Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
future.
That's the whole
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict
Tom Caylor wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If you died today and just by accident a possible next
moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
the
future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in
1Z wrote:
...
And
surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally
1Z wrote:
Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
are not, it must be rejected.
I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad -
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
consciousness.
But the
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
...
We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
Peter Jones writes:
I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
virtual
reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for
the sake
of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
experience do not
Bruno Marchal writes:
Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute
all computable functions from N to N.
It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does
not invoke physical machine at all.
In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
mathematical
structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
1 second ago)
+
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
mathematical
structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the
linear accelerator)? Is not the
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
mathematical
structures
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the
linear
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 21:00, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a
mathematical reality,
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the accuracies needed for the
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
David and 1Z:
How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
successively approach the
Peter Jones writes:
The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
It could be a contingent natural law that certain
Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements.
So where
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that
on the one hand: a belief in 'primary'
Bruno Marchal wrote:
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements.
Lest we go yet another round in the
David Nyman wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better arithmetical realism I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of OR statements.
Lest we go yet
Hi Stathis,
I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
successfully.
(Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
successfully.
(Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic.
You need a UD -- a UD which exists.
In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely
Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating
Le 21-oct.-06, à 02:12, David Nyman a écrit :
Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in
fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the
data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the
data'. And my point is also that a model
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
and highly significant.
It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner
1Z wrote:
Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
and highly significant.
It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
A conflict between
1Z wrote:
Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone
1Z wrote:
1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
propose as the
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing
Brent Meeker wrote:
Suppose that theory X predicts there are some things we'll never figure out.
And there are some things we haven't figured out. That's at best extremely
weak support for theory X.
I would agree were that the case. But surely the potential power of
comp qua Theory X is
David Nyman wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it
corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general
relativity, and every other theory.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism
Le 19-oct.-06, à 13:58, 1Z a écrit :
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
EVERYTHING?
Touché!
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
And if the materialist
Le 19-oct.-06, à 01:14, 1Z a écrit :
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe
to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it
to non-existstent numbers.
Obviously. But there is no existent physical universe, if comp
Le 19-oct.-06, à 22:57, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Is the UD process
a) UD generating all programs
then
b) UD executes all of them
No. The UD is one program, it cannot generate all programs and *then*
begin to run them.
That would be like condemning a thief to perpetuity and then to
Le 20-oct.-06, à 06:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating
Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:27, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno: In computer science, a
fixed universal machine plays the role of a coordinate system in
geometry. That's all. With Church Thesis, we don't even have to name
the particular universal machine, it could be a universal cellular
automaton (like the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-oct.-06, à 13:58, 1Z a écrit :
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
EVERYTHING?
Touché!
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-oct.-06, à 01:14, 1Z a écrit :
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe
to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it
to non-existstent numbers.
Obviously. But there is no existent
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:27, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno: In computer science, a
fixed universal machine plays the role of a coordinate system in
geometry. That's all. With Church Thesis, we don't even have to name
the particular universal machine, it could be a universal
Colin Hales wrote:
Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
Hume suggested that the best place for books on
Colin Hales wrote:
It's one of my favourite lines from Hume! but the issue does not
live
quite so clearly into the 21st century. We now have words and much
neuroscience pinning down subjective experience to the operation of
small
groups of cells and hence, likely, single cells. It's
Brent Meeker wrote:
So you want an explanation in terms of the underlying physics - the physics
of the really real reality. And how will you know when you've found it?
It seems to me that comp precisely asserts (and can putatively prove)
such a 'really real reality' from which observable
David Nyman wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
So you want an explanation in terms of the underlying physics - the physics
of the really real reality. And how will you know when you've found it?
It seems to me that comp precisely asserts (and can putatively prove)
such a 'really real
Brent Meeker wrote:
But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it
corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general
relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially.
Given that no actual
Peter Jones writes:
I have no problem with the idea that algorithms can be identified
with abstract structures consisting of relations. (As opposed, for
instance,
to Stathis's identification of algorithms with inteprretations by
virtual interpreters).
We don't have a problem until we come
David Nyman wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
only way tojudge whether it is a good model to see how it
corresponds with mere appearance; just like we test QM, general
relativity, and every other theory. It
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
EVERYTHING?
Touché!
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
And if the materialist isn't reifying the observables, he's
Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:41, David Nyman a écrit :
Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive
computations (like the UD), not theorems. In terms of comp, is there
any necessary distinction between a UD and a parallel distributed
'architecture'?
I am not sure what the EC
David Nyman:
Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive
computations (like the UD), not theorems. In terms of comp, is there any
necessary distinction between a UD and a parallel distributed
'architecture'?
I am not sure what the EC axioms are. The UD is both
Peter Jones writes:
Yes, of course. All such discourse is metaphysics, what else could it
be? It is a question of faith if we wish to go beyond this
acknowledgement and ascribe 'ultimate reality' in the direction of our
metaphysical gestures.
When I say metaphysical, I don't mean
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially.
Given that no actual
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The D is for
dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially.
Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
Hume suggested that the best place for books on metaphysics was
in the fire,
Colin Hales wrote:
Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
Hume suggested that the best place for books on metaphysics was
in
It's one of my favourite lines from Hume! but the issue does not
live
quite so clearly into the 21st century. We now have words and much
neuroscience pinning down subjective experience to the operation of
small
groups of cells and hence, likely, single cells. It's entirely
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi,
I have come back from Bergen (it was very nice) and I have read the
last posts and I will make some comments in order.
Peter D. Jones said some time ago, after I said that I will identify
(digital) machines with number; he said:
You can't.
Of course I can.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you prefer I should
have said associate instead of identifying.
Hi Bruno, welcome back.
The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe
it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but
when you say 'identify' I think it steers
David Nyman wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you prefer I should
have said associate instead of identifying.
Hi Bruno, welcome back.
The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe
it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but
when you say
Le 13-avr.-06, à 15:37, 1Z a écrit :
Your version of comp seems to be that an abstract algorithm In Plato's
heaven can implement a mind, even though it isn't a process occurring
over a span of time. Admitedly you seem to get there via the idea
that minds can be transferred into processes
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
properties as well
as physical properties.
Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you
Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
properties as well
as physical properties.
Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is
still
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, à 19:18, 1Z a écrit :
All right but sometime map are continuously or computationally
embedded
in the territory, and so there is a fixed point where the point of the
map coincide with the point of the territory: typically yhe indexical
where
Le 04-avr.-06, à 19:31, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, à 19:18, 1Z a écrit :
...
If you believe in absolute QM (or just assume absolute QM I eman QM
without wave collapse) then, obviously, observers are subject to the
SWE, and are multiplied or
Le 01-avr.-06, à 19:18, 1Z a écrit :
All right but sometime map are continuously or computationally
embedded
in the territory, and so there is a fixed point where the point of the
map coincide with the point of the territory: typically yhe indexical
where you are, both with respect to
Hi John,
So: WHAT can be conscious?
A person. Or a soul. Or someone ...
... *relatively* incarnated in a body or in numbers or machines if we
accept the comp hyp.
I would say,
Best
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi John,
So: WHAT can be conscious?
A person. Or a soul. Or someone ...
... *relatively* incarnated in a body or in numbers
or machines if we
accept the comp hyp.
I would say,
Best
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, à 19:18, 1Z a écrit :
...
If you believe in absolute QM (or just assume absolute QM I eman QM
without wave collapse) then, obviously, observers are subject to the
SWE, and are multiplied or differentiated continuously.
It may be so, but not
Georges Quénot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
[...]
The question of whether there could be other type of objects
than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could
mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am
afraid I cannot easily transmit
--- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
Two centuries ago, people weren't able to figure
out *how* complex living beings could have emerged
from simple
and inert matter and they thought too that this
was impossible
and that they had to choose another default
explanation.
Two
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
[...]
The question of whether there could be other type of objects
than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could
mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am
afraid I cannot
Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And read perhaps the literature on the mind body problem: all
materialist approaches has failed, and then the result I got explains
what it should be so.
I have my own analysis of the problem: the words map and territory
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And read perhaps the literature on the mind body problem: all
materialist approaches has failed, and then the result I got explains
what it should be so.
I have my own analysis of the problem:
--- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And read perhaps the literature on the mind
body problem: all
materialist approaches has failed, and then the
result I got explains
what it should
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 01-avr.-06, ࠰0:46, 1Z a 飲it :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
And read perhaps the literature on the mind
body problem: all
materialist approaches has failed, and then the
result I got explains
what it should be so.
I have my own analysis of
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
[...]
The question of whether there could be other type of objects
than mathematical is a different one. I can figure what could
mathematical objects and that they can exist (though I am
afraid I cannot easily transmit that feeling). It is harder
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence.
Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and physical) ?
For various historical
Le 31-mars-06, à 11:13, Georges Quenot a écrit (to Peter D Jones)
Physical MWI is more constrained than mathematical
multiverse theories, so there is not so much Harry-Potterness.
This is just an opinion. It must refer to prejudices about
what physical MWI and mathematical multiverse
Le 30-mars-06, à 20:22, 1Z a écrit :
I think
that having a richer ontology automatically makes it easier
to solve metaphysical problems, since you can say that X , Y or Z
is intrinsic to the universe and therefore not to be explained away
as something else
This is so true that with such
Georges Quenot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
peterdjones wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
mathematical existence and physical existence.
Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 30-mars-06, à 20:22, 1Z a écrit :
I think
that having a richer ontology automatically makes it easier
to solve metaphysical problems, since you can say that X , Y or Z
is intrinsic to the universe and therefore not to be explained away
as something else
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