Re: subjective reality
On 05 Sep 2005, at 23:54, Saibal Mitra wrote:I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists. "Physical existence = mathematical existence" belongs to G* minus G.True but not provable. It is neither knowable, nor observable. Somehow "physical existence" is mathematical existence as observed by mathematical machines.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Norman, I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists. Saibal - Original Message - From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 09:33 PM Subject: Re: subjective reality > Hi Saibal, > While my simple mind believes that "mathematical existence = physical > existence," I do not assume that "we owe our existence to the mere existence > of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it." > To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence > is that "in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must exist." > If it's describable mathematically, then it "can" exist, somewhere in the > multiverse - therefore it "must" exist. Tegmark claims, for example, that > in his Level I multiverse, there is "an identical copy of (me) about > 10^10^29 meters away." (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1 7 Feb 2003) > > Norman > ~~ > > - Original Message - > From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Cc: > Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > > Hi Godfrey, > > It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality etc. > here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it > all all boils down to this: > > Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would generate > an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be similar > to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and > GR). > > The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the > transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state to > the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be the > case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when > interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would > violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because > the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you > believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you assume > that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a > machine that executes it. > > > Saibal > - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Saibal, While my simple mind believes that "mathematical existence = physical existence," I do not assume that "we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it." To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence is that "in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must exist." If it's describable mathematically, then it "can" exist, somewhere in the multiverse - therefore it "must" exist. Tegmark claims, for example, that in his Level I multiverse, there is "an identical copy of (me) about 10^10^29 meters away." (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1 7 Feb 2003) Norman ~~ - Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey, It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality etc. here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it all all boils down to this: Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would generate an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be similar to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and GR). The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state to the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be the case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you assume that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it. Saibal
Re: subjective reality
On 02 Sep 2005, at 21:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they point to otherwise you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable processes in the physical world! Please, read what I say. In this list everybody knows that I insist that comp (I am a machine) entails that there is no primitive "physical worlds", and that the appearance of a "physical world" should be non computational. It is the (comp) white rabbits. Reality is full of non-computable processes. "I am computational" entails that what I see should be non computational *a priori*, but then, by taking the incompleteness phenomenon into account, the reasoning inherit nuances from theoretical computer science. I have already sum up this by the slogan: [Me = a machine] entails [Not me, as seen by me, ≠ all machines].This is comprehensible only if you understand the difference between notions of first and third person point of view. It would be far easier to follow the 8 steps proof (instead of inferring and attributing propositions I have never made). The case of the general NON-computability of the results of individual measurements is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM does not in general compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite generally) but because we know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and furthermore, no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In fact the only other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute anything like the QM distibutions must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features that violate other well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by George Svetlichnybut I am sure you know the link so I need not include it.You make wrong inferences at each paragraph! But in any case nothing you allude to is relevant for the understanding that comp implies the reversal physics/computer-science/number-theory/machine-theology/. I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict" because physical theories are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing machines are very general (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding such algorithms and implementing them in special physical systems called digital computers to generate approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or any model of digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum computer by that matter)that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot!Of course. We know this since Deutsch wrote his fundamental paper on quantum universal machine.So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes (predicts) a whole lot lessthan QM and so, why should I care for it anyway?This is an interesting and hard question. Now, and this is not a coincidence, I think that the easiest and shorter explanation follows directly by the seventh first step of the UDA reasoning. The non-locality and the indeterminacy (and its measure) will be first person (plural) notion (subjective in the sense of Everett). In case UDA's non locality is provably different from the testable non-locality of our "empirical" most probable computational history, then we are done, comp, in the way I make it precise, would be refuted. But when we replace the YD type of grandmother intuition by the possible discourse of the self-referentially classical sound sufficiently rich Universal machine (alias the lobian machine), it appears that the intuitive grandmother indeterminacy inherits a mathematical structures constrained enough to derive, currently, the propositional physics (the logic of yes/no answer). Results have been obtained that this move leads to "some" quantum logic. What form of non-locality? Open problem. But precise enough to be formulated in a decidable theory.We care because the UD argument and its translation offer us a nice alternative by providing a test which either indirectly refute comp or give us an explanation of the origin of (propositional) physics, by traditional "natural" science use of OCCAM. In both case we will learn something which matters for tackling fundamental questions.I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run outof arguments and send people to your papersYou are still making inference. And negative one. From this I could quasi-deduce that you have some negative prejudices. This is rather paradoxical given that we agree!!! (Well, at the grandmother intuitive level). You believe comp is false (by believing YD false), and apparently you believe in some material reality, which is indeed incompatible (explicatively empty) with comp.You should actually appreciate my showing that comp "eliminates" all the physicalist token-substances, given that by believing in that physicalism, it makes you wise to be skepti
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality etc. here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it all all boils down to this: Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would generate an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be similar to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and GR). The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state to the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be the case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you assume that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it. Saibal From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Friday, September 02, 2005 09:34 PM Subject: Re: subjective reality > Hi Bruno, > > From the bottom > > [BM] > About the links: I know them. Thanks anyway. > > [GK] > Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they point > to otherwise > you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable > processes in the > physical world! You probably also have heard of books such of that by > Pour-El and > Richards which catalogue a good number of them from both classical and > quantum > physics but declined to read them as they don't agree with your > proclivities... > > The case of the general NON-computability of the results of individual > measurements > is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM does > not in general > compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite > generally) but because we > know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and > furthermore, > no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In > fact the only > other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute > anything like the QM distibutions > must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features that > violate other > well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by > George Svetlichny > but I am sure you know the link so I need not include it. > > I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict" because > physical theories > are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing > machines are very general > (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding such > algorithms and > implementing them in special physical systems called digital computers > to generate > approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or any > model of > digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum computer by > that matter) > that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot! > > So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that > means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes > (predicts) a whole lot less > than QM and so, why should I care for it anyway? > > I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run out > of arguments and send people to your papers... > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > > > > -Original Message- > From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: everything-List List > Sent: Fri, 2 Sep 2005 12:10:17 +0200 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > [BM] > Hi Godfrey, > > I answer some relevant (imo) comments in one post (for avoiding > mailbox abuse). > For your others paragraphs, I can only suggest you study the UDA > theorem > > > On 01 Sep 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > [RussellStandish] > > How does this affect Bruno's UDA? As far as I can tell, steps 1-6 go > through as before, but after that the conclusions are not so clear. > > > [Godfrey] > > But isn't step 1 the YD? > > > Good remark! (And Russell's answer does not really answers). > Glad to see you are going from step 0 (YD hypothesis mainly) to step 1 > (classical teleportation). What about step 2? > CF: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf > Explanat
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, From the bottom [BM] About the links: I know them. Thanks anyway. [GK] Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they point to otherwise you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable processes in the physical world! You probably also have heard of books such of that by Pour-El and Richards which catalogue a good number of them from both classical and quantum physics but declined to read them as they don't agree with your proclivities... The case of the general NON-computability of the results of individual measurements is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM does not in general compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite generally) but because we know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and furthermore, no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In fact the only other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute anything like the QM distibutions must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features that violate other well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by George Svetlichny but I am sure you know the link so I need not include it. I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict" because physical theories are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing machines are very general (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding such algorithms and implementing them in special physical systems called digital computers to generate approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or any model of digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum computer by that matter) that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot! So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes (predicts) a whole lot less than QM and so, why should I care for it anyway? I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run out of arguments and send people to your papers... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-List List Sent: Fri, 2 Sep 2005 12:10:17 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality [BM] Hi Godfrey, I answer some relevant (imo) comments in one post (for avoiding mailbox abuse). For your others paragraphs, I can only suggest you study the UDA theorem On 01 Sep 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [RussellStandish] > How does this affect Bruno's UDA? As far as I can tell, steps 1-6 go through as before, but after that the conclusions are not so clear. [Godfrey] > But isn't step 1 the YD? Good remark! (And Russell's answer does not really answers). Glad to see you are going from step 0 (YD hypothesis mainly) to step 1 (classical teleportation). What about step 2? CF: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf Explanation here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm [GK] Tsk, tsk Bruno! Now you are getting petty and condescending. I take it as a sign that this exchange as lasted longer than it should... > I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem was solved long time ago. [BM] ? What is the solution? [GK] The body perishes, the soul (and the damnation) is eternal! What else? > Sorry, but I don't follow here! You get physics but you loose theology!!! Why do you need the theology? [BM] Is not comp, through the YD, not already a hope in a form of reincarnation? [GK] For sure! If not a last grip on the myth for immortality. You tell me. [BM] I think we can have a scientific attitude (modesty, right of questioning hypotheses, methodological agnosticism) in the fundamental matter. I'm just interested in "theology" and particularly in "cosmogony": where and why information, sensations, space and time come from. [GK] Sounds very much like what the proponents of the " Theory of Intelligent Design" argue in this country. The question seems innocent enough but what is being asked is really whether one can disguise religious doctrine with just enough scientific verbiage to make it pass for a rival theory and fit it in school books? As I suggested before, that seems to be your real calling, "father" Bruno (;-) > I guess you are right. I think I am more confused about what you are saying than when we started this exchange. [BM] It is all normal. I see you don't grasp the point. More in my answer to Lee Corbin, about "computationalism". Bruno [GK] Well I read your answer to Lee and it cleared my confusion, thanks! You are indeed in a
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey,I answer some relevant (imo) comments in one post (for avoiding mailbox abuse). For your others paragraphs, I can only suggest you study the UDA theoremOn 01 Sep 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[RussellStandish]How does this affect Bruno's UDA? As far as I can tell, steps 1-6 gothrough as before, but after that the conclusions are not so clear.[GogfreyK]But isn't step 1 the YD?Good remark! (And Russell's answer does not really answers).Glad to see you are going from step 0 (YD hypothesis mainly) to step 1 (classical teleportation). What about step 2?CF: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdfExplanation here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem was solved long time ago.? What is the solution? Sorry, but I don't follow here! You get physics but you loose theology!!! Why do you need the theology?Is not comp, through the YD, not already a hope in a form of reincarnation?I think we can have a scientific attitude (modesty, right of questioning hypotheses, methodological agnosticism) in the fundamental matter. I'm just interested in "theology" and particularly in "cosmogony": where and why information, sensations, space and time come from. I guess you are right. I think I am more confused about what you are saying than when we started this exchange.It is all normal. I see you don't grasp the point. More in my answer to Lee Corbin, about "computationalism".About the links: I know them. Thanks anyway.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Sorry Godfrey, I take the opportunity to explain the use of CT in the search of the observability conditions. But I know people are not familiar with mathematical logic. Computer science is not well known either. Bruno On 01 Sep 2005, at 17:49, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Bruno, I appreciate your effort on my behalf but I am afraid I do not understand anything of your "explanation" below! Sorry! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 15:54:40 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? This is obviously technical, but in a nutshell (see more in the papers): By the UD Argument (UDA, Universal Dovetailer Argument), we know, assuming comp, that all atomic or primitive observer moment corresponds to the states accessible by the Universal Dovetailer (CT is used here). This can be shown (with CT) equivalent to the set of true *Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences* (i.e those provably equivalent, by the lobian machines, to sentences having the shape EnP(n) with P decidable. For a lobian machine, the provability with such atomic sentences is given(*) by the theory G + (p -> Bp). Now, a propositional event will correspond to a proposition A true in all accessible observer-moments (accessible through consistent extensions, not through the UD!). And this in the case at least one such accessible observer-moments exists (the non cul-de-sac assumption). Modally (or arithmetically the B and D are the arithmetical provability and consistency predicates), this gives BA & DA. This gives the "conditions of observability" (as illustrated by UDA), and this gives rise to one of the 3 arithmetical quantum logic. The move from Bp to Bp & Dp is the second Theaetetical move. Dp is ~B~p. Read D Diamond, and B Box; or B=Provable and D=Consistent, in this setting (the interview of the universal lobian machine). Part of this has been motivated informally in the discussion between Lee and Stathis (around the "death thread"). Apology for this more "advanced post" which needs more technical knowledge in logic and computer science. Bruno (*) EnP(n) = it exists a natural number n such that P(n) is true. If p = EnP(n), explain why p -> Bp is true for lobian, or any sufficiently rich theorem prover machine. This should be intuitively easy (try!). Much more difficult: show that not only p - > Bp will be true, but it will also be *provable* by the lobian machine. The first exercise is very easy, the second one is very difficult (and I suggest the reading of Hilbert Bernays Grundlagen, or Boolos 1993, or Smorinsky 1985 for detailled explanations). PS: I must go now, I have students passing exams. I intent to comment Russell's post hopefully tomorrow or during the week-end. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ __ __ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry- leading spam and email virus protection. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Good argumentation, Russell, however...: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: SNIP SNIP SNIP... >...From my point of view, it appears to be necessary to get the laws of physics as we known them. If there were people around with a different sort of mind, do they see a different sort of physics? Lots of questions. ... What 'sort of mind'? instead of 'what this sort'? Our ideational development parallelled the notions we formulated into our views about the world, including the model of a physical world, with all its habitual observations ("laws"), using something we nonchanatly call "mind". A different route would have (maybe) seen different factors for the evolution (=total history) of our universe and build a different model for the "physical" world. We are the 3D-Abbott people. We condone 2 poles in our physics: + and -, not more and have problems what to do with the 4th dimension (time) if we think reasonably. If one accepts my take on 'consciousness' as the acknowledgement of and response to information (not in the Shannonic sense), which is expandable to everything in the world (ideation etc.) 'we' - or whatever takes a 'thinking' role in a universe - would (maybe) recognize other factors and the 'model' for understanding the observations would be different. If such different mindset (?) would have invented colors and shade-compositions instead of numbers? Is it possible at all to free ourselves from the dungeon we incarcerated ourselves with our models? What may the 'mind' come up with, if it were free? New Nobel prizes? I doubt. The committee is enslaved. Please, take a deep breath and do not be angry at me! John Mikes
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 14:47:17 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? [GK] Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! [BM] Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM. [GK] As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer. [BM] But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL. [GK] What are you talking about!? Much stronger form of non-locality? By what measure? If that was the case than YD would be false by an even bigger measure!!! > Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the > trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patience >and the help of the many wonders of quantum states. [BM] No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so much computational. Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy and non-locality it implies. [GK] But isn't your UD a turing emulation? Any "hugeness" of indeterminancy and non-locality would only show that it is obviously false! Only the exact amount of indeterminancy and non-locality would sugget that it may not be "obviously wrong". Non-locality is a non-additive property, not a big pot from which you just take what you need!!! [BM] remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are classically emulable. [GK] But that does not much help you either if your brain produces correlations that are other than EPR! Than it is NOT a quantum computer either!!! [BM] You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and still want to say something. Bruno [GK] I guess you are right. I think I am more confused about what you are saying than when we started this exchange. Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, I appreciate your effort on my behalf but I am afraid I do not understand anything of your "explanation" below! Sorry! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 15:54:40 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? This is obviously technical, but in a nutshell (see more in the papers): By the UD Argument (UDA, Universal Dovetailer Argument), we know, assuming comp, that all atomic or primitive observer moment corresponds to the states accessible by the Universal Dovetailer (CT is used here). This can be shown (with CT) equivalent to the set of true *Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences* (i.e those provably equivalent, by the lobian machines, to sentences having the shape EnP(n) with P decidable. For a lobian machine, the provability with such atomic sentences is given(*) by the theory G + (p -> Bp). Now, a propositional event will correspond to a proposition A true in all accessible observer-moments (accessible through consistent extensions, not through the UD!). And this in the case at least one such accessible observer-moments exists (the non cul-de-sac assumption). Modally (or arithmetically the B and D are the arithmetical provability and consistency predicates), this gives BA & DA. This gives the "conditions of observability" (as illustrated by UDA), and this gives rise to one of the 3 arithmetical quantum logic. The move from Bp to Bp & Dp is the second Theaetetical move. Dp is ~B~p. Read D Diamond, and B Box; or B=Provable and D=Consistent, in this setting (the interview of the universal lobian machine). Part of this has been motivated informally in the discussion between Lee and Stathis (around the "death thread"). Apology for this more "advanced post" which needs more technical knowledge in logic and computer science. Bruno (*) EnP(n) = it exists a natural number n such that P(n) is true. If p = EnP(n), explain why p -> Bp is true for lobian, or any sufficiently rich theorem prover machine. This should be intuitively easy (try!). Much more difficult: show that not only p -> Bp will be true, but it will also be *provable* by the lobian machine. The first exercise is very easy, the second one is very difficult (and I suggest the reading of Hilbert Bernays Grundlagen, or Boolos 1993, or Smorinsky 1985 for detailled explanations). PS: I must go now, I have students passing exams. I intent to comment Russell's post hopefully tomorrow or during the week-end. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 12:30:20 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has > not been solved. [BM] Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build-in solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are aware of the problem. [GK] I would leave the "soul" out of my statements. The soul-body problem was solved long time ago. [BM] > They would probably would also agree > that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over > the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind > stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body-> stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you > try to figure > out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your > attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? [BM] Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just numbers and their dreams ... [GK] What do numbers dream about? And do the name sheep to go to sleep? > You do however > invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of > YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no? [BM] YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically exist, only that "I" exists and that I am supported by a relatively stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning. [GK] It seems to me that most of your statements mention assumptions that you accept as starting points only to show that they are not needed in the end! If you assume that the I is "only supported by a stable sheaf of computations" aren't you already assuming what you mean to prove? > I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain > (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) [BM] I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non, turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to abandon arithmetical realism. [GK] This is patently false and even more so in your much loved platonic realm which is quite infested with non-digitally computable entities. Turing was careful to provide an example called the Halting problem and he also proved that most real numbers are incomputable but there are many others problems that have been proved Turing un-computable over the years and mathematicians keep finding such instances (tilling problems are one big source of examples). Furthermore people that work in neural network Learning Theory have began to show that there are by-example methods for leaning uncomputable problems which I think are very relevant to this question. Read for example: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/lathrop96learnability.html In physics it is a bit more dificult to argue the uncomputability of natural processes whose phenomenology one has not studied fully but there are surely instances of uncomputable within physical theories that we already know. A classical paper on these issues in cosmology is by Hartle and Geroch. You will find it at: www.cs.columbia.edu/~library/TR-repository/reports/reports-1997/cucs-012- 97.ps.gz There is also a recent book on the subject (which I have not seen) by Barry Cooper and Piergiorgio Onifreddi. You can read a review of it at http://fgc.math.ist.utl.pt/in.pdf About QM the problem is not simulating indeterminancy but simulating quantum correlations by local mecanistic means which is how Turing machines compute! Failed attempts to produce such emulations by Wolfram are what makes his book well... ridiculous!!! Abou
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell Thanks for the long exposition. I am not sure I can do it justice but I will give it a shot... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 1 Sep 2005 09:36:08 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality On Wed, Aug 31, 2005 at 09:59:33AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [GK] > Now I am confused! So you do not believe Bruno's COMP=YD+CT+AP > but you still believe it is a good enough approximation of reality to > "deliver most of physics as we know it today". Are you saying that, > without assuming COMP you derive all of that physics? I guess I > will have to read your book but a Yes/No answer would help me > decide whether I want to read it at all... > > I would rather argue out your assumptions because, as you may > agree, measures of metaphysical extravagance tend to be a bit, > if I may use the word, subjective. I am much more interested in > how one can empirically decide whether a metaphysical thesis > is indeed too extravagant to be true. > > Best regards, > > -Godfrey > [RS] The Maudlin Olympia/Klara argument (equivalently Marchal's filmed graph argument) has convinced that the brain is quantum mechanical to some extent. I am largely unimpressed by the works of others who've argued this point, however, eg Penrose, Stapp or Lockwood. I'm sceptical that the brain is a quantum computer. My suspicions, which I argue in my book, as well as many times on this list, is that a certain amount indeterminism is exploited, and indeed perhaps required by consciousness. Thus it would negate the strictest version of YD - one would not survive with your "brain" replaced by a Turing machine. However, I do think it is possible to replace one's brain by a machine of some sort, provided one doesn't restrict it to the Turing class of machines. [GK] Now I find that a much more reasonable position than that of Bruno's and pretty much akin to my own proclivities on the subject! I too am not convinced by Penrose et al. but I have some grounded suspicion that the brain is not Turing emulable. Even John Searle agrees that the brain is a machine of some sort, just not a Turing-like machine! [RS] How does this affect Bruno's UDA? As far as I can tell, steps 1-6 go through as before, but after that the conclusions are not so clear. [GK] But isn't step 1 the YD? [RS] Now as for deriving physics from properties of the observer, what I've achieved is a derivation of the following quantum mechanical postulates: 1) That states are vectors in a complex Hilbert space 2) These vectors evolve according to a unitary differential equation (aka Schrodinger equation) 3) The Born rule There is usually only one other postulate given in QM, the so called correspondence principle, which connects the quantum world with the classical. I have not obtained the correspondence principle, but Vic Stenger gets most of the way by appeal to gauge invariance. [GK] I don't find any of the above (axioms) very hard to derive from classical local assumptions. Indeed Schrodinger derived his equations from classical mechanics (plus the de Brogie ansatz). But this is NOT the whole of quantum mechanics as I am sure you know. It also does not sound like a one way ticket to a MW version of QM but it is surely closer than to conventional QM. [RS] My assumptions for obtaining these postulates? 1) The "everything" assumption, or that we are seeing a single possibility from the ensemble of all possibilities. This is roughly equivalent, I believe to Bruno's Arithmetic Platonism, however strictly speaking it is identical to assuming the existence of the output of his universal dovetailer. 2) A uniform measure on the ensemble of possibilities 3) A subjective experience of time. By this, I mean that we perceive an ordered series of "observer moments" (using the terminology of this list), or "worlds" to use say Modal logic terminology. Being ordered, they can be mapped to the real numbers by an order preserving map, and this defines a unique topology. By fixing the map (which is arbitrary), one induces a metric upon time, or in other words defines a clock. This is the physicist's notion of time - coordinate time and proper time. 4) Our knowledge of the world is updated according to an evolutionary process. I apply Lewontin's 3 criteria of evolutionary processes, variation, selection and heritability. Our successor "observer moment" is selected from the range of possible observer moments according to a probability distribution, from heritability we get unitary differential evolution. [GK] That sounds quite interesting to me already, if you can do that much, though I cannot vouch for any of those assumptions (except perha
Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:11, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? This is obviously technical, but in a nutshell (see more in the papers):By the UD Argument (UDA, Universal Dovetailer Argument), we know, assuming comp, that all atomic or primitive observer moment corresponds to the states accessible by the Universal Dovetailer (CT is used here). This can be shown (with CT) equivalent to the set of true *Sigma_1 arithmetical sentences* (i.e those provably equivalent, by the lobian machines, to sentences having the shape EnP(n) with P decidable. For a lobian machine, the provability with such atomic sentences is given(*) by the theory G + (p -> Bp). Now, a propositional event will correspond to a proposition A true in all accessible observer-moments (accessible through consistent extensions, not through the UD!). And this in the case at least one such accessible observer-moments exists (the non cul-de-sac assumption). Modally (or arithmetically the B and D are the arithmetical provability and consistency predicates), this gives BA & DA. This gives the "conditions of observability" (as illustrated by UDA), and this gives rise to one of the 3 arithmetical quantum logic. The move from Bp to Bp & Dp is the second Theaetetical move. Dp is ~B~p. Read D Diamond, and B Box; or B=Provable and D=Consistent, in this setting (the interview of the universal lobian machine). Part of this has been motivated informally in the discussion between Lee and Stathis (around the "death thread"). Apology for this more "advanced post" which needs more technical knowledge in logic and computer science.Bruno(*) EnP(n) = it exists a natural number n such that P(n) is true. If p = EnP(n), explain why p -> Bp is true for lobian, or any sufficiently rich theorem prover machine. This should be intuitively easy (try!). Much more difficult: show that not only p -> Bp will be true, but it will also be *provable* by the lobian machine. The first exercise is very easy, the second one is very difficult (and I suggest the reading of Hilbert Bernays Grundlagen, or Boolos 1993, or Smorinsky 1985 for detailled explanations).PS: I must go now, I have students passing exams. I intent to comment Russell's post hopefully tomorrow or during the week-end. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 17:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Brent MeekerWhy do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! Just to be clear: comp gives the comp-correct physics, and from what can be qualitatively and/or quantitatively already be derived, YD is inconsistent with SWE + collapse. I guess you mean QM = Copenhagen QM. As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer.But YD entails much stronger form of non-locality! As, a priori, YD entails very strong form of non-locality. Proof: see the UDA in my URL. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patienceand the help of the many wonders of quantum states.No. If comp contradicts physics, it will be so by comp being much more non-local and much more non-deterministic (from the observers viewpoints). The mystery is that with comp physics could appears so much computational. Remember that if comp is true, whatever the physical universe appears to be it cannot be the output of a computation, nor can it be the result of a turing emulation other than a UD. Only the taking into account of incompleteness show that comp cannot be obviously false, as it could seem to be when you understand the hugeness of indeterminacy and non-locality it implies.remember also that comp (and thus YD ) is not incompatible with my brain being a quantum computer. Reason: quantum computer are classically emulable.You should read the proof, I think you have not yet grasped the enunciation of the result. It is all normal given the novelty. What seems to me to be less normal is that you don't want to read it and still want to say something.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not been solved. Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build- in solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are aware of the problem. They would probably would also agree that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body- stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just numbers and their dreams ... You do however invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no? YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically exist, only that "I" exists and that I am supported by a relatively stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning. I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non, turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to abandon arithmetical realism. to so if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all? This is the eleventh time you confuse "p -> q" with "q -> p". Unless (here) you mean by "demolish YD", the non use of YD in the translation of UDA in arithmetic. Why not proceed to that interview directly? You can. But this is like going from physics to the study of differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability *must* obey to the Bp -> Dp rule (probability one of p entails the probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the comp- physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp -> Dp rule in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the link with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that "science" has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in case comp is true). Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my opinion... You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive science). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, Thanks for your clarifying comment. Yes I think that is the basis of my objection to Bruno and I am glad someone has gotten it! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Finney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 14:20:00 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: subjective reality I wade into this dispute with trepidation, because I think it is for the most part incomprehensible. But I believe I see one place where there was a miscommunication and I hope to clear it up. Godfrey Kurtz wrote, to Bruno Marchal: You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim. What is this incompatibility? I believe he means it to be the following. Bruno had written: This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. And yet, Bruno claims that his methods will lead to a derivation of physics, which as far as we know includes QM. Godfrey sees the previous quote from Bruno as indicating that his "Yes Doctor" starting point is *incompatible* with QM. This is the contradiction that he sees. I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he was referring to above. Hal Finney Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 18:12:43 -0700 Subject: Re: subjective reality [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > -Original Message- > From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > > On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have > concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two > of your premises (CT & AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though > they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic > evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that > "one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a "digital computer" without prejudice to that experience". > Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to your derivation of the *whole of physics* you > cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware > of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis, > in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such > replacement (which I assume might involve some > physical interventions). YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it. In fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be almost completely classical. So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would have to inconsistent with classical physics. Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Brent Meeker Hi Brent, At this stage of the argument I feel like answering: because Bruno thinks so! But you deserve a better answer. I don't quite think your statements above are quite accurate and one does not surely follow from the other. Human experience is surely NOT an epiphenomenon of brain activity though SOME of it very likely is. To me, at least human experience includes things like: we are born, we eat, we grow, we play, we work, we meet other people, we learn to dance, we drive cars, we get into accidents, we get sick, we go to war, we run into bullets, we get old, we forget, we die. It also includes things like, we are happy, we are sad, we pain, we dream, we crave, we wonder, we prove theorems. See what I mean? Are all these epiphenomena of barin activity? I don't think you can say that about the first set though I am sure you have experienced some of what I describe. About the second set you may be more convinced but I am sure you have heard the word "intensionality" associated to at least some of those. It reminds us that some of our so called "mental states" (brain configurations if you prefer" have a certain directionality to them usually pointing to events that we take to be consensually external to us. So maybe you want to widen a bit your concept of 'human experience" above. As I stated before I believe it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which you can falsify, by a non-local quantum mechanical experiment the type of hypothesis that Bruno calls YD, meaning one scenario in which all your experience (by which I mean what I describe above) is, at some point in your life, replaced by a suitably programmed digital computer. Bruno states that he actually knows this to be the case that is the reason I have not given myself the trouble to try and sharpen up the argument. But I am quite confident that this can be done with a bit of patience and the help of the many wonders of quantum states. As far as I can tell you are correct in that Classical Mechanics does not, a priori, forbid such "operation" if the brain is indeed a fully classical functional system and Tegmark's argument has obvious merit. On the other hand there may be other "technical" impediments to this "avatar" that we don't know about since we do not really know much about brain function and surely about how it really pins down human experience (in the narrow or wide sense). Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 13:08:16 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it simpler for reason of clarity. Copenhagen QM: SWE Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observation Everett QM: SWE comp theory of observation/cognition Your servitor: comp. The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic) superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the "collapse" is far more speculative. [GK] You are probably right about this but I would say it differently: there is no Quantum Theory of "collapse" though something quite like that needs to occur to produce the classical world we know. Anything beyond this is... speculation either way! It is incorrect to say that "EQM explains collapse" because in EQM there is no collapse. It is also incorrect to say that EQM includes COMP for the reasons I already stated to you out of Preskill's lectures. [BM] The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why the quantum computations wins the "observability conditions" on the (well defined by Church Thesis) collection of all computations. This is not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got. [GK] This I don't quite follow. Sorry! How are "conditions of observability" defined by CT? [BM] For comp "philosophers of mind" (Alias theoretical cognitive scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a "correction" of the "old" Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's incompleteness. [GK] If I remember it right this is an argument that aims to show why a "mathematician" cannot be a "digital computer". Does your correction make it a better argument? I take it you are saying that it is correct after all! [GK] >From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either > 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify >those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see that >theory if you have it! [BM] On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic operates on nature). From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical features did appeared. [GK] I take it that this means you are trying out the route I labelled (1) or that you think that is the way to go. I am not sure that "quantum logic operates on nature" because there isn't one but many "quantum logics" and I am not acquainted with one that reproduces the quantum formalism with all its quirks. But what you say above already denotes the use of some "non-boolean" logic from where I sit. 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable [BM] This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable). [GK] So it is (1), I guess! [GK] >and that would only require > that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same. [BM] That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Rec
Re: subjective reality
Hi, Bruno, Thanks for your considerate reply and for whatever you expressed your consent to. I try to address the rest: --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > You are using human natural science and human > science (history) to > relativize religion. > And then you are doing the same to relativize an, > admittedly > widespread, "religious" belief in science (say). > "Religious" with quote is always put for some > pejorative view of > religion, that is a view with "authoritative > arguments". > > Somehow let me say that I agree > 99,...%. But it remains a stubbornly > infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I > totally follow your critical conclusions on the > "religious" science). > > To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with > both Descartes > systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue > is at the origin > of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist > notion of *the > center of the wheel" which provides a good image. JM: I always had doubts about that 'center of the wheel' idea: it MOVES with the wheel, whether we see it or not. > BM: > Of course I don't know what is a human being. JM: I am just working on how to view it (us?) - not as the 'model' (remember my term) but as a non-entity within the totality, interconnected with 'them all' but in various efficiency (strength? depth? closeness?) which must be a natural(?) distinction in our 'modeling'. It may lead to a tie between wholistic and reductionist views beyond "our choice and taste". I am tempted to apply (my so far denied) 'attractor' concept used lately on the list by Ben Goertzel's blog. >BM: > But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty, > I have *choosen* a theory, and I have > even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we > can derive precise conclusions. All what I say must > be remembered as having been > casted in the frame of that theory. (JM: Precision exactly pertinent to the "model" ways by cutting out the uncomputable 'rest of the world') > >BM: > > Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your > strategy. If human > are machines, by using human sciences to relativize > human science, > you will applied a computable transformation on the > space of the > computable transformations, and it can be shown that > you will get a > fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all > its points- > propositions will move (put in doubt) and be > relativized except one: > the center of the wheel. > > What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science > itself, but > where science is understood as an ideal of > communication conditionned > by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget > this; most forget > this when talking on colleagues' fields). JM: see my remark above. The fixed point is moving around and can be regarded fixed only in a model-view of itself - the reductionist "science" I mean. I see no real disagreement, I just continue into a wholistic image. > > JM earlier: > > I differentiate also the "simulation" model, as > the > > mathematical or physical simulation of a thing to > > make it 'understandable(?) > > There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it > helped > > us to all we know of the world and to our > technology. > > Not to 'understanding' the connections. > BM: > Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with > understanding 'understanding' JM: a loaded word! > > Wriong it is, > > if we draw 'universal' conclusions from > considerations > > upon a model - and regard it universally valid. > > BM: > I have no models in that sense. The theory which is > isolated from the > machine's interview is embeddable in number theory. > > > As in the ['topically reduced' models called the] > > sciences (including I think logics, which is cut > > to the thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind). My Mail does not take a longer post and 'lost' the rest of your writing, sorry John M
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 15:47:38 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] >Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: "Could your argument be > made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require > you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?". Just a thought... [BM] Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has always been to just explain that the "mind-body" problem has not been solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen as "just" a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp, I have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive science. Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances. [GK] That actually makes a bit more sense to me (surely more than your other response!) I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not been solved. They would probably would also agree that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body-stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right? You do however invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no? I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable) to so if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all? Why not proceed to that interview directly? Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my opinion... Godfrey Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell Thanks for your lucid comments. Maybe you are a better advocate of Bruno's than Bruno himself... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 09:30:07 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality > > > [GK] > Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's: > > On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > [GK] > > > > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM > which > > > > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus > Collapse, by the way. > > > > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that > does it > > > > (and entanglement, of course!) > > > > [BM] > >This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus > YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. [RS] All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch. [GK] That would be fine if it was really what he is saying! But he insists that "it is not out of the question that he can derive collapse" from the same premises. My point is that you can't have it both ways. > > [GK] > I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way > and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day > and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims > before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these > theories are just poorly put together. > [RS] That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding propositions should be eliminated wherever possible. However, the "claim" (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our understanding of consciousness improves, then "ontological reversal" will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately morphed to yield better theories. [GK] What you are here circumscribing with your careful prose is exactly the domain of philosophical speculation --- for which I have much regard but try not to confuse with that of scientific prediction. One of the most intriguing novelties which quantum mechanics has made possible is the settling of some specific items of speculation by empirical means, and the creation of what some people call "experimental metaphysics". That was the case of the Bell-EPR experiments which showed that a good number of speculative departures from QM (local hidden-variable theories) are largely inviable. Clearly we do not know what the limits are to this type of approach but the parts of it that we already have settled should definitely bind our future speculation. I have not had a chance to check your book but, from the posts about it, I confess I am much intrigued about it. When I manage to go thru it I will try and give you some feed back along the same lines as I have done with Bruno. [RS] The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP, ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality false. Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be intrigued in generalization of the COMP argument. However, I find that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological "cycle" with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can appreciate that it is a test of the theory. [GK] Now I am confused! So you do not believe Bruno's COMP=YD+CT+AP but you still believe it
Re: subjective reality
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: "Could your argument be made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?". Just a thought... Perhaps I should give you my original motivation. My deeper goal has always been to just explain that the "mind-body" problem has not been solved. In term of the mind body problem, what I have done can be seen as "just" a reduction of a problem into another. With the comp hyp, I have reduced the mind-body problem to the problem of explaining the appearance of the physical laws from arithmetic/computer science. For this YD is needed, if only to make palpable the relation with cognitive science.Then I interview the machine and YD is eliminated, although we should need to dig a little more in the technics for adding some nuances.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On 30 Aug 2005, at 18:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! My view, as addressed to physicist, is the following. I make it simpler for reason of clarity.Copenhagen QM: SWE Unintelligible dualist theory of measurement/observationEverett QM: SWE comp theory of observation/cognitionYour servitor: comp.The collapse is a speculation on a theory which does not exist, and which has been invented to make the (isolated, microscopic) superposition non contagious on the environment. So if you want make the distinction between speculation and hypothesis, I would say the "collapse" is far more speculative.The problem of comp is that machine cannot know if they are supported by any computations and it is up to Everett Deutsch etc. to explain why the quantum computations wins the "observability conditions" on the (well defined by Church Thesis) collection of all computations. This is not obvious at all and constitutes the first main result I got.For comp "philosophers of mind" (Alias theoretical cognitive scientists), the two main result I got can be seen as a "correction" of the "old" Lucas Penrose argument which try to refute comp by Godel's incompleteness.From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see thattheory if you have it!On my web page you can find all the needed programs to run a theorem prover of that physics. With some time and training you could perhaps optimize it and ... refute or confirm comp (admitting quantum logic operates on nature).From what has been already derived, some non trivial quantum logical features did appeared. 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable This is nonsense. Better: with comp it is provably nonsense. (G G* confusion, for those who knows). It is a key point: if comp is true YD will never be proved to be implementable. (It is of the type Dt, or equivalently ~B~t, its truth makes it unprovable).and that would only require that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same.That is the act of faith needed for the comp practitionners. Recall that for many people such a question will be a weaker one at first, like should I accept an artificial hyppocampus instead of dying now. Well the real question will be: should I choose a mac, a pc, or what? The fact is that comp can justify by itself why it is a act of faith, and I am not sure it is entirely "comp-polite" to suggest such an operation to anyone but oneself. (Of course you can always claim that it has already occurred, as you sometimes suggest and that is cute but just plain silly,too. )I claim this in the context of comp + OCCAM. Amoeba's self-duplication, and even the high sexual reproduction of mammals involved rather clearly digital information processing.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: subjective reality
Quentin writes > I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read > himself You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you > just like insulting other people and show your big neck... > > By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and good > continuation in your research to know if really you're the best... What took you so long? We have here the first instance I've seen of entities I've only heard of: trolls. http://kb.iu.edu/data/afhc.html I have not read any of his posts for a long time now, nor do I bother reading the replies he's able to provoke people into making. Now of course, human behavior is almost infinitely complicated, and so I hesitate to embrace any concrete categorizations, but in a personal exchange with him---when I vaguely described what trolls were and my suspicions that he was one---he basically just said that he enjoyed laughing at me. (It's really not worth further effort to figure out if that was some kind of joke.) Thanks for taking the time, Quentin. Lee
Re: subjective reality
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two of your premises (CT & AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that "one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a "digital computer" without prejudice to that experience". Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to your derivation of the *whole of physics* you cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis, in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such replacement (which I assume might involve some physical interventions). YD is certainly speculative, but there is considerable evidence that human experience is an epiphenomena of brain activity - from which is follows that YD is possible. So far as I know there is nothing in QM that contradicts it. In fact Tegmark and others have shown that the operation of the human brain must be almost completely classical. So for YD to be inconsistent with physics it would have to inconsistent with classical physics. Why do you think YD is inconsistent with QM? Brent Meeker
Re: subjective reality
On Tue, Aug 30, 2005 at 10:26:46AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > [GK] > > You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And > I > > don't really have to study your argument because > > it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are > > incompatible with the conclusions you claim. > > [RS] > I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that, > without proof. > > > [GK] > Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's: > > On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > [GK] > > > > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM > which > > > > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus > Collapse, by the way. > > > > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that > does it > > > > (and entanglement, of course!) > > > > [BM] > >This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus > YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch. ... > > [GK] > I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way > and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day > and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims > before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these > theories are just poorly put together. > That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding propositions should be eliminated wherever possible. However, the "claim" (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our understanding of consciousness improves, then "ontological reversal" will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately morphed to yield better theories. The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP, ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality false. Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be intrigued in generalisations of the COMP argument. However, I find that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological "cycle" with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can appreciate that it is a test of the theory. > I think there may be something of merit and interest in what Bruno is > trying out (though my doubts are growing) and that is why I am engaging > him. There are many ways of being wrong and some are more interesting > than others. > ... > > [GK] > Maybe you are right about that and maybe I have been unfair with his > "theotropic > verbiage" ; but don't you think there is already something weird about > needing to cast technical meanings to those terms? What for? > I'll let Bruno justify these terms. I think it is probably his way of translating modal logic expressions into "plain" English... -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgp5R6cybDlHK.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
I wade into this dispute with trepidation, because I think it is for the most part incomprehensible. But I believe I see one place where there was a miscommunication and I hope to clear it up. Godfrey Kurtz wrote, to Bruno Marchal: > You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I > don't really have to study your argument because > it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are > incompatible with the conclusions you claim. What is this incompatibility? I believe he means it to be the following. Bruno had written: > This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus > YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. And yet, Bruno claims that his methods will lead to a derivation of physics, which as far as we know includes QM. Godfrey sees the previous quote from Bruno as indicating that his "Yes Doctor" starting point is *incompatible* with QM. This is the contradiction that he sees. I'll stop here and invite Godfrey to comment on whether this is the admission of incompatibility between premises and conclusions that he was referring to above. Hal Finney
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 12:01:42 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim. [BM] Please explain what you mean. I have never say I got conclusions incompatible with the premises. I would have concluded the negation of comp. I am open that such event could occur of course, and that is why I say my derivation shows that comp is testable. I try hard to understand what you miss in my posts (not my work!). We are not yet at the point of agreeing about what we are not agreeing upon. To be clear my derivation does not involve an atom of speculation. Perhaps you could tell me what is the object of my speculation, but I'm afraid you are only confusing hypothetico-deductive reasoning and speculation (in which case all theories are speculative: in that large sense I agree. Bruno [GK] Speculation for me is not a pejorative term, to begin with. Yes, there is a sense in which all theories are speculative but some have ceased to be purely so because either empirical or heuristic evidence was found in their favor. That is the sense in which they are no longer considered speculative. So QM, for example, is no longer called a speculative theory, though people do speculate a lot around it since it poses some serious intepretative problems. The Everett version of QM is either an interpretation of QM or a better theory (let us call it EQM) depending on whom you ask, and that is actually another item of speculation, btw. But the people who claim that EQM is a theory need to come up with feasible empirical tests for which EQM gives predictions distinct from QM. Until these tests are proposed and are performed EQM remains a speculative theory!! Now, you start with a number of what you call hypothesis (YD,CT,AR) from which you claim you can derive the *whole of physics*. Since I don't know what the *whole of physics* is but I think that QM is likely to be included in it since is the less speculative theory we have ever found I take your claim is that you either (1) derive QM as we know it or (2) derive a better theory than QM by which I understand some theory that makes all the same predictions that QM where QM makes right predictions and makes others that QM does not predict or predicts wrong. You are also speculating in a narrower sense and that is where I have concentrated my objections, thus far. Though two of your premises (CT & AR) seem quite legitimate to me because, though they remain conjectural, there is some heuristic evidence that favors them, there is one of them, YD, which is purely speculative. To make it precise this is the claim that "one can replace the entire experience of a human being by that of a "digital computer" without prejudice to that experience". Though you seem ambivalent about how necessary this hypothesis is to your derivation of the *whole of physics* you cannot deny that you currently use it as an axiom! You seem also aware of the fact that QM invalidates this hypothesis, in other words, if QM is true physics than you cannot accomplish such replacement (which I assume might involve some physical interventions). From this I see only a couple of ways out: Either 1) your derivation leads you not to QM but to a better physical theory with testable empirical predictions that falsify those of QM, presumably including those that lead to the invalidation of YD. I would very much like to see that theory if you have it! 2) you actually prove (by non-QM means, I assume) that YD is empirically implementable and that would only require that you replace the experience of one human being (may I suggest yours?) by a digital computer version of the same. (Of course you can always claim that it has already occurred, as you sometimes suggest and that is cute but just plain silly, too. ) Which is it? Just to show you I am not mean spirited may I make the following suggestive question: "Could your argument be made on the basis of something not as drastic as YD, say a Turing Test type argument, which would not require you to take someone apart but just produce a convincing simulation?". Just a thought... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell, Still have not had a chance to look up your book but hope to do so shortly. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 10:44:00 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality On Mon, Aug 29, 2005 at 12:41:23PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > [GK] > You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I > don't really have to study your argument because > it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are > incompatible with the conclusions you claim. [RS] I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that, without proof. [GK] Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's: On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [GK] > > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which > > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way. > > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it > > (and entanglement, of course!) [BM] >This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. [GK] Since QM is generally believed to be a part of physics and Bruno claims to derive the whole of it from YD it seems that my statement is accurate. Now if his claim was that what he derives is not QM but "QM without collapse" that would be different but he seems to claim instead (Bruno, correct me if I am wrong) that "QM without collapse" or at least the Everett version of it was introduced to accommodate YD! This I find quite bizarre both as an historical claim or as something that would help his "program" since, if that were true, he would not have derived anything new! > > [GK] > To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of > Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims > to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-) [RS] It is a claim, not a proof. Such a claim is readily falsifiable, by means of counterexamples when such are discovered. [GK] I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that way and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these theories are just poorly put together. I think there may be something of merit and interest in what Bruno is trying out (though my doubts are growing) and that is why I am engaging him. There are many ways of being wrong and some are more interesting than others. [GK] > > Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including > logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some > religious cultist form ("The Grand Programmer"-vision), thus your > constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally > may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is better > funding in the "intelligent design" camp these days, so maybe I wished > you more luck than you need... > > Best regards, > > Godfrey [RS] Schmidhuber does the "Great Programmer" thing, not Marchal. And I suspect Schmidhuber is being tongue-in-cheek anyway. Marchal uses "faith" and "theology" in different ways to everyday use - he has technical meanings for these terms, to which the everyday meaning is but an approximation. [GK] Maybe you are right about that and maybe I have been unfair with his "theotropic verbiage" ; but don't you think there is already something weird about needing to cast technical meanings to those terms? What for? -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
On 29 Aug 2005, at 18:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim. Please explain what you mean. I have never say I got conclusions incompatible with the premises. I would have concluded the negation of comp. I am open that such event could occur of course, and that is why I say my derivation shows that comp is testable. I try hard to understand what you miss in my posts (not my work!). We are not yet at the point of agreeing about what we are not agreeing upon.To be clear my derivation does not involve an atom of speculation. Perhaps you could tell me what is the object of my speculation, but I'm afraid you are only confusing hypothetico-deductive reasoning and speculation (in which case all theories are speculative: in that large sense I agree.Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On Mon, Aug 29, 2005 at 12:41:23PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > [GK] > You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I > don't really have to study your argument because > it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are > incompatible with the conclusions you claim. I've never seen Bruno admit that! I've only seen you claim that, without proof. > > [GK] > To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of > Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims > to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-) It is a claim, not a proof. Such a claim is readily falsifiable, by means of counterexamples when such are discovered. [GK] > > Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including > logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some > religious cultist form ("The Grand Programmer"-vision), thus your > constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally > may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is better > funding in the "intelligent design" camp these days, so maybe I wished > you more luck than you need... > > Best regards, > > Godfrey Schmidhuber does the "Great Programmer" thing, not Marchal. And I suspect Schmidhuber is being tongue-in-cheek anyway. Marchal uses "faith" and "theology" in different ways to everyday use - he has technical meanings for these terms, to which the everyday meaning is but an approximation. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpFe1g2ba4RM.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 17:37:34 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality On 29 Aug 2005, at 16:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of Physics* so he is really no great help to you. [BM] Yes sure, it is the point where if you asks David how he can defend such a revisionist form of CT, he just say that he disagrees with 100% of the mathemaéticians. Actually Deutsch's position is interesting because it illustrates the point that once you take comp seriously enough, you are forced to "physicalize" the math, for not making math more fundamental than physics. [GK] I don't really agree with Deutsch on this, by the way... [BM] I prefer to follow Wheeler's view that the physical laws cannot be generated in any physical way. [GK] ...but I don't think this is correct about Wheeler either. Sure he talked a lot about "if from bit" but never developed into anything usable. The origin of the physical laws is an interesting philosophical problem on its own but, if your suggestion is that they can be derived from math alone is somewhat spurious because the laws of physics are already mathematical! The main problem is that the physical laws are only one part of the information you need to build observable physics. The other are the boundary conditions, the symmetry-breaking accidents and such which really don't have an obvious place in the Platonic world. [BM] As for the rest of the post you turn around the pot., and adopt a tone like if I was doing something speculative, and this just illustrates what you have already confessed: you don't have study the argument I have given. For example: [GK] You ARE doing something speculative whether you admit it or not! And I don't really have to study your argument because it is derived from premises that, you already admitted, are incompatible with the conclusions you claim. [GK] > I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive QM but a more general TOE [BM] This means you have not already grasped the main theorem in my work, although I have unsuccessfully try to give you the idea. I try one times again: The result is that there is only one TOE compatible with comp, and it is derivable from comp. That TOE is physically complete. To verify comp, just compare that TOE (already given) with QM (currently most believed physical theory) or compare directly with the physical facts. The tests already done confirm the quantum logical aspects of nature. [GK] To claim that a TOE is physically complete you have to know ALL of Physics which is more than anyone in this world claims to know, least of all, me! So who am I to disagree? (;-) [BM] Could you please stop trying to demolish theoretical works before grasping the enunciation of the main theorems? What is your goal? Bruno [GK] My goal was to try and understand whether there is a grain of anything interesting in what you claim you have done. Since you say above both that I have "already grasped the main theorem" and than demand that I grasp it before I demolish it I can only conclude that it is... self-demolishing! Now it appears to me that you are trying, at all costs (including logic), to save the remnants of the strong-AI thesis in some religious cultist form ("The Grand Programmer"-vision), thus your constant references to faith and theology. This, incidentally may be a better bet than actually doing science since there is better funding in the "intelligent design" camp these days, so maybe I wished you more luck than you need... Best regards, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
On 29 Aug 2005, at 16:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of Physics* so he is really no great help to you. Yes sure, it is the point where if you asks David how he can defend such a revisionist form of CT, he just say that he disagrees with 100% of the mathemaéticians. Actually Deutsch's position is interesting because it illustrates the point that once you take comp seriously enough, you are forced to "physicalize" the math, for not making math more fundamental than physics.I prefer to follow Wheeler's view that the physical laws cannot be generated in any physical way.As for the rest of the post you turn around the pot., and adopt a tone like if I was doing something speculative, and this just illustrates what you have already confessed: you don't have study the argument I have given. For example: I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive QM but a more general TOEThis means you have not already grasped the main theorem in my work, although I have unsuccesfully try to give you the idea. I try one times again:The result is that there is only one TOE compatible with comp, and it is derivable from comp. That TOE is physically complete. To verify comp, just compare that TOE (already given) with QM (currently most believed physical theory) or compare directly with the physical facts. The tests already done confirm the quantum logical aspects of nature.Could you please stop trying to demolish theoretical works before grasping the enunciation of the main theorems? What is your goal?Brunohttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sat, 27 Aug 2005 14:31:08 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality >[BM] >I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler >assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic. [GK] > That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything like that in his book) but I have read both > Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in no way shape or form does anything like YD >even figure in them!!! [BM] Literally, of course. YD is just a tools for explaining what it is "to be like an Everett memory machine". It is implicit in reducing the quantum uncertainty to the ignorance of which branch we are in a superposition. Mathematically it can be justified by Gleason theorem or by Graham Hartle type of infinite "frequency" operator. See the Preskill's course on quantum computation which makes a nice summary. [GK] I don't quite know what you mean by an "Everett memory machine" neither could I find a definition (or a mention of it) in Preskill's lectures. If by this you mean something like a machine whose memory would track the successive branchings such thing is innimical to the Everett notion that all information contained in the universal wave function is relative and all probabilities are conditional. Otherwise all "memory machines" are either (1) classical and thus relativised to one branch or (2) quantal and permanently standing in a superposition of branches so that their memories would be as "un situated" as that of any other subject. As for your "justification" I will just quote Preskill on a piece of credo which is characteristic of Many-Worlders: "My own view is that the Everett Interpretation of quantum theory provides a satisfying explanation of measurement and of the origin of randomness, but does not yet fully explain the quantum mechanical rules for computing probabilities. A full explanation should go beyond the frequency interpretation of probability --- ideally it would place the Bayesian view of probability on a secure objective foundation." Though this is highly disputable in itself I think it shows quite well where your statement above is mistaken. >[GK] > Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow! >I have already answered. [GK] That is a Yes, than. [BM] The current aim is to derive SWE (by which I mean the correct geometrical-gravity extension of Schroedinger Wave Equation) from comp. I don't expect to derive anything like SWE + collapse (although this is not entirely excluded!). What I have already proved is that 1) if you make the move from "SWE + collapse" to "SWE + comp", then from purely arithmetical reasons you are forced to go the the quite simpler theory "comp". This is the result of the UDA reasoning and you are invited to criticize it: it presuppose some "folk-psychology" and some passive understanding of Church thesis. See the slide of my 2004 SANE paper for a presentation is eight steps. 2) I translate that reasoning into the language of a large class of universal machine and got more constructive description of the physics you need (by "1)") to derive from comp. This is technically more involved. It suppresses the need of the folk psychology. Bruno [GK] I decrypt the above as a statement that you are NOT trying to derive QM but a more general TOE, so that assuming YD is no different than say, assuming subplankian determinism like 't Hooft or Hiley do. I guess you need a lot more good luck than I first wished you! Because you referred me to Deutsch's book I too a look at his own defense of the Everett interpretation and was reminded also of his not so passive understanding of the CT. As it turns out his whole masterplan hinges on his belief that *CT is a result of Physics* so he is really no great help to you. Best regards, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi John,You referred me to your web page on "Science Religion, a Historical View". Here:http://pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/SciRelMay00.htmlI read it with great interest. I could agree up to a point, which I will try to make clear. And then I comment your last post.You are using human natural science and human science (history) to relativize religion.And then you are doing the same to relativize an, admittedly widespread, "religious" belief in science (say)."Religious" with quote is always put for some pejorative view of religion, that is a view with "authoritative arguments".Somehow let me say that I agree 99,...%. But it remains a stubbornly infinitesimal point of disagreement (even if I totally follow your critical conclusions on the "religious" science).To make clearer my critic, I will relate it with both Descartes systematic doubting procedure (which I would argue is at the origin of modern theoretical sciences), and the Buddhist notion of *the center of the wheel" which provides a good image.Of course I don't know what is a human being. But, as you know, for reason of clarity and modesty, I have *choose* a theory, and I have even choose a theory sufficiently precise so that we can derive precise conclusions. All what I say must be remembered as having been casted in the frame of that theory.I don't want to be specific on the details. The theory, in its intuitive description appears already in "The question of King Milinda" and many other old "religious texts", but in his modern form, applied to animals, it is attributed to Descartes and is called "mechanism", and I take the digital restriction: digital mechanism, or computationalism, or just comp.Now, with comp, there is a little problem in your strategy. If human are machines, by using human sciences to relativize human science, you will applied a computable transformation on the space of the computable transformations, and it can be shown that you will get a fixed point. It is like making rotating a wheel: all its points-propositions will move (put in doubt) and be relativized except one: the center of the wheel.This fixed point is related to the space of the un-doubtable, but the epistemological price of comp will be that science must be (provably!) modest. All (sufficiently rich, universal) theories are necessarily hypothetical. This happens when we enlarge the space of the sound human platonist reasoner into the space of the Lobian machines.What is the fixed point? in a nutshell it is science itself, but where science is understood as an ideal of communication conditionned by hypothetical statements (some scientists forget this; most forget this when talking on colleagues' fields).BM:You put the finger on one of the main difficulty tokeep the dialog between logician and physicist: they interchange,almost but alas not completely, the use of the words "theory" and"models". Logicians use the word "model" for the intended reality they wantto describe with a theory (like the painter how call the naked personin front of him, the model). The painting, is the theory, the littlethings we put on a paper. JM: $fine. I like that kind of 'model' if she(!) ispretty.I differentiate also the "simulation" model, as themathematical or physical simulation of a thing to makeit accessible to our feeble knowledge. Now MY model:as you know I think in totality (wholeness) at least Itry. Our mind is incapable of envompassing ALL, so weselect segments we can handle (if we can...) andREDUCE our vision to them (=MY reductionism). Suchsegment is a (MY) model if it disregards the 'rest ofthe world' (as it should to serve our feeble mind). Itcan be a person, a theory, a science-topic, a thought,a car, or anything topically (or functionally)surrounded by boundaries (our mental model-horizon). Itook the word from Robert Rosen. A limited model iswhat we can use in our thinking. If we widen it beyondALL boundaries it becomes a "natural system", maximummodel (nonsense) = the 'thing' itself. This is myvocabulary and you cannot argue about it - it is MINE(ha ha). There is nothing wrong with model-thinking, it helpedus to all we know of the world and to our technology.Not to 'understanding' the connections. Why? There is only a (necessary) problem with understanding 'understanding'Wriong it is,if we draw 'universal' conclusions from considerationsupon a model - regard it universally valid. I have no models in that sense. The theory which is isolated from the machine's interview is embeddable in number theory.As in thesciences (including I think logics, which is cut tothe thinking habits of the HUMAN brain (mind). No. It is build frrom the consideration of being the less dependent on prejudices or even just meanings. And there are many many logics. You should explain why you think science (and not its mediatic "religious" perception) is cut for human thinking habits, when the whole story of science and logic illustrates a (never ending) abstraction of all our contingent
Re: subjective reality
On 26 Aug 2005, at 23:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[BM] I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic.[GK] That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything like that in his book) but I have read both Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in no way shape or form does anything like YDeven figure in them!!!Literally, of course. YD is just a tools for explaining what it is "to be like an Everett memory machine". It is implicit in reducing the quantum uncertainty to the ignorance of which branch we are in a superposition. Mathematically it can be justified by Gleason theorem or by Graham Hartle type of infinite "frequency" operator. See the Preskill's course on quantum computation which makes a nice summary.[GK] Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow!I have already answered. The current aim is to derive SWE (by which I mean the correct geometrical-gravity extension of Schroedinger Wave Equation) from comp. I don't expect to derive anything like SWE + collapse (although this is not entirely excluded!).What I have already proved is that 1) if you make the move from "SWE + collapse" to "SWE + comp", then from purely arithmetical reasons you are forced to go the the quite simpler theory "comp". This is the result of the UDA reasoning and you are invited to criticize it: it presuppose some "folk-psychology" and some passive understanding of Church thesis. See the slide of my 2004 SANE paper for a presentation is eight steps.2) I translate that reasoning into the language of a large class of universal machine and got more constructive description of the physics you need (by "1)") to derive from comp. This is technically more involved. It suppresses the need of the folk psychology.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
I think I've waited long enough... Kurt, you are just a guy who like read himself You'll never make your point, because you don't have one... you just like insulting other people and show your big neck... By now, your messages goes directly to the trash bin... Ciao and good continuation in your research to know if really you're the best... Quentin Le Vendredi 26 Août 2005 23:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com; Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:53:41 +0200 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem. > > > On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > [GK] > > > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM > > which > > > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus > > Collapse, by the way. > > > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that > > does it > > > (and entanglement, of course!) > > [BM] > This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus > YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. > > > > [GK] > > > I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying > > that Everett > > > based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I > > strongly doubt that... > > [BM] > I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based > on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From > a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be > built but it is really out of topic. > > > [GK] > That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything > like that in his book) but I have read both > Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in > no way shape or form does anything like YD > even figure in them!!! > > > [GK] > > > Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a > > few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions > > > that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The > > general idea is that one has to be extremely > > > careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context > > because they may not even be definable... > > > [BM] > This is true for all context. Nevertheless "my theory" does not assume > QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is > true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp, > indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come > from, so I should better not presuppose them. > > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > [GK] > Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis > which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow! > > I only have two words for you Bruno: good luck! > > Best regards, > > Godfrey, > > > > > > > > Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and > industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com; Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:53:41 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem. On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK] > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way. > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it > (and entanglement, of course!) [BM] This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. [GK] > I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying that Everett > based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I strongly doubt that... [BM] I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic. [GK] That may be Deutsch's opinion (though, again, I doubt he says anything like that in his book) but I have read both Everett's thesis and both Wheeler's and DeWitt's defenses of it and in no way shape or form does anything like YD even figure in them!!! [GK] > Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions > that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The general idea is that one has to be extremely > careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context because they may not even be definable... [BM] This is true for all context. Nevertheless "my theory" does not assume QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp, indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come from, so I should better not presuppose them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] Let me understand this: your aim is to derive QM from an hypothesis which, you know, is contradicted by QM ?!!!? Wow! I only have two words for you Bruno: good luck! Best regards, Godfrey, Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Serafino, I am not familiar with Rubin's papers but I know Clifton's and I think you are indeed right. Bell wrote the most enlightening observations about Everettiana and I think he correctly pin down that it is akin to a (contextual) hidden-variable interpretation when you try and extract any definite information from it. This is also clear from his famous Como Lectures "MWI for Cosmologists". The myth of a Universal Distribution is just one square away from the myth of a Universal Wave Function seems to me. There is clearly a hint of something like that is all retractions from classical determinism (Bohm's Implicate Order is another one but less hooked on Universal notions). I will check out the paper by Zeh. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: scerir <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 08:17:06 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Godfrey: > I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your > query [...] There are papers by Mark Rubin showing (perhaps) that in the Schroedinger picture, information on splitting worlds must be inferred from *the history* of the combined system. While in the Heisenberg picture this information is contained in mathematical quantities associated with a single time. http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310186 http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0209055 Rob Clifton in a paper on 'Phil. of Science' (circa 1996) appeals to the magic properties of the Schroedinger Unitary-evolving *Universal* Wave-function. (This approach seems to be similar to the concept of a global wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. John Bell pointed out a similarity between Bohmian mechanics and MWI, btw.) There are, imo, interesting ideas in the paper http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507051 by D. Zeh. Mainly about the 'dynamics' of entropy within a 'world' vs. the rest of the 'worlds'. Needlless to say, all that seems to have something to do with what Hal Finney wrote here recently, in search of a *consistent* universal distribution. Regards, s. Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: At 11:21 AM 8/25/2005, you wrote: [HR] I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our universe - back to the system that embeds them. [GK] Again, those (states of our universe) are exactly the objects whose reality attribution is more problematic! I am not sure how to drive this point accross to you. There is a paper posted today in the phsyics arXiv that you may want to read as it is exactly on this subject: I am still working on the model and will eventually update definitions of the terms used as needed. By "reality" I mean that which allows a SAS to have a sense of "observing". Universe states exist continuously in my All but have transitory reality. [HR] If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding system should allow for that. This does not preclude other universes for which quantum mechanics is not part of the description. [GK] Well, I think it is hard to argue that QM is not a "part of the valid description of our universe" so I cannot agree with you above! All empirical indications, so far, are to the contrary. What is an open question is whether it is the ONLY valid part or whether it is the valid description of the WHOLE universe since we still lack one. I think we may yet find that QM [as currently formulated] is approximate and/or emergent but Quantification of some sort seems likely to me. >Now if by "reality" you mean > platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may > exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician... [HR] I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers. I believe that most participants in this venue would allow that "Numbers exist" is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered a type of Platonism. I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers]. [GK] Here I don't fully understand you. I am willing to admit that numbers exist or that they have a reality that is independent of my own existence or yours but I think that means that "numbers have properties" rather than "numbers are properties (of something else)"; if I believe the latter I don't think I could claim to be a platonist... My: "I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers]." is the idea that to represent information, numbers must have meaning [interpretations]. A number plus its set of interpretations [other numbers] are a set of properties. A property is also therefore a collection of numbers. >(I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?) [HR] Well there is a difference between listing and counting. I may not be able to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a mathematician who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will also allow that in such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a line segment of arbitrary length on a note pad. Since my list has no dimensionality restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum. Hal Ruhl [GK] Sorry Hal, I don't see very well how a list can be "one-to-one with the continuum"! That may be a default of my imagination... In response to your question I was just speculating as to whether a "list" is exclusively a discrete item or if a list can also be continuous. Cantor and Turing were using discrete [counting] lists - R1,R2,R3,... and P1,P2,P3... If there is no difference between listing and counting then why have two words? In the above discrete lists the line items are written out natural and real numbers. Writing out a number is just a representation. A discrete list contains representations. A line segment also represents a number. Since a line segment contains all shorter line segments is it a list of all these representations? I do not think the All or the Everything should be restricted to just discrete lists. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
On 24 Aug 2005, at 05:02, Stephen Paul King wrote:BM: Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism: machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia. [SPK] This looks suspiciously like confusing 1st person and 3rd person aspects! But whatever the case, I disagree. Unless a means can be found to record and playback (as in the movie Brainstorm) phenomenal qualia we have nothing but factually unjustified belief in YD. With out proof all that one has is BEC-MEC, i.e. the Turing Test. I don't understand any sentences in that paragraph. If you have the time to develop it a little bit, I would appreciate.To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis, you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences (or subjective, first person, private, etc.).[SPK] Not really, all that is required is that it is in principle impossible for the class of Machines to emulate minds. IF minds are purely classical, AI goes through. IF minds as some aspect that is QM that is indispensable, the proof holds. QED. Remember that comp could be true even in the case my brain is a quantum computer. That makes the "doctor" and "teleportation" thought experiments more complex, but the once the Universal Dovetailer is invoked those supplementary difficulties disappear.Unless there exists a subclass of Machines that satisfies the all of the requirements to emulate an arbitrary Mind then Strong AI is ...You are unclear for me, I'm afraid.To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be turing emulable.[SPK] This is too high a bar to ask for! In effect you have made comp unfalsifiable! Not at all. Remember that I have shown that if comp is true then physics is given by a precise theory. If that theory is in contradiction with known physical facts then comp is refuted. Comp has already pass the test of the non booleannity of the observable propositions.Like I stated in the first place, you are asking for a skeptic to prove a negative!Here too, if you could say a little more. The point is not a question of true and false, but of the consistency of related set of beliefs. I maintain that comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH, and I don't understand what is wrong with that.Have a nice week-end,Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem.On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:[GK] I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way. But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it (and entanglement, of course!) This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD. I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying that Everett based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I strongly doubt that...I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic. Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The general idea is that one has to be extremely careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context because they may not even be definable...This is true for all context. Nevertheless "my theory" does not assume QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case comp is true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed* in comp, indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of physics come from, so I should better not presuppose them.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Godfrey: > I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your > query [...] There are papers by Mark Rubin showing (perhaps) that in the Schroedinger picture, information on splitting worlds must be inferred from *the history* of the combined system. While in the Heisenberg picture this information is contained in mathematical quantities associated with a single time. http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310186 http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0209055 Rob Clifton in a paper on 'Phil. of Science' (circa 1996) appeals to the magic properties of the Schroedinger Unitary-evolving *Universal* Wave-function. (This approach seems to be similar to the concept of a global wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. John Bell pointed out a similarity between Bohmian mechanics and MWI, btw.) There are, imo, interesting ideas in the paper http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507051 by D. Zeh. Mainly about the 'dynamics' of entropy within a 'world' vs. the rest of the 'worlds'. Needlless to say, all that seems to have something to do with what Hal Finney wrote here recently, in search of a *consistent* universal distribution. Regards, s.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Serafino, I am not sure I can give you a decent answer to your query since I am not an Everrettista myself and so a lot of their subtleties escape me. But I think they would probably remind you that they believe that superpositions only give way to more superpositions so that, after each measurement event there will be more branches added to each of the original two and you will find yourself on the one that is factored out by the successive series of eigenvalues you detect. What he will not tell you is why you find yourself on that particular one since they were all equiprobable to start with. If you insist they will say that quantum mechanics does not tell you that either, and than you will say: "but regular QM does not introduce many branches!" and your head will start spinning, etc... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: scerir <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 23:38:05 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Godfrey: 'MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection Postulates!' Imagine a superposition like this |'spin_z' +1> |'detector' +1> + |'spin_z' -1> |'detector' -1> It describes a superposition of spin up/down states, and the entagled (or relative) states of a detector. Now imagine a second - whatever, human? - device, to measure a specific observable of the above superposition. Let this observable be such that the ray generated by the above superposition state is an eigenspace of this observable, corresponding to a definite eigenvalue, the eigenvalue 'yes'. Since neither component of the above superposition state lies in the eigenspace of this observable, this observable fails to commute with the 'spin_z' observable, and fails to commute with the 'detector' observable. We can write (canonically) ... |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> + |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> In a MWI, a world should instantiate an eigenvalue for an observable if the superposition term associated with that world is an eigenstate of the observable corresponding to that eigenvalue. So, after the (second) measurement, what would an Everettista write? This one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |?> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |?> <=> world B (Since, in each world, the observable measured by the second - whatever, human? - device does not commute with the 'spin_z' observable, so it has no predeterminate value, that is to say that the outcome of the (second) measurement must occur by chance.) Or this one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> <=> world B (In this case the fact that the second device would later record the state |yes> seems to be fixed ... in advance of the measurement itself. And this is magic. White Rabbit? What else?) Godfrey: 'I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way.' Maybe. s. [It is too late here, I cannot write more, and I cannot check the above :-)] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, I am not sure I can give you much feed back on what you advance below because these go well beyond the little I understand about these questions of metaphysics. In general I think you can strech some of conventional definitions in order to find out where that gets you but if you try and strech all of them at once you risk not knowing what you are talking about anymore. I'll give it a shot but please forgive me where I can't really say much... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 17:42:13 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey: At 03:10 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: snip >[GK] > >Hi Hal, > My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read > something like: "The list of course would have properties that seem > incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but > nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of > the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but > so what? " I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything > list contains contradictory attributions like "X is a car" and "X is not > a car" for the same X. I obviously >misunderstood you. [HR] The distinction is between existence and reality. While the whole list is taken as existing the assumption does not hold that every "is" and "is not" definable object can also have reality. I find it difficult to accept some combinations of "X is ***..." and "X is not ***..." as being simultaneous properties of the same object that can have reality or of any of its sub components but "round square" is perhaps not so unacceptable. For example in a discrete point universe where for one of its components half the applicable points are arranged "square" and half "round" this being a state in some sort of transition sequence of states wherein that component goes from being round to being square. Now when this particular state has reality in a sequence of such states does it not contain a "round square"? [GK] I see but again I caution you about the use of those words, "reality" and "existence". I think the first one has been more in the province of physics and that is why Einstein gave himself the trouble of defining it as a "metatheoretic term". Mathematicians, even the ones who are not ashamed of professing platonism, never actually give you a definition of their "platonic reality" , since they don't quite believe they can map the whole realm of "platonic forms" or don't even believe that can be done (as Godel insisted). They will however prove "Existence" and Non-Existence theorems about some of these objects that you can build from attributions such as your infamous "round square" (though I am not aware of any proof concerning this particular ontological thorn). I sympathize with the more "liberal" metaphysical point of view about what abstracta exist as defended, for example by Ed Zalta following Meinong and Mally (check is humorous Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford: http://mally.stanford.edu/ ) though I don't agree with his view of mathematical objects in particular. So I would grant you "a list" of sorts even containing "fictional objects" such as the round-square if you exclude from it any reference to physical objects. I just don't know how useful something like that would be > About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to > say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if > by 'reality" one understands "physical reality" as defined by EPR, that > is, as composed by distinct elements > bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used > to assign them to such objects. This is the gist > of Einstein's famous question "Is the moon there when nobody looks?" and > all that folklore. [HR] I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our universe - back to the system that embeds them. [GK] Again, those (states of our universe) are exactly the objects whose reality attribution is more problematic! I am not sure how to drive this point accross to you. There is a paper posted today in the phsyics arXiv that you may want to read as it is exactly on this subject: http://arXiv.org/quant-ph/0508183 [HR] If
Re: subjective reality
On Wed, Aug 24, 2005 at 10:34:30AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > [RS] > Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day, > arguing that alternative "projection postulates" are compatible with > the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied > turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate > that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the > white rabbits in the MWI. > > [GK] > I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should > reproduce > regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection > Postulates! > Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be > done, seems to > me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no? > Don't worry too much - I'm indulging in a bit of idle speculation for the benefit of Brent, amongst others. See my post msg07791.html (available from http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg07791.html as the other archive appears to be out of action). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpEkq3kBiw8L.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
Godfrey: 'MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection Postulates!' Imagine a superposition like this |'spin_z' +1> |'detector' +1> + |'spin_z' -1> |'detector' -1> It describes a superposition of spin up/down states, and the entagled (or relative) states of a detector. Now imagine a second - whatever, human? - device, to measure a specific observable of the above superposition. Let this observable be such that the ray generated by the above superposition state is an eigenspace of this observable, corresponding to a definite eigenvalue, the eigenvalue 'yes'. Since neither component of the above superposition state lies in the eigenspace of this observable, this observable fails to commute with the 'spin_z' observable, and fails to commute with the 'detector' observable. We can write (canonically) ... |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> + |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> In a MWI, a world should instantiate an eigenvalue for an observable if the superposition term associated with that world is an eigenstate of the observable corresponding to that eigenvalue. So, after the (second) measurement, what would an Everettista write? This one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |?> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |?> <=> world B (Since, in each world, the observable measured by the second - whatever, human? - device does not commute with the 'spin_z' observable, so it has no predeterminate value, that is to say that the outcome of the (second) measurement must occur by chance.) Or this one? |'z-spin' +1> |'detector' +1> |yes> <=> world A |'z-spin' -1> |'detector' -1> |yes> <=> world B (In this case the fact that the second device would later record the state |yes> seems to be fixed ... in advance of the measurement itself. And this is magic. White Rabbit? What else?) Godfrey: 'I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way.' Maybe. s. [It is too late here, I cannot write more, and I cannot check the above :-)]
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: At 03:10 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: snip [GK] Hi Hal, My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read something like: "The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? " I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything list contains contradictory attributions like "X is a car" and "X is not a car" for the same X. I obviously misunderstood you. The distinction is between existence and reality. While the whole list is taken as existing the assumption does not hold that every "is" and "is not" definable object can also have reality. I find it difficult to accept some combinations of "X is ***..." and "X is not ***..." as being simultaneous properties of the same object that can have reality or of any of its sub components but "round square" is perhaps not so unacceptable. For example in a discrete point universe where for one of its components half the applicable points are arranged "square" and half "round" this being a state in some sort of transition sequence of states wherein that component goes from being round to being square. Now when this particular state has reality in a sequence of such states does it not contain a "round square"? About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if by 'reality" one understands "physical reality" as defined by EPR, that is, as composed by distinct elements bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used to assign them to such objects. This is the gist of Einstein's famous question "Is the moon there when nobody looks?" and all that folklore. I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our universe - back to the system that embeds them. If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding system should allow for that. This does not preclude other universes for which quantum mechanics is not part of the description. Now if by "reality" you mean platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician... I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers. I believe that most participants in this venue would allow that "Numbers exist" is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered a type of Platonism. I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers]. (I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?) Well there is a difference between listing and counting. I may not be able to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a mathematician who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will also allow that in such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a line segment of arbitrary length on a note pad. Since my list has no dimensionality restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 14:15:43 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey: At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: >Hi Hal, > >Just a minimal comment to what you state below. >I erase a bit of the previous exchange. > >Godfrey Kurtz >(New Brunswick, NJ) snip >[GK] > If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much > like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also > their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus > imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in > all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). My first assumption says: "There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can have reality." Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to this internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does not exist? Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of logic. I give it only one property by assumption - existence. Hal Ruhl [GK] Hi Hal, My first comment was directed at your previous sentence which read something like: "The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? " I thought, from it, that you meant to say that your Everything list contains contradictory attributions like "X is a car" and "X is not a car" for the same X. I obviously misunderstood you. About your first assumption, as you restate above, I would venture to say that QM suggests that the existence of such list is very unlikely if by 'reality" one understands "physical reality" as defined by EPR, that is, as composed by distinct elements bearing properties that are independent of the means of observation used to assign them to such objects. This is the gist of Einstein's famous question "Is the moon there when nobody looks?" and all that folklore. Now if by "reality" you mean platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician... (I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?) Kindly, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: At 12:03 PM 8/24/2005, you wrote: Hi Hal, Just a minimal comment to what you state below. I erase a bit of the previous exchange. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) snip [GK] If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). My first assumption says: "There exists a list of all possible properties of objects that can have reality." Are you saying that this list taken as a whole is necessarily self contradictory and therefore you can not show it does not exist due to this internal self contradiction and this is your proof that it does not exist? Let me first point out that the list is just a list - not a system of logic. I give it only one property by assumption - existence. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, Just a minimal comment to what you state below. I erase a bit of the previous exchange. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:33:45 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey At 01:09 PM 8/22/2005, you wrote: [HR] I do not derive YD, CT or AR. The model is based on a list of properties that objects can have. Definition divides this list into two sub lists. The Nothing has the sole property "empty", the All has all the remaining properties. The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? [GK] If I understand you correctly your List-of-Everything is pretty much like our own everything-list (;-)! So it contains YD, CT and AR and also their negations which makes it self-contradictory a priori and thus imprevious to any charges of contradiction and in all likelyhood beyond any argument that anyone may devise (since it obviously contains it too). (skipped) [HR] As to falsifiability of my model I will try to list my assumptions, etc.: 1) There exists a list [call it the Everything] of all possible properties of objects that can have reality. 2) The list is divided into two sub lists by the process of definition [definition forms a definitional [is:is not] pair]. 3) The definition resulting in the [Nothing:All] definitional pair is unavoidable and thus this pair has simultaneous existence with the list. It is then noted that the Nothing can not respond to any meaningful question about itself and there is such a question: Does it persist? Thus the Nothing is incomplete. The necessary attempt at resolution of this incompleteness by the Nothing by accessing [incorporating] parts of the list [a symmetry breaking?] results in a random dynamic within the All producing a randomly evolving Something [that which the Nothing has become by incorporating parts of the list] [an evolving universe]. But by #3 the Nothing must be restored so the process of creating randomly evolving Somethings repeats [a form of an MWI]. A random evolution can produce long strings of states of universes that can support Self Aware Structures [SAS], YD, comp etc. [A state of a universe is one side of a definitional pair - a sub list, and I have in the past called sub lists "kernels" [of information] to tie in with some of my previous posts.] That is my model in a nut shell. [GK] Sounds solid to me! And because it includes Everything and more(!) what can I possibly add beyond the suggestion that you name it the... "Whatever Theory" (:-). >I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or >anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous >libel often directed at String Theory that "it is not even false!" I believe that particular description is actually more like "that is not even wrong" [citation unknown] and may be older than string theory. In any event I think we should be careful how we use descriptions such as true/false, right /wrong, compatible/incompatible, in contradiction with, etc. because they seem to have different domains. I am now interested in how you and Bruno use such terms re comp, YD, UDA, QM, MWI, etc. [GK] Oh, those tired dichotomies, true/false, right/wrong, bla-bla! There so confining, aren't they? No match for Everything/Nothing that is for sure(/unsure?)! I am sorry, Hal, but I am afraid my views may strike you as old fashioned as I am still a bit attached to those old notions you have already so dashingly transcended, like... common sense (;-) In that regard I think it is time you present your argument re YD/QM and see what the list has to say about it. Hal Ruhl [GK] Working on it. Regards, -Godfrey, Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell, Thanks for the clarification on the White Rabbit issue. That is helpful. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 24 Aug 2005 13:27:19 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality On Tue, Aug 23, 2005 at 10:19:34AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't > even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's "popular > account" I gather it has something to do with the possibility of > finding > unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of "theory" he > and, I guess you, profess. No? > [RS] Another name for the White Rabbit problem is failure of induction. Basically, it is the possibility that any/all of our laws of science may suddenly stop being applicable. It bedevils most ensemble theories of everything. [GK] Oh! In that case I don't think my argument qualifies as a White Rabbit but you may think otherwise. I have set it up the other way around, that is, imagining a situation in which the laws (or consequences) of QM defeat the possibility of the "substitution" envisaged in the YD hypothesis. You can always appeal for "an exemption from the laws of physics" that would still make the process go and that would be a White Rabbit, I guess. But I don't think that qualifies as a loophole... There is a subtler style of argument involving the "need" for laws of nature altogether that occurs sometimes in QM and, blocks out an exit route from my argument which is referred to sometimes as the "Demiurge Problem". > Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum > Mechanics > produces a very good deal of "White Rabbits" on its own, and by this > I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of expectations > you place on reality! [RS] That is not what is meant by White Rabbits. Predictions of QM are entirely lawlike even they're unexpected. [GK] Agreed (even if I would put the "lawlike" between quotes). [RS] Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day, arguing that alternative "projection postulates" are compatible with the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the white rabbits in the MWI. [GK] I can't say I follow you here. MWI + Projection postulates should reproduce regular Copenhagenian QM since MWI is basically QM - Projection Postulates! Now killing white rabbits with the Born rule!??? If that could be done, seems to me, would obviate all the need for MWI in the first place, no? > > The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the > premise > of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM can > defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a > bit of reflection. No, I have a complete "failure of imagination" in this department. > [RS] > So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine > argument against the YD, let's hear it. > > Cheers > > [GK] > As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho > pressure > in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno! I'm hardly pressuring you, but it is very frustrating to be constantly told by you that you have an interesting point to make, without you ever making the point. This is not an email list for egotistical posturings - people come here to learn stuff. It is fine to post poorly thought out speculations, noone think any the less of you - other bright minds can quickly find the glaring flaws in these, and one learns something in the process, often including the very person demolishing an argument. Cheers [GK] I get your point and I do agree with you, somewhat. I am leaning towards sketching the argument even if not for Bruno's benefit any longer. Though it occurred to me as a fly in his ointment I think it may play a more constructive role in another dispute which I find interesting. I am much less certain about that last possibility and could certainly use your wits and those of the other member of the list in checking it out Please, bear with me for a little longer while I work this out in some communicable shape. Kindly, Godfrey A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix
Re: subjective reality
On Tue, Aug 23, 2005 at 10:19:34AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't > even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's "popular > account" I gather it has something to do with the possibility of > finding > unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of "theory" he > and, I guess you, profess. No? > Another name for the White Rabbit problem is failure of induction. Basically, it is the possibility that any/all of our laws of science may suddenly stop being applicable. It bedevils most ensemble theories of everything. > Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum > Mechanics > produces a very good deal of "White Rabbits" on its own, and by this > I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of expectations > you place on reality! That is not what is meant by White Rabbits. Predictions of QM are entirely lawlike even they're unexpected. Interestingly, someone pointed me at a paper by Esche the other day, arguing that alternative "projection postulates" are compatible with the MWI. The precise alternative projection postulate they supplied turns out to be riddled with white rabbits - which makes me speculate that the Born rule is precisely what you need to kill off all the white rabbits in the MWI. > > The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the > premise > of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM can > defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a > bit of reflection. No, I have a complete "failure of imagination" in this department. > [RS] > So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine > argument against the YD, let's hear it. > > Cheers > > [GK] > As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho > pressure > in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno! I'm hardly pressuring you, but it is very frustrating to be constantly told by you that you have an interesting point to make, without you ever making the point. This is not an email list for egotistical posturings - people come here to learn stuff. It is fine to post poorly thought out speculations, noone think any the less of you - other bright minds can quickly find the glaring flaws in these, and one learns something in the process, often including the very person demolishing an argument. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpE2NUI9pzH4.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
Dear Bruno, Thank you for your kind reply, but... - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: "Everything-List List" Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 10:16 AM Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Stephen, Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit : It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition? Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism: machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia. [SPK] This looks suspiciously like confusing 1st person and 3rd person aspects! But whatever the case, I disagree. Unless a means can be found to record and playback (as in the movie Brainstorm) phenomenal qualia we have nothing but factually unjustified belief in YD. With out proof all that one has is BEC-MEC, i.e. the Turing Test. To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis, you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences (or subjective, first person, private, etc.). [SPK] Not really, all that is required is that it is in principle impossible for the class of Machines to emulate minds. IF minds are purely classical, AI goes through. IF minds as some aspect that is QM that is indispensable, the proof holds. QED. Unless there exists a subclass of Machines that satisfies the all of the requirements to emulate an arbitrary Mind then Strong AI is ... To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be turing emulable. [SPK] This is too high a bar to ask for! In effect you have made comp unfalsifiable! Like I stated in the first place, you are asking for a skeptic to prove a negative! Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because "machine could think" does not entail "only machine could think" (of course if "machine can think" then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and show it is incompatible with another old prejudice: materialisme/naturalism/physicalism). So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse), or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are incompatible. [SPK] I hope you can address the Calude et al paper some day... ;-) 1.. C. S. Calude, P. H. Hertling, K. Svozil. Embedding quantum universes into classical ones, Foundations of Physics, 29, 3 (1999), 349-379. http://tph.tuwien.ac.at/~svozil/publ/1999-embed-jfulltext.pdf Onward! Stephen
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, I might have partly answered your query in my response to Russell. I am not sure. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:55:07 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Le 22-août-05, à 17:17, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > I guess I spoke too soon... [BM] Do you think that YD is incompatible with (SWE + collapse) or with only SWE? (YD = accepting an artificial brain for some level of description ("Yes Doctor"); SWE = Schroedinger Wave Equation). [GK] I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus Collapse, by the way. But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both that does it (and entanglement, of course!) [BM] Imo, YD is the driving motor of the Everett "interpretation" of QM. [GK] I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you saying that Everett based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I strongly doubt that... [BM] What is your opinion about quantum suicide, quantum immortality, and their comp (a priori more general) form? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] The short answer to that is that I agree with Milan Circovic (and David Lewis) on the issue of quantum suicide: arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412147 [Check what he says on Everett, by the way...] Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter. The general idea is that one has to be extremely careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context because they may not even be definable... I can give you a longer answer, but you would like it even less... Best regards, -Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey At 01:09 PM 8/22/2005, you wrote: Hi Hal, I am sorry I have not responded to you previously and I thank you for the further clarifications your provide about your theory. Sounds quite extraordinary but unfortunately I don't feel I grasp it well enough to make any useful comment as to its contents. There is a recent thread I started "An All/Nothing universe model" that gives some of the model's recent development. I can not access the archive right now so I can not give you a URL for the start of the thread. From what you say before it seems that you claim that you derive YD, CT and AR from it which happen to be Bruno's points of departure! Is that the case? Does your All include false statements too? I do not derive YD, CT or AR. The model is based on a list of properties that objects can have. Definition divides this list into two sub lists. The Nothing has the sole property "empty", the All has all the remaining properties. The list of course would have properties that seem incompatible as simultaneous properties of a single object, but nevertheless definitions create such objects as the "is not" member of the definitional pair. So the All is - in total - self incompatible, but so what? It would seem that the All contains YD, CT, and AR since these are potential properties of objects and would be on the list. I gave an example of a universe that seems compatible with these and seems to become more compatible with our universe if one adds noise which is the result of the random dynamic. The fact that YD may be incompatible with QM or any other item on the list is not relevant to the All but only to sequences of states of universes that are given instantations of reality by the dynamic. Thus if Bruno's reasoning from YD, CT, and AR is correct - I am not one to judge - then the All would contain potential sequences of universe states compatible with comp. The noise causes such sequences to jump tracks here and there. I am asking this out of curiosity not because I see any obvious way of addressing the falsification of your model. As to falsifiability of my model I will try to list my assumptions, etc.: 1) There exists a list [call it the Everything] of all possible properties of objects that can have reality. 2) The list is divided into two sub lists by the process of definition [definition forms a definitional [is:is not] pair]. 3) The definition resulting in the [Nothing:All] definitional pair is unavoidable and thus this pair has simultaneous existence with the list. It is then noted that the Nothing can not respond to any meaningful question about itself and there is such a question: Does it persist? Thus the Nothing is incomplete. The necessary attempt at resolution of this incompleteness by the Nothing by accessing [incorportating] parts of the list [a symmetry breaking?] results in a random dynamic within the All producing a randomly evolving Something [that which the Nothing has become by incorporating parts of the list] [an evolving universe]. But by #3 the Nothing must be restored so the process of creating randomly evolving Somethings repeats [a form of an MWI]. A random evolution can produce long strings of states of universes that can support Self Aware Structures [SAS], YD, comp etc. [A state of a universe is one side of a definitional pair - a sub list, and I have in the past called sub lists "kernels" [of information] to tie in with some of my previous posts.] That is my model in a nut shell. I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous libel often directed at String Theory that "it is not even false!" I believe that particular description is actually more like "that is not even wrong" [citation unknown] and may be older than string theory. In any event I think we should be careful how we use descriptions such as true/false, right /wrong, compatible/incompatible, in contradiction with, etc. because they seem to have different domains. I am now interested in how you and Bruno use such terms re comp, YD, UDA, QM, MWI, etc. In that regard I think it is time you present your argument re YD/QM and see what the list has to say about it. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
Sorry Russell, Everyone One of mys sentences got mangled in the middle in my last reply. I meant to direct you to the recent book by Aharonov, Y. and Rohrlich D. Quantum Paradoxes: Quantum Theory for the Perplexed. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/3527403914/qid=1124806729/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-8758662-2102523?v=glance&s=books as a source of "quantum mechanical white rabbits". Enjoy, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
-Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> On Mon, Aug 22, 2005 at 01:15:22PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Hi Tom, > > Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even more > like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar > since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was > just a pipe dream, like those of that > Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!! > > Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped... > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > But was your argument based on the white rabbit problem? And in any case, the white rabbit problem is merely a problem for Bruno's thesis, not a show stopper. As far as I'm aware, my solution to the white rabbit problem is compatible with Bruno's COMP, although it does require some additional assumptions. Nobody has checked this thoroughly, of course. [GK] Hi Russell, My argument is not based on the White Rabbit Problem since I don't even know what that is, in all honesty! From reading Brunos's "popular account" I gather it has something to do with the possibility of finding unruly or unexpected things once you believe the kind of "theory" he and, I guess you, profess. No? Without meaning to disrespect your solutions, I think Quantum Mechanics produces a very good deal of "White Rabbits" on its own, and by this I mean predictions that thwart any of the everyday type of expectations you place on reality! Have you heard of the "Mean King Problem", for example? If you want a big "hat" from where loads of these come out The argument I believe I have is just a simple working out of the premise of YD till you get to a situation that our current knowledge of QM can defeat. I am sure there are many more that you can think up with a bit of reflection. If you want to consider those White Rabbit's is entirely up to you as long as you start getting used to have them around... [RS] So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine argument against the YD, let's hear it. Cheers [GK] As I stated before I don't react very well to that style of macho pressure in spite of my (clumsy) attempts to use it on Bruno! As it turns out my argument may be of interest for another issue that some people have been disputing in the land of quantum marginalia, but I am not entirely convinced of that yet. When I am I may try and sketch it for the list, though I am doubtful that you would have any interest in it since its speculative level is orders of magnitude below what you guys are used to... (;-) Cheers indeed, -Godfrey, -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 c Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Le 22-août-05, à 17:17, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I guess I spoke too soon... Do you think that YD is incompatible with (SWE + collapse) or with only SWE? (YD = accepting an artificial brain for some level of description ("Yes Doctor"); SWE = Schroedinger Wave Equation). Imo, YD is the driving motor of the Everett "interpretation" of QM. What is your opinion about quantum suicide, quantum immortality, and their comp (a priori more general) form? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On Mon, Aug 22, 2005 at 01:15:22PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Hi Tom, > > Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even more > like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar > since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was > just a pipe dream, like those of that > Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!! > > Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped... > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > But was your argument based on the white rabbit problem? And in any case, the white rabbit problem is merely a problem for Bruno's thesis, not a show stopper. As far as I'm aware, my solution to the white rabbit problem is compatible with Bruno's COMP, although it does require some additional asumptions. Nobody has checked this thoroughly, of course. So it is time to put up or shut up Godfrey! If you have some genuine argument against the YD, let's hear it. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpUIE6jwnHTv.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, I am sorry I have not responded to you previously and I thank you for the further clarifications your provide about your theory. Sounds quite extraordinary but unfortunately I don't feel I grasp it well enough to make any useful comment as to its contents. From what you say before it seems that you claim that you derive YD, CT and AR from it which happen to be Bruno's points of departure! Is that the case? Does your All include false statements too? I am asking this out of curiosity not because I see any obvious way of addressing the falsification of your model. I don't want to sound like a big stickler for Popper or anything but I am sure you are familiar with the infamous libel often directed at String Theory that "it is not even false!" It is always easy to marvel at a construction in the sky when we don't see the strings (pass the pun) that hold it up... Best regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 16:34:22 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey: My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable definition - of the All and [simultaneously] the Nothing. Any definition defines a pair of two objects. The target object such as a flower [the "is" part of the pair] and an object that has the remainder of the list of all properties etc. of all possible objects [the "is not" part of the pair]. Generally the "is not" part of the pair is of little use. The All and the Nothing are an interesting "is", "is not" definitional pair. The All is the entire list and the Nothing is the absence of the entire list. The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this results in the dynamic. This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this model before as it has developed. Now the All part contains all possible states of all possible universes. This should include the one I believe represents ours. Therefore my All seems to contain universes that support YD and thus comp if Bruno is correct. To answer your questions as best I currently can: My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if Bruno's follow on reasoning is correct and if in fact my model contains YD, CT, and AR then it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it would embed comp. Is my model falsifiable? I will have to think about that - after all I just recently got to where it supports a flow of consciousness. Since the model does not say exactly what is on the list that is the All and the 'instantation of reality" dynamic is random then what indeed is the scope of "all possible states of all possible universes" and the resulting actually implemented evolving universes? In any event it would be interesting to see if YD can be shown to be false. I think that might start to constrain the All and that would be interesting - [why that constraint and what others are there?]. Hal At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote: >Hi Hal, > > From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model is > identical or > distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let > me ask you: > > Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if that > is the case? > > I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less > interesting than >falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand > >Best regards, > >Godfrey Kurtz >(New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Tom, Than you can surely understand how disappointed I feel! It's even more like the hooka-smoking-Caterpillar since Bruno pulled the mushroom right from under me!!! Oh! Maybe was just a pipe dream, like those of that Lob(otomy?) machine of his. How sad!!! Sorry guys. Looks like I have been scooped... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: kurtleegod; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 13:06:03 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality Well, Godfrey, I just want to voice my reaction that I am disap"point"ed that in the end you really have no new point. It seems that you are more like the Mad Hatter or Cheshire Cat. Tom [BM] So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point. Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a thesis that you admitted not having read). [GK] Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: I am "way behind your thesis" since you already argued my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us "White Rabbits" always arriving late... Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't it? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point since you already proved it and made it yours. Let me think about it. Best regards, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Well, Godfrey, I just want to voice my reaction that I am disap"point"ed that in the end you really have no new point. It seems that you are more like the Mad Hatter or Cheshire Cat. Tom [BM] So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point. Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a thesis that you admitted not having read). [GK] Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: I am "way behind your thesis" since you already argued my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us "White Rabbits" always arriving late... Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't it? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point since you already proved it and made it yours. Let me think about it. Best regards, Godfrey
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, I guess I spoke too soon... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 16:05:58 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Le 22-août-05, à 00:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [GK] > By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I > have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that > shows that your YD is incompatible with QM being the > correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit > that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the > part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along and I have not changed it. So there is no point in > challenging me in these terms. I made clear already. [BM] I thought you said you get a proof that YD is false. (Confirmed by my looking at your posts). This would have invalidate the Universal Dovetailer Argument (but not its arithmetical translation as I explained before). Now you are saying that YD is just inconsistent with QM. This is a far much weaker statement, which would not refute anything at all. On the contrary, given that my UDA-point says that comp entails verifiable physical statements (a whole comp-phys). And for me it is still an open problem if comp-phys is compatible with QM or not, or is even equal to QM or not. [GK] I have never claimed to have a proof that YD is false only that I can give you an argument that "QM can shoot down YD" and this being the case, from what I understand from your previous post, means that your "proof" that physics is necessarily reducible to computer science" is incorrect in the CT and AR are true. I quite sure you have stated that much in your previous post. To be more specific my argument aims to show you that if QM is the correct microscopic description of the world (in which you apply YD) than YD is contradicts it. I am quite sure that I never stated anything different. I might have used the expression "if YD is false" as a condition but that means "if my argument is correct". [BM] Actually, if you read my thesis you will see that I arrive at a point where I conclude that comp (thus YD) seems to be in contradiction with QM, because it gives a priori much more relative computational continuations than QM (the white rabbit problem), but then I explain that computer science and incompleteness phenomena force us to add many nuances, and this is what has lead me to make a complete translation of UDA in arithmetic. [GK] This is news to me! If I read you right it means that you already proved my point! That is reassuring. I had some lingering doubts about my argument, of course, but seems that my intuitions are correct at least since you have anticipated them. Now which one of those nuances that you speak of salvages an hypothesis that contradicts QM? I'm curious... [BM] So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point. Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a thesis that you admitted not having read). [GK] Bruno, you are just too kind! I would describe it the other way round: I am "way behind your thesis" since you already argued my point out affirmatively! I guess that is the problem with us "White Rabbits" always arriving late... Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't it? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] Well, I am kind of discouraged now. It would no longer be my point since you already proved it and made it yours. Let me think about it. Best regards, Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Russell, Touche' (:-)! I am going to claim a typo, on this one. I will be more careful with my time from here on, though come to think of it, 3.4 hours maybe a good estimate on the time I manage to dedicate to pure platonic contemplation in a week, sadly... Thanks for the humorous nit-picking. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 09:19:40 +1000 Subject: Re: subjective reality On Sun, Aug 21, 2005 at 06:21:13PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)! > 24/7 = 3.4285714... Why is this full time? Its a little bigger than Pi (so a little bigger than a half a turn), maybe a bit more in the state of Indiana (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi). I'm jesting with you of course - you must mean 24 (hours) x 7 (days) (per week), but I ask you, why do you confuse division and multiplication? Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Le 22-août-05, à 00:21, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that shows that your YD is incompatible with QM being the correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along and I have not changed it. So there is no point in challenging me in these terms. I made clear already. I thought you said you get a proof that YD is false. (Confirmed by my looking at your posts). This would have invalidate the Universal Dovetailer Argument (but not its arithmetical translation as I explained before). Now you are saying that YD is just inconsistent with QM. This is a far much weaker statement, which would not refute anything at all. On the contrary, given that my UDA-point says that comp entails verifiable physical statements (a whole comp-phys). And for me it is still an open problem if comp-phys is compatible with QM or not, or is even equal to QM or not. Actually, if you read my thesis you will see that I arrive at a point where I conclude that comp (thus YD) seems to be in contradiction with QM, because it gives a priori much more relative computational continuations than QM (the white rabbit problem), but then I explain that computer science and incompleteness phenomena force us to add many nuances, and this is what has lead me to make a complete translation of UDA in arithmetic. So, this means you could just be *in advance* of my thesis! That would still be very interesting of course, so, please make your point. Ah yes you want to make it only if it demolishes the whole of a thesis that you admitted not having read (I don't understand at all why you don't want to give a (perhaps interesting) argument unless it refutes a thesis that you admitted not having read). Please make your point, we can still discussed its impact after, isn't it? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Norman, Le 20-août-05, à 20:25, Norman Samish a écrit : Bruno, I don't know what you mean by this comment. Could you please go into more detail? I realize this is speculation, nevertheless I'd like to know what your speculation is. Thanks, Norman Samish ~~~ - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything-List List" Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 10:54 AM Subject: Rép : subjective reality ". . . The next millenia? It will be "pschhht!" or, something like an uncontrollable creative big bang, from what I smell from comp." To be alive, or conscious, or even just consistent always entail the possibility of being dead or inconsistent soon or later. To be alive is necessary to be in a fragile state. My version of Godel theorem for babies illustrates already this: it is when you stand up that you can fall. I don't know if we are divine creature, but by comp we can already say that IF we are divine creature we can only be hypothetical. We would be divine *hypotheses*, and we would be infinitely wrong to take our existence as granted. In particular such a contempt would lead us to the fall, and like the dinosaurs we would disappear (the psct). If our modesty prevails we will continue to grow and multiply. For purely economical reason we will, or those who bet on comp will, live in virtual reality on computers that Robots will develop in Space and we will extend ourself in the galaxy. Humanity will perhaps divide into those who will "take refuge" at the center of the galaxy in or on its main black hole using his surface as a sort of quantum computer and into those who will escape the galaxy, and explore other galaxies. But all this is a little too much "third person", when in reality, like always, first person reality will prevail and grow much faster than anything 3-person describable. And this of course I cannot describe. We will always feel incomplete and always feel there is something more to say or to do. Many will have bigger brain, but other will have lesser brain and learn to control amnesic path or how to born again without dying, and how to fuse identities and personalities. Of course if YD is shown false, forget what I say. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
On Sun, Aug 21, 2005 at 06:21:13PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)! > 24/7 = 3.4285714... Why is this full time? Its a little bigger than Pi (so a little bigger than a half a turn), maybe a bit more in the state of Indiana (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pi). I'm jesting with you of course - you must mean 24 (hours) x 7 (days) (per week), but I ask you, why do you confuse division and multiplication? Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpVYnUUAqwzv.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, Not quite there yet, but making progress Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sat, 20 Aug 2005 19:44:44 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Le 19-août-05, à 18:13, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > [GK] > I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those > would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into > a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is > amiss in your world! [BM] OK if it is a temporary interdiction. The YD will entail that we are duplicable in a weak sense (which does not contravene the no-cloning theorem (but here I anticipate the reasoning)). You pretend YD is false, show the proof. [GK] By now you should have understood that I will not be taunted, so no use in trying. I do not pretend anything. What I have told you and maintain is that I can sketch an argument that shows that your YD is incompatible with QM being the correct physics of the world and I will do so as soon as you admit that this will invalidate ALL your thesis (not just the part of it you feel like conceding). This was my proposal all along and I have not changed it. So there is no point in challenging me in these terms. I made clear already. > [GK] > What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. That allows me to dismiss anything you say based > on that premise. Of course. But of course, everything I say from CT and AR alone will survive. I hope you see this clearly. [GK] If you claim that you derive the whole of physics (including QM) from CT and AR alone there is no point in my showing you that physics invalidates YD! Is there? You would know that already, or you could derive it independently! Whether I am right or wrong would be completely indiferent to you. Why would you even consider my argument? > That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here > on I will make no comment on > any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove > that..." . Nothing personal, please understand. [BM] Sure. Except that in a second round (the "interview" of the lobian machine) I translate "comp" in arithmetic, and I extract *a* physics from that COMP. To understand that translation YD is very useful, but no more. Then if the physics that is extracted from the arithmetical COMP corresponds to the empirical physics, your proof of the falsity of the YD would show that a falsity has helped in discovering the origin of the physical laws. Funny but not entirely impossible. Except that, without wanting to discourage you in advance, it is very hard for me to believe you have find a proof or an argument showing comp is wrong. But that makes me just more curious. [GK] OK. Let me ask you this than and maybe help you avoid any more painful contortions: can you even imagine a situation in which you could be proven wrong? (Please remember how many times you have underscored that COMP is verifiable!) (skipped) I take it like that. You are telling me you are platonist the week and not platonist the week-end? Or "ditto" means you agree with *me*, I guess. [GK] I agree with you but I am a platonist 24/7 (=full-time)! > [GK] > In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics from > CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you > will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment! > Congratulations! But there is a derivation of a physics from CT and AR. Just to understand *that* intuitively you need YD. I have done two things the universal dovetailer argument (UDA) which shows that YD + CT + AR entails that physics emerges necessary from a web of machine dreams (say, dream being entirely defined in term of computer science or number theory). But then in the second part, called sometime the arithmetical universal dovetailer argument (AUDA), or more simply the "interview of the lobian machine", I translate (UDA) in arithmetic (because comp makes it possible and necessary). YD disappears or is translated in arithmetic (by Godel-like devices). The derivation of physics is purely mathematical of course, I am not a magician extracting the galaxies from someone saying "yes" to a doctor. It looks like it disappoints you, but there is two parts in my work: UDA: an argument that YD + CT + AR implies physics is necessarily a branch of computer science. AUDA: a translation of the argument in arithmetic, with the (modest) result that the logic of the observable proposition is given by the composition of three mathematical transformations operating on a "well-known" modal logic (G). And it already looks enough like some quantum logics to encourage furt
Re: subjective reality
Bruno, I don't know what you mean by this comment. Could you please go into more detail? I realize this is speculation, nevertheless I'd like to know what your speculation is. Thanks, Norman Samish ~~~ - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything-List List" Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 10:54 AM Subject: Rép : subjective reality ". . . The next millenia? It will be "pschhht!" or, something like an uncontrollable creative big bang, from what I smell from comp."
Re: subjective reality
Le 19-août-05, à 18:13, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [GK] I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is amiss in your world! OK if it is a temporary interdiction. The YD will entail that we are duplicable in a weak sense (which does not contravene the no-cloning theorem (but here I anticipate the reasoning)). You pretend YD is false, show the proof. [GK] What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. That allows me to dismiss anything you say based on that premise. Of course. But of course, everything I say from CT and AR alone will survive. I hope you see this clearly. That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here on I will make no comment on any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove that..." . Nothing personal, please understand. Sure. Except that in a second round (the "interview" of the lobian machine) I translate "comp" in arithmetic, and I extract *a* physics from that COMP. To understand that translation YD is very useful, but no more. Then if the physics that is extracted from the arithmetical COMP corresponds to the empirical physics, your proof of the falsity of the YD would show that a falsity has helped in discovering the origin of the physical laws. Funny but not entirely impossible. Except that, without wanting to discourage you in advance, it is very hard for me to believe you have find a proof or an argument showing comp is wrong. But that makes me just more curious. Now, although 99, % of the mathematician > are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the week-end!). > > [GK] > > Ditto. Hope you are not serious! [GK] Sorry! "Ditto" over here in the States is used as a note of agreement. I take it like that. You are telling me you are platonist the week and not platonist the week-end? Or "ditto" means you agree with *me*, I guess. [GK] In that case enjoy the prize! If you derived the laws of physics from CT and AR alone you surely deserve the recognition you will enjoy because that is a remarkable accomplishment! Congratulations! But there is a derivation of a physics from CT and AR. Just to understand *that* intuitively you need YD. I have done two things the universal dovetailer argument (UDA) which shows that YD + CT + AR entails that physics emerges necessary from a web of machine dreams (say, dream being entirely defined in term of computer science or number theory). But then in the second part, called sometime the arithmetical universal dovetailer argument (AUDA), or more simply the "interview of the lobian machine", I translate (UDA) in arithmetic (because comp makes it possible and necessary). YD disappears or is translated in arithmetic (by Godel-like devices). The derivation of physics is purely mathematical of course, I am not a magician extracting the galaxies from someone saying "yes" to a doctor. It looks like it disappoints you, but there is two parts in my work: UDA: an argument that YD + CT + AR implies physics is necessarily a branch of computer science. AUDA: a translation of the argument in arithmetic, with the (modest) result that the logic of the observable proposition is given by the composition of three mathematical transformations operating on a "well-known" modal logic (G). And it already looks enough like some quantum logics to encourage further research. Alas the math are not easy and not well known. I feel like saying: my work here is done! But it is done. Yes of course.And if YD is false (which I doubt), UDA will be dead, ok, but it will make the AUDA much more enigmatic! Without even trying I have let you relinquish one of your hypothesis! It looks your goal is shooting me completely: the UDA and AUDA! I have absolutely no worry about YD, but it is a logical fact you ask me to make clear: even if that were true (that YD is false), that would kill one halve only, the one some people ask me sometimes to drop out, but I prefer to keep it for preventing positivistic interpretation of machine's discourses. [GK] Well, YD is so secondary to your purposes, why do you care? Because many people take YD for granted, already. Because it makes the comp-physics obligatory making the whole of comp testable. YD is secondary for the extraction of physics, but it is necessary for having an understanding why it is a derivation of physics. I am anormaly patient, you could understand this by reading the UDA, and the beginning of the AUDA. I am almost sure you would approve my version but I am not putting it down until you give me a good reason to do it!!! Because that would kill the first half of my PhD thesis and makes the second part enigmatic. But many in this list find YD plausible and if you can sho
Re: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality
Le 19-août-05, à 20:00, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully agree that I sound like I am bluffing. To say the less ... :-) But I still have hope that Bruno will come to his senses Well thanks Godfrey. I also hope I will come to my senses. Actually I hope I am in my senses. And I hope you are in your senses too, or, if not, that you will come to your senses, too. and accept my bargain (which is much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!) Yes but some will think that accepting an artificial part of the brain is much less risky when the alternative is dying and suffering quasi-surely the next month. Technology has already invaded the brain. Comp is already practiced. I show that comp is falsifiable. You pretend that the YD is already false! I can understand Quentin's impatience. I know already you can't be serious, because you pretend talking about something I would not have anticipated, but you acknowledge not having the need to read what I wrote (!?). And at the same time you are saying something very big. To refute YD you need to show that there are no level of description of ourselves capable of being Turing-emulable. You would refute my reasoning at step 0! Go ahead. You are the first one who tries this. In general people try at least at step 3! (I follow the numbering (8 steps) of the Universal Dovetailer Argument like in this pdf slides: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf Explanations are in the SANE paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html) Oh I see you have another post still without your argument! I will answer it quickly because I indulge your little diversions but it is probably a weakness of my part. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Stephen, Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit : It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition? Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism: machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia. To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis, you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences (or subjective, first person, private, etc.). To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be turing emulable. Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because "machine could think" does not entail "only machine could think" (of course if "machine can think" then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and show it is incompatible with another old prejudice: materialisme/naturalism/physicalism). So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse), or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are incompatible. Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi, Hal, I wrote lately that 'our' (two but distinct and different) theories started from a somewuat similar way of thinking. That startup was more than a decade ago. Since then you transformed yours in its aspects and I did so as well. You went the theoretical way, I followed a practical thinking acceptable (?) to human logic as an inevitable origination of the Multiverse. I had to add this remark, because I don't want to 'ride' the theoretical merits of your theory in any sense. My "narrative" is by now completely different from your theory. Please forgive me my superficial words. John Mikes --- Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi Godfrey: > > My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable > definition - of the All > and [simultaneously] the Nothing. > > Any definition defines a pair of two objects. The > target object such as a > flower [the "is" part of the pair] and an object > that has the remainder of > the list of all properties etc. of all possible > objects [the "is not" part > of the pair]. Generally the "is not" part of the > pair is of little > use. The All and the Nothing are an interesting > "is", "is not" > definitional pair. The All is the entire list and > the Nothing is the > absence of the entire list. > > The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this > results in the dynamic. > > This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this > model before as it has > developed. > > Now the All part contains all possible states of all > possible > universes. This should include the one I believe > represents > ours. Therefore my All seems to contain universes > that support YD and thus > comp if Bruno is correct. > > To answer your questions as best I currently can: > > My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if > Bruno's follow on > reasoning is correct and if in fact my model > contains YD, CT, and AR then > it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it > would embed comp. > > Is my model falsifiable? I will have to think about > that - after all I > just recently got to where it supports a flow of > consciousness. Since the > model does not say exactly what is on the list that > is the All and the > 'instantation of reality" dynamic is random then > what indeed is the scope > of "all possible states of all possible universes" > and the resulting > actually implemented evolving universes? > > In any event it would be interesting to see if YD > can be shown to be > false. I think that might start to constrain the > All and that would be > interesting - [why that constraint and what others > are there?]. > > Hal > > At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote: > >Hi Hal, > > > > From what you say below I am not able to > determine whether your model is > > identical or > > distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am > interested in so let > > me ask you: > > > > Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you > still "dance" if that > > is the case? > > > > I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out > to be a lot less > > interesting than > >falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand > > > >Best regards, > > > >Godfrey Kurtz > >(New Brunswick, NJ) > > >
Re: subjective reality
Dear Bruno and Godfrey, It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition? Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 12:13 PM Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Bruno, OK. I think we are making progress. I will start the other thread after this message as I don't really have more obvious divergences from you and you are kind enough to indulge me in this little diversion. As before I will erase the obvious points of agreement below... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 11:48:06 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey, Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : (skipped) [BM] "No YD, no Bruno"!?! You make me anxious :) [GK] I am sorry! That was very callous of me! I really did not mean to imply that you would be "eliminated" by my argument! Much on the contrary, I am hoping you will be... illuminated (;-) !!! [BM] SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital "generalized brain". First axiom of comp. (Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them once by mail). > It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite > care if you take refuge in another Everett World. > That > would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I > digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies! [BM] Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD). [GK] I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is amiss in your world! > [GK] > I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would > shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my > non-existence if YD is false. Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here! [GK] What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. That allows me to dismiss anything you say based on that premise. That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here on I will make no comment on any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove that..." . Nothing personal, please understand. > BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more > precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can > use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", > "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way. > > [GK] > I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses > tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic status and it is misleading to call them the same. > If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your > point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising > either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore > below: [BM] Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist). [GK] Oh I would not worry! Computer scientists are by, now, used to have their hopes dashed (;-). And you strike me as a "real grown-up" since you are not afraid of facing up to empirical testing! (skipped) > [BM] > Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my > reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a > platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a > sort of "cop out". Now, although 99, % of the mathematician > are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the week-end!). > snip
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey: My model starts with what I describe as unavoidable definition - of the All and [simultaneously] the Nothing. Any definition defines a pair of two objects. The target object such as a flower [the "is" part of the pair] and an object that has the remainder of the list of all properties etc. of all possible objects [the "is not" part of the pair]. Generally the "is not" part of the pair is of little use. The All and the Nothing are an interesting "is", "is not" definitional pair. The All is the entire list and the Nothing is the absence of the entire list. The Nothing is inherently incomplete and this results in the dynamic. This is a brief semi intro and I have posted on this model before as it has developed. Now the All part contains all possible states of all possible universes. This should include the one I believe represents ours. Therefore my All seems to contain universes that support YD and thus comp if Bruno is correct. To answer your questions as best I currently can: My model appears to contain YD, CT, and AR so if Bruno's follow on reasoning is correct and if in fact my model contains YD, CT, and AR then it contains comp but it is not the same as comp - it would embed comp. Is my model falsifiable? I will have to think about that - after all I just recently got to where it supports a flow of consciousness. Since the model does not say exactly what is on the list that is the All and the 'instantation of reality" dynamic is random then what indeed is the scope of "all possible states of all possible universes" and the resulting actually implemented evolving universes? In any event it would be interesting to see if YD can be shown to be false. I think that might start to constrain the All and that would be interesting - [why that constraint and what others are there?]. Hal At 10:44 AM 8/19/2005, you wrote: Hi Hal, From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model is identical or distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let me ask you: Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if that is the case? I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less interesting than falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand Best regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ)
Re: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality
Hi Quentin, No harm done. I think I understand your comment and I fully agree that I sound like I am bluffing. But I still have hope that Bruno will come to his senses and accept my bargain (which is much less risky than the one his Doctor proposes, by the way!) I take it that French is your native language from your reply header. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 18:48:48 +0200 Subject: [offtopic] Re: subjective reality Dear, Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 18:27, vous avez écrit : > Dear Quentin, > > Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you > since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you > personally! No, none directed to me... I don't know if it's my poor comprehension of english... but anyway I don't really like when people just want to "show" by acting as if they knew "the real knowledge"... I apologize for feeling it like that... But as it was not your intention. I would feel shame to ask you to unsubscribe, it wasn't at all my intention, just let the discussion stay sane (with a message like mine, I understand it 's not the better way for it to stay sane ;). Quentin Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
[offtopic] Re: subjective reality
Dear, Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 18:27, vous avez écrit : > Dear Quentin, > > Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you > since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you > personally! No, none directed to me... I don't know if it's my poor comprehension of english... but anyway I don't really like when people just want to "show" by acting as if they knew "the real knowledge"... I apologize for feeling it like that... But as it was not your intention. I would feel shame to ask you to unsubscribe, it wasn't at all my intention, just let the discussion stay sane (with a message like mine, I understand it 's not the better way for it to stay sane ;). Quentin
Re: subjective reality
Hi Saibal, You are entirely correct about that. Non-local models can indeed reproduce QM. No surprise than that all the remaining approaches to the unification of physical theories still fighting it out (string/M theories, loop quantum gravity, twistor theory) are non-loca,l unlike the old QFTs. That is not the case with 't Hooft's CA models, of course. But he has later began to play with (deterministic) M-brane type ideas (since he started teaching string theory) and those may hold better promise. He is also no longer insisting on the pre-determinism loophole notion (at least the last time I heard him this year). Maybe he realized that made him sound a bit foolish... His web site is always entertaining: http://www.phys.uu.nl/~thooft/ Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 18:06:23 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey, As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may be proved wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models can reproduce QM. Saibal - Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM Subject: Re: subjective reality > Hi Saibal, > > Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our > cis-plankian > one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go > theorems of > quantum physics are "in small print" is because his "reading glasses" > are no > longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of > simple > deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his > little > examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree. > > However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth > looking > into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world > we know > and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some > discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and > all > indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models > alone. > 't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and > he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less > than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for > non-abelian gauge > theories in his youth I suspect "god's dice" are loaded against him > this time. > > However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard > this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous > animations... > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > > -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > Hi Godfrey, > > 't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale > physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding > deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists > working on > ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such > bold > assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''. > > As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models. > It > seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any > serious > work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say > that > anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One > could > imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could > yield > the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as > fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists, > then > you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''. > > Saibal > > > > > Hi Saibal, > > > > You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in > > QFTh. > > But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in > which > > non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet). > Understandably > > 't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, ho
Re: subjective reality
Dear Quentin, Je m'excuse. It is not my intension to insult anyone least of all you since I don't quite remember having directed any message to you personally! I have used some irony in discussing with Bruno but meant no harm by it. My feeling from reading the different posts is that people in this list have some sense of humor and do not take their theories so seriously that any play around is taken in personal terms! I take "turning around the hole" to mean something like "beating around the bush". In that case, I am afraid I cannot comply just yet. Please see my last message to Bruno. I am not bluffing, just hoping to break his bluff and I don't think he is insulted (Bruno?) --- To the rest of the crowd: if this is a generalized feeling, please let me know, and I will withdraw from the list. I surely don't want to ruffle any feathers! Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 17:15:47 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi, I apologize if I misunderstood your differents posts here as I'm not an english native but I find very insulting your way to "discuss" with people... Either you have an argument to the YD hypothesis, either you haven't... stop turning around the hole... Quentin Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Hi Hal, > > From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model > is identical or > distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let > me ask you: > > Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if > that is the case? > > I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less > interesting than > falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand > > Best regards, > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > > -Original Message- > From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe > consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral > locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is > confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral > location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to > allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their > regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all > triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to > represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such > oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid > but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of > semi "stable" associations of nearby [small] dances. > > The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region > asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its > region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA]. > > At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at > all. > > The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of > universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the > "done effectively" part] since large dances can be self interactive. > > The other things that are in my model which is derived from my "is" > "is not" definitional approach is that the imbedding system: > > 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist > [multi world and the model's link to AR], > > 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of > reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the > accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of > the noise] recently observed), > > 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality > that overlap [the flow of consciousness]. > > In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp. > > I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some > degree convergent. > > Hal Ruhl > > > > Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and > industry-leading spam and email virus protection. Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, OK. I think we are making progress. I will start the other thread after this message as I don't really have more obvious divergences from you and you are kind enough to indulge me in this little diversion. As before I will erase the obvious points of agreement below... Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Fri, 19 Aug 2005 11:48:06 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfrey, Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : (skipped) [BM] "No YD, no Bruno"!?! You make me anxious :) [GK] I am sorry! That was very callous of me! I really did not mean to imply that you would be "eliminated" by my argument! Much on the contrary, I am hoping you will be... illuminated (;-) !!! [BM] SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital "generalized brain". First axiom of comp. (Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them once by mail). > It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite > care if you take refuge in another Everett World. > That > would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I > digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies! [BM] Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD). [GK] I would like to leave copies out of the YD because I think those would actually invalidate the premise. If you ran into a copy of yourself in the street you may suspect that something is amiss in your world! > [GK] > I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would > shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my > non-existence if YD is false. Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here! [GK] What I propose to do is to show you that your premise, YD, is false. That allows me to dismiss anything you say based on that premise. That is actually not general at all but extremely specific. From here on I will make no comment on any sentence you preface with "But from COMP (or YD) I can prove that..." . Nothing personal, please understand. > BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more > precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can > use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", > "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way. > > [GK] > I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses > tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic status and it is misleading to call them the same. > If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your > point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising > either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore > below: [BM] Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist). [GK] Oh I would not worry! Computer scientists are by, now, used to have their hopes dashed (;-). And you strike me as a "real grown-up" since you are not afraid of facing up to empirical testing! (skipped) > [BM] > Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my > reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a > platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a > sort of "cop out". Now, although 99, % of the mathematician > are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the week-end!). > > [GK] > > Ditto. Hope you are not serious! [GK] Sorry! "Ditto" over here in the States is used as a note of agreement. (skipped) [BM] Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a bit what "digital" means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say, CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD. [GK] Oh. No problem there. Maybe I did not make it clear enough. What I am suggesting is that we (you and I) agree implicitly that CT and AR are unassailably true for the purposes of my argument! I will in fact need that to be th
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may be proved wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models can reproduce QM. Saibal - Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM Subject: Re: subjective reality > Hi Saibal, > > Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our > cis-plankian > one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go > theorems of > quantum physics are "in small print" is because his "reading glasses" > are no > longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of > simple > deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his > little > examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree. > > However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth > looking > into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world > we know > and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some > discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and > all > indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models > alone. > 't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and > he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less > than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for > non-abelian gauge > theories in his youth I suspect "god's dice" are loaded against him > this time. > > However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard > this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous > animations... > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > > -----Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > Hi Godfrey, > > 't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale > physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding > deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists > working on > ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such > bold > assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''. > > As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models. > It > seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any > serious > work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say > that > anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One > could > imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could > yield > the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as > fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists, > then > you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''. > > Saibal > > > > > Hi Saibal, > > > > You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in > > QFTh. > > But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in > which > > non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet). > Understandably > > 't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been > > very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous > > slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of > > Physics). > > > > So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from > > which one > > can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no > way > > bypasses > > the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations. > > > > He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an > thus > > classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out > > just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him! > > That much I will grant you... > > > > (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell > > you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- ) > > > > Best regar
Re: subjective reality
Hi, I apologize if I misunderstood your differents posts here as I'm not an english native but I find very insulting your way to "discuss" with people... Either you have an argument to the YD hypothesis, either you haven't... stop turning around the hole... Quentin Le Vendredi 19 Août 2005 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Hi Hal, > > From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model > is identical or > distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let > me ask you: > > Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if > that is the case? > > I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less > interesting than > falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand > > Best regards, > > Godfrey Kurtz > (New Brunswick, NJ) > > -Original Message- > From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400 > Subject: Re: subjective reality > > With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe > consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral > locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is > confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral > location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to > allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their > regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all > triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to > represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such > oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid > but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of > semi "stable" associations of nearby [small] dances. > > The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region > asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its > region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA]. > > At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at > all. > > The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of > universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the > "done effectively" part] since large dances can be self interactive. > > The other things that are in my model which is derived from my "is" > "is not" definitional approach is that the imbedding system: > > 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist > [multi world and the model's link to AR], > > 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of > reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the > accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of > the noise] recently observed), > > 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality > that overlap [the flow of consciousness]. > > In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp. > > I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some > degree convergent. > > Hal Ruhl > > > > Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and > industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Hal, From what you say below I am not able to determine whether your model is identical or distinct from Bruno's in the only point that I am interested in so let me ask you: Is your model falsified if YD is false or can you still "dance" if that is the case? I am asking because unfalsifiable models turn out to be a lot less interesting than falsifiable ones as I am sure you understand Best regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 17:34:48 -0400 Subject: Re: subjective reality With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of semi "stable" associations of nearby [small] dances. The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA]. At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all. The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the "done effectively" part] since large dances can be self interactive. The other things that are in my model which is derived from my "is" "is not" definitional approach is that the imbedding system: 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist [multi world and the model's link to AR], 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of the noise] recently observed), 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality that overlap [the flow of consciousness]. In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp. I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some degree convergent. Hal Ruhl Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, Le 18-août-05, à 20:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [BM] OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a "solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this is going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the comp derivation. We can come back on this latter. [GK] Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does not lead to that problem! It does however have a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are non-interactive measurements that people have been looking into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you guys touched on these sometime ago... But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you to commit to the proposition that "No-YD: no Bruno"! We agree it is not relevant for our purpose! Just two words: As a logician I don't consider Everett proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, but a new formulation of quantum mechanics. It is really SWE + comp. (as opposed to the Copenhagen formulation which is SWE + "an unintelligible dualist theory of mind". Then what I say can be sum up like this: Everett theory is redundant: SWE follows from comp. But this is another thread, and we can come back on Everett later. "No YD, no Bruno"!?! You make me anxious :) SWE : Schroedinger Wave Equation YD: Saying Yes to a doctor who propose you an artificial digital "generalized brain". First axiom of comp. (Some people complains out-of-line for the acronyms, so I repeat them once by mail). It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite care if you take refuge in another Everett World. That would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies! Well: not of copies IN THIS WORLD, I guess. Giving that that is really the by-product of saying YES to the DOCTOR (YD). [GK] I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my non-existence if YD is false. Only if YD is *proved* false!!! (I could deduce your inexistence from the SWE if any TOE (theory of everything) which supposed SWE true, if SWE is false!). You are saying something very general here! BM: Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way. [GK] I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic status and it is misleading to call them the same. If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore below: Mmhhh... This is your opinion, and perhaps mine. But not of most people to which my proof is addressed (computer scientist). [GK] Agreed, than . In any case one unassailable counterexample would shoot down CT, deep and " Kleene" as it is (:-) Exactly! [BM] Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a sort of "cop out". Now, although 99, % of the mathematician are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the week-end!). [GK] Ditto. Hope you are not serious! > (skiip) > > (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR 'course. [GK] Good! Well, you will perhaps accuse me of weaseling out again, but thinking twice, I believe I have answer too quickly in the sense that for saying yes for an artificial *digital* brain to a Doctor you need to know a bit what "digital" means, and for this you need CT (Church Thesis), and for this, I think, you need AR (Arithmetical Realism). But as you say, CT and AR are mainly bodyguards of YD. > (2) GK: CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we both like them that way, which is the same). [BM] I give the opportunity to make comp false in more than one way. If you read the Ma
Re: subjective reality
Typo: In my last post the sentence: "At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all." of course should be: "At this level YD seems straight forward since there is no change at all." Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
With regard to YD I have proposed in other posts that our universe consists of a set of discrete points that are when in their neutral locations arranged on a face centered cubic grid. Each point is confined to a region of discrete locations that surround its neutral location in the grid. I like this grid because its symmetries appear to allow a set of first order oscillations of the points within their regions in a unit cell consisting of 12 points around one with all triples being on straight lines that pass through the central point to represent the basic particles of the Standard Model. I call such oscillations a [small] dance. A [small] dance can move through the grid but individual points can not. Larger dances (such as a SAS) consist of semi "stable" associations of nearby [small] dances. The entire grid [universe] changes state when a point in a region asynchronously polls its 12 neighbors and assumes a new location in its region based on the results. It is a type of Cellular Automaton [CA]. At this level TD seems straight forward since there is no change at all. The approach is compatible with CT since some CA are capable of universal computation and the universe it models can contain SAS [the "done effectively" part] since large dances can be self interactive. The other things that are in my model which is derived from my "is" "is not" definitional approach is that the imbedding system: 1) Is one in which all possible states of all universes preexist [multi world and the model's link to AR], 2) Is randomly dynamic in terms of which states have instantations of reality [noise in the flow of reality] (a nice explanation of the accelerating expansion of our universe [additional points as part of the noise] recently observed), 3) In the dynamic, adjacent states can have instantations of reality that overlap [the flow of consciousness]. In the end then I must say that it seems my model contains comp. I indicated to Bruno some time ago that I thought we were to some degree convergent. Hal Ruhl
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, It is maybe time to change the name of the thread. But I'll get to that below. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 15:41:12 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality (skipped) ... [BM] OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a "solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this is going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the comp derivation. We can come back on this latter. [GK] Here we part company. MWI (I prefer to call it Everett's Interpretation or EQM) is NOT a solution to the measurement problem of QM but an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics that does not lead to that problem! It does however have a tripartite problem of its own that, in my opinion, is just the measurement problem blown up. In any case what you say afterwords does not follow (from EQM or QM). There are non-interactive measurements that people have been looking into for a while now (Dicke, Elitzur-Vaidman, etc...). I am sure you guys touched on these sometime ago... But all of this is irrelevant for my purpose at hand which is for you to commit to the proposition that "No-YD: no Bruno"! It seems to me that you are weaseling out of it but I don't quite care if you take refuge in another Everett World. That would be a cop out and I am sure you know it. I want you and I digitised IN THIS WORLD! I don't care for copies! (skip) > In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a > way that would not obviously violate the correspondence > limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. > But do not worry because I think you are a lot better > shot by QM. [BM] To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you can deduce quickly the qualitative "many-relative state/worlds" feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause much more problem to my approach. [GK] I don't much care what you can deduce from COMP, Bruno. I care that COMP=YD+CT+AR and that shooting down YD would shoot down COMP. You could very well deduce from COMP my non-existence if YD is false. (skipped) > > "Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical > Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following > three sub-hypotheses:" > > after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for > Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism. > > My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be called an hypothesis! Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way. [GK] I think you get my point. I am not asking for precision at all. I am pointing out that thesis and doctrines are not hypotheses tout court. These three "assumptions" do not have the same epistemic status and it is misleading to call them the same. If you don't like it, than acknowledge my pragmatics: if your point-of-view is falsifiable it should be so without compromising either CT and AR which stand very well on their own as you underscore below: [BM] > CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable > but favored by overwhelming heuristic support. Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's "definition" of the computable functions. The argument is the closure of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable "Church thesis". The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the early 19-twenties). See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned in my web page). > I know that there are > some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation > could produce a counterexample to > shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is unlikely. OK. [GK] Agreed, than . In any case one unassa
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfrey, Le 17-août-05, à 19:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : [BM] Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman integral (see my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf for a little summary. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the "classical world" from QM, as I pointed out to Lee, OK. Now I agree with Lee, and many on the FOR and the Everything lists that Everett (many-worlds + decoherence already) constitutes a "solution of the measurement problem". All measurements are just interaction, and then all states are relative. As I said, it seems to me that this is even more clear in the integral formulation of QM where F = ma can be deduced from the "sum on all histories". But this is going a little bit out of topics, and is not needed to understand the comp derivation. We can come back on this latter. but one can surely object to a "third party" theory from the fact that it does not reproduce a classical world any better than quantum mechanics. This is a complicated issue because: (a) Classical physics does not explain the "classical world" either as it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance, which only QM explains. (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena that we do observe as part of the "classical world" i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum etc... OK. In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a way that would not obviously violate the correspondence limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. But do not worry because I think you are a lot better shot by QM. To anticipate a little bit, I think this will be hard. From comp you can deduce quickly the qualitative "many-relative state/worlds" feature, the no-cloning theorem, the appearance of indeterminacy. I told you Newtonian physics (with a single universe-history) would cause much more problem to my approach. Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP: I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a full statement of your hypothesis since you were not kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read French that well and your English paper is somewhat sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page : http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to the following sentence: "Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-hypotheses:" after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism. My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be called an hypothesis! Ouh la la. You are close to the 1004 fallacy (asking for more precise definition than the reasoning itself). At the start you can use the term "axioms", "postulates", "theses", "premises", "assumptions", "hypotheses", etc.. in a similar way. CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable but favored by overwhelming heuristic support. Not only overwhelming supports: there is the deep conceptual argument that Kleene has discovered when he failed to refute Church's "definition" of the computable functions. The argument is the closure of the set of partial computable functions for the most transcendental mathematical operation: diagonalization. Kleene invented the vocable "Church thesis". The first to get Church's thesis is Emil Post (in the early 19-twenties). See (perhaps later) the diagonalization posts in this list (mentionned in my web page). I know that there are some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation could produce a counterexample to shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is unlikely. OK. And AR is a metaphysical position which I happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove or empirically test (nor do I have any idea on how to do it! Do you?) Well, I have decided to put it explicitly, because, in front of my reasoning, some people cop out simply by saying "Ah, but you are a platonist!". So I prefer to say it at once. I agree with you it is a sort of "cop out". Now, although 99, % of the mathematician are platonist during the week, most like to pretends they are not (the week-end!). Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the rest of your argument to go. But I find that it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to have to stand in company of the o
RE: subjective reality
Might you say a few more words about the method you refer to? sure. Its known as doubt. I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore it if inconvenient: about this "method": is there a body of work based upon this method? Yes. Science. Is it at all falsifiable? is anything? What other practitioners have there been? Anyone who has thought, "hmmm. Maybe its just me!" or "Goodness! That cant be right". Think of Descartes. On the way down he employs his method. Doubt, born of subjectivity. THis part of his journey is successful. Its when he abandones it and tries to re-establish the 'objective' realm that things go wrong. Chris. ;) From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "EverythingList" Subject: RE: subjective reality Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 06:31:22 -0700 Chris writes > I admire Descartes as a man [I would have said scientist and mathematician], > not so much as a philosopher. I admire his method more than his results, > he looked inwards. He also did a tremendous amount of good work in science and math. > Like Hume, Berkley , Locke and countless others. These people were the > forefathers of science, not the resistance to it. Europe, having been freed > from the authority of dogma by commerce and free enterprise, these people > voiced a challenge that had been long suppressed. Yes > Brent wrote > > > I think you are attacking a straw man "realist". > > Im challenging comments and attitudes I saw on this board. Introspection was > deemed an archaic relic of pre 16th century superstition, when in fact the > cogito was the cornerstone of the enlightenment and has been important ever > since. Interesting that you denigrate the guy's philosophy (so do I), but then say this. Yes, he did contribute to the foundations of rationalism. > Not just in substance but in method too. People might not be happy > about 'souls' and worse 'soul stuff', but really Descartes participated in > putting thinking and rationalising back on the map. Yes. > I doubt very much for instance that there would be cognitive psychology were > it not for the work of Descartes filtered through Chomskian Linguistics. Our > conscious robot is a product of the idea that there are innate mental > structures. Its the pattern and/or process computable function - that has > become important in philosophy of mind - even if its at the most basic level > of a stimulated neural nets, weighted sums et al. We have reached this point > because in a subjective sense we all experience these intractable > processes first hand, like finding a word once lost at the tip of your > tongue. How do we know about that? Because we experience it! Yes, that's right. That's how we first knew something was going on in humans. So far as I know, the best way to then investigate the phenomenon is not through further introspection---however helpful that may be in suggesting hypotheses---but by actual lab work in psychology. > Its the method thats worth saving, not the indivisible soul languishing > somewhere near the penal gland. Its not even whether souls provide a good > account of identity, its the method that Im defending, and the method that > I saw attacked. So far, Im still convinced Im right, which is very rare. Might you say a few more words about the method you refer to? I know that I may be asking a lot with the following so please ignore it if inconvenient: about this "method": is there a body of work based upon this method? Is it at all falsifiable? (perhaps an unfair question---I don't know.) What other practitioners have there been? Lee _ Want to block unwanted pop-ups? Download the free MSN Toolbar now! http://toolbar.msn.co.uk/
RE: subjective reality
Lee Corbin > > Colin writes > > > > So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, > > > > but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable > > > > illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where > > > > its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the > > > > observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic > > > > presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to > > > > the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally > > > > standardized RED #12398765). > > > > > > > > This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT > > > > and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not > > > > have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be > > > > completely different and as long as the experience is > > > > consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will > > > > be the same "OUCH". > > > > > > Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to > > > be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would > > > not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an > > > extremely important function for our survival as animals. > > > > Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are > > saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, > > which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the > > meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the > > measurement probe), is that our brain literally > > becomes hot? > > You think that I am saying that when one has an > experience of something being hot, the brain is > hot? What kind of a fool do you take me for, > anyway? How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F > where you went to elementary school? > > So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion > above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns > out to be in your use of the word "intimately", > which I failed to infer correctly what you meant > by it. Sloppy me. Yes you are right. Gazzumpt by the language again. I was actually going to quote Ramachandran. Glad you did, for the rest of the list... there's a didactic role here... Back to the measurement thing, just to be very clear The _event_ of the expression of the experiential quality in the brain is directly causally connected to the act of measurement(peripheral sensory neurons behaving appropriately). The experience itself (the detail of the quality thereof) could be anything (you could make sensing heat a sound if you wanted - synthesthesia, Ramachandran again). Exactly what experiential quality is selected for representation of hotness will be something for future biophysics to work out. My 'hot' and you 'hot' could be different. In terms of brain operation as long as the resultant behaviour is appropriate and consistently used the quality of the experience is irrelevant. The result is that an assumption that one can necessarily claim similarity of the physics of the real world and the brain physics of the behind experience is simply not justified. This does not mean that the physics of the distal world is not in some conformally mapped/useful way _similar_ to the physics of the experience. It just means that you cannot assume that the relationship. Exactly what 'ism this is I don’t know. Indirect realism? It doesn’t matter much. Naïve realism is out. The philosophers of perception can retrofit the actual nomenclature situation after it’s sorted out by the biophysicists. I think this encapsulates the position. I declare you the winner of today's grumpy old guy contest.. :-) Colin
RE: subjective reality
Colin writes > > > So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, > > > but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable > > > illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where > > > its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the > > > observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic > > > presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to > > > the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally > > > standardized RED #12398765). > > > > > > This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT > > > and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not > > > have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be > > > completely different and as long as the experience is > > > consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will > > > be the same "OUCH". > > > > Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to > > be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would > > not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an > > extremely important function for our survival as animals. > > Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are > saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, > which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the > meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the > measurement probe), is that our brain literally > becomes hot? You think that I am saying that when one has an experience of something being hot, the brain is hot? What kind of a fool do you take me for, anyway? How early do they teach 98.6 degrees F where you went to elementary school? So *I* will take the time to reread the discussion above and put my finger on the trouble. It turns out to be in your use of the word "intimately", which I failed to infer correctly what you meant by it. I took you to mean "intimately related" in the sense that there is a tight *causal* connection in the nervous systems of animals between outside objects and "inside" readings, and of course, it is *generally* true that there is such a tight causal connection. But you meant something a bit different, and I should have picked up on it, sorry. > I don't know about you, but to me very cold things feel > like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to > different thermal behaviour in the world. Yes, I've heard of that before. Doesn't happen to me, though. In any case, we easily see what is happening here (we know all the facts). Evolution programmed you to remove your hand post haste from anything extreme in temperature either way, and I guess it didn't affect the survival rates of our ancestors, as the idea was just to bring the dangerous phenomenon to the attention of your higher centers. > There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences > do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! > An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none! > That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain > material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. You are quite correct, but the statement "the experiences do not match the physics of the real world" is really misleading. Of course they have to match---to a certain fidelity---the physics of the real world, or our ancestors would have been unable to propagate as well. I needn't give you countless examples of how, for example, your hand reaches out rather unerringly for door handles when you approach them. My reading of "experiences matching the physics of the real world" include those numerous examples. But I hope that you don't think that I'm ignorant of how phantom limbs work (the very best book is Ramachandran's "Phantoms of the Brain", which I highly recommend). But after assuming that I thought that brains get hot, I just don't know. > We simply don't have to have the argument: it's over. If you say so! (I did agree with the remaining parts of your email.) Lee
RE: subjective reality
Lee Corbin > > Colin writes > > > ACCURACY > > Extent to which a measurement matches an international standard. > > > > REPEATABILITY > > Extent to which a measurement matches its own prior measurement. > > > > For example the SICK DME 2000 laser distance measurement instrument > > has an accuracy of about 10mm over 150m but a repeatability of 0.7mm > > > > Why does this matter? > > > > Because _within_ the measurement system is simply does not > > matter what the accuracy is! As long as systematic errors are > > repeatable, the systems behaviour will be repeatable... > > Sounds reasonable. And indeed, matches the *reliability* vs. > *validity* of statistical measurements and performance. Does > this distinction between accuracy and repeatability get the > same kind of press that reliability vs. validity does? > I’m just talking about data sheets. Reliability is a 'mean time between failure' number in hours. 'Validity'? Dunno what that is. 'Availability' is another figure like reliability a %uptime, if you like, more to do with how much time is spent with the instrument out of service being calibrated. When you buy instruments you have to understand the use to which it will be put. ‘Repeatability’ is an Ockham’s razor solution for instrumentation: it costs less! If the measurement’s accuracy matters outside the system being measured you must go for accuracy and get out your cheque book. All else equal it stands to reason that the cheaper option (repeatability) is what will be used by nature it will be selected. > > So, for subjective experience: Yes it can be an illusion, > > but a systematically erroneous, relentlessly repeatable > > illusion driven by measurement of the natural world where > > its errors are not important - .ie. not mission fatal to the > > observer. Experiential qualities, in their solipsistic > > presentation, need only be repeatable (my red/attached to > > the linguistic token RED), not 'accurate' (internationally > > standardized RED #12398765). > > > > This is equivalent to saying that the experience of HOT > > and the actual hotness of reality (wobbly atoms) _do not > > have to be intimately/directly related_!!! They can be > > completely different and as long as the experience is > > consistently used the behaviour of the experiencer will > > be the same "OUCH". > > Well, wait a minute. The experience of HOT *does* have to > be intimately related: otherwise, the machines we are would > not have been built by evolution in this way. It serves an > extremely important function for our survival as animals. Here I’m afraid we have to disagree. What you are saying is that the experiential quality of HOT, which is _entirely_ generated in the brain (the meter output) from a sensory neuron or two (the measurement probe), is that our brain literally becomes hot? I don;t know about you, but to me very cold things feel like a burn. The same experiencing system is attached to different thermal behaviour in the world. Also this is not what is found in any experimental tests. The transduction at your fingertip (in the candle flame) makes use of the thermal effects on cell excitability in your finger nerves. Thinking the way you suggest is like saying that the voltmeter indicates voltage by altering the voltage of the volt meter chassis, as opposed to altering the display. A fairly agricultural analogy but descriptive enough. There is clear experimental evidence that the experiences do not match the physics of the real world. Take phantom limb! An amputee can have a feel a whole arm where there is none! That phantom experience of the arm is generated by brain material receiving pathological feeds from broken nerves. We simply don't have to have the argment: it's over. > > > Haven't we all asked 'is my red the same as your red'? > > Haven't we all concluded that we'd never be able to > > ascertain the difference because it really does not > > matter? > > No, only the philosophically inclined ever ask that. And > yes, they conclude (or should conclude) that it doesn't > matter and is actually a wrong question. It's analogously > bad to "What is it like to be a bat?" another question > that only a philosopher would ask, and which just derails > thinking into unproductive channels IMO. > I was trying to instill an understanding of the implications of repeatability vs accuracy from the point of view of ‘being’ the instrument. The last thing I need to do is get philosophical! :-) > > ...we all point to the object and agree its red > > repeatability meanwhile the actual physical reality > > of 'redness' is simply irrelevant and may not represent > > any real quality of the observed system at all... > > That's *possible*, of course. Sometimes brains malfunction from > the viewpoint of evolution. It was, after all, "actual physical > reality of redness" > > WARNING WARNING WARNING PHILOSOPHICAL DANGER ALERT USE OF > COLOR IN PHILOSOPHY EXC
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, Thanks for your assent on this. I am sure that CT and AR are needed, at some point, for your really outrageous conclusions. But I am sure you agree that they cannot save them if the "Yes doctor" presumption can be shot down by itself. Right? This would save me from having to read through your Dovetail-Lob etc... argument which is probably way above my head! We obviously move in very different circles because I was taught by very stubborn old strong AI types and cognoscendi cognitivists and I have never heard anyone argue for something like that YD hypothesis! But as you have conceded no one needs it to defend the old-fashioned materialist functionalism credo that you (and I) do not subscribe to anyway. But I will wait for your other comments. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 19:48:35 +0200 Subject: Re: subjective reality Hi Godfray, I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses. > I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real > interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not > need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends with. OK? I can say yes. Nevertheless, the "bodyguards" will appear necessary when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it! Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough). None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out. But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print it now. A demain, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Hi Godfray, I must leave my office, and I let you know just my first impression of your last post. First I hope you will accept my apologies for having skip unintentionally your demand for my hypotheses. I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends with. OK? I can say yes. Nevertheless, the "bodyguards" will appear necessary when you go through the reasoning at some point. Actually most computer scientist who does not want to abandon physicalism after the reading of my reasoning, does abandon comp under the form of abandoning the Arithmetical Realism (AR) part of it! Few abandon the YES doctor part (curiously enough). None, until now, abandon Church thesis, but it *is* a logical way out. But I will comment more carefully your post tomorrow. I will just print it now. A demain, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Bruno, Thanks for indulging my skepticism. I think I am getting a clearer picture of what you are up to. There is only one point in our exchange below to which I would like to respond and than I have some unrelated comments. I will erase the rest of the conversation to which I don't have much to add. Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Hi Godfrey, Le 15-août-05, à 21:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > > Also if Newtonian physics is enough to shoot down your hypothesis > than it must be dead already since Newtonian physics > is the correspondence limit of QM and QM is right!!! I really don't follow you here... [BM] Not really, as far as you agree that classical physics can be extracted from quantum physics. My favorite unrigorous way: Feynman integral (see my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf for a little summary. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [GK] I did not say, nor do I believe, that one can extract the "classical world" from QM, as I pointed out to Lee, but one can surely object to a "third party" theory from the fact that it does not reproduce a classical world any better than quantum mechanics. This is a complicated issue because: (a) Classical physics does not explain the "classical world" either as it cannot account for the stability of matter, for instance, which only QM explains. (b) Quantum mechanics predicts some entirely macroscopic phenomena that we do observe as part of the "classical world" i.e. superfluidity of He, superconductivity, stability of the vaccuum etc... In other words: if I found a way of shooting down your theory in a way that would not obviously violate the correspondence limit of QM , it would shot down! That is what I am suggesting above. But do not worry because I think you are a lot better shot by QM. Now my logistic COMPlaints about your COMP: I have searched through your web site to see whether I could find a full statement of your hypothesis since you were not kind enough to reproduce it in the previous exchange. I don't read French that well and your English paper is somewhat sketchy on this, so I can only refer to what you state in the page : http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm where I found what looks like a definition. My first objection is to the following sentence: "Definition: Classical Digital mechanism, or Classical Computationalism, or just comp, is the conjunction of the following three sub-hypotheses:" after which you list three items which I will not reproduce here and will just short as 1) YD for "Yes-doctor", 2) CT for Church Thesis and 3) AR for Arithmetic Realism. My objection is that of these three only the first can genuinely be called an hypothesis! CT, as the name indicates, is a Thesis which is most likely unprovable but favored by overwhelming heuristic support. I know that there are some people in the southern hemisphere who think that QComputation could produce a counterexample to shoot it down (and perhaps it could) but you and I agree that it is unlikely. And AR is a metaphysical position which I happen to subscribe but which I would never fathom to try and prove or empirically test (nor do I have any idea on how to do it! Do you?) Now I suppose that you need for these three things to be true for the rest of your argument to go. But I find that it is extremely unfair to force your most excellent hypothesis YD to have to stand in company of the other two to assert its merits!!! In other words as (1) YD is obviously independent from CT and AR (2) CT and AR stand no chance of being falsified empirically (or we both like them that way, which is the same). (3) No one that we know has been able to extract conclusions such as yours from CT & AR without YD (right) would you have any objections to us concentrating, from here on, on your "YD hypothesis"? I am saying this because I actually think that it is the real interesting and original part of your proposal and it does not need those two other huge "body guards" which I happen to be friends with. OK? If you agree with this I may have something interesting to tell you about your idea that you have not anticipated! Please,don't COMP out! Say "yes", Doctor Bruno! -Godfrey Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
Re: subjective reality
Le 16-août-05, à 04:59, John M a écrit : (The original went only to Bruno's addressw) To: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, everything-list@eskimo.com In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Bruno, your postulate of testability is falling into obsolescence. Thanks John! (I agree that testability should not be an obsession, but once you get it in a field traditionnally considered has making untestable propositions , it is hard to resist pointing on the feature, and also, it is the best way to attract people for many other scientific community, among the contemplators, for example. Proof within the model can be applied to testable events within the model. Logicians make jumps back and forth between theories and models (note the plural). If the model proves too narrow, you have to 'assume' beyond and 'theorize' beyond the in-model testability. Then, later on, you may find indications whether your assumed novelty is 'solid' or discardable. OK. Most of the discussions on this list since the early 90s are non-testable. I would add many nuances. Thay are degree of non-testability. Tests can be indirect, or on some horizon. Tests can address matter of consistency or necessity. I cannot measure the blood pressure of the white rabbit or the length of all the universes. Hal Ruhl (and myself, not far from his) presented some worldview without testable origins. But it is very hard to prove something is not testable. You need to anticipate many conclusions of your saying before. We should not 'wall in' ourselves into the existing framework of a testable ambiance if we want to think further. We should not wall ourself. Comma. Justifiability is another question, but it can be raised later on. The same may apply to the 'screening' by human logic (formal or not) and we have plenty of examples on this list when human logic was not applied as a liiting model. Take Lobian logics. (I am joking, partially ;) I would not restrict nature (te wholeness) to anything we can muster in our capabilities. No. But my point is that if we just take digital mechanism seriously enough then, necessarily, the observable wholeness emerges from what lobian machines can dream about their capacities. The beauty of it, is that, continuing assuming comp after that reversal, it can be shown that it is NOT a restriction of Nature or of Whatever. By incompleteness, to believe it is a restriction, is a lack of modesty in front of the unknown (assuming comp!!!). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Chris Peck: But subjectivity is certain. Lee: Since the only thing that is certain is "I think therefore I am" or "...I am thinking", it's not a stretch to say that no worthwhile knowledge is certain. All knowledge is conjectural. To be fair, you should google for "Pan Critical Rationalism" if you have not already read up on it. Only scientific knowledge is conjectural. Only third person communicable knowledge is conjectural. You did acknowledge the ineffable knowledge of what is is like having a friend putting a needle in your finger. And, of course, I would not be happy if when I complain about headache to my Doctor if he tells me "your headache? Pure conjecture!" First person knowledge is not conjectural, at least not consciously so, nor consistently so. It is Descartes fixed point of its systematic doubting procedure, when you doubt that you doubt making up an unavoidable place for an indubitable reality, though ineffable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: subjective reality
Hi Lee, As much as I sympathise with your call for preservation of naive realism and agree entirely with your opinion on the demerits of introspection I have to take issue with half of what you say below: -Original Message- From: Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ... >I'm not too sure what you mean by "to embed". If we are seeking to *explain* >---if that is what you mean---then we cannot explain QM by classical physics, >but we *can* explain classical physics by QM. (I take our primary activity to >be---and the activity I'm most interesting in participating in---*explaining*.) ... Lee Yes we cannot explain QM by classical physics but NEITHER can we explain from QM the classical world we know and love with its well defined and assigned elements of (naive) physical reality that you so much cherish, I am afraid! If we did there would not be no Measurement Problem, no spooky long-distance correlations, no zombie Schrodinger Cat's around to haunt us... You see, amplitudes don't just add! They also multiply and square! I hope this does not add to your grumpiness. The miracle of experience you talk about is still there, of course. Even more so, perhaps. Regards, Godfrey Kurtz (New Brunswick, NJ) Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.