I've seen John Baez suggest that
On 17 Aug, 15:23, ronaldheld wrote:
> arxiv.org:0908.2063v1
> Any comments?
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On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> > Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> > physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
> > round.
>
> Are you saying that without platonism, the square root of 2 d
On 17 Aug, 11:23, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 1Z :
>
> > Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument
> > about which pixies exist.
>
> Forgive me for butting in, but I wonder whether there is a level at
> which your metaphysical disagreement is perhaps somewhat more
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or
> > > explain.
> But what is this "primary matter"? If it is entirely divorced from all the
> e
On 17 Aug, 18:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Does Bruno assume arithmetic is really real or just a really good model, and
> can the
> difference be known?
I don't think Bruno believes there is anything else
for arithemeic *to* model.
--~--~-~--~~~---
On 17 Aug, 20:49, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Peter Jones wrote:
>
> > On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
> > > > physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
On 18 Aug, 02:47, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:
> AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
> problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
> exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
> parameters capable
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Peter Jones wrote:
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > > But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> > > > > mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers described or
> > > > >
> > > > >
On 18 Aug, 00:41, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion :
>
> > Yep. I have no problem with any of that
>
> Really? Let's see then.
>
> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
> >> statement l
On 18 Aug, 01:43, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/17 Flammarion :
>
> > I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
> > assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
> > of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
> &g
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
On 18 Aug, 09:52, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> >>>> But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
> >>&g
On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> What do you mean by "ontological existence"?
>
> > Real in the Sense that I am Real.
>
> What does that mean?
>
> Do you mean "real in th
On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > the term in a way that clearly has re
On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
> >> run
> >> a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
> >> computation,
> >>
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
> >> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> > The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.
>
> Comp is based on the notion
On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > Subject:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> > some
> > possible mathematical structur
On 18 Aug, 12:52, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > > Subject:
On 18 Aug, 15:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
> >> we
> >> have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
> >>
On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
> > Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> > not about
> > explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> > contingency as the price
> > paid fo
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> >> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> >> assuming comp. Matter is more or less
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
> >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
> >> is material, then th
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in a
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting
> >> >> a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about
&g
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion :
> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
> > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
> > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
>
> And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
>
&g
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote:
> 009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
> >> paraphrase argument - the
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> >> and PM are incompat
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote:
> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
> is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
> - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
> rigorous spelling out in physical terms f
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> > > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> > > ar
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from
> contingent
> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
>
> >>> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
> >>> existence. It is not a structure of anythin
On 19 Aug, 21:49, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote:
> > > 009/8/19
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
> >> is a posteriori compressed - for example into
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman wrote:
> On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
> I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing *for*
> eliminative materialism, except as devil's advocate (I'm sure you know
> t
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
> > all. I don't see any evidence for that
>
> I am explaining this right now.
>
>
On 20 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer :
> So someone else noticed Peter dodging the consequences of what he
> originally claimed with respect to Quinean paraphrase! Thanks.
What consequence was that?
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received th
On 20 Aug, 00:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
>
> &
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
> >> is a posteriori compressed - for example into
On 20 Aug, 11:31, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> Indeed, you don't believe in the number seven. But sometimes you seem
> to believe in their mathematical existence, and that is all what I
> need.
No. I always qualify mathema
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman wrote:
> On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 20 Aug 2009, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
>
> > > 2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer :
>
> > > I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation
> > > is "a
> > > physical process taking p
On 15 Aug, 02:40, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/14 1Z :
>
> >> I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
> >> in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
> >> (OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is uniquely available to
> >> us. Since
On 21 Aug, 17:25, David Nyman wrote:
> On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > > Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
> > > Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
> > > 'eliminative p
On 19 Aug, 15:16, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>>>
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
>
On 26 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman wrote:
> Just so. To recapitulate the (approximate) history of this part of the
> discussion, Peter and I had been delving into the question - posed by
> him - of whether a complete scan of a brain at the subatomic level
> could in principle capture all the availa
On 26 Aug, 21:49, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
> The question is whether PM is sufficient to describe the system.
> Language is almost certainly inadequate to describing what it is like
> to 'be' the system - you cannot even fully describe what it is like to
> be you. That's why I
On 27 Aug, 01:35, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker :
> > The idea of 'being' somebody (or thing) else already assumes dualism.
> > It assumes some 'I' that could move to be Stathis or a bat and yet
> > retain some identity. But on a functionalist view 'I' already am
> > Stathis and
On 21 Aug, 16:39, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/21 Flammarion :
> > Do you concede that many aspects of mind -- cognition, memory and so
> > on --
> > are not part of any Hard Problem?
>
> Yes, absolutely. But I think our basic divergence is that I say you
> can&
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
> > Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
> > level,
> > you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
>
> That's an interesting question and one that I think r
On 21 Aug, 20:40, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote:
> With UDA alone, of course not.
>
> But AUDA does provides a a theory of qualia which explains why no 1-
> person can and will ever explain the qualitative feature of its qualia.
It treats qualia as *cognit
On 26 Aug, 17:58, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > What about lower levels? Surely it doesn't matter whether 10,000 K+
> > cross the axon membrane or 10,001 cross. So somehow looking at just
> > the right level matters in the hypothesis of functionalis
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> on the ground
On 27 Aug, 20:11, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> >> and hence that it can't
> >> in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
>
> > I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
> > be ta
On 28 Aug, 02:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > the door is opened to some grander metaphysical speculation
> > concerning the nature of the world. For example, it is often noted
> > that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in
> > terms of their relations to other entities,
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> But you see Brent, here you confirm that material
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
> >>> level,
> >>> you stil
On 28 Aug, 09:50, Flammarion wrote:
> On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> > > On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > >> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
> > >> This is because if consciousness
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
>
> >> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> >> indep
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Where he says computation can happen without any p
On 28 Aug, 12:53, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
On 22 Aug, 00:38, David Nyman wrote:
> On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
> > > > explaining away qua elimination.
>
> > > Well, either way he's explaining away, as
On 25 Aug, 08:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >>> That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
> >>> with the full force of necessity --
>
> >> I don't remember. I do
On 28 Aug, 13:51, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Is functionalism monism, property dualism, or might it even be a form
> of substance dualism?
Monism
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On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
> > by something else that does
> > 2. I ontologically exist
> > 3. According to you, I am generated
On 28 Aug, 17:07, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>> Flammarion wrote:
> >>>>> Do you thin
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is responsible
> for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
> some form of naturalism/materialism or computationalism).OK?
On 28 Aug, 18:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>
>
>
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> >>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman :
> >>&
On 28 Aug, 22:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>
>
>
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
> >>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>>> 2009/8/27 Flammarion :
>
> >>>>> On 27 A
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> If the physical laws are turing emulable, th
On 30 Aug, 22:21, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> > Ok, so you want to solve the "hard problem" right at the beginning by
> > taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
>
> No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not use the word
> consciousness. What
On 31 Aug, 00:21, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/28 Flammarion :
>
> > 1. It seems reasonable that relations must have relata. However,
> > relata
> > need not have a rich set of properties. You could build a physical
> > universe out
> > a single type of part
On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
> > considerable advantage.
>
> If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I
> would do. Otherwise, I wouldn't d
On 31 Aug, 19:15, Rex Allen wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen wrote:
> >> On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meeker
> >> wrote:
>
> >> > If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only b
On 28 Aug, 15:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand th
On 31 Aug, 17:57, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> > If the lower level is discarded, the qualia aren't there. So where
> > are they?
>
> Since you find this mode of thought so uncongenial, let's focus on
> this single issue for now. I do
On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/11 Rex Allen :
> Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from
> its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the
> right to whisk a mysteriously powerless ghost of it back later by
> sleight of intuition)
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> Peter, surely you must see that in saying "abstracta are arrived at by
> ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects" you are simply
> agreeing with Quentin that "if everything is reduced
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman wrote:
> On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
>
> > I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
> > ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
> > either true o
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> >> It's more an attempt to characterise our
> >> metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
> >> immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> > That says nothing about qualia at all.
>
> It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
> of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
> provocation - as a c
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> > I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
> > I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
> > incomprehensible.
>
> In that case you may wish to reconsider
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
> >> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
> >> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>
> >
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Exactly,
> if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
> is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).
>
> There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
> machine running on a virtual
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Can't matter have processes?
>
> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
> matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
> proper
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
> responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
> don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> >> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a t
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> >> Ok, so you want to solve the "hard problem" right at the beginning by
> >> taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
>
> > No I don't - that's
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Can't matter have processes?
>
> >> But in t
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > > the basis of any consistent not
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
>
> The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
> "just".
Really?
>There is no possibility of a context-fr
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> >> >
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>>> That is the point. I should say that my starting po
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >>>> On 1 Sep, 13
On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >>
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
> > OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> > specifically to access consciousn
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