subject:"\"Re\\\: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry\""

On Apr 17, 3:45 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 12:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
>
> >> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* 
> >> don't have any
> >> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there.  Of course they are 
> >> entirely
> >> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>
> > I can turn on the internet by pushing a few buttons. That doesn't mean
> > that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet.
>
> I can invent irrelevant metaphors, but that doesn't mean I've made an 
> argument.

You can call the truth irrelevant because it is expressed through a
comparison, but that doesn't mean you've made a counter argument.

>
> > Atoms
> > being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
> > well.
>
> If the pattern changed your memory and/or function would change - as proven 
> in millions
> accidents and brain operations.

Accidents and brain operations change the brain itself, not just the
arrangement. A few molecules of LSD change the psyche. Not much of
anything is rearranged, it is only the substance itself which is
metabolized by the substance of the brain.

>
> > It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
> > recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves.
>
> A lot of stuff makes sense to you, because you define 'sense' to mean 
> whatever you need it
> to mean.

I don't need it to mean anything other than what it is. If you can
tell me how patterns interact with each other without sense, be my
guest.

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On 4/17/2012 12:27 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb wrote:

But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't
have any
sense at all - even though the atoms are still there. Of course they are
entirely
different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.

I can turn on the internet by pushing a few buttons. That doesn't mean
that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet.

I can invent irrelevant metaphors, but that doesn't mean I've made an argument.

Atoms
being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
well.

If the pattern changed your memory and/or function would change - as proven in millions
accidents and brain operations.

It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves.

A lot of stuff makes sense to you, because you define 'sense' to mean whatever you need it
to mean.

Brent

No byte
has every done anything by itself.

I think it may be the case too that the whole Standard Model rests on
a faulty foundation, so that although our measurements and
observations are assumed to be objective and universal, in fact they
are attributable directly to the common sense of matter which makes up
our instruments, bodies, and brain alike. Our view of the microcosm
assumes significance from the outside in, despite our own experience
of significance arising from the inside out as well. It may be that
there is a sense-making inertia which drives the arrangement of atoms
from the top down and from within. I have not seen this possibility
suggested by anyone else and it seems likely to me that it simply has
not been considered.

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On Apr 17, 3:05 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

> But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* 
> don't have any
> sense at all - even though the atoms are still there.  Of course they are 
> entirely
> different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.
>

I can turn on the internet by pushing a few buttons. That doesn't mean
that consequences of keyboard activity are causing the internet. Atoms
being replaced continuously changes the arrangement continuously as
well. It makes sense to me that patterns are dependent upon pattern
recognition and have no causal efficacy in and of themselves. No byte
has every done anything by itself.

I think it may be the case too that the whole Standard Model rests on
a faulty foundation, so that although our measurements and
observations are assumed to be objective and universal, in fact they
are attributable directly to the common sense of matter which makes up
our instruments, bodies, and brain alike. Our view of the microcosm
assumes significance from the outside in, despite our own experience
of significance arising from the inside out as well. It may be that
there is a sense-making inertia which drives the arrangement of atoms
from the top down and from within. I have not seen this possibility
suggested by anyone else and it seems likely to me that it simply has
not been considered.

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 4/17/2012 11:30 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 17, 1:49 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdbwrote:

On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged?  LOL

You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
balls instead of atoms?

That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.

My point is that they could not produce functional equivalence.
Function is not dependent only on 'arrangement' but on what is being
arranged.





What you are not considering is that just because the top level
consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
motive on other levels would not be retained.

Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?

I am made of nothing but atoms, so everything that I know is grounded
in the sense of atoms.


But a very slight rearrangement by your local anesthesiologist and *you* don't have any 
sense at all - even though the atoms are still there.  Of course they are entirely 
different atoms than were constituting you a year ago.


Brent


Either that or it appears as a metaphysical
entity out of nothingness when computational rituals are acted out
invisibly in the silent intangible void.

Given the choice between tracing the origin of awareness to evolving
substance and substantialized evolvingness in a vacuum it seems more
likely that they are both different aspects of the same thing rather
than one being a product of the other. If you could really have
Platonic awareness by itself, what would be the point of having such
relentless physical stability in the universe? If you could have
substance without awareness, why should awareness develop?

Craig



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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On Apr 17, 1:49 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged?  LOL
>
> > You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
> > balls instead of atoms?
>
> That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.

My point is that they could not produce functional equivalence.
Function is not dependent only on 'arrangement' but on what is being
arranged.

>
>
>
> > What you are not considering is that just because the top level
> > consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
> > motive on other levels would not be retained.
>
> Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?

I am made of nothing but atoms, so everything that I know is grounded
in the sense of atoms. Either that or it appears as a metaphysical
entity out of nothingness when computational rituals are acted out
invisibly in the silent intangible void.

Given the choice between tracing the origin of awareness to evolving
substance and substantialized evolvingness in a vacuum it seems more
likely that they are both different aspects of the same thing rather
than one being a product of the other. If you could really have
Platonic awareness by itself, what would be the point of having such
relentless physical stability in the universe? If you could have
substance without awareness, why should awareness develop?

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 4/17/2012 10:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged?  LOL


You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
balls instead of atoms?


That's right - so long as their arrangement produced functional equivalence.



What you are not considering is that just because the top level
consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
motive on other levels would not be retained.


Yeah, the sense level of atoms which you know about...how?

Brent



LOL

Craig



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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On Apr 17, 1:36 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
> So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged?  LOL
>

You think you'll be just as conscious if I arrange you out of golf
balls instead of atoms?

What you are not considering is that just because the top level
consciousness would be lost doesn't automatically mean that sense and
motive on other levels would not be retained.

LOL

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 4/17/2012 10:24 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Apr 8, 2:10 pm, meekerdb  wrote:


That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components 
rather than
of their functional organization.  There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) 
components
(e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious 
beings.

I can just as easily say that all components must have some degree of
consciousness themselves since we are made of the same kinds of atoms
as all things are. Assembly only changes the relative presentation of
some group of atoms to another group.


So you think you'll be just as conscious if your atoms are rearranged?  LOL


Brent


It has no power to summon
awareness from the void. To say that unconsciousness is obvious is an
argument from naive realism. We can't see consciousness in a human
body, why should we expect to see it in an atom's body?

Craig



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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On Apr 8, 2:10 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components 
> rather than
> of their functional organization.  There can obviously be zombie 
> (unconscious) components
> (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious 
> beings.

I can just as easily say that all components must have some degree of
consciousness themselves since we are made of the same kinds of atoms
as all things are. Assembly only changes the relative presentation of
some group of atoms to another group. It has no power to summon
awareness from the void. To say that unconsciousness is obvious is an
argument from naive realism. We can't see consciousness in a human
body, why should we expect to see it in an atom's body?

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-11 Thread Redshirt Bluejacket

As this topic is touching on both philosophical zombies and deism, I
recommend a reading of Bernardo Kastrup's essay, The parallels of
Pandeism: http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2010/03/consciousness-and-pandeism.html
-- wherein Kastrup observes "some intriguing parallels between the
debate around the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the philosophy
of Pandeism" which he finds "provides an intriguing, holistic view
encompassing all sides of the debate."

Kastrup defines Pandeism thusly:

"Pandeism is a school of thought that holds that the universe is
identical to God, but also that God was initially an omni-conscious
and omni-sentient force or entity. However, upon creating the
universe, God became unconscious and non-sentient by the very act of
becoming the universe itself."

And so, Pandeism is (naturally) both a kind of Deism and a kind of
Pantheism (and so we get from, Pantheist- Deism to Pan-Deism to
PanDeism to Pandeism).

On Apr 9, 9:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 1:18 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> >> A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
> >> of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
> >> consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
> >> visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
> >> visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
> >> removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
> >> zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
> >> component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
> >> consciousness even though the component didn't
>
> > This is where I find your argument confusing.  Consider an atom in the
> > brain.  Can you replace it with a zombie atom?  It doesen't matter, so long
> > as it acts like a normal atom it will contribute to consciousness.  The
> > brain as a whole will have normal consciousness even though the atom
> > doesn't.  But the consciousness never depended on the atom *having*
> > consciousness - only on the atom *contributing* to consciousness (by having
> > the same functional behavior).
>
> Yes, I agree with you; I don't believe it is possible to make a
> zombie. If it were possible then we would either need components that
> lack or don't contribute to intrinsic consciousness (if consciousness
> is an intrinsic property of matter or if consciousness is added via an
> immaterial soul) or components that lack or don't contribute to the
> functional organisation that gives rise to consciousness while
> possessing the functional organisation that gives rise to intelligent
> behaviour. It's an argument against zombies and against the
> substrate-dependence of consciousness.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >> you could modify the
> >> thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
> >> In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie,
>
> > No.  I can replace all the atoms with zombie atoms and the brain is still a
> > normal conscious brain.
>
> >> but
> >> adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
> >> consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
> >> are possible.
>
> > I agree with your conclusion, but your argument seems to imply that since
> > zombies are impossible, zombie components are impossible and so quarks must
> > have an element of consciousness.  It invites the fallacy of slipping from
> > 'contributes to consciousness' to 'has consciousness'.
>
> No, I don't think quarks are either conscious or zombies. I think
> consciousness arises necessarily from intelligent behaviour.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 1:18 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>> A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
>> of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
>> consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
>> visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
>> visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
>> removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
>> zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
>> component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
>> consciousness even though the component didn't
>
>
> This is where I find your argument confusing.  Consider an atom in the
> brain.  Can you replace it with a zombie atom?  It doesen't matter, so long
> as it acts like a normal atom it will contribute to consciousness.  The
> brain as a whole will have normal consciousness even though the atom
> doesn't.  But the consciousness never depended on the atom *having*
> consciousness - only on the atom *contributing* to consciousness (by having
> the same functional behavior).

Yes, I agree with you; I don't believe it is possible to make a
zombie. If it were possible then we would either need components that
lack or don't contribute to intrinsic consciousness (if consciousness
is an intrinsic property of matter or if consciousness is added via an
immaterial soul) or components that lack or don't contribute to the
functional organisation that gives rise to consciousness while
possessing the functional organisation that gives rise to intelligent
behaviour. It's an argument against zombies and against the
substrate-dependence of consciousness.

>> you could modify the
>> thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
>> In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie,
>
>
> No.  I can replace all the atoms with zombie atoms and the brain is still a
> normal conscious brain.
>
>
>> but
>> adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
>> consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
>> are possible.
>
>
> I agree with your conclusion, but your argument seems to imply that since
> zombies are impossible, zombie components are impossible and so quarks must
> have an element of consciousness.  It invites the fallacy of slipping from
> 'contributes to consciousness' to 'has consciousness'.

No, I don't think quarks are either conscious or zombies. I think
consciousness arises necessarily from intelligent behaviour.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-09 Thread meekerdb


On 4/9/2012 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:10 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdbwrote:


But is it an empirical question?  What would it mean for "neuroscience to
find zombies"?  We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any
physical
cause.  But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
that it was not conscious.  I think if we had a very detailed
understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people."  But if it truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the
difference
was.  Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
example.  So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors
-
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.

It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;


That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of
components rather than of their functional organization.  There can
obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons)
which when properly assembled produce conscious beings. So the inference
doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply
you can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.

A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
consciousness even though the component didn't


This is where I find your argument confusing.  Consider an atom in the brain.  Can you 
replace it with a zombie atom?  It doesen't matter, so long as it acts like a normal atom 
it will contribute to consciousness.  The brain as a whole will have normal consciousness 
even though the atom doesn't.  But the consciousness never depended on the atom *having* 
consciousness - only on the atom *contributing* to consciousness (by having the same 
functional behavior).



you could modify the
thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie,


No.  I can replace all the atoms with zombie atoms and the brain is still a normal 
conscious brain.



but
adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
are possible.


I agree with your conclusion, but your argument seems to imply that since zombies are 
impossible, zombie components are impossible and so quarks must have an element of 
consciousness.  It invites the fallacy of slipping from 'contributes to consciousness' to 
'has consciousness'.


Brent

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:10 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>> But is it an empirical question?  What would it mean for "neuroscience to
>>> find zombies"?  We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
>>> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any
>>> physical
>>> cause.  But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
>>> that it was not conscious.  I think if we had a very detailed
>>> understanding
>>> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
>>> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
>>> probably experiences numbers differently than people."  But if it truly
>>> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the
>>> difference
>>> was.  Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
>>> example.  So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors
>>> -
>>> but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
>>
>> It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
>> isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
>> analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
>> would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
>> would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
>
>
> That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of
> components rather than of their functional organization.  There can
> obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons)
> which when properly assembled produce conscious beings. So the inference
> doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply
> you can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.

A zombie brain component is a component that replicates the function
of the tissue it replaces but does not replicate its contribution to
consciousness, such as it may be. The visual cortex is necessary for
visual perception since if we remove it we eliminate vision. A zombie
visual cortex replicates the I/O behaviour at the cut interface of the
removed tissue but does not contribute to consciousness. If whole
zombies are possible then it should be possible to make such a
component. If you say the brain as a whole would have normal
consciousness even though the component didn't you could modify the
thought experiment to replace all of the brain except for one neuron.
In that case the replaced brain would be a full blown zombie, but
adding the single biological neuron would suddenly restore full
consciousness. This is absurd, but it should be possible if zombies
are possible.

>>  for
>> example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
>> was blind.
>
>
> There are people like.  But they are not partial zombie's.  You say "blind
> but behaved normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's
> impossible.

I agree it's impossible and that's why I think functionalism is right
and zombies impossible.

>> If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
>> zombies.
>
>
> Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of
> light?  We don't behave as if we can see it.

I'm not sure what you mean here. A zombie behaves as if it perceives
everything a conscious being does and nothing a conscious being
doesn't, while not actually having any perceptions at all.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-08 Thread meekerdb


On 4/8/2012 5:52 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/4/8 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdbmailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>  wrote:

But is it an empirical question?  What would it mean for 
"neuroscience to
find zombies"?  We have some idea what it would mean to find a 
soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any 
physical
cause.  But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to 
find
that it was not conscious.  I think if we had a very detailed 
understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot 
or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This 
zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people."  But if it 
truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the 
difference
was.  Of course humans don't all act the same, some have 
synesthesia for
example.  So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with 
colors -
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.

It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;


That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of 
components rather
than of their functional organization.  There can obviously be zombie 
(unconscious)
components (e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce
conscious beings. 



I could only say you're right and you're wrong. Consciousness and being is "lived" as a 
whole. From your own POV, you can't say "zombieness is an attribute of components rather 
than of their functional organization", because you feel it.


I didn't say it.  I said that was what Stathis argument assumed.

Whenever you say such thing, you can't be honest with yourself... that's not an 
argument. It's just proper English


Brent

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/4/8 meekerdb 

> On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  But is it an empirical question?  What would it mean for "neuroscience to
>>> find zombies"?  We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
>>> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any
>>> physical
>>> cause.  But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
>>> that it was not conscious.  I think if we had a very detailed
>>> understanding
>>> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
>>> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
>>> probably experiences numbers differently than people."  But if it truly
>>> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the
>>> difference
>>> was.  Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
>>> example.  So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with
>>> colors -
>>> but this would show up in the zombies actions too.
>>>
>> It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
>> isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
>> analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
>> would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
>> would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;
>>
>
> That doesn't follow.  It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of
> components rather than of their functional organization.  There can
> obviously be zombie (unconscious) components (e.g. quarks and electrons)
> which when properly assembled produce conscious beings.


I could only say you're right and you're wrong. Consciousness and being is
"lived" as a whole. From your own POV, you can't say "zombieness is an
attribute of components rather than of their functional organization",
because you feel it. Whenever you say such thing, you can't be honest with
yourself... that's not an argument. It's just proper English


> So the inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie
> components doesn't imply you can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.
>
>
>   for
>> example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
>> was blind.
>>
>
> There are people like.  But they are not partial zombie's.  You say "blind
> but behaved normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's
> impossible.
>
>
>  If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
>> zombies.
>>
>
> Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of
> light?  We don't behave as if we can see it.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
>> distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
>> if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
>> are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
>> either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-08 Thread meekerdb

On 4/8/2012 6:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb wrote:

But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to
find zombies"? We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
cause. But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed understanding
of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
probably experiences numbers differently than people." But if it truly
acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
but this would show up in the zombies actions too.

It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie;

That doesn't follow. It assmes that zombieness is an attribute of components rather than
of their functional organization. There can obviously be zombie (unconscious) components
(e.g. quarks and electrons) which when properly assembled produce conscious beings. So the
inference doesn't go the other way; the existence of zombie components doesn't imply you
can make a zombie, partial or otherwise.

for
example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
was blind.

There are people like. But they are not partial zombie's. You say "blind but behaved
normally" implying they behaved just as if sighted - but that's impossible.

If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
zombies.

Because we 'behave normally' without being able to see the polarization of light? We
don't behave as if we can see it.

Brent

If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 6:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

> But is it an empirical question?  What would it mean for "neuroscience to
> find zombies"?  We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some
> seemingly purposeful sequence of brain processes begin without any physical
> cause.  But I'm not sure what test you would perform on a zombie to find
> that it was not conscious.  I think if we had a very detailed understanding
> of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
> zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie
> probably experiences numbers differently than people."  But if it truly
> acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't be able to say what the difference
> was.  Of course humans don't all act the same, some have synesthesia for
> example.  So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with colors -
> but this would show up in the zombies actions too.

It's not an empirical question since no experiment can prove that it
isn't a zombie. However, I think that the question can be approached
analytically. If zombies were possible then zombie brain components
would be possible. If zombie brain components were possible then it
would be possible to make a being that is a partial zombie; for
example, that was blind but behaved normally and did not realise it
was blind. If partial zombies are possible then we could be partial
zombies. If we were partial zombies that would destroy the fundamental
distinction between consciousness and zombiehood: that at least I know
if I am conscious even if I can't prove it to others. So if zombies
are possible then zombies are no different to conscious beings. Hence,
either zombies are impossible or consciousness is impossible.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-07 Thread meekerdb

On 4/7/2012 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyiwrote:

On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:

Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?

The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
is
late-error detection.

But the late-error detection processing could be done in the same way
by a philosophical zombie. Since, by definition, a philosophical
zombie's behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a conscious being
there is no way that nature could favour a conscious being over the
equivalent philosophical zombie. You then have two options to explain
why we are not zombies:

(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
of consciousness.

Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.

Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
so I am not sure if this is relevant.

As I have written, conscious experience offers unique capabilities to tune
all running servomechanisms to the brain that otherwise it has not. This is
what neuroscience says. When neuroscience will find zombies, then it would
be possible to consider this hypothesis as well.

Clearly one can imagine that he/she is not zombie and others are zombies.
But then he/she must convince others that they are zombies.

I think you've missed the point. It is not necessary that
philosophical zombies exist, it is only necessary that the idea is
coherent. The question then is, Could philosophical zombies exist? If
you say no, then you are saying that consciousness is a necessary
side-effect of the kind of intelligent behaviour that humans display.
Do you believe that that is so, or do you believe that it is possible
for a being to be made that behaves just like a human but lacks
consciousness? You are free to dismiss this question as uninteresting
to you but I think it is still a coherent question.

But is it an empirical question? What would it mean for "neuroscience to find zombies"?
We have some idea what it would mean to find a soul: some seemingly purposeful sequence of
brain processes begin without any physical cause. But I'm not sure what test you would
perform on a zombie to find that it was not conscious. I think if we had a very detailed
understanding of the human brain we might be able to study and intelligent robot or a
zombie android at the same level and say something like, "This zombie probably experiences
numbers differently than people." But if it truly acted exactly like a human, we wouldn't
be able to say what the difference was. Of course humans don't all act the same, some
have synesthesia for example. So we might be able to say this zombie sees numbers with
colors - but this would show up in the zombies actions too.

Brent

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 2:37 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
> On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>>
>>
 Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
 side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
 Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?

>>>
>>> The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
>>> is
>>> late-error detection.
>>
>>
>> But the late-error detection processing could be done in the same way
>> by a philosophical zombie. Since, by definition, a philosophical
>> zombie's behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a conscious being
>> there is no way that nature could favour a conscious being over the
>> equivalent philosophical zombie. You then have two options to explain
>> why we are not zombies:
>>
>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>> of consciousness.
>>
>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>
>
> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
>
> As I have written, conscious experience offers unique capabilities to tune
> all running servomechanisms to the brain that otherwise it has not. This is
> what neuroscience says. When neuroscience will find zombies, then it would
> be possible to consider this hypothesis as well.
>
> Clearly one can imagine that he/she is not zombie and others are zombies.
> But then he/she must convince others that they are zombies.

I think you've missed the point. It is not necessary that
philosophical zombies exist, it is only necessary that the idea is
coherent. The question then is, Could philosophical zombies exist? If
you say no, then you are saying that consciousness is a necessary
side-effect of the kind of intelligent behaviour that humans display.
Do you believe that that is so, or do you believe that it is possible
for a being to be made that behaves just like a human but lacks
consciousness? You are free to dismiss this question as uninteresting
to you but I think it is still a coherent question.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

2012-04-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


Evgenii,

I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned,  
his conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a  
majority of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence,  
in a way he was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.


I can appreciate that. Nagel and others come frequently to that idea,  
but few seems even aware that the Aristotelian conception of reality  
might be flawed.





The difference with your point is that according to him, mind,  
knowledge, and self is not related to conscious experience that he  
has considered. Well, you go other way around from math, he  
presumably would not agree with you. In this respect, you might be  
right.


My point is just that mechanism and materialism are incompatible. I do  
relate consciousness with mind, knowledge and many notion of selves,  
which is rather normal in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.  
But I don't identify them, and I fail to understand what could be a  
theory of consciousness if it does not explain the feeling of those  
relations. Consciousness is usually thought to be lived by a subject,  
which is a knower, has a notion of self, etc.






Your statement

> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is  
doubtful

> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.

in my view, contradicts to empirical science.


Not necessarily. A theory of consciousness can have indirect  
consequences on matter or other 3-person phenomena. I am an  
empiricist, even if comp implies that the "real laws of physics" are  
deducible from reason alone. This means only that we can test comp  
empirically, by comparing what we observe and what we should observe  
with comp.





I believe that I understand what you mean, I think I understand your  
logic. Yet, I am not sure I understand what a research program on  
consciousness you offer.


Computer science, with the taking into consideration of the different  
possible person points of view.


Computer science minus computer's computer science gives the non  
provable part, which might explain the gap that we feel between  
consciousness per se, and the many possible content of consciousness,  
most being non provable.




What is the role of experimentalists in your research program?


To verify the consequence of our theories. Mainly, to refute them.  
When we are lucky enough.





On a related note. Prof Hoenen in his lectures of on Voraussetzung  
und Vorurteil (Prerequisite and Prejudice) talks quite awhile about  
Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics. According to Collingwood,  
your statements above seems to be an absolute presupposition, that  
is, a statement that we can take as it is but we cannot prove if it  
true or false.


Hmm... I am not sure. It is close to Descartes' argument, with a  
slight amendment:


"I doubt thus I think; I think thus I am ... conscious".

Thomas Slezak has defended that argument, by comparing it to the  
diagonal used in the Gödel's proof of incompleteness, where self- 
consistency appears as a fixed point of doubt. It means that self- 
consistency (Dt, ~Bf), is a solution to "x <-> ~provable x". The  
solution says about itself that it is not provable, making it true and  
not provable. This means that as far as you are correct (which you  
cannot know) you can bet (but bet only) on your self-consistency. This  
leads to a computational advantage (speed-up theorem), and it ends up  
to a (correct) belief that you can access an incommunicable truth,  
which seems to fit nicely with the notion of consciousness.


I am not sure I can make sense of a theory of consciousness not  
relying strongly on the first person notion, or on subjectivity. But I  
was probably exaggerating in saying purely first person, as the math  
experience is typically a subjective experience with a big third  
person sharable part.






It is worthy noting that during his historical analysis of absolute  
presuppositions, Collingwood came to the conclusion that monotheism  
was crucial for the success of the modern science. I have not read  
his book by myself, my knowledge is just from lectures, but this is  
a quote that I have found in Internet


“The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . .  
of the Christian belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent  
God.”


I think Christian took this from the Platonists. I think monotheism is  
only an anthropomorphic conception of monism. The idea that reality is  
one, consistent, true, and (partially) intelligible. Oh! I see you  
have a quote (by MJ O'Neill) going in that direction:


“I say “monotheistic science” following Collingwood’s contention that  
monotheism (Platonic or Christian), in contrast to Paganism, brings  
with it the idea that the universe is one, rationally ordered, and  
intelligible. See Essay on Metaphysics, Chapter X

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

2012-04-06 Thread meekerdb

On 4/6/2012 9:26 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Bruno,

I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his conclusion was
that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority of scientists) cannot explain
conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific
framework.

The difference with your point is that according to him, mind, knowledge, and self is
not related to conscious experience that he has considered. Well, you go other way
around from math, he presumably would not agree with you. In this respect, you might be
right.

Your statement

> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.

in my view, contradicts to empirical science. I believe that I understand what you mean,
I think I understand your logic. Yet, I am not sure I understand what a research program
on consciousness you offer. What is the role of experimentalists in your research program?

On a related note. Prof Hoenen in his lectures of on Voraussetzung und Vorurteil
(Prerequisite and Prejudice) talks quite awhile about Collingwood's An Essay on
Metaphysics. According to Collingwood, your statements above seems to be an absolute
presupposition, that is, a statement that we can take as it is but we cannot prove if it
true or false.

It is worthy noting that during his historical analysis of absolute presuppositions,
Collingwood came to the conclusion that monotheism was crucial for the success of the
modern science. I have not read his book by myself, my knowledge is just from lectures,
but this is a quote that I have found in Internet

“The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . . of the Christian
belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.”

Of course the regularity of nature is more consistent with a single god than with many
contending gods, but it is still more consistent with a deist god who creates the world
and then leaves it to itself than a theist god who answers prayers.

Brent

Some more what I have found to this end

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/03/collingwood-on-monotheism-and-science.html

The last paper on this page "Matter, Mathematics, and God" shows quite nicely a peculiar
role of mathematics in science. If physicists accept that Nature obeys to the laws
written by mathematical equations, then actually your position looks quite natural.

Evgenii

On 06.04.2012 10:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

...

When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and
panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not give
an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of
consciousness.

However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it
in the lab.

But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful

that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.

So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be a
theory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first person
view. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for a
notion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Most
research in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept the

following axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":

Kp -> p
Kp -> KKp
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)

and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and
(p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).

This is the modal logic S4. Gödel already knew that in any "rich"
theory, provability cannot obey those S4 axioms, and later Kaplan and
Montague have shown that there is just no way we can define such notion
of knowledge, in any third person way, capable of playing that role,
confirming that S4 bears on a pure first person notion.
Yet, as seen by many philsopher (from Theatetus to the old
Wittgenstein), we can "simulate", at the meta-level such a knowledge by
taking any theory of belief, and defining knowledge by a belief which
happens to be true, so that we get the first axiom above. By a result of

Tarski, we know already that truth ---about a theory/machine---cannot be

defined---by the machine or in the theory. Accepting the knowledge
account of consciousness (as the knowldedge of one truth, may be a
tautology or just the constant boolean "t") explains then completely why

consciousness exist (like a true belief), and why we will never find it
in the lab. Now, if the belief notion can be finitely defined in a third

person way, this entails the comp hypothesis, and this does not solve
completely the mind-body problem. Indeed we might say that such a theory

does solve the hard consciousness problem, but as the UDA sho

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

2012-04-06 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

Bruno,

I believe that you are unfair to Jeffery Gray. As I have mentioned, his 
conclusion was that the modern science (here as accepted by a majority 
of scientists) cannot explain conscious phenomena. Hence, in a way he 
was ready to reconsider the accepted scientific framework.

The difference with your point is that according to him, mind, 
knowledge, and self is not related to conscious experience that he has 
considered. Well, you go other way around from math, he presumably would 
not agree with you. In this respect, you might be right.

Your statement

> But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
> that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
> person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.

in my view, contradicts to empirical science. I believe that I 
understand what you mean, I think I understand your logic. Yet, I am not 
sure I understand what a research program on consciousness you offer. 
What is the role of experimentalists in your research program?

On a related note. Prof Hoenen in his lectures of on Voraussetzung und 
Vorurteil (Prerequisite and Prejudice) talks quite awhile about 
Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics. According to Collingwood, your 
statements above seems to be an absolute presupposition, that is, a 
statement that we can take as it is but we cannot prove if it true or 
false.

It is worthy noting that during his historical analysis of absolute 
presuppositions, Collingwood came to the conclusion that monotheism was 
crucial for the success of the modern science. I have not read his book 
by myself, my knowledge is just from lectures, but this is a quote that 
I have found in Internet

“The very possibility of applied mathematics is an expression . . . of 
the Christian belief that nature is the creation of an omnipotent God.”

Some more what I have found to this end

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/03/collingwood-on-monotheism-and-science.html

The last paper on this page "Matter, Mathematics, and God" shows quite 
nicely a peculiar role of mathematics in science. If physicists accept 
that Nature obeys to the laws written by mathematical equations, then 
actually your position looks quite natural.

Evgenii

On 06.04.2012 10:52 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

...

When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and
panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not give
an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of
consciousness.

However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it
in the lab.

But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is doubtful
that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only third
person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.

So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be a
theory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first person
view. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for a
notion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Most
research in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept the
following axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":

Kp -> p
Kp -> KKp
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)

and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and
(p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).

This is the modal logic S4. Gödel already knew that in any "rich"
theory, provability cannot obey those S4 axioms, and later Kaplan and
Montague have shown that there is just no way we can define such notion
of knowledge, in any third person way, capable of playing that role,
confirming that S4 bears on a pure first person notion.
Yet, as seen by many philsopher (from Theatetus to the old
Wittgenstein), we can "simulate", at the meta-level such a knowledge by
taking any theory of belief, and defining knowledge by a belief which
happens to be true, so that we get the first axiom above. By a result of
Tarski, we know already that truth ---about a theory/machine---cannot be
defined---by the machine or in the theory. Accepting the knowledge
account of consciousness (as the knowldedge of one truth, may be a
tautology or just the constant boolean "t") explains then completely why
consciousness exist (like a true belief), and why we will never find it
in the lab. Now, if the belief notion can be finitely defined in a third
person way, this entails the comp hypothesis, and this does not solve
completely the mind-body problem. Indeed we might say that such a theory
does solve the hard consciousness problem, but as the UDA shows, it
introduces a new problem: we have to justify the stability of the lab
itself from that theory of consciousness. That is nice because it leads
to the first explanation of why there is a physical universe, and it
makes physics a branch of psychology or theology. Then the constraints
of computer science gives se

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

2012-04-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Apr 5, 12:41 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

> We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that
> at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display
> than to employ other means.

That assumes that such a means was a prori possible. Why would it be?
It would probably be even simpler to create telepathy or omniscience.
Without any hint of explanation of where the potential for 'display'
could come from, I can't consider it a realistic possibility.

> On the other hand, the robotics has yet to
> prove that they can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals.
> This has not been done yet. One cannot exclude that the progress here
> will be achieved only when people will find a trick how a brain creates
> conscious experience.

It's not a trick. I think that every natural whole subject has
experience. A human being is a complex natural whole and it has a
complex experience. A robot is not a natural whole subject, it is an
assembly of parts. To get to natural wholes in a robot you have to get
down to molecules.

Craig

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

2012-04-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Apr 2012, at 22:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 05.04.2012 21:44 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Display to whom? the homunculus?


No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:

p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual
medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;


Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons? Is it an
immaterial soul stuff? Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap  
in the

theory?


It is just a placeholder. The modern science cannot explain the  
nature of that medium.




(2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;


Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.


It is the unconscious brain.



(3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its
usual electrochemical medium.”


Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.


Here it again the unconscious brain. As I have written,  
'consciousness display' just gives new possibilities to the  
unconscious brain to rule over all the servomechanisms.




Hence the unconscious brain does the job.


But the display is denoted 'conscious'? Is it not part of the brain?


It is an open question. For example Gray asks

“Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in  
this way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists  
have a clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4,  
disconnected from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot  
discharge the functions associated with the experience of colour.  
But, if we had a theory that started, not from function, but from  
brain tissue, maybe it would give a different answer. Alas, no such  
theory is to hand. Worse, even one had been proposed, there is no  
known way of detecting qualia in a brain slice!”.


No one knows. This is the state of the art.


I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I
perceive a three dimensional world, but this is another problem. In
his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a plausible scheme.


Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.

Brent



When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and  
panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not  
give an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of  
consciousness.


However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it  
in the lab.


But consciousness is a 100% first person "phenomenon", so it is  
doubtful that we will ever found it in the lab, where we can find only  
third person (or first person plural) describable phenomena.


So a theory of consciousness, or *about* consciousness can only be a  
theory acknowledging some principle or axioms about the first person  
view. This makes sense, if only because such axioms can be found for a  
notion deeply related to consciousness, and which is knowledge. Most  
research in the cognitive science , sufficiently theoretical, accept  
the following axioms for knowledge, with Kp interpreted as "I know p":


Kp -> p
Kp -> KKp
K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq)

and with modus ponens and necessitation as inference rule (from p and  
(p->q) you can derive q, and from p you can derive Kp).


This is the modal logic S4. Gödel already knew that in any "rich"  
theory, provability cannot obey those S4 axioms, and later Kaplan and  
Montague have shown that there is just no way we can define such  
notion of knowledge, in any third person way, capable of playing that  
role, confirming that S4 bears on a pure first person notion.
Yet, as seen by many philsopher (from Theatetus to the old  
Wittgenstein), we can "simulate", at the meta-level such a knowledge  
by taking any theory of belief, and defining knowledge by a belief  
which happens to be true, so that we get the first axiom above. By a  
result of Tarski, we know already that truth ---about a theory/ 
machine---cannot be defined---by the machine or in the theory.  
Accepting the knowledge account of consciousness (as the knowldedge of  
one truth, may be a tautology or just the constant boolean "t")  
explains then completely why consciousness exist (like a true belief),  
and why we will never find it in the lab. Now, if the belief notion  
can be finitely defined in a third person way, this entails the comp  
hypothesis, and this does not solve completely the mind-body problem.  
Indeed we might say that such a theory does solve the hard  
consciousness problem, but as the UDA shows, it introduces a new  
problem: we have to justify the stability of the lab itself from that  
theory of consciousness. That is nice because it leads to the first  
explanation of why there is a physical universe, and it makes physics  
a branch of psychology or theology. Then the constraints of computer  
science gives sense to this, because provability obeys to  
believab

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection


On 05.04.2012 21:44 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Display to whom? the homunculus?


No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:

p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium,
that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual
medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;


Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons? Is it an
immaterial soul stuff? Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap in the
theory?


It is just a placeholder. The modern science cannot explain the nature 
of that medium.




(2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;


Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.


It is the unconscious brain.



(3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its
usual electrochemical medium.”


Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.


Here it again the unconscious brain. As I have written, 'consciousness 
display' just gives new possibilities to the unconscious brain to rule 
over all the servomechanisms.




Hence the unconscious brain does the job.


But the display is denoted 'conscious'? Is it not part of the brain?


It is an open question. For example Gray asks

“Might it be the case that, if one put a slice of V4 in a dish in this 
way, it could continue to sustain colour qualia? Functionalists have a 
clear answer to this question: no, because a slice of V4, disconnected 
from its normal visual inputs and motor outputs, cannot discharge the 
functions associated with the experience of colour. But, if we had a 
theory that started, not from function, but from brain tissue, maybe it 
would give a different answer. Alas, no such theory is to hand. Worse, 
even one had been proposed, there is no known way of detecting qualia in 
a brain slice!”.


No one knows. This is the state of the art.


I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I
perceive a three dimensional world, but this is another problem. In
his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a plausible scheme.


Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.

Brent



When Gray considers would be explanations, he mentions dualism and 
panpsychism (for example quantum consciousness). Yet, he does not give 
an answer. His statement is that we do not have a theory of consciousness.


However, the phenomenon is there and he has shown how to research it in 
the lab.


Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 April 2012 20:58, meekerdb  wrote:

>> Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
>> implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
>> of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
>> macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.
>
>
> I think that's the story even if comp is false.

I certainly hope so, if comp is to be consistent with physics.

> Are you contemplating consciousness as a kind of equivalence relation that
> picks out the different branches of Everett's MWI, i.e. solves the basis
> problem of decoherence?  That would seem to make every quasi-classical
> object conscious.

Well, one could argue for a subjective perspective centred on every
quasi-classical object capable of instantiating the appropriate
structural relations, both internally and with respect to its
environment (to speak rather loosely).  It is instructive in this
regard to consider the effects of changes in brain structure on the
range of possible human conscious states, which are so obviously
dependent on such relations.  For example, from the various stages of
sleep, to the extreme impairment of the ability to integrate personal
history characteristic of late-stage dementia (which is close to
unconsciousness, I would speculate), culminating in the total loss of
appropriate function characteristic of brain-death.

>>  But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
>> the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives,
>
>
> To refer to 'subjective' perspectives seems to already assume consciousness.

Yes I am indeed assuming it, as indispensable to the account, not in
the sense of a causal role in the "physical" narrative, but rather in
terms of the "universal mind" heuristic. I hope it's apparent that I'm
not peddling some knock-down theory here, but rather proposing a
possibly illuminating way of thinking about the various states of
affairs that seem to require something supplementary to any possible
objective account. It seems to me that there are three features of the
subjective - but NOT the objective - account the presupposition of
which is both indispensable and irreducible:

(a) subjective localisation in terms of one of all possible such
states; but also
(b) the discontinuity and mutual exclusivity of such subjectively
localised states (i.e. what we usually conceive as change of
subjective location in time);
(c) the subjective integration ("emergence") of
epistemologically-composite states.

The heuristic I have described allows one to render a coherent
account, at least in broad outline, of the first two of these
features.  The final feature, that of the integration of
epistemological composites, seems to me a particularly strong argument
for the justification of consciousness as a "truth" as opposed to a
mere belief, in that there is simply no need of the hypothesis of
composition in the ontologically-reduced objective account. Be that as
it may, it has proved to be an elusive intuition for many.

David

> On 4/5/2012 12:39 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
>> other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
>> Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
>> implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
>> of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
>> macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.
>
>
> I think that's the story even if comp is false.
>
>
>> It also
>> entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
>> of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
>> features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
>
>
> Are you contemplating consciousness as a kind of equivalence relation that
> picks out the different branches of Everett's MWI, i.e. solves the basis
> problem of decoherence?  That would seem to make every quasi-classical
> object conscious.
>
>
>>  But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
>> the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives,
>
>
> To refer to 'subjective' perspectives seems to already assume consciousness.
>
> Brent
>
>
>> but at
>> a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
>> the reductive structural relation between states).
>>
>> David
>
>
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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 05.04.2012 21:39 David Nyman said the following:

On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:


Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.


Sure, if it is there, it could indeed be advantageous, if not
indispensable.  But such notions of course do not avoid the Hard
Problem.  Many independent considerations converge to suggest that -
as it bears on macroscopic physical evolution - consciousness in the
Hard sense will always be externally indistinguishable from
sufficiently intelligent behaviour, as Brent argues.  The problem with
"display" ideas about consciousness (compare, for example, Johnjoe
McFadden's EM theory) is that they must, in the end, be fully
justified in impersonal terms, and hence once again appeals to the
additional hypothesis of consciousness, at the relevant level of
description, will be redundant.

I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.  It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
  But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives, but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).

David


Gray's book is not a theory of consciousness, this is rather an 
empirical research with an outcome that the modern science cannot 
explain observation in that research. Gray also confesses that


“There are no behavioral tests by which we can distinguish whether a 
computer, a robot or a Martian possesses qualia.”


At the same time, he shows how to bring consciousness into the lab:

“These experiments demonstrate yet again, by the way, that the ‘privacy’ 
of conscious experience offers no barrier to good science. Synaesthetes 
claim a form of experience that is, from the point of view of most 
people, idiosyncratic in the extreme. Yet it can be successfully brought 
into the laboratory.”


Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 05.04.2012 21:38 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/5/2012 11:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:

On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
of consciousness.

Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.



Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical
studies.
Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy
philosophers,
so I am not sure if this is relevant.


I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
without reference to any putative conscious states

The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
our theories of how things are. Hence, in the case that either option
a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.

David


In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In
his book, Jeffery Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be
explained by the current science. According to him, a new science is
required.

Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness
display" could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it
is, but if is there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms
in the body.


But 'conscious display' is just putting another name on what he purports
to explain. Unless Gray can point to specific brain structures and
processes and explain why those structures and processes make
consciousness and others don't, he has done nothing to put new words on
"consciousness". Science needs *operational* definitions. Conversely, if
he can specify the structures and processes then we can instantiate
those in a robot and see if the robot acts as if it were conscious. I
think that will be the experimental test of a theory of consciousness.
If we can manipulate consciousness by physical/chemical manipulation of
the brain that will be evidence we know what consciousness is. Notice
that in the physical science we don't go around saying, "Yes, I know how
gravity works and I can predict its effects and write equations for it,
but what IS it?"


Science start with a research on a phenomenon. If to speak about a 
theory of consciousness then we are presumably close to the level when 
ancient Greeks would try to develop a theory of electricity. Yet, the 
phenomenon, for example lighting was already there and it was possible 
to describe it even then.


'Conscious display' is a metaphor, if you like then a placeholder. We 
cannot explain right now how brain produces consciousness and this is 
Gray's point. Yet, this does not mean that the phenomenon is not there. 
We just cannot explain it. In this respect, Gray's book is a very good 
example of empirical science, the theory of consciousness is however not 
there.


Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 4/5/2012 12:39 PM, David Nyman wrote:

I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.


I think that's the story even if comp is false.


It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.


Are you contemplating consciousness as a kind of equivalence relation that picks out the 
different branches of Everett's MWI, i.e. solves the basis problem of decoherence?  That 
would seem to make every quasi-classical object conscious.



  But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives,


To refer to 'subjective' perspectives seems to already assume consciousness.

Brent


but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).

David


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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection


On 4/5/2012 11:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Display to whom? the homunculus?


No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:

p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious 
perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in 
and between nerve cells;


Is it a physical medium, made of quarks and electrons?  Is it an immaterial soul stuff?  
Or is it just a placeholder name for a gap in the theory?




(2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;


Is the display conscious or the 'it' that's doing the inspection.



(3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual 
electrochemical medium.”


Sounds like a soul or homunculus to me.



Hence the unconscious brain does the job. 


But the display is denoted 'conscious'?  Is it not part of  the brain?

I should say that this does not answer my personal inquiry on how I perceive a three 
dimensional world, but this is another problem. In his book, Jeffrey Gray offers quite a 
plausible scheme. 


Doesn't sound anymore plausible than a conscious spirit.

Brent

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 April 2012 19:56, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.

Sure, if it is there, it could indeed be advantageous, if not
indispensable.  But such notions of course do not avoid the Hard
Problem.  Many independent considerations converge to suggest that -
as it bears on macroscopic physical evolution - consciousness in the
Hard sense will always be externally indistinguishable from
sufficiently intelligent behaviour, as Brent argues.  The problem with
"display" ideas about consciousness (compare, for example, Johnjoe
McFadden's EM theory) is that they must, in the end, be fully
justified in impersonal terms, and hence once again appeals to the
additional hypothesis of consciousness, at the relevant level of
description, will be redundant.

I confess this smells to me like the wrong sort of theory.  On the
other hand, if comp is true the story can be somewhat more subtle.
Comp + consciousness (the "internal view" of arithmetical truth)
implies an infinity of possible histories, in which natural selection,
of features advantageous to macroscopic entities inhabiting a
macroscopic environment, is a particularly consistent strand.  It also
entails parallel strands of "evolutionary history" - i.e. at the level
of wave function - which need make no reference to any such macro
features but nonetheless imply the same gross distributions of matter.
 But such a schema does entail a "causal" role for consciousness, as
the unique integrator of discontinuous subjective perspectives, but at
a very different logical level than that of "physical causation" (i.e.
the reductive structural relation between states).

David

> On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:
>
>> On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
>>
 (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
 is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
 (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
 for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
 of consciousness.

 Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.

>>>
>>> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical
>>> studies.
>>> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy
>>> philosophers,
>>> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
>>
>>
>> I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
>> nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
>> physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
>> pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
>> assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
>> complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
>> without reference to any putative conscious states
>>
>> The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
>> actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
>> our theories of how things are.  Hence, in the case that either option
>> a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
>> neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
>> the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.
>>
>> David
>
>
> In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In his
> book, Jeffery Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be explained by
> the current science. According to him, a new science is required.
>
> Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display"
> could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is
> there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in the body.
>
>
> Evgenii
>
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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

On 4/5/2012 11:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:

On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.

Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
so I am not sure if this is relevant.

I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
without reference to any putative conscious states

The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
our theories of how things are. Hence, in the case that either option
a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.

David

In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In his book, Jeffery
Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be explained by the current science.
According to him, a new science is required.

Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness display" could be
advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, but if is there, it certainly can
help to organize servomechanisms in the body.

But 'conscious display' is just putting another name on what he purports to explain.
Unless Gray can point to specific brain structures and processes and explain why those
structures and processes make consciousness and others don't, he has done nothing to put
new words on "consciousness". Science needs *operational* definitions. Conversely, if he
can specify the structures and processes then we can instantiate those in a robot and see
if the robot acts as if it were conscious. I think that will be the experimental test of
a theory of consciousness. If we can manipulate consciousness by physical/chemical
manipulation of the brain that will be evidence we know what consciousness is. Notice
that in the physical science we don't go around saying, "Yes, I know how gravity works and
I can predict its effects and write equations for it, but what IS it?"

Brent

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry


On 05.04.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:

On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:


(a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
(b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
of consciousness.

Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.



Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
so I am not sure if this is relevant.


I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
without reference to any putative conscious states

The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
our theories of how things are.  Hence, in the case that either option
a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.

David


In this sense, his conclusion is in agreement with philosophers. In his 
book, Jeffery Gray shows that "consciousness display" cannot be 
explained by the current science. According to him, a new science is 
required.


Yet, this does not change his hypothesis about why "consciousness 
display" could be advantageous for evolution. We do not know what it is, 
but if is there, it certainly can help to organize servomechanisms in 
the body.


Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection


On 05.04.2012 20:10 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/5/2012 9:41 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:

On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.

Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.

He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of
the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he
shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the theories
within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
consciousness, etc.).

According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It
is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this
is not that important.

He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares the
goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious level
but conscious experience binds everything together in its display. This
binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding)
but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we
consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in the brain
lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we cannot
consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.

Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
detection. That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are
running
on their own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution
viewpoint.

Evgenii


If an evolutionary advantage would be conferred by synchronization and
binding of data, why not just synchronize and bind the data
quantitatively? Parallel processing, compression, etc. Where would the
possibility of experienced qualities come in?


We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be
that at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious
display


But what constitutes 'a conscious display'. Display implies someone to
whom it is displayed.


than to employ other means. On the other hand, the robotics has yet to
prove that they can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals.
This has not been done yet. One cannot exclude that the progress here
will be achieved only when people will find a trick how a brain
creates conscious experience.


I think they will solve the problem of producing intelligent behavior
and just assume they have created conscious experience.



It is hard to predict what happens. Let us see.

Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection


On 05.04.2012 20:07 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/4/2012 11:58 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.

Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.

He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework
of the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but
then he shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the
theories within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
consciousness, etc.).

According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display.
It is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment
this is not that important.


Display to whom? the homunculus?


No, he creates an interesting scheme to escape the homunculus:

p. 110. “(1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, 
that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual 
medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells;


(2) it inspects the conscious constructed display;

(3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its 
usual electrochemical medium.”


Hence the unconscious brain does the job. I should say that this does 
not answer my personal inquiry on how I perceive a three dimensional 
world, but this is another problem. In his book, Jeffrey Gray offers 
quite a plausible scheme.




He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares
the goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious
level but conscious experience binds everything together in its display.


But why is the binding together conscious?


There is no answer to this question yet. This is just his hypothesis 
based on experimental research. In a way, this is a description of 
experiments. The question why requires a theory, it is not there yet.



This binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal
binding) but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For
example we consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in
the brain lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we
cannot consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.


Actually I can. It takes some practice, but if, for example, you are a
painter you learn to see things a separate patches of color. As an
engineer I can see a kite as structural and aerodynamic elements.


If you visually experiences this indeed, it might be good to make a MRI 
test to see the difference with others. This way you will help to 
develop the theory of consciousness.


I understand what you say and I can imagine a kite as a bunch of masses, 
springs and dampers but I cannot visually experience this when I observe 
the kite. I can visually experience this only when I draw it on a paper.




Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
detection.


But none of that explains why it is necessarily conscious. Is he
contending that any comparisons of expectations with reality
instantiates consciousness? So if a Mars Rover uses some predictive
program about what's over the hill and then later compares that with
what is over the hill it will be conscious?


He just describes experimental results. He has conscious experience, he 
has a brain, MRI shows activities in the brain, then another person in 
similar circumstances shows a similar activities in the brain and states 
that he has conscious experience. Hence it is logical to suppose that 
brain produces conscious experience.


There is no discussion in his book whether this is necessarily 
conscious. There are no experimental results to discuss that. As for 
Mars Rover, in his book there is a statement that ascribing 
consciousness to robots is not grounded scientifically. There are no 
experimental results in this respect to discuss.



That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running on their
own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution
viewpoint.


It's easy to say consciousness does this and that and to argue that
since these things are evolutionarily useful that's why consciousness
developed. But what is needed is saying why doing this and that rather
than something else instantiates consciousness.


This remains as Hard Problem. There is no solution of that in the book.


It seems that Gray is following my idea that the question of qualia,
Chalmer's 'hard problem', will simply be bypassed. We will learn how to
make robots that act conscious and we will just say consciousness is
just an operat

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry

2012-04-05 Thread David Nyman

On 5 April 2012 17:37, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>> of consciousness.
>>
>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>
>
> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
> so I am not sure if this is relevant.

I've always thought that the parable of the philosophical zombie was
nothing more than a way of dramatising the fact that fundamental
physical theory explicitly abjures any appeal to consciousness in
pursuit of its explanatory goals. All such theories are built on the
assumption (which I for one am in no position to dispute) that a
complete physical account of human behaviour could be completed
without reference to any putative conscious states

The zombie metaphor isn't intended as a challenge to how things
actually are, but rather to pump our intuition of explanatory gaps in
our theories of how things are.  Hence, in the case that either option
a) or b) were true, it would still seem unsatisfactory that that
neither conclusion is forced by any existing physical theory, given
the unavoidable observational truth of consciousness.

David

> On 05.04.2012 01:59 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 03.04.2012 02:06 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:
>>
>>
 Since there is no evolutionary advantage to consciousness it must be a
 side-effect of the sort of behaviour that conscious organisms display.
 Otherwise, why did we not evolve as zombies?

>>>
>>> The evolutionary advantage of consciousness, according to Jeffrey Gray,
>>> is
>>> late-error detection.
>>
>>
>> But the late-error detection processing could be done in the same way
>> by a philosophical zombie. Since, by definition, a philosophical
>> zombie's behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a conscious being
>> there is no way that nature could favour a conscious being over the
>> equivalent philosophical zombie. You then have two options to explain
>> why we are not zombies:
>>
>> (a) It is impossible to make a philosophical zombie as consciousness
>> is just a side-effect of intelligent behaviour;
>> (b) It is possible to make a philosophical zombie but the mechanism
>> for intelligent behaviour that nature chanced upon has the side-effect
>> of consciousness.
>>
>> Though (b) is possible I don't think it's plausible.
>>
>
> Jeffrey Gray considers consciousness from a viewpoint of empirical studies.
> Philosophical zombies so far exist only in the minds of crazy philosophers,
> so I am not sure if this is relevant.
>
> As I have written, conscious experience offers unique capabilities to tune
> all running servomechanisms to the brain that otherwise it has not. This is
> what neuroscience says. When neuroscience will find zombies, then it would
> be possible to consider this hypothesis as well.
>
> Clearly one can imagine that he/she is not zombie and others are zombies.
> But then he/she must convince others that they are zombies.
>
> Evgenii
>
>
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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

On 4/5/2012 9:41 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:

On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.

Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.

He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of
the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he
shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the theories
within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
consciousness, etc.).

According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It
is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this
is not that important.

He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares the
goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious level
but conscious experience binds everything together in its display. This
binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding)
but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we
consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in the brain
lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we cannot
consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.

Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
detection. That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running
on their own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution viewpoint.

Evgenii

If an evolutionary advantage would be conferred by synchronization and
binding of data, why not just synchronize and bind the data
quantitatively? Parallel processing, compression, etc. Where would the
possibility of experienced qualities come in?

We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that at the level of
neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display

But what constitutes 'a conscious display'. Display implies someone to whom it
is displayed.

than to employ other means. On the other hand, the robotics has yet to prove that they
can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals. This has not been done yet. One
cannot exclude that the progress here will be achieved only when people will find a
trick how a brain creates conscious experience.

I think they will solve the problem of producing intelligent behavior and just assume they
have created conscious experience.

Brent

Evgenii

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection

On 4/4/2012 11:58 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
The term late error detection as such could be employed without consciousness indeed.
Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning that I will try briefly describe below.

Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is, exactly about
qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.

He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of the normal
science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he shows that conscious
experience cannot be explained by the theories within a normal science (functionalism,
neural correlates of consciousness, etc.).

According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It is necessary yet
to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this is not that important.

Display to whom? the homunculus?

But why is the binding together conscious?

This binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding) but also
within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we consciously experience a red
kite as a whole, although in the brain lines, colors, surfaces are processed
independently. Yet we cannot consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.

Actually I can. It takes some practice, but if, for example, you are a painter you learn
to see things a separate patches of color. As an engineer I can see a kite as structural
and aerodynamic elements.

Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare expectations with reality
and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error detection.

But none of that explains why it is necessarily conscious. Is he contending that any
comparisons of expectations with reality instantiates consciousness? So if a Mars Rover
uses some predictive program about what's over the hill and then later compares that with
what is over the hill it will be conscious?

That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running on their own but then
conscious experience allows brain to synchronize everything together. This is a clear
advantage from the Evolution viewpoint.

It's easy to say consciousness does this and that and to argue that since these things are
evolutionarily useful that's why consciousness developed. But what is needed is saying
why doing this and that rather than something else instantiates consciousness.

It seems that Gray is following my idea that the question of qualia, Chalmer's 'hard
problem', will simply be bypassed. We will learn how to make robots that act conscious
and we will just say consciousness is just an operational attribute.

Brent

Evgenii

Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry: Late error detection


On 05.04.2012 01:43 Craig Weinberg said the following:

On Apr 4, 2:58 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

The term late error detection as such could be employed without
consciousness indeed. Yet, Jeffrey Gray gives it some special meaning
that I will try briefly describe below.

Jeffrey Gray in his book speaks about conscious experience, that is,
exactly about qualia. Self, mind, and intellect as such is not there.

He has tried first hard to put conscious experience in the framework of
the normal science (I guess that he means here physicalism) but then he
shows that conscious experience cannot be explained by the theories
within a normal science (functionalism, neural correlates of
consciousness, etc.).

According to him, conscious experience is some multipurpose display. It
is necessary yet to find how Nature produces it but at the moment this
is not that important.

He considers an organism from a cybernetic viewpoint, as a bunch of
feedback mechanisms (servomechanisms). For a servomechanism it is
necessary to set a goal and then to have a comparator that compares the
goal with the reality. It might function okay at the unconscious level
but conscious experience binds everything together in its display. This
binding happens not only between different senses (multimodal binding)
but also within a single sense (intramodel binding). For example we
consciously experience a red kite as a whole, although in the brain
lines, colors, surfaces are processed independently. Yet we cannot
consciously experience a red kite not as a whole, just try it.

Hence the conscious display gives a new opportunity to compare
expectations with reality and Jeffrey Grayrefers to it as late error
detection. That is, there is a bunch of servomechanisms that are running
on their own but then conscious experience allows brain to synchronize
everything together. This is a clear advantage from the Evolution viewpoint.

Evgenii


If an evolutionary advantage would be conferred by synchronization and
binding of data, why not just synchronize and bind the data
quantitatively? Parallel processing, compression, etc. Where would the
possibility of experienced qualities come in?


We do not know what kind of computing brain does. It well might be that 
at the level of neuron nets it was simpler to create a conscious display 
than to employ other means. On the other hand, the robotics has yet to 
prove that they can reach the behavioral level of for example mammals. 
This has not been done yet. One cannot exclude that the progress here 
will be achieved only when people will find a trick how a brain creates 
conscious experience.


Evgenii

Evgenii

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Re: Primitive Awareness and Symmetry