Re: Digital Neurology
Sounds (vaguely) similar to Fred Pohl's A Plague of Pythons. On 24 February 2014 20:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/23/2014 10:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 24 February 2014 16:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/23/2014 9:26 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 24 February 2014 11:45, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:27, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: John Searle in one of his papers proposes that if our brain were being gradually replaced we would find ourselves losing qualia while declaring that everything was normal, and being unable to make any protest to the contrary. Replaced with what though? I assume he must stipulate non-biological components that supposedly replicate brain function, although I would guess that the idea of a substitution level hasn't occurred to him explicitly. That said, the idea seems preposterous on its face. Replacement with computer chips, which he agrees is at least theoretically possible. This would imply that we think with something other than our brain, a soul equivalent, and that in certain situations the brain and this soul equivalent can become decoupled. Yes it would seem to imply that. I'd never realised that Searle would infer anything like that on the basis of his so-called biological naturalism. Mind you, since he is at least implicitly a materialist, I never had much of a clue what he meant in appealing to some unspecified non-functional causal power of the brain to produce consciousness. AFAIK he never elaborated this beyond a brute stipulation that this is how the brain can bypass his no-semantics-from-syntax prohibition (something like the brain produces consciousness like the liver produces bile). I found the quote, from Searle, J. 1992 The Rediscovery of Mind (Cambridge, Mass : The MIT Press, Bradford Books): As the silicon is progressively implanted into your dwindling brain, you find that the area of your conscious experience is shrinking, but that this shows no effect on your external behavior. You find, to your total amazement, that you are indeed losing control of your external behavior. You find, for example, that when the doctors test your vision, you hear them say, We are holding up a red object in front of you; please tell us what you see. You want to cry out, I can't see anything. I'm going totally blind. But you hear your voice saying in a way that is completely out of your control, I see a red object in front of me. Greg Egan wrote a short story The Jewel on this theme. At maturity, before one's brain starts to deteriorate, everyone has their brain replaces by a jewel that encodes and functionally replaces their brain but which will not deteriorate with age. Of course, in the story, the subject discovers he is conscious but has no control over his body and he here's himself telling people that he is conscious just as before and there's been no change. So really the story idea is that the original consciousness loses control of the body but continues to perceive and to think a narrative life story which it remembers. Since everyone who has the operation to install a jewel reports that it works perfectly, everyone continues to volunteer for the replacement. Brent That's possible if the jewel is an adjunct rather than a replacement, for otherwise what is doing the thinking if the original brain is gone? ?? Per the story, the jewel takes over all function, but the brain remains - just along for the ride as it were. But no one reports this. It's like an unzombie - a being that acts perfectly normally, but has an extra (? it's not clear in the story whether the jewel is conscious) consciousness in the sense of an internal narrative. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: How would an Earth-Earth system evolve, different than the Earth-Moon
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:35:33 AM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:39:50 PM UTC, Liz R wrote: They would pull further away, I believe. Tidal drag slows the rotation of the bodies (for example by pulling the ocean out into an ovoid in this case) and conservation of angular momentum requires that their orbits widen as a result. Yo Liz (and Gabriel/Brent) Many thanks for that. It's what I thought given that's the situation with Earth/Moon,. But then I kept thinking about the bulking crusts and oceans as shortening the distance bnetween them By the way, Stating a personal position I think the collision that left the Earth-Moon system behind is fundamental in the history that we got, that worked out so good for the prospects of the luscious green curly kind of life. ' The idea is well out there, so it'll unlikely be the first you've heard. Which means you might have a view of your own. I should be interested to hear. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:45:36 AM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:27, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: John Searle in one of his papers proposes that if our brain were being gradually replaced we would find ourselves losing qualia while declaring that everything was normal, and being unable to make any protest to the contrary. Replaced with what though? I assume he must stipulate non-biological components that supposedly replicate brain function, although I would guess that the idea of a substitution level hasn't occurred to him explicitly. That said, the idea seems preposterous on its face. This would imply that we think with something other than our brain, a soul equivalent, and that in certain situations the brain and this soul equivalent can become decoupled. Yes it would seem to imply that. I'd never realised that Searle would infer anything like that on the basis of his so-called biological naturalism. Mind you, since he is at least implicitly a materialist, I never had much of a clue what he meant in appealing to some unspecified non-functional causal power of the brain to produce consciousness. AFAIK he never elaborated this beyond a brute stipulation that this is how the brain can bypass his no-semantics-from-syntax prohibition (something like the brain produces consciousness like the liver produces bile). David Yo David, You said somewhere you had a thought for how consciousness might be. I'm into that one at the moment so I'd be interested to hear anything you have to say. Assuming it's not secret squirrel - which if it is mazel tov geezer you go for it -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good culturally-empirical mind -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Jesse, Let me make sure I understand what you are saying. You say we can drop an arbitrary coordinate system onto spacetime, and then we can place an originally synchronized clock at every grid intersection. Is that correct? And that those clocks read what is called the coordinate times of those grid intersections, and this gives us in some sense a measure of the actual time coordinate of that spatial coordinate? One clarification before I agree. The clocks on this grid that are in gravitational fields will be running slower than the clocks that are not? And we can compare the clocks across the grid to determine which are running slower and which faster? Is that correctly part of the model? If so I agree. It's my understanding of relativity theory, and my theory starts by accepting every part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. So is my understanding correct, and do we both agree to the same thing here? Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:05:04 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sun, Feb 23, 2014 at 11:57 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, To address your question. I'll start with your terminology. Your ABC doesn't follow and I'll show why it doesn't. Same space and time coordinates? In which coordinate system? In general these will be different in different coordinate systems, and as you yourself have pointed out choice of coordinate system is arbitrary in relativity. So if twins A and B happen to have the same clock time coordinates at the same point in space they could well be at that point in space in entirely different p-times OR they could be there at the same P-time. That depends on their relativistic history and choice of coordinate systems. Let me clarify. Take a point Px,y,z in space. One twin could pass through that point at earth time 1989 when his proper clock (actual age) was 30, and then ten years later in 1999 the other twin could pass through that point P when his proper clock (actual age) was 30. In this case they would NOT be at the same point in p-time even though 10 years apart they DID have the exact same space and time coordinates. You are repeating a confusion which I have already corrected several times in the past. In relativity, the time coordinate of an event is defined ONLY in terms of a set of coordinate clocks which are affixed to particular position coordinates, like the clocks attached to different markings on a lattice of rigid rulers that are used to define coordinate time in inertial reference frames, as illustrated here (please take the time to click the link and at least glance at the illustration): http://www.upscale.utoronto.ca/GeneralInterest/Harrison/SpecRel/SpecRel.html#Exploring If the clocks of your twins aren't coordinate clocks--as implied by the fact that they are said to pass through a given set of spatial coordinates, rather than being permanently attached to them--then those readings ARE NOT TIME COORDINATES in whatever coordinate system you are using to define position coordinates. They are PROPER TIMES for the twins (specifically the proper time between their birth and any other moment on their worldline, if they represent ages), which are DIFFERENT from coordinate times. Of course we could program our coordinate clocks in such a way that the coordinate clock at x,y,z, also showed a reading of 30 years as one of the twins was passing next to it, but in this case it would NOT show a reading of 30 years when the other twin was passing next to it, so the event of that other twin's clock reading 30 would NOT be assigned a coordinate time of 30 in this coordinate system. And the coordinate clock time need not agree with either twin's proper time--for example, the coordinate clocks could just be designed to show the current date (in Greenwich mean time, say), in which case the event of the first twin having a PROPER time of 30 would have a COORDINATE time of 1989, and the event of the second twin having a PROPER time of 30 would have a COORDINATE time of 1999. Do you disagree that in relativity the coordinate time of any event in a given coordinate system is defined in terms of local reading on the COORDINATE CLOCK for that system that was right next to the event when it happened, and that it may differ from the time shown on a clock which isn't a coordinate clock for that coordinate system? Yes or no? Do you disagree that GIVEN such a definition of coordinate time, then two events which have the same coordinate position and coordinate time in a single coordinate system will necessarily have the same coordinate position and coordinate time as one another in all other coordinate systems, and they will also have happened at the same point in spacetime according to the
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Thursday, February 20, 2014 6:56:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. Are you saying I got that wrong? No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. It's not religion part I'm objecting to, but how you used it in context of what the other guy - Nyman I think - had just said to you. He was asking you a question that certainly I would like to know the answer of too. That is, you have consistently fielded points of order from sceptical individuals by telling them they are assuming not-comp. Which is a serious charge, because if they are guilty of that, they are debating your ideas in bad blood, because you make it clear that's the key assumption walking in. Understood, you rarely or never disallow that assuming not-comp was innocent of all that - instead just unrealized logical implication for some messy bits in thinkin. But David, if it was him, asked a really useful question both ways, that answered carefully and thoughtfully can serve either to reveal or refute the implied conjecture that comp needs some housekeeping maybe, is partial still maybe, and maybe that's a way to say no to the doctor while very strongly leaning to something of the fundamental going on in computer workings It needs answering. What it got on this occasion was some line about logical decrees that comp is perfect by necessity, immediately then degraded to religious belief, or apparently so. It's that way you used it that I'm taking exception to, silencing an unanswered question that sits at the heart of quite a few people's thinking here, or so it has seemed to me. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. It isn't. In the end it boils down to which way you go on a single question. Was something profound and unique taking place in the new ways that came to be known as science? Or was and is, science nothihng more than another extension - downward - of philosophy? Now, that's the sort of thing I would consider wheeling out religion for an answer. It isn't resolved and so in large part it's about what your intuition - so to others your faith - says. Invoking religion the way you did, says you see science nothing special FWIW I go the other way. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. The above two lines are candidates for the kind of trippy vocabularly - that I don't mind - but which don't have a useful place in science, or didn't used to. I mean, I'm all for gratuitously throwing out metaphor. I'm guilty of that. But is that what you are doing? Or are you confusing metaphor for real events in reasoning in t heir final most simplified form? intis that what you are claiming? I'm not sure. Maybe everyone else is. In which case it'll be firing squad at dawn for me, instead of you. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequence I believe you are sincere when you say this, which is a lot, on a regular basis. But I question whether it makes things clearer or murkier? You don't talk about anything else. You won't talk to other
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:59:44 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: This seems vaguely akin to the discovery that most of the mass-energy of a proton is the binding energy holding it together. If we found that the mass of the quarks was also in fact binding energy we might end up with something that was actually made of massless particles plus the energy holding them together (or perhaps of nothing at all holding itself together...) That's consistent with the mass-energy of the nucleus too, isn't it? Now instead of binding, call it framing, and consider framing to be a staging of opportunities for perception within some range of sensory participation/appreciation. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:42 AM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 6:56:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. Are you saying I got that wrong? No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. It's not religion part I'm objecting to, but how you used it in context of what the other guy - Nyman I think - had just said to you. He was asking you a question that certainly I would like to know the answer of too. That is, you have consistently fielded points of order from sceptical individuals by telling them they are assuming not-comp. Which is a serious charge, because if they are guilty of that, they are debating your ideas in bad blood, because you make it clear that's the key assumption walking in. Understood, you rarely or never disallow that assuming not-comp was innocent of all that - instead just unrealized logical implication for some messy bits in thinkin. But David, if it was him, asked a really useful question both ways, that answered carefully and thoughtfully can serve either to reveal or refute the implied conjecture that comp needs some housekeeping maybe, is partial still maybe, and maybe that's a way to say no to the doctor while very strongly leaning to something of the fundamental going on in computer workings It needs answering. What it got on this occasion was some line about logical decrees that comp is perfect by necessity, immediately then degraded to religious belief, or apparently so. It's that way you used it that I'm taking exception to, silencing an unanswered question that sits at the heart of quite a few people's thinking here, or so it has seemed to me. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. It isn't. In the end it boils down to which way you go on a single question. Was something profound and unique taking place in the new ways that came to be known as science? Or was and is, science nothihng more than another extension - downward - of philosophy? Now, that's the sort of thing I would consider wheeling out religion for an answer. It isn't resolved and so in large part it's about what your intuition - so to others your faith - says. Invoking religion the way you did, says you see science nothing special FWIW I go the other way. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. The above two lines are candidates for the kind of trippy vocabularly - that I don't mind - but which don't have a useful place in science, or didn't used to. I mean, I'm all for gratuitously throwing out metaphor. I'm guilty of that. But is that what you are doing? Or are you confusing metaphor for real events in reasoning in t heir final most simplified form? intis that what you are claiming? I'm not sure. Maybe everyone else is. In which case it'll be firing squad at dawn for me, instead of you. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequence I believe you are sincere when you say this, which is a lot, on a regular basis. But I question whether it makes things clearer or murkier? You don't talk about anything else. You won't talk to other
Re: Digital Neurology
On 24 February 2014 11:27, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: Yo David, You said somewhere you had a thought for how consciousness might be. I'm into that one at the moment so I'd be interested to hear anything you have to say. Assuming it's not secret squirrel - which if it is mazel tov geezer you go for it Sorry, you're going to have to help me out here. What statements of mine are you referring to? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is literally encountered? On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from my book on Reality: All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative motion are what they are. Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it appears the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though it is actually relative motion. This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as vibrating strings. But in my theory the vibration itself is not the particle and there is no need for extra dimensions. In my theory, the vibration takes place in ordinary 3D space and represents only the mass of the particle. Only in 3D space is it interconvertible to other 3D relative motions. [In my theory particles themselves are composed of their particle properties (not vibrating strings), one of which is mass-energy, but that's another part of the theory I won't get into in this post.] So in this theory the conversion of mass to energy is quite simple. It's just the conversion of the equivalent amount of vibrational motion into either the relative linear motion of kinetic energy and/or the relative wave motion of EM energy. This theory neatly conceptually unifies all forms of mass and energy, and the conversion of one form to another as simply the conversion of one form of relative motion to an equivalent amount of another. All other forms of energy neatly conform to this explanation including what we call potential energy which is really just an accounting trick. What we call potential energy is actually just some form of blocking (or impinging) energy from a system external to the system under consideration. To just analyze the system itself, we imagine a potential energy IN the system equivalent to the actual blocking energy outside the system. It just makes things easier to analyze. So potential energy is not a real form of energy, not a real relative motion, but an accounting trick to confine analysis to an isolated system when systems are not actually energetically isolated from their environments. Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
Craig, PS: but there do seem to be a lot of 1p perspective fanatics which amounts to pretty much the same thing. Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is literally encountered? On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from my book on Reality: All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative motion are what they are. Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it appears the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though it is actually relative motion. This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as vibrating strings. But in my theory the vibration itself is not the particle and there is no need for extra dimensions. In my theory, the vibration takes place in ordinary 3D space and represents only the mass of the particle. Only in 3D space is it interconvertible to other 3D relative motions. [In my theory particles themselves are composed of their particle properties (not vibrating strings), one of which is mass-energy, but that's another part of the theory I won't get into in this post.] So in this theory the conversion of mass to energy is quite simple. It's just the conversion of the equivalent amount of vibrational motion into either the relative linear motion of kinetic energy and/or the relative wave motion of EM energy. This theory neatly conceptually unifies all forms of mass and energy, and the conversion of one form to another as simply the conversion of one form of relative motion to an equivalent amount of another. All other forms of energy neatly conform to this explanation including what we call potential energy which is really just an accounting trick. What we call potential energy is actually just some form of blocking (or impinging) energy from a system external to the system under consideration. To just analyze the system itself, we imagine a potential energy IN the system equivalent to the actual blocking energy outside the system. It just makes things easier to analyze. So potential energy is not a real form of energy, not a real relative motion, but an accounting trick to confine analysis to an isolated system when systems are not actually energetically isolated from their environments. Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
Liz, Good points! Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:59:44 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: This seems vaguely akin to the discovery that most of the mass-energy of a proton is the binding energy holding it together. If we found that the mass of the quarks was also in fact binding energy we might end up with something that was actually made of massless particles plus the energy holding them together (or perhaps of nothing at all holding itself together...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:05:17 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 11:27, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Yo David, You said somewhere you had a thought for how consciousness might be. I'm into that one at the moment so I'd be interested to hear anything you have to say. Assuming it's not secret squirrel - which if it is mazel tov geezer you go for it Sorry, you're going to have to help me out here. What statements of mine are you referring to? David Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you had said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got you mixed up. Sorry about that. Or maybe you didn't make sense of what I said? if so please say. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 03:38, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if we turn them inside out. My contention is that CTM already rehabilitates and redeems its mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level of functional substitutability. That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive levels of sensitivity. This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption *at the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not to *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately justified level of explanation. Then it is not a theory of mind, it is a theory of mental elaboration - which I am not opposed to, as long as mental elaboration is not conflated with additional capacities of sensation. We can, for instance, look through a camera which will transduce infra-red radiation to a visible color (usually phosphor green or black-body-like spectrum). CTM could be used, IMO, to develop this kind of transduced extension of sense, but it cannot be used to provide additional visual sense (like being able to actually see infra-red as a color). Regardless of how intelligent the behavior of the program seems, the actual depth of consciousness will never increase beyond the specifications of the technology used to implement it. Since you yourself brought the example of Galileo to mind, I think it fair to point out that your examples above are faintly reminiscent of the position of the Catholic hierarchy that as a natural philosopher he was
Re: Digital Neurology
On 24 February 2014 13:13, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you had said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got you mixed up. Sorry about that. But I've no idea what you are suggesting I had said. Could you give me the gist of it? Dvaid -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Stathis, 1. This disproves what it sets out to prove. It assumes a RUNNING computer which assumes a flowing time. This example can't be taken seriously. If anything it's a proof that time has to flow to give the appearance of time flowing, which is the correct understanding... 2. I assume in this context you don't mean 'multiverse' but 'many worlds' and that your use of 'multiverse' was a typo? If so I have some questions I like to ask to clarify how you understand MWI, particularly in the block universe context you previously mentioned. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:06:49 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 24 February 2014 07:57, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript: wrote: Stathis, If we assume time flows, as everyone in the universe other than block time devotees do, the answers to all your questions are obvious. First of all my universe is NOT a presentist universe. Don't use misleading incorrect labels to describe it. If time flows, as it clearly does, then all movement follows automatically. The flow of time is a fundamental assumption in my theory. Doesn't matter if it flows continuously or in minute increments. The way my theory says it actually flows is in minute processor cycles in which the current state of the universe is continually recomputed. This also corresponds to the continual extension of the radial dimension of a hyperspherical universe. The current present moment is simply the current surface of that hypersphere, and the current processor cycle of p-time. It is not the SAME present moment all the time because the present moment is just the current moment of p-time. It does continually move along the radial p-time axis of the universe. That's how the past continually transitions to the present as the universe continually recomputes its current state. This is a simple elegant theory that is consistent with all of science, and reflects the basic idea of science that time flows from the big bang to the present moment of time. Everyone believes this with very few exceptions, and everyone WITHOUT exception lives according to it. Even block universe believers live their entire lives as if time flows because that is the only way they can possibly function. That's overwhelming evidence that time does flow. Now, how does that work in a block universe? You didn't answer my questions, you just asked the same questions back to me and I gave you the answers. So now what are your answers please? It can be shown that motion and the appearance of the flow of time can survive a discontinuity. Imagine there is computer simulation with an observer watching a moving object, such as ball thrown across his field of vision. The computer goes through machine states M1,M2,M3,M4 corresponding (roughly) with subjective states in the observer S1,S2,S3,S4. Now suppose at M2 the data is saved to disk, the program stopped and the computer shut down. After a period, the computer is rebooted, the program restarted and the saved data loaded. The computer then goes through M3 and M4. Do you agree that the observer cannot tell if the computer was shut down, or how long it was shut down for? Do you agree that he has the same uninterrupted visual experience S1,S2,S3,S4 of the ball flying through the air? And another question. What is the basic reason you think we need a block universe? What does it explain that the normal view of time flowing from the big bang to the present doesn't explain? The block universe theory explains nothing that the ordinary scientific view of the universe doesn't explain better and just adds all sorts of complications and convoluted explanations. So why come up with it in the first place? I find the idea of a multiverse elegant and simple, and despite what you say I think it is consistent with observation. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Stathis, You've of course hit on the crux in your explanation, though perhaps unknowingly so. You state The me, yesterday is not me, now Yes, I agree completely. You, yourself have just stated the selection mechanism is the 'NOW' which you mention. It is the now that you are in that selects which version of Stathis you are on the basis of what time it is in that now. The Stathis that corresponds to that time is the Stathis that you are right now at that time. That is what I've been telling you, that you are the Stathis version of yourself that you are because that is the only one that exists in this NOW in which you exist. That in itself demonstrates there is a now, a present moment, which selects the actual version of yourself that you are at this particular time. And if there is a particular now, then time MUST flow... You, yourself demonstrate my point... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:18:17 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 24 February 2014 08:09, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript: wrote: Stathis, This is just Sophistry that avoids the real question. Everyone of the Stathis instantiations may well feel it is the real one, but why is the one you are right now the one I am talking to? It could be anyone of them? Right? So why is it the one you think you are right now? The only logical answer is because it is the one that coincides with the present moment in which we are talking. Right? But the only way that can be true is if there is a real present moment that selects the current Stathis. There is no logical way around that. There absolutely has to be a selection mechanism that selects which Stathis you experience yourself as, and that can only be the one in the current present moment. Ten minutes ago you were that Stathis. Now you are this Stathis. Why the change in which one you are? The only possible mechanism is a current present moment, and that conclusively falsifies the block universe theory. There is simply no logical way around this... Why are you not the Stathis you were 10 minutes ago? Answer is because it is NOT 10 minutes ago now. It is now now, and that now is what selects the Stathis you are now It's not sophistry. I maintain that the reason I feel myself to be me, now, and not one of the other versions of me who may exist elsewhere in the multiverse is trivially obvious, in the same way as it is trivially obvious why I don't feel myself to be any of the other billions of people in the world. The inhabitants of China are not me, now even though they look a bit like me, now and their mental states are a bit like mine, now. The me, yesterday is not me, now even though he looks a bit like me, now and his mental state is a bit like mine, now. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good culturally-empirical mind -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to the very weak (logically) version of it. Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the organ of consciousness' and that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp assumes only a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as we want, and works for a general notion of brains, which can any portion of the physical universe we would have to copy to have the consciousness invariance. Comp can have a level so low that we might need the copy of the whole universe, at the level of strings described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example (and that is usually not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM). So, if you want COMP - CTM. I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. Bruno Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre- mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:17:02 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 03:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if we turn them inside out. My contention is that CTM already rehabilitates and redeems its mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level of functional substitutability. That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive levels of sensitivity. This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption *at the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not to *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately justified level of explanation. Then it is not a theory of mind, it is a theory of mental elaboration - which I am not opposed to, as long as mental elaboration is not conflated with additional capacities of sensation. We can, for instance, look through a camera which will transduce infra-red radiation to a visible color (usually phosphor green or black-body-like spectrum). CTM could be used, IMO, to develop this kind of transduced extension of sense, but it cannot be used to provide additional visual sense (like being able to actually see infra-red as a color). Regardless of how intelligent the behavior of the program seems, the actual depth of consciousness will never increase beyond the specifications of the technology used to implement it. Since you yourself brought the example of Galileo to
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Thanks Bruno... As an advocate of a computational reality, I certainly believe that part of that universe (subsets) is computational minds, though I suspect we'd disagree about most of the rest Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:53:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to the very weak (logically) version of it. Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the organ of consciousness' and that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp assumes only a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as we want, and works for a general notion of brains, which can any portion of the physical universe we would have to copy to have the consciousness invariance. Comp can have a level so low that we might need the copy of the whole universe, at the level of strings described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example (and that is usually not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM). So, if you want COMP - CTM. I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. Bruno Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre- mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: Your questions above are answered in computer science. I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the notion of UD, and still ask how numbers can encounter something. Then a notion like encounter seems to assume many vague things. But then you say it is just sense. I don't see a theory. 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. ? 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special terms. I will believe that you have a theory, when what you predict is invariant for the terming used. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- subordinate. We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense, and humans are known to fight on this since day one. You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you going to just talk with yourself. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. That is quite imprecise. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Craig, All this discussion about replacing selves or brains is entirely a matter of definition, and thus pretty much a meaningless discussion. It is clear that if we could replace in EVERY last detail, that the new self would be an exact duplicate of the old self with the exact same mental state and would not notice any difference. This is because there is no aspect of soul, consciousness, ghost in the machine, elan vital, or anything that has to be added to a neurobiological body to get it to function and experience the way it does. The neurobiological body itself is the whole self. But it is equally clear that it is NOT possible to actually do such a complete replacement, though certainly partial replacements are possible as e.g. in the New Topic I posted about one monkey brain wired to another monkey's spinal cord to control it, which apparently no one read. So again, I find the whole discussion just a matter of definition, and not very relevant to the nature of reality. Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:38:40 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if we turn them inside out. My contention is that CTM already rehabilitates and redeems its mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level of functional substitutability. That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive levels of sensitivity. This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption *at the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself. Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a more formal narrative of observation. In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is literally encountered? On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from my book on Reality: All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative motion are what they are. Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it appears the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though it is actually relative motion. This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as vibrating strings. But in my theory the vibration itself is not the particle and there is no need for extra dimensions. In my theory, the vibration takes place in ordinary 3D space and represents only the mass of the particle. Only in 3D space is it interconvertible to other 3D relative motions. [In my theory particles themselves are composed of their particle properties (not vibrating strings), one of which is mass-energy, but that's another part of the theory I won't get into in this post.] So in this theory the conversion of mass to energy is quite simple. It's just the conversion of the equivalent amount of vibrational motion into either the relative linear motion of kinetic energy and/or the relative wave motion of EM energy. This theory neatly conceptually unifies all forms of mass and energy, and the conversion of one form to another as simply the conversion of one form of relative motion to an equivalent amount of another. All other forms of energy neatly conform to this explanation including what we call potential energy which is really just an accounting trick. What we call potential energy is actually just some form of blocking (or impinging) energy from a system external to the system under consideration. To just analyze the system
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior attachment to a sensory-motive approach. In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at once. And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to test at least some of this conjecture in yes doctor mode, by direct interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI doll to become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:19:09 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:13, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you had said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got you mixed up. Sorry about that. But I've no idea what you are suggesting I had said. Could you give me the gist of it? Dvaid Sure -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:15:53 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:19:09 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:13, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Well, so long as you understood the sort of thing I was suggesting you had said, I think you'd probably know if you had said it, so I guess I got you mixed up. Sorry about that. But I've no idea what you are suggesting I had said. Could you give me the gist of it? Dvaid that last one got sent by accident Sure . I was only browsing mind you which is why I may have it wrong, and why I can't remember where it was. I thought I saw you make what looked like a signing off remark at the end of a discussion, which I thought had been about consciousness. I I think you said something like I may have stumble [an explanation],,, I thought the object was consciousness, and I thought the context was material, as in what kind biological structure might something like consciousness be brought into existence. Appreciated that's an awful lot of I thought in play there -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On 24 February 2014 14:22, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: I think you said something like I may have stumble [an explanation],,, Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists), directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital substitution that, notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:04, chris peck wrote:
Hi Liz
Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be
sent to, and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send
you to A or B with equal probability based on some quantum coin
flip. But by accident it duplicates you, and sends you to both.
This effectively conflates the comp and MWI versions IMHO, so you
can't easily disentangle them in this thought experiment.
An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a
determined result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to
uncertainty from 1p.
OK.
Thats the big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision.
You get 1p uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty.
That's the interest. And it is what you say above, so I don't follow
you here.
By introducing a 'quantum coin flip' you're loading the dice towards
uncertainty.
Well, not with Everett MWI. You get 3p certainty (the Shroedinger wave
evolves deterministically) and from it Everett explains the 1p
uncertainty, in a manner similar to the comp FPI.
So I can't really say you shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.
The equivalence comes from the fact that Everett explains the
quantum indeterminacy by a form of first person (that he called
subjective) mechanist indeterminacy interpreting superposition as
actual relative multiplication/duplication, or differentiation.
This restores all what Einstein likes in physics: 3p determinacy and
3p locality.
Then my point is that if we take that move seriously, without
reification of neither mind nor matter, we have to push that move on a
part of the arithmetical reality /truth.
Then I have done this, and we get indeed an intuitionist logic/
mathematics for the mind, and a quantum logic/mathematics for matter.
To be short.
I explain a bit of modal logic with the goal of showing how that
happens, and has to happen, in case computationalism is true.
This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible
futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course,
the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always
seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one
outcome.
Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there
is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering
what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability
he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on
what identity criterion gets imposed.
It depends only on the difference between 1p and 3p, and the identity-
theory based on personal memory and of course personality feature,
which is the one defined by the acceptance of the artificial digital
brain.
All the rest follows, and indeed, we could use simple proving machine,
with quite elementary induction and inductive inference ability, to
formalize this easily. This is done eventually in the translation of
UDA in arithmetic, which I am currently explaining.
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with
again.
The uncertainty is invariant for all the identity theories as far as
they are consistent with the idea of surviving with a digital body or
brain, or generalized brain.
But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just
recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome,
... one outcome that they were unable to predict. Only those having
written W v M win, all the others prediction failed.
You don't need to know who you are, in the 1p sense, to be able to
open a door and distinguish Washington from Moscow, and write the
result in a diary.
I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability
assignments would be asymmetric
I can be OK. If W and M represents the place where my 3p body will be
reconstituted, then with the step 3 protocol, we already know that
P(W M) = 1.
Now we are polite and attribute two different, and incompatible, 1p
experience to each of the copies, so if W and M represent place where
I will survive, then again P('W M) = 1. That is the 3-1 view : the
experiencer will be conscious in Washington and he will be conscious
in Moscow.
All this is already known from comp. And in step 3, we ask a different
question, which is what do you expect to live from the 1p view (which
is equal to the 1-1-1-1-1-... view) when pushing on the button.
So, if W and M represent the result of the outcome of pushing the
button, opening the door, and writing in the diary the outcome, then
we already know, assuming comp of course, that in no situation can the
guy open the door and see both cities at once, so that P(W M) = 0.
Similarly, P(W) ≠1, P(M) ≠1, and P(W v M) = 1.
from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he
doesn't manage that.
What is wrong with above?
Bruno
All the
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome. Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the just might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p p), an observer ([]p p), and a feeler ([]p p p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all observer moment. The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby, which can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors. Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical internal point of view. The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher probability of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each continuation is individually certain in a different underlying sense. This is just to say that subjective uncertainty (or the expectation of probabilistic outcomes) is a function of incomplete knowledge at any given point in the sequence. OK. I know that Bruno quarrels with Hoyle's idea as being superfluous to, or possibly even incompatible with, comp I think about it. I try to make sense of it. That might have sense, but then it remains to look at it in arithmetic. I mean the relations between a person and the universal person in her is complex, and the splitting between []p and []p p is part of it. but personally I still find it a neat heuristic for pumping one's intuition on the indeterminacy of first-personal expectations. OK. It is just that I expect platonism to be counter-intuitive and so intuition pump must be handled with care. But you know that. I just try to understand the point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
Craig, It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views reality, rather than fundamental reality itself. For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself. Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a more formal narrative of observation. In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is literally encountered? On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from my book on Reality: All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative motion are what they are. Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it appears the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though it is actually relative motion. This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as vibrating strings. But in my theory the vibration itself is not the particle and there is no need for extra dimensions. In my theory, the vibration takes place in ordinary 3D space and represents only the mass of the particle. Only in 3D space is it interconvertible to other 3D relative motions. [In my theory particles themselves are composed of their particle properties (not vibrating strings), one of which is mass-energy, but that's another part of the theory I won't get into in this post.] So in this theory the conversion of mass to energy is quite simple. It's just the conversion of the equivalent amount of vibrational motion
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to become a living person. I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion? Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water, and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers, lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the synthetic projection on the wall. Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water? Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can only be an image. Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the container of dimensionality itself. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:23:39 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 14:22, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I think you said something like I may have stumble [an explanation],,, Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then. David It possibly was you but you were talking about what you refer to again here: To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me ..,. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself. To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior attachment to a sensory-motive approach. I don't think that you had a sensory-motive approach, I think you probably had an idealist-theoretic approach...the idea of experience as a pseudo-substance rather than ordinary sense/sense-making. In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at once. We can if the explanation is felt directly rather than symbolized and communicated. And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to test at least some of this conjecture in yes doctor mode, by direct interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? Nothing is persuasive until someone is transplanted into a synthetic brain and returns to tell the tale. We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI doll to become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No? As long as there is enough of us left to live and participate as a person, we can compensate to some extent for the shortfall of a prosthetic limb. We triangulate the gap and our perception can fill-in to a surprising degree. Only if our entire brain is amputated and replaced successfully will we know what it is like to
Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: *This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as though I only experienced one outcome.* Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that. Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the class of all possible observer moments. Well, the just might be not that easy to define. If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than being me or you. But how would you remember that? I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states. I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal (self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p p), an observer ([]p p), and a feeler ([]p p p)). But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will select among all observer moment. Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can give some relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point is that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering of the moments themselves. Essentially he is saying that the panoptic bird view is somehow preserved at the frog level, at the price of breaking the simultaneity of the momentary views. The hypostatic universal person is more like a universal baby, which can split in a much larger spectrum of future 1p histories, but from its first person perspective it is like it has still to go through the histories to get the right relative statistics on his most probable universal neighbors. Won't this still be effectively satisfied by Hoyle's heuristic? ISTM that going through the histories is a notion that splits in the 3p and 1p views. I suppose this is equivalent to conceiving observer moments as self-ordering monads in terms of which any random serialisation over the entire class must eventually preserve the right relative statistics. Eventually here relies on a similar opacity to delays in continuation as you argue in the UDA, plus the reliance on prior relativisation to some specific spatial-temporal orientation, to get a 1p notion of temporal order. But perhaps this formulation of a discrete observer moment is incompatible with comp? Of course, in the arithmetical reality, it don't get it, it is an indexical internal point of view. Perhaps it gets it eventually, in the sense I outline above? The situations of having been duplicated one or more times are then just non-simultaneous selections from the same class. This gives us a consistent way of considering the 3p and 1p (or bird and frog) probabilities symmetrically. That is, it is now certain that I will confront each and every 3p continuation from a unique 1p perspective, just not simultaneously. That said, this approach retains a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability in the case that there are fungible or equivalent continuations. For example, if the protocol mandates that I will be duplicated 100 times and 99 of my copies will be sent to a red room and one to a blue room, it would be rational to anticipate a higher probability of continuation associated with the larger class, even though each continuation is individually certain in a different underlying
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists), ? What is CTM? In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes no bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but it is strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the theological aspect , the belief in a form of technological reincarnation). directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital substitution that, ? This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is stronger. Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT (although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain replacement. I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is comp. If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary plays) inconsistent with comp. Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church thesis, but none succeed to define them properly, or there are different notion than computation, like provability, and their opposition to Church thesis is a confusion of level. So if CTM is computational theory of mind , it means that it is computationalism (taking into account the consequences or not). In that sense CTM - comp (but some will disagree, as CT is not so well understood, I think). Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral, but any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level, AUDA is partially representational, []p is representational, but []p p is not. notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. OK. That is a problem to solve. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 16:01, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to become a living person. I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion? Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water, and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers, lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the synthetic projection on the wall. Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water? Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can only be an image. Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the container of dimensionality itself. You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person associated with that brain. Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your theory? If not, why not? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good culturally-empirical mind -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views reality, rather than fundamental reality itself. You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic quality which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects of how mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 'aspects' and 'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. Realism is a measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the subset of sense which records experience and organizes those records. For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking... It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, general relativity, etc. Craig Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself. Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a more formal narrative of observation. In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is literally encountered? On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:37:46 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from my book on Reality: All forms of mass and energy are just different forms of relative motion. They actually have to be different forms of the same thing for there to be mass-energy conservation, and different forms of relative motion are what they are. Rest mass in this theory is just vibrational motion. It is relative motion, but since this relative motion is so spatially confined, it appears the same to all external observers. It is equally relative to all observers, thus it appears absolute in having the same value relative to all observers. Thus rest mass is the same to all observers, even though it is actually relative motion. This is somewhat similar to string theory's notion of particles as vibrating strings. But in my
Re: Block Universes
On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:26, Edgar L. Owen wrote: It assumes a RUNNING computer which assumes a flowing time. Not at all. you can hope that there is a physical universe capable of running a computation, but a computation is a mathematical, even arithmetical notion. The existence of any ending computations, and of all finite pieces of non ending computations, can be proved in quite tiny theory. The notion of running a computer does not need to assume a flowing time. You need to assume no more than the laws of addition and multiplication and classical logic. I am afraid you are using a highly non standard notion of computation, and I remind you that I asked regularly what you mean by computation. It is clearly not the standard notion, which is a mathematical notion not involving anything physical, notably, time. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On Monday, February 24, 2014 4:03:06 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:23:39 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 14:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I think you said something like I may have stumble [an explanation],,, Oh, well that definitely wasn't me, then. David It possibly was you but you were talking about what you refer to again here: To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me ..,. No it wasn't that. I stumbled on the line again and can see why I thought it was you. Pasted below. It was craig but the colour of his sign-off got changed making it look like it was you Now, 24 years later, there has been no improvement in our understanding, no progress whatsoever in these fundamental issues of consciousness. I think that I may actually have stumbled on the real improvement, but it's going to take a long time before people realize that computation is not the center of the universe. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:43:28 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 16:01, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:21:15 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Sure, but there is a difference between restoring damaged parts of a living person's brain and putting parts synthetic brain parts and expecting it to become a living person. I think we need to examine that assumption of difference more closely. ISTM that, if you can replace or restore any part of a living person's brain, that is in any significant way involved in consciousness, with a functional equivalent, this must directly contradict any contention that function cannot emulate consciousness. How could one escape that conclusion? Easily. If there is a reflection of the sun coming off a puddle of water, and you can see that reflection on the wall as an interplay of light and shadow, you can analyze that reflection mathematically and then recreate the pattern of light using any number of methods (photography, lasers, lenses and mirrors, etc). It can be demonstrated conclusively that dropping a pebble in the puddle changes the reflection on the wall in the same way that adding a mathematical description of a dropped pebble will change the synthetic projection on the wall. Why then can't we say that lenses or photography create water? Well, if we didn't know for a fact that the only the original pattern is related to something we call water and the sun, then we could say - we would have to say that logically lenses do create water, and that water can only be an image. Since we cannot deny our own experience, except by using our capacity to understand and represent some aspect of our experience to logically abstract a concept of experiential absence, then we should realize that there is no possibility for any description within consciousness (such as brains encountered by our body's examination of other bodies) to supersede consciousness itself. Any mathematical description of what our brain does or what our mind thinks that it does will always be superseded and diagonalized by awareness itself. It's not a higher dimension, it is the container of dimensionality itself. You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person associated with that brain. No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves). Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your theory? If not, why not? If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet? Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:57, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Thanks Bruno... As an advocate of a computational reality, I certainly believe that part of that universe (subsets) is computational minds, though I suspect we'd disagree about most of the rest You are welcome, but may be David meant some nuances. The problem is that many definition of CTM are done in the frame of the Aristotelian idea that there is a primitive physical universe, which, actually is not sensical with mechanism, comp or CTM well understood. Bruno Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:53:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? It is Computationalist Theory of Mind. It is another name of computationalism or comp, although usually comp refers explicitly to the very weak (logically) version of it. Usually CTM assumes that the brain is the organ of consciousness' and that neurons are the main items handling information, but comp assumes only a level of digital substitution, which can be as low as we want, and works for a general notion of brains, which can any portion of the physical universe we would have to copy to have the consciousness invariance. Comp can have a level so low that we might need the copy of the whole universe, at the level of strings described with 10^(10^10) decimals, for example (and that is usually not allowed implicitly in common forms of CTM). So, if you want COMP - CTM. I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. Bruno Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 16:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 13:53, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am not sure why David switched the term. Perhaps to avoid the confusion between comp and its assumptions (like John Clark does sometimes), or perhaps just to allude to the fact that it is a common theory used by most cognitive scientists. All of the above. My working assumption is that CTM, as an implicit posit of many theories (not merely those of cognitive scientists), ? What is CTM? Just what you said it was - the computational theory of mind. I'm agreeing with you. I just meant to say that it's implicitly assumed in much of science and not only by cognitive scientists. I didn't mean to be controversial! In a sense comp is very weak (= very general, assume less), it assumes no bound for the level and the scope of the digital substitution, but it is strong in making explicit a bet on consciousness invariance (the theological aspect , the belief in a form of technological reincarnation). Yes. directly entails the logically weaker formulation based on digital substitution that, ? This is confusing. If it entails something, that something is stronger. Sorry, your use of certain terms, as a logician, is much more precise than mine. I probably should have said something more like leads us to the conclusion that.etc instead of entails. I just meant that I agree with the argument, as presented in the UDA, that the assumption of the invariance of consciousness to digital substitution is incompatible with the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. Which, as you say is a formulation of a problem rather than a solution. Sorry for any confusion. David Comp assumes less, but is still strong in itself. As it assumes CT (although it is formally dispensable), and it assumes the brain replacement. I am no more sure what you mean by CTM. If M is for mind, then it is comp. If M is for matter, then it is (very plausibly up to vocabulary plays) inconsistent with comp. Some people believe in notion of computation not related to Church thesis, but none succeed to define them properly, or there are different notion than computation, like provability, and their opposition to Church thesis is a confusion of level. So if CTM is computational theory of mind , it means that it is computationalism (taking into account the consequences or not). In that sense CTM - comp (but some will disagree, as CT is not so well understood, I think). Usually, computational theory of mind still divide on representational theory, and non representational theories, comp is a priori neutral, but any choice of substitution level, entails a representation level, AUDA is partially representational, []p is representational, but []p p is not. notably, does not presuppose the localisation of mind in a primitive physical universe. OK. That is a problem to solve. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1- person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re- acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre- mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans- theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense- subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:03:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2014, at 15:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: Your questions above are answered in computer science. What makes the answers applicable beyond computer science? I think you should study it. I cannot imagine that you grasp the notion of UD, and still ask how numbers can encounter something. Then a notion like encounter seems to assume many vague things. But then you say it is just sense. What does 'encounter' assume? I don't see a theory. We have to go beyond theory to see sense, just as we have to wake up to some degree to know that we were dreaming. 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. ? Arithmetic does not examine its own origin, it assumes them from the start. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. You should be able to give the axioms, without using any special terms. If I am suggesting a solution that has not existed before, what term could I use to refer to it that is not 'special'? I will believe that you have a theory, when what you predict is invariant for the terming used. Not sure what you mean. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. We grasp number easily. We don't grasp sense, We don't need to grasp sense, we are sense, our lives are sensed. Numbers are not easily grasp, and the vast majority of people alive today and in human history have been almost mathematically illiterate. and humans are known to fight on this since day one. You have to find axioms on which you can agree with others, or you going to just talk with yourself. That would seem to contradict the universality of mechanism. How is a machine talking to itself different from agreeing to talk about the same things with others? It seems like an argument for conformity for the sake of conformity. Others can find ways to agree with me too, you know...unless I am a machine that is made specially different. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. That is quite imprecise. It's too compressed as a sentence, I agree. All I'm trying to say is that machines can tell the truth about some aspects of subjectivity and other parts of the cosmos also, but not because they have any subjective experience. Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this
Re: Block Universes
Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good culturally-empirical mind -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 16:59, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person associated with that brain. No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves). Well, removed is one thing and substituted is another. So to be clear, in your theory would it be possible for me to have part of my brain substituted digitally and not be aware of any difference? Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your theory? If not, why not? If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet? Well, the patient would notice that they no longer had any sensation between their hip and their foot, I suppose, so no, it wouldn't contradict that theory. For this to be an adequate analogy, no relevant aspect of the patient's pre-operative functional capabilities would be different. But my question is reasonable, isn't it? Perhaps you could just try to answer my it directly without the use of analogies. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You clearly have a good culturally-empirical mind -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
Craig, This seems crazy to me at least, as it seems to assume that reality was somehow created so people could appreciate it and participate in it. To me that seems a few orders of magnitude less likely than e.g. P-time! I would turn this around and say that humans were created of the same logical structure as a pre-existing human independent universe, and that is why they CAN appreciate and participate. That, to my mind, is a much more logical approach. And the fact that GR may be counter intuitive certainly does NOT imply any other counter intuitive theory is somehow correct. I'm sure you'd agree with that. And I'm surprised you consider GEOcentric astronomy somehow ordinary thinking. Perhaps you are still stuck in one of your block universe incarnations from the early Middle Ages? Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:17 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views reality, rather than fundamental reality itself. You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic quality which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects of how mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 'aspects' and 'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. Realism is a measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the subset of sense which records experience and organizes those records. For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking... It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, general relativity, etc. Craig Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself. Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a more formal narrative of observation. In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms and functions are like cliches or masks for the underlying sense experience. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:43:08 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 8:13:15 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Yes of course there can be motion or relations without an experience if you mean a human experience. No, I don't mean human experience. Not even biological experience, just experiential phenomena. The only people who believe otherwise are a few comp and intersubjectivists who believe nothing happened in the whole universe before humans came along. I don't think that there are any many genuine solipsists or anthropcentrists out there outside of religious fanatics, but the accusation that there are such beliefs out there is very popular. I'm talking about physics and ontology, it has nothing to do with biology or Homo sapiens. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:39:45 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can there be any motion or relation without an experience in which a sense of motion or relation is
Re: Block Universes
O Bruno, Bruno! First you snip my post you respond to so no one can tell that my quote applied to a very specific example given by Stathis which you snipped out, and NOT to what your quote implies it referred to. Second you once again repeat the charge I haven't explained what I mean by computation, and simultaneously accuse me of using a non-standard notion of computation. Please, you are contradicting yourself here, since how do you know it's non-standard if you admit you don't know what it is? And I have explained what I mean by computation, and by a computational universe on multiple occasions, several times in direct response to you asking that question. And I do use computation in a standard way as analogous to how computers compute results which is essentially how Turing used it. All in all, your continued repeated posts seem intellectually dishonest, I'm sorry to say... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 14:26, Edgar L. Owen wrote: It assumes a RUNNING computer which assumes a flowing time. Not at all. you can hope that there is a physical universe capable of running a computation, but a computation is a mathematical, even arithmetical notion. The existence of any ending computations, and of all finite pieces of non ending computations, can be proved in quite tiny theory. The notion of running a computer does not need to assume a flowing time. You need to assume no more than the laws of addition and multiplication and classical logic. I am afraid you are using a highly non standard notion of computation, and I remind you that I asked regularly what you mean by computation. It is clearly not the standard notion, which is a mathematical notion not involving anything physical, notably, time. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:16:26 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 16:59, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: You seem to be answering a different question. I thought it was a direct entailment of your theory that no part of the brain could be substituted purely functionally without affecting the consciousness of the person associated with that brain. No, I never said that at all. People have a whole hemisphere of their brain surgically removed and it doesn't affect their human capacities nearly to the extent that we might guess, and it doesn't affect their consciousness itself at all (they still wake up being themselves). Well, removed is one thing and substituted is another. So to be clear, in your theory would it be possible for me to have part of my brain substituted digitally and not be aware of any difference? Suppose such a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. Wouldn't that directly contradict your theory? If not, why not? If a doctor amputates a patient's leg, but then put the foot back on the end of the wooden leg, and the foot worked so that neither the patient or anyone else could tell the difference, wouldn't that directly contradict the theory that wooden legs can't support real feet? Well, the patient would notice that they no longer had any sensation between their hip and their foot, I suppose, so no, it wouldn't contradict that theory. No, they patient couldn't notice any difference. That's the conceit of the scenario - just as the conceit of your scenario is a substitution of part of my brain, along the lines discussed in the wiki, were actually made, and neither I nor any third party could tell the difference. I'm mirroring back to you the terms of your question so that you might see why the question is loaded. For this to be an adequate analogy, no relevant aspect of the patient's pre-operative functional capabilities would be different. Right. I am saying it wouldn't. Some how the wooden leg just feels like a real leg - maybe they have a brain injury in which the feeling of their right leg is mirrored on their left. But my question is reasonable, isn't it? Perhaps you could just try to answer my it directly without the use of analogies. No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the same single drum. That's infinity thinking to my mind unless and until I can see why not. Infinity thinking isn't just about infinity, it's just any kind of magical thinking, in which nature is assumed capable of anything even at such an early stage as you envisage p-time But I'm interested to see otherwise. You ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe
Re: Block Universes
For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself: If as you say, the same point in time in relativity just MEANS that two events are assigned the same time coordinate then the twins are NOT at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different time coordinates in their coordinate systems. if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t. 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity like thinking. It might be finite in some key dimensions, but that absolute consistency, that sameness, that all corners of reality being in earshot of the
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Bruno, PS: I have no idea what you are asking in the following question. If you make it clear I'll try to respond You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at
Re: Block Universes
Quentin, As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just revert to hot air... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overla ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy. 2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just revert to hot air... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overla ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving
Re: Block Universes
Quentin, The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another poster was using, rather than actual theory. Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a very long time! Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself: If as you say, the same point in time in relativity just MEANS that two events are assigned the same time coordinate then the twins are NOT at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different time coordinates in their coordinate systems. if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t. 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allc...@gmail.comjavascript: : ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomn ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry
Re: Block Universes
Quentin, Certainly you clearly CAN'T understand very much of anything, certainly not my theory. You demonstrate your lack of comprehension by being unable to even spell misunderstood correctly! :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:53:12 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy. 2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Quentin, As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just revert to hot air... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a circus. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another poster was using, rather than actual theory. Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a very long time! Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself: If as you say, the same point in time in relativity just MEANS that two events are assigned the same time coordinate then the twins are NOT at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different time coordinates in their coordinate systems. if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t. 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allc...@gmail.com: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomn ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
écris donc en français et on en discute... 2014-02-24 18:58 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, Certainly you clearly CAN'T understand very much of anything, certainly not my theory. You demonstrate your lack of comprehension by being unable to even spell misunderstood correctly! :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:53:12 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yeah yeah... you're a misundestood genius... poor guy. 2014-02-24 18:50 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, As I expected you can't show us anything to make your point, and just revert to hot air... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:39:30 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Quentin, The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the post he is responding to. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
blablabla... genius. 2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the post he is responding to. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:38:40 AM UTC, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:22:36 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 10:35:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 14:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro level mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the fallacy directly. 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense encounters is the sole axiom. 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to reversing the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from PIP as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, theoretical platform of sense. I'm beginning to get the impression in points 9 and 10 that you are wavering a little in your blanket rejection of CTM. No, I've always held that the contents of CTM are still redeemable if we turn them inside out. My contention is that CTM already rehabilitates and redeems its mathematical science in the sense you suggest as a consequence of its explicit reliance on the invariance of consciousness to some assumed level of functional substitutability. That's not the sense that I suggest. I'm claiming that CTM can only be rehabilitated by recognizing that function can never be a substitute for consciousness, and that in fact all functions supervene on more primitive levels of sensitivity. This already entails that CTM - as must be true of any theory that doesn't effectively junk the whole notion as supernumerary - incorporates consciousness into its schema as a transcendentally original assumption *at the outset*. Hence it eludes the jaws of petito principii by seeking not to *explain* but to *exploit* this assumption, at the appropriately justified level of explanation. Then it is not a theory of mind, it is a theory of mental elaboration - which I am not opposed to, as long as mental elaboration is not conflated with additional capacities of sensation. We can, for instance, look through a camera which will transduce infra-red radiation to a visible color (usually phosphor green or black-body-like spectrum). CTM could be used, IMO, to develop this kind of transduced extension of sense, but it cannot be used to provide additional visual sense (like being able to actually see infra-red as a color). Regardless of how intelligent the behavior of the program seems, the actual depth of consciousness will never increase beyond the specifications of the technology used to implement it. Since you yourself brought the example of Galileo to mind, I think it fair to point out that your examples above are faintly reminiscent of the position of
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Quentin, Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part. Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a circus. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Quentin, The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another poster was using, rather than actual theory. Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a very long time! Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself: If as you say, the same point in time in relativity just MEANS that two events are assigned the same time coordinate then the twins are NOT at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different time coordinates in their coordinate systems. if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t. 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allc...@gmail.com: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:blockquote style=margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(2 ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Quentin, Again you confirm my contention, and confirm your inability to state any inconsistency between P-time and relativity whatsoever. You can blubber forever and that will remain the same... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:05:01 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: blablabla... genius. 2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:: Quentin, The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the post he is responding to. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 17:41, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, it would be possible to have part of your brain removed and not be aware of any difference also - my point though is, 'so what?' You can be dead and not know the difference either, presumably. Are you making some distinction here between noticing a difference and there being a difference? Help me out a little, Craig. Ambiguity may be satisfying in some contexts, but it isn't working for me here. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 2:25 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.comwrote: There are many reasons why nuclear power is dead in the water. I think the main reason is that reactors got too big too fast and their design has been frozen for nearly half a century. They found a nuclear reactor design that worked well in submarines and figured if they just scaled it up a few hundred times it would work well in commercial power plants too, but it didn't work out quite that way. Freeman Dyson said the real problem is that reactor design isn't fun anymore because nobody is allowed to build even a small one if it is significantly (or even slightly) different from what has already been built, so the most creative people go into areas other than nuclear power. the sector would have never existed without massive government subsidies Neither would wind farms or big solar energy power plants. And what do you make of the government putting a huge tariff on Chinese solar cells to protect domestic producers which makes photovoltaics much more expensive in the USA? the lead time to bring working LFTR reactors to market and to build out enough of them to begin to make an impact on the global (or some important regional) energy market is long and should be measured in decades at least. Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come online. That would certainly be true if there is no sense of urgency to get the job done, but we got to the moon in less than 9 years once we decided we really really wanted to go there. There is no scientific reason it would take decades to get a LFTR online, but there are political reasons. Decades from today is as soon as the first LFTRs could begin to come online. By that time - they will need to compete with solar PV and the per unit costs for PV that are achieved over the next two or three decades. Finding a good inexpensive solar cell is not enough, even more important is finding a cheap and reliable way to store vast amounts of electrical energy. And because solar energy is so dilute environmentalists will whine about the huge amounts of land required. And some applications are just not going to work, you'll never see a solar powered 747 or fighter jet. The reason they are not getting built has less to do with political activists and a more to do with the negative economic profile James Hansen is one of the world's leading environmentalists and has done more to raise the alarm about climate change than anybody else, he started to do so in 1988. Hansen has recently changed his mind and is now in favor of nuclear power because he figures it causes less environmental impact than anything else, or at least anything else that wasn't moonbeams and could actually make a dent in satiating the worldwide energy demand. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
Just first, explain what p-time is supposed to solve in the first place that relativity doesn't. (if you come back again with the possibility for the twins to meet up, relativity doesn't need p-time for that, so you should find a real problem p-time solve that relativity alone can't). Then answer the following: Is there an objective fact about the simultaneity of two distant event in p-time ? Yes/No Quentin 2014-02-24 19:11 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, Even if that were true, and it's not, it doesn't even address your contention my theory is inconsistent with relativity, which remains unproved and simply an unfounded opinion on your part. Perhaps you are trying to change the subject because you can't prove your original contention? That's fine, just man up and admit it... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:59:10 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Yes, you didn't know proper time and coordinate time, and now you're mastering it... you're the best joke of the internet... you should open a circus. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:56 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, The pitiful thing is that you don't understand that is a true statement exactly as stated. It's a comment on definitions of terminology another poster was using, rather than actual theory. Keep trying my friend, but if that is the best you can do it will take a very long time! Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:43:20 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: For your pleasure, just a little quote from yourself: If as you say, the same point in time in relativity just MEANS that two events are assigned the same time coordinate then the twins are NOT at the same point in time because the two events of their meeting have different time coordinates in their coordinate systems. if someone need a proof you don't understand s..t. 2014-02-24 18:39 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allc...@gmail.com: ahahah 2014-02-24 18:36 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Quentin, I challenge you to show me a single inconsistency between P-time and relativity. There aren't any that I'm aware of even though Jesse has tried repeatedly he is still trying to prove the very first one (by his own admission) and hasn't succeeded so far You can't just state an uniformed opinion and expect anyone to believe it Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:19:57 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Plenty of people have already demonstrated the inconsistency of your view of p-time and simultaneity... you just ignore it and play dumb. You still haven't grasped what it means to be at the same spacetime coordinate... Quentin 2014-02-24 18:14 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:blockquote style=margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border- left-color:rgb(2 ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On Monday, February 24, 2014 5:14:20 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar Well, I can put hand on heart I have no personal investment in your theory being wrong. Or right. But more right than wrong because I do minimally know you, so have that much surplus with me at least. But I have tried to gently point out some questions. They are big Edgar, because the do impact on logic. That you are using. For example, nothing is inconsistent with anything, if it is laid in a causally isolated layer directly beneath or above. Is there a necesseary causal input from the perspective of Relativity in terms of P-time? Does P-time have necessary implication within itself for a relativistic nature that must occupy the level above. This is another way of restating what I raised with you. This time closer teo the context you are using at this moment in your debate. The question then becomes reversed as how could it be possible for an inconsistency to exist on these terms. Unleshs there's an answer, the relevance of this consistency is about as much as the fact me lying here in my bath is entirely consistent with the Planet Neptune It's up to you what you do with issue. I won't push it. I don't know what you most want to get out of this process. Maybe the issue isn't at all helpful. I don't want to be the way, On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:48:09 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:41:17 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, To address one of your points. My P-time theory starts by accepting EVERY part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. To be honest this wasn't one of my points. This has already come up and been stated quite a few times. Feel free to try reading but otherwise not to worry. I'm not trying to replace relativity in any respect at all. I'm adding a necessary interpretation and context to it, which it itself implicitly assumes, though without stating that assumption. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 6:48:54 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:12:05 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Well, first of all my theory doesn't tell nature what to do, it asks nature what it does and attempts to explain it. All the issues you raise are good ones, but when my theory is understood it greatly SIMPLIFIES reality. It doesn't make it more complex as you claim. And in fact it clarifies many points that relativity can't on its own, such as how the twins can have different clock times and different real ages in an agreed upon and empirically observable single present moment. Only p-time can explain that. Relativity on its own just can't explain that... My theory makes it all clear, and directly leads to the clarification of many other mysteries as well, from cosmology to how spaceclocktime is created by quantum events. By doing that it resolves quantum paradox, conceptually unifies GR and QT, and explains the source of quantum randomness. So rather than complicating things, it simplifies and clarifies things. Edgar Hi Edgar - if you thought something I asked was worthwhile why didn't you have a go at answering? I don't recall the two themes you answered in being part of what I put to you. I tend to throw out metaphor if it feels easier at the time, maybe you answered one of those literally, which maybe was a reasonable thing to do, no bother either way my end. I've seen you reference that piece about not telling nature how to do things. It's certainly an idea to admire and agree with, and something to aspire to also. But what's really worth just for the knowing and speaking? How do you translate the goal of seeking to see nature as pure as possible, involving the least reflection of yourself? For example, I've put that front and centre by seeking the nature of discovery as a methodical procedure. How go you? Also, if you are tempted to respond to just one of the questions I asked, the one I'd most like to hear back about is how you reconcile that back end logical perfection for initial conditions, with what nature then did when she got local to where we are? Why all the relativistic overlays and finite speeds of light, and fussy complex arrangements to minute scale, and all the rest? Why would she do all that if she already had something in the opposite direction that was perfect? p.s. we share a lot of basic instincts about the nature of the world. About infinity and its usage and so on. But as things stand, I actually regard p-time as one of the worser cases opf infinity
Re: Block Universes
On Monday, February 24, 2014 5:14:20 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Nevertheless people keep accusing P-time of being inconsistent with relativity when it isn't and no one has been able to demonstrate any way that it is. Edgar Well, I can put hand on heart I have no personal investment in your theory being wrong. Or right. But more right than wrong because I do minimally know you, so have that much surplus with me at least. But I have tried to gently point out some questions. They are big Edgar, because the do impact on logic. That you are using. For example, nothing is inconsistent with anything, if it is laid in a causally isolated layer directly beneath or above. Is there a necesseary causal input from the perspective of Relativity in terms of P-time? Does P-time have necessary implication within itself for a relativistic nature that must occupy the level above. This is another way of restating what I raised with you. This time closer teo the context you are using at this moment in your debate. The question then becomes reversed as how could it be possible for an inconsistency to exist on these terms. Unleshs there's an answer, the relevance of this consistency is about as much as the fact me lying here in my bath is entirely consistent with the Planet Neptune It's up to you what you do with issue. I won't push it. I don't know what you most want to get out of this process. Maybe the issue isn't at all helpful. I don't want to be the way, -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is changed... that's what you mean ? So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? Quentin Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: All mass and energy are just various forms of relative motion
On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:21:59 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, This seems crazy to me at least, as it seems to assume that reality was somehow created so people could appreciate it and participate in it. That would be crazy, but no, you are forgetting that nothing that I am talking about applies in any way to people. The hypothesis is about the relation of sense-motive, form-function, and matter-energy. No biology or human life is necessary. To me that seems a few orders of magnitude less likely than e.g. P-time! I would turn this around and say that humans were created of the same logical structure as a pre-existing human independent universe, and that is why they CAN appreciate and participate. That, to my mind, is a much more logical approach. Obviously, sure. That's not what I mean though. I'm looking at 'logical structure' as being a meaningless term in the absence of some appreciation of logical form and participation in logical function. Logic has to make sense, but sense does not have to make logic or come from logic. And the fact that GR may be counter intuitive certainly does NOT imply any other counter intuitive theory is somehow correct. I'm sure you'd agree with that. It doesn't imply any particular counter intuitive theory is correct, but it proves that being counter-intuitive is not a strike against it. To the contrary, counter-intuitive can sometimes be an indication of accessing a deeper and more far reaching level of sense making. And I'm surprised you consider GEOcentric astronomy somehow ordinary thinking. Perhaps you are still stuck in one of your block universe incarnations from the early Middle Ages? Geocentric astronomy was the ordinary thinking for most of human history, was it not? If it weren't for some counter-intuitive theories, it still would be the norm. Craig Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 11:52:17 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 10:56:08 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, It's hard to understand how your view is self consistent. You still seem to be assuming some unstated observer, which you deny, by claiming pattern recognition, aesthetics, appreciation, participation must somehow precede any ontological formulation. These are all aspects of how mind views reality, rather than fundamental reality itself. You are assuming that reality is something other than an aesthetic quality which is appreciated and participated in. They are no just aspects of how mind views reality, they are what creates the possibility of 'aspects' and 'views' to begin with. Forget about fundamental reality. Realism is a measure of correspondence among fictions. Reality is the subset of sense which records experience and organizes those records. For me at least, you need to clarify your thesis and try to state the whole more simply and completely. As it is it seems fragmentary and inconsistent, or at least backwards to ordinary thinking... It is backwards to ordinary thinking, yes - like Heliocentric astronomy, general relativity, etc. Craig Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:08:52 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:09:35 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, How do you define experiential phenomena without invoking an observer to experience them? The same way that I would invoke 'material phenomena' or 'energetic phenomena' without an observer to experience them. We are only a particular kind of experience, so it is hard to say whether the nested quality of that experience that makes it seem as if we are some 'thing' observing from behind a face is more local to conscious animals than to experience itself. Just something that COULD be experienced if an observer was there to experience it? No, I get rid of the observer assumption altogether, or make it ambiguous. All experiences may have some degree of distinction between interior and exterior aesthetics, but only some experiences might constellate into a more formal narrative of observation. In my book I define what I call Xperience as the computational alteration of any information form (information forms being what makes up the universe) and thus view all computations that make up the universe in terms of the Xperiences of GENERIC observers. Human and biological EXperience then becomes just a subset of the general phenomenon which constitutes the universe. But I suspect your definition is something quite different? Actually not so different, except that by using information forms as fundamental, you are choosing the third person, object view (forms and functions = patterns) without acknowledging the pattern recognition (= appreciation and participation) that must ontologically precede any particular formations. Computation is automation and unconsciousness. Forms and
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: : On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is changed... that's what you mean ? So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself which conjures something to be contained. Craig Quentin Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:24 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Let me make sure I understand what you are saying. You say we can drop an arbitrary coordinate system onto spacetime, and then we can place an originally synchronized clock at every grid intersection. Is that correct? It depends whether we are talking about inertial frames or arbitrary non-inertial coordinate systems. In non-inertial coordinate systems, the only requirement is that the coordinate be smooth--no sudden discontinuities in the coordinates assigned to infinitesimally-close points in spacetime. Beyond that, not only are you free to drop an arbitrarily-shaped rubbery coordinate grid with clocks at each intersection, but you're also free to define synchronization any way you want, you don't need to follow any standard procedure for deciding what point on each clock's worldline is the one where it be set to read zero, you can do this any way you like (again provided that the resulting simultaneity surfaces are smooth, with no discontinuous jumps). And there's also no requirement that the coordinate clock times actually correspond to the proper times along their worldline--you could have a coordinate clock that was designed to alternately run faster or slower than a normal clock moving right alongside them, for example. But the example I gave with Alice/Bob/Arlene/Bart involved an inertial coordinate system, not any non-inertial ones. In this case the rules for constructing a coordinate system are more strict--you have to use a Cartesian grid of straight rulers that are all inertial and at rest relative to one another, and then you have to use the Einstein synchronization convention to define what it means for clocks at different grid intersections to be synchronized with one another--the most common definition of this convention is that if you send a light signal from clock A when it reads tA1, it reflects off clock B when it reads tB, and the reflected light returns back to clock A when it reads tA2, then tB should be exactly halfway between tA1 and tA2 (i.e. tB = (tA2 - tA1)/2 ). Another equivalent definition is that if you set off a flash of light from a ruler marking that's exactly halfway between the markings that A and B are attached to, then both clocks should show the same reading when the light from the flash reaches them. The Einstein synchronization convention ensures that each inertial frame will measure the speed of light to be the same in all directions. And that those clocks read what is called the coordinate times of those grid intersections, and this gives us in some sense a measure of the actual time coordinate of that spatial coordinate? Yes, or more specifically they give a time coordinate for any EVENT that happens at a given spatial coordinate. For example, if a firework goes off at position x,y,z, then the time coordinate of the firework exploding would be defined by the reading t on the coordinate clock at x,y,z as the firework was exploding right next to it (so a photo of this location at that moment would show both the exploding firework and the clock there reading t). One clarification before I agree. The clocks on this grid that are in gravitational fields will be running slower than the clocks that are not? And we can compare the clocks across the grid to determine which are running slower and which faster? Is that correctly part of the model? In the case of inertial frames, these spacetimes are defined only in the flat spacetime of special relativity, where there is no gravity (since gravity involves spacetime curvature). In the real world there may be no perfectly flat regions of spacetime, but many regions in space that are limited in spatial and temporal extent may be extremely good approximations to flat spacetime. In general relativity where spacetime is curved, there isn't really any objective coordinate-independent way to compare the rates of clocks at different points in space, all you can do is compare how fast each clock is ticking relative to coordinate time in some coordinate system (and as I said above, the rate of coordinate clocks in arbitrary non-inertial coordinate systems can in principle be anything, although of course you're free to construct a coordinate system where coordinate time at each grid intersection does actually correspond to proper time of a clock at that intersection). I discussed the problem of defining the relative rate of different clocks in GR in the second half of my post at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/jFX-wTm_E_Q/SX19ccLeij0J(starting with the paragraph that begins Not a well-defined assumption.) If so I agree. It's my understanding of relativity theory, and my theory starts by accepting every part of relativity theory and adding to it rather than trying to change any part of it. If my theory is inconsistent with relativity in any respect I would consider my theory falsified. So is my
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 19:02, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, OK, we're getting somewhere. Doesn't that imply that the function is providing an adequate substitute for the original subjective components it is emulating? but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. Oops, I spoke too soon. Transpersonal and subpersonal experiences? You seem to be saying something like Let's be very careful about any such substitution because although it may seem to make no ordinary sort of personal difference to you or anyone else, to any arbitrary level of detail, there may still be other non-ordinary types of personal differences and the consequence of that will be ... well, what? The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference ... To your tenacious grip on your theory? and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. How is it a Red Herring? You just conceded that an appropriate level of functional substitution would make no difference to the subjective state of the patient. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? Hm..so if I had a piece of my brain substituted that made no subjective or objective difference you might concede that I was still the original David Nyman, just slightly foxed. However at what point would you say that too much of me had been replaced and I was no longer acceptable as the original, no matter how much I protested to the contrary? How much would be too much? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. If your brain is constantly replaced atom by atom and molecule by molecule, as indeed we are told it is, is it thereby any less your brain? Ah, but your theory has it that this is merely the tip of an iceberg and what is really occurring is an integral part of a never-ending story told in entirely other terms. You know what? Every other theory has it that way too, when you come to think of it. Stuff happens for deep and possibly unfathomable reasons and it ain't about to tell us everything about itself. But despite this, we appear to be able to understand and intervene rather effectively in the exterior form of such happenings and we try to explain this ability, and its consequences, with the fewest possibly extraneous assumptions. And as far as I can see the idea that any fundamental distinction between copy and original is germane to any such explanation is extraneous to the nth degree. Indeed the most effective explanations we have developed to date appear to contradict it directly both in principle and in practice. For good measure, I am still unable to fathom what necessary connection it has with the problems of consciousness. But I guess I'm probably just missing the point as usual. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com: On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is changed... that's what you mean ? So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? Yes, if I can't tell them apart then by definition I can't tell them apart... You still didn't answer the question... Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself which conjures something to be contained. Craig Quentin Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 7:55:35 PM UTC, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 19:02, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, OK, we're getting somewhere. Doesn't that imply that the function is providing an adequate substitute for the original subjective components it is emulating? but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. Oops, I spoke too soon. Transpersonal and subpersonal experiences? You seem to be saying something like Let's be very careful about any such substitution because although it may seem to make no ordinary sort of personal difference to you or anyone else, to any arbitrary level of detail, there may still be other non-ordinary types of personal differences and the consequence of that will be ... well, what? The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference ... To your tenacious grip on your theory? and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. How is it a Red Herring? You just conceded that an appropriate level of functional substitution would make no difference to the subjective state of the patient. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? Hm..so if I had a piece of my brain substituted that made no subjective or objective difference you might concede that I was still the original David Nyman, just slightly foxed. However at what point would you say that too much of me had been replaced and I was no longer acceptable as the original, no matter how much I protested to the contrary? How much would be too much? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. If your brain is constantly replaced atom by atom and molecule by molecule, as indeed we are told it is, is it thereby any less your brain? Ah, but your theory has it that this is merely the tip of an iceberg and what is really occurring is an integral part of a never-ending story told in entirely other terms. You know what? Every other theory has it that way too, when you come to think of it. Stuff happens for deep and possibly unfathomable reasons and it ain't about to tell us everything about itself. But despite this, we appear to be able to understand and intervene rather effectively in the exterior form of such happenings and we try to explain this ability, and its consequences, with the fewest possibly extraneous assumptions. And as far as I can see the idea that any fundamental distinction between copy and original is germane to any such explanation is extraneous to the nth degree. Indeed the most effective explanations we have developed to date appear to contradict it directly both in principle and in practice. For good measure, I am still unable to fathom what necessary connection it
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle out your drift. I wasn't asking why primitive sense because that's a posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no questions of this kind can ever be answered? The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We cannot doubt it. Uniquely so, in fact. We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive. I agree. As indeed did Descartes. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself. I understand that feeling and share it. It's very common (though curiously, not universal) and perhaps it is not eliminable as long as we insist on understanding the puzzle exclusively from within the frame of sense. I know it seems as if once we step outside that frame, even conceptually, we can never step back in. It seems impossible, like lifting oneself by one's own bootstraps. But understanding the world in its fullness inevitably seems to involve believing six impossible things before breakfast. This step is not by any stretch the most impossible, especially if we can find ways of accurately modelling the reference to sense, as Bruno tries to teach us, if not quite bridging the gap
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 24 February 2014 20:15, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: MHO the stage for bickering comes after a lot of this goes down. Prematurally, you've got a virtual cast iron guar antee, however long this runs, it's endings will the familiar territory, in line with all the other instances you participated with whoever to do the same before I don't doubt it. Fortunately I seem to be close to running out of gas. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:11:47 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-24 20:24 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: : On Monday, February 24, 2014 2:06:24 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-24 20:02 GMT+01:00 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com: On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:10:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 17:38, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's the point of the analogy, so you can see for yourself why the question is not reasonable. The question posed over and over to me here has been some variation of this same But if the world didn't work the way that it does, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? You've lost me. Surely such questions are more like If the world turned out not to work the way in the way you predict, wouldn't you have to agree that you were wrong and the world was right? It's not the way that I predict though, it is the way that the world already it. It is CTM which is predicting a future technology that transcends consciousness and can duplicate it. IOW I thought I was asking a question capable of a definite answer in principle. I thought you had a definite view about whether any significant part of the brain could be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the patient. Yes, I have a definite view - some parts of the brain can be functionally substituted without subjective consequences for the personal experience of the patient, but that has nothing to do with the transpersonal and subpersonal experiences of the patient, which would be impacted in some way. The overall effect may or may not be 'significant' to us personally, but it makes absolutely no difference and is a Red Herring to the question of whether consciousness can be generated mechanically. In fact I assumed that your view was that this wouldn't be possible. Is that incorrect? On that assumption, I asked you to consider, hypothetically, my telling you that I had survived such a substitution without any loss or difference. If such an eventuality were to occur, wouldn't you at least consider that this anomaly put your theory in doubt? Why would it put my theory in doubt? If you can substitute the brake pedal on a Rolls Royce with a piece of plywood and duct tape, does that mean that a Rolls Royce can be replaced entirely by plywood and duct tape? Does it mean that there is some magical point where the Rolls stops being a Rolls if you keep replacing parts? If you start with the wood and tape, you can never get a Rolls, but if you start with a Rolls, you can do quite a bit of modification without it being devalued significantly. So that amount to say that you can't replace the whole brain with a functionnaly working replacement... if you start piece by piece there will be a point where it is not working anymore, and the external behavior is changed... that's what you mean ? So if one day, you're presented with someone having endured such process and there is absolutely no difference in his external behavior... would that point to a possibility your theory is wrong ? If you see two Rolls Royces and are told that one of them is made of duct tape and plywood, but you can't tell them apart, would that mean that duct tape and plywood can be used to build a Rolls Royce? Yes, if I can't tell them apart then by definition I can't tell them apart... You still didn't answer the question... The answer is that one person not being able to tell them apart at some particular moment doesn't mean anything. I don't know how much clearer I can make it: http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/simberg.jpg?w=595 Think of computation as containment, and universal machine is one which can be programmed to be box, bag, jar, or bottle. You could make boxes of bottles of bags, but there is nothing about containment in and of itself which conjures something to be contained. Craig Quentin Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Block Universes
The point Edgar seems to be missing vis-a-vis block universes is that, whether correct or not, they explain our experience of time. Otherwise Einstein, Weyl, Minkowski etc would have dismissed the idea of space-time out of hand, instead of embracing it as a replacement for the Newtonian paradigm of space and time as separate dimensions (Newtonian physics also posited a block universe, of course, but this was at the time merely an ontological assumption - it took Special Relativity to produce testable consequences). Not being able to grasp an idea, or not being able to correctly visualise its implications, doesn't make it wrong. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The situation at Fukushima appears to be deteriorating
Solar cells are getting cheaper and easier to use (e.g. flexible plastic ones). It should be possible to stick them anywhere you want, e.g. on buildings or cars. This would mean at least some solar power could be harvested using existing infrastructure. As usual the technology is there, or almost there, but this needs political or commercial will to achieve. Personally I'd like to see a solar farm that uses the energy it receives from the Sun to power machinery that sucks CO2 and water from the air and turns them into petrol. (Then you really *could* run a 747 on solar power :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Bless your noddly appendages. On 25 February 2014 06:57, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from data which is not relevant to the machine? Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism behind computation, I conclude that: 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical theory of mind is rooted in
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:32:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle out your drift. I wasn't asking why primitive sense because that's a posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. The desire to move your hand doesn't 'turn into' anything. Think of your desire as an earthquake causing ripples in various parts of the world simultaneously, on all different scales. The molecules are changing polarity, the ion gates are closing, the neurons are firing, the muscle fibers are contracting, the arm is moving - they are all the same event, only expressed within different sized frames of 'here' and 'now'. Where there are neurons, there is no person. Where there is a person, there can be neurons in a figurative sense, derived through understanding and instrumental extension, but at the level of a personal experience, a 'neuron' is *really* an ability to feel or touch something. I am saying that is the ontological reality of what it is. The neuron is an outsider's view which reveals details that the insider view cannot, but I suggest that the view which reconciles them both is metaphenomenal rather than meta-mechanical (arithmetic). How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no questions of this kind can ever be answered? Yes. There is no way to ask how you begin the chain of physical changes which moves your arm, or how you know how to do that. It is primitive. You can only experience it directly. A computation does not have that. It can never know how to initiate any physical or phenomenal change, any more than a ripple can initiate rippling in a lake. The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? Because that's how sense organizes itself to invite opportunities for richer qualities of experience. Mathematics can show us precisely why the relations which are used in nature make that kind of sense, but it is meaningless outside of a context which is worth making sense of. Counting what can never be encountered is a moot point ontologically. That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me. I don't avoid the need to address a question, I explain that the question is coming from somewhere that evaporates as soon as you accept the consequences of the original premise. How comes from sense, so it makes no sense to ask how sense makes itself. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
On 25 February 2014 06:57, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Tch. You've got a sauce. PS bless your noodly appendages! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Quentin, The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the post he is responding to. For some reason my irony meter just exploded. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Digital Neurology
On 25 February 2014 05:53, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: Now, 24 years later, there has been no improvement in our understanding, no progress whatsoever in these fundamental issues of consciousness. I think that I may actually have stumbled on the real improvement, but it's going to take a long time before people realize that computation is not the center of the universe. Craig I would be interested to know what it is, if it can be explained simply enough that a dummy like me can get what you're saying. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 February 2014 01:57, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: MWI cannot be falsified in the Popperian sense because all scientific experiments are necessarily limited to one world. Yet MWI is central to asking the doctor. But there is no scientific experiment that verifies MWI. Indeed, there is no experiment that verifies MWI (or anything else... :) However a suggested falsification from Deutsch is if there is some limit to how much information a quantum computer can handle. If it can handle 500 qubits then according to the MWI that is 2^500 universes being involved in the calculation. Penrose would probably say that the superposition of 500 qubits would collapse the wavefunction (something to do with the difference between superposed worlds exceeding some gravitational threshold, I believe). So that's a falsification test which may become technologically feasible at some point. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: CTM Attack and Redemption
Pasta with meatballs and the meat balls are higher dimensional energy fields and the tomato sauce is the rolling tide of higgs singlets reacting with all. -Original Message- From: Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Feb 24, 2014 12:57 pm Subject: Re: CTM Attack and Redemption I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual pastas are or exactly how they taste like. However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to falsifiability). My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Quentin 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Bruno, As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there is no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable universe. My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual computations are or exactly how they work. However we can say many things about my computational universe. For example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete because it always continues to output the current observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect while yours does not. Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it from my computational reality. But please tell us what it is. computational is a technical term. Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or any (Turing) universal machine or numbers? Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical implementation of a computation. You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it seems to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of comp). Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. Bruno :-) Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? Computational Theory of Mind. Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and natural, when I suspect that is neither. Craig Edgar On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: This might be a more concise way of making my argument: It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations are encountered. My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as experience with technological devices, is that everything which is counted must first be encountered. Extending this dictum, I propose that 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, and 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated from the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an actual machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware substrate, but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate itself from
Re: MODAL 5 (was Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
On 24 February 2014 07:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
About [](A - B) - ([]A - []B), let me ask you a more precise exercise.
Convince yourself that this formula is true in all worlds, of all Kripke
multiverses, with any illumination.
Hint: you might try a reductio ad absurdum. try to build a multiverse in
which that law would be violated.
[](A - B) - ([]A - []B)
OK. For a disconnected universe this is t - (t - t) or t - t which is
true.
And for a Leibniz universe, I'm fairly sure this is also true.
So that leaves {alpha R alpha} and {alpha R beta} and so on, for any
number of universes + relations.
Maybe I can come back on this one.
Sure. Me too. (I will myself be plausibly slowed down, as I have two weeks
of teaching, take your time, just try to not forget what you learn, by
having good summary, that you can read from time to time).
Well, does an illuminated Kripke universe effectively act as a Leibniz
universe? If so this is definitely true (OK I try to jump in quickly
here...)
You do good work, but I am not sure if you have good notes. That is not
grave, but not helpful to you.
Yes, I know - about the notes, I mean. (Maybe I just need to search the
list for []p to find some...)
Never hesitate to ask for any definition or recall.
Thank you, don't worry I will :)
The modal logic part is not the real thing. The real thing will be the
interview of universal and Löbian machines, and some modal logics will just
sum up infinite conversations we can have with them, notably on predictions
and physics.
Yes, that is where it all happens! But I feel like I am quite a way from
that.
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