I've seen John Baez suggest that
On 17 Aug, 15:23, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote:
arxiv.org:0908.2063v1
Any comments?
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On 17 Aug, 20:49, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So the UDA is based on
On 18 Aug, 02:47, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:
AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
On 18 Aug, 00:41, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yep. I have no problem with any of that
Really? Let's see then.
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
statement like unicorns have one horn
On 18 Aug, 01:43, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
of Platonism as a non-observable background might
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So
On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
What do you mean by ontological existence?
Real in the Sense that I am Real.
What does that mean?
Do you mean real in the sense that 1-I is real? or
do you mean real in the sense
On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
the term in a way that
On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
run
a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement
On 18 Aug, 15:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
we
have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
arithmetical existence, if only because
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we see around us
is material, then the
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting
a statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about
reality and thus being forced to accept
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
So to save
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
rigorous spelling out
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from
contingent
structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
existence. It is not a structure of anything.
On 19 Aug, 21:49, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing *for*
eliminative materialism, except as
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
Only Bruno thinks computation trancends
On 20 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
So someone else noticed Peter dodging the consequences of what he
originally claimed with respect to Quinean paraphrase! Thanks.
What consequence was that?
On 20 Aug, 00:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example
On 20 Aug, 11:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:
Indeed, you don't believe in the number seven. But sometimes you seem
to believe in their mathematical existence, and that is all what I
need.
No. I always qualify mathematical
On 15 Aug, 02:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
(OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is
On 21 Aug, 17:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I
On 19 Aug, 15:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
can imagine that your consciousness supervene
On 26 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Just so. To recapitulate the (approximate) history of this part of the
discussion, Peter and I had been delving into the question - posed by
him - of whether a complete scan of a brain at the subatomic level
could in principle
On 27 Aug, 01:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The idea of 'being' somebody (or thing) else already assumes dualism.
It assumes some 'I' that could move to be Stathis or a bat and yet
retain some identity. But on a
On 21 Aug, 16:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Do you concede that many aspects of mind -- cognition, memory and so
on --
are not part of any Hard Problem?
Yes, absolutely. But I think our basic divergence is that I say you
can't
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
That's an interesting question and one that I think relates
On 21 Aug, 20:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote:
With UDA alone, of course not.
But AUDA does provides a a theory of qualia which explains why no 1-
person can and will ever explain the qualitative feature of its qualia.
It treats
On 26 Aug, 17:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
What about lower levels? Surely it doesn't matter whether 10,000 K+
cross the axon membrane or 10,001 cross. So somehow looking at just
the right level matters in the hypothesis of
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
perfom the computation on an abacus or within my
On 27 Aug, 20:11, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and hence that it can't
in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
be taken accounto fi in any
On 28 Aug, 02:20, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
the door is opened to some grander metaphysical speculation
concerning the nature of the world. For example, it is often noted
that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in
terms of their relations to
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured all
On 28 Aug, 09:50, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process
at
all. I
On 28 Aug, 12:53, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21
On 22 Aug, 00:38, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
explaining away qua elimination.
Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
below
On 25 Aug, 08:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
with the full force of necessity --
I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.
Where?
Well
On 28 Aug, 13:51, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Is functionalism monism, property dualism, or might it even be a form
of substance dualism?
Monism
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On 28 Aug, 17:07, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is responsible
for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
some form of naturalism/materialism or
On 28 Aug, 18:15, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
On 28 Aug, 22:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is
responsible
On 30 Aug, 22:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not
On 31 Aug, 00:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
1. It seems reasonable that relations must have relata. However,
relata
need not have a rich set of properties. You could build a physical
universe out
a single type of particle
On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer
considerable advantage.
If that's what the future held for me, then that's exactly what I
On 31 Aug, 19:15, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com
wrote:
If you suffer
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
generated
On 28 Aug, 15:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that
non
On 31 Aug, 17:57, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If the lower level is discarded, the qualia aren't there. So where
are they?
Since you find this mode of thought so uncongenial, let's focus on
this single issue for now. I don't
On 11 Aug, 16:38, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/11 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
Standard physicalism, on the other hand, by banishing self-access from
its fundamental notions of causal adequacy (though arrogating the
right to whisk a mysteriously powerless ghost of it
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, surely you must see that in saying abstracta are arrived at by
ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects you are simply
agreeing with Quentin that if everything is reduced
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
It's more an attempt to characterise our
metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That says nothing about qualia at all.
It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
just.
Really?
There is no possibility of a context-free
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
ontological
On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of
which is out of date?
Well, as well
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
I think his exploration of
the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on
the money.
So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
at some lower level can be said to
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia?
ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
is restricted to the sense of physical
On 2 Sep, 18:03, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
I think his exploration of
the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
the question
Well, a computation is a type,
A type of computation is a type.
A token of a type of computation
On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/3 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical
On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
Dear Peter,
the Yablo-Carnac-Gallois-Quine compendium is an interesting reading - except
for missing the crux:
You, as a person, with knowledge about the ideas of the bickering
philosophers, could do us the politesse of a brief summary
On 3 Sep, 17:12, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
I am fundamentally opposed to 'ontology', because I consider it explaining
the partial knowledge we have about 'the world' as if it were the total.
How much we don't know is somehting we don't know.
On 9 Sep, 01:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
1. Computationalism in general associates that consciousness with a
specific comptuer programme, programme C let's say.
2. Let us combine that with the further claim that programme C
causes cosnciousness, somehow leveraging
On 10 Sep, 14:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
It is strictly an argument against the claim that
computation
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