus determinism dilemma since the whole big deal 
there was always about whether or not an INDEPENDENT self can assert itself, 
i.e. exercise it's free will. Obviously a value-based metaphysics also denies 
the determinism horn of the traditional SOM dilemma as well. ...


dmb says:
Yes, Steve, the existence of the DEPENDENT self denies the the notion of an 
INDEPENDENT self. It is a rejection of the self as an independent entity. 
Pirsig's description of Lila (and everyone else) as persons engaged in a 
struggle with the patterns of their own life e is an alternative to the notion 
of an independent self. I'm talking about the discussion of freedom and 
constraint in terms of Lila's battle, in terms of Pirsig's evolutionary 
morality. That's WHY the traditional dilemma doesn't come up. The MOQ sets the 
issues of freedom and control into a completely different context AND thereby 
re-conceiving the self so that we are NOT EVEN TALKING about the freedom and 
constraint OF an independent self anymore. Instead, we are talking about the 
freedom and constraint of the MOQ's dependent self. That is the one who is 
controlled to some extent. That is the one who is free to some extent. 

So what are YOU talking about, Steve, if not that one? Have we not already 
agreed that there is no independent self? Have we not already established the 
fact that the MOQ rejects that notion of the self? Have we not already 
established the topic here as Pirsig's reformulation of the issue without the 
Cartesian self figuring into it? Yes. Yes, we have. And so your reply is a 
non-sequetor. Questions about the status of this independent self simply isn't 
relevant because it does not exist in Pirsig's reformulation. You're not only 
talking about a straw man that nobody is defending, you're changing the 
subject. 


Steve said:
...To the extent we follow static patterns we are not free, to the extent we 
are acting in response to DQ, we are free. ..But to exactly what extent IS 
that? What is interesting to me is that what we seem to have here is a whole 
new MOQ Platypus after the SOM Platypi have been dissolved. Because Pirsig says 
we cannot distinguish degeneracy from DQ until long after the fact we just 
can't say to what extent we are free.


dmb says:
Platypus? Well, no. A platypus is something that doesn't neatly fit into our 
conceptual categories. (Egg-laying mammals!? What!? A reptile with milk!? 
What?!) The extent to which any given person is free or controlled may not be 
easy to quantify but that doesn't mean that it defies our thought categories or 
that it doesn't fit into the MOQ's evolutionary framework. And Pirsig makes a 
case that it is SOM that prevents us from seeing the difference between saviors 
and degenerates, between revolutionaries and criminals. It may be true that 
Rorty thinks Quality is just a compliment we pay to sentences but that is 
nowhere near Pirsig's position. According to Pirsig's metaphysics, Quality is 
the source and substance of everything, the engine that drives evolution toward 
ever-increasing freedom. It is the mystic reality from which the entire static 
world was derived, including us.

 


  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Steven Peterson

Hi Dan,

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 2:33 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote:
 Hello everyone

 On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 11:46 AM, Steven Peterson
 peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
In the MOQ,
 this dilemma doesn't come up. Instead, in the MOQ the issue of
 freedom is about static versus dynamic Quality. To the extent we
 follow static patterns we are not free, to the extent we are acting in
 response to DQ, we are free.

 But to exactly what extent IS that? What is interesting to me is that
 what we seem to have here is a whole new MOQ Platypus after the SOM
 Platypi have been dissolved. Because Pirsig says we cannot distinguish
 degeneracy from DQ until long after the fact we just can't say to what
 extent we are free.

Dan:
 You're phrasing your rephrasing of RMP wrongly, in my opinion. He is
 not saying we are free. He is saying to the extent we follow Dynamic
 Quality, our behavior is free... our actions and our reactions to
 inorganic, biological, social, and intellectual stimuli. We are not
 free to the extent our behavior is controlled by those static quality
 patterns.

Steve:
I wasn't trying to create any controversy on that point. The exact
quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is
controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to
the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable,
one’s behavior is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free
will to the extent we follow DQ and are determined to the extent that
WE are controlled by static patterns. I'm not sure that I understand
the distinction you are making, but I do notice in RMPs reformulation
of the issue the notion of we as well as the will is conspicuously
absent. dmb sees these notions as implied. I see them as deliberately
left out.


Dan:
 We know to what extent our behavior is controlled. If we did not, I
 doubt we'd be talking right now. We follow the law. We do what is
 expected. And we do this to seek approval from others. Yet, we yearn
 for freedom even if we don't really understand what it is that we're
 yearning for.

Steve:
We do know that our behavior is controlled to some extent, but I would
say that we have no idea how far that goes.

As for yearning for freedom, I think Pirsig substitutes the positive
goal of yearning for quality for the negative goal of freedom from
constraint.



Dan:
 What you seem to be asking is: how can we be free without sinking into
 some sort of degeneracy? The short answer is: we can't. But there is a
 longer answer that says: by seeking an understanding of the
 biological, social, and intellectual ramifications of our actions and
 reactions to stimuli, we are better able to chart a course away from
 all patterns and avoid for example the biological degeneracy that did
 in the hippies and the social degeneracy that devoured communism and
 the intellectual degeneracy that destroyed Nietzsche.

 Huh?

Steve:
What I was trying to do is move the conversation forward. Instead of
arguing whether or not Pirsig's statement is a middle ground between
free will and determinism [dmb] or better viewed as a rejection of
both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma in
favor of a whole new reformulation of the question of freedom [steve],
we might move forward toward discussing Pirsig's reformulation itself.

Pirsig says, “To the extent that one’s behavior is controlled by
static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to the extent
that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one’s behavior
is free.” So our behavior is free to some extent and not free to some
extent. Ok, but...

(1) ...to exactly what extent IS that? Isn't THAT the question we need
to know about freedom? Everyone knows that our behaviors are
constrained to some extent, but how far does that go?

(2) How do we come to know the difference (if we ever do) between
being controlled by static patterns and following DQ?

(3) Why are static patterns thought of as controlling our behavior
while DQ is thought of as being followed?

Best,
Steve
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Steven Peterson

Hi dmb,

On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 3:42 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:

 dmb said:
 Steve keeps saying Lila just is her values and there is no added metaphysical 
 entity beyond that. This is true enough as far as it goes, but this doesn't 
 mean that selves have no existence at all. Steve and I and everyone else 
 exist DEPENDENTLY within this larger evolutionary framework.

 Steve replied:
 To assert that the self exists DEPENDENTLY is to deny the free will horn of 
 the traditional free will versus determinism dilemma since the whole big deal 
 there was always about whether or not an INDEPENDENT self can assert itself, 
 i.e. exercise it's free will. Obviously a value-based metaphysics also denies 
 the determinism horn of the traditional SOM dilemma as well. ...


 dmb says:
 Yes, Steve, the existence of the DEPENDENT self denies the the notion of an 
 INDEPENDENT self. It is a rejection of the self as an independent entity. 
 Pirsig's description of Lila (and everyone else) as persons engaged in a 
 struggle with the patterns of their own life e is an alternative to the 
 notion of an independent self. I'm talking about the discussion of freedom 
 and constraint in terms of Lila's battle, in terms of Pirsig's evolutionary 
 morality. That's WHY the traditional dilemma doesn't come up. The MOQ sets 
 the issues of freedom and control into a completely different context AND 
 thereby re-conceiving the self so that we are NOT EVEN TALKING about the 
 freedom and constraint OF an independent self anymore. Instead, we are 
 talking about the freedom and constraint of the MOQ's dependent self. That is 
 the one who is controlled to some extent. That is the one who is free to 
 some extent.

 So what are YOU talking about, Steve, if not that one? Have we not already 
 agreed that there is no independent self? Have we not already established the 
 fact that the MOQ rejects that notion of the self? Have we not already 
 established the topic here as Pirsig's reformulation of the issue without the 
 Cartesian self figuring into it? Yes. Yes, we have. And so your reply is a 
 non-sequetor. Questions about the status of this independent self simply 
 isn't relevant because it does not exist in Pirsig's reformulation. You're 
 not only talking about a straw man that nobody is defending, you're changing 
 the subject.

Steve:
Maybe you can answer this as our master of logic. How can you still
think it is an interesting question to wonder about whether a
DEPENDENT self has INDEPENDENT (free) will?

You accuse me of changing the subject, but my point all along has been
that the free will determinism debate is an SOM problem which as
Pirsig says, doesn't come up in the MOQ. Everything you said above
supports what I have been saying all along, so I can only think that
if I am arguing against a straw man it is only because you have
finally come around.

If there is no independent (free) self, then in the SOM sense of the
term (and free will is an SOM term) the MOQ denies the free will
horn of the ancient dilemma. If reality is Quality, the MOQ denies the
determinism horn of the dilemma as well. What we have here is not some
middle ground that says we have a little free will and are also a
little bit determined by forces external to the will (since the MOQ
doesn't play that internal/external subject-object game). Instead the
MOQ denies the SOM premise (the independent self in a world of
objects) upon which  it could possibly make sense to ask the free
will/determinism question. That doesn't mean we can't talk about
freedom, but in the MOQ we aren't talking about free will since
there is no independent self who could possess this faculty.

Best,
Steve
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Steve said to Dan:

...The exact quote I was referencing is “To the extent that one’s behavior is 
controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice.  But to the 
extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one’s behavior 
is free.” dmb takes this to mean that WE have free will to the extent we 
follow DQ and are determined to the extent that WE are controlled by static 
patterns. ... I do notice in RMPs reformulation of the issue the notion of we 
as well as the will is conspicuously absent. dmb sees these notions as 
implied.  ...Instead of arguing whether or not Pirsig's statement is a middle 
ground between free will and determinism [dmb] or better viewed as a rejection 
of both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma in favor of 
a whole new reformulation of the question of freedom [steve], we might move 
forward toward discussing Pirsig's reformulation itself. Pirsig says, “To the 
extent that one’s behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is 
without choice.  But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is 
undefinable, one’s behavior is free.” So our behavior is free to some extent 
and not free to some extent. 



dmb says:
As far as I can tell, you're the only one who is NOT talking about Pirsig's 
reformulation. You keep pretending that I'm not talking about freedom and 
constraint within the terms of Pirsig's reformulation no matter how many times 
I tell you otherwise. My claims have nothing to do with the claims of the straw 
man you've invented. As a result, you are arguing with nobody about nothing. 
One can only wonder why, I suppose, but I'd guess that it's a desperation move 
aimed at avoiding the actual claims. 


  
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


Marsha said to dmb:

Now you seem to understand why I've stated that I neither accept free-will, nor 
deny free-will.  It's irrelevant within the MoQ.

dmb says:
Nothing could be further from the truth. I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates 
the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the MOST relevant thing 
in the universe. I'm correcting the distortion which render it irrelevant and 
meaningless, such as your's and Steve's. I'm saying freedom and constraint go 
all the way down and I'm saying that AGAINST your vacuous nihilism.

Like Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as 
opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no 
self at all. In Pirsig's formulation, the one who is free to some extent and 
the one controlled to some extent is that dependent self. That is the self 
for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's what what the 
whole evolutionary battle is all about. 

To NEITHER reject NOR accept freewill doesn't even count as having a position 
on the issue. It's just another classic example of meaningless equivocation.

Your mantra is boring. Would it kill you to write a fresh sentence? 

 


 On Jul 20, 2011, at 5:14 PM, david buchanan wrote:
 
  
  Steve asked dmb:
  Maybe you can answer this as our master of logic. How can you still think 
  it is an interesting question to wonder about whether a DEPENDENT self has 
  INDEPENDENT (free) will?
  
  dmb says:
  How can I think it's interesting to ask about the DEPENDENT self's 
  INDEPENDENT (free) will?
  Well, I don't think that is an interesting question at all. I think the 
  question is absurd. The question confuses and combines two completely 
  different conceptions of the self. In the MOQ, everything exists in 
  relation to everything else and, in that sense, there is no such thing as 
  independence. But you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent 
  self is not at all the same as saying there is no self at all. In Pirsig's 
  formulation, the one who is free to some extent and the one controlled 
  to some extent is not independent. 
  
  Steve said: 
  You accuse me of changing the subject, but my point all along has been that 
  the free will determinism debate is an SOM problem which as Pirsig says, 
  doesn't come up in the MOQ.  ...If there is no independent (free) self, 
  then in the SOM sense of the term (and free will is an SOM term) the MOQ 
  denies the free will horn of the ancient dilemma. If reality is Quality, 
  the MOQ denies the determinism horn of the dilemma as well. What we have 
  here is not some middle ground that says we have a little free will and are 
  also a little bit determined by forces external to the will (since the MOQ 
  doesn't play that internal/external subject-object game). Instead the MOQ 
  denies the SOM premise (the independent self in a world of objects) upon 
  which  it could possibly make sense to ask the free will/determinism 
  question. That doesn't mean we can't talk about freedom, but in the MOQ we 
  aren't talking about free will since there is no independent self who 
  could possess this faculty.
  
  dmb says:
  Yes, so you keep saying. You keep insisting that free will is superglued 
  to SOM and the independent self. That is just an arbitrary rule that you 
  made up and that's exactly why you keep re-inserting the Cartesian self 
  into my sentences, even the ones in which I reject the Cartesian self. That 
  arbitrary rule of yours is, in effect, a straw man factory. You're cranking 
  them out by the dozen. You are objecting to claims that nobody made. You're 
  asking me to defend the ridiculous nonsense produced by YOU at YOUR straw 
  man factory.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will

2011-07-20 Thread Ham Priday



On Wed, July 20, 2011 at 1:46 PM, Steven Peterson 
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:





To assert that the self exists DEPENDENTLY is to deny
the free will horn of the traditional free will versus determinism
dilemma since the whole big deal there was always about
whether or not an INDEPENDENT self can assert itself,
i.e. exercise it's free will.  Obviously a value-based metaphysics
also denies the determinism horn of the traditional SOM
dilemma as well. ...


What you have concluded above is only half true.  The BEING of an individual 
exists dependently; the SELF of that being is independent (free).


Sensible awareness, despite the brain and nervous system that supports it, 
is not itself a biological entity.  Neither are thoughts, concepts, or 
values.  So you can forget about the mini-computer 'I' inside your head 
and start realizing that the world outside you (beingness) is a product of 
your Value, instead of the other way around.  Each of us IS an autonomous 
Self with the freedom to choose and the power to objectivize every aspect of 
physical reality.


In the absence of sensible awareness there is no being, no experiential 
(i.e., empirical) reality.  Pirsig himself said as much when he wrote that 
experience is the leading edge of reality.


Valuistically speaking,
Ham

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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will


On Jul 20, 2011, at 6:00 PM, david buchanan wrote:

 
 Marsha said to dmb:
 
 Now you seem to understand why I've stated that I neither accept free-will, 
 nor deny free-will.  It's irrelevant within the MoQ.
 
 dmb says:
 Nothing could be further from the truth. I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates 
 the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the MOST relevant 
 thing in the universe. I'm correcting the distortion which render it 
 irrelevant and meaningless, such as your's and Steve's.

Marsha:
Three questions:  

Have you dropped the words 'free-will' and 'determinism'?  
If you are using new words please define them clearly?  
Please clearly explain the reformulation as you understand?  

 
If you are not using 'free-will' and 'determinism' as defined in the 
dictionary, than you must agree that I was correct to neither accept 
'free-will' and 'determinism', nor reject 'free-will' and 'determinism'.  They 
are irrelevant within the MoQ.  Of course, you are about to explain the new 
words to use and new understanding.  

I look forward to your explanations.  


Marsha 






 I'm saying freedom and constraint go all the way down and I'm saying that 
 AGAINST your vacuous nihilism.
 
 Like Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as 
 opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no 
 self at all. In Pirsig's formulation, the one who is free to some extent 
 and the one controlled to some extent is that dependent self. That is the 
 self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's what 
 what the whole evolutionary battle is all about. 
 
 To NEITHER reject NOR accept freewill doesn't even count as having a position 
 on the issue. It's just another classic example of meaningless equivocation.
 
 Your mantra is boring. Would it kill you to write a fresh sentence? 
 
 
 
 
 On Jul 20, 2011, at 5:14 PM, david buchanan wrote:
 
 
 Steve asked dmb:
 Maybe you can answer this as our master of logic. How can you still think 
 it is an interesting question to wonder about whether a DEPENDENT self has 
 INDEPENDENT (free) will?
 
 dmb says:
 How can I think it's interesting to ask about the DEPENDENT self's 
 INDEPENDENT (free) will?
 Well, I don't think that is an interesting question at all. I think the 
 question is absurd. The question confuses and combines two completely 
 different conceptions of the self. In the MOQ, everything exists in 
 relation to everything else and, in that sense, there is no such thing as 
 independence. But you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent 
 self is not at all the same as saying there is no self at all. In Pirsig's 
 formulation, the one who is free to some extent and the one controlled 
 to some extent is not independent. 
 
 Steve said: 
 You accuse me of changing the subject, but my point all along has been that 
 the free will determinism debate is an SOM problem which as Pirsig says, 
 doesn't come up in the MOQ.  ...If there is no independent (free) self, 
 then in the SOM sense of the term (and free will is an SOM term) the MOQ 
 denies the free will horn of the ancient dilemma. If reality is Quality, 
 the MOQ denies the determinism horn of the dilemma as well. What we have 
 here is not some middle ground that says we have a little free will and are 
 also a little bit determined by forces external to the will (since the MOQ 
 doesn't play that internal/external subject-object game). Instead the MOQ 
 denies the SOM premise (the independent self in a world of objects) upon 
 which  it could possibly make sense to ask the free will/determinism 
 question. That doesn't mean we can't talk about freedom, but in the MOQ we 
 aren't talking about free will since there is no independent self who 
 could possess this faculty.
 
 dmb says:
 Yes, so you keep saying. You keep insisting that free will is superglued 
 to SOM and the independent self. That is just an arbitrary rule that you 
 made up and that's exactly why you keep re-inserting the Cartesian self 
 into my sentences, even the ones in which I reject the Cartesian self. That 
 arbitrary rule of yours is, in effect, a straw man factory. You're cranking 
 them out by the dozen. You are objecting to claims that nobody made. You're 
 asking me to defend the ridiculous nonsense produced by YOU at YOUR straw 
 man factory.


 
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Re: [MD] The Quality of Free Will