[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:9259] DEADLINE EXTENDED CFP: "Semiotics of hybrid natures" (8–10.11.2018, University of Tartu, Estonia)

[Gary Richmond]

Due to several requests the deadline for the conference „Semiotics of
hybrid natures: Anthropogenic ecosystems, multimodalities, transformed
umwelts“ (8–10.11.2018, Tartu Estonia) has been extended up to 10 June. For
participating, please send the abstract (up to 500 words) and a bionote (up
to 50 words) to the address: hybridnatu...@gmail.com.

_



Call for Papers

Semiotics of hybrid natures:

Anthropogenic ecosystems, multimodalities, transformed umwelts

8–10.11.2018

University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia



Plenary speakers:

Nathalie Blanc (CNRS / Université Paris Diderot -Paris 7, France) – “At the
crossroads of senses and meaning, socio-environmental communities”

Morten Tønnessen (University of Stavanger, Norway) – “Current human ecology
in light of Umwelt theory”

Kati Lindström (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden) – “Generating
value in protection policies: Challenge of the Anthropocene entanglements”



Global and all-encompassing human impact has brought along many new types
of relations between humans and other biological species. These
interactions change animal ecologies but also bring along new forms and
aggregations of umwelts (animal personal worlds, after J. v. Uexküll). In
this context, human technology both alienates and reconnects — media
technologies have created new ways of becoming related with the environment
(development of citizen science and augmented realities), and there are new
technological capacities for restoring and shaping environments
(geoengineering). Correspondingly, the human-animal-environment
configurations have a hybrid nature: they are based on ecological
relations, make use of the technologies and artificial environments and at
the same time are represented and framed by human culture.

Achieving better knowledge on the dynamics and expressions of “hybrid
natures” is essential for mitigating environmental conflicts and enhancing
biodiversity in environments under human impact. The aim of the conference
is to exchange knowledge on various manifestations of hybrid natures as
well as to elaborate suitable research methods in ecosemiotics and beyond
in other environmental humanities. Semiotics appears to have good potential
for developing methods with prognostic value — for instance, analyzing
umwelts and communication for estimating what species can reach stable
co-existence and what adjustments may be needed for new natures to
persist.



Possible topics for contributions include, but are not limited to:

• new types of interactions in interspecies relations;

• semiotics of techno-natures;

• human-induced changes in animal umwelts;

• changes of human perception in hybrid environments;

• recognizing and reacting to environmental change;

• methodologies for studying hybrid natures;

• semiotics of multispecies environments.



Submission

To submit a proposal, interested scholars should e-mail an abstract (up to
500 words) and a bionote (up to 50 words) for the 20 minute presentation to
the address: hybridnatu...@gmail.com. The abstract should be sent as a
separate one-page file (.docx or .rtf; please use template from homepage).
The deadline for the abstracts is May 31, 2018. For additional information
and further updates please visit the conference website at
https://www.flfi.ut.ee/en/semiotics-of-hybrid-natures.



Organisers

The conference “Semiotics of hybrid natures: anthropogenic ecosystems,
multimodalities, transformed umwelts” is organized by The Department of
Semiotics at the University of Tartu, Estonia and by the Estonian Semiotics
Association under the auspice of International Society of Biosemiotic
Studies. The conference is supported by the Estonian Research Agency (Grant
PUT1363) and The Faculty of Humanities and Arts at the University of Tartu.



Additional information and updates: https://www.flfi.ut.ee/en/
semiotics-of-hybrid-natures

Organsing team: Nelly Mäekivi, Riin Magnus, Silver Rattasepp, Timo Maran

E-mail: hybridnatu...@gmail.com

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Gary Richmond]

List,

If one downloads Jon's paper and wants to quickly get to the discussion of
Peirce's cosmology in RLT--where he argues that 3ns not 1ns is primal,
contrasting this with his earlier views as expressed in "A Guess at the
Riddle" (the passage Edwina often cites)--scroll down to section page 9 in
section 4 beginning at "At first glance, this might seem to contradict
Peirce's earlier cosmological writings, such as an oft-cited narrative in
'A Guess at the Riddle' " through page 14 to section 6.

Of course for those interested in the how "all this" relates to the NA, the
entire paper is recommended.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 5:27 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, Jon, list,
>
> Edwina: "My reading of the above outline, however, obviously does not
> involve any metaphysical Agent [God]. As Peirce wrote: " You must not let
> this interfere with or be interfered with by any religious belief. "
> [6.217 my emphasis]. "
>
> Well, we've been through this before. It seems to me that while you
> reference Peirce's earlier cosmological musings that you never make
> reference to his 1898 comments on what I have called the proto-universe
> (call it what you wish, but it is most definitely an analysis of the
> conditions prior to the putative big bang). I think this discussion might
> be able to move forward dramatically if participants in this discussion
> could offer their interpretations of Peirce's remarks there. A short cut
> might be to frist read those passages in Jon's paper related to them. In
> any event, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* (RLT) is available in an
> inexpensive paperback edition; here's a link to to Jon's paper:
> https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244
>
> Yes, of course Peirce holds that science as science must be
> single-mindedly taken up with no interference by or thought of religion or
> even practical matters. And, in fact, there is no mention of God whatsoever
> in Peirce's 1898 lectures. But what one 'does' with the *result* of any
> inquiry is another matter there being, for example, practical arts and
> applied sciences. But you are correct that to keep these inquiries 'pure'
> so to speak, Peirce doesn't discuss God here at all. He makes a point not
> to. Still, there is in Peirce's classification of science a religious
> metaphysics in which he did some significant work himself.
>
> You conclude: "And these writings are also the ground for my rejection
> of Thirdness as a priori or primary; I continue to posit that Firstness,
> understood as potentiality - is primary."
>
> Well, again, in the last of the 1898 lectures Peirce posits *not 1ns *but
> continuity as primary (I'm working from memory as I am still away from my
> desk). The blackboard analogy offers the surface of the blackboard as that
> ur-continuity. Now there is no concept more closely linked to 3ns I don't
> believe than continuity, not even time (of course time doesn't exist in the
> proto-cosmos conjectured in this lecture, nor is it there time even in the
> early stages of the cosmos which is to issue forth* as this* universe).
>
> The first chalk mark 'made' upon that board is the first discontinuity. As
> Peirce writes (I'm quoting from Jon's paper):
>
> The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon
> which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential
> Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark—like a line figure drawn on
> the area of the blackboard. (RLT 162; 1898)
>
>
> As Jon puts it in his paper turning to the later lecture in the series
> which includes the blackboard analogy:
>
> A chalk line drawn on the blackboard represents the spontaneous
> introduction of a brute discontinuity. However, the mark itself it is not
> really a line; it is a surface with its own continuity, which is entirely
> derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. The only
> true line is the limit of the white and black areas, and this is the
> discontinuity—"the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which it
> is separated" (CP 6.203). Peirce thus acknowledged that all three
> Categories—whiteness or blackness (1ns), their boundary (2ns), and the
> continuity of each (3ns)—are necessary for the reality of the chalk mark
> (CP 6.205). However, *the continuity of the blackboard (3ns) is
> primordial, in the sense that its reality precedes and sustains that of
> anything drawn upon it; this is "its really commanding function.*"
> (emphasis added)
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina: "My reading of the above outline, however, obviously does not
involve any metaphysical Agent [God]. As Peirce wrote: " You must not let
this interfere with or be interfered with by any religious belief. " [6.217
my emphasis]. "

Well, we've been through this before. It seems to me that while you
reference Peirce's earlier cosmological musings that you never make
reference to his 1898 comments on what I have called the proto-universe
(call it what you wish, but it is most definitely an analysis of the
conditions prior to the putative big bang). I think this discussion might
be able to move forward dramatically if participants in this discussion
could offer their interpretations of Peirce's remarks there. A short cut
might be to frist read those passages in Jon's paper related to them. In
any event, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* (RLT) is available in an
inexpensive paperback edition; here's a link to to Jon's paper:
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244

Yes, of course Peirce holds that science as science must be single-mindedly
taken up with no interference by or thought of religion or even practical
matters. And, in fact, there is no mention of God whatsoever in Peirce's
1898 lectures. But what one 'does' with the *result* of any inquiry is
another matter there being, for example, practical arts and applied
sciences. But you are correct that to keep these inquiries 'pure' so to
speak, Peirce doesn't discuss God here at all. He makes a point not to.
Still, there is in Peirce's classification of science a religious
metaphysics in which he did some significant work himself.

You conclude: "And these writings are also the ground for my rejection
of Thirdness as a priori or primary; I continue to posit that Firstness,
understood as potentiality - is primary."

Well, again, in the last of the 1898 lectures Peirce posits *not 1ns *but
continuity as primary (I'm working from memory as I am still away from my
desk). The blackboard analogy offers the surface of the blackboard as that
ur-continuity. Now there is no concept more closely linked to 3ns I don't
believe than continuity, not even time (of course time doesn't exist in the
proto-cosmos conjectured in this lecture, nor is it there time even in the
early stages of the cosmos which is to issue forth* as this* universe).

The first chalk mark 'made' upon that board is the first discontinuity. As
Peirce writes (I'm quoting from Jon's paper):

The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon
which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential
Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark—like a line figure drawn on
the area of the blackboard. (RLT 162; 1898)


As Jon puts it in his paper turning to the later lecture in the series
which includes the blackboard analogy:

A chalk line drawn on the blackboard represents the spontaneous
introduction of a brute discontinuity. However, the mark itself it is not
really a line; it is a surface with its own continuity, which is entirely
derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. The only
true line is the limit of the white and black areas, and this is the
discontinuity—"the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which it
is separated" (CP 6.203). Peirce thus acknowledged that all three
Categories—whiteness or blackness (1ns), their boundary (2ns), and the
continuity of each (3ns)—are necessary for the reality of the chalk mark
(CP 6.205). However, *the continuity of the blackboard (3ns) is primordial,
in the sense that its reality precedes and sustains that of anything drawn
upon it; this is "its really commanding function.*" (emphasis added)


Note the short Peirce snippet in the quotation just above. Jon continues:


A chalk mark that persists, rather than being erased, represents the
establishment of a habit—which is also entirely derived from and dependent
on the continuity of the underlying blackboard: This habit is a
generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a general,
and as such a continuum or continuity. *It must have its origin in the
original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.* *Continuity, as
generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general. (CP
6.204)* As additional marks are drawn and persist, they join together due
to other developing habits and become "reacting systems," which aggregate
and merge into larger such systems (CP 6.206-207). Eventually, "out of one
of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe
of existence in which we happen to be" (CP 6.208). (Emphasis added)


Well, that's all I have time for now and, as mentioned above, I'm hampered
in not having RLT at hand at the moment. I would strongly advise all here
who are truly interested in this topic to read Jon's paper and at least the
last lecture in RLT.

Best,

Gary

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, John, Jon, list,

Peirce's definition of belief is "that upon which a man is prepared to
act."

It is well known (Fisch 1954) that Peirce got his definition of belief from
Alexander Bain, of which he heard in the discussions of the Metaphysical
Club : [1] "In particular, he [Nicholas St. John Green] often urged the
importance of applying Bain's definition of belief, as "that upon which a
man is prepared to act." From this definition, pragmatism is scarce more
than a corollary; so that I am disposed to think of him as the grandfather
of pragmatism." ( Peirce CP 5.12, 1907) In "BELIEF AS A DISPOSITION TO ACT:
VARIATIONS ON A PRAGMATIST THEME" by Pascal Engel
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/91be/5413de00ed7d1e6bada9b8
df9c3dd5710221.pdf


Near the conclusion of the paper Engel writes:


What matters is that we can identify a species of pragmatism, theoria
pragmatism, which, without renouncing the dispositional conception of
belief as a basic tenet of pragmatism, does not throw by the board the
basic dualities between believing and willing, fact and value, theory and
practice (op. cit, 19) [as, for example, Richard Rorty tried to do-GR]


Now this view of belief (and pragmatism) seems to me to be essentially
correct, and I consider it so for most all our beliefs, especially to the
extent to which they have been critically evaluated. I would maintain that
this is so whether our belief pertains to science or religion or to some
ordinary aspect of our quotidian activity.

No doubt certain of our beliefs in science are so well founded, so well
tested , technologies, even advanced technologies, finally having been
developed out of them, that we can hardly doubt them--and we do *not* doubt
them. Those would indeed be "paper doubts." Indeed, some of our scientific
beliefs are so completely established--for example, the mechanical
ones--that really no sane, decently educated person would think of doubting
them.

But when we consider matters like the origin of the cosmos--whether our
belief is that the universe came into being as a result of a big bang or
was created by God--such beliefs are, in my opinion, of an entirely
different order. They cannot be formed in the way that, say, mechanical and
chemical laws are in our thinking, that is, experimentally. There are signs
and suggestions, but these can be and are variously interpreted. Still, we
(fallibly) believe what we believe in these matters.

Consider, for example, Jonathan Strickland in writing on the standard big
bang theory and, after offering reasons why some scientists (for example,
Robert Gentry, Hannes Alfven, Halton Arp, Goeffrey Burbridge, and even Sir
Fred Hoyle who coined the term "Big Bang"), "have questioned and criticized
the model" concludes:

There are several other models as well. Could one of these theories (or
other ones we haven't even thought of) one day replace the big bang theory
as the accepted model of the universe? It's quite possible. As time passes
and our capability to study the universe increases, we'll be able to make
more accurate models of how the universe developed.https://science.hows
tuffworks.com/dictionary/astronomy-terms/big-bang-theory7.htm


But for some scientists the standard big bang theory has become as much a
dogma as certain religious dogmas are for some fundamentalist religionists.

I have been studying the Big Bang theory for decades as, no doubt, have
many on this list, and I find it wanting. For prime reason (although there
are many reasons relating more directly to physical phenomena), it doesn't
answer the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" so that
when, for example, the late Stephen Hawkings was asked what preceded the
Big Bang his short answer was "nothing."

On the other hand, Peirce outlines an earliest cosmology (that is, one of
the hypothetical quasi-'conditions' or quasi-'states' preceding the
supposed Big Bang or, in my understanding, the Creation of this, our,
Cosmos) in his highly conjectural musings in the concluding lecture of the
series published as *Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge
Conferences Lectures of 1898*.
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674749672 Jon Alan Schmidt
has further developed those musings in a most interesting and creative way
in his recent paper which he's provided a link to. In my reading, these
speculations tend to support the hypothesis of God.

Best,

Gary






*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> John, list:
>
> My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than individual
> instantiations or existences of that generality.
>
> Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case,
> t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding "alien" life in the cosmos

[Gary Richmond]

John S, list,

And I think it's significant in the context of the several recent threads
that Peirce was one of the first scientists to imagine that there had to be
a cosmos beyond the Milky Way, our own galaxy.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 8:12 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 5/16/2018 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> So, at very least, the jury is still out on this question.
>>
>
> I certainly agree.  Ray K's predictions about AI have usually
> been unreliable or just wrong.
>
> The inverse square law implies that the energy of electromagnetic
> radiation falls off very rapidly *unless* the transmission is beamed
> directly at some intended target.
>
> The absence of any evidence of alien civilizations could just mean
> that nobody in our region of the Milky Way noticed, or nobody beamed
> any info at us, or that nobody on earth was listening if and when
> somebody did send a message our way.
>
> The likelihood that any civilization in another galaxy could have
> noticed our planet is vanishingly small.  If they had detected
> our planet, they must have detected billions of others that were
> closer or more interesting to them.  And if they had beamed a
> message our way, it's certain that we never beamed a response
> to them, and they probably gave up.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen J, List,

Neither Jon S nor I have been arguing for or against our own personal
religious views in this discussion, but only affirming *Peirce's own stated
views*. We are, it would seem, in agreement as to what those views are
since Peirce was quite explicit about them.

Our own personal views regarding God and religion, at least as I understand
them, are similar to Peirce's principally in that we are theists, but
different from his in many regards. And I know from off-list discussions
with Jon that his and my beliefs are very different from each other's.
Meanwhile, all that Jon has said on list about his own personal beliefs is
that he is a theist and a Lutheran, while I have commented (although not in
the present discussion) that some of my views are, as I see them, similar
to Peirce's while some are quite different. For example, regarding one
difference, like you I especially struggle with the notion of a personal
God.

But, again, our personal religious views in this discussion have *never
even once* been the issue. We, like many--perhaps virtually all--who have
studied Peirce's religious views, simply affirm that Peirce held a belief
in the Reality of God, that is, that he was a theist.

*CSP: T*he word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is
*the* definable
proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of
all three Universes of Experience.


That is all. One can agree or disagree with his religious views, his
theism, but he was most definitely a theist, not an atheist, not an
agnostic. And, again, we are not arguing pro nor con regarding theism.

As for whether any individual in this forum or, for that matter, *anywhere*
is a theist or an atheist, that matters not a whit to me. I am married to
an agnostic, and the most beloved living member of my family, my sister, is
an atheist, her husband a Buddhist. The agnostics and atheists whom I know
personally and call friends are all very good and ethical people in my
opinion. The theists I know personally and call friends are all very good
and ethical people. And I should add that I have friends, colleagues, and
students who are Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, Baha'i, and Muslim, one of
the delights of living in as culturally rich a city as New York City is.
Perhaps the greatest teacher in my life, Da Liu, was Taoist.

Best,

Gary





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 6:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
wrote:

> Gary, list
>
> I find the certainty with which positions are taken here, and asserted,
> rather disconcerting. I am not an expert on Peirce at all, so I cannot
> comment on the verity of what he had said or intended.
>
> My own position on the nature of God? I keep out of that conversation. I
> can no more know God than I can know the “true” nature of empty space. It
> does not interest me to conjecture about gods, for my mind-body is not
> equipped to apprehend such an entity… any more than a neuron is equipped to
> understand me.
>
> Here is a poem that I wrote around 2005. People can read into this pretty
> much whatever they want. Is God implied? Merely a metaphor? Or is he real?
> Maybe a personal god who affects us directly? Take your pick… though I
> should add that I find the idea of a personal god especially troublesome,
> nay self-indulgent, as per my views on human exceptionalism… in a universe
> comprised of trillions of billions of planets (by current conservative
> guesstimates), as if each and every one of us could be so important.
>
>
> I AM CULTURE
>
> Sociologists studied the behaviors of crowds, and never saw my
> essence.
> Psychologists analyzed the behaviors of individuals, and never saw
> my form.
> Others - also with their own personal problems and private lives -
> have categorized, labeled and pigeonholed me.
> They call me “Culture”.
>
> But you don’t know me.
> Indeed, very few people can even guess how I might affect their
> lives.
> Yet I am responsible for the way that you and all your brothers
> and sisters live and interact.
> I am responsible for the successes and failures of each and every
> one of your kind.
> I am more powerful than you could ever have imagined.
> Yet whole lives can be lived without ever knowing - or caring -
> that I exist.
>
> Everyone sees and responds to the consequences of my power.
> Each and every thought, each and every action is a direct result
> of interactions with my power.
> Even if one of your kind knew me - even if he could know my power
> and would choose to rebel against it, he would be powerless.
> For

[PEIRCE-L] The Eighteenth Annual Biosemiotics Gathering

[Gary Richmond]

*The Eighteenth Annual Biosemiotics Gathering*


Hosted at the University of California at Berkeley by
Terrence Deacon and Yogi Hendlin on behalf of the International Society of
Biosemiotic Studies, June 17-20, 2018.

We have no keynotes, no break-out sessions, no hierarchy--we're a
thoroughly rhizomatic organization. This means that everyone gets to
participate and each talk builds on the previous one, providing a uniquely
rich discursive milieu.

Biosemiotics is, in the words of Jesper Hoffmeyer, “the signs of life and
the life of signs.” As an interdisciplinary field, it emerged from the
semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, and the theoretical biology of Jakob von
Uexküll. It was finally distilled by Thomas Sebeok and many others. This
Gathering, now in its eighteenth year, occurs under the auspices of
the International
Society for Biosemiotic Studies <http://www.biosemiotics.org/>.

TIME

Sun, Jun 17, 2018, 9:00 AM –

Wed, Jun 20, 2018, 6:00 PM PDT


LOCATION


International House at UC Berkeley

2299 Piedmont Avenue

Berkeley, CA 94720


For more information: www.biosemiotics.life


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

You can obstinately stand by your views, but that won't make them any more
logical. You wrote:

ET: 1]   . . . I repeat; the terms of God and Real are vague and can mean
anything that one subjectively wishes.

2] With regard to the second point - same problem; the terms are vague.

You totally misconstrue what Peirce means by 'vague' and how he uses it in
many discussions, often in consideration of logical issues where he
distinguishes the vague from the general. For example:

1905 | Issues of Pragmaticism | EP 2:351; CP 5.447-448

[A]nything is *general* in so far as the principle of excluded middle does
not apply to it and is *vague* in so far as the principle of contradiction
does not apply to it.
1904 | Foundations of Mathematics [R] | MS [R] 10:1-2

If a sign allows the utterer a certain latitude of choice as to what his
meaning may be; so that he may perhaps defend its applicability in several
ways […] then the sign may be said to be *vague*, or *non-definite*.

As to the vagueness involved in the ideas 'God' and the 'Real', Jon has
already discussed this at some length, so again I won't repeat his
discussion of how Peirce employs the idea of 'vagueness' in those context.
But for Peirce "vague" *in any context *certainly does *not* "mean anything
that one subjectively wishes." That is patent nonsense.

Peirce's offers several definitions of the vague and vagueness which are
fairly similar and seem to me to apply to the current discussion.

1904 | Foundations of Mathematics [R] | MS [R] 11:1

If a sign allows a latitude of choice to the utterer in certain respects
and within certain limits, as to what its object or meaning shall be, it
may be called *vague*, or *non-determinate*.

Note, the "latitude of choice" is "in certain respects and within certain
limits."

Peirce defines both "God" (as Ens Necessarium and as Real Creator of the
Three Universes, and all that these concepts, albeit, vaguely imply); and
he defines the "Real":

1905 | Materials for Monist Article: The Consequences of Pragmaticism.
Vols. I and II [R] | MS [R] 288:117

A real is anything that is not affected by men’s cognitions *about it*.


ET: 3] No - I cannot offer any retraction, since I don't accept your view.

There's a huge difference in meaning between 'Creator' and 'creating'.

In the present context, this is not so as Peirce sees it. From A Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God:

*T*he word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable
proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of
all three Universes of Experience.

You conclude:


ET: That is-  God/Mind is creating the universe - and, as outlined in
Peirce's description of the emergence of Mind-as-Matter, in 1.412, this
constant action of creation is not via some prior Supreme Power, not via
some Supreme Design, not via some metaphysical Agency, but is an ongoing
Complex Self-Organized Action. Therefore - I do not see God as the Creator;
I read Peirce to outline how Mind/Matter are constantly forming,
dissipating and forming novel matter within a complex
self-organized interaction of the Three Categories.

Well, I can certainly agree that, as you wrote, "God/Mind is creating the
universe." But, in my opinion, you ought to consider not only 1.412 but
also the final lectures of the 1898 series (not in the CP) where Peirce
radically modifies his view of the emergence of the cosmos. Jon's recent
paper takes this up rather masterfully, in my opinion. Your autopoietic
(self-organizing) view of the emergence of the cosmos would be news to
Peirce, while I think that he would find it valuable in consideration of
the emergence of biological life.

Edwina, I am personally getting tired of this "debate." You seem married to
your positions and unwilling to reconsider any one of them or any part of
any one of them. I find your analysis of Peirce's views of God and religion
illogical. At this point and out of intellectual exhaustion I usually say,
you can have the last word.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 7:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> I stand by my views.
>
> 1]   I wrote: " its premises could be false. The problem is: the
> terms: God, Real - are vague and therefore, can mean anything that one
> subjectively wishes."
>
> And I repeat; the terms of God and Real are vague and can mean anything
> that one subjectively wishes.
>
> 2] With regard to the second point - same problem; the terms are vague.
>
> 3] No - I cannot offer any retraction, since I don't accept your view.
> Peirce wrote: "Do you believe this Supreme Being to have been the creator
> of the uni

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon, responding to Edwina wrote:

1.  Defining "God" and "Real" as Peirce did in CP 6.452-453, which of my
premises is false, such that the conclusion is false?

2.  The subject at hand is not what one *can *say, but what Peirce *did *say;
he believed in God, *and *affirmed His Reality.

3.  It is demonstrably false that "Peirce denies God as the Creator"; on
the contrary, he explicitly affirmed it, over and over.


1. Your premises are not false, Jon, and this nonsense coming from Edwina
is strictly illogical

2. Peirce most certainly said "he believed in God, and affirmed His
Reality" and to attempt to deny this is simply absurd.

3. Saying, as Edwina did, that "Peirce denies God as the Creator" is false
and the whole of her absurd illogic on this matter is becoming offensive. I
would like to strongly suggest that you offer a retraction of that last
statement, Edwina.

Best,

Gary (writing at 3. as list moderator)




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  Defining "God" and "Real" as Peirce did in CP 6.452-453, which of my
> premises is false, such that the conclusion is false?
>
> 2.  The subject at hand is not what one *can *say, but what Peirce *did *say;
> he believed in God, *and *affirmed His Reality.
>
> 3.  It is demonstrably false that "Peirce denies God as the Creator"; on
> the contrary, he explicitly affirmed it, over and over.
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list:
>>
>> 1] Your argument may be logically valid as a basic syllogism but its
>> premises could be false. The problem is: the terms: God, Real - are vague
>> and therefore, can mean anything that one subjectively wishes.
>>
>> 2] Yes - I suggest that one can say "I believe in god' and yet, deny
>> god's reality - since the terms are vague [god, reality]..Furthermore, such
>> vague beliefs are, in themselves, without anything other than emotional
>> meaning and strictly personal and subjective.
>>
>> 3] Peirce denies God as the Creator - instead, his complex semiosis means
>> that matter is always being created, Mind-as-Matter.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Mon 14/05/18 4:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina:
>>
>> This is one of two posts that I am sending more or less simultaneously;
>> please read the other one first.
>>
>> Here is the only formal argument that I offered below; note that it is
>> deductively valid.
>>
>> Someone who believes that God is Real is a theist.
>> Peirce believed that God is Real.
>> Therefore, Peirce was a theist.
>>
>>
>> Since you deny the conclusion, which premise do you deny?  The first is a
>> straightforward definition, and the second is something that Peirce
>> explicitly affirmed.
>>
>> 1.  Are you seriously suggesting that someone can say, "I believe in
>> God," and yet deny that God is Real?  That strikes me as completely
>> incoherent.
>>
>> 2.  Again, I stated quite plainly, " a theist is by definition  someone
>> who believes in God."  Are you operating with some other idiosyncratic
>> definition of "theist"?
>>
>> 3.  Peirce explicitly defined both "God" and "Real" at the beginning of
>> "A Neglected Argument," and plainly described God (so defined) as being "
>> in my belief Really [so defined] creator of all three Universes of
>> Experience" (CP 6.452-453).  "Theistic God" is redundant; what kind of God
>> could possibly be "non-theistic"?  If what you are really questioning is
>> whether Peirce believed in a personal God, then there is likewise no
>> need to speculate.
>>
>> CSP:   The mere carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical.
>> This remark has an application to the philosophy of religion. It is that a
>> genuine evolutionary philosophy, that is, one that makes the principle of
>> growth a primordial element of the universe, is so far from being
>> antagonistic to the idea of a personal creator that it is really
>> inseparable from that idea; while a necessitarian religion is in an
>> altogether false position and is destined to become disintegrated. But a
>> pseudo-evolutionism which enthrones mechanical law above the principle of
>> growth is at once sc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reconciling science and religion; and, religion as poetic sentiment generalized, was, The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

OK, we'll have to agree to disagree on these matters related to Peirce and
religion.

But I would like to comment on this concluding remark of yours:

ET: I'm a gardener - and my view is that the plants 'talk with each other';
indeed, one has to respect this interaction - and not uproot them or move
them around too rapidly; one has to watch how they like to grow and not
impose our will - and then, follow them along.


I completely agree with you as to communication occurring within that
world.
A few years ago I read chapters of a book which Gary Furhman recommended, *The
Hidden Life of Trees* (I'm away from my desk so can't say for certain that
this is the title). For a very long time I'd had a vague notion that this
was so, but reading that book absolutely convinced me of it.

On a related topic, this weekend at a theater in Manhattan I saw a
wonderful one woman show, *Seedfolks *(written and performed by the
talented Sonja Parks). In it she plays a rather large number of characters,
a young Korean girl, an old Mexican man who doesn't speak English, a young
hip Black man, a teenage Latino tough, an older nosy Nigerian woman, etc.
Set in a slum in Cleveland, Ohio (where I grew up, although not in a slum
and principally in two of its suburbs), the play begins with the young
girl, 9 year old Kim, planting some beans in the corner of a filthy,
garbage strewn empty lot as a gesture to her father who had died before she
was born. As the play unfolds, slowly many members of the
not-quite-a-community find reasons to plant their own seeds, the lot is
completely transformed, and a vibrant community is formed.

So, bringing together these ideas, gardening in this case would seem to
have created communities both above and below ground!

This reminded me that a couple of years ago Ben Udell and I wrote a chapter
for a book, *Peirce in His Own Words (Semiotics, Communication and
Cognition)*, which we titled "Logic is rooted in the social principle (and
vice versa)."
https://www.amazon.com/Charles-Sanders-Semiotics-Communication-Cognition/dp/1614517533

Remembering that for Peirce logic *is* semeiotic, it would seem that in
*Seedfolks* that both the above ground and the below ground communities
were rooted in semiotic and semiotic in them!

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 4:23 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary, list:
>
> I don't think that one can readily say something such as "a believer in
> the Reality of God' without defining one's terms: reality and God.
>
> What Peirce writes about God - is, as he specifically says, analogous to
> 'Mind'. And Mind operates also as he says, within the three categories.
> That's it.
>
> 1] As for a 'rapproachement of science and religion - yes and no.
>
>  The basic infrastructure of religion, which is always a societal
> infrastructure in that it includes what one 'ought to believe' - is its
> basic axioms which are beliefs. Not empirical facts. But beliefs. Do we
> need beliefs? I think so - for one cannot be 're-inventing the world' every
> few years. But - the problem is that our beliefs can become fixed and
> harmful - eg, the belief that women are witches. So, not all belief systems
> are equivalent or good.
>
>  Are there common beliefs? Again - I think so - common because we are
> human; that is, these common beliefs lie outside of any religious set,
> outside of any ethnic or cultural set - they are common to all humankind.
> But we tend to deny our commonality and instead, live within isolate
> tribes/ethnicities/religions filled with adversarial views of others.
>
> The basic infrastructure of science is its insistence on the bonding of
> facts to hypotheses [beliefs]. Religion has no involvement in facts. But
> science has to acknowledge the commonality of our humankind.
>
> 2] The human capacity for imagination - i.e., Firstness - is vital. But in
> a sense, other living beings also have a capacity-to-'imagine' or
> anticipate being different. They can't articulate it in symbols [artwork,
> poetry, music] - but - they do have the capacity to anticipate being
> different..and then, even activating that difference. They can adapt and
> evolve.
>
> I'm a gardener - and my view is that the plants 'talk with each other';
> indeed, one has to respect this interaction - and not uproot them or move
> them around too rapidly; one has to watch how they like to grow and not
> impose our will - and then, follow them along. This is Firstness within the
> plant world!
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 14/05/18 3:29 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> I'll no doubt have much more to say at some p

Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Gary F., list,

Helmut wrote: "Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real"
or "being" or "ens" or "ontological" is a direct experience too."

I think that this is correct as long as one remembers that in Peirce's
understanding existential being is a matter of 2ns (so is *hic et nunc*)
while reality is a matter of 3ns (habituality, lawfulness, and so also has
its 'being' *in futuro*). So, what is "real" includes would-bes (3ns) as
well as is's (2ns) and may-bes (1ns).

Peirce uses the expression *lawfulness* as 3ns to suggest that those laws
which are embodied in existential structures will tend to be in effect in
the future, although, of course they may be modified and even evolve. The
idea that laws themselves (and not just biological structures) can evolve
is a relatively recent one which is being given more and more credence even
in physics.

So, to summarize: what is real (3ns) involves that which is existent (2ns)
which in turn involve characters, qualities, possibilities, etc. (1ns).
Consequently reality involves both existents and qualities, possibilities,
etc.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 12:01 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

>
> Thank you, Gary f., for correcting my use of the term "proof". I now
> recall, that K.O. Apel didn´t say "final proof", but "ultimate foundation"
> ("Letztbegründung") "of discourse ethics". He also wrote of
> "self-upstepping of reality" ("Selbstaufstufung der Realität") in this
> context. I think, this means a circular (retroductive) argument.
> I see that "proof of existence" needs direct experience. But I think, that
> this direct experience may also be in a premiss of a deductive argument- or
> even in a pre-premiss which has formed the premiss by a deductive argument,
> or a pre-pre-premiss...
> So the direct experience needed for calling something existent is a
> spatiotemporal one, I think.
> Now my guess about what is needed to call something "real" or "being" or
> "ens" or "ontological" is a direct experience too: The direct experience of
> fixation of belief by a retroduction ("self-upstepping of reality", maybe
> badly translated). Of course spatiotemporal direct experience does the job
> too, as existence is a subset of reality.
> Well, I am just trying to get the concepts in order. Existence is spatial,
> I think, and reality is functional.
>
> Best, Helmut
> 13. Mai 2018 um 17:07 Uhr
>  g...@gnusystems.ca
> wrote:
>
> Helmut, since you ask,
>
> The only “proof of existence” is direct experience; no kind of reasoning
> is up to the task of verifying the genuine Secondness of anything that
> exists — as opposed to an *ens rationis*, which may or may not be *real*,
> but its reality is not that of an existing thing.
>
> Usually in logic, if not in religion, “proof” refers to a deductive
> argument, and that is the milieu in which a circular argument is invalid.
> Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” is much more retroductive than deductive.
>
> I think Peirce preferred not to use terms like “theism” or “theist” (or
> “deist”) because those are technical terms in theology. One thing Peirce
> apparently shared with William Fox is that they both became impatient with
> theology and simply avoided it as they grew older. “God” on the other hand
> is a vernacular term, and a supremely vague one (as Peirce pointed out more
> than once), so using “belief in God” rather than “theism” is a way of
> placing the matter in the realm of instinctive common sense, where he
> thought the concept of God belonged. If we regard his NA as deductive, we
> have to say that its premisses are that belief in a Creator is instinctive,
> and that such instinctive beliefs are more reliable than beliefs based on
> reasoning. Both of those premisses are questionable, in my opinion, but if
> we grant them, then the deductive argument has some validity. But the
> deductive argument is not the one that matters to Peirce anyway, as far as
> I can see.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } You can't depend on your judgment when your imagination is out of focus.
> [Mark Twain] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Sent:* 13-May-18 04:22
>
>
> Gary, Gary, list,
>
> I understand that when it is about reality (of God), Peirce was a theist,
> and when it is about existence, not. Now i have a more general question
> about real versus existent

[PEIRCE-L] Reconciling science and religion; and, religion as poetic sentiment generalized, was, The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I'll no doubt have much more to say at some point, and not only as a
believer in the Reality of God, but I consider virtually all the points Jon
made in his several posts today *as they relate to Peirce's view of God *valid
and Edwina's countering them captious. Principally, her continuing to
refuse to acknowledge Peirce's clearly stated views on several of these
matters, substituting for them her own (as I see it it, idiosyncratic)
interpretation is exasperating to say the least. So there's no point in my
offering my own position in this matter as I'd be merely restating what Jon
has already written. Jon and I have disagreed on any number of matter in
this forum over the years, some even relating to religion, but here we seem
to be in full agreement.

Meanwhile, Edwina is not even willing to accept what Peirce says so
emphatically on several occasions, namely, that he believes in the Reality
of God. As a member of this Peirce forum I'm somewhat less interested in
other, for example, general arguments--theistic or atheistic--but in what
Peirce's own views were. Once *that* is clarified (which Jon seems to me to
be doing) rather than obfuscated (which in my opinion Edwina is doing in
suggesting, for example, that what Peirce means when he says 'God' doesn't
mean 'God' but 'Mind') *then* one can accept of reject those views using
whatever valid argumentation one pleases.

But here I want to introduce two matters related to Peirce's views
regarding religion.

(1) The value of a possible rapprochement of science and religion.

[A] religion, so true to itself, that it becomes animated by the scientific
spirit, confident that all the conquests of science will be triumphs of its
own, and accepting all the results of science, as scientific men themselves
accept them, as steps toward the truth. . . CP 6.428-434 given the title
"The Marriage of Religion and Science" by the editors.

"Let science and religion each have stout faith in itself, and refuse to
compromise with alien and secondary purposes, but push the development of
its own thought on its own line; and then, when reconcilement comes--as
come it surely will--it will have a positive value, and be an unmixed
good." (CP 6.603; 1893)


(2) That Peirce saw religion as, at least potentially, and in a very real
sense, the sentiment involved in poetry completely generalized and
regenerated.

The complete generalization, the complete regeneration of sentiment is
religion, which is poetry, but poetry completed. (CP 1.676; 1898)


These quotations on Art and Imagination from Richard Rohr's blog has gotten
me thinking more deeply about this second theme.

"The imagination retains a passion for freedom. There are no rules for the
imagination. It never wants to stay trapped in the expected territories.
The old maps never satisfy it. It wants to press ahead beyond the accepted
frontiers and bring back reports of regions no mapmaker has yet visited."
John O’Donohue.

“I am enough of an artist to draw freely upon my imagination. Imagination
is more important than knowledge. . . . [It] encircles the world.” Einstein.

"Whether for an infant or a society on the verge of change, a new way to
think about reality begins with the assimilation of unfamiliar images. . .
. Because the erosion of images by words occurs at such an early age, we
forget that in order to learn something radically new, we need first to
imagine it. “Imagine” literally means to “make an image.” . . . If, as I
propose, this function of imagination, so crucial to the development of an
infant, is also present in the civilization at large, who then creates the
new images that precede abstract ideas and descriptive language? It is the
artist. . . . Revolutionary art in all times has served this function of
preparing the future." Leonard Shlain, *Art and Physics: Parallel Visions
in Space, Time, and Light*


Rohr comments:

Perhaps, like the prophetic mystics of all traditions, the great artists of
each generation can help us transcend our dualisms and move us beyond the
exclusionary frameworks that are comfortable for us . . . if we have the
ears to hear or the eyes to see and the willingness to engage!


Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, May 14, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> JAS, list:
>
> Those are all circular and thus invalid arguments.
>
> 1] To equate someone who says: 'I believe in God' with a claim that this
> person is also saying: 'God is Real' - is an invalid argument - both
> syllogistically and informally, [the latter since the terms of 'real'
> and god are undefined'.] and syllogistically since thee are only two terms
> :god/real]
>
> 2] To equate someone who says: 'I believe in God' to be a 'theist' is also
> an invalid argument, sin

[PEIRCE-L] Cybernetics & Human Knowing: 25th Anniversary Issue

[Gary Richmond]

[image: Image may contain: sky, ocean, cloud, text and outdoor]
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10216897990621988=a.1410495382359.59927.1231733263=3=1>
Claudia Jacques
<https://www.facebook.com/claudiajacquesdemoraes?hc_ref=ARTfq5-dkrLwBFYjfUeo7tOZZniQDmFiLQAvj9Wmqza-9I4sV0VvZfnE3HgVUGB7nHc=nf_location=group>
7 hrs
<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10216897990621988=a.1410495382359.59927.1231733263=3=1>

I am honored to introduce (and be featured in) the 25th Anniversary issue
of Cybernetic and Human Knowing journal: High Abstraction and Skillful
Application!

Many thanks to Søren Brier
<https://www.facebook.com/sb.ikk?fref=mentions_location=group> for
carrying this journal for a quarter century, Phillip Guddemi
<https://www.facebook.com/phillip.guddemi?fref=mentions_location=group> for
helping insure the journal's transdisciplinarity breath and depth, Jeanette
Bopry for her knowledge and eagle eyes, and for former art editors (Bruno
Kjaer, Vols. 1–12; Pille Bunnell, Vols. 12–19).

"In this jubilee year, we want to acknowledge all the members of the
editorial board, the guest editors, societies, referees, columnists and
authors who have worked with us
and contributed to the success of this endeavor. A unique, integral
component of the journal is that articles are complemented by the
contributions of featured artists,
coordinated by past and current art editors (Bruno Kjaer, Vols. 1–12; Pille
Bunnell, Vols. 12–19; Claudia Jacques
<https://www.facebook.com/claudiajacquesdemoraes?fref=mentions_location=group>,
Vols. 20–present).

Also of course we want to acknowledge our publisher for many years, Imprint
Academic.

The editor in chief, Søren Brier
<https://www.facebook.com/sb.ibc?fref=mentions_location=group>, thanks
his employer the Copenhagen Business School for donating working hours.
Last but not least, thank you to all the presidents of the American Society
for Cybernetics (ASC) and the many founding fathers who are no longer with
us, but whose trust in us helped us get started. The most prominent of
these who is still alive should be mentioned in particular—Fred Steier,
then president of ASC who cooperated in starting the journal with Søren
Brier.

This has been a collective effort where every contribution counts.
Cybernetics and Human Knowing is a bumblebee that only flies on the
goodwill of all its creators and
subscribers. As long as you are all there we will continue to publish." CHK
25(1), p. 7.

Articles by: Bent Sørensen, Torkild Thellefsen
<https://www.facebook.com/torkild.thellefsen?fref=mentions_location=group>,
and Søren Brier
<https://www.facebook.com/sb.ibc?fref=mentions_location=group>, Paul
Cobley, Gorm Harste, Klaus Brønd Laursen and Egon Noe. ASC column by Bill
Seaman
<https://www.facebook.com/bill.seaman?fref=mentions_location=group> and
book review by Liqian Zhou

http://chkjournal.com/?q=node/275
<https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fchkjournal.com%2F%3Fq%3Dnode%2F275=ATOxj3k1SclgaH81Fn5HaEOjf5UgURZ454pQwYltOEq6E4Qo9HukrvHsLB9APEHhwIm7X4Kw_o1EAr9pgFoligZGD4iuHRIWn1uvBZzhmIMfYi_i-SwNIff3FPTDOsX5hoD->


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

You wrote:

​ET: ​
1] The 'Five Ways' or Quinque viae,  refers to the very famous purely
logical arguments by the scholastics [ Aquinas Summa Theologiciae but see
also Anselm's Proslogian] for the reality of God. I know that JAS didn't
refer to these arguments
​. . .​

I have nothing to add to Jon's comments on this today. Your introducing the
'Five Ways' seems to me to offer nothing of value to the discussion and,
perhaps, muddles it.

​ET:
2] I disagree with you that Peirce was a theist.

If you would rather not call Peirce a theist, well that's fine with me. I
just don't see how you can argue against his repeated assertion that he
believed in the "Reality of God."

ET: [Peirce's] references to 'Mind', do not, in my reading, outline it or
even examine it as the Mind of God.


I refer you to the conclusion of the third and final quotation which Jon
offered today.

CSP: I suppose most of our knowledge of Him must be by similitudes.  Thus,
He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular Existent (meaning
by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to brute
constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed in His
Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that *He is a
Spirit, or Mind*. (R 843; 1908) (emphasis added)


ET: His cosmological arguments, his evolutionary arguments do not outline
this 'Reality', this metaphysical Being. Instead - what he outlines in his
analysis of What is Matter/Life.are the three basic categories of MIND:
 Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. He sees them as 'ens necessarium' in
themselves and I see no correlation of these operations with any
specific Mind of God'.


You continue to ignore Peirce's explicit statements on "ens necessarium"
and "Spirit, or Mind" == God. Yours appears to me to be an idiosyncratic
interpretation of what Peirce explicitly says he means by "ens necessarium."

ET: 3] As for Judeo-Christian traditions, I consider these societal rather
than religious traditions. All religions, after all, besides their
metaphysical outlines, are methods of forming and continuing a sense of
'community'.

It is news to me that my Christian faith, or, say, Martin Buber's Jewish
faith, do not represent "religious traditions." Your perfunctory analysis
of "All religions" as but "methods of forming and continuing a sense of
'community' is, I suppose, what one might expect from an atheistic
sociologist. But, as far as I'm concerned, my Christian faith is decidedly
centered in a "religious tradition" and to say otherwise appears to me to
be perfect nonsense.

ET: Our species is a social species - and this sense of belonging to a
community is vital for our rational and psychological health. Anyone who
lacks this - is a psychopath.


I agree.

ET: So- we'll have to disagree on this issue.


On the issues of whether Peirce believed in the Reality of God and saw God
as similtudine to "Spirit, or Mind," and whether Christian and Jewish faith
do or do not represent "religious traditions," we most certainly appear to
completely disagree.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 4:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary, list:
>
> 1] The 'Five Ways' or Quinque viae,  refers to the very famous purely
> logical arguments by the scholastics [ Aquinas Summa Theologiciae but see
> also Anselm's Proslogian] for the reality of God. I know that JAS didn't
> refer to these arguments but I am very sure as a theist himself that he
> would have to know of them; after all - they form the analytic backbone of
> theistic Arguments for the Reality of God. It isn't enough to say:
> I believe God exists'; that's not an argument but a Fixation of Belief from
> ...a priori, Authority..whatever. There has to be an Argument - and the
> Five Ways is The Argument. I consider each one actually illogical and
> thus inadequate, but...many accept them...and there have been over the
> years, many volumes devoted to both support and rejection of the Five Ways.
>
> 2] I disagree with you that Peirce was a theist. His references to 'Mind',
> do not, in my reading, outline it or even examine it as the Mind of God.
> After all- to do so, would require an analysis of God himself - and Peirce
> doesn't do this. His cosmological arguments, his evolutionary arguments do
> not outline this 'Reality', this metaphysical Being. Instead - what he
> outlines in his analysis of What is Matter/Life.are the three basic
> categories of MIND:  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. He sees them as
> 'ens necessarium' in themselves and I see no correlation of these
> operations with any specific Mind of God'.
>
> 3] As for J

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

GF: After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to
say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t
contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who
denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362).
Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality)
of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never
self-applied that term.

On this list and elsewhere we've discussed how difficult it is (or how lax
one can become) sometimes in discussing Reality without using words like
'is', 'existence', and so forth. Peirce sometimes expresses himself about
matters pertaining to reality in such truly inappropriate existential
language.  So, you knowing this, I will assume that you are merely playing
with words in what you wrote above. For if in Peircean terms one more
properly defines an "atheist" as "One who denies the *reality* of God"
Peirce was most certainly *not* an atheist.

GF: I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist” either, though. Nor did
I find him applying it to anyone else.

That he did or did not self- or other-apply the word "theist" seems of
little importance in my view. For, as Jon S. wrote today: "If Peirce was
not a theist, then what other term should we use instead for someone who
very explicitly, on more than one occasion, in no uncertain terms, affirmed
his belief in the Reality of God? So, a theist, properly understood *in
Peircean terms*, is simply one who believes in the Reality of God. In this
sense Peirce was most certainly a theist.

GF: So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells
us more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any
other source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:

“The word “God,” … is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens
necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience.” (I wish I knew more about *Ens necessarium* … )

I too wish I knew more about *Ens Necessarium*. In his 1937 book,  *Ends &
Means, *Aldous Huxley offers a hint in remarking that a traditional
theistic argument was "that if there is an *ens necessarium* it must be at
the same time an *ens realissimum*."

That certainly makes good sense for Peirce's theism!

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 6:10 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, list,
>
> After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to
> say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t
> contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who
> denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362).
> Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality)
> of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never
> self-applied that term. I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist”
> either, though. Nor did I find him applying it to anyone else. I did find a
> 1905 letter to William James where he wrote, “I have lately been writing
> out the application of my philosophy to religion. On the theistic question
> my attitude has some resemblance to that of Wm. Johnson Fox.” Not very
> helpful, given the dearth of information about Fox I was able to did up on
> the Net.
>
> So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells us
> more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any other
> source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:
>
> “The word “God,” … is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens
> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
> Experience.” (I wish I knew more about *Ens necessarium* … )
>
> Gary F.
>
> } A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. [Herbert Simon] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* 12-May-18 15:56
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>
>
>
> In my view the central question here is not whether JAS is a theist and
> that he is interpreting Peirce in that light, but whether Peirce was a
> theist and that his remarks on God and Mind *ought* to be interpreted in
> light of his theism. I would maintain that there there can be little, if
> any, doubt that he was a theist. Just a cursory glance at this page from
> Gary Furhman's blog should at least suggest as much.
> https://www.gnusystems.ca/CSP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, list,

In my view the central question here is not whether JAS is a theist and
that he is interpreting Peirce in that light, but whether Peirce was a
theist and that his remarks on God and Mind *ought* to be interpreted in
light of his theism. I would maintain that there there can be little, if
any, doubt that he was a theist. Just a cursory glance at this page from
Gary Furhman's blog should at least suggest as much.
https://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm But the literature is now packed with
analyses of his theism.

So, contrary to your atheistic interpretation of, for example, Mind as not
referring to God, I would say that Mind most certainly ought be interpreted
in Peirce's work in light of his theism such that Mind (so capitalized) in
Peirce's thinking *is* the Mind of God. I do not see a moment in his
comments from his youth through the more extended arguments near the end of
his life, notably in his writing "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of
God," where he ever--even once--expresses doubts regarding that Reality. If
anyone knows of such an expressed doubt, I would be most eager to read it.

On the other hand, his view of God seems to me to be essentially a
non-standard and decidedly scientific one (Peirce was, for example, notably
critical of theology and theologians). There are, however, other moments
when he seems to align himself with the Judeo-Christian religious
traditions, say, in the interest of participating in a larger community of
faith (see, for example, his comments on why he says the Apostle's Creed
with his fellow congregates in which he seems to suggest that he does so in
the spirit of Christian brotherhood and community).

As for Jon's remarks to which you responded, I do not see that he speaks of
or even hints at "the Five Ways" or "a First Cause." Where'd that come from?

So, in a word, it seems to me much more natural to interpret Mind as Peirce
employs it, as well as his arguments relating to the earliest cosmology
--which, btw, are *not* definitively stated in the passage you most
frequently quote regarding this matter, viz., CP 1.411-412, and which early
cosmological views are, in fact, modified dramatically categorially in the
last of the 1898 lectures (I'm thinking of the famous "Blackboard" analogy:
see Jon Alan Schmidt's excellent paper which includes a discussion of this,
"A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of
God," in which, btw way, he acknowledges your help, through discussions on
Peirce-L, in honing his argumentation)--again, it is natural to interpret
Mind and his Early Cosmological discussions through Peirce's theism.

As an atheist you will no doubt continue to disavow theism; but there have
been not only many articles and papers, but now also a number of books
analyzing Peirce's theism. This has always been a contentious matter for
some Peirce scholars (I mean especially the ones who are atheists or
agnostics), but in my view Peirce's arguments regarding the Reality of God
speak for themselves.

Best,

Gary R






*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 2:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon Alan, list:
>
> If one is, unlike you, not a theist, then, your answers don't provide any
> rationale for 'the nature of existence'. Your assertion that one simply has
> to accept the 'reality of god' is a Fixation of Belief by..what, authority,
> tenacity? But it isn't based on reason or empiricism - and as far as I am
> concerned, the famous Five Ways [Anselm, Aquinas] are semantic expressions
> - that's all.
>
> That is, for example, to declare that we as finite, cannot 'know' the
> infinite...and that we can yet declare that the infinite IS REAL - is, in
> my mind, not a valid argument--- for its validity rests solely on semantics
> and the necessity-to-believe.
>
> To declare that there must be either a First Cause or a Supreme Cause - is
> yet again, an exercise in semantics.
>
> Peirce's outline "there are three elements ...active in the world: first,
> chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking" 1.409. And his outline of the
> emergence of finite matter from "a state of mere indeterminacy, in which
> nothing existed or really happened"Out of the womb of indeterminacy we
> must say that there would have come something, by the principle of
> Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there
> would have been a second flash" 1.411-12. Thus, both Secondness or finite
> matter and Thirdness or habits, emerge.
>
> I note that in this outline of the emergence of matter, there is no
> mention of any hierarchical or first or final cause [god]; supreme agenda
> or 'unmoved Mover 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Thank you for getting the discussion of Intelligent Design, etc. into the
Peirce list proper (that is, *only*). Ben Udell and I, as well as the
technical staff at IUPUI,  have not yet found a way to stop the automatic
forwarding to our forum of messages sent by Sadhu Sanga members who are
also members of Peirce-. Meanwhile, the Sadhu Sanga administration has been
less than helpful in this matter.

I appreciate your approach of removing the Cc to Sadhu Sanga as well as all
the addresses except the Peirce-list address.

Best,

Gary (writing as list moderator)




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 2:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon Alan, list:
>
> If one is, unlike you, not a theist, then, your answers don't provide any
> rationale for 'the nature of existence'. Your assertion that one simply has
> to accept the 'reality of god' is a Fixation of Belief by..what, authority,
> tenacity? But it isn't based on reason or empiricism - and as far as I am
> concerned, the famous Five Ways [Anselm, Aquinas] are semantic expressions
> - that's all.
>
> That is, for example, to declare that we as finite, cannot 'know' the
> infinite...and that we can yet declare that the infinite IS REAL - is, in
> my mind, not a valid argument--- for its validity rests solely on semantics
> and the necessity-to-believe.
>
> To declare that there must be either a First Cause or a Supreme Cause - is
> yet again, an exercise in semantics.
>
> Peirce's outline "there are three elements ...active in the world: first,
> chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking" 1.409. And his outline of the
> emergence of finite matter from "a state of mere indeterminacy, in which
> nothing existed or really happened"Out of the womb of indeterminacy we
> must say that there would have come something, by the principle of
> Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there
> would have been a second flash" 1.411-12. Thus, both Secondness or finite
> matter and Thirdness or habits, emerge.
>
> I note that in this outline of the emergence of matter, there is no
> mention of any hierarchical or first or final cause [god]; supreme agenda
> or 'unmoved Mover [of god]; contingency [god] etc.
>
> And Peirce's equally famous 4.551 comment of 'Thought is not necessarily
> connected with a brain" has no reference to god.
>
> Now, if one wants to argue, against the Five Reasons, for the reality of
> Mind within Matter - that is another argument and one that I would consider
> to have validity. Peirce's outline [6.490] of this 'disembodied spirit or
> pure mind'' which has a "character related to the habit-taking capacity".
>
> But - in contrast to the axioms of Anselm/Aquinas, to Peirce "the
> Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy" 6.492..and Peirce's view of god, as I
> read him, is that it is a force akin to Mind - the introduction/generation
> of [old and new]  habits of formation within matter. Period.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 11/05/18 1:39 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Stephen J., List:
>
> I have no desire (and no time these days) to engage in a debate here, but
> ...
>
> SJ:  I don’t understand what insights a creator/designer provides as to
> the nature of existence.
>
>
> Why is there existence at all?  Why is there something, rather than
> nothing?  Peirce's answer was the Reality of God as Ens necessarium.
>
> SJ:  What phenomenology explains His motivation to be? Why should He care
> to create life? Where is His workshop? What tools does He use? Does He have
> hands with which to wield a hammer or use a soldering iron? Does he have
> eyes with which to read a blueprint? ... I’m not big fan of Richard
> Dawkins, but he does have a point when he asks, sarcastically, who created
> god? A god-god? Then who created god-god? A god-god-god? God as a creator
> makes no sense and explains nothing.
>
>
> These kinds of questions reveal a profound misunderstanding, or perhaps
> willful ignorance, of what classical theists actually believe about the
> nature of God.
>
> SJ:  Here’s my prediction… whatever the right theory is, it MUST make
> sense… and we will know it when we see it. A godly designer does not make
> sense.
>
>
> Your faith in human reason is impressive, but sadly misplaced.  Why would
> anyone expect an infinite God, if Real, to be entirely comprehensible to
> finite beings like us?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:9258] CFP: "Semiotics of hybrid natures" (8–10.11.2018, University of Tartu, Estonia)

[Gary Richmond]

Call for Papers

Semiotics of hybrid natures:

Anthropogenic ecosystems, multimodalities, transformed umwelts

8–10.11.2018

University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia



Plenary speakers:

Nathalie Blanc (CNRS / Université Paris Diderot -Paris 7, France), Morten
Tønnessen (University of Stavanger, Norway) and Kati Lindström (KTH Royal
Institute of Technology, Sweden).



Global and all-encompassing human impact has brought along many new types
of relations between humans and other biological species. These
interactions change animal ecologies but also bring along new forms and
aggregations of umwelts (animal personal worlds, after J. v. Uexküll). In
this context, human technology both alienates and reconnects — media
technologies have created new ways of becoming related with the environment
(development of citizen science and augmented realities), and there are new
technological capacities for restoring and shaping environments
(geoengineering). Correspondingly, the human-animal-environment
configurations have a hybrid nature: they are based on ecological
relations, make use of the technologies and artificial environments and at
the same time are represented and framed by human culture.



Achieving better knowledge on the dynamics and expressions of “hybrid
natures” is essential for mitigating environmental conflicts and enhancing
biodiversity in environments under human impact. The aim of the conference
is to exchange knowledge on various manifestations of hybrid natures as
well as to elaborate suitable research methods in ecosemiotics and beyond
in other environmental humanities. Semiotics appears to have good potential
for developing methods with prognostic value — for instance, analyzing
umwelts and communication for estimating what species can reach stable
co-existence and what adjustments may be needed for new natures to
persist.



Possible topics for contributions include, but are not limited to:

• new types of interactions in interspecies relations;

• semiotics of techno-natures;

• human-induced changes in animal umwelts;

• changes of human perception in hybrid environments;

• recognizing and reacting to environmental change;

• methodologies for studying hybrid natures;

• semiotics of multispecies environments.



Submission

To submit a proposal, interested scholars should e-mail an abstract (up to
500 words) and a bionote (up to 50 words) for the 20 minute presentation to
the address: hybridnatu...@gmail.com. The abstract should be sent as a
separate one-page file (.docx or .rtf; please use template from homepage).
The deadline for the abstracts is May 31, 2018. For additional information
and further updates please visit the conference website at
https://www.flfi.ut.ee/en/semiotics-of-hybrid-natures.



Organisers

The conference “Semiotics of hybrid natures: anthropogenic ecosystems,
multimodalities, transformed umwelts” is organized by The Department of
Semiotics at the University of Tartu, Estonia and by the Estonian Semiotics
Association under the auspice of International Society of Biosemiotic
Studies. The conference is supported by the Estonian Research Agency (Grant
PUT1363) and The Faculty of Humanities and Arts at the University of Tartu.



Additional information and updates: https://www.flfi.ut.ee/en/
semiotics-of-hybrid-natures

Organsing team: Nelly Mäekivi, Riin Magnus, Silver Rattasepp, Timo Maran

E-mail: hybridnatu...@gmail.com

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Focus on Phenomenology and the Categories, was, [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Gary Richmond]

 which interest me (and in the arts,
etc. as well).

However, it would appear that there has been *considerably* less interest
in Peirce's Phenomenology and the phenomenological categories per se then
there has been in his semeiotic, both in this forum and in Peirce
scholarship generally. Indeed, some have been seemingly antithetical to the
former, and I recall some sharp on and off-list exchanges with Joe Ransdell
in which he argued that (1) there was very little to say about the
categories and (2) Peirce had already said it, principally in the early *On
a New List of Categories*. Sometimes Joe seemed even to suggest that
Peirce's phenomenology wasn't a proper science at all, that what work there
was to be done involving it was to properly be accomplished in other
sciences, especially semeiotic. His somewhat contradictory views are
summarized in "Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?"

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM.

*JR: Now let us turn to Peirce's phenomenology proper. As I remarked
earlier, the essence of it is found in the 1867 paper (The New List GR] on
the categories, and I should perhaps remark before proceeding that if
Peirce is to be regarded as a phenomenologist it should be understood that
most of Peirce's analyses should be looked for under the heading of
semiotic. For his phenomenology proper is really quite simple: the paper in
question is quite short, and there is not a whole lot more to be done in
phenomenology proper than what he does therein, though the line of argument
certainly could be--and I believe should be--developed at much greater
length and in much greater detail. Let me hasten to say that I do not mean
to trivialize the matter by stressing the relative simplicity of it. The
point is simply that the way Peirce conceives phenomenology it leaves most
of the work to be done under other headings, and most of what Peirce
himself did along these lines would properly be regarded as a part of
semiotic. *

Needless to say, I disagreed then and disagree now. Not only does Peirce
have a great deal to say about the categories *as such* throughout his
career, but to suggest that they "should be looked for under the heading of
semiotic" is to me simply mistaken. Joe seemed to me to be first and
foremost a semiotician and, in my opinion and by his own admission, little
suited to work in phenomenology (Peirce commented that few were). However,
Ransdell does conclude the paper just cited with this remark, affirming
both their central importance to his philosophy as well as allowing that
Peirce's Phenomenology is a science in its own right (but one, however,
radically different from what has hitherto been called "phenomenology").

*JR: These categories and their inter-relationships are the rudimentary
conceptual elements out of which Pierce's entire philosophy is built. My
brief account does not do them justice, but these three conceptions are
truly remarkable and what Peirce did with them constructively is even more
so. But is this sort of thing appropriately describable as phenomenology?
As I said earlier, I am inclined to think so myself, but if phenomenology
should turn out to go in this direction it might involve the abandonment of
quite a lot which has traditionally been associated with it.*

So, in a word, it seems to me that Joe was of two minds in this matter of
the status of phenomenology, a bit internally conflicted (I'd have to dig
up some list posts and emails to support this comment). On the other hand,
some Peirce scholars have taken up his phenomenology in earnest (and there
are a few phenomenologists in this forum), but much work needs to be done.

I changed the Subject to reflect the emphasis of this message.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:34 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:

> Hi Gary R, List,
>
> I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. I
> have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about what
> you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you have
> written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from 'Re:
> Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one
> overlap in the Venn diagram.
>
> What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
> categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
> continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a
> medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it,
> namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the
> same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars
> (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Fir

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

particular will 'hold' in the future. But there's no reason to doubt what
we've no reason to doubt as to what science has already discovered.

ET: BUT - just because I have analyzed the scientifically valid nature of
this species - does NOT mean that its habits are closed to adaptation and
evolution. They could - and probably will - evolve and change. So, habit
formation and truth are not the same thing.

I agree that "habit formation and truth are not the same thing." What I
suggested was that our human striving to understand the nature of reality
together in a scientific way is the optimal way to arrive at whatever
truths we may ever hope to achieve in whatever areas of inquiry we may take
up. We could, of course, be wrong at any point in our inquiry, while the
history of science will show that this has been the case any number of
times. But, again, we clearly make scientific discoveries or we wouldn't
see, for example, the development of the technologies we've witnessed even
in our own lives--but our understandings remain fallible especially as we
continue our inquiries.

4] Gary R: It is Peirce who says that the habit-taking tendency is the
primordial law of mind, I believe first in the essay "The Law of Mind"
(1892). Habits, 3ns, in the involutional sense I recently commented on as
it appears in "The Logic of Mathematics," involve the other two categories
quasi-necessarily.

EDWINA:  My view is that habit-taking is ONE of the primordial laws
of Mind . Indeed, the formation of habits is vital. . . However, I don't
see that habits 'involve' the other two categories quasi-necessarily.  That
is, Thirdness does not, in its own nature, require 1ns or 2ns. . .

Here I will have to partially disagree. Although one can abstract
(prescind) 1ns and 2ns from 3ns, it is of the very nature of the categories
that in the phaneron and in reality that they are all present, that in
particular that 3ns involves (cf 'involutional' as Peirce uses it) 2ns and
1ns.

*1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture III | CP 5.66*

*Category the Third is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a
Third, or Medium, between a Second and its First. That is to say, it
is Representation as an element of the Phenomenon.*
You agree that this is so apparently only for semiosis: ET (continuing from
above): . . .but semiosis certainly, absolutely, does. . .

I am beginning to see what you've been aiming at as regards habits in your
writing, for example:

ET (continuing): . . .a universe made up only of habits is obviously dead -
in the sense that all life has ended, all individuation has ended, and the
universe is one huge crystal [see 6.33]. Peirce himself saw this only as
pure theoretical speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future.

And I see you as actually resolving the whole question in writing in the
snippet above that for Peirce this *virtual* cessation of all life, growth,
and evolution is but "speculation in the infinite [i.e., never] future"
(which is why I just used the term 'virtual' and not 'actual').

ET: . . . [Semiosis] exists as Mind - which functions within all three
primordial modes: 1ns, 2ns, 3ns - and I see all of them as equal and basic
primordial forces.

I wouldn't use 'exists' or 'forces' as you have here because I associate
both those terms with 2ns, but I agree that semiosis involves all three of
Peirce's categories and further agree that they are 'equal', 'basic' and
'priordial'. I don't, however, see them in reality as ever occurring apart
from each other even while one may (at least seemingly) dominate in any
given situation.

ET: As for 'entelechy' - Peirce may have used the term, but what did he
mean by it?

I personally think that Peirce was clear enough by what he meant by
entelechy in writing:

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:304

. . . The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua* fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth” of being. The
“Truth,” the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign.

I expect that you'll disagree with much of what I've written above. But I
believe that besides that one clear point of agreement at the top of this
post as well as some apparent partial agreement in a few other points,
that, with further inquiry, we might arrive at others.

Meanwhile, I very much look forward to your response to this message should
you offer one. But, I think that for now I'll leave the last word to you.
Thank you again for your very thoughtful response to my last post.

Best,

Gary





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R - see my responses below:
>
>
>
> On Sat 07/04/18 1:06 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, Edwina, Jon, list,

Mike wrote: "Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past
and present. There is a reason both of you [Edwina and Jon S] study and
feel so passionately about Peirce. I humbly suggest that intersection of
interests is a more practical domain of inquiry than trying to find where
your interpretations differ."


I would tend to *strongly* agree, Mike. I have always thought, and
occasionally suggested on this list, that those who want to promote
Peirce's philosophy in the world at large (whose achievements are most
certainly not at all limited to semeiotics) ought attempt to find what is
most powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then we can
explore ways to send his profound insights into the world, agreeing that
some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable potential value.

On the other hand, little of value, at least it seems to me, comes of the
tendency to debate (pro and con can tend to degenerate into
'my view' is correct and 'your view' is not and, further, even denying that
this is happening).

Peirce wrote both that* logic* is rooted in the *social principle* and the
converse, that the *social principle* is rooted in *logic *(Ben Udell and I
wrote a short book chapter on this theme). Conversely, ego is seen by
Peirce as pretty much an impediment to the growth of science, and more
generally, to the evolution of intelligence and the advance of humane
culture (I personally have at times found it very difficult to 'check' my
ego).

The emphasis in my view ought be *much* less on debate than on
collaborative inquiry. I personally think that if any forum members want to
debate matters introduced on the list that they ought to take much--if not
most--of it off-list when it's become clear that that is what it has, in my
opinion, *degenerated* into. Debate can feel for observers of it here,
exhausting, enervating and, in a word, tedious.

So, I would only add to what Mike has written a question: What can we who
value the vast intellect of Peirce, a scientist and philosopher who has
been called "America's greatest thinker" by some rather substantial
thinkers; again, what can those of us who resolutely believe that he has
much of value to offer in consideration of, for prime example,
methodological approaches not only to issues in science and philosophy, but
to what some have called the "wicked problems" of our present era
(including a number of ethical and metaphysical issues), what can we offer
towards the explication and promulgating of Peirce's work?

So, potentially working towards discovering "intersections of interest" as
Mike put it, I'd ask: Is it possible for us to at least attempt to fathom
together, make sense of together, try to find what in his vast philosophy
that we can tend to agree is of importance and value? Can we begin to offer
what we *together* might think could help clarify, develop, and, perhaps,
*finally* promote the dissemination of what we, hopefully, can come to
agree is important, even essential, in Peirce's thought? Lacking that,
we'll just continue to endlessly debate--in vain. Perhaps this is nothing
but a pipe dream, at least for this forum.

So, I guess along with Mike I'm saying something like: Endless debate
blocks the way of inquiry. Debate is *not* inquiry, it is *mere*
debate, only contention. And, I'd add, almost always deeply infused with
ego (while it seems to me that especially some, but by all means not all,
very sharp intellects are prone to it--Peirce suggests in one place that,
especially for keen intellects, the concept of involution, for example, is
difficult to grasp).

To conclude: As many of us here have come to see over the years and
decades, Peirce is much too complex, subtle, contradictory (in the sense of
Walt Whitman, I'd suggest), much too *profound* to be *debated*.

As for being "a positive contributor" to the list, Mike, you've already
proven yourself to be one.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 11:46 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:

> Hi Edwina, Jon,
>
> I have changed the subject line. It would not bother me if this is the
> only item on the thread.
>
> Somehow, again, you two go hammer-and-tongs at one another. Edwina, you
> know as well as any of us how closely Peirce tied semiosis to logic. Jon,
> you will cite stanza and verse but also know well that form-matter-entelchy
> is but one of scores of trichotomous relations using the universal
> categories that Peirce put forward.
>
> Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past and present.
> There is a reason both of you study and feel so passionately about Peirce.
> I humbly suggest tha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, list,

This message isn't directly about the subject of this thread, but I did
take a pretty close look at some of the 1908 manuscripts you'd transcribed
and recently linked to https://fromthepage.com/jeffdo
wn1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15 and wanted to reiterate what an
extraordinary contribution you and others on the list (for example, Jon
Allan Schmidt and Gary Furhman) and off it are making by giving your time
and effort to transcribing Peirce documents in the SPIN project.

This is just to say 'thank you' for all the work you have done in
developing the project and which you and others have contributed to it in
the transcribing. I'm sure you'd be eager to have other forum members join
the effort.

Best,

Gary

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 5:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jeff:
>
> It looks like you sent this to me only, but intended to post it to the
> List, so I hope that you do not mind if I respond (briefly) on-List.
>
> JD:  In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two kinds of
> determination:  one type is dyadic in character, such as when correlate A
> determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character, such as
> when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a general rule
> that mediates between C and D.
>
>
> Does C=Object, D=Interpretant, and E=Sign?  If so, in what sense is a Sign
> "a general rule"?
>
> Thanks for the link to those manuscripts, which are apparently from late
> 1908.  I will take a look when I get a chance.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 4:15 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Gary R, List,
>>
>> It seems clear, at least to me, that there must be some significant
>> differences between the kinds determination that hold between correlates in
>> dyadic or triadic relations that have the character of possibles,
>> existents or necessitants. Otherwise, we would not have a rule that "a
>> Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be
>> determined by nothing but a Necessitant." As such, I think it is
>> important to work out the analyses that Peirce developed in his account of
>> determination. In the definition of the sign, it appears that we have two
>> kinds of determination:  one type is dyadic in character, such as when
>> correlate A determines correlate B; the other type is triadic in character,
>> such as when correlate C determines D in accord with E, where E is a
>> general rule that mediates between C and D.
>>
>> I've transcribed part of a manuscript (MS 611-15), and it is available as
>> part of the Peirce collection on FromthePage. Thus far, the transcription
>> is not complete, so anyone who is interested is encouraged to join in the
>> effort. In this manuscript, Peirce develops an account of determination
>> that starts with our common experience of what is involved in making and
>> carrying out a decision that determines our conduct. Starting with this
>> type of case, he then generalizes upon the account of determination so that
>> it applies broadly. At various points, he steps back from the examination
>> of our common experience and tries to provide a more exact logical analysis
>> of the relations involved, focusing on three kinds of relations:  (1) A
>> determines B, (2) C determines D in accord with E, (3) and F determines
>> H to be after G. None of the analyses is complete or error free. Peirce
>> sees some of the errors and tries to correct them in later drafts as he
>> expands on the earlier drafts. Other errors seem to remain--in part
>> because the analyses are not brought to completion. Upon seeing the
>> complications involved in the formal analyses of the relations of
>> determination, one begins to get a clearer sense of the conceptual
>> difficulties that lurk beneath the surface. I recommend taking a look
>> because this discussion has been helpful to me.
>>
>> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-611-15
>>
>> Yours,
>>
>> Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> bu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You wrote: "Still, there seems to be a sense in which the If is the genuine
Interpretant, the Id is the degenerate Interpretant, and the Ii is the
doubly degenerate Interpretant."


I thought that was just what I was suggesting. At least that was what I
meant. so that if that didn't come across clearly, I apologize.

JAS: I think of involution as something that proceeds *across *each
trichotomy, such that a Necessitant involves an Existent, which involves a
Possible--e.g., a Symbol involves an Index, which involves an Icon--rather
than *between *different trichotomies.


I see no reason to limit the concept of logical involution to the
trichotomies of Peirce's late taxonomy. Although I think they have an
important role to play in those trichotomies, they also figure in many,
many others, something I've noted frequently over the years. And not just
in semeiotics, but in phenomenology, metaphysics, the classification of the
sciences, etc.

JAS: As for why I am advocating this particular sequence of three
Interpretants and ten divisions altogether, I explained my entire rationale
in my three posts that launched this thread.  Rather than repeat myself, I
will just ask--which aspects of that lengthy explanation remain unclear to
you?

.
You did not respond to my post addressed to you prior to this one. That
might have been helpful. But please, there's no need for you to repeat any
part of your "lengthy explanation" for my sake.

JAS: I wonder if "determination" in the logical sense, which is the basis
for the order of the ten trichotomies, is subtly different from
"determination" in whatever sense pertains to an instance of concrete
semiosis.


This what *exactly* I was asking. I too hope Jeff can shed some light on it.

JAS: I am puzzled by your comment about "terminological problems in the
list."  By and large, I have simply duplicated the terms that Peirce used
in the December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby (EP 2:488-490), his last
attempt at laying out the entire taxonomy.  The only exceptions are
reverting to Tone/Token/Type (as Peirce himself hinted),
Gratific/Actuous/Temperative, and Abducent/Inducent/Deducent (the last two
are shorthand from earlier versions).


I wasn't questioning your use of Peirce "last attempt at laying out the
entire taxonomy" but, rather, suggesting that Peirce's neologisms in that
"last attempt" aren't necessarily very helpful in all cases, and that doing
things like "reverting to Tone/Token/Type" might not be a bad idea. I also
suggested that there's no reason to believe that Peirce might not have
reconsidered any or all of those neologisms (as he hinted at as regards
Tone/Token/Type); who knows?

But I'm dropping out of this discussion. Jon, because I don't feel that
it's been very productive for me and, this last post of yours suggests
strongly that I have nothing useful or helpful to offer you as well. No
doubt there are others here who will join you in this inquiry, but I have
nothing to add (even having recently reviewed your "three posts that
launched this thread").

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 9:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> If there is involution among the three Interpretants, it would be in the
> opposite order from what you suggested--the If involves the Id, which
> involves the Ii.  However, I think of involution as something that proceeds 
> *across
> *each trichotomy, such that a Necessitant involves an Existent, which
> involves a Possible--e.g., a Symbol involves an Index, which involves an
> Icon--rather than *between *different trichotomies.  Still, there seems
> to be a sense in which the If is the genuine Interpretant, the Id is the
> degenerate Interpretant, and the Ii is the doubly degenerate Interpretant.
>
> As for why I am advocating this particular sequence of three Interpretants
> and ten divisions altogether, I explained my entire rationale in my three
> posts that launched this thread.  Rather than repeat myself, I will just
> ask--which aspects of that lengthy explanation remain unclear to you?
>
> I wonder if "determination" in the logical sense, which is the basis for
> the order of the ten trichotomies, is subtly different from "determination"
> in whatever sense pertains to an instance of concrete semiosis.  I am
> hoping that Jeff will respond to my requests for clarification earlier
> today, and that his doing so will shed some further light on this.
>
> I am puzzled by your comment about "terminological problems in the list."
> By and large, I have simply duplicated the terms that Peirce used in the
> December 1908 draft

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Helmut, Edwina, list,

Jeff wrote:


​
Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on
the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the
water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not
yet really been so interpreted--such as by the animals (e.g., birds, deer
and humans) who might later be on the shore looking across the surface of
the water.
​​
A
​​
ll that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of interpretation in
order to be a sign.

Prior to being really so interpreted, I think the relation of determination
between the wind and the ripples can be classified as an existential dyadic
relation of diversity that is both materially and formally ordered. What is
more, it would appear to be a relation that is productive because the wind
creates the ripples. Such dyadic relations are the paradigm of a cause and
effect relation, because the wind is acting as the causal agent and the
ripples are the patient.

But your second paragraph saying that prior to being interpreted that the
wind/ripples ought be "classified as an existential dyadic relation" seems
to contradict your comment in your first paragraph that "
​
all that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of interpretation in
order to be a sign."

I agree that signs need only have potential interpretants. Say I'd
installed a camera on the banks of the lake (many naturalists do this).
Months later I watch the video and say, "The wind was blowing NNW on Jan
14, 2018." How is that any different from someone, say, discovering a book
that had been written in the 15th century but which was buried underground
and never until now read? Both *were* potential, now actual signs.

Edwina's pansemiotic approach to this (which I just read) is also worth
reflecting on, especially in consideration of the recent discussion of the
so-called "semiotic threshold." At the moment I would place that threshold
a bit higher, I think; but I've only recently begun thinking about this
issue with any intensity.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 5:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Helmut, List,
>
>
> What Gary says certainly holds for the relation of determination between
> dynamical objects and symbols. Is it also true for the relation of
> determination between dynamical objects and indices?
>
>
> Peirce describes the relations of determination in the following way at CP
> 4.531:
>
>
> an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest 
> limits,
> as anything which, being determined by an object, determines an interpretation
> to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a proof that every
> sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the
> characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by
> being really and in its individual existence connected with the
> individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or
> less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the
> object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a
> natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol.
>
>
> Focusing on indices, how should this relation of determination be
> classified? One place where Peirce answers that question is in "The Logic
> of Mathematics, an attempt..." In saying that an index is "really and in
> its individual existence connected with the individual object", he is
> focusing attention on the relation between an indexical *sinsign *and an
> individual existing object.
>
>
> ​​
> Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on
> the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the
> water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not
> yet really been so interpreted--such as by the animals (e.g., birds, deer
> and humans) who might later be on the shore looking across the surface of
> the water. All that is required is that such a sign be *capable* of
> interpretation in order to be a sign.
>
>
> Prior to being really so interpreted, I think the relation of
> determination between the wind and the ripples can be classified as an
> existential dyadic relation of diversity that is both materially and
> formally ordered. What is more, it would appear to be a relation that is
> productive because the wind creates the ripples. Such dyadic relations are
> the paradigm of a cause and effect relation, because the wind is acting as
> the causal agent and the ripples are the patient.
>
>
> On Peirce's account, w

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

Well, there's been a great deal of discussion among semioticians over the
years as to what exactly Peirce meant by "determines" in his saying that
the object determines the sign which in turn determines the interpretant
sign. When I say "discussion" I mean at times downright disagreement. While
T.L.Short holds the view that Atkin and Mats Bergman (see below) seem to
hold, Joe Ransdell appears to have been of another mind (there's a paper
that, in part, contrasts their view, but I can't locate it at the moment).

Yet I think that Bergman offers a clue as to why he, Atkin (and, as you
might imagine, I) hold this non-causal meaning for semeiotic determination.
He writes:

Before taking a closer look at collateral experience, it is necessary to
say a few preliminary words about semiotic determination. This should not
be confused with straightforward efficient causation; the determination in
question is best grasped as a delimitation of the field of signification or
semiosis, something which constrains the semiotic process (Joswick 1996, p.
98; Liszka 1996, p. 23). Put differently, the dynamical object does not
determine the sign absolutely, so as to always produce a given interpretant
or set of interpretants. However, the determination of the sign by the
dynamical object does place limitations on how the sign can be grasped. I,
for example, have an idea of George Bush which constitutes my immediate
object of the president. It is a kind of composite picture, formed by
numerous news broadcasts, articles, discussions, etc. It is obviously full
of interpretative elements, my attempts to form as coherent picture of the
man in question as possible. It is bound to be at least partly erroneous. I
have never met George Bush, nor seen him in real life. Yet, there is a
sense in which my sign ‘George Bush’ is determined by the real man. It is
indicated by the fact that I am not able to interpret the sign in any way I
like. I cannot, for example, genuinely take ‘George Bush’ to stand for
‘person who recently has come from Mars’, although it might prove to be an
entertaining thought experiment. I will also modify my view of the
president, if experience so dictates. Peirce claims that the basis of the
objects dynamical, determinative power lies in the fact that the
interpreter must have had his or her mind determined by collateral
experience of the object, apart from his or her encounter with signs that
represent, or claim to represent, the object in question. . . This
impression is strengthened by the fact that Peirce emphasizes that
collateral experience does not mean knowledge of signs. Mats Bergman
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/download/26855/23617


I think that part of the key here is in his writing that "the dynamical
object does not determine the sign absolutely, so as to always produce a
given interpretant or set of interpretants."

But another part is that no dynamical object can be fully represented in *any
*given sign, not even, say, in a biography (or autobiography) of George
Bush. And this is why Atkin comments that, rather, semeiotic determination
is "the *placing of constraints* or conditions on successful signification
by the object," and even if the sign--say a satirical musical parody of
George Bush's life--were meant to be somewhat fanciful. *Something* of
Bush's character, well known details of his life, his presidency, etc.
(known by most any member of the intended audience by a kind of collateral
knowledge each might have) would need to be represented. I couldn't, for
example, call the piece *George Bush* and parody Barack Obama: I am
constrained--limited--in the creation of my sign (the musical parody) to
references to an actual person, George Bush.

Best,

Gary




Best,

Gary





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 4:41 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Gary, list,
> "Push-pull" is quite a crude metaphor, ok. But I don´t understand how
> "placing of constraints or conditions" and "using certain features (...) to
> generate and shape our understanding" is not causal.
> Best, Helmut
>
> 04. April 2018 um 22:14 Uhr
> "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>
> Helmut, list,
>
> Peirce's term "determination" as used in his semeiotics does not concern
> any causal or generative interaction, certainly no push/pull sort of thing.
> As the second quotation below puts it: "this determination is not
> determination in any causal sense."
>
> Here *determination* is considered in relation to the Object (all
> quotations are from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/)
>
>
> Just as with the sign, not every characteristic of the object is relevant
> to s

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

Peirce's term "determination" as used in his semeiotics does not concern
any causal or generative interaction, certainly no push/pull sort of thing.
As the second quotation below puts it: "this determination is not
determination in any causal sense."

Here *determination* is considered in relation to the Object (all
quotations are from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/)

Just as with the sign, not every characteristic of the object is relevant
to signification: only certain features of an object enable a sign to
signify it. For Peirce, the relationship between the object of a sign and
the sign that represents it is one of determination: the object determines
the sign. Peirce's notion of determination is by no means clear and it is
open to interpretation, but for our purposes, it is perhaps best understood
as the *placing of constraints* or conditions on successful signification
by the object, rather than the object *causing* or *generating *the sign.
The idea is that the object imposes certain parameters that a sign must
fall within if it is to represent that object. However, only certain
characteristics of an object are relevant to this process of determination.


Here as regards the Interpretant:

[J]ust as with the sign/object relation, Peirce believes the
sign/interpretant relation to be one of determination: the sign determines
an interpretant. Further, this determination is not determination in any
causal sense, rather, the sign determines an interpretant by using certain
features of the way the sign signifies its object to generate and shape our
understanding.


But as noted in the first quotation above, "Peirce's notion of
determination is by no means clear and it is open to interpretation," and
so the discussions above by Albert Atkin are not, I'm fairly certain, meant
to be definitive (if that's even possible).

Best,

Gary







*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 3:48 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> List,
> Trying to make myself a concept of "determination", I am thinking: Is it a
> part of a dyadic interaction? And, if the three sign parts S,O,I have
> dyadic interactions, I guess these are results of a projective reduction,
> which is possible (Jon Awbrey), in contrast to a compositional (real)
> reduction (irreducible triad).
> I try to imagine "determination as the "pull"-part of a "push-pull"-
> interaction. The sign pushes the object into existence: It denotes it,
> creates it as a subject´s aboutness. In return the object pulls, determines
> the sign.
> The sign is brought into existence (pushed) by the interpretant via the
> interpretant´s interpretational capacity. If this capacity would not exist,
> then there would be no sign. In return the sign "pulls" at the
> interpretant: It takes advantage of this capacity of its: It determines it.
> What about the interaction between interpretant and object? Maybe this is
> the part, in which the interpretant becomes a new sign?
> Best, Helmut
>
>  04. April 2018 um 21:06 Uhr
>  "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> Jon S, list,
>
> A question for the sake of clarity.
>
> Preceding your list of the 10 orders of determination you wrote:
>
>
> JAS: "In summary, I now believe that the complete order of determination--
> *the **logical sequence of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations,
> not necessarily their temporal** sequence in a concrete instance of
> semiosis*--is as follows" (emphasis added).
>
>
> Then your list of these 10:
>
>1. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Object (Od) - Abstractive, Concretive,
>Collective.
>2. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (Oi) - Descriptive,
>Designative, Copulative.
>3. Mode of Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign (S) - Tone, Token,
>Type.
>4. Nature of Reference (Od-S) - Icon, Index, Symbol.
>5. Purpose of the Final Interpretant (If) - Gratific, Actuous (to
>produce action), Temperative (to produce self-control).
>6. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - Sympathetic
>(feeling), Percussive (exertion), Usual (another Sign).
>7. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant (Ii) -
>Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative.
>8. Nature of Intended Influence (S-If) - Seme (rheme/term), Pheme
>(dicisign/proposition), Delome (argument).
>9. Manner of Appeal (S-Id) - Suggestive (presented), Imperative
>(urged), Indicative (submitted).
>10. Nature of Assurance (S-Od-If) - Abducent (instinct), Inducent
>(experience), Deducent (form).
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, list,

A question for the sake of clarity.

Preceding your list of the 10 orders of determination you wrote:

JAS: "In summary, I now believe that the complete order of determination--
*the **logical sequence of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations, not
necessarily their temporal** sequence in a concrete instance of semiosis*--is
as follows" (emphasis added).


Then your list of these 10:

   1. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Object (Od) - Abstractive, Concretive,
   Collective.
   2. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Object (Oi) - Descriptive,
   Designative, Copulative.
   3. Mode of Apprehension or Presentation of the Sign (S) - Tone, Token,
   Type.
   4. Nature of Reference (Od-S) - Icon, Index, Symbol.
   5. Purpose of the Final Interpretant (If) - Gratific, Actuous (to
   produce action), Temperative (to produce self-control).
   6. Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant (Id) - Sympathetic
   (feeling), Percussive (exertion), Usual (another Sign).
   7. Mode of Presentation of the Immediate Interpretant (Ii) - Hypothetic,
   Categorical, Relative.
   8. Nature of Intended Influence (S-If) - Seme (rheme/term), Pheme
   (dicisign/proposition), Delome (argument).
   9. Manner of Appeal (S-Id) - Suggestive (presented), Imperative (urged),
   Indicative (submitted).
   10. Nature of Assurance (S-Od-If) - Abducent (instinct), Inducent
   (experience), Deducent (form).

Also, specifically regarding the determination of the three Interpretants
you wrote:
​


JAS: "Hence the order of determination of the three Interpretants is If,
Id, Ii; and since Peirce explicitly indicated that Od, Oi, and S precede
these (EP 2:481; 1908), only the arrangement of the Relation trichotomies
remains to be established."


Are you suggesting that there might perhaps be some sort of logical
*involution* happening here (at numbers 5-7) in the sense of that term as
employed in "The Logic of Mathematics" at CP 1.490 such that 7 involves 6
which involves 5)? For the determination of the three Interpretants in your
"complete order of determination of the semiotic Correlates and their
Relations"  seems not only not to be temporal (in the sense that you noted
in the first snippet above, tempered a bit by the phrase "not
necessarily"); nor can I make much sense of these three from the standpoint
of "determination." Why are they ordered as they are in this sequence?

As you suggested that you yourself are, I too have become confused by what
Peirce means by "determination," not only as regards the three
Interpretants, but throughout the 10. Even what had once seemed clear
enough and simple enough to me, viz., that the Od *determines* the Oi which
in term *determines* the S which *determines* *some* I (I had thought
firstly that this would likely be the Ii), makes we wonder if Peirce is
using *determination* in the same sense throughout. It seems to me that he
is not, but I would be hard pressed to explain, for example, how the
determination of the Oi by the Od differs from that of the S by the Oi (of
course we're concerned here in any event with  logical and not physical
determination).

Am I still somehow conflating facets of this abstract list of the order of
determination with determination in some "concrete instance of semiosis"?
Perhaps I am.

But then, again, why *this* sequence of the 10? Your list at first blush
makes sense to me, but for now creates more questions than answers in my
mind.

I also continue to find terminological problems in the list, especially if
it is ever to become more generally useful. Which semeiotic or other
scientific community is your list meant to address? Peirce's endless
re-neologizing becomes for me a significant problem in his late semeiotic,
although he no doubt does this to clarify (at least for himself) certain
subtle distinctions, only some of which can I yet fully appreciate (he'll
also in places offer a term x, "*or*" term y--I'd suggest that to the end
he was constantly experimenting, never fully settling on a 'final' or
'best' terminology).

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> List:
>
> If the trichotomy for the S-If Relation came *before* the one for the
> Immediate Interpretant, then a Seme could not be scribed with any Lines of
> Identity, and only a Delome could be scribed with more than one.  However,
> there are Semes with one Line of Identity and Phemes with multiple Lines of
> Identity; therefore, the trichotomy for the S-If Relation must come
> *after* the one for the Immediate Interpretant.  This is consistent with
> Short's *a posteriori* assessment, which also--along with Peirce's 1904
> letter to Lady Welby (CP 8.338)--est

[PEIRCE-L] The John Dewey Society is meeting in New York on April 13 and 14.

[Gary Richmond]

 Forwarded, FYI. GR

HI, all,

The John Dewey Society is meeting in New York on April 13 and 14.

The NY Pragmatist Forum takes place in the later afternoon of April 13.

If you are planning to attend the Pragmatist Forum you can get a 'two-fer'.
The two meetings are not far apart.

The theme of this year's Dewey Society annual meeting is Nationalism War
and Peace.

Our amazing program features such speakers as best selling authors Scott
Shapiro (Yale Law), author of  *The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan
to Outlaw War Remade the World, *

 and Sasha Polakow-Suransky (Senior Editor,  New York Times),  author most
recently of
*Go Back to Where You Came From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the
Fate of Western Democracy. *

*As always, John Dewey Society meetings are free and open to the public.
Come and bring your colleagues and students. *
Here is the link to the program:


*2018 New York City, NY -
<http://www.johndeweysociety.org/conferences/2018-new-york-ny/>*


2018 New York City, NY -
*Free & Open to the Public Conference Program The John Dewey Society will
hold its annual meeting in conjunc...
<http://www.johndeweysociety.org/conferences/2018-new-york-ny/>


Hope to see you soon.
Leonard J. Waks, Ph. D.

Professor Emeritus of Educational Leadership,  Temple University
Immediate Past President: John Dewey Society

New Books:
*- John Dewey's Democracy and Education: A Centennial Handbook *(Leonard
Waks and Andrea English, editors, Cambridge University Press, 2017).
-The Evolution and Evaluation of Massive Open Online Courses: MOOCs in
Motion - (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016).
*-Listening to Teach: Beyond Didactic Pedagogy* (SUNY Press, 2015)
*-Education 2.0 : The LearningWeb Revolution and the Transformation of the
School *(Paradigm Press, 2013)

General Editor: LEADERS IN EDUCATIONAL STUDIES
https://www.sensepublishers.com/catalogs/bookseries/leaders-in-educational-
studies/

website: www.leonardwaks.net
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/leonard.waks
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ljwaks
Email: ljw...@yahoo.com
Cell: 267-455-5109


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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[PEIRCE-L] Updated flyer on New York Pragmatists Forum with Axel Honneth

[Gary Richmond]

*THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM*


*South Lounge, Lowenstein Building, Fordham University@ Lincoln Center*

*9**th** (Columbus) Avenue at 60**th** Street, New York, USA 10023*


*Friday, April 13, 2018*

*4:00 – 8:00 p.m.*


*- - - - - - - -*


*A Workshop on Pragmatism and Critical Theory*


*"IS THERE AN *

*EMANCIPATORY INTEREST?”*


*Axel Honneth Meets Critics: *


*Michael Baur, Fordham University*

*Nicholas Berry, Fordham University*

*Jacoby Carter, John Jay College*

*Lillian Cicerchia, Fordham University*

*Jeffrey Flynn, Fordham University*

*Judith Green, Fordham University*

*Chad Kautzer, Lehigh University*

*Heikki J. Koskinen, University of Helsinki*

*David McClean, Rutgers University*


*For More Information: www.NYPF.ace.fordham.edu
<http://www.NYPF.ace.fordham.edu>*


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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[PEIRCE-L] The 2018–2019 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Prize

[Gary Richmond]

Forwarded, FYI GR
Peirce Essay Prize: First Call for Papers
View this email in your browser
<https://mailchi.mp/9015cd46903c/20182019-peirce-essay-prize?e=860edf35dc>
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
Dear Gary,

We are pleased to announce:

*The 2018–2019 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Prize*

*Topic:* Any topic on or related to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.

*Awards:* $1000 cash prize; presentation at the Society's next annual
meeting, held in conjunction with the Eastern APA (in New York City, NY,
USA, Jan. 7–10, 2019); possible publication, subject to editorial revision,
in the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.*

*Submission Deadline:* August 1, 2018

*Length:* Because the winning essay may be published in the *Transactions*,
the length of contest submissions should be about the length of an average
journal article.  The maximum acceptable length is 10,000 words, including
notes.  The presentation of the winning submission at the annual meeting
cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time.

*Open to:* Graduate students and persons who have held a Ph.D. or its
equivalent for no more than seven years.  Entries from students who have
not yet begun their graduate training will not be considered.  Past winners
of the contest are ineligible.  Joint submissions are allowed provided that
all authors satisfy the eligibility requirements.  The essay may be in any
language, provided a 1,000-word summary of the paper’s argument, written in
English, is supplied.  The winner will be required to present the paper in
English and to translate it into English for publication in the
*Transactions*.

*Advice to Essay Prize Entrants: *The winning entry will make a genuine
contribution to the literature on Peirce.  Therefore, entrants should
become familiar with the major currents of work on Peirce to date and take
care to locate their views in relation to published material that bears
directly on their topic.

Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce frequently benefits from
the explicit consideration of the historical development of his views.
Even a submission that focuses on a single stage in that development can
benefit from noting the stage on which it focuses in reference to other
phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under consideration.  (This
advice is not intended to reflect a bias toward chronological studies, but
merely to express a strong preference for a chronologically informed
understanding of Peirce's philosophy.)

We do not require but strongly encourage, where appropriate, citation of
the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*.  Ideally,
citation of texts found in both the Collected Papers and the Writings
should be to both CP and W.

Submissions should be prepared for anonymous evaluation.  Authors who
submit their entry electronically should be sure to remove any identifying
information from their document properties/metadata.  Entries must not be
under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Cover letter or email should include complete contact information,
including mailing address and phone numbers, and a statement that the
entrant meets the eligibility requirements of the contest.

Electronic submissions are preferred.  Submissions should be sent as email
attachments (Microsoft Word documents, RTF files, or PDF files only) to
Richard Kenneth Atkins, Secretary-Treasurer of the Society:
peircesoci...@gmail.com. Please include "Peirce Essay Prize Submission" in
the subject line of your email.


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "What is the main challenge for contemporary semiotics?"

[Gary Richmond]

John, list,

Thanks for pointing to this paper and providing some intriguing excerpts
from it. I just skimmed it and want to peruse it later.

I agree that the 'semiotic threshold' is a hot topic in biosemiotics and
hope that it will eventually be of interest in certain other
sciences--especially the life sciences--as well (but then semiotics
generally hasn't been of interest to most scientists to date).

Those of us who have delved into biosemiotics at all can certainly imagine
that the idea might find a place in biology, microbiology, biochemistry,
etc.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 3:02 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On a related issue, the page that Gary R cited contained a reference
> to a 2017 article by Higuera & Kull on "The Semiotic Threshold":
> https://www.academia.edu/32620524/The_Semiotic_Threshold
>
> This is a hot topic in biosemiotic research.
>
> Some excerpts below.
>
> John
> _
>
> the ongoing discussion on the split between the semiotic and the
> non-semiotic has been a productive tool in modeling and revisiting our
> positions on the role of meaning in biology. In what follows we will
> document and describe the concept of the threshold as it is currently used
> by biosemioticians in general lines in order to reveal a point of
> contention as well as similarities in how it is treated...
>
> Eco writes about the  natural boundaries that pertain to semiotics,
> mentioning both the lower and the upper thresholds as specific areas where
> we may find the semiotic and the non-semiotic...
>
> we can define protosemiosis as the most rudimentary process of semiosis, a
> process that barely fulfills the minimum requirements of semiosis and is
> hence just above the semiotic threshold between the semiotic and the
> non-semiotic world, if such a threshold exists at all. (Nöth 2001b: 13)
>
> Notions on continuity such as Peircean synechism do not deny the
> possibility of differentiated thresholds, and it is possible to have a
> pansemiotic view that still allows for some hierarchies to be part of the
> theory (see Salthe 2007). If we take the antonym of ‘threshold’ as a point
> of end or closure,then we are only limited to a soft sense that will not
> present a theoretical challenge to the notion of a threshold itself.
> Instead, it appears to mark only a singular point within a continuum of
> which the threshold is a part...
>
> Considering the divergence of opinions on the applicability and reach of
> the concept we have examined, reaching a synthesis of what is consensually
> meant by ‘semiotic threshold’ is not a simple task, and we will not provide
> an ultimate definition for what the semiotic threshold is supposed to be.
> There are, however, a number of general notions that can guide our
> understanding to make sense of what a ‘semiotic threshold’ may refer to...
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] "What is the main challenge for contemporary semiotics?"

[Gary Richmond]

List,

A paper which might interest interest many here was recently posted to the
Academia site by Kalevi Kull.

What is the main challenge for contemporary semiotics?
<https://www.academia.edu/t/a-MfMJfX8-kT9zd/10471687/What_is_the_main_challenge_for_contemporary_semiotics>


Kalevi Kull, Ekaterina Velmezova

We present the answers of 38 influential semioticians of the world to the
question on the main challenge for contemporary semiotics, as they
formulated it in the autumn of 2014.

https://www.academia.edu/10471687/What_is_the_main_challenge_for_contemporary_semiotics?auto=download=weekly_digest

GR: Most of the responses are quite brief.The semioticians questioned are,
for the most part but not exclusively, European. Given Kull's primary field
of interest, many--but hardly all--are biosemioticians. As the authors
comment in their conclusion, the responses are quite varied and so
difficult to summarize even for this select group.

Best,

Gary


*​Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants)

[Gary Richmond]

ry teleology.

So, in sum: my principal disagreement with you is in your writing: "There
are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns." I am beginning to see the
logic of your argumentation, but I don't agree with it. I also find your
use of "replica" in consideration of "natural signs" illegitimate.

Best,

Gary






*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 10:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Peirce did not say that a *Symbol *"is of such a nature as to exist in
> replicas," he said that a *Sign *"is of such a nature as to exist in
> replicas" (EP 2:303; 1904).  Something that exists in any way *other *than
> in Replicas is *not *a Sign.  Peirce did not say that *Symbols *are
> Entelechies, he said that *Signs *are Entelechies (NEM 2:295-300; 1904).
> Something that is *not *an Entelechy--such as a quality, which is a Form,
> or something that exists (including a Replica), which is Matter--is *not *a
> Sign.  This substitution of Symbol for Sign on your part--illegitimate, in
> my view--seems to pervade your entire response.
>
> In particular, I have no idea why you are suggesting that there is some
> kind of hidden "theological metaphysics" underlying my recent project.  On
> the contrary, I have simply been emphasizing the Sign/Replica distinction
> and the alignment of the three Categories with Form (1ns), Matter (2ns),
> and Entelechy (3ns), as well as the indispensability of Quasi-minds for all 
> *triadic
> *semiosis--i.e., where there are no Quasi-minds, there can only ever be 
> *dyadic
> *action/reaction between Things.
>
> Please note that I have *never*--not once--used the phrase, "metaphysics
> of *semeiotic*," which would indeed be a conflation of two distinct
> sciences in Peirce's architectonic.  Instead, I have consistently referred
> to the metaphysics of (concrete) *semiosis*; i.e., the primary subject
> matter is the *Reality *of Signs, the other Correlates, and their
> Relations.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> JAS: 1. There is no Sign action, only Replica action--action requires
>> existence, and a Sign only exists in Replicas
>>
>> In my understanding I'd modify that to "a Symbol only exists in
>> Replicas."
>>
>> JAS: 2. There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns--which I
>> prefer simply to call Signs, as distinguished from their Replicas.
>> Anything that functions as a "natural sign" is a Replica of a general Sign.
>>
>> I see no basis for your claiming this. Peirce discusses Qualisigns and
>> Sinsigns at length, nowhere to my knowledge eliminating Qualisigns or
>> Sinsigns from his semeiotic analysis.
>>
>> To use "Replica" as you do for natural signs seems to me to hint at a
>> theological metaphysics not yet made explicit by you.
>>
>> How is a "natural sign" a Replica of a general Sign? What's the "general
>> sign" in, say, 'a spontaneous cry', one of Peirce's examples of a Sinsign?
>> So far, all I can make of your holding that every "natural sign" is "a
>> Replica of a general Sign" is that it is possibly a maxim of a kind of
>> theology which would make of the Universe a kind of symbol-system in the
>> mind of God, that only those symbols are real and that the entire existent
>> Universe exists as replicas of that symbolic-system (but Peirce says that
>> the symbols of the Cosmos have as well their integral icons and indexes).
>>
>> JAS: 3. Language and general Signs are not coextensive--in fact, language
>> consists entirely of Replicas, not Signs.  "Man" in English and "homme" in
>> French are two Replicas of the same Sign, whose Reality is independent of
>> any actual language.
>>
>> I agree that "Language and general Signs are not coextensive" which would
>> seem to support the position I've been arguing as much as yours. So I must
>> be misinterpreting your meaning. Again you seem to reducing all semiosis to
>> the action of replicas of Legisigns, perhaps especially or primarily
>> Symbols. I find that hard to support in Peirce's semeiotic and in my own
>> thinking about it.
>>
>> I agree that "language consists entirely of Replicas"--not an issue.
>>
>> JAS: 4. That said, without language--or at least *some *k

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants)

[Gary Richmond]

always seemed to me
somewhat misguided in doing just what Jeff has just suggested that it is
perhaps unwise to do). As I commented in my earlier post, I think that it
might be helpful to focus on the role that trichotomic phenomenology plays
in the development of Peirce's semeiotic, something which might allow you
to consider a significant role there for Qualisigns and Legisigns rather
than flatly stating "There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns."

I would modify your comment "a Sign is an Entelechy" to "a Symbol is an
Entelechy." I am beginning to see a kind of logocentrism in your analyses
which, again, makes me think that your are trying to conform your
semeiotics (your "metaphysics of semiotics") to a theological view you hold
(not yet explicitly stated). Of course I could be completely wrong in
thinking that this might be the case.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 11:07 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> The following is how I see things right now, which is very much subject to
> change with further reading, thinking, and discussion.
>
>1. There is no Sign action, only Replica action--action requires
>existence, and a Sign only exists in Replicas.  I confess that I do not
>know enough about biosemiosis to address it specifically.
>2. There are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns, only Legisigns--which I prefer
>simply to call Signs, as distinguished from their Replicas.  Anything that
>functions as a "natural sign" is a Replica of a general Sign.
>3. Language and general Signs are not coextensive--in fact, language
>consists entirely of Replicas, not Signs.  "Man" in English and "homme" in
>French are two Replicas of the same Sign, whose Reality is independent of
>any actual language.
>4. That said, without language--or at least *some *kind of internal
>Symbol-system--how could the woman in your "far out example" *cognize *her
>fever as a "sign" that something is "off" in her body, rather than merely
>react instinctively?
>5. I agree with you and Peirce that there is no pure 1ns, and also
>that there is no pure 2ns--3ns permeates Reality, which is what I take him
>to mean when he says that the Universe is "perfused with signs."  That is
>precisely why I affirm #2.
>6. I am not at all seeking to *eliminate *characters and qualities
>from semiosis--I am suggesting that their *metaphysical *role is that
>of Form, whereas a Sign is an Entelechy.  Qualities are indeed everywhere,
>but they are not (in themselves) Signs.
>
> Jeff's point about recognizing and respecting the boundary between
> normative science and metaphysics is well-taken, but exactly where to draw
> that line is not always clear.  I have noted all along the way that my
> current inquiry is focused on the metaphysics of concrete semiosis, not
> logic as semeiotic, but I will try to do a better job of maintaining the
> distinction.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Mar 30, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, list,
>>
>> JAS: My current position is that *every *Sinsign *is *an individual
>> Replica of a general Sign, because *only *a general Sign can mediate
>> between an Object and Interpretant in a *genuine* triadic Relation.  A
>> fever is the result of dyadic physical processes, and is only
>> *interpreted *as a sign of disease by virtue of a habit developed by
>> means of Collateral Experience.
>>
>>
>> I can't follow you here. I don't see why "*every *Sinsign *is *an
>> individual Replica of a general Sign, because *only *a general Sign can
>> mediate between an Object and Interpretant in a *genuine* triadic
>> Relation"
>>
>> For one thing, why is it necessary that there be a "general sign" in all
>> cases of sign action (this sounds almost legalistic--Legisigns, perhaps
>> esp. Symbols rule?) How, for example, does this work in biosemiosis?
>>
>>  And why can "only a general Sign," by which I assume you mean a Legisign
>> (unless you further restrict "general sign" to one of the last three sign
>> classes in the 1903 classification, viz, rheme, dicisign, argument) bring
>> about a "genui

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants)

[Gary Richmond]

ambitious' as
it and your inquiry is. It may yield important insights into the nature of
the extraordinarily complex semiosic process, at least from the theoretical
standpoint.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 7:55 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I do not recall claiming that the girl's scream was not a sign at all, but
> I did initially classify it as a natural/degenerate sign because I viewed
> it as an *involuntary *exertion, rather than an *intentional *utterance
> for the *purpose *of getting her mother's attention.  In the linked
> thread, I corrected myself to call it "a Replica of a Sign," consistent
> with what I have been saying more recently, although I obviously have done
> a lot of further thinking (and posting) in the interim.
>
> My current position is that *every *Sinsign *is *an individual Replica of
> a general Sign, because *only *a general Sign can mediate between an
> Object and Interpretant in a *genuine* triadic Relation.  A fever is the
> result of dyadic physical processes, and is only *interpreted *as a sign
> of disease by virtue of a habit developed by means of Collateral
> Experience.  Although Peirce often used a weathercock as an example of an
> Index, he nevertheless explicitly acknowledged its generality on at least
> two occasions.
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition ... It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two
> weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to
> different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique
> embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a
> part of the very fact represented. (EP 2:203; 1903)
>
> CSP:  Now a weathercock is one of those natural signs, like a sign of the
> weather, which depend upon a physical connection between the sign and that
> of which it is the sign. But a weathercock having been devised, as everyone
> knows, to show which way the wind blows, itself signifies to what it
> refers; and consequently it may be argued that no collateral observation is
> called for to complete its significance. But this reasoning commits two
> faults. In the first place, it confuses two incompatible ways of conceiving
> of a weathercock: as a natural sign, and therefore as having no utterer;
> and as a human contrivance to show the direction of the wind, and as such,
> uttered by its original inventor (for I speak of the weathercock--the type,
> not the single instance). (EP 2:406; 1907)
>
>
> I am having a very hard time imagining anything that a quality as pure 1ns
> could possibly represent, other than itself in itself.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 5:54 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary f, Jon S, list,
>>
>> In another related thread, Jon A pointed to three posts from just over a
>> month ago, his short post, and two longer ones by Gary f and Jon S.
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00194.html
>>
>> Reading them over clarified a great deal of confusion I've been having
>> reconciling Gary f's and Jon S's views regarding, in particular, the
>> replica and sinsign. I would highly recommend that Gary f and Jon S (and
>> anyone else interested in this topic) reread those posts. In that earlier
>> post Gary f wrote:
>>
>>
>> GF: What I’m suggesting is that, in the language of “New Elements,” a
>> legisign is
>> a more “genuine” sign than a sinsign or replica; and when Peirce said in
>> “New
>> Elements” that “a sign is not a real thing,” he meant the same thing that
>> he
>> meant in saying that “It is not a single object, but a general type.” And
>> we
>> must notice here that Peirce defines two kinds of sinsigns: “ordinary
>> Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as
>> significant”;
>> and the sinsigns that are the replicas required by legisigns. The
>> difference
>> is that the ordinary sinsign is regarded, but not intended, as
>> significant.
>> So in Gary’s R’s example, the burnt child’s scream is an ordinary sinsign
>> for
>> the mother, because she reads it as an index of the child’s distress, not
>> because it is a replica of any legisign. There is a psychological sense
>> in
>> which that scream is more real than a replica of a legisign would be,
>> because
>> it elicits a more dynamic reaction from the mother. But that rea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three Interpretants)

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Jon S, list,

In another related thread, Jon A pointed to three posts from just over a
month ago, his short post, and two longer ones by Gary f and Jon S.
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00194.html

Reading them over clarified a great deal of confusion I've been having
reconciling Gary f's and Jon S's views regarding, in particular, the
replica and sinsign. I would highly recommend that Gary f and Jon S (and
anyone else interested in this topic) reread those posts. In that earlier
post Gary f wrote:


GF: What I’m suggesting is that, in the language of “New Elements,” a
legisign is
a more “genuine” sign than a sinsign or replica; and when Peirce said in
“New
Elements” that “a sign is not a real thing,” he meant the same thing that
he
meant in saying that “It is not a single object, but a general type.” And
we
must notice here that Peirce defines two kinds of sinsigns: “ordinary
Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as
significant”;
and the sinsigns that are the replicas required by legisigns. The
difference
is that the ordinary sinsign is regarded, but not intended, as significant.
So in Gary’s R’s example, the burnt child’s scream is an ordinary sinsign
for
the mother, because she reads it as an index of the child’s distress, not
because it is a replica of any legisign. There is a psychological sense in
which that scream is more real than a replica of a legisign would be,
because
it elicits a more dynamic reaction from the mother. But that reaction,
being
more dyadic and less intentional, is the interpretant in a relation to the
sign which is less genuuinely triadic (from a logical point of view) than
the
relation would be if the sign were a replica of a legisign.


So, for starters (and I won't try to get much further into this than to
make this one point, although I could make several others), Gary f is
saying here--and contra Jon S--that *not all signs need exist in replica*,
that the ordinary sinsign (in the example above, the child's scream) is not
a replica of a legisign, and in at least one sense (the psychological) it
may be considered "more than a replica of a legisign would be, because it
elicits a more dynamic reaction from the mother." As I recall, Jon S had
previously argued that that scream is not a sign at all.

So as I'm now seeing it, from the top down perspective which Gary f
elucidates in that Febriaru post (and elsewhere) the legisign, while more
*genuine* than the sinsign or qualisign (both degenerate signs), it yet
necessarily requires *replicas*. But not all sinsigns have or need replicas
(such as the scream of the child). In connection with the 1903 diagram and
elsewhere Peirce offers other examples of sinsigns. for example, a fever, a
weathercock, etc. which do not require replicas (although the weathercock
may 'lie' if its mechanism is stuck). But all signs would seem to require
collateral knowledge if they are to produce an interpretant (unless they
are innate, and I suppose one might argue that the mother's reaction to her
child's cry could be innate).

So, in sum, while I while I agree with Jon S that all signs are real, I do
not agree with him that they "only *exist *in Replicas.  A Sign is an
inexhaustible continuum of *potential *Replicas, and a Replica is an
*individual *instantiation of a Sign." This is so only necessarily for the
legisign and certain sinsigns.

Neither do I agree with him that the qualisign is not a sign (but arguing
that would require more time than I now have.

Best,

Gary R






*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 5:46 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Jon, just to clarify: In Peirce’s 1903 classification, some signs (being
> individuals, sinsigns) are replicas of other signs, those other signs being
> general in themselves (legisigns). But in your classification, no signs are
> replicas, no replicas are signs, and an index is not a sign, since it lacks
> generality. Although signs “exist in replicas,” replicas are not signs
> (i.e. a replica cannot be one of the three correlates in a genuine triadic
> relation). Is that right?
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* 29-Mar-18 16:13
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Nature and Division of Signs (was Three
> Interpretants)
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> What I am suggesting is that all Signs are *Real *in themselves, but only 
> *exist
> *in Replicas.  A Sign is an inexhaustible continuum of *potential *Replicas,
> and a Replica is an *individual *instantiation of a Sign--as I have said
> before, analogous to the relation between a line and a point, and the
> semiotic counterpart of a law of n

[PEIRCE-L] THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM

[Gary Richmond]

*Forwarded FYI*

*THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM*


*Plaza Lounge, Lowenstein Building, Fordham University@ Lincoln Center*

*9**th** (Columbus) Avenue at 60**th** Street, New York, USA 10023*


*Friday, April 13, 2018*

*4:00 – 8:00 p.m.*


*- - - - - - - -*


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*"IS THERE AN *

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*Axel Honneth Meets Critics: *


*Michael Baur, Fordham University*

*Nicholas Berry, Fordham University*

*Jacoby Carter, John Jay College*

*Lillian Cicerchia, Fordham University*

*Jeffrey Flynn, Fordham University*

*Judith Green, Fordham University*

*Chad Kautzer, Lehigh University*

*David McClean, Rutgers University*



*For More Information: www.NYPF.ace.fordham.edu
<http://www.NYPF.ace.fordham.edu>*


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants and Fuzzy Logic

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, John S, list

On 3/25/2018 3:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

> I would suggest that Peirce's 'haziness' and 'fuzzy logic' have a great
> deal in common.
>

John Sowa: I agree, but there is one important difference.  See the article
on
"What is the source of fuzziness?"

I disagree, at least as regards the passage in Peirce that we've been
considering here of late:

Now it is easy to see that my attempt to draw this three-way,

“trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and important three-way

distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of

study before it is rendered perfect. CSP


Peirce says that the distinction he is attempting to draw "is quite hazy
and needs a vast deal of study *before it is rendered perfect*."

That does not suggest fuzziness to me at all, since apparently Peirce feels
that *with* "a vast deal of study" that it* may be* "rendered perfect."

JS: The statements in the theory have a denotation (T,F) in terms of the
model, but the model has a fuzzy mapping (good, fair, poor) to
​ ​
the world.

Peirce's haziness in this "trivalis" distinction seems more likely, when
rendered perfect (perfectly clear?), to "have a denotation (T,F)" than "a
fuzzy mapping (good, fair, poor) to the world.

ET: " I think that it's very difficult to correlate theory to model
to the real world -  and I think that Peirce specifically didn't want to do
such a thing, not because of the difficulty but because of the resultant
'lack of truth' in these correlations

I would tend to agree with Edwina as regards the first part of this
statement, but disagree with her as to the second. There is just too much
theory meant to model vital semiosis in his work.

Btw, I highly recommend Edwina's paper for those wishing to get a handle on
at least one important facet of her approach to semiotic. See: "The Nature
of the Sign as a *WFF* - A Well-Formed Formula" (in WORD format)
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/taborsky-sign-wff.doc>

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/taborsky-sign-wff.doc


Best,

Gary





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Mar 25, 2018 at 4:12 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 3/25/2018 3:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
>> I would suggest that Peirce's 'haziness' and 'fuzzy logic' have a great
>> deal in common.
>>
>
> I agree, but there is one important difference.  See the article on
> "What is the source of fuzziness?" : http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
>
> In 1965, Zadeh began with fuzzy set theory, which has always had
> a sounder foundation that fuzzy logic.  See the egg-yolk diagrams
> on page 2 (Figure 1) and p. 4 (Figure 2).
>
> Susan Haack had strong arguments against the idea of degrees
> of truth, and I agree with her.  But see Figure 3 on p. 5 for
> "Relating a theory to the world":
>
> To bridge the gap between theories and the world, Figure 3 shows
>> a model as a Janus-like structure, with an engineering side facing
>> the world and an abstract side facing a theory.
>>
>
> The model in the middle is an abstract, Tarski-style model.  The
> statements in the theory have a denotation (T,F) in terms of the
> model, but the model has a fuzzy mapping (good, fair, poor) to
> the world.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, list,

You wrote: "Triadic philosophy asks how what we are considering is
tolerant, helpful and democratic. It considers how it relates to freedom.
love and justice."

I understand that *your* triadic philosophy--quite different from Peirce's
by your own admission even in terms of your basic triad--is concerned with
"freedom, love and justice."

But, as we recently discussed here in another thread in connection with
what Peirce had said in the first Cambridge Lecture of 1898, these are
matters of 'sentiment' which scientific inquiry should not concern itself
with but, rather, should strictly avoid. Sentiment may be *far more
importan*t in the scheme of humane concerns, he suggests, but science must
be free to make its inquiries unrestrained by these concerns.

So for science pragmatism expresses itself principally in how to conduct
what Peirce calls in the N.A. a "complete inquiry" involving hypothesis
formation, deduction of the implications for testing the hypothesis, and
the actual inductive testing which, as noted by John Sowa and Gary Furhman
begin a circle of inquiry.

I would like to have people on the list feel free to engage in whatever
Peirce-related inquiries they wish at whatever level of abstraction they
wish to conduct them. That is all.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 6:14 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Bogus is a strong term. I think Edwina is suggesting that we observe the
> pragmatic maxim. What is the practical effect or substance of a
> consideration? What is the whole of the matter?   What is the end of this
> particular effort to parse a particular sign? Triadic philosophy asks how
> what we are considering is tolerant, helpful and democratic. It considers
> how it relates to freedom. love and justice. The end result is an
> expression or action that can be noted and described.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:07 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>>  "I think that the various comments and concerns by others on the
>> list, that attempts to set up an analytic and abstract model of the
>> semiosic process, with each part defined within an exact and singular term
>> and providing an exact and singular action - actually deny the real nature
>> of semiosis."
>>
>>
>> Who here is presenting a model "with each part defined within an exact
>> and singular term and providing an exact and singular action"?
>>
>> Besides the fact that Peirce himself made many  "analytic and abstract
>> model [s] of the semiosic process," noting time and again that *Logic as
>> Semeiotic* is a *theoretical* science (this is especially evident in its
>> first two branches, theoretical grammar and critic), many Peirce scholars
>> and other semioticians have found that analytical and abstract analyses and
>> models can assist them in understanding certain underlying structures and
>> processes. And so the pages of many journals--and not just 
>> *Transactions*--are
>> filled with such analyses, models, diagrams, etc.
>>
>> And this is the case for science more generally: not only does it occur
>> in virtually all sciences that I know of, but most scientists--at least
>> those that I know in person (and I know quite a few) or by reputation--hold
>> that models and abstract analysis do not necessarily deny reality
>> whatsoever. Quite the contrary. They are but another *tool* to help
>> understand reality.
>>
>> And your own work, including one of your more recent papers, takes an
>> "analytical and abstract" approach to semeiotic involving models and
>> diagrams and the like. See: "The Nature of the Sign as a *WFF* - A
>> Well-Formed Formula" (in WORD format)
>> <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/taborsky-sign-wff.doc>
>>
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/tabor
>> sky-sign-wff.doc
>>
>> ET: "The morphological form is a well-formed formula (*wff*), a Sign, an
>> organized process of information. The Sign is formed within a triadic set
>> of relations, which are encoded spatial and temporal measurements. Using a
>> Cartesian quadrant, the six possible relational modes are examined to show
>> how reality is moulded within both symmetrical and asymmetrical functions."
>>
>>
>> *Many approaches* to inquiry are, as I see it, quasi-necessary in the
>> sense that &qu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

You wrote:

 "I think that the various comments and concerns by others on the
list, that attempts to set up an analytic and abstract model of the
semiosic process, with each part defined within an exact and singular term
and providing an exact and singular action - actually deny the real nature
of semiosis."


Who here is presenting a model "with each part defined within an exact and
singular term and providing an exact and singular action"?

Besides the fact that Peirce himself made many  "analytic and abstract
model [s] of the semiosic process," noting time and again that *Logic as
Semeiotic* is a *theoretical* science (this is especially evident in its
first two branches, theoretical grammar and critic), many Peirce scholars
and other semioticians have found that analytical and abstract analyses and
models can assist them in understanding certain underlying structures and
processes. And so the pages of many journals--and not just *Transactions*--are
filled with such analyses, models, diagrams, etc.

And this is the case for science more generally: not only does it occur in
virtually all sciences that I know of, but most scientists--at least those
that I know in person (and I know quite a few) or by reputation--hold that
models and abstract analysis do not necessarily deny reality whatsoever.
Quite the contrary. They are but another *tool* to help understand reality.

And your own work, including one of your more recent papers, takes an
"analytical and abstract" approach to semeiotic involving models and
diagrams and the like. See: "The Nature of the Sign as a *WFF* - A
Well-Formed Formula" (in WORD format)
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/taborsky-sign-wff.doc>

http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/taborsky-sign-wff.doc


ET: "The morphological form is a well-formed formula (*wff*), a Sign, an
organized process of information. The Sign is formed within a triadic set
of relations, which are encoded spatial and temporal measurements. Using a
Cartesian quadrant, the six possible relational modes are examined to show
how reality is moulded within both symmetrical and asymmetrical functions."


*Many approaches* to inquiry are, as I see it, quasi-necessary in the sense
that "getting at" reality requires these varied approaches, including (but
not limited to) more abstract and analytical ones. I do not see why both
more or less abstract inquiries ought not be undertaken.

And given some of your own inquiry--for example the paper above, not to
mention much that you've done on this list--I consider your critique bogus.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

>
> List
>
> I think that the various comments and concerns by others on the list, that
> attempts to set up an analytic and abstract model of the semiosic process,
> with each part defined within an exact and singular term and providing an
> exact and singular action - actually deny the real nature of semiosis.
>
> As Peirce noted, his pragmatacism was rooted in reality, a reality that is
> necessarily dynamic - and not in models, not in closed abstractions of
> thought. The fact that his semiosis includes not merely three basic modal
> categories - but- if you include the degenerate modes - there are 6 modal
> categories - as well as two objects and three interpretants suggests a
> complex system.
>
> No complex system operates deductively, but as has been pointed out - it
> operates inductively. And - abductively. An abstract technical model has no
> capacity to show or even allow such actions.
>
> In addition, each semiosic triad is networked with other triads - each
> with their own categorical modes - adding to the complex nature of the
> process.
>
> That is, semiosis is a so-called 'far-from-equilibrium' complex adaptive
> system - and can't be outlined within an abstract analytical deductive
> model.
>
> Edwina
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

John, list,


JS: On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
> important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in
> time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important
> three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue
> to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect.


​JS: ​
I agree that the issues are important.  And I am
​​
not objecting to people
continuing to study the issues.

​
[. . .]​

JS: But I wouldn't waste my time, *unless* some significant new evidence is
discovered.


New evidence? I have no ideas what you might mean by that. Peirce seems to
have taken these late semeiotic notions as far as he could at the time,
especially as he saw that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
important three-way distinction." In my opinion, what is needed is greater
clarity as to the meaning of these late semeiotic ideas (and the terms used
to express them) as well as how they might relate to each other.

John concluded:

JS: I was trying to state a point about Peirce's ethics of terminology.
Note that he did not approve of people who took his word 'pragmatics'
and used it in a very different way.


I agree that the misuse of terms established by Peirce like 'pragmatic' is
unacceptable (btw, I don't believe Peirce used the word 'pragmatics',
Charles Morris' term for his distorted view of Peirce's work which has
plagued Peircean pragmatic inquiry since). But in my view the current issue
has little if anything to do with the 'ethics of terminology' and to the
extent that it does in any way relate to that ethics, Jon Schmidt has
*not *used
Peirce's terminology "in a very different way," quite the contrary.

JS: My only point is that if any of those definitions are precise, then
they cannot be
the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define.  If so,
Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's
term -- they should choose a different word or phrase of their own.


Your point seems to me more than a little strained. The "hazy notion that
Peirce was trying to define" might *yet *be clarified in the very terms he
created and used. That clarification affects the 'haziness', not
necessarily the concepts as such, nor the terminology being considered.
What Jon seems to be doing, at least in part, is to bring these concepts
together into a well organized structure for our contemplation.

So, again, while I'm all for adhering to Peirce's 'ethics of terminology',
at least in Jon Alan Schmidt's case he is employing in his inquiry terms
Peirce used late in his career, notably, Quasi-mind, Quasi-utter,
Quasi-interpreter, Commens, and perfect Sign in ways which I do not see
much deviating from Peirce's (he offers textual support for this). It is my
sense that Peirce did not live long enough to fully explore, explicate, and
further develop the meanings of those admittedly complex late semeiotic
notions (we may find more discussions of them as more of his work is
published); while Lady Welby and her group didn't get much beyond "Sense,
Meaning, Significance." I see no reason why--and certainly not in
consideration of the 'ethics of terminology'--that these late semeiotic
notions not be inquired into further employing the terminology Peirce
invented.

And, speaking personally, I am for the most part following Jon's
argumentation, finding his outlines and  diagrams of interest and value. So
I am glad to read that you are "not objecting to people continuing to study
the issues."
​And knowing Jon as well as I do from his list discussions, I would expect
that were there *real* issues involving the ethics of terminology in his
inquiry that he would be the first to address them.

Best,

Gary





xx



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 9:38 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
>> important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in
>> time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important
>> three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue
>> to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect.
>>
>
> I agree that the issues are important.  And I am not objecting to people
> continuing to study the issues.
>
> I was trying to state a point about Peirce's ethics of terminology.
> Note that he did not approve of people who took his word 'pragmatics'
> and used it in a very different 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, Gary f, list,

You wrote:

JS: If these issues were hazy and imperfect for Peirce, Lady Welby, and
the Significs group, I don't believe that they can be resolved by
the same methods they used in their day.

.
And yet in the passage you quoted Peirce writes:

Now it is easy to see that my attempt to draw this three-way,

“trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and important three-way

distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of

study before it is rendered perfect.



Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in
time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important
three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue
to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect.

You concluded:

JS: I don't want to block anybody's "way of inquiry".  But I wouldn't
waste my time, *unless* some significant new evidence is discovered.


From my remarks just above I'm sure it's clear that I hardly find it a
"waste of time" to pursue this sort of study for those who, like Jon, are
interested in it. And, yes, comments about 'wasting time' can tend to block
the way of inquiry in my opinion. So, if someone is not interested in this
line of inquiry then they needn't read the thread, ought read or
participate in or start another thread. As you quote Gary f as writing: "I’d
better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking for
more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open."

At the same time there are certainly other "promising" questions that
Peirce left unanswered. :

JS: Those are also questions that people who have (until now) ignored
Peirce are likely
to find significant.  They might become converts to Peircean methods
*if* his methods, when applied to the new evidence, could answer them.


Let's not only hope so, but also work towards drawing these potential
"converts to Peircean methods" to them.

But in terms of *semeiotic theory-*-certainly not everyone's cup of tea--a
question that Peirce termed "a *real and important* three-way distinction"
which will need "*a vast deal of study* before it is rendered perfect"
seems one that those so inclined to study ought not be dissuaded from
doing. Quite the contrary.

In a word, I see no reason why any and all areas of inquiry suggested by
Peirce work ought not be pursued.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 1:37 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 3/21/2018 8:02 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
>> I’d better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking
>> for more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open.
>>
>
> There are many questions that Peirce "left open".  I believe that the
> most promising ones to pursue are those for which the past century
> has found evidence that wasn't available in his day.  Those are also
> questions that people who have (until now) ignored Peirce are likely
> to find significant.  They might become converts to Peircean methods
> *if* his methods, when applied to the new evidence, could answer them.
>
> But the passage by Peirce [EP2:498] makes me doubt that the following
> issues are promising ones to pursue:
>
>> Now it is easy to see that my attempt to draw this three-way,
>> “trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and important three-way
>> distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of
>> study before it is rendered perfect. Lady Welby has got hold of the
>> same real distinction in her “Sense, Meaning, Significance,” but
>> conceives it as imperfectly as I do, but imperfectly in other ways.
>>
>
> If these issues were hazy and imperfect for Peirce, Lady Welby, and
> the Significs group, I don't believe that they can be resolved by
> the same methods they used in their day.
>
> I don't want to block anybody's "way of inquiry".  But I wouldn't
> waste my time, *unless* some significant new evidence is discovered.
>
> John
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, Jon, Gary f, list,

Stephen wrote: "Any talk of signs would benefit from the use of examples."

I agree. Perhaps we could revisit the example Gary f offered a few weeks
back. I haven't time to find it now, but as I recall it's in a letter to
William James. In it Peirce is describing the weather to his wife in
semeiotic terms, notably in terms of Interpretants.

But perhaps this isn't the best optimal for the topic of this thread. For
example, Gary f asked:

GF: Are you assuming (or are you convinced) that the
*Intentional/Effectual/Communicational *trichotomy of interpretants differs *in
name only* from the *Immediate/Dynamical/Final *trichotomy? Are there
really only three interpretants, not six or more?


The weather example Peirce employs is, as I recall, the second trichotomy
above. There's been a great deal of analysis of the question as to the
number of Interpretants over the years (decades), much of it in published
form (*Transactions* has published any number of articles on the topic).

Btw, my own answer to Gary f's question is that it seems to me that there
are but three Interpretants and that Peirce deepened his conception of the
three and modified his terminology to express his evolved understanding.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:55 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Any talk of signs would benefit from the use of examples. Otherwise, you
> are constructing hypotheticals with no possibility of arriving at an
> expressive or actionable result. There's a big world out there. Semiosis
> has to do with all, everything, as I understand it.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:50 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> OK, I think I can follow your reasoning, though I don’t find it
>> persuasive. It implies that there is no such thing as an *intended
>> interpretant* of any given sign, if that means an interpretant intended
>> by the utterer. This makes me wonder what Peirce could possibly be
>> referring to as “the Influence the Sign is *intended* to exert" (R
>> 339:424[285r]” (quoted in your earlier message), if neither Seme nor Pheme
>> nor Delome can have an intended interpretant.
>>
>> Are you assuming (or are you convinced) that the 
>> *Intentional/Effectual/Communicational
>> *trichotomy of interpretants differs *in name only* from the 
>> *Immediate/Dynamical/Final
>> *trichotomy? Are there really only three interpretants, not six or more?
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* 20-Mar-18 16:33
>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants
>>
>>
>>
>> Garys, List:
>>
>>
>>
>> GR:  When you say that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, what part
>> does the Immediate Object play in that determination? I am for now assuming
>> that it is the Form which the Sign will represent. Can one say that the
>> Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign?
>> That, at least, has been my understanding.
>>
>>
>>
>> Peirce consistently held that the Object determines the Sign, which
>> determines the Interpretant.  When he expanded his analysis to two Objects
>> (and three Interpretants), he indeed indicated that the Dynamic Object
>> determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign; but keep in
>> mind that the Immediate Object is *internal *to the Sign.  My current
>> proposal is that the Dynamic Object is the Matter that the Sign denotes,
>> while the Immediate Object is the Form that the Sign signifies--as I have
>> put it previously, a partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic
>> Object that render it recognizable to an interpreting Quasi-mind with the
>> appropriate Collateral Experience.  Does that answer your questions?
>>
>>
>>
>> GF:  Jon, one question re your statement: “… he had defined the
>> Intentional Interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer"
>> (SS 196, EP 2:478).  Apparently he realized that, as such, it obviously 
>> *cannot
>> *be an Interpretant of the Sign that the utterer is *currently *uttering
>> …”  Why not?
>>
>>
>>
>> Because any Interpretant is always a determination of the Quasi-mind that 
>> *interprets
>> *a given Sign, never the Quasi-mind that *utters *it--even when these
>> are temporally successive versions of the *same *Quasi-mi

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Society Newsletter 2:1

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I'm forwarding this extraordinarily rich edition of the Peirce Society
Newsletter FYI. Please scroll down as you are sure to find something(s)
here of interest.

Best,

Gary


Peirce Society Newsletter 2:1
Peirce Society Newsletter 2:1
View this email in your browser

[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]

*The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter, 2:1*
*March 2018*


Dear Gary,

We are pleased to be sending you this year’s first issue of the Peirce
Society Newsletter.  Peirce’s ideas continue to be a source of inspiration
and cause for innovation throughout the world.  We hope that you will let
us know about the work you are doing and that the following information
keeps you abreast of the work of kindred scholars.

Yours truly,

The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee

*Spotlight on the Peirce Society President*

*Rossella Fabbrichesi* is Professor of Hermeneutics at the State University
of Milan, Italy.  She has published four monographs on Peirce and three
collections of Peirce’s writings, besides many essays on the subject.  She
also has worked on the link between Peirce and Wittgenstein, on semiotics,
and on hermeneutics.  She edits the first Italian website entirely devoted
to Peirce and is Former President of Associazione Pragma.  Her most recent
essay was published in the volume of the Library of Living Philosophers
devoted to *The Philosophy of Umberto Eco*.  Her most recent book is *Cosa
si fa quando si fa filosofia?* (Cortina, Milano, 2017).  She also recently
edited *Pragmatism: Some New Ways of Thinking for an Old Name*, a
monographic issue of *Rivista di storia della Filosofia *(3-2017).

*The Peirce Memorial Monument Project*

You recently received an email about our efforts to build Peirce a proper
memorial monument.  If you have already supported this project, *Thank You!*
To learn more about it or to donate, please visit: http://monument.peirce-
foundation.org/


*Have You Been Keeping Up with the Transactions?  *

Benoit Gaultier’s 2016 Peirce Essay Prize winning piece “The Iconicity of
Thought and Its Moving Pictures” appeared in the most recent issue.  Along
with it were Tom Short’s carefully argued “The 1903 Maxim,” Daniel
Kalpokas’s insightful “Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge,” and Marco Stango’s
compelling “A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of
Consciousness.”  Also in the volume were a fascinating examination of Black
Elk’s theology titled “Native Hermeneutics: Reverse Typology and
Remythologization,” by S. Joshua Thomas, and an intriguing comparative
study on the axiologies of Alain Locke and William James titled
“Absolutism, Relativism, and Anarchy,” by Neil W. Williams.  The next issue
of the *Transactions* will be out soon—subscribe by becoming a member of
the Peirce Society today!

*Are You Able to Help SPIN?*

The Scalable Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN) project has the aim of
enlisting scholars and interested members of the public as volunteers in a
collaborative effort to transcribe select portions of the C.S. Peirce
manuscripts into an online searchable form.  The approach draws on
crowdsourcing strategies to make transcriptions that are improved
incrementally over time.  The project is up and running and the management
team would like to encourage all who might be interested to (1) join the
transcription efforts and (2) share the information about the project with
colleagues, students and other contacts who might be willing to volunteer
some of their time.  In recent months, volunteers have taken on the task of
transcribing drafts of the “Neglected Argument” and portions of the 1903
Lowell Lectures, and they have facilitated discussions of the ideas in
those texts on the Peirce-List.  Over time, the project management team
would like to have hundreds of volunteers joining in the efforts—even if
some only transcribe a page or two.  As the saying goes, many hands make
for light work.  Towards this end, the team is exploring innovative ways to
support the transcription efforts of a large community of volunteers, and
they are also trying to support a wide range of possible downstream uses of
the transcriptions.  Scholars and editors should contact
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu with questions or to express interests in having
particular collections of manuscripts transcribed.  Exports of the
transcriptions can be made available in a wide range of formats.
Information about getting started, including simple transcription
guidelines and a short video, are available on the project site.  The
process is relatively simple for transcribing text, and there are more
detailed instructions for encoding logical formulas and diagrams in LaTeX.
See: https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts

*Mark Your Calendars*

March 28–April 1, 2018 | San 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Thanks for this very helpful analysis of the three interpretants of
Peirce's late semeiotic. My first impression is, from what I can grasp of
it, that it seems correct and complete, a succinct and subtle analysis. But
I'll want to study it further as there are some points which are still a
bit unclear to me, for example:

JA: The essential ingredient of the utterer is the Dynamic Object, which
determines the Sign; that of the interpreter is the Dynamic Interpretant,
which the Sign determines; and that of the Commens is the Sign itself,
which welds the utterer and interpreter into one Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.551).



When you say that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, what part does
the Immediate Object play in that determination? I am for now assuming that
it is the Form which the Sign *will *represent. Can one say that the
Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign?
That, at least, has been my understanding.

In any event, your analysis should allow semioticians interested in this
aspect of Peirce's late semiotic to get a handle on it sufficient to
springboard into further analysis. This is, of course, not to suggest that
it may not need some correction (or at least tweaking), but for me for now
it makes more sense of the three interpretants than anything else I've read
in years. And, again, that it does it succinctly is in my mind a definite
virtue (esp. for the purposes of study).

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> List:
>
> In a draft letter to Victoria Lady Welby, Peirce asserted that "every sign
> … must be a determination of a quasi-mind," which "is itself a sign, a
> determinable sign" (SS 195; all citations 1906 unless noted otherwise).  He
> then defined a Sign as "any medium for the communication or extension of a
> Form" (SS 196, EP 2:477), and went on to describe an instance of semiosis
> as follows.
>
>
>
> CSP:  There is the *Intentional *lnterpretant, which is a determination
> of the mind of the utterer; the *Effectual *lnterpretant, which is a
> determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the *Communicational 
> *lnterpretant,
> or say the *Cominterpretant, *which is a determination of that mind into
> which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that
> any communication should take place. (SS 196-197, EP 2:478)
>
>
>
> The Effectual Interpretant is almost certainly the Dynamic Interpretant as
> the feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign *actually*
> determines the interpreting Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.536).  In the secondary
> literature, there seems to be a general consensus that the Intentional and
> Communicational Interpretants are the Immediate and Final Interpretants,
> respectively.  For example, the EP editors imply this in a note on the
> quoted passage.
>
>
>
> PEP:  In the Logic Notebook (MS 339:531, 533, 541-44), the Intentional
> Interpretant is also called the Intended, Impressional, or Initial
> Interpretant; the Effectual Interpretant is also called the Factual,
> Middle, or Dynamic Interpretant; and the Communicational Interpretant is
> also called the Normal, Habitual, or Eventual Interpretant. (EP 2:555n2)
>
>
>
> However, Peirce did not actually mention the Intentional, Effectual, or
> Communicational Interpretants *at all* in that particular manuscript
> (with pages numbered per the microfilm images [and by Peirce himself], R
> 339:412[275r], 414[276r], 422-425[283r-286r]).  Fortunately, he did make
> some relevant remarks right after briefly defining the Normal, Dynamic, and
> Immediate Interpretants.
>
>
>
> CSP:  I have thus omitted the *intended* interpretant.  So far as the
> intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant.
> So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another*
> sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign. (R
> 339:414[276r])
>
>
>
> Peirce thus explained why he switched from Intended on one page (275r,
> dated March 31) to Immediate on the next (276r, dated April 2).  Only a
> few weeks previously (March 9), he had defined the Intentional Interpretant
> as "a determination of the mind of the utterer" (SS 196, EP 2:478).  
> Apparently
> he realized that, as such, it obviously *cannot* be an Interpretant of
> the Sign that the utterer is *currently* uttering; instead, it must be an
> Interpretant of a *previous* Sign determined by the same Dynamic Object.  
> Hence
> it is a *Final* Interpretant in the sense of being the *last* outcome of
> se

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Jon wrote:

JAS: There is nothing "magical" about the power of retroduction in Peirce's
philosophy.  It is a direct result of the *continuity *of all things
(synechism), which entails that there is no "correspondence gap" between
Reality and Mind, including human minds.  While Reality is indeed
independent of what you or I or any *discrete* collection of *individual *minds
may think about it, it is not independent of thought *in general*.  This is
precisely the basis for the regulative hope that the final opinion at the
end of *infinite *inquiry--the *ultimate *Interpretant of *every *Sign--
*would *perfectly conform to Reality, and thus constitute the perfect (or
absolute) Truth.  In the meantime, any or all of our beliefs may turn out
to be mistaken--that is the principle of fallibilism--but we have no good
reason to doubt any one of them in particular, unless and until we are
confronted by the "outward clash" of experience with an unpleasant surprise
that forces us to reconsider it.


I know that you like to bring Peircean concepts together in as complete yet
as succinct a way that you can while retaining the complexity of the
relations of the component ideas in your summary synthesis. In this
paragraph you've seemed to outdone yourself in bringing together in a most
cogent manner: *retroduction*, *continuity*, *synechism*, *(independent)*
*Reality*, *Mind*, *regulative hope*, *final opinion*, *infinite inquiry,
ultimate interpretant*, *perfect (absolute) Truth*, and *fallibilism*.

I have put this in my file of thoughts "to be inscribed on every wall of
the city of philosophy"--well, at least on the walls of Arisbe :-)
This is to simply to say that I view it as a very rich summary of certain
essential concepts of Peirce's Realism.

See, also, Susan Haack's *Transactions* paper, "Do not block the way of
inquiry" https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612013 as
your brief comments immediately made me think of it, esp. the section of
its Abstract which capsule content I've put in boldface below.

Abstract

The first goal is to understand why Peirce describes his motto, "Do Not
Block the Way of Inquiry," as a corollary of the "first rule of reason,"
why he believes it deserves to be inscribed on every wall of the city of
philosophy, and what he has in mind when he characterizes the various
barricades philosophers set up, the many obstacles they put in the path of
inquiry. *This soon leads us to important, substantive themes in Peirce's
meta-philosophical, cosmological, metaphysical, logical, and
epistemological work* (§1). However, it also leads us to what might seem to
be a tension in his account of the motives for inquiry. So the second goal
is to track the source of this apparent tension, and to show how Peirce
resolved it (§2). But the ultimate goal is to explain why Peirce's warning
against blocking the way of inquiry is no less important, given the
condition of philosophy today, than it was when he offered it more than a
century ago-perhaps even more so (§3).


I don't know whether there is a *strong* connection here, but that the
"first rule of reason" and its corollary are important precepts in Peirce's
theory of inquiry within pragmaticism, occurring as they do in the third
branch of logic as semeiotic--preceding the possible application of what
has been discovered in semeiotic to considerations in the last of the
cenoscopic sciences, metaphysics--*that* may be what brought Haack's paper
to my mind.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Matt, List:
>
> There is nothing "magical" about the power of retroduction in Peirce's
> philosophy.  It is a direct result of the *continuity *of all things
> (synechism), which entails that there is no "correspondence gap" between
> Reality and Mind, including human minds.  While Reality is indeed
> independent of what you or I or any *discrete* collection of *individual 
> *minds
> may think about it, it is not independent of thought *in general*.  This
> is precisely the basis for the regulative hope that the final opinion at
> the end of *infinite *inquiry--the *ultimate *Interpretant of *every *
> Sign--*would *perfectly conform to Reality, and thus constitute the
> perfect (or absolute) Truth.  In the meantime, any or all of our beliefs
> may turn out to be mistaken--that is the principle of fallibilism--but we
> have no good reason to doubt any one of them in particular, unless and
> until we are confronted by the "outward clash" of experience with an
> unpleasant surprise that forces us to reconsider it.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce,
please do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote below
from CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in the
original text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these are
incorrect assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the clear
difference between Peirce's text and your own additions to it. Therefore -
please inform the reader that the bracketed terms are your
additions...that's all.

To me this sounds like so much nit-picking. Not only does Peirce *not* use
brackets in this way to my knowledge, but 3ns, 2ns, 1ns are abbreviations I
invented a couple of decades ago and which some, including Jon, use rather
than the more cumbersome thirdness, secondness, and firstness. I doubt that
anyone on this list would think that 1ns, 2ns, 3ns reflect Peirce's own
usage within or with out brackets.

ET: 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
opinions.

Again, I completely disagree with you that Jon's analysis is simply an
opinion. He brings together Peirce's own conception of "the Universe [as] a
vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose" with recent
discussions of and his own reflections on the Quasi-Mind,
Utterer-Interpreter, and Perfect Sign--all from Peirce's late work in
semeiotic and in the context of his extraordinarily compelling, in my
opinion (and, of course, this *is* simply my opinion) analysis in his
paper, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality
of God (see the link below).

He does this--and even in this recent post--in a way which to my mind
complements Peirce's own analysis of the universe as a symbol of God's
work. Along with other better known Peircean phenomenological and semiotic
notions (the categories, icon/index/symbol) he seems moving in the
direction of a deepening of that part of Peirce's metaphysics which
explicitly concerns God by applying these late semiotic ideas.

Finally, Jon offers this most recent message as the beginning of the
unpacking of a hypothesis. JAS: "If my latest hypothesis is correct that
the Universe is the Perfect Sign, what would be its Object?" You may argue
against his analysis on phenomenological, semeiotic, or metaphysical
grounds, but to dismiss it out of hand seems to me much more like mere
opinion than Jon's message (which, as I see it, is not opinion at all).
Peirce *was* a theist, and those who are theists (and even those who
aren't) may find Jon's work of considerable interest as in effect
developing and deepening these semeiotic/metaphysical ideas of Peirce. See,
especially, A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the
Reality of God, published recently in the journal, Signs.

https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 16, 2018 at 9:18 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
> 1] Just one suggestion. When you are providing a quote from Peirce, please
> do not add your comments within that quoted text. In the quote below from
> CP 5,119, the words in brackets [3ns, 2ns, 1ns] are NOT in the original
> text but are your own commentary. I'm not saying these are incorrect
> assumptions - but, I think the reader ought to know the clear difference
> between Peirce's text and your own additions to it. Therefore - please
> inform the reader that the bracketed terms are your additions...that's all.
>
> 2] I also don't agree with your analysis ...on God - but that's
> irrelevant, since both your analysis and my rejection of it are simply
> opinions.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 16/03/18 8:58 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List:
>
> If my latest hypothesis is correct that the Universe is the Perfect Sign,
> what would be its Object?  What is perpetually acting upon it with new
> Signs that give it fresh energy and kindle its previously dormant energy?
> What has the absolute freedom to introduce spontaneous changes into it?  In
> other words, what sustains the Universe as something that is living and
> growing, rather than succumbing to "the complete induration of habit
> reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to
> complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)?
>
>
>
> CSP:  ... the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's
> purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol
> [3ns] must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions [2ns]
> and its Icons of Qualities [1ns]; and suc

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Gene thanks for putting the time and effort into this post. You have most
certainly addressed my criticisms that leading to your conclusion:

EH:  Again, I deeply admire Peirce’s vast philosophy. But I also abhor the
narrow-mindedness of these types of private beliefs he seems to have held,
all the more so given the fecundity of his ideas such as agapasm. I wish
that the deep poverty and injustice Peirce personally suffered could have
tempered his prejudices in later life and opened his eyes to some of the
institutional sources of injustice and poverty, but I don’t get the sense
that that happened.


I think I will have to reevaluate my view of Peirce's character as I've had
to do with other thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. For now I will
say that your argumentation is persuasive.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
wrote:

> Dear Gary R.,
>
> Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was
> not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and
> especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are
> features of actually existing science and technology rather than external
> to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am
> grateful for your criticism.
>
> When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T.
> H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th
> century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy
> access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long
> unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of
> actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist
> and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical
> murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which
> wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of
> science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging
> the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction.
>
> You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if
> I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that
> Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And
> you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single
> comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the
> civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.”
>
> Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of
> greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me
> at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with
> Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to
> what Carnegie expressed.
>
>
>
> Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady
> Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal
> suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for
> the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest
> class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.”
>
> Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class,
> pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of
> workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider,
> Upton Sinclair published his novel *The Jungle*, two years earlier,
> depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago.
> Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already
> actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class
> immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in
> the grip of industrial capitalism.
>
> Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and
> necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in
> politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be
> enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone
> can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped
> the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken
> was classical Greek; and it is obvious that no people could have spoken it
> who were not provided with plenty of intelligent slaves. As to us
> Americans, who had, at first, so much political sense, we always showed a
> disposition to support such aristocracy as we had; and we have co

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, Edwina, Kirsti,  list

Gene wrote:

EH: Regarding the potential for catastrophe, Gary R. stated, “that you
would, however, find it difficult to find in Peirce very much support for
your thesis.”


The potential for catastrophe (regarding which I fully agree with you) was
not the 'thesis' that I said you would "find it difficult to find In Peirce
very much support." Re: "catastrophe" I fully agree with you since
quotations we've both offered make Peirce's view of that quite clear, for
example, his writing in 'Evolutionary Love' "The twentieth century, in its
latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst upon the social
order -- to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has
long plunged it into guilt." Indeed the "deluge-tempest" didn't even take
as long as Peirce thought it would as the First World War broke out just a
few months following his death. The rest of the horror of that century and
the continued horror in this century, both brought about by the crazed
greed and power seeking of a few men is, in my view, virtually self-evident.

What I didn't agree with was your assertion that "The greed, power, and
especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not
simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are
essential features of the system." I have already given my reasons for
disagreeing with you on that thesis so I won't repeat them now; and I
assume that we are still in disagreement on this matter even while you've
offered additional examples of "corruption within science itself." There is
not an actual or even, I think, conceivable institution where one won't
find corrupt men and women (mainly men). I also agree with Edwina that
Peirce was entirely and explicitly opposed to Social Darwinism.

In addition, your impugning of Peirce's character seems to me over the top.
You wrote:

EH: Peirce’s criticism of the greed philosophy, including a reference to
how he was swindled, did not seem to apply to workers. In fact, his
criticism of the philosophy of greed rings hypocritical when some of his
other comments are taken into account, which read as similar to those of
Carnegie.


You will have to offer much more evidence if I'm to believe that Peirce's
character and Carnegie's were "similar," that Peirce was "hypocritical" in
his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed.

And you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single
comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the
civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.
May none of our characters be judged on the basis of the views of our
parents. You wrote:

EH: As Peirce wrote to Lady Welby: “The people ought to be enslaved; only
the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone can maintain
their rule.”  (*Semiotics and Significs, *edited by Charles S. Hardwick
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 78). Given that
Peirce lived through the American civil war (not fighting in it), and that
his father Benjamin had been pro-slavery before the war, Charles’s advocacy
of a “virtuous” slaveholding elite strikes me as repugnant and puerile.

Can you guess what side of the slaveholder/enslaved divide Peirce would put
himself on?


I do not take Peirce's comments about "the people" (not, btw, the African
people held as slaves in America) literally. He is writing to a, I
believe *relatively
*liberal, friend in England, a woman whom he's gotten to know well through
letters, one who will know that this is not to be taken literally (as you
clearly have). I find his comment (in context) more along the lines of
Jasper, very skeptical of majoritarian democracy, famously arguing for a
form of government guided by "an intellectual elite." There is just too
much else in Peirce suggesting that he upholds the ethics of the Gospel of
Love, including, for an example recently discussed on the list, his support
for Abbot against the unfair criticism of his work by Royce.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>
> *We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
> before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
> presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
> come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
> to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
> man's glory! **Peirce: CP 1.627 *
>
>
> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>
> But first consider that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] APA Pacific Meeting Author Meets Critics: From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Congratulations Gene!

I wish I could attend that APA meeting. Your book  From the Axial Age to
the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New
Understanding of the Idea <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137441584>
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan) is quite extraordinary, as always, extremely
well researched and beautifully written. I can whole-heartedly recommend it
to the list. As with all your books, even when I disagree with some of your
thinking I agree with much of it; and I always learn a great deal from your
occasionally very different (from my) perspectives. So, I hope that, among
other things, your book helps lead to a resurgence of more general interest
in Jaspers (of course there are particular fields where interest in his
work has never declined).

Jaspers, undoubtedly one of the greatest of 20th century thinkers, was only
a few decades being very widely read and discussed in quite diverse
intellectual circles, for example, in NYC in the 70's and 80's. I fondly
recall hanging out at Greenwich Village coffee shops with professors and
students at NYU interested in art, music, literature, and philosophy,
especially the 'symbolic' thinking of Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer,
Existentialism, for example, thinkers as diverse in their approaches as
Martin Buber and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, yes, Jaspers, esp. some of his
more 'popular' works. But then the intellectual climate changed and many of
these great 20th century thinkers were neglected in the last part of the
20th and early years of the 21st centuries.

At least until now. Besides your work centering on Jaspers, one could, for
example, point to the Peircean, Robert Innis, the local organizer of the
2013 Peirce Centennial at UMass, Lowell, who took a fresh look at Langer's
work in: Innis, Robert E. (2009), *Susanne Langer in focus: the symbolic
mind*, Indiana University Press. Her work in aesthetics and philosophy of
mind has parallels in Peirce's work, although her greatest influence was
"the philosophy of symbolic forms" of Cassirer.

But, again, congratulations and good luck with your presentation. I'm
fairly certain that your rediscovery of Stuart-Glennie and your reflections
on D. H. Lawrence will  provoke much interesting discussion.

And, if not now, soon, I'm sure that I'm not the only one in this forum who
would like to hear more about Peirce's "semiotic animism" as you phrased it.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 1:48 PM, Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
wrote:

> For anyone who might be interested, who will be at the
> American Philosophic Association Pacific meeting in San Diego at the end of
> this month. There will be an author meets critics session sponsored by the
> Karl Jaspers Society of North America, which will discuss my book, From
> the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers,
> and a New Understanding of the Idea
> <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137441584>  (New York: Palgrave
> MacMillan).
>
> My book involves discussions of the revolutionary changes across different
> civilizations in the period roughly 2,500 years ago, which Jaspers labelled
> “the axial age” in 1949. I rediscovered a 19th century thinker, John
> Stuart-Glennie, who had advanced a full theory of the phenomena, which he
> termed "the moral revolution," and philosophy of history 75 years earlier,
> in 1873, only to be forgotten after he died in 1910. I also discovered
> while writing the book, that 20 years before Jaspers, D. H. Lawrence also
> addressed the phenomena, in ways that connect to contemporary discussions
> today on rationalization. Stuart-Glennie and Lawrence also address issues
> that relate to current discussions of “the new animism,” a relational
> ontology that easily connects to what could be called Peirce’s semiotic
> animism.
>
>Here is information on the session below.
>
> Gene Halton
>
>
>
> APA PACIFIC DIVISION ANNUAL MEETING
>
> Saturday, March 31 6:00 - 8:00 p.m., G10C, Westin Gaslamp Quarter Hotel,
> San Diego, CA
>
>
>
> Karl Jaspers Society of North America Session Two: Author meets Critics
>
> From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl
> Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)
>
>
>
> Author: Eugene Halton (University of Notre Dame)
>
>
>
> Chair: Elena Bezzubova (University of California, Irvine)
>
>
>
> Critics: Victor Lidz (Drexel University)
>
> Christopher Peet (The King's University, Canada)
>
> Benjamin Schewel (University of Virginia)
>
> John Tor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means
that no final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the
perfect' or even 'truth'.

I would tend to strongly agree "that no final state can be reached.",
Neither JAS nor I have suggested that a final state can be reached, in
fact, quite the contrary. As Jon wrote:

JAS:  As Gary R. . . pointed out, the text that I quoted clearly treats
perfection as an ideal, a *regulative hope*.  It is much like Peirce's
notion of "the final opinion," which will never *actually *be achieved,
either.

I must admit that I don't see what you're disagreeing with.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 6:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Peirce doesn't employ the notion of perfection in any concrete sense. I
> stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means that no
> final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the perfect' or
> even 'truth'.
>
> The basic composition of the universe, i.e., the Three Categories and the
> Triadic Semiosic Process means that deviation from a 'path' is basic to
> life. Indeed, your quotes below confirm my point - that no final state [and
> that includes perfection] is possible. Not merely not possible but it would
> be non-semiosic - for that triad and those three categories prevent
> finality.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 10/03/18 4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the
> notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the
> perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."
>
> Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
> does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
> by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.
>
> ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system
> that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and
> Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and
> developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there
> is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity
> prevent such a linear and closed path.
>
> See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
> 'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
> him not to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
> a tendency exactly towards evolutionary growth, but that it is asymptotic
> and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
> out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
> neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
> Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
> inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.
>
> 1909 | Letters to William James  | EP 2:496-7
>
> …there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
> Interpretant, because  it is that which would finally be decided to be
> the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far
> that an ultimate opinion were reached.
>
> Notice the would in would finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could argue
> in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate opinion"
> in the snippet quoted above. These are general tendencies considered in
> futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909 letter Peirce
> writes:
>
> ". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
> about according to which a general description of result is made to come
> about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
> that particular way" (CSP).
>
>
> ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
> frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
> but not only does it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion
of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."

Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.

ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that
is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
such a linear and closed path.

See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
him *not* to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
a tendency *exactly towards evolutionary growth,* but that it is asymptotic
and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.

1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:496-7

…there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
Interpretant, because it is that which *would *finally be decided to be the
true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that
an ultimate opinion were reached.

Notice the *would* in *would* finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could
argue in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate
opinion" in the snippet quoted above. These are *general tendencies*
considered in futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909
letter Peirce writes:

". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
about according to which a general description of result is made to come
about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
that particular way" (CSP).


ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
but its very individuality precludes perfection.

This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and evolve as
if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There is a theological
notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold it--although I can't
recall where I got it--that none of *this *world's growth and evolution is
lost in the Mind of God, or just Mind if you prefer; however, this is
surely not the thread to get into *that* idea.)

ET: And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
'final state'


There is no "necessitarianism" in *Peirce's notion* of the 'perfect Sign',
etc. Take, for example, Peirce's understanding of "Final Causation":

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical Notions. Section I.
Classification of the Sciences (Logic II) | EP 2:120; CP 1.211

Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be
brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain *general
characte**r**. *(emphasis added by me)

In my view, the 'general character' of the evolution of the Cosmos through,
shall we say, infinite semiosis, is what Peirce means when he uses such
terminology as that involving 'final' and 'perfect' and 'Truth'.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> List -
>
>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
> 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
> sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis.
>
> The fact that there ar

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You concluded: "Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply
not be of much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I
find it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been
posting. :-)"

I would imagine that there are several on this list (I could probably name
them) who find the topics you're discussing of considerable interest, and I
am one of them. I doubt that everyone--even and especially every one of
those interested individuals--agrees with everything you've been posting,
but I personally agree with much of it, having some reservations about some
of it which I'll have to discuss in a future post.

However, more to the middle reason you offered in the snippet I quoted
above as to why you haven't received much feedback recently. I myself have
been exceedingly busy of late and haven't had much time to fully digest
your very rich messages let alone respond to them. From off list messages,
I know two other list members who are quite interested in this line of
inquiry but who are now themselves very busy. This situation reminds me of
Joe Ransdell's comment on the Peirce-l page at the Arisbe web site.


 If nobody responds to your posts you should NOT assume that it is because
of lack of interest, or that your post is perceived as something
negligible. You really have no basis for doing that, given the
understandings and practices of lists like this. Frequently, the interested
people just don't have time to respond, and few of us have time to respond
to more than a small percentage of the things that interest us, in any
case. Since you usually have no way of knowing why you didn't get the
response you hoped for, it is best to be Stoic about it. . .  Pose your
questions and comments well by your own standards and remind yourself that
even if there is no overt response, what you have said or asked will be
read by hundreds of people in any case, and with what results or "fruits"
you cannot know.


While I'm still busy, for now I'd like to respond to a couple of more
substantive points made in your most recent post:

JAS:  After further contemplation, I now believe that Peirce was
describing *the
same thing* here as in the passage about "the ideal sign" that I have
mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple of years earlier.


You then quoted the passage from EP 2:304 which included these sentences:


CSP:  . . . Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*,
which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the
very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
denoted united with the very form signified by it.

This snippet from the longer quotation, especially the phrase "the ideal
sign which should be quite perfect," would seem to nearly confirm your
sense that what Peirce terms the "ideal sign" and, years later, the
"perfect sign" are, indeed, synonymous.

And I'm also "with you" in your revising your previous hypothesis.


​JAS: ​
Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous with
"Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
Universe.

​While I've held from the get-go that 'perfect Sign' and 'Quasi-mind' are
*not* the same thing, I'm beginning to return to my original thought that
the 'perfect Sign' expresses some kind of an ideal, some asymptotic
approach ​to "the Truth that corresponds to the Universe," a Universe
which, however, is ever-evolving.

So, it seems to me that 'perfection' (also, 'ideal') in Peirce's semieotic
sense is *not* being employed by him in some informal, every day,
colloquial way. I think that if respondents to your posts were to read more
of what Peirce means by these terms ('perfect' or 'ideal' + sign, 'the
Truth', etc.) rather than what they 'think' these may mean based on a less
scientific and more colloquial usage, that this inquiry could perhaps move
forward more speedily. Or not.

Best,

Gary R

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, Jon S, list,

Stephen wrote:

SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important.


I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In
fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic
which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it
is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason
whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this
as an important inquiry and quite the contrary.

SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used
in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000
references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.


Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your stats
hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of
certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for
example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and
never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one
might come up with a *very* different frequency rate.

Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about
it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a
great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a
fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of
terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances
of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a
number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years,
say. . .

SR:  I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not fundamental
to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended treatment as
something that will somehow advance u thinking.


What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road of
inquiry" because one  doesn't find it of personal interest or personal
value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by
Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further
research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of
the topics under consideration.

SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
lexicon


First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's
own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to
give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may
warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute
to it.

Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond
the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently
noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and
this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially
his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to
dictionaries, etc.

Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself
deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

Do not block the way of inquiry.


Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>>
>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
>> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
>> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>
>>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>>  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Terry, list,

Terry asked: Is there an estimate of what those ongoing maintenance and
repair costs [for the Peirce monument] might be?

I haven't personally been involved in the project, but I'll look into it.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Terry L Rankin <rankin.te...@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> Thanks, Gary! Is there an estimate of what those ongoing maintenance and
> repair costs might be?
>
>
>
> Still in One Peace,
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> rankin.te...@hotmail.com
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 8, 2018 8:57 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and
> Memorial
>
>
>
> Terry, list,
>
>
>
> Terry asked: "I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m wondering about
> ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?"
>
>
>
> That's a very good question. The notice I posted yesterday does note:
>
>
>
> The Monument Project page will provide regular updates on progress toward
> our goal. Any funds received in excess of the final project cost will be
> used for annual upkeep.
>
> http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeircesociety.us15.list-manage.com%2Ftrack%2Fclick%3Fu%3D2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c%26id%3D04387f977d%26e%3D860edf35dc=02%7C01%7C%7Cf82839af6ed04de75f4208d584fca104%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435%7C1%7C0%7C636561142929413736=mbsfvGGsoCRShk9cFDSpiKxcUiKSnJHbYewGK6RMzpI%3D=0>
>
>
>
> ​We can only hope that some means for permanent upkeep with finally be
> devised.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
> ​
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 6:18 AM, Terry L Rankin <rankin.te...@hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Thank you for this notice! I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m
> wondering about ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?
>
>
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> *silkpei...@semiotic.com <silkpei...@semiotic.com>*
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 7, 2018 11:48 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
>
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
>
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
>
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
>
> [i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Terry, list,

Terry asked: "I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m wondering about
ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?"

That's a very good question. The notice I posted yesterday does note:


The Monument Project page will provide regular updates on progress toward
our goal. Any funds received in excess of the final project cost will be
used for annual upkeep.
http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=04387f977d=860edf35dc>


​We can only hope that some means for permanent upkeep with finally be
devised.

Best,

Gary
​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 6:18 AM, Terry L Rankin <rankin.te...@hotmail.com>
wrote:

> Thank you for this notice! I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m
> wondering about ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?
>
>
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> *silkpei...@semiotic.com <silkpei...@semiotic.com>*
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 7, 2018 11:48 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
>
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
>
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
>
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
>
> [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
>
> Dear Gary,
>
> We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
> have led us to include you among those who regard Charles S. Peirce as one
> of the world’s great thinkers. Soon after their marriage, Peirce and
> Juliette moved to Milford, Pennsylvania, where they resided until Charles’s
> death in 1914. For the remainder of her impoverished life, Juliette kept
> the urn with Peirce’s ashes on a mantel at their home, Arisbe. When
> Juliette died in 1934, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, a friend of
> the Peirces with a grand home in Milford, arranged for Juliette’s burial in
> the local cemetery near the Pinchot family plots. The urn with Peirce’s
> ashes was placed in the casket with Juliette and was interred with her. A
> small inconspicuous tombstone was erected to mark the grave.
>
> In August 2014, after the close of the International Peirce Congress in
> Lowell, Massachusetts, a group of Peirce scholars travelled to Milford to
> install and dedicate a commemorative plaque in Peirce’s study at Arisbe.
> This excursion to Milford, arranged for by Rosa Mayorga, included a visit
> to the Milford Cemetery to visit Peirce’s grave. Even the few who had
> visited Peirce’s grave before and who knew approximately where it was
> located had difficulty finding it. We were told stories 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Dan, list,

I would encourage those who have the opportunity to visit Milford, PA, a
charming town with a fine local museum which, as you mentioned, Dan, has a
small, but quite interesting room of Peirce artifacts. I agree with you
that it would be nice were Arisbe restored and made a Peirce museum. But
for now the scientific team at the National Park Service there will, I
believe, with some advance notice, give even a small group a tour of the
house which itself has some Peirce articles including a large, beautiful,
and totally fascinating Quincuncial Projection of the World which Peirce
created several versions of. This is, I believe, the largest rendering. On
Peirce's quincuncial projection, yet another mark of his scientific genius,
see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peirce_quincuncial_projection

One can also visit the beautiful mansion and extensive, well kept grounds
of the friends of the Peirces, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot and
his wife. In letters Peirce writes fondly of dinners with the Pinchots.
Peirce's grave site sits somewhat below the Pinchots and might help you in
finding it should you visit the cemetery in which the monument will be
placed.

To learn more about the project and to donate, please visit:
http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=04387f977d=860edf35dc>

Please send your contributions to the Peirce Foundation. The Foundation,
which is a 501(c)3 corporation, will provide you with a receipt for tax
purposes.


The town itself has some nice galleries, shops, and restaurants, and two
inns, one rather grand and one quite quaint and modest. Near the center of
town and close to the museum is the grander of the two, Hotel Fauchere,
where Peirce and his wife, Juliette, stayed on their arrival in Milford on
April 28, 1887.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 2:08 AM, Everett, Daniel <dever...@bentley.edu>
wrote:

> Thanks very much for this. My wife and I recently visited Milford and
> Arisbe. My own hope is that someday Arisbe itself can be restored as a
> Peirce museum. But in the meantime this project is excellent.
>
> It was quite moving to visit the small Peirce section of the local Milford
> museum, to see photos and objects from his life and to read through
> facsimiles of his correspondence. No one at the museum knew all that much
> about him.
>
> A monument is a welcome project.
>
> Dan
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Mar 8, 2018, at 05:48, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
> [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
> Dear Gary,
>
> We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
> have led us to include

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.

I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
found (but see the entire discussion below):

The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.


Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a monument
plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now moved to
the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be around $20,000
US and the committee is now asking interested members of the Peirce
community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
erected soon.

Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
information on how you may contribute.

Best,

Gary Richmond


Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of Peirce
Alive
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
Dear Gary,

We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
have led us to include you among those who regard Charles S. Peirce as one
of the world’s great thinkers. Soon after their marriage, Peirce and
Juliette moved to Milford, Pennsylvania, where they resided until Charles’s
death in 1914. For the remainder of her impoverished life, Juliette kept
the urn with Peirce’s ashes on a mantel at their home, Arisbe. When
Juliette died in 1934, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, a friend of
the Peirces with a grand home in Milford, arranged for Juliette’s burial in
the local cemetery near the Pinchot family plots. The urn with Peirce’s
ashes was placed in the casket with Juliette and was interred with her. A
small inconspicuous tombstone was erected to mark the grave.

In August 2014, after the close of the International Peirce Congress in
Lowell, Massachusetts, a group of Peirce scholars travelled to Milford to
install and dedicate a commemorative plaque in Peirce’s study at Arisbe.
This excursion to Milford, arranged for by Rosa Mayorga, included a visit
to the Milford Cemetery to visit Peirce’s grave. Even the few who had
visited Peirce’s grave before and who knew approximately where it was
located had difficulty finding it. We were told stories of visitors from
around the world who had tried in vain to find Peirce’s burial place. Once
located, it was easy to see why the grave is hard to find. The tombstone is
small and slightly askew and the urn beside it was broken in two. It is a
very unimpressive marker indexing the final resting place of the man who
many believe to be America’s greatest philosopher.


The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.

Following this group visit to Milford, Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou, then
President of the Peirce Society, appointed a special committee, composed of
members of the Peirce Society and the Peirce Foundation and chaired by Rosa
Mayorga, to develop plans for a more satisfactory memorial. This committee
secured the necessary permissions to erect a new monument on the grave site
and adopted a monument plan designed by Céline Poisson, Professor at the
School of Design at the University of Quebec at Montreal.


This plan has now moved to the funding and implementation stage. The
estimated cost for construction of this monument is $16,250.00 in addition
to costs related to the planning and design phases. To cover these costs we
seek to raise $20,000.00 and hope that you will help us achieve this goal.
We ask you to make a generous donation. To make sure this project succeeds,
we would like to be able to make definite arrangements for the co

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Gene, list,

After some reflection I don't think I can completely agree with Gary f that
Political Economy is not a science at all in Peirce's time. Consider, for
example, Stanley Jevons book of 1879 titled The Theory of Political
Economy. See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy where
one reads:

In the late 19th century, the term "economics
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics>" gradually began to replace the
term "political economy" with the rise of mathematical modelling coinciding
with the publication of an influential textbook by Alfred Marshall
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Marshall> in 1890. Earlier, William
Stanley Jevons <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Stanley_Jevons>, a
proponent of mathematical methods applied to the subject, advocated
economics for brevity and with the hope of the term becoming "the
recognised name of a science".


However, it seems to me that what Peirce seems to be emphasizing in the
passage Gene quoted, but also elsewhere, the tendency of the entire
political-economic power structure toward what he terms "The Gospel of
Greed." So, in the quotation by Peirce just mentioned, he writes "an
exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed . . . has resulted in a
philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent
in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe," an
Ayn Randian notion if ever there was one.

I think that Gene has some support for his notion idea that Political
Economy was seen in the late 19th Century as a science and one which Peirce
sees as having detrimental effects.

As for the quotation concerning Darwin's *Theory of Evolution*, while I
tend to agree with Gene that it was Peirce's view that Darwin's theory was
quite incomplete and needed a consideration of all three categories to
complete it, it would appear that Darwin *was* influenced by Herbert
Spencer's 1852, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of
Human Fertility," while Darwin seems to have been himself influenced by
Spencer's 1857, "Progress: Its Law and Cause." However, I don't think this
represents or even hints at the full picture, and even though the term
Social Darwinism wasn't much used in the USA before the turn of the 20th
century. However, it seems to me likely that "greedy industrialists"
weren't much reading Devons or Spencer (although Peirce knew their work
quite well).

Gene concluded:

I’m criticizing the costs of outlooks which take precise elements of
reality as the whole of reality, myopically, while excluding real elements
in ways whose costs and consequences have now brought the biosphere to the
gates of catastrophe. Yes, I would agree that Peirce offers a much broader
understanding of science, but that does not excuse the ways in which
science and technology have been willing perps in unsustainability as well.


Firstly, it seems to me that the ideas of "political economy" and "social
Darwinism" overlap to some considerable effect, although I can't discuss
this just now. Mainly, I'd suggest that while there have been some in,
especially, contemporary science and technology who "have been willing
perps in unsustainability," that for the most part scientists have not been
(although I'm fairly certain that more than a few have been compromised by
the need to feed their families). I offered the example of in my last post
of 97% of climate scientists accepting the human cause of global warming,
which warming itself has, as Gene wrote, "brought the biosphere to the
gates of catastrophe." Consider only the possibility of the Siberian tundra
melting sufficiently to release vast amounts of methane, 36 times more
potent a greenhouse gas than carbon.

I think, Gene, that you would, however, find it difficult to find in Peirce
very much support for your thesis. However, in our age especially, I think
it's true that science, and especially technology, have been plundered and
misused--just as the biosphere has--and unless we make great efforts to
counter that misuse in the next decade or so, I think Gene's expressed
concern is not overstated.

Best,

Gary R





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 4:36 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Gene,
>
> It’s questionable whether Political Economy is a science at all in the
> Peircean sense of that word; maybe to him it was no more genuinely
> scientific than, well, the Gospel. But if we consider 21st-century
> Economics as a science, then we should look for self-criticism, and
> criticism of “classical” economic theories, within the profession, as
> symptomatic of the science being genuine in that Peircean sense. And that
> is not hard to find i

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry,

Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
"conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
Really?

Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
list.

Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> That sounds like conspiracy.
>
>
>
> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>
>
>
> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, list,
>>
>> You concluded:
>>
>> EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
>> deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
>> and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
>> admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
>> technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
>> with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
>> technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.
>>
>>
>> I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing.
>>
>> I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
>> very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
>> political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
>> locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
>> technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
>> scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
>> "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
>> disagree.
>>
>> Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
>> number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
>> global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
>> that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Storch> (1999). "Climate
>> Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
>> <http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/1520-0477%281999%29080%3C0439%3ACSAEEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2>
>> (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
>> 439–455.
>>
>> In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most part
>> scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy
>> and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support
>> policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of
>> the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.)
>> The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who
>> deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."
>>
>> But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
>> scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
>> unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
>> the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
>> That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
>> for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
>> science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
>> did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
>> political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
>> view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
>> science and technology can be seen as pa

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

, I believe, anticipated in a close reading of certain of
Peirce's writings, including those on education, because he saw it *well on
its way* in his own era.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
wrote:

> Dear Gary R.,
>  Yes, thanks, you understood my critique and likely difference of
> opinion.
>  From my point of view your response, like that of many Peirceans, and
> sci-tech proponents more generally, takes an ideal of what science and
> technology should be as an excuse to deny their actual complicity in the
> delusion of limitless development of human-all-too-human purposes that has
> brought us to the likelihood of an emerging collapse. The greed, power, and
> especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not
> simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are
> essential features of the system, despite the many admirable individuals
> within it. That is why actually existing science and technology represent
> possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world with humans still a
> part of it, and why actually existing science and technology must be
> critically confronted as part of the problem.
>   Gene
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:27 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, list,
>>
>> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
>> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
>> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>>
>> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
>> overpopulated earth.
>>  Such is man's glory!
>>
>>
>> You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
>> comment. All​
>> ​
>> ​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive*
>> results of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
>> incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
>> well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
>> been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
>> application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)
>>
>> However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
>> earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
>> power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
>> can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
>> haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
>> that's because of greed, etc.)
>>
>> Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
>> replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
>> books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
>> there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
>> computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
>> technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than
>> the greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that
>> you wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.
>>
>> In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
>> matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
>> technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
>> too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
>> population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
>> which they have almost unlimited control.
>> Best,
>> Gary
>>  ​
>>
>
>
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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen. list,

SR: I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
reading of the lectures is in question.


While the 1898 Cambridge lecture series--which Kirsti explicitly referred
to--doesn't express his "despair," there is little doubt that Peirce in
such places as the quotation your offered, which is *not* from this lecture
series but from the essay "Evolutionary Love," did see the Gospel of Greed
as having supplanted the Gospel of Love in American political economy.

As for my own thoughts on this supplanting, see my response today to Gene
Halton's post.

I am happy to hear that you don't think that my reading of the *Reasoning
and the Logic of Thing*s isn't in question, but we'll see about that since
Kirsti referenced *that* lecture series and not "Evolutionary Love."

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:25 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
> reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
> reading of the lectures is in question. It would be fairly easy to go
> through CP and pick and choose a small quilt of expressions that amount to
> a sort of despair about American culture or a critique of her theology--
> greed and such.
> *"Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is this:
> Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the
> fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between
> men, and leads to the summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort.
> Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to
> say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy,
> the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. But the study of
> doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily encourage
> generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has encouraged
> necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to
> economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the
> beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment,
> until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that
> greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the
> evolution of the universe.* " 6.290
>
> On a more encouraging note, "*In general, God is perpetually creating us,
> that is developing our real manhood, our spiritual reality. Like a good
> teacher, He is engaged in detaching us from a False dependence upon Him."
> 6.507*
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 12:51 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Kirsti, list,
>>
>> You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:
>>
>> KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his
>> true views on science and vitally important matters.
>>
>> ​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see
>> any "despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my
>> interpretation of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis
>> and feel confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
>> offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
>> but from many sources.
>>
>> But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them
>> so often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce
>> claimed he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the
>> structure and content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps
>> the principal theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of
>> despair at all, but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he
>> explicitly argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair
>> whatsoever in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely
>> positive estimate of both within their own provinces.
>>
>> So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
>> offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
>> with no basis in fact.
>>
>> KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe
>>
>> I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
>> moment I have confidence 

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"

Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
overpopulated earth.
 Such is man's glory!


You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
comment. All​
​
​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive* results
of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)

However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
that's because of greed, etc.)

Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than the
greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that you
wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.

In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
which they have almost unlimited control.

Best,

Gary
 ​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
wrote:

> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>
> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
> overpopulated earth.
>  Such is man's glory!
>  Gene H
>
>
>
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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:

KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
views on science and vitally important matters.

​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see any
"despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my interpretation
of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis and feel
confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
but from many sources.

But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them so
often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce claimed
he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the structure and
content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps the principal
theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of despair at all,
but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he explicitly
argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair whatsoever
in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely positive
estimate of both within their own provinces.

So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
with no basis in fact.

KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe

I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
moment I have confidence that my view is supported not only by Peirce's
discussion in the 1898 lectures, but in *many* other places in his work, as
always, and in the spirit of Peirce, I would be delighted to have you prove
me wrong. Then I'd have learned something I hadn't known and corrected an
error in my thinking. Peirce called this approach 'Critical Commonsensism',
and commented that his Pragmatism could be thought of as but a development
of it.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
> views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>
>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>> _
>>>
>>
>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>
>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>> of a jury, now is it?
>>
>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>
>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>
>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
>> theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
>>

Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen quoted Peirce:

*We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
man's glory! **Peirce: CP 1.627 *


In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.

But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that of a
jury, now is it?

Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator ask
contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this off-list). The
quotation above appears in the first lecture of the 1998 lectures published
as *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*.

When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of lectures in
Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then speaking on logic and
science as he was wont to do, that instead Peirce ought speak on "topics of
vital importance" (which phrase appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626
and .636). Peirce, of course, chose to speak on what interested him at the
time, including logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.

In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he hadn't
taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins by arguing
that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a "theory of
reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But they *do* have
their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . . in practical
affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy to exaggerate the
importance of ratiocination" and in such matters Peirce will offer as
alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It is this snippet just
quoted that introduces the paragraph which concludes the quotation which
Stephen offered. However, ". . . in theoretical matters I refuse to allow
sentiment any weight whatsoever" (CP 1.634).

Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . . has
nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637), and it is
best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly untrammeled a
scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's concluded this discussion
of topics of vital importance being little aided by our vain power of
reason (witness the jury illustration!), he moves on in the lectures to
follow to discussions of topics of scientific importance.

Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results of
scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied to
matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)

Best,

Gary R










Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote:

> *We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
> before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
> presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
> come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
> to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
> man's glory!*
>
> *Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††*
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, Gary f, list,

ET: I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.

I completely disagree. First, as you wrote, it is a "current focus." Other
foci are possible and, no doubt, desirable. If one is not interested in a
particular line of inquiry then one may leave the thread--don't even read
the posts in it.

But even better is to begin a thread on a 'focus' which *does* interest
you. There have been *many* focuses over the years, some of them not even
on semeiotics, but rather on other aspects of Peirce's thinking. I would
encourage the development of threads on any and all facets of science,
philosophy, art, literature, music, architecture, religion, etc. which are
Peirce-related.

In addition, and significantly, Peirce himself offers *many* "singular
definitions of terms" in his discussion of the three branches of semiotics,
typically relating them to other terms. I do not see why the "current
focus" on the meaning of, especially, some very intriguing terms which
Peirce uses in his late work in semeiotic, including "Quasi-mind" and
"perfect Sign", "obscures" semeiotic inquiry; rather the contrary is the
case in my view. I am finding the threads on Quasi-mind, etc. personally
quite stimulating, drawn back into the discussion just when I was about to
leave it in the direction of another 'focus'.

Finally, I think the dismissal of a particular approach to semeiotic
inquiry as 'obscuring it' tends to "block the way of inquiry."

ET: In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that
enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.

Firstly, I thought you weren't interested in the "singular definitions of
terms," but here you are participating in that "focus." In any event, I do
not agree that a Quasi-mind can be reduced to "a LOCAL articulation of
Mind" (see the many Peirce quotes Jon S offered which contradict that
interpretation @ https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322
.html)

As to your notion that the Quasi-mind is *not* a Sign, it is Peirce who
writes that the Quasi-mind *is* a Sign. For example, here (emphasis added):

1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195

I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will
try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in
the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what they
are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But
a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A
thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of
dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self
of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires
a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination
of a quasi-mind. *The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign.*

ET: Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects
the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network


I do not see the "linearity" that you speak of. Please show how the model
which, for example, Jon S, Gary f, and I are employing (despite our many
moments of sometimes significant disagreement on particulars) "disconnects
the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network." Indeed, I
would suggest that recent analyses around Quasi-mind do just the opposite,
while it is your notion of "Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind," for
example, which seems to "disconnect."

You will disagree, I'm certain, but I would say that as much as possible
that we are basing our recent analyses at least on Peirce's own model of
triadic semiosis (which is hardly linear), whereas I find a certain
"linearity" in, for example, your own model of input-mediation-output, your
notion of "dynamic transformic nature" in a semiotic context, whereas
Peirce generally uses terms like dynamic for dyadic action.

Best,

Gary R

*​*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
> clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
>
> My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This
> capacity requires [1]  a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2]
>  requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant
> interactional and relational networking of Sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Jon S, list,

I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so
I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:

Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind?

I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that the
perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a Quasi-sign
are *not* the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns out to be that
it does *not* mean that the Object can be completely represented. I'd
suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of
representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect
Sign is "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its
occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial
interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a
Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured,
perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis.

Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
Object sounds like a *concept*— as, for example, your concept of a woman
includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?

Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the Sign
with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its characters or qualities; and
that *partial *combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the Form
that the Sign communicates."  I am less certain that I would distinguish
the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing "Only the
Sign *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
(determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to
me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating in some
literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a
Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me,
problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how completely
we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of certain
rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard distinctions seem
to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the Form which the
Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from it.

Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
correlate of a *triadic* relation?
I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction."

I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our
answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what your
understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is.

Best,

Gary R

​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs
> in a Quasi-mind?
>
>
> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an *individual
> *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs," and (in his words) "something
> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing
> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a *perfect *sign" as "the
> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
> with it."  I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter
> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
> metaphysical ground first.
>
> JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the 
> *entire
> *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>
>
> GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman
> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>
>
> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a
> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:

EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted by
it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the
Truth*.


If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects
or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say,
"selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a
perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only
asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent.

So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a
perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote:

The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of the
Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the
*entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).


It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic
Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility.

Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this part
of your conclusion:

Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves Entelechy,
the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.  This is
the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a
representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554,
EP 2:380; 1906).

Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.


By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just
two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP
2:411; 1907).


But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even if
rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it
retrospectively, so to speak, creates.

Best,

Gary R
-



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> List:
>
> Since there have been no comments on my revised summary of what Peirce
> wrote about Quasi-minds, I guess that we can move on to some related topics.
>
> As Gary R. pointed out a while back, Peirce observed that there are
> "various meanings of the word 'Mind,' Logical, Metaphysical, and
> Psychological" (CP 4.550; 1906); and presumably the same is true of his
> concept of a Quasi-mind.  Consequently, it is important to be clear about
> which one is in view, and I believe that so far we have been focusing
> primarily on its *logical *aspects.  However, presumably there must be
> *real* Quasi-minds that play an indispensable role in any *concrete*
> instance of semiosis.  This obviously takes us from logic into
> metaphysics.
>
>
>
> CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory … (EP 2:304; 1904)
>
>
>
> The following is my summary of a few passages that I think are especially
> helpful for sorting out the nature of *actual* Signs and Sign-action.  
> Interestingly,
> they lead to a notion of "perfect sign" that (at least initially) seems
> different from what Peirce described in EP 2:545n25.
>
>- EP 2:304 (1904) - Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/2ns),
>*signifies* characters or qualities (Form/1ns), and *determines* its
>Interpretant that unites them (Entelechy/3ns).
>- EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign is *passive *in its relation to its
>Object, being determined by but not affecting it; and *active *in its
>relation to its Interpretant, determining but not being affected by it.
>- EP 2:410 (1907) - The Sign *mediates *between its Object and
>Interpretant; it is determined by the Object *relatively to the
>Interpretant*, and determines the Interpretant *in reference to the
>Object*.
>- EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign *communicates *a Form, which has the
>being of the *predicate*, the truth of a conditional proposition; it
>is in the Dynamic Object *entitatively* and in the Sign (as its
>Immediate Object) *representatively*.
>- EP 2:307 (1904) - A pure *Icon *is perfect in respect to
>signification, but lacking in denotation; while a pure *Index* is
>perfect in respect to denotation, but lacking in signification.
>- EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
>identity a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

I would tend to agree with your conclusion.

JAS: [It] seems to me that a Quasi-mind can be defined as an *individual *Sign
that is also a *complex *of Signs, which are connected such that they are
susceptible to determination by *another *Sign to a *single *Interpretant.
The additional Sign may be either a *natural *Sign determined directly by a
Dynamic Object that the Quasi-mind encounters, or a *genuine *Sign
determined by another Quasi-mind (perhaps its *past *self) with which it
becomes welded in that Sign.  The resulting Interpretant may be a
*further *genuine
Sign that determines yet another Quasi-mind (perhaps its *future *self).

Peirce's characteristic emphasis on continuity is evident here.  The flow
of Signs within and between Quasi-minds is much like the flow of time
itself, which has no *discrete *instants--only *infinitesimal *moments (cf.
CP 7.653; 1903).  That is why *any *analysis of concrete semiosis must be
*arbitrary *to some degree--designating one Sign within a process of
Sign-action is like marking one point on a line; in both cases, we are
introducing a *discontinuity *into that which is *continuous *in itself.

Well analyzed!  As I'm now seeing it, the Quasi-mind, a Sign which, as you
wrote, is also a complex of Signs, is in itself nothing special--nothing
mysterious, and certainly not the perfect sign at all, but something like
the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication;  that is,
* a requirement of semiosis itself when one considers Sign-action in the
light of continuity.*

Best,

Gary R





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 25, 2018 at 5:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> List:
>
> Per Gary R.'s suggestion, I set aside the concept of "perfect Sign" for a
> little while to focus on the concept of "Quasi-mind."  After going back
> through the key quotes (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/
> arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322.html), all of which are from 1906, here is
> a revised summary.
>
>1. Every Sign is a *determination *of a Quasi-mind, which is something
>of the general nature of a Mind.
>   1. The Quasi-mind is *itself *a Sign that is susceptible to
>   determination, but it is not logically necessary that it possess
>   *consciousness*.
>   2. There are no *isolated *Signs, and multiple Signs connected such
>   that they can have *one *Interpretant are determinations of *one *
>   Quasi-mind.
>   3. The determinations of a Quasi-mind become Immediate
>   Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamic Interpretants are
>   dynamically connected
>   2. Every Sign requires *two *distinct Quasi-minds, a *Quasi-utterer*
>and a *Quasi-interpreter*, which may be temporally successive versions
>of the *same *Quasi-mind; as well as a *third *Quasi-mind that is
>their overlap, the *Commens*.
>   1. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-utterer is the (Dynamic)
>   Object, which determines the Sign *only *in the respect (Immediate
>   Object) that enables the Sign to act on the Quasi-interpreter as the 
> Object *itself
>   *would.
>   2. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-interpreter is the
>   (Dynamic) Interpretant, which the Sign produces as a *singular *event
>   by determining the Quasi-interpreter to a feeling, to an exertion,
>   or to another Sign.
>   3. The essential ingredient of the Commens is the Sign itself,
>   which *welds *the Quasi-utterer and Quasi-interpreter into *one 
> *Quasi-mind
>   that includes whatever they must *already *share for the Sign to
>   fulfill its function.
>   4. When there is no *actual *Quasi-interpreter, the (Immediate)
>   Interpretant is the range of *possible *effects that the Sign
>   *would *produce, if it *were *to determine a Quasi-interpreter.
>   5. When there *is *a Quasi-interpreter, the (Dynamic) Interpretant
>   is a state of activity, mingled with curiosity, that usually leads to
>   experimentation as the normal logical effect.
>3. In Existential Graphs, the Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is ...
>   1. the *matter *that the Graph-instances are to determine, in which
>   the Graphist and Interpreter are *at one*.
>   2. the *means *by which the Graphist and Interpreter *collaborate *in
>   composing a Pheme [or Dicisign] and in operating on this so as to 
> develop a
>   Delome [or Argument].
>   3. a Diagram of the logical Quasi-mind that is determined by all of
>   the Signs represented on it.
>   4. a Diagram of the logical Universe and a Seme [or Rheme] of *the
>   Truth*, the widest Universe of

[PEIRCE-L] Extended Deadline: 2nd International Conference Semiosis in Communication: Differences and Similarities

[Gary Richmond]

Forwarded FYI: Extended Deadline: 2nd International Conference Semiosis in
Communication: Differences and Similarities

*2nd International* *Conference Semiosis in Communication: Differences and
Similarities*, June 14-16, 2018, Bucharest, Romania.

We are glad to announce that the abstract submission deadline for this
event is extended to *8th of April*, 2018.

For planning final conference arrangements, we would be very grateful if
you consider this new date as the final one.

*Important deadlines:*

   - Deadline for submission of Abstracts: 25th of February 2018– *8th of
   April 2018*
   - Notification of Acceptance: 11th of March 2018 – *15th of April 2018*
   - Deadline for participation fee:16th of April 2018 – *6th of May 2018*
   - Conference: *14-16 June, 2018*

Please visit the conference website for the call (CfP), the registration
procedure and every other detail at:
http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/semiosisc_2018.html (check regularly
for updates).

You can also find up-to-date information about the event on the Facebook
conference page, https://www.facebook.com/Semiosis.in.Communication/.

We welcome each and all of you to Bucharest, Romania to the National
University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania (NUPSPA).

For questions and details concerning the conference *Semiosis in
Communication: Differences and Similarities*, please write to Nicolae-Sorin
Drăgan at: dragan.nicolaeso...@gmail.com.

*updated version of Call for Papers*: Call_for_Papers
<http://iass-ais.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Call_for_Papers.pdf>



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Peircean linguistic view of the Second Amendment

[Gary Richmond]

ould be interpreted


The first, known as the "states' rights
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States%27_rights>" or "collective right"
model, held that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals;
rather, it recognizes the right of each state to arm its militia. Under
this approach, citizens "have no right to keep or bear arms, but the states
have a collective right to have the National Guard". Advocates of
collective rights models argued that the Second Amendment was written to
prevent the federal government from disarming state militias, rather than
to secure an individual right to possess firearms. Prior to 2001, every
circuit court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment endorsed the
"collective right" model. However, beginning with the Fifth Circuit's
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Fifth_Circuit>
 opinion *United States v. Emerson* in 2001, some circuit courts recognized
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.In the
latter half of the 20th century, there was considerable debate over whether
the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a collective right
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_and_group_rights>.The debate
centered on whether the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free State") declared the amendment’s only
purpose or merely announced a purpose to introduce the operative clause
("the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed").
Scholars advanced three competing theoretical models for how the prefatory
clause should be interpreted.

The second, known as the "sophisticated collective right model",held that
the Second Amendment recognizes some limited individual right. However,
this individual right could only be exercised by actively participating
members of a functioning, organized state militia/ Some scholars have
argued that the "sophisticated collective rights model" is, in fact, the
functional equivalent of the "collective rights model." Other commentators
have observed that prior to *Emerson*, five circuit courts specifically
endorsed the "sophisticated collective right model"

The third, known as the "standard model", held that the Second Amendment
recognized the personal right of individuals to keep and bear
arms. Supporters of this model argued that "although the first clause may
describe a general purpose for the amendment, the second clause is
controlling and therefore the amendment confers an individual right 'of the
people' to keep and bear arms".Additionally, scholars who favored this
model argued the "absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the
Amendment's preamble does not render it a 'dead letter' because the
preamble is a 'philosophical declaration' safeguarding militias and is but
one of multiple 'civic purposes' for which the Amendment was enacted".

Under both of the collective right models, the opening phrase was
considered essential as a pre-condition for the main clause. These
interpretations held that this was a grammar structure that was common
during that era and that this grammar dictated that the Second Amendment
protected a collective right to firearms to the extent necessary for
militia duty. However, under the standard model, the opening phrase was
believed to be prefatory or amplifying to the operative clause. The opening
phrase was meant as a non-exclusive example – one of many reasons for the
amendment. This interpretation is consistent with the position that the
Second Amendment protects a modified individual right.

The question of a collective right versus an individual right was
progressively resolved in favor of the individual rights model, beginning
with the Fifth Circuit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Fifth_Circuit>
ruling
in *United States v. Emerson
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Emerson>* (2001), along
with the Supreme Court's rulings in *District of Columbia v. Heller* (2008),
and *McDonald v. Chicago* (2010). In *Heller*, the Supreme Court resolved
any remaining circuit splits <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circuit_split> by
ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Although the
Second Amendment is the only Constitutional amendment with a prefatory
clause, such linguistic constructions were widely used elsewhere in the
late eighteenth century.

(See also the following sections.)


Meaning of "well regulated militia"

Meaning of "the right of the People"

Meaning of "keep and bear arms"




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 3:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jo

[PEIRCE-L] A Peircean linguistic view of the Second Amendment

[Gary Richmond]

List,

The conclusion of the Peircean linguist Michael Shapiro's blog post of 2014
on the Second Amendment. First, the Amendment.

 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."

"The word militia of the first clause governs—is hierarchically
superordinate to—the phrase the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
The framers of the Constitution had the grammatical option to invert the
two clauses but did not. The element order speaks for itself, rendering
militia the pragmatistic scope (i. e., in the Peircean sense of the
philosophical doctrine of pragmatism) under which right to keep and bear
arms is restricted. " Michael Shapiro

His complete argumentation is, of course, longer; for which see his blog.
http://languagelore.net Included in Shapiro's post was this:

>From Dennis Baron, “Guns and Grammar: the Linguistics of the Second
Amendment” (www.english.illinois.edu/-people/faculty/debaron/essays/guns.pdf
):

“In our amicus brief in the Heller case we attempted to demonstrate,
• that the Second Amendment must be read in its entirety, and that its
initial absolute functions as a subordinate adverbial that establishes a
cause-and-effect connection with the amendment’s main clause; connection
with the amendment’s main clause;
• that the vast preponderance of examples show that the phrase bear arms
refers specifically to carrying weapons in the context of a well-regulated
militia;
• that the word militia itself refers to a federally-authorized, collective
fighting force, drawn only from the subgroup of citizens eligible for
service in such a body;
• and that as the linguistic evidence makes clear, the militia clause is
inextricably bound to the right to bear arms clause. 18th-century readers,
grammarians, and lexicographers understood the Second Amendment in this
way, and it is how linguists have understood it as well.”

Professor Joseph Dauben of the CUNY Graduate Center commented on Shapiro's
blog post in an email today: "It's clear from what you say that the
amendment means "the people" collectively, in their joint defense, not
every NRA member out there who may on his own want to keep a weapon handy,
whether there is a militia anywhere in sight or not."

I should note that this post is meant only to demonstrate one way in which
Peircean thought is being effectively employed in consideration of
contemporary issues.

Best,

Gary R


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, list,

Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in
this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of
quasi-minds?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our
> incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds:
>
>
>
> *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel,
> the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..*
>
>
>
> *He said he hated the work..*
>
> *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. *
>
> *praised.. criticized..  That was the principle of the work..*
>
>
>
> *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens
> regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..*
>
>
>
> *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a
> real person..*
>
>
>
> *These technologies are unbelievably effective..*
>
>
>
> *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when
> she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were
> planted by trolls.*
>
> *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts
> were formed by the propagandists," she said.*
>
> http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russian-
> troll-factory-20180219-story.html
>
>
>
> *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could
> mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; *
>
>
>
> *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter
> and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable?  Certainly not!  *
>
>
>
> *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism
>
> Jeffrey Barnou,  *Journal of the History of Ideas*
>
>
>
> Hth,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of
>> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906).
>> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should
>> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to
>> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>>
>> 8.  Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram
>> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its
>> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter,
>> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It
>> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the
>> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in
>> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318).
>>
>>
>> 9.  The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only
>> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the
>> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and
>> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of
>> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the
>> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside
>> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being
>> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better
>> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of
>> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320)
>>
>>
>> 10.  Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially
>> in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which
>> one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the
>> Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form
>> represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not
>> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove"
>> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not
>> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when
>> regarded in two

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S., list,

OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on
Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime
next week.

Best,

Gary R




1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give
“Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within
our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it
may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a
*Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they
are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human
Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It
might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this
fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -
and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is
only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of
diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it
be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our system
may not represent every variety of non-human thought.
1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant]

… quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined,
must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
susceptibility to determination.
1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195

I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will
try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in
the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what they
are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But
a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A
thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of
dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self
of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires
a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination
of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign.


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You wrote:

JAS: Hence we seem to be converging at last on classifying the girl's
scream as a genuine Sign, both for her and for the mother, at least from a
certain point of view.  However, I am still not sure whether to treat it as
a Replica of one Sign or of two different Signs.  Ironically, it would
*have *to be the latter if it were a natural/degenerate Sign for the child
and a genuine Sign for the mother.  On the other hand, I am reminded of
Peirce's notion that two Quasi-minds are "welded" when the same Sign is
uttered by one and interpreted by the other (CP 4.551; 1906).  Presumably
the resolution still depends on whether the Sign has the same Dynamic
Object for both of them--the girl's pain, for example.


I
​ think it might be wise to leave it at this for now. I definitely see the
child's and the mother's Signs as two Signs since, again, I see two
different Dynamic Objects. But for now I haven't anything to add beyond
what I've already written, so I'm content to know that our thinking was
able to 'converge', as you wrote, to the extent that it has (is that
convergence an example of Quasi-mind?)​

Speaking of which, I also just reread the *Commens* Dictionary entries on
Quasi-mind and still think we could benefit from a discussion of that
concept, especially as I'm seeing the notion, "welded in the Sign" as it
appears in one of the entries somewhat differently than you seem to be
interpreting it. It seems to me more closely connected to the notion of
"dialogic" than what you've been proposing in analyzing "The Child Learns a
Lesson" case.

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity
of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.
​
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551
​ at *Commens*.​
​


I should hasten to add that, although I see it as a potentially important
​inquiry
, I would rather postpone
​that discussion of Quasi-mind
as well.
​ Of course if you care to comment on this now, or even begin a new thread,
please do. But for now, I'll let whatever you have to say stand with no
response and hope to join in later.

​JAS:
Thanks for your patience in working through all of this with me.  Should we
revisit the vase scenario next? :-)


Thanks for your patience in return. I would actually at some point like to
revisit the vase scenario but, again, not just now. I like the way we "kept
at" the child/mother case, even  imagining that if I had your, shall we
say, 'probing fortitude', that we might be able to resolve at least some of
those issues on which we have not yet come to full agreement on. In any
event, engaging in dialogue with you is always stimulating, challenging,
and well worth the time and effort put into it. In a word, it always felt
like a joint 'inquiry' and not mere 'debate', and with both of us willing
to modify our views in the light of the other's thinking.

What I'd like to turn to soon is
​
Peirce's late (1907) manuscript, given the title, "Pragmatism" by the
Essential Peirce editors (EP 2:398-434 ).
​ But that could be, I think, a major inquiry, one which, perhaps early in
March, I'd like to introduce in a way which might hopefully encourage
additional participation in our forum. I've been thinking about this for
some time now and drafting notes to myself, excepting passages and ideas
from "Pragmatism" in preparation for beginning a discussion.

So, for now, especially as I'm occupied with other matters needing my
attention, I'll drop off the list for at least the rest of the week,
perhaps longer, and try to find time to re-read "Pragmatism."

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I was about to send an addendum to my previous post when I received your
> reply--for which I am grateful, because it prompted me to hold off a bit
> and reconsider a couple of things.  I agree that we make a good team in
> this discussion, given our opposing proclivities for abstract vs. concrete
> analysis.
>
> As you mentioned in a side note, "it is clear that animals change their
> habits as a consequence of natural signs."  This is just another way of
> saying that non-human animals are bundles of Collateral Experience and
> Habits of Interpretati

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

's another topic.

You had earlier suggested that there was but one sign for both the child
and the mother. This you said would almost certainly result in their
respective habit changes. I wrote:

GR. . . these will be very different habits: not touching flames in the
future for the child; not leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the
future for the mother. Again, this stark difference in habit-change
strongly suggests to me two different signs, not one.


Earlier you were questioning if what were happening in the child was
semiosis at all (JAS: is this really an example of Sign-action at all? )
But more recently you've been arguing that it is a degenerate Sign. Now
you've written "that what happens within the child is Sign-action, not
dyadic action/reaction;" but are you saying that only if the child cried
something like "Maman!" and not "Aie!" (which, again, I find tinged with
something *not* natural but influenced by the language she speaks, viz.,
French)? Am I wrong to assume that in any case that you agree that the
child's Sign (genuine or degenerate) and the mother's Sign are two, not one?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 10:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> In your original presentation of this thought experiment, the child was a
> toddler and did not scream "Maman" or any other recognizable word, but
> simply "Aie!"  As such, I took it to be an involuntary reflex, such as any
> of us likely would exclaim when surprised by pain, although as an
> English-speaker I would presumably be more inclined to say something like
> "Ouch!" or perhaps another four-letter expression.  Frankly, I find it
> implausible that the first thing to come out of someone's mouth--especially
> such a young one--upon touching a hot burner would be "Maman."
>
> Be that as it may, further contemplation of this example already led me to
> settle on new tentative answers to my own questions, and I discovered your
> reply upon coming online to post them.  Your points below are well-taken,
> especially once again correctly diagnosing my affinity for the abstract
> over the concrete, a fault that I am unlikely ever to escape completely.
>
> I now agree that what happens within the child is Sign-action, not dyadic
> action/reaction, even if I retain the assumption--which you understandably
> find dubious--that the steps from finger contact to vocal chord vibration
> constitute a series of *dynamical *causes and effects.  The reason is
> because of the potential (and perhaps probable) Habit-change that I
> posited--the girl is capable of learning by experience, and hence acquiring
> the new habit of *not *touching stove burners as the Final Interpretant
> of this particular Sign.  My new hypothesis is that *any *action
> involving a Mind (or Quasi-mind) as *either *utterer *or *interpreter is
> irreducibly semiosic.
>
> I also agree that if the child screams "Maman" it is a *genuine *Sign for
> the mother, as any word *must *be.  That would make the girl its utterer,
> since she would be *intentionally *producing it.  However, if the scream
> is something truly *involuntary*, like I take "Aie!" to be, I am still
> inclined to view it as a natural/degenerate Sign.  My other new hypothesis
> is that *only *a Sign that has Minds (or Quasi-minds) as *both *its
> utterer *and *its interpreter--which may be two temporally sequential
> versions of the *same *Mind (or Quasi-mind)--is *genuine*, the kind that
> exists in Replicas.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
>> questions about the girl's scream.
>>
>> For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic Interpretant
>> produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by a series of
>> dyadic causes?
>> ​. . .
>> when the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do
>> we distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?
>>
>>
>> ​You say it is "an involuntary reflex," while I don't see it as merely
>> that. In my view the dynamic interpretant *is* produced by triadic
>> semiosis, that is to say that this is an example of somethi

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You wrote:

I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
questions about the girl's scream.

For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic Interpretant
produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by a series of
dyadic causes?
​. . .
when the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do we
distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?


​You say it is "an involuntary reflex," while I don't see it as merely
that. In my view the dynamic interpretant *is* produced by triadic
semiosis, that is to say that this is an example of something which is more
than an involuntary reflect. I'll try to explain my position.

Say the child screams "Maman!" I don't see how you can abstract her very
human cry (which *may* 'mean', at least in part, "Maman" *whatever* she may
scream), how can you reduce her cry which, as I've just suggested, may
include a deep relationship to her mother (including the very word,
"Maman"), to mere dyadic causes. It seems to me that you have overly
abstracted the whole situation, left out, for prime example, the humanity
(the deep relations to other humans, notably, her mother) involved in the
child's semiosis. I personally have no problem distinguishing her semiosis
from brute reaction. That you seem to suggests to me, again, your
self-acknowledged tendency to look at such things more abstractly than I,
for example, do.

So, in short, it seems to me that you maybe be over-analyzing in an
extremely abstract manner what is *vitally* involved in such an occurrence, *as
if the IO-R-DI had no local, in this case human, residence*. In particular
I find the child's Representamen and especially her Interpretant not to be,
at least not *predominantly*, a 2ns. I think that in a way you've
abstracted the 'life' out of this (albeit, hypothetical) semiosic
situation.

2. For the mother, is it [the scream GR] a Replica (Token) of a genuine
Sign (Type), or a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
.
​ . .​
how do we distinguish a Replica from a natural/degenerate Sinsign?


Whether the child screams "Maman" or "Aie" or whatever, I see the mother
responding--at least principally--to the Replica of a genuine Sign, while
all the intense feeling conveyed in the non-verbal aspects of the Sign (the
harsh, jagged intensity of her cry, "Maman," signaling that something
terribly awful or painful has happened to the child) are present as well,
but especially directed toward her mother. So, is 2ns involved in her
response? Most certainly, as such extreme semiosis is highly complex. But
it is mixed with genuine semiosis in my view.

To abstract "all that" from the semiosic experience of the mother, should
you suggest (as I think you are suggesting) that the child's scream is
*merely* a "natural/degenerate Sinsign" makes me once again think that
perhaps you are enthralled--at least in this hypothetical case--by semiotic
abstraction, especially abstract terminology, and in doing so have
disconnected your analysis from not only "the life of the sign," but from
life more generally--from semiosis as it is lived in all its complexity.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
> questions about the girl's scream.
>
>1. For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic
>Interpretant produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by
>a series of dyadic causes?
>2. For the mother, is it a Replica (Token) of a genuine Sign (Type),
>or a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
>
> Obviously I am also seeking explanations for any answers offered.  For #1, 
> when
> the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do we
> distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?  For #2, how
> do we distinguish a Replica from a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:35 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:
>>
>> JAS: Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels
>> highly conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive)
>> criticism.
>>
>> I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
>> to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly
>> conjectural" that I just can't enough sense of it to 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list

You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:

JAS: Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.

I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly
conjectural" that I just can't enough sense of it to offer a helpful
critique of it. It feels to me almost like a kind of literary exegesis,
rich but somewhat fantastic. You propose several extraordinary interpretive
claims and suggestions (for example, that the child's scream may not be
sign-action at all) which seem, well, strained.

So, I'm going to leave it to others to offer constructive criticism.
Meanwhile, I'll stand by my previous analyses.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
> response.  Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
> mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign.  Upon
> reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of
> the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP
> 2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am
> misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than
> one* Sign.
>
> In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
> "primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a *degenerate 
> *Sign--an
> instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such
> that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns).  As such, I get the sense that
> many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of
> the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves
> from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
> conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*.  Why
> should we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a
> particular neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather
> than as merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects?
> If she effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of
> Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise regarding the flight of a
> bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have some vague notions of possible
> answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear
> explanation.
>
> For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any kind of 
> *deterministic
> *response.  Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts,"
> she rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore
> the child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From
> her standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the
> scream, even if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed
> where we must "look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential
> ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not
> convinced that it is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an
> utterer, the Dynamic Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the
> utterer (as the saying goes) *has in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in
> this case, perhaps the *pain *that the girl is sensing.  The Immediate
> Object is then the combination of attributes of *this particular scream*
> that the mother's Collateral Experience leads her to associate with
> previous *screams of pain or distress* that she has heard, both from this
> child and from others, which likely differentiates them somehow from *other
> kinds* of childish screams.
>
> This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the mother,
> the girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously 
> *cannot
> *be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign
> is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*.  Hence the
> context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual 
> *semiosis--necessarily
> involving Replicas--is quite evident here.
>
> Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
> conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
> In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject it rig

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:

JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?

I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.

The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again,
as I see it the Dynamic Object for the mother is the child, while those
several characters which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her
immediate object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a
different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their
having *entirely
different* Dynamic Objects.


Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems closer
to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream in the DO.
For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a character) from the
flaming burners led to the child's pain (a character) that grounded her
semiosis, it was the child as DO whose scream (a character for her mother)
grounded her mother's semiosis.

Jon continued:

JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection between the
hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because
the one would not have happened without the other.

Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite regress
going as far back as the child's conception, and probably much further back
than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc, propter hoc version of that
regress. What you point to ("the one would not have happened without the
other") seems to me more like physical than semiotic determination.

JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic Object for
the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the very same Sign?

I do not *at al*l see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are two
signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by the DI of
the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still *two distinct signs*(at
least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least partial agreement.

So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why I think
our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the interpretant
standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign
itself does"  doesn't apply to both signs, but to the child's sign and* not
*to the mother's (as you've been analyzing the semioses).

The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as I see
it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like which will
in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis, additional signs,
etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here. This is not to suggest that
the habits of the mother and the daughter will not lead to perhaps
life-changing habit change. But you yourself have noted that these will be
very different habits: not touching flames in the future for the child; not
leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again,
this stark difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different
signs, not one.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> List:
>
> In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
> to try combining multiple replies into one post.
>
> Gary R.:
>
> 1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
> capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
> much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.
>
> 2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged
> previously, I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these
> kinds of practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In
> this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the child's
> semiosis"

Self-control and self-criticism, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

This post began as my (hopefully) final note on the theme of reducing the
frequency of posts to the forum.

"To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves." Virginia Woolf


This was the sum total of Gary Fuhrman's blog entry for today.
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/02/of-course/

Of course each person has to decide what kinds of and how much self-control
she wants to develop in any particular context and for her life more
generally.

Woolf's words reminded me of Peirce's comment on the development of
"thoroughly deliberate" conduct.

“If conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of
feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of
self—criticism and of hetero— criticism” (CP 1.574, 1906),


So, interestingly, according to Peirce this ideal of conduct is the result
of *both* self- and other-criticism. Any thoughts on why Peirce included
the idea of "hetero-criticism" in the development of this ideal of conduct?
My own thought at the moment is that this comment prepares for his famously
non-standard definition of esthetics as "the theory of the deliberate
formation of such habits of feeling: (CP 1.574). Putting this in the
context of the normative sciences, in the 1903 Harvard Lectures Peirce had
written:

Supposing, however, that normative science divides into esthetics, ethics,
and logic, then it is easily perceived, from my standpoint, that this
division is governed by the three categories. For Normative Science in
general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends,
esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of
feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those
things whose end is to represent something.


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Kirsti, list,
>
> Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
> to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
> even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
> irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week
> *plus* additional copies.
>
> What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
> sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.
>
> Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
> the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
> myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
> a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
> in that message.
>
> In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
> ". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
> requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary (writing as list moderator)
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
>> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
>> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>>
>> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull,
>> so hopeless.
>>
>> Best, Kirsti
>>
>>
>>
>> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>>
>>
>> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>>
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>>> for archiving or reply.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>>
>>>> Delet

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.


Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in
his ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that
extent intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly
triadic action of semiosis" *requires* a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of
degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.


I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not
that of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign
determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's
Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural
signal and the external scream are *Indices *of the hot burner; at least,
that is how I see it at the moment.


I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the
Sign's DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother
as grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate
Object for *her, *the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in
the cry of her child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object
of the mother's Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the
interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as
the Sign itself does" applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the
child.


3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.


Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.


It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may
be using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it
*would* connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially
eager to hear what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural sig

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, list,

For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
*only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
*without *a DO.


My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).

John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for a,
shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down
the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely>*

As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
termed "physiosemiosis" not only
"played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent
of life" but has played one since and does so today, and not only in the
formation of crystals. But, again, in my view, once the crystal is formed
the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it continues to have a relation to its
environment, and there will be atomic and sub-atomic activity necessarily
occurring, but I personally have yet to be convinced that such activity
constitutes a form of semiosis, while some physicists have argued that it
does).

Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
(esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of Biosemiotics
holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in relation to
its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex semiosic
activity. I would tend to strongly agree.


2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.


While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, I
do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
child herself.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."


As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
"Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
includes more ordinary cases as well.

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.


​At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there seems
to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form seems to
me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of related
elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the elements
themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many if not
all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking about Signs as individual "things"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week *plus*
additional copies.

What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.

Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
in that message.

In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."

Best,

Gary (writing as list moderator)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:

> List,
>
> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>
> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, so
> hopeless.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
>
>
> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>
>
> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>> for archiving or reply.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>
>>> Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are
>>> occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about
>>> meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both unPeircean
>>> (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not particularly
>>> well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings or cognizant of
>>> the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many philosophers.
>>>
>>> I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice to
>>> Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the consequences of
>>> his epistemology for modern linguistics (which has been deeply Cartesian in
>>> the main for decades). So when more experienced Peirce scholars discuss his
>>> terms, it can be educational.
>>>
>>> I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before
>>> responding and perhaps responding once a day instead of several times
>>> would/could lead to better responses of more benefit to others.
>>>
>>> To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there is
>>> nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and then delete
>>> them if I am going to. Time-consuming.
>>>
>>> At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep
>>> shooting out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us will
>>> be more likely to read them if they come less frequently. If these are just
>>> personal quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to be on the list. If
>>> they are felt worthy for the entire list, frequency reduction would be
>>> useful. But if not, I won’t say another word on the subject.
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

John Sowa wrote: "Since the beginning of February, there have been over 200
emails
on Peirce-L."

Thanks, John, for seconding my idea that it might be important--and even
valuable--for very active participants in the forum to make an attempt to
reduce the frequency of their postings.

I would hope that John's observing that there have "over 200 emails" on the
list in February--and we haven't yet reached the middle of the
month!--ought suggest to all that there may have been of late an all too
rapid exchange of messages to Peirce-l from a very few participants. And I
can't imagine that I am the only reader of these many posts who has noticed
that there has been quite a bit of, shall we say, redundancy of content of
some (many?) posts.

I hope that I've made it clear that I do not want in any way to inhibit
participation on the list. But there ought to be a way in which frequent
contributors to our forum might find their way to practicing some
additional self-discipline as to frequency of posting.

Again, as I first wrote:

GR: I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
*consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they are
but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
contributors) .


In short, such self-discipline could possibly benefit all of us:
participants and lurkers.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 11:06 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

> On 2/10/2018 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> I have recently received a few complaints and two requests to
>> be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
>> unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as
>> list moderator that naturally concerns me.
>>
>
> Since the beginning of February, there have been over 200 emails
> on Peirce-L.  I've been tied up with other work and have only
> had a chance to sample a few snowflakes in this storm.
>
> Fortunately, I direct all Peirce-L notes to a special folder,
> where they can pile up undisturbed.  I don't want to block
> anybody's "way of inquiry", but I second Gary's concerns.
>
> John
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining differences in
viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet points:

   - The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
   within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.

While I agree that for any *given* Sign that this is correct in some
abstract way. But I am wondering if Edwina isn't suggesting that no single
Sign can be so isolated in the continuum of semiosis (a notion involved in
the concept of Quasi-sign). This is to say that the individual's semiosis
is not discontinuous with that of his environment where all manner of
semiosis is occurring.

And Peirce did offer the determination of semiosis as beginning in the DO,
making a simple diagram not unlike the one Edwina has been offering
(although he didn't include the brackets which, I think, are an essential
addition to the diagram; as I recall he uses only dashes).

Further, as I analyzed it in terms of the child burning her hand in the
fire, the child's DI becomes a sign for her mother. While I'm not sure
whether I agree with Edwina that *only* the II is within the sign, the DI
would seem to be *at least a bridge* to further semiosis, viz., that of her
mother, and much as the DO was to the child's semiosis. Again, isolating
the individual Sign seems problematic to me except in the most abstract of
analyses.

   - A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of Collateral
   Experience and Habits of Interpretation.

This use of Quasi-mind as that which "stores" knowledge is not yet
convincing to me. That is, it seems to me that the concept is perhaps being
overburdened in employing it in that way. An individual no doubt has her
Collateral Experience and Knowledge and Habits of Interpretation, but this
is "stored" in her memory (including sense memory) and externally (for
example, in notes she may make, etc.), and is no doubt continuous with
those signs in the Quasi-mind that involves all the signs she interprets
and uses.

But why burden the idea of Quasi-mind with "all that" memory mentioned
above? Yes for communication to occur a Quasi-mind is essential, and even
one's own thought process takes the form of a dialogue (a Quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter: "So I says to myself": Peirce notes the common
expression), but one can make too much of this I think. So I would like to
see a further discussion of Quasi-mind. Again, I don't see that Peirce
loads the concept with all that has been recently suggested. He writes:

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
CP 4.551

A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort
of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered
self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking
requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a
determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
determinable sign. 1906 Letter to Victoria Welby


   - Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
   4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
   2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
   and Entelechy with 3ns.

I agree with Jon that Peirce aligns Form with 1ns and that it might be
prudent to stick with his usage.

Any thoughts?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Our deeper differences are resurfacing, so we might want to stop here,
> before things get contentious again.  Briefly ...
>
>- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
>within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
>- A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of
>Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation.
>- Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
>4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
>2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
>and Entelechy with 3ns.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrot

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I've gotten several off-list responses to my post on frequency of posting
which messages move me to reiterate "please post as you see fit!" and to
add what I've written here several times in the past, namely, that the best
approach to dealing with posts that you're not interested in is to *just
delete them!*

Of course I would always encourage *more* participation on the list
including more participants. So, lurkers on the list, feel free to chime in
even if you don't want to get involved in an extended discussion. In this
forum "the more the merrier!" But initiate, join in, or leave a discussion
at will!

And thanks to those of you who occasionally (including today) write
off-list in support of my efforts in this sometimes challenging job of
acting as list moderator. It is I who should thank all of you for keeping
Peirce-L alive--both as active participants and observers--when so many
other philosophy and semiotics fora have floundered.

Best,

Gary R (writing, again, as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> List,
>
> It has always been the 'policy' here that there is no limit on frequency
> or length of posts to Peirce-L and I continue to believe that that's a good
> policy. Certainly the recent flurry of exchanges have been valuable in
> bringing about for some on the list a better understanding of several
> difficult semeiotic issues. One can only approve and applaud that.
>
> Still, I must note that I have recently received a few complaints and two
> requests to be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
> unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as list
> moderator that naturally concerns me.
>
> So, I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
> *consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they
> are but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
> messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
> such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
> reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
> contributors) .
>
> But, again, please post as you see fit!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

It has always been the 'policy' here that there is no limit on frequency or
length of posts to Peirce-L and I continue to believe that that's a good
policy. Certainly the recent flurry of exchanges have been valuable in
bringing about for some on the list a better understanding of several
difficult semeiotic issues. One can only approve and applaud that.

Still, I must note that I have recently received a few complaints and two
requests to be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as list
moderator that naturally concerns me.

So, I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
*consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they are
but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
contributors) .

But, again, please post as you see fit!

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

 vain.

ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one
(I'm still not entirely clear as to *exactly* how to characterize it--but
there *is* a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and
agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it,
perhaps, operates* within* one.

Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the
child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea
of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a
different Sign for her mother (in my view).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 10:06 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
> experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
> analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary,
> since semiosis is *continuous*.
>
> While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your
> model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my
> reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or
> uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes
> about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing
> this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both
> "Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when
> it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP
> 2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two
> Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into
> which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
>
> The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a
> "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that
> particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something
> in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the
> character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental
> effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its
> Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and
> "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed,
> representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
> sign, or *representamen*, of some kind, *outward or inward*, mediating
> between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
> added).  Furthermore ...
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)
>
>
> Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
> fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the *same *Representamen *whenever
> *it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a
> different *Sign *when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is
> different.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
>> involved. I understand the Sign as: DO-[IO-R-DI]...and often DI. That's the
>> basic format.
>>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,

I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as practical
(pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally. While, as
I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have been
concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the last
several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both on
the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will encourage
forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical.

But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial post,
Jeff. You concluded:

JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner
and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their
objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to
an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then to
a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal to
thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience of
inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being
explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of
these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
greater clarity can be achieved.


I'm interested in this matter of *outer-inner* from several standpoint
including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an expression he
introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to
Victoria Welby.

I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the Immediate
Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a continuing bone
of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f has already
given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather useful quote
of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the Lowell threads. I
think that quotation still needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in
addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:

Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . . make
Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term *immediate object* very
clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic
object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object, such as
recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).


The IO is that “part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic
object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object)." But, again, I
would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the *Ground*  of the
Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can imagine
that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself, known
through collateral observation.

But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."

So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not to
touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for herself. She
fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which point her mother,
hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts ice and then ointment on
her fingers.

I would suggest that *something* involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.) for
some here. What is the putative sign here?

Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her IO,
'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic signs)
forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign, that is, *her*
IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her Representamen?

Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an *external*
sign *for her mother* which is (or involves) a DO which, again,
'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc. What is the
Dynamic Object for her mother.

Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.

I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize the
Signs and semiosis involved in this example.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 6:41 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> List,
>
>
> Looking at Peirce's account of the distinction between what is internal
> and external--and how the distinction seems to apply in different areas of
> inquiry (e.g., math,, phenomenology, speculative grammar, critical logic,
> metaphysics, etc.)--might shed some light on these matters.
>
>
> Kant provides an account of the distinction between the inner and outer in
> the Amphiboly of th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

Mary, list,

I hope that your spouse feels much better soon.

Thanks for this illuminating post! I was drafting one myself, but will now
have to reconsider it in light of your questions. I add just one more
question for now to pair with your "Is it a translation?" What if the
person seeing that word doesn't read English?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Dan and Peircers,
>
> I agree with Dan’s proposal to consider “the practical/empirical
> consequences C.S. intended each definition to have.”  I’m not sure I can
> attempt that. The complications shown are interesting but above my pay
> grade. Instead I would like to offer what went through my mind when I first
> read
> vase
>
>
>- Is it an answer to a question,
>- Is it a request by someone pointing to a vase to deal with the/a
>situation occurring with reference to the vase,
>- Is it a word meant to be a word on a sheet of paper? and if so:
>
> is it a clue, a reminder, a label, part of your kid’s homework assignment?
>
>- Is the word meant to be interpreted as written or spoken, for
>example, part o f a sentence written down? Or is it voiced, in which case
>we need to ask about or consider various speech acts, and we can infer
>qualities about the speaker’s physical characteristics among other things
>- Is the word a mistake? Is it a word that was omitted from something?
>Is it part of a word such as vaseline?
>- Is a character in a novel by, let’s say James Joyce, thinking it. Is
>the character thinking it as a word in a disconnected passage, as in an
>epiphany, or is it a word in a disjointed stream of consciousness passage.
>Is the character aware of it, and/or aware of it as a matrial, Is it
>intended to be any or all of these possibilities? Does a reader of a novel
>see/hear or not see/hear the word in a novel. There are so many questions
>- Or, on another hand, is the word under erasure [note: I prefer not
>to discuss Derrida’s concept here]; is it also written but not marked, i.e.
>invisible
>- It is material, so of what material is it made? But if the word is
>not material but a concept is it general or specific?
>- Is it assumed there are no italics, bold…is the font significant,
>and the size? If it were to be true that the font and size were to make a
>possible difference is the word vase on my screen unique to me in my
>situation or not? Does a word vase on my computer have thisness or
>haecceity as a material object
>- If a poem is about a vase and uses the word in different contexts as
>a symbol, can I compare its use as a symbol in another poem by the same, or
>different, author?
>- What if vase is a made up of spaced letters in a square shape?
>- Should I assume that since it isn’t in quote or italics or
>underlined that it is a word that general
>- Is it possible to have a word without a speaker, creator,
>interpreter?
>- Is it translation
>- Is it part of a rhetorical device
>- These could be placed into Peircean definitions
>
> I kept thinking how the word can not be defined as fitting any Peircean
> definition stated or implied in the peirce-list email without a context and
> without a commitment as to its materiality, existence, and use.
>
> Of course my narrative is a construction. Once I saw the word, I thought
> unconsciously as if my thoughts were words I was writing down in a response
> to Peirce-l. Once my awareness of the above occurred I realized I could not
> answer the question.  Then I enjoyed the intellectual activity. I thought
> of the word used in the numerous ways Joyce uses words. I thought of
> various activities/studies I could conduct related to this. This was the
> beginning of amusement.
>
> I do not think that a definitive, singular meaning can be given to
> Peirce’s terms even in a dictionary, as is true of every word over time in
> different contexts. The Oxford English Dictionary thus gives chronological
> definitions with sentences from written Late Middle English to spoken
> English today.
>   ... I have to end here with apologies to take care of a sick spouse.
> Thanks for reading this far!
>
> Mary Libertin
>
>
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2018, at 1:10 PM, Everett, Daniel <dever...@bentley.edu> wrote:
>
> I am enjoying this exchange and learning a good deal from it. However, it
> seems to me that in a “true” Peircean spirit, one would propose not only
> chapter and verse for 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen

[Gary Richmond]

And I'd add that the interpretant of 'vase' doesn't have to be the lived
experience, it could be, say, a poetic one. The point being that considered
abstractly, or in some literary context, or in some lived experience, a
rheme *must* be considered "in regard to it's relation to its signified
interpretant."

Yoni Sav <https://hellopoetry.com/yoni-sav/> Apr 2014
Break the vase <https://hellopoetry.com/poem/651606/break-the-vase/>

I sealed myself inside a vase
to keep the world outside
to let me live my life
in happiness and peace
I cemented with my brain
this urn I built from all my pain
To keep my love form leaking out
I sealed in it my broken heart
but now I try to break the clay
show you myself as a whole
and as the pieces fall down
the pain shows back
and I'm afraid
that in the dust
I have lost your trust
when I needed it the most

Now the vase is gone
and I am left
alone

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 8:59 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> For Jon S's survey:
>
>
> vase
>
>
>
> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>
> 1. There is no semiotic context. I'd say that it is a mere example of a
> possible rheme and, as such, useful, perhaps, for some abstract analysis of
> one of the ten categories of signs, only a little less abstract than
> Peirce's "common noun" example.
>
> 2. Either way? I don't see this as necessarily a yes/no question. Again,
> what's the context? Explanation in 3.
>
> 3. Again, lacking a semiosic context there is no interpretant (except,
> perhaps, in some very abstract analysis; but, as it is, it is just an
> example of a rheme, a term, a common noun). When I offered my
> thought-experiment involving a vase there was a context, a living one,
> *my* semiosis experience of one vase in particular, so there was *that *unique
> dynamic object, *my* IO-R-I. See these definitions of rheme (*boldface*
> emphasis added by me):
> 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far
> as they are determined | EP 2:292 A *Rheme* is a Sign which, *for its
> Interpretant*, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is
> understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any
> rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as
> doing so (emphasis added).
>
> 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34 *In regard to its relation to its
> signified interpretant*, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an
> Argument. This corresponds to the old division Term, Proposition, &
> Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. [—] A rheme
> is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single word
> except ‘yes’ and ‘no’, which are almost peculiar to modern languages. [—] A
> rhe*me is defined as a sign which is represented in its signified
> interpretant as if it were a character or mark (or as being so).*
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 10:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> With your kind indulgence, I would like to try conducting a little
>> experiment/survey.  Before reading anyone else's replies to this post
>> (including my own), consider the following, and then answer a couple of
>> questions about it.
>>
>>
>> vase
>>
>>
>>
>> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
>> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
>> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>>
>> The point is not to start any arguments about our different analyses, but
>> simply to see what diversity of views we turn out to have.  With that in
>> mind, I also humbly request that we all refrain from commenting on each
>> other's responses here; instead, if you wish to engage in that kind of
>> discussion, please start another thread for it.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen

[Gary Richmond]

For Jon S's survey:


vase



1.  Is the above a Representamen?
2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?

1. There is no semiotic context. I'd say that it is a mere example of a
possible rheme and, as such, useful, perhaps, for some abstract analysis of
one of the ten categories of signs, only a little less abstract than
Peirce's "common noun" example.

2. Either way? I don't see this as necessarily a yes/no question. Again,
what's the context? Explanation in 3.

3. Again, lacking a semiosic context there is no interpretant (except,
perhaps, in some very abstract analysis; but, as it is, it is just an
example of a rheme, a term, a common noun). When I offered my
thought-experiment involving a vase there was a context, a living one, *my*
semiosis experience of one vase in particular, so there was *that *unique
dynamic object, *my* IO-R-I. See these definitions of rheme (*boldface*
emphasis added by me):
1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as
they are determined | EP 2:292 A *Rheme* is a Sign which, *for its
Interpretant*, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood
as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme,
perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing
so (emphasis added).

1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34 *In regard to its relation to its
signified interpretant*, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an
Argument. This corresponds to the old division Term, Proposition, &
Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. [—] A rheme
is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single word except
‘yes’ and ‘no’, which are almost peculiar to modern languages. [—] A rhe*me
is defined as a sign which is represented in its signified interpretant as
if it were a character or mark (or as being so).*

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 10:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> List:
>
> With your kind indulgence, I would like to try conducting a little
> experiment/survey.  Before reading anyone else's replies to this post
> (including my own), consider the following, and then answer a couple of
> questions about it.
>
>
> vase
>
>
>
> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>
> The point is not to start any arguments about our different analyses, but
> simply to see what diversity of views we turn out to have.  With that in
> mind, I also humbly request that we all refrain from commenting on each
> other's responses here; instead, if you wish to engage in that kind of
> discussion, please start another thread for it.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally,
because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in
different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading
Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as
well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that
extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2).
There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential
relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it
might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights.

I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that
some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the
terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have
found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me that
there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear
enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be
at all.

I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity,
while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain
key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very
different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in
interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the
effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways.
What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and
Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in
that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on
what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that
self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . .

I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon;
or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is,
I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of
the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both
you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different
ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic
nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear).

So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular
discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in
preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more
sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's
analyses, also very intriguing.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina:
>
> I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
> I fear that it is going to get contentious.  You keep pressing me on where
> to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
> whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly
> that--I do not have a firm opinion yet.  Nevertheless, I continue to find
> your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my
> understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen.
>
> On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns
> need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and
> Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective
> Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make
> abundantly clear.  Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form
> (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and
> entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?),  EP
> 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909).
>
> Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful
> discussion.  Enjoy the sponge cake! :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process.
>> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
>>
>> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of
>> the external stimuli.  I consider that this action of representation
>> belongs to the Interpretant.
>>
>> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the
>> 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."

I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external
sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that
external sign as immediate object.

Sorry about that!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jon S, list,
>
> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
> than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
> I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
> Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the
> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to
> look at it from 'within'.
>
> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
> former, mine the latter.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I
>> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
>>
>> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
>> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
>> that direction.
>>
>> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
>> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
>> point you are making about this.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
>>> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
>>> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
>>> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
>>> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>>>  me.
>>>
>>>
>>> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
>>> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
>>> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
>>> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
>>> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place
>>> within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the
>>> sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another
>>> analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this
>>> analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and
>>> clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird
>>> although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
>>> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
>>> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
>>> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
>>> more sense to me.
>>>
>>>
>>> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
>>> indexical sinsign* 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back!

Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be
helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read
my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful. I
think it might be easier to get a 'handle' on this question focusing on
human semiosis (anyhow, I'm finding the 'bird' example 'tricky').

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
> soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
> frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
> non-cognitive example.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation
>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in
>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer
>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis
>> added by me in all cases).
>>
>> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
>>
>> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
>> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
>>
>>
>> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
>>
>> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
>> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
>> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
>> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
>> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
>> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
>> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
>>
>>
>> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
>>
>> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
>> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
>> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
>> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
>> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
>> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
>> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
>> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
>> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
>> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
>> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
>> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
>> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
>> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
>> instant of the interval a new idea.
>>
>>
>> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
>>
>> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
>> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
>> of a sign.* [—]
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud
sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 me.


Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within
the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of which
it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). (Btw, I
think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to
consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the
analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can
take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).

Jon wrote:

How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in
a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the
*individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your previous
post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense
to me.


But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP

Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?

OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
potential value imo, at least for me.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>
> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
> more sense to me.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
>> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>>
>> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>>
>> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
>> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
>> system is the IO.
>>
>> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
>> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>>
>> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>>
>> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
>> stand alone.
>>
>> 
>>
>> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
>> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>>
>> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
>> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
>> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>>
>> ---
>> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in
>> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base,
>> both biological and learned, of that bird.
>>
>> --
>>  Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight
>> more differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>>
>> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
>> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
>&

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, list,

At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
by me in all cases).


1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*


1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign
which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing
itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other
forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate
present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of
past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*


1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands for
that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which
I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to
be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in everyday talk;
I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s
idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at
some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the
thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a
*like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the
interval a new idea.


1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6

…a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature of
a sign.* [—]


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>
> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>
> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react
> and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is
> the IO.
>
> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which
> is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>
> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>
> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
> stand alone.
>
> 
>
> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>
> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>
> ---
> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a
> mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both
> biological and learned, of that bird.
>
> --
>  Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
> differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>
> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis
> during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
> that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
> bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
> to me that each of these could be analyzed as a Representamen--even the
> bird'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

 seeing things, but
I hope so. On the other hand, in certain matters (e.g., "the sign of a
sign") I remain confused and uncertain. And for me the terminology remains
a morass which I due soon to leave to others to try to sort out.

Still, I think both you and I, Jon, always enter into a discussion such as
this with the, shall I say, good faith hope that we will better understand
each other and the subject of our discussion.

But now I really must stop writing! I've rescheduled my dental appointment
for this afternoon and have much to do in preparation for my operation
tomorrow!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I appreciate you taking another stab at this.  I think that you are
> exactly right about my bent toward abstract analysis being very different
> from your much more concrete, experiential approach.  Perhaps for that very
> reason, I am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediate Objects
> in your thought experiment.  Are we talking about ...
>
>- "vase" as a common noun, or "this vase" as a particular thing?
>- the vase itself as the Sign, or as the Dynamic Object of your
>thought-Signs about it?
>- the vase as (initially) unidentified object, or as (eventually)
>recognized to be a vase?
>
> I am unclear on exactly what Peirce meant by "subjective" in EP 2:410,
> especially since he himself put that word in quotation marks.  As for
> "locating" the Immediate Object, it has to be "within the Sign," but I
> agree that further reflection on what this means is warranted.  In my
> example, does that place it within the statue itself, or within the
> thought-Signs of an observer?  I emphasized the statue's "Qualisignic"
> aspects because Peirce explicitly classified it as a Descriptive Potisign
> (Qualisign), and I was trying to figure out why.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 6:09 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> Thanks for your good wishes regarding my cataract surgery. As I noted
>> earlier, I've pretty much run out of time before the Friday surgery and
>> wanted to respond not only to you and Gary f, which I was able to do a few
>> times recently, but I also wanted to respond to Jeff as I hadn't had that
>> opportunity until today. So that's why I haven't been able, until now, to
>> respond to your most recent post. I had to cancel a dental appt. today,
>> which gave me a little more unexpected time to comment.
>>
>> You wrote: "My main request was to identify the Signs that correspond to
>> the Immediate Objects that you posited.  My understanding of the triadic
>> nature of semiosis is such that something *cannot *be an Immediate
>> Object unless it serves as such *within *a particular Sign."
>> ​​
>>
>> To which I'd add that Peirce holds that both the immediate object and the
>> emotional interpretant are "*subjective*."
>>
>> "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
>> interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective";
>> both, too, appertain to all signs without exception." (EP 2:410; 1907)
>>
>>
>> JS: "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's
>> clue as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in
>> these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is
>> singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective).
>>
>> GR: Firstly, I see no reason to take "Bellucci's clue," and there is much
>> else I do not agree with in his interpretation. Secondly, you seem to leap
>> to a wholly abstract way of analyzing *my* semiosic experience so that
>> for you my 'vase' cannot be 'this vase' that I perceive and make an
>> immediate object in my inner semiosis. It may be the case that at the
>> moment of recognition of the vase *qua* vase that I unconsciously (via
>> memory) take it to be an example of that Collective (general) 'vase'despite
>> its bizarre shape, but it is *this* vase that is the dynamic object of my
>> subjective immediate object.
>>
>> JS: F

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

 not truly Universal, in the sense of implying a truth of
the kind of "Any S is P"; it only expresses "Some S is P." This makes it
*not *a //*Copulant/Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. This needs to
be borne in mind. (EP 2:486; 1908)


JS: The Dynamic Object of the statue is *general **[it is general because
it is "representing a common soldier," whereas my vase in the unfamiliar
room is a particular vase GR]* presumably the collection (or continuum?) of
soldiers who fell in the Civil War* [but my vase doesn't represent vases in
general, but is a unique example of one (and peculiar in its shape, etc. in
my example), recognized by me (through my memory, etc.) as a vase (and
that's the sum of the generality in it]*; so the Sign *[the statue, its DO
representing something common, and *not* a unique DO as in the case of my
vase]* is a Collective (he introduced this term later).  However, its
Immediate Object is *vague **[where, btw, do you *locate* this immediate
object? Subjectively in that someone is observing it? If not, where? ]*, so
the Sign is a Descriptive *[my immediate object is *not* vague, but is of
*this* unique and peculiar vase--which, btw, may turn out *not* to be a
vase at all, but a piece of sculpture]*; Peirce even said that it expresses
a *particular *proposition (not a *universal *one) *[and I maintain that my
vase expresses no proposition whatsoever, although you disagree]*,
consistent with Bellucci's hypothesis [this statue is *loaded* with
meaning; my vase is not].  But this entails that the statue, as a Sign,
*must *be a Qualisign [do you mean that it* involves* a Qualisign? It seems
to me that what is Qualisignific here would entail not one, but several
Qualisigns], and thus an Icon and a Rheme; as such, it *cannot *be a
proposition.  Yet obviously it is *embodied *as a Sinsign, as all
Qualisigns (and Legisigns) *must *be, and a Sinsign *can *be a Dicisign.
Does the statue, as an embodied Qualisign, turn out to be a Dicent Sinsign
of a peculiar kind?  If so, what are S and P in the particular proposition
that it expresses? *[I don't see at all why you are emphasizing what is
Qualisignic about it.]*

While it's kind of 'fun', I can't say that I find this kind of meta- on top
of meta-analysis, heavy with problematic terminology, very helpful.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Best wishes on your upcoming procedure.  I must admit to being
> disappointed not to receive more feedback from you on my last couple of
> posts, especially regarding my analysis of Peirce's statue example.
>
> "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's clue
> as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in
> these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is
> singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective).  Furthermore,
> I still maintain that when the Athenian says "Socrates" to himself, what he
> is *really *saying to himself is "that is Socrates"; i.e., he is making a
> perceptual judgment, either presenting (as hypothesis) or asserting (as
> fact) a proposition.  It seems to me that only the vague thought of
> (absent) Socrates as generated by the imagination could be a true Rheme.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:59 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Gary f, Jon S, list,
>>
>> Thanks for clarifying your position, Jeff. You wrote:
>>
>> JD: Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would
>> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the
>> immediate object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for
>> the simple reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical
>> analysis of symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses
>> and conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for
>> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear
>> to their objects and interpretants.
>>
>>
>> I agree and have already commented on CP. 4.583 in this thread.
>>
>> Jeff also wrote:
>>
>> JD: . . .my initial impression after reading Bellucci's claims about the
>> immediate object in his essays was--"that can't be right." It is a view
>> that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

iday and have much to do before hand, and will be visually challenged for
a few days after, I've decided to drop out of this thread. Perhaps I am
currently less interested in the first two branches of logic, while it is
surely possible that my semeiotic terminology--for principal recent
example, in my recent thought experiments--could use some fine tuning (some
here might think, "To say the least!") so no doubt I'll get back to formal
grammar and critic. But I think that it's time for me to return to my
current principal interests, viz., phenomenology, pragmaticism, and
classification of sciences. In February I hope to introduce a topic in
pragmatism that I've been drafting a message regarding for a while now.
(I'll be reading responses to this post--if any--but this will be my last
message for about a week at least.)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello,
>
>
> Just to be clear about my own views, my initial impression after reading
> Bellucci's claims about the immediate object in his essays was--"that can't
> be right." It is a view that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting
> the classification of signs based on the manner of presentation of the
> immediate object.
>
>
> Having said that, my own views are vague and confused in a number of
> respects. As such, I look to interpretations that are different from my
> own--especially by those who are engaged actively in the research and have
> given the matter considerable thought--as a source of challenge and
> possible light.
>
>
> Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would
> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the immediate
> object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for the simple
> reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical analysis of
> symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses and
> conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for
> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear
> to their objects and interpretants.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, January 29, 2018 3:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
> Lecture 3.14)
>
> Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list,
>
> Gf: "I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate
> object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that
> statement *means*."
>
> I'm not exactly sure what your meaning could be here. It seems that
> earlier you *were* arguing (and Jeff seemed to agree) that only
> propositions have immediate objects. If you are now "not challenging the
> statement that 'every sign has an immediate object'," then why would the
> "context," as you strongly suggest, make a significant difference except by
> in some way limiting the meaning of 'Sign' in some formal logical
> abstraction of the idea of 'Sign'?
>
> This, or something like it, seems to be the case as I reflect on the
> quotations you just gave and commented on.
>
> Quotation/commentary #1:
>
>
> [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of
> propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition
> can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of
> concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported by
> the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of
> signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no
> logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a
> proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents
> of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906]
>
> This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” *because
> it is a constituent of a proposition.*
>
>
> As I read this quotation, it is not that "every sign has an immediate
> object” *because it is a constituent of a proposition*," but that "no
> sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to which concepts
> belong — can arise except in a proposition" as these are employed in
> existential graphs. That is all that Peirce seems to be claiming.