. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-16, 11:45:19
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 9/16/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Leibniz was not a solipsist, since he took it for
granted that the world out
On 9/17/2012 9:21 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Forgive me if I bring up Leibniz again, but to my mind he gives
the most thorough descriptions as to how the world works.
And so logical that you can figure out many things
on your own.
Dear Roger,
I too have found Leibniz'
have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-15, 13:29:01
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 9/15/2012 9:12 AM, Roger
...@verizon.net
9/16/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-15, 13:29:01
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends
On 9/16/2012 8:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
The other minds problem (How do I know that there are other minds ?)
is indeed an impossible to crack nut if you are a solipsist. So
solipsim is perhaps the only philiosophy impossible to
disprove. Or prove, I think.
Leibniz was not a
Hi Stephan,
I would like to quibble about your statement:
For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to
compute the relations .
in terms of the OMEGA Point (OP).
Both in MWI and SWI, God (or whatever mechanism) is able to compute the OP.
But I suspect that the computation is not
On 9/16/2012 12:35 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Hi Stephan,
I would like to quibble about your statement:
For God, all things are given but once and there is no need to
compute the relations .
in terms of the OMEGA Point (OP).
Hi Richard,
A good friend of mine (who I was just talking to a
.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-14, 13:29:27
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 9/14/2012 11:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King
On 9/15/2012 9:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
And then there is Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, identity
there meaning that you only need one of them, throw the rest away.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net
9/15/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no
On 30 Aug 2012, at 04:40, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one
On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel
On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
Godel numberings are not unique.
True, there are a infinite number of ways you could do Godel numbering.
Thus there is no a single abslute structure of relations, there is an
infinity
And you can use any one of
On 9/14/2012 11:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 7:55 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Godel numberings are not unique.
True, there are a infinite number of ways you could do Godel numbering.
Hi John,
Yes, but my
On 14 Sep 2012, at 16:00, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/14/2012 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 20:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
!= or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.
Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute
structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.
2) the physical
On 12 Sep 2012, at 15:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
On 12 Sep 2012, at 21:48, benjayk wrote:
Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and
On 13 Sep 2012, at 12:40, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
!= or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.
Sure, and if I interpret the
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single
abslute structure of relations, there is an
On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several
things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of
relations, there is an infinity
On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single
On 9/13/2012 1:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi benjayk,
This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He
does not see several things that are problematic.
1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my
Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus
On 12 Sep 2012, at 14:05, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that,
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion.
We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.
We are not
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in
On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the
On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:19, benjayk wrote:
You always refer to studying some paper,
Always the same.
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.
Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory
represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P.
But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers. The just
contain 123456789 + * and =. There is no notion of veryifying or
On 05 Sep 2012, at 20:28, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what
On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live,
I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a
On 04 Sep 2012, at 22:40, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize
that
the RA level was enough.
Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that
On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
don't
see how it makes
On 03 Sep 2012, at 16:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,
context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why
On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p
point
of view where this isn't true. This
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that
the RA level was enough.
Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that
the RA
level would be enough.
Why?
No
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.
Terren
On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my
Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible
persons?...e.g. materialism.
Bren
On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
On 30 Aug 2012, at 06:21, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all
the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in
arithmetic.
This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all
On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Brent,
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our
computer monitors.
Seems pretty precise to me. The UD executes
Hi Brent, I didn't wrote what is quoted, it's Stephen ;)
Quentin
2012/8/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Brent,
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation
by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated
On 8/29/2012 2:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net
On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they
On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Brent,
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.
Seems
On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Brent,
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase generation by the UD
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of
It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.
Terren
Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
at any stage short the infinite
On 8/29/2012 10:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Brent,
Until there is a precise explanation of what this phrase
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a
Hi Terry,
I think so too. I wonder if this could be captured by assuming the
opposite of Cantor continuum hypothesis? Or by thinking of computations
as integers embedded in hyperreal numbers.
On 8/29/2012 12:04 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's
But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities. Of course that
also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still
remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states
instantiating you.
Brent
On
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been
On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can
What you are all missing is this:
A particular kind of pattern (in sand or salt) can be generated by
generating a specific sound (cymatics).
The same pattern would be generated whether or not any human ear was
present to hear the 'sound' as an audible experience.
The same pattern could be
On 8/27/2012 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal
On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound
in arithmetic.
This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all
copies are identical and this by the principle of
On 26 Aug 2012, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough
to replicate any
On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,
context
and
ambiguity
On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk
On Sun, Aug 26, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears
A brain is nothing but a glob of grey goo says the robot.
There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock.
Yes there is, the clock sauce is the
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.
None of them are the reasons of a clock.
Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs at
the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a
On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to
replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness
are not required).
And now a subtle
On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from
comp before this can be used as an argument here.
On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:30, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/24/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute
On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and
roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long
as infinities or true randomness
On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
On Sunday, August 26, 2012 11:12:35 AM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.
None of them are the reasons of a clock.
Certainly it’s the reasons of a
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 5:04 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.
That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do.
It is an
On 23 Aug 2012, at 19:08, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:49 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:
'You won't be able to determine the truth of this statement by
programming a computer'
If true then you won't be able to determine the truth of this
statement
On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:
I don't know either, nobody knows, even the computer doesn't know if
it will stop until it finds itself stopping;
If a computer stops, it will never know that. If it executes a
stopping program, then it can.
To stop has no first person
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.
But here you do a
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.
That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
through a (quite accurate)
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from
comp before this can be used as an argument here.
Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general
relativity and the
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world
of inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is
already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine.
I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main
points:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
But let's say we mean except for memory and unlimited accuracy.
This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY
computers.
Is this
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2012 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so
by your
own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.
That's QM+collapse, but
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
We might do things because the laws of arithmetic.
If so then we in particular and everything in general is as deterministic
as a cuckoo clock because when you add 2 numbers together you always get
the same answer. I might
On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
I did it for many reasons
And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.
None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must
Point, Set, Match: Craig Weinberg!
On 8/25/2012 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
I did it for many reasons
And a cuckoo clock operates the way
On 8/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws
of nature, and if we do not then we are random.
We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the
ontology. You are assuming
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-23, 16:53:10
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012? Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The laws of nature are such that they demand that we do things intentionally.
This means
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 11:11 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
So what is your definition of computer, and what is your
evidence/reasoning
that you yourself are not contained in that definition?
There is no
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or
nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you want
into
this
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can be
described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it seems
all laws are necessarily incomplete.
It is just dogma of
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can
be
described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it
seems
all laws are
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.
But here you do a confusion level as I think
On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so by
your
own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.
That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined, and many
incompatible theories are proposed for it,
On Thursday, August 23, 2012 4:53:10 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:
The laws of nature are such that they demand that we do things
intentionally. This means neither random nor completely determined
externally.
I
On 23 Aug 2012, at 16:52, Jason Resch wrote:
The holographic principle places a finite bound on the amount of
physical information that there can be in a fixed volume. This
implies there is a finite number of possible brain states and
infinite precision cannot be a requirement for the
On 23 Aug 2012, at 18:11, benjayk wrote:
Or how can you determine whether to program a particular program or
not? To
do this computationally you would need another program, but how do you
determine if this is the correct one?
You don't.
In theoretical inductive inference theory (Putnam,
On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Honestly I do not find the Gödel theorem a limitation for computers.
Indeed, as Judson Webb showed the anti-mechanism argument based on
Gödel is double edged, when made precise enough it becomes a tool
making possible to the machine to
On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be
used as an argument here.
Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the
Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it
On 24 Aug 2012, at 00:28, Jason Resch wrote:
That reminded me of this:
I, Kerry Wendell Thornley, KSC, JFK Assassin, Bull Goose of Limbo,
Recreational Director of the Wilhelm Reich Athletic Club, Assistant
Philosopher, President of the Universal Successionist Association
(USA),
1 - 100 of 153 matches
Mail list logo
