n see any real
attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than
denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction.
The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so
much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof)
and because t
Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Our discus
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2012/9/12 Quentin Anciaux
>
>>
>>
>> 2012/9/12 benjayk
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>>> >
>>> > 2012/9/11 Quentin Anciaux
>>> >
>>> >>
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>> Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
>> I want to
>> attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
>> and I a
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2012/9/11 Quentin Anciaux
>
>>
>>
>> 2012/9/11 benjayk
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>>> >
>>> > 2012/9/11 benjayk
>>> >
>>> >>
>>>
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2012/9/11 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2012/9/11 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> &
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2012/9/11 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2012/9/10 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> > > No program can determine its hardware. This is a conse
udy proofs regarding this issue (as they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).
benjayk
--
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Sent from the Everything List
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2012/9/10 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> > > No program can determine its hardware. This is a consequence of the
>> > > Church
>> > > Turing thesis. The particular machine at the lowest level has no
>> > bea
> > No program can determine its hardware. This is a consequence of the
> > Church
> > Turing thesis. The particular machine at the lowest level has no
> bearing
> > (from the program's perspective).
> If that is true, we can show that CT must be false, because we *can*
> define
> a "meta-progr
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> even though the paper actually
>>>> doesn't even begin to adress the question.
>>>
>>> Which ques
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 Sep 2012, at 16:08, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:22, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal
t need to create another emulation C that
is wrong on its level, but is correct on level B, etc...
So to actually emulate the meta-program using UTMs we need to create an
unbound amount of counterfactual emulations and interpret them correctly (to
understand in which way and at which point the &
ively computational and being implementable on
a computer) where there are computations that can't be emulated by universal
turing machine, using "level breaking" languages (which explicitly refer to
what is being computed on the base level). I'll write another post on this.
benjayk
es and ones, and the screen will
>> convert
>> this into pixels. Without your interpretation the pixels (and thus the
>> answers) are meaningless.
>>
>
> When things make a difference, they aren't meaningless. The register
> containing a value representing a plane&
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:22, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>> Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggeste
al is nonsense with
regards to matter) premise.
The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive
abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of view don't
necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus confusing
your reader which thinks tha
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:31, benjayk wrote:
>
>> Quantum effects beyond individual brains (suggested by psi) can't be
>> computed as well: No matter what I compute in my brain, this doesn't
>> entangle it with other brains sin
his case we can't
>>>> derive
>>>> anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may actually
>>>> require
>>>> a biological brain or even something more.
>>>
>>> The consequences will go through
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 6, 2012 at 12:47 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Tue, Aug 28, 2012 at 2:57 PM, benjayk
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> It seems t
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Aug 2012, at 21:57, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>> It seems that the Church-Turing thesis, that states that an
>> universal turing
>> machine can compute everything that is intuitively computable, has
>> near
>>
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 28, 2012 at 2:57 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>> It seems that the Church-Turing thesis, that states that an universal
>> turing
>> machine can compute everything that is intuitively computable, has near
>> univ
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Sep 2012, at 21:47, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, we simulated some systems, but they couldn't perform the
>>>> same function.
>>>
>>> A pump
e a clue why you believe this is senseless or
>>> inconsistent.
>> For one thing, with COMP we postulate that we can substitute a brain
>> with a
>> digital emulation ("yes doctor"),
>
> At some level.
>
>
>
>> yet the brain
>
>
bstitution does really take place -
yes doctor is just a metaphor for "I am digital"), but then it is
tautological and your reasoning is merely an explanation of what it means if
we are digital.
Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and argue that
COMP sa
to what
we (locally) are, only what is emulable matters. I find this assumption
completely unwarranted and I have yet to see evidence for it or a reasoning
behind it.
benjayk
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John Clark-12 wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 3, 2012 at 9:11 AM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>> Showing scientifically that nature is infinite isn't really possible.
>>
>
> Maybe not. In Turing's proof he assumed that machines could not operate
> with infinite num
people
to adhere to societal norms?
(Obviously there are also people that consider themselves left or right to
whom not all of that or nothing applies to. I am just referring to the
majority.)
benjayk
--
View this message in context:
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Sent fr
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Sep 2012, at 15:11, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you disagree, please tell me why.
>>>
>>> I don't disagree. I just point on the fact that
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
>>>
>>>> But this avoides my point that we can'
h I think this would be quite superficial), but he won't
be connected to the universal field of experiencing in the same way -
because at some level his emulation is only approximate which may not matter
much on earth, but will matter in "heaven" or "the beyond" (which is w
It seems that the Church-Turing thesis, that states that an universal turing
machine can compute everything that is intuitively computable, has near
universal acceptance among computer scientists.
I really wonder why this is so, given that there are simple cases where we
can compute something tha
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much no
>> >> other
>> >> way to explain psi.
>> >>
>> >
>> > What do you mean by psi?
>>
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>> The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.
>
>> That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
>> through a (quite
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
>
>> But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
>> and
>> ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
>> not mean
>
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>> I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can
>> be
>> described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it
>> seems
&g
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or
>> >> nothing), just like the sentence &quo
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 11:11 AM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> >>> So what is your definition of computer, and what is your
>> >> >>> ev
Sorry, I am not going to answer to your whole post, because frankly the
points you make are not very interesting to me.
John Clark-12 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:49 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>
>> > 'You won't be able to determine the truth of
{0, 1}
The problem is: Change one of the symbols of this turing machine to 2.
Given that it is a universal turing machine, it is supposed to be able to
solve that problem. Yet because it doesn't have access to the right level,
it cannot do it.
It is an example of direct self-manipulation,
>> > special cases of computers. The particular case can defined by
>> > program, which may be executed on any Turing machine.
>> Nope. We are not computers and also not hyper-computers.
>>
>>
> That is a bit like saying we are not X, but we are also not (not X).
Right, r
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 1:52 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:59 PM, benjayk
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>>
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Aug 22, 2012, at 1:57 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 1:07 PM, benjayk
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 1:07 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 10:48 AM, benjayk
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:59 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 11:49 AM, benjayk
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>>
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 10:48 AM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Imagine a computer without an output. Now, if we look at what the
>> >> computer
>> >
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 11:49 AM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> John Clark-12 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 5:33 PM, benjayk
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >> I have no difficulty as
John Clark-12 wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 5:33 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>> I have no difficulty asserting this statement as well. See:
>>
>
>> "Benjamin Jakubik cannot consistently assert this sentence" is true.
>>
>
>
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Imagine a computer without an output. Now, if we look at what the
>> computer
>> is doing, we can not infer what it is actually doing in terms of
>> high-level
>> activity, because this is just defined at the output/input. For
>> example, no
>> video exists in
benjayk wrote:
>
> Is the following statement true?
> 'This statement can't be confirmed to be true solely by utilizing a
> computer'
> Imagine a computer trying to solve this problem:
> If it says yes, it leads to a contradiction, since a computer has been
>
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/21/2012 3:26 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>> On 8/21/2012 2:52 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>> On 8/21/2012 2:24 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>>>>> meekerdb wrote
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Aug 2012, at 00:26, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/21/2012 2:52 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>>>
>>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>> On 8/21/2012 2:24 PM, benjayk w
Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi benjayk
>
> In monadic theory, since space does not exist, monads are by definition
> nonlocal, thus all minds in a sense are one
> and can commune with one another as well as with God (the mind behind the
> supreme monad).
>
> The cl
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/21/2012 2:52 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>> On 8/21/2012 2:24 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>> "This sentence cannot be confirmed to be true by a human being."
>>>
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/21/2012 2:24 PM, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>> "This sentence cannot be confirmed to be true by a human being."
>>>
>>> The Computer
>>>
>> He might be right in saying that (See my respon
Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> Dear Benjayk,
>
> Isn't this a form of the same argument that Penrose made?
>
I guess so, yet it seems more specific. At least it was more obvious to me
than the usual arguments against AI. I haven't really read anything by
Penrose, e
John Clark-12 wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 21, 2012 benjayk wrote:
>
>> In this post I present an example of a problem that we can (quite easily)
>> solve, yet a computer can't, even in principle, thus showing that our
>> intelligence transcends that of a comput
meekerdb wrote:
>
> "This sentence cannot be confirmed to be true by a human being."
>
> The Computer
>
He might be right in saying that (See my response to Saibal).
But it can't confirm it as well (how could it, since we as humans can't
confirm it and what he knows about us derives from what
Saibal Mitra-2 wrote:
>
> It's a simple logical paradox, an AI could play the same game by asking:
>
> Is the following statement true? 'This statement can't be confirmed to
> be true solely by utilizing a human brain'.
>
It is true as well. We can even confirm it to ourselves.
'This stateme
In this post I present an example of a problem that we can (quite easily)
solve, yet a computer can't, even in principle, thus showing that our
intelligence transcends that of a computer. It doesn't necessarily show that
human intelligence transcend computer intelligence, since the human may have
Sorry, I am done with this discussion, I am just tired of it.
I actually agree your argument is useful for refuting materialism, but I
still don't think your conlusion follows from just COMP, since you didn't
eliminate COMP+non-platonic-immaterialism.
benjayk
--
View this message
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
>> favorite
>> mystery is acceptable).
>
> This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 12/7/2011 8:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
>> Tegmark's argument shows only that the brain is essentially classical if
>> we
>> assume decoherence works the same in natural systems as in our
>> "artificial"
>> experiments. Bu
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>
little use.
I treat all these ideas of the conscious singularity as ideas, not as dearly
held beliefs. If it happens it is going to be infinitely unbelievable
anyway.
benjayk
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Sent from the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I am just not arguing at all for what
>>>> your argument(s) seeks to refute.
>>>
>>> I know that. It might be your pr
es, among other things, universal cooperative behaviour among humans).
What is our individual part in all of this? Naturally learn to recognize
that we as individuals are just a part of the whole that we really are, and
through this, learn to finally relax into our true infinite consciousness
and be rea
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/12/6 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/12/5 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >
>&g
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/12/5 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will
>>>> never
>>>> be.
>>
here is to it. The substitution does simply
work because it subjectively works, not because of some inherent, *objective
and/or absolute* association of physical activity with experience.
The whole MGA argument is supposed to show that the physical supervenience
thesis is false, but that's not the only p
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
>>>
>>> If you can add and multiply, or if you c
teps in really being able to experience reality and ourselves in an
unbiased and clear manner.
As long as we cling to knowledge, we are looking at our ideas of reality and
ourselves, not at reality as it actually is.
benjayk
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View this message in context:
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at not a reductio ad absurdum?
>> The only situtation where COMP may be reasonable is if the
>> substitute is
>> very similar in a way beyond computational similarity - which we can
>> already
>> confirm due to digital implants working.
>
> The apparent success of dig
s, so we can't have a finite substitution level. But we would
need that in order to say YES. In any case, COMP is false in the general
case.
COMP only works relatively if subjective self-reference *happens* to arrive
at a similar state of consciousness. But this is not (purely) due to the
compu
ions are instantiated because of subjective
self-reference.
OK, we could say YES based on the faith that subjective self-reference will
develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world
(though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua computatio.
benjayk
--
Vi
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>> >
>> >> On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
g our universe seem barren and our material reality
limited. I think a big jump will occur if we collectively are open to such
things (meaning no dogmatic materialism and religion), and not start to be
superstitous and esoteric because of the events, and not be fearful, and be
skeptic concerning the
sn't specific enough. I meant that step 8 can be used to eliminate a
need for a concrete physical instantiation / a physical reality realizing
(some part of) the computations, but not the need for a transcendental
reality. This transcendental reality may not generate the whole UD* (making
some
sn't specific enough. I meant that step 8 can be used to eliminate a
need for a concrete physical instantiation / a physical reality realizing
(some part of) the computations, but not the need for a transcendental
reality. This transcendental reality may not generate the whole UD* (making
some
re coherent one (without having to die). Virtual
>> experience just start out of nowhere, but they also can be
>> (relatively)
>> started from normal reality.
>
> ? (not clear for me, sorry).
The last sentence? I mean that a certain "virtual" experience may be al
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Nov 2011, at 18:39, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>> I have a few more ideas to add, considering how this singularity
>> might work
>> in practice.
>>
>> I think that actually consciousness does not start in a linear
&
" by other ones) and
in that way prolong the time until we have to come to earth (or whatever
exists then) again.
benjayk
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elf-organization, is just isn't that apparent yet,
as it is still in its embryonal stage of its unfoldment in the manifest
world.
benjayk
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Sent from the Everything List mailing l
asy to show that the laws don't universally apply, because it
is very hard to verify. Up to a certain point, we can always say "maybe the
laws work together in a way we don't yet understand" (even though that gets
increasingly implausible), since the laws are so damn complex.
be
he claim that there is different consciousness on.
>>
>
> Solipsism is false.
How do you know? It seems obviously true to me when it comes to
consciousness, not persons.
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
>> It is not even clear to me what other consciousness could even mean.
>
>
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/11/10 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Spudboy100 wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
>> > benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
>> >
>> > Pr
d, but the criticism if often
not vindicated, in my opinion), and a lot of astounding anecdotes. But it
might not work in the way we expect, in terms of consistency,
controllability and scope.
benjayk
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very rough), that's why it sometimes makes
sense to put some light pressure on your (personal)self and others (the big
pressure is given by life itself) so you don't act like it is something
which you could safely ignore until it becomes obvious by itself (which will
be felt as suffering)
goodness. And who could be
the one if not all of us? Consider the "goodness wager": What is there to
lose if you believe that reality is fundamentally good (without making an
image what this has to mean, and without attaching to this belief, since
these may have bad consequences)
ess,
we fear the bad, but we also fear the good, we fear God, but we also fear
the devil, we fear everything, but also nothingness. No wonder we are
suffering if everything becomes a reason to be fearful. The only solution is
to discover directly that there is *nothing* that ever could threaten what
w
if it helps to develop faster (and undoubtably suffering
makes it very clear that something is going wrong, which is going to happen
a lot of times as long as you are ignorant about what's real and what's
important).
What do you think (or feel) about this idea? Isn't it too good to be
*false*
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 11/7/2011 12:02 PM, benjayk wrote:
>> I think we only fear the elimination of personhood because we confuse
>> being
>> conscious as an ego with being conscious. We somehow think that if we in
>> the
>> state of feeling to be a seper
meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 11/7/2011 9:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>> >
>>> > How great was that?
>> I don't know. Being a fetus might be a peaceful experience, or like
>> sleep.
>> But the point is that it doesn
a big change of perspective, and we fear that as we fear the
unknown in general.
benjayk
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--
You received this
ight be a peaceful experience, or like sleep.
But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was, since
what we are is beyond particular experiences (it is experiencing itself).
Even when I feel absolutely terrible I still am beyond all, I just don't
realize it. The very f
great burden is lifted from you. Unfortunately this
realization is rare, since it requires one to not buy into the dominant
collective delusion and deeply ingrained feelings of fear towards death of
self.
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
>> Neither
>> experientally, nor logically or scien
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/11/3 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you
>> can
>> >> be
>> >> conscious without there bei
hese things, we feel immensly treatened by the idea that
>> this is not at all what is important about us. It (apparently) reduces us
>> to
>> nothing.
>> But isn't it, when we face it from a more open perspective, tremendously
>> liberating and exciting? By
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> 2011/11/1 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> &
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