Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 09:05:27PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> That is an assumption. There are proposed cosmologies that allow for
> an infinite number of computational steps to occur - IIRC, the "big
> rip" is one such.
> 
> 
> I don't think so -- the "big rip" would simple tear the physical computer to
> pieces.

Yes, but give it enough energy to execute an inifnite number of
computational steps before its demise. Or so I was told :).

There are cosmologies where that doesn't happen too - the "big crunch"
being one IIRC. That was famously where Tipler came unstuck.

>  
> 
> Once multiverses get into the picture, there is
> almost assuredly sufficient computational resources to go around.
> 
> 
> No so fast. The multiverse is an assemblage of disjoint universes -- what
> happens in one universe does not affect any other universe. So that doesn't 
> get
> you any more computing power.
>  
>

I don't need to execute all programs here, they just need to be
executed somewhere. So the Multiverse definitely does fit the bill, so
long as there's enough of them. The string landscape probably doesn't
have enough :)

> Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether insufficient
> resources to support the full reality of the integers makes any damn
> difference at all to mathematics or even observable reality. Norm
> Wildberger is one of the few people championing this sort of work.
> 
> 
> If the dovetailer has only limited resources, does it actually get you 
> anything
> at all?
>  

Norm thinks so. But its early days in that program, and I don't think
they have many results. I just point it out that it is really the
logical conclusion from the position you're arguing.

> 
> >
> >     I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can 
> be
> >     run in order for a machine to be considered truly
> >     universal.
> >
> >
> > That might be the case, in which case the argument works only on the
> realist
> > assumption. Since there is no necessity to make such an assumption, we
> can
> > safely ignore the whole shebang
> >
> 
> There's a lot of plausible arguments in favour of a multiversal
> reality - indeed it tends to be the prevalent background assumption of
> this mailing list.
> 
> 
> This list is a very small sample of the scientific community, much less of
> humanity as a whole.

Do you want it otherwise?

> Multiverse ideas are around, but unless seriously
> constrained, they are definitely suspect.
>  

Maybe so - but let's not try to give up critical thinking about them.

> 
> My gut feeling is that if there really is an ultrafinitist limit to
> the amount of computation available in the universe, then there ought
> to be some measureable consequence of this in our observable universe.
> 
> 
> Why? That might be the case if the computationalist/arithmetical realist 
> thesis
> has some basis. But there is no evidence for that. Physicalism is still safer
> bet..
>

Everything theories have definite advantages over theories that say
"it just is - some things exist, others don't, for no apparent
reason". So its worth trying to pin down what constraints that
assumption puts on out observed reality. Of course, it may be that "it
just is" wins out at the end, but that would be like: OK science stops
here.

BTW - computationalism already has a "some things exist, others don't"
moment. The CT thesis implicitly assumes that hypercomputers do not
exist. If they did, then there would be some computations that are
impossible for a Turing machine to perform.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190520001900.GG14791%40zen.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 6:00 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 05:11:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:45 PM Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is about calculable
> numbers, not  about
> > > reification. It also works in a purely nominalist account.
> > >
> >
> > Hmm - possibly I went too fast here. The existence of a running
> > universal dovetailer is sufficient for the whole numbers to be
> > reified, as the abovementioned constructive program will eventually
> be
> > run for all such whole numbers.
> >
> >
> > For the dovetailer to run on all numbers, it must be run "in
> arithmetic", as
> > Bruno claims. If you do not assume arithmetical realism, the dovetailer
> cannot
> > get off the ground unless it is implemented in a physical computer. But
> that is
> > always necessarily finite, so the argument again collapses.
> >
> >
> > In order for the dovetailer to fail to
> > generate all whole numbers, it must be starved of some resources,
> > which is an ultrafinitist move.
> >
> >
> > Or the necessary involvement of a finite physical computer
> >
>
> That is an assumption. There are proposed cosmologies that allow for
> an infinite number of computational steps to occur - IIRC, the "big
> rip" is one such.


I don't think so -- the "big rip" would simple tear the physical computer
to pieces.


> Once multiverses get into the picture, there is
> almost assuredly sufficient computational resources to go around.
>

No so fast. The multiverse is an assemblage of disjoint universes -- what
happens in one universe does not affect any other universe. So that doesn't
get you any more computing power.


> Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether insufficient
> resources to support the full reality of the integers makes any damn
> difference at all to mathematics or even observable reality. Norm
> Wildberger is one of the few people championing this sort of work.
>

If the dovetailer has only limited resources, does it actually get you
anything at all?


> >
> > I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can be
> > run in order for a machine to be considered truly
> > universal.
> >
> >
> > That might be the case, in which case the argument works only on the
> realist
> > assumption. Since there is no necessity to make such an assumption, we
> can
> > safely ignore the whole shebang
> >
>
> There's a lot of plausible arguments in favour of a multiversal
> reality - indeed it tends to be the prevalent background assumption of
> this mailing list.
>

This list is a very small sample of the scientific community, much less of
humanity as a whole. Multiverse ideas are around, but unless seriously
constrained, they are definitely suspect.


> My gut feeling is that if there really is an ultrafinitist limit to
> the amount of computation available in the universe, then there ought
> to be some measureable consequence of this in our observable universe.
>

Why? That might be the case if the computationalist/arithmetical realist
thesis has some basis. But there is no evidence for that. Physicalism is
still safer bet..

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSak7WKaUphQgiox%3DmwNQrSUWD2wKgGiGWHGv8908MZAw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 05:11:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:45 PM Russell Standish  
> wrote:
> 
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:12:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish 
> 
> > wrote:
> >
> >     On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >     > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> >     >
> >     >     On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett 
> 
> >     wrote:
> >     >
> >     >         On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal <
> marc...@ulb.ac.be
> >     >
> >     >         wrote:
> >     >
> >     >             The first order theory of the real numbers does not
> require
> >     >             arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the
> >     trigonometrical
> >     >             functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the
> >     integers.
> >     >             Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in that theory.
> >     >
> >     >             If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell 
> us
> which
> >     >             axioms you reject among,
> >     >
> >     >             1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> >     >             2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> >     >             3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> >     >             4) x+0 = x
> >     >             5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> >     >             6) x*0=0
> >     >             7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> >     >
> >     >
> >     > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of
> arithmetic
> >     above.
> >     > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the 
> model
> of
> >     > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here:
> are
> >     the
> >     > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms
> that
> >     are
> >     > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist
> independently
> >     of
> >     > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy
> the
> >     axioms,
> >     > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on
> pain
> >     of
> >     > vicious circularity.
> >
> >
> >     Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to
> >     generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the
> >     element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation
> (eg
> >     5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, 
> and
> >     6&7 define multiplication on these objects.
> >
> >
> > That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of 
> whole
> > numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of
> arithmetic. If,
> > however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for
> these
> > axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have arithmetic
> > realism. You can't have it both ways.
> 
> It is clear that application of the successor function is sufficient to
> generate all whole numbers (given sufficient resources, of
> course). The definitions of addition and multiplication give a
> contructive way of computing these operations.
> 
> I can't see why one can't also suppose that those entities exist
> independently of whether I bother to run a program that generates them
> or not - so one can have it both ways AFAICS. Realism vs nominalism is
> a choice.
> 
> 
> That was the point I was trying to make: Realism is an assumption that has to
> be added to the axioms.
> 
> 
> 
> >     Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true
> statements
> >     of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone.
> >
> >     In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms,
> >     whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of
> their
> >     own).
> >
> >
> > That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I
> have
> > pointed out.
> >  
> 
> No I was parroting another argument that Goedelian incompleteness
> entails an independent existence - that some things are true (exist)
> 
> 
> A clear confusion between the notions of "truth" and "existence". Truth does
> not imply existence. It is true that Dr Watson is Sherlock Holmes's sidekick;
> but that does not entail the existence of either character.
>  
> 
> even if you cannot generate that thing algorithmically. I'm a little
> ambivalent on this argument - it forms the core of the argument a
> friend of mine is writing a book about, but he's only shown me the
> first chapter (which I've critiqued), so I haven't got to the meat of
> it.
> 
> 
> Nah! I 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:45 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:12:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish  >
> > wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett  >
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal <
> marc...@ulb.ac.be
> > >
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > The first order theory of the real numbers does not
> require
> > > arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the
> > trigonometrical
> > > functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the
> > integers.
> > > Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in that theory.
> > >
> > > If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell
> us which
> > > axioms you reject among,
> > >
> > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> > > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> > > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
> > > 4) x+0 = x
> > > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> > > 6) x*0=0
> > > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> > >
> > >
> > > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of
> arithmetic
> > above.
> > > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the
> model of
> > > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here:
> are
> > the
> > > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms
> that
> > are
> > > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist
> independently
> > of
> > > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy
> the
> > axioms,
> > > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on
> pain
> > of
> > > vicious circularity.
> >
> >
> > Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to
> > generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the
> > element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation
> (eg
> > 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and
> > 6&7 define multiplication on these objects.
> >
> >
> > That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of whole
> > numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of
> arithmetic. If,
> > however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for
> these
> > axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have arithmetic
> > realism. You can't have it both ways.
>
> It is clear that application of the successor function is sufficient to
> generate all whole numbers (given sufficient resources, of
> course). The definitions of addition and multiplication give a
> contructive way of computing these operations.
>
> I can't see why one can't also suppose that those entities exist
> independently of whether I bother to run a program that generates them
> or not - so one can have it both ways AFAICS. Realism vs nominalism is
> a choice.
>

That was the point I was trying to make: Realism is an assumption that has
to be added to the axioms.


> Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements
> > of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone.
> >
> > In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms,
> > whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of
> their
> > own).
> >
> >
> > That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I
> have
> > pointed out.
> >
>
> No I was parroting another argument that Goedelian incompleteness
> entails an independent existence - that some things are true (exist)
>

A clear confusion between the notions of "truth" and "existence". Truth
does not imply existence. It is true that Dr Watson is Sherlock Holmes's
sidekick; but that does not entail the existence of either character.


> even if you cannot generate that thing algorithmically. I'm a little
> ambivalent on this argument - it forms the core of the argument a
> friend of mine is writing a book about, but he's only shown me the
> first chapter (which I've critiqued), so I haven't got to the meat of
> it.
>

Nah! I can assure you that the argument is flawed..


> > There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding
> additional
> > elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive
> > application of s.
> >
> > Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for
> generating
> > the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the
> > existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the
> > whole numbers.
> >
> >
> > That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:12:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal  
> wrote:
> >
> >     On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
> >
> >         On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal 
>  >
> >         wrote:
> >
> >             The first order theory of the real numbers does not require
> >             arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the
> trigonometrical
> >             functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the
> integers.
> >             Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in that theory.
> >
> >             If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us 
> which
> >             axioms you reject among,
> >
> >             1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> >             2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> >             3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> >             4) x+0 = x
> >             5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> >             6) x*0=0
> >             7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> >
> >
> > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic
> above.
> > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model of
> > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are
> the
> > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that
> are
> > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist 
> independently
> of
> > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy the
> axioms,
> > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on pain
> of
> > vicious circularity.
> 
> 
> Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to
> generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the
> element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation (eg
> 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and
> 6&7 define multiplication on these objects.
> 
> 
> That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of whole
> numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of arithmetic. If,
> however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for these
> axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have arithmetic
> realism. You can't have it both ways.

It is clear that application of the successor function is sufficient to
generate all whole numbers (given sufficient resources, of
course). The definitions of addition and multiplication give a
contructive way of computing these operations.

I can't see why one can't also suppose that those entities exist
independently of whether I bother to run a program that generates them
or not - so one can have it both ways AFAICS. Realism vs nominalism is
a choice.

> 
> 
> Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements
> of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone.
> 
> In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms,
> whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of their
> own).
> 
> 
> That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I have
> pointed out.
>  

No I was parroting another argument that Goedelian incompleteness
entails an independent existence - that some things are true (exist)
even if you cannot generate that thing algorithmically. I'm a little
ambivalent on this argument - it forms the core of the argument a
friend of mine is writing a book about, but he's only shown me the
first chapter (which I've critiqued), so I haven't got to the meat of
it.

> 
> There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding additional
> elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive
> application of s.
> 
> Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for generating
> the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the
> existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the
> whole numbers.
> 
> 
> That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is about calculable numbers, not 
> about
> reification. It also works in a purely nominalist account.
>  

Hmm - possibly I went too fast here. The existence of a running
universal dovetailer is sufficient for the whole numbers to be
reified, as the abovementioned constructive program will eventually be
run for all such whole numbers. In order for the dovetailer to fail to
generate all whole numbers, it must be starved of some resources,
which is an ultrafinitist move.

I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can be
run in order for a machine to be considered truly
universal. Ultrafinitism makes a nonsense of that, of course.

Hopefully, 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> >
> > On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal <
> marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> > wrote:
> >
> > The first order theory of the real numbers does not require
> > arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the
> trigonometrical
> > functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the
> integers.
> > Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in that theory.
> >
> > If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which
> > axioms you reject among,
> >
> > 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
> > 4) x+0 = x
> > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> > 6) x*0=0
> > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> >
> >
> > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic
> above.
> > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model of
> > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are
> the
> > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that
> are
> > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist
> independently of
> > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy the
> axioms,
> > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on pain
> of
> > vicious circularity.
>
>
> Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to
> generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the
> element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation (eg
> 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and
> 6&7 define multiplication on these objects.
>

That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of whole
numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of arithmetic.
If, however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for
these axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have
arithmetic realism. You can't have it both ways.

Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements
> of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone.
>
> In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms,
> whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of their
> own).
>

That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I
have pointed out.


> There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding additional
> elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive
> application of s.
>
> Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for generating
> the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the
> existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the
> whole numbers.


That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is about calculable numbers, not
about reification. It also works in a purely nominalist account.


> Conversely, this arithmetic is sufficient to generate
> all possible Turing machine (IIRC, the proof involves Diophantine
> equations, but wiser heads then me may confirm or deny).
>
> A converse position (held by a small minority of mathematicians) is
> that perhaps not all whole numbers exist - that there is some
> (unspecified) maximum integer x for which s(x) is not meaningful, and
> in particular, for which axiom 3 is false. In such an environment, the
> CT thesis must be false, there can be no universal machine capable of
> emulating all other others - there must be at least one such machine
> whose emulation program is too long to fit on the obviously finite length
> tape.
>

Interesting, but not my immediate concern. Which is that the axioms and CT
do not imply arithmetical realism: that has to be a separate assumption,
and there is no independent justification for such an assumption.

Bruce


> Bruno's work does not address this ultrafinitist case, as the CT
> thesis is an explicit assumption. Except that the Movie Graph Argument
> is supposedly about that case.
>
> Cheers
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQhexHK7kaEMYxS0Bri%2Bz-5591Wmt%3DyQTRmrCR8cm5VUQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 7:27:53 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> Bruno's work does not address this ultrafinitist case, as the CT 
> thesis is an explicit assumption. Except that the Movie Graph Argument 
> is supposedly about that case. 
>
> Cheers 
>
>
Re:The Movie Graph Argument

The Movie Graph Argument Revisited
 Russell K. Standish
 https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.07764


*Real computationalism*

 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/

is *compatible with materialism*.

RealComp vs. Comp (the latter being in vocabulary of the commonly expressed 
version of Church-Turing, even with the hyperarithmetical extensions) 
removes all pretenses and vestiges of Platonism.

@philipthrift





   

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f6699b9b-5193-49b1-ba26-cff3fd20e5a5%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> 
> The first order theory of the real numbers does not require
> arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical
> functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the integers.
> Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in that theory.
> 
> If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which
> axioms you reject among,
> 
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> 
> You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic above.
> But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model of
> arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are the
> integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that are
> "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist independently of
> the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy the axioms,
> and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on pain of
> vicious circularity.


Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to
generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the
element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation (eg
5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and
6&7 define multiplication on these objects.

Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements
of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone.

In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms,
whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of their own).

There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding additional
elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive
application of s.

Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for generating
the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the
existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the
whole numbers. Conversely, this arithmetic is sufficient to generate
all possible Turing machine (IIRC, the proof involves Diophantine
equations, but wiser heads then me may confirm or deny).

A converse position (held by a small minority of mathematicians) is
that perhaps not all whole numbers exist - that there is some
(unspecified) maximum integer x for which s(x) is not meaningful, and
in particular, for which axiom 3 is false. In such an environment, the
CT thesis must be false, there can be no universal machine capable of
emulating all other others - there must be at least one such machine
whose emulation program is too long to fit on the obviously finite length tape.

Bruno's work does not address this ultrafinitist case, as the CT
thesis is an explicit assumption. Except that the Movie Graph Argument
is supposedly about that case.

Cheers

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190519002736.GK5592%40zen.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/17/2019 5:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 May 2019, at 01:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 wrote:



On 5/15/2019 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 May 2019, at 23:46, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 wrote:



On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot be 
derived from or defined by labels.

And it depends on the model.  Which is why it's undefinable within the system.  And also why 
it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true that snow is white.”

?

I don’t see the difference. The standard model of arithmetic is given by the 
intersection between all models.

Isn't the intersection of all models just the provable part?

By incompleteness that is not the case. The provable part is much smaller than 
the true part.


Isn't that what I said?


The true undecidable sentences are true in the standard sense, just possibly 
false in the non start sense.


Right.  All the models make the provable part "true"; otherwise they 
wouldn't be models.  What you mean by the "true undecidable sentences 
are true in the standard sense" is that they are true in the standard 
model, which is the abstraction from empirically counting, adding, 
subtracting, and multiplying sets of objects.  It is that empirical 
basis which makes the standard model standard and is the reason everyone 
agree on "it".


Brent


Typical example: the consistency of PA. Everyone familiar with natural numbers 
believe that PA is consistent, but PA cannot prove this, and thus there is a 
model of PA where “PA is inconsistent” is true. It means that some “omega” (see 
my preceding posts) is a proof of “0=1”; but as omega is not accessible by the 
successor relation, that they is still consistent.  PA + (PA is inconsistent) 
is a consistent theory of natural numbers, but it is not a sound theory. It is 
false in the standard  model.

Bruno




Brent


See my other recent explanations.

Bruno




Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/816e0c3c-76cc-82c8-a3b3-18f6af30b042%40verizon.net.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab8bbe0f-a236-9628-c030-4de2928ca181%40verizon.net.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d0ad3345-c0f4-878f-9271-07db96cb5190%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/17/2019 5:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 May 2019, at 01:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 wrote:



On 5/15/2019 8:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Mathematical logic distinguish well the name of a thing and the thing itself. 
You confuse “0” and 0.

Also, when you say that something does not exist, you might give us your 
metaphysical axioms. Taken literarily, what you say is like saying that the 
equation x - 4 = 0 has no solution.

That's confusing "Satisfies a predicate." with "exists".  Such a definition of 
"exists" is only relative to a context.  Compare, "There exists a physician companion of Sherlock 
Holmes.”

In arithmetic, I use the expression “it exists x P(x)” with the meaning the 
standard model of arithmetic satisfies “it exists x P(x)”. Which is the 
logician way to describe the meaning of “it exists x such that x-1=0” in 
high-school.

Since day one, we use the standard model of arithmetic. It is the one everyone 
understand. The no standard model are sophisticated constructs in the mind of 
logician, to prove that PA, and all sound machines, have limitation with 
respect to the standard model, which can be defined online a richer theory.


And I use the standard model of Sherlock Holmes, the one everyone 
understands.  That doesn't make Watson exist.


Brent




The level of mathematical confidence is high up to ZFC, like in analysis and 
physics.

Bruno





Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13f30fc5-3fd9-9b09-17c5-f198c540b5a8%40verizon.net.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c94fc0cd-1234-9d67-b406-47e3849af756%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/17/2019 3:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


It's a matter of equivocating on "the natural numbers".  If you 
regard them as a theory of things, the way you learn them at your 
mother's knee, then there are objective truths "Two garbanzo beans 
plus two chick peas make four beans." the way "Snow is white."  But 
if you want to evaluate the truth of "2+2=4" that's a  proposition in 
arithmetic.  If it's PA then it's true in every model because it's a 
theorem.  But when you say there are true statements of arithmetic 
that aren't provable in PA, what they are depends on the model.


Hmm… No.


Are you saying that non-standard models of arithmetic don't assign 
different truth values to some propositions?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/382aedaf-a8bb-a63b-dcfa-01ef7534dab1%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Complexity challenges us all, and the few are able to successfully rise to the 
challenge. For me, the mathematically gifted are indeed a successor species!


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Fri, May 17, 2019 8:34 am
Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon



On 15 May 2019, at 17:41, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same thing 
as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all domains 
followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?


With mechanism, what exists are the numbers. The (halting) computations are 
enough for the ontology, and their existence are assured by RA (the weaker 
Turing universal theory with finitely many axioms).
To compare with physical brother mathematical notion of multiverse remains to 
be done by the future generations. It is  complex subject. 
Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon



On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:





Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only to 
be not human defined, but to be not human definable.



(This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/
"Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf


The final slides:

The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.It is incorrect to 
describe it as an open question.
The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how theCH both holds and 
fails throughout the multiverse, of how thesemodels are connected and how one 
may reach them from eachother while preserving or omitting certain features.
Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but themost important 
essential facts are known.
Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just onemathematical world or many

Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
         Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and 
semantics!

If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
theories on that reality.
It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical 
worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the 
contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The 
standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which 
most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA 
or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, 
Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became phenomenological. 





There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
and false in another.

That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
choice or the continuum hypotheses.
Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much more 
than RA. 
Bruno




@philipthrift



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06ca3480-cdf1-426b-9f38-404bc2fa1550%40googlegroups.com.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/07CE2D6F-E36D-45E6-883E-E9A13C4812B3%40ulb.ac.be.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1625287452.1090267.1557934879733%40mail.yahoo.com.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To uns

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> The first order theory of the real numbers does not require arithmetical
>> realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical functions reintroduce
>> the need of being realist on the integers. Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the
>> integers  in that theory.
>>
>> If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which axioms you
>> reject among,
>>
>> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
>> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
>> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
>> 4) x+0 = x
>> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>> 6) x*0=0
>> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>
>> Some people add some metaphysical baggage in “realism” which is not
>> there., “Arithmetical realism” is just the doctrine according to which the
>> axioms above make sense. Usually, they are implicitly taught in primary
>> school.
>> It is used only for the Church-Turing thesis and the (mathematical)
>> definition of “digital machine”.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> You are just using your personal Humpty-Dumpty dictionary to define
> "realism". Arithmetical realism is a bit more than just the axioms above --
> it is a metaphysical notion.
>
>
> “Metaphysical notion is fuzzy”, but I have given a precise definition of
> realism in arithmetic, the one used in the work. Realism is just the belief
> in the truth of the axioms above (and a bit of logic).
>

You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic
above. But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model
of arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are
the integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that
are "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist
independently of the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that
satisfy the axioms, and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the
axioms, on pain of vicious circularity.

The alternative is to say that the integers are defined by the axioms, and
cannot, therefore, be a model (in your sense, viz, independent entities
that satisfy the axioms).

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQkbFdDHToiXjOGeVdWAmJ3x5o1GwaSnTBiB5E18QPFHQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 05:07, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> And why should I care what the Quran says?

The neoplatonist reading of the Quran has lead to Enlightened Islam, which has 
lead to Averroes, and eventually European coming back to science (except for 
the missing theology).

The Aristotelian reading of the Quran has lead to the elimination of person, 
the literalism in religion, obscurantism and wars.

It is bit the same with the bible and the gospel, but it looks like Maimonides 
has prevented the jews to fall in the theological trap. 

Those who try to convert other people just spread their lack of belief in God, 
or better in .
If they trust God, they trust it means, and let HIM/HER/IT to do the job.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> "Science flies to the moon.  Religion flies into buildings."
>--- Vic Stenger
> 
> On 5/15/2019 7:47 PM, Samiya Illias wrote:
>> The Quran presents a similar idea of one gigantic sky layered into seven 
>> skies, each with its own laws/commands/affair. Please read excerpt below 
>> 
>> ...
>> Revisiting Surah alFussilat (Explained in Detail), we read: 
>> 
>> ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ فَقَالَ لَهَا وَلِلْأَرْضِ 
>> ائْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ
>> فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَىٰ فِي كُلِّ سَمَاءٍ 
>> أَمْرَهَاوَزَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ وَحِفْظًا ذَٰلِكَ 
>> تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ
>> 
>> Then He directed (Himself) towards the heaven while it (was) smoke, and He 
>> said to it and to the earth, "Come both of you willingly or unwillingly." 
>> They both said, "We come willingly."
>> Then He completed them (as) seven heavens in two periods and He revealed in 
>> each heaven its affair. And We adorned the heaven, [the world] with lamps 
>> and (to) guard. That (is the) Decree (of) the All-Mighty, the All-Knower. 
>> [Al-Quran 41:11 <https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/11/>-12 
>> <https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/12/>] 
>> ... 
>> excerpt from: 
>> http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html 
>> <http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html?m=0> 
>> 
>> On 15-May-2019, at 8:41 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
>>> Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same 
>>> thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all 
>>> domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -Original Message-
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> To: everything-list >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>>
>>> Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
>>> Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift >>> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not 
>>>> only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> (This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>>>> 
>>>> From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/ 
>>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/>
>>>> 
>>>> "Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
>>>> 
>>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
>>>> than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf 
>>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf>
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> The final slides:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
>>>> 
>>>> On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
>>>> It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.
>>>> 
>>>> The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
>>>> CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
>>>> models are connected and how one may r

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 04:47, Samiya Illias  wrote:
> 
> The Quran presents a similar idea of one gigantic sky layered into seven 
> skies, each with its own laws/commands/affair. Please read excerpt below 
> 
> ...
> Revisiting Surah alFussilat (Explained in Detail), we read: 
> 
> ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ فَقَالَ لَهَا وَلِلْأَرْضِ 
> ائْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ
> فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَىٰ فِي كُلِّ سَمَاءٍ 
> أَمْرَهَاوَزَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ وَحِفْظًا ذَٰلِكَ 
> تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ
> 
> Then He directed (Himself) towards the heaven while it (was) smoke, and He 
> said to it and to the earth, "Come both of you willingly or unwillingly." 
> They both said, "We come willingly."
> Then He completed them (as) seven heavens in two periods and He revealed in 
> each heaven its affair. And We adorned the heaven, [the world]


Are you identifying the Heaven with the physical world? That is Aristotelian 
metaphysics, indeed introduced in Islam by Al Ghazali, but that is the idea 
that Plato and Mechanism are questioning.

That is less blasphemous than saying that a human is a god, but that is not so 
far from it, in platonism perspective.

Bruno





> with lamps and (to) guard. That (is the) Decree (of) the All-Mighty, the 
> All-Knower. 
> [Al-Quran 41:11 <https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/11/>-12 
> <https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/12/>] 
> ... 
> excerpt from: 
> http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html 
> <http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html?m=0> 
> 
> On 15-May-2019, at 8:41 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
>> Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
>> Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same 
>> thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all 
>> domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?
>> 
>> 
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> To: everything-list > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>>
>> Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
>> Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
>> 
>> 
>>> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift >> <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not 
>>> only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> (This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>>> 
>>> From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/ 
>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/>
>>> 
>>> "Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
>>> 
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
>>> than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf 
>>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The final slides:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
>>> 
>>> On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
>>> It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.
>>> 
>>> The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
>>> CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
>>> models are connected and how one may reach them from each
>>> other while preserving or omitting certain features.
>>> 
>>> Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
>>> most important essential facts are known.
>>> 
>>> Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
>>> mathematical world or many
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
>>> 
>>>  Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) 
>>> and semantics!
>> 
>> If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
>> reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
>> theories on that reality.
>> 
>> It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there a

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 17:41, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
> Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same 
> thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all 
> domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?

With mechanism, what exists are the numbers. The (halting) computations are 
enough for the ontology, and their existence are assured by RA (the weaker 
Turing universal theory with finitely many axioms).

To compare with physical brother mathematical notion of multiverse remains to 
be done by the future generations. It is  complex subject. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
> Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
> 
> 
>> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift > <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only 
>> to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> (This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>> 
>> From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/ 
>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/>
>> 
>> "Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
>> 
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
>> than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf 
>> <http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf>
>> 
>> 
>> The final slides:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
>> 
>> On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
>> It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.
>> 
>> The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
>> CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
>> models are connected and how one may reach them from each
>> other while preserving or omitting certain features.
>> 
>> Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
>> most important essential facts are known.
>> 
>> Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
>> mathematical world or many
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
>> 
>>  Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and 
>> semantics!
> 
> If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
> reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
> theories on that reality.
> 
> It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical 
> worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the 
> contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The 
> standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which 
> most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA 
> or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, 
> Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became 
> phenomenological. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
>> 
>> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
>> and false in another.
> 
> That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
> 
> Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
> than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
> choice or the continuum hypotheses.
> 
> Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much 
> more than RA. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06ca3480-cdf1-426b-9f38-404bc2fa1550%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06ca3480-cdf1-426b-9f38-404bc2

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 03:42, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 2:18 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 14 May 2019, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes > > wrote:
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 
 Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
 failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
 certain to exist.
>>> 
>>> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
>>> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
>>> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
>>> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
>>> describes observed phenomena.
>> 
>> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used 
>> the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that 
>> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or 
>> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I 
>> make clear what I mean:
>> 
>> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my favorite 
>> scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological 
>> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. 
>> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally 
>> equivalent p-zombie does the trick.
>> 
>> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because 
>> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?
>> 
>> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
>> body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. 
>> What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
>> accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
>> 
>> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not 
>> able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It 
>> goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism. 
>> I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, is not 
>> compatible with physicalism.
>> 
>> Telmo.
>> 
>> You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible 
>> with physicalism.
> 
> Consciousness is only incompatible with physicalism + mechanism.
> 
> So just drop mechanism!

Then I have to drop molecular biology (and re-introduce some vitalism). I have 
to drop quantum mechanics, or introduce a non computable hamiltonian (which 
one), and all this to keep an ontological universe, for which there is zero 
evidences (as Plato understood). 

There are tuns of evidences for mechanism, and none for physicalism. Or if you 
know one, just show it to me. I have never ceased to search for one, but as the 
dream arguent suggests, that would be Gard to find, and that is why I am happy 
finding a way to find one:compare the material modes of the Löbian machine’s 
self with the empirical reality, but up to now, that empirical reality confirms 
Mechanism. 




>  
> It is nice, because the canonical theory of consciousness given by the 
> machine itself explains consciousness (as best as logically possible), and 
> explain constructively the appearance of matter, so that we can evaluate and 
> test the theory by comparing with nature.
> 
> You begin to sound like a string theorist -- we have a constructive theory 
> that will make predictions that can be compared with experiment -- but not 
> just yet.

I have a great respect for String theorists. Yes sometimes simpler new theories 
can only rediscover what has been already discovered, but then you are wrong: 
mechanism is the only theory which explains both quanta and qualia, where 
physicalism explain quanta, but fails to explain even the qualaia of the 
confirmation of quanta theories. It simply does not work, except by cheating on 
the mind-body question, by invoking a god in the sense of Plato (an ontological 
commitment incompatible with mechanism). It looks like “God made it”.



> We still have to work out exactly what the theory (viz. string theory/physics 
> via mechanism) is..
> 
> String theory has clearly failed. Its supposed promise has not been 
> fulfilled, and all the predictions that it has ever made (and there aren't 
> many)  have failed the experimental test. Exactly the same is true of 
> mechanism -- your supposed prediction of quantum mechanics is rather like the 
> string theorists' claim that they have predicted gravity!

That analogy is more correct. But Mechanism has not yet been refuted in that 
sense, unlike phsycialism (not physics, physicalism, the metaphysics of 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 11 May 2019, at 01:02, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
>> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>> 
>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
>> is manifestly a pipe dream.
>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, and mechanism is a failed idea 
>> because it cannot account for our experience.
> 
> 99,9 % of the mathematician are realist,
> 
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The other days of the week they are all 
> nominalists.

No, only at the pause-café and during the week-end. I would say. When they stop 
using their brain.


>  
> without even thinking about this. But I would say that 100% of all scientists 
> are arithmetical realist, which is more than what we need to study Mechanism 
> (which eventually requires only sigma_1 arithmetical realism, just to 
> understand that the Universal Dovetailer is a non stopping program.
> 
> The first order theory of the real numbers does not require arithmetical 
> realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical functions reintroduce the 
> need of being realist on the integers. Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in 
> that theory.
> 
> If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which axioms you 
> reject among,
> 
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
> 
> Some people add some metaphysical baggage in “realism” which is not there., 
> “Arithmetical realism” is just the doctrine according to which the axioms 
> above make sense. Usually, they are implicitly taught in primary school.
> It is used only for the Church-Turing thesis and the (mathematical) 
> definition of “digital machine”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> You are just using your personal Humpty-Dumpty dictionary to define 
> "realism". Arithmetical realism is a bit more than just the axioms above -- 
> it is a metaphysical notion.

“Metaphysical notion is fuzzy”, but I have given a precise definition of 
realism in arithmetic, the one used in the work. Realism is just the belief in 
the truth of the axioms above (and a bit of logic).



> And if you think you can get away without acknowledging your metaphysics, 
> then you are dreaming.

I do metaphysics with the scientific method. I give the axiom and theory. The 
only things which I can’t formalise is the yes doctor. Arithmetical realism 
issued only to make sense of the Church-Turing thesis. 

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQDgjbCL2Px9VUJ%3Dm%3D9wV1paL89mcTFvo77%3DwafhwK78Q%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/75D92B9C-F5BB-4DAA-BCC1-C97D25E7BD47%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 01:40, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/15/2019 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 13 May 2019, at 23:46, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot be 
 derived from or defined by labels.
>>> And it depends on the model.  Which is why it's undefinable within the 
>>> system.  And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true that 
>>> snow is white.”
>> ?
>> 
>> I don’t see the difference. The standard model of arithmetic is given by the 
>> intersection between all models.
> 
> Isn't the intersection of all models just the provable part?

By incompleteness that is not the case. The provable part is much smaller than 
the true part. The true undecidable sentences are true in the standard sense, 
just possibly false in the non start sense.

Typical example: the consistency of PA. Everyone familiar with natural numbers 
believe that PA is consistent, but PA cannot prove this, and thus there is a 
model of PA where “PA is inconsistent” is true. It means that some “omega” (see 
my preceding posts) is a proof of “0=1”; but as omega is not accessible by the 
successor relation, that they is still consistent.  PA + (PA is inconsistent) 
is a consistent theory of natural numbers, but it is not a sound theory. It is 
false in the standard  model.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> See my other recent explanations.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/816e0c3c-76cc-82c8-a3b3-18f6af30b042%40verizon.net.
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab8bbe0f-a236-9628-c030-4de2928ca181%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/614D86A6-0E19-4C7F-A515-21D19A6A8E92%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 01:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/15/2019 8:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Mathematical logic distinguish well the name of a thing and the thing 
>> itself. You confuse “0” and 0.
>> 
>> Also, when you say that something does not exist, you might give us your 
>> metaphysical axioms. Taken literarily, what you say is like saying that the 
>> equation x - 4 = 0 has no solution.
> 
> That's confusing "Satisfies a predicate." with "exists".  Such a definition 
> of "exists" is only relative to a context.  Compare, "There exists a 
> physician companion of Sherlock Holmes.”

In arithmetic, I use the expression “it exists x P(x)” with the meaning the 
standard model of arithmetic satisfies “it exists x P(x)”. Which is the 
logician way to describe the meaning of “it exists x such that x-1=0” in 
high-school.

Since day one, we use the standard model of arithmetic. It is the one everyone 
understand. The no standard model are sophisticated constructs in the mind of 
logician, to prove that PA, and all sound machines, have limitation with 
respect to the standard model, which can be defined online a richer theory.

The level of mathematical confidence is high up to ZFC, like in analysis and 
physics.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13f30fc5-3fd9-9b09-17c5-f198c540b5a8%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B03F1583-24B6-4315-8EF1-A31FAAB1DD4C%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 01:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/15/2019 8:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real". 
>> Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective 
>> agreement about them.
>> 
>> 
>> I would say we invented theories (axioms) to study them, but that the 
>> properties of integers were always there waiting to be discovered. Prove me 
>> wrong.
> 
> Were there always infinitely many of them?
> 
> Prove you're right.


In science, we can never prove that we were right. But for the arithmetical 
reality, nobody serious doubt that all undecidable arithmetical sentences of 
PA, ZF and there effective sound extensions are true.

That is why we believe in the propositional axiom (A or not A) in arithmetic. 
Even intuitionist believes this, albeit formulate it differently. The 
difficulties comes always from the infinity axiom, but there is none in the 
mechanist ontology description. Their use remains confines in the phenomenology 
of the numbers.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ad589d2-17f7-e2c9-c464-36d95c81d985%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/419BD192-115C-4E3A-BBE5-DE23740262FB%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 May 2019, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/15/2019 7:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 7:29 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they 
>>> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>>> 
>>> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements 
>>> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.
>> 
>> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.  
>> 
>> 
>> You are right, but in the above context we were speaking of arithmetical 
>> statements, for which my statement is correct.
>>  
>> 
>>> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be 
>>> proved.
>> 
>> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
>> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
>> 
>> Even entirely within the system there's such statements that you know are 
>> true but not provable.
> 
> HOW do you know they are true?  Because they say they are not provable?

The Gödelian sentences are know to be true, because as humans we believe that 
PA’s axiom are true. That entails their truth, although not probably so for PA, 
which cannot prove its own truth/correctness.

But there might be other reason, notably for other sentences, like the fact 
that the Goodstein sequence converge, or that Hercule wins the hydras, etc. No 
mathematicians doubt those theorem, because thy use stringer theory than PA all 
the times. 

We don’t use formal theory to do mathematics. Mathematics is always done 
informally, even by logicians. We study formal theory like biologist study DNA 
and brains. You would not attack a neurophysiologist theory of brain just 
because they use a brain to produce it OK?

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1f08ad00-890c-8802-175f-73235c7b4d2e%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B2E7E06D-E370-469F-8F0A-DCD78FA27A6C%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 10:31:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
> 
> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
> 
> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
> and false in another.
> 
> That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
> 
> Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
> than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
> choice or the continuum hypotheses.
> 
> Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much 
> more than RA. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The set-theoretic multiverse of Hamkins
> 
>   https://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.4223.pdf 
> 
> 
> 
> goes beyond the model-theoretic forcing methods of Cohen, with a framework 
> for a multiverse of dialects (my word) of set theory, each with their own 
> definition of "set". I'm not a set theorist, but can read the paper 
> approximately  well, and it was enough to get him from City University New 
> York to Oxford.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Biography 
> 
> 
> In September 2018, Hamkins moved to the University of Oxford 
>  to become Professor of 
> Logic in the Faculty of Philosophy and Sir Peter Strawson Fellow in 
> Philosophy in University College, Oxford 
> .
> 


When assuming Mechanism, we cannot even add the induction axioms to RA. With a 
richer theory than RA for the ontology, the mathematical multiverse becomes so 
big that the white rabbits cardinality explodes. 
Hamkins theory is interesting, no doubt, and might be used in the phenomenology 
of numbers, but it should not be taken “ontologically”, unless we abandon 
Mechanism.

Bruno 





> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/992c5ede-0609-4ee7-bb8c-6da22283dded%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/32AC7C89-3A20-4E86-BF47-EB7A5F31A673%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 9:15 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 15 May 2019, at 13:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 5:50 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 10 May 2019, at 15:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter
>>> the annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that
>>> indeterminacy is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated.
>>>
>>
>> In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum
>> superposition continuing after a measurement has been made.
>>
>>
>> Which duplication experiments. The one is step 3, or the one in step
>> seven? The whole point is that the second one should give the entanglement,
>> and that is why I study the modes of self-reference corresponding to it,
>> and there, we do find a quantum formalism.
>>
>
> I am talking about person duplication as in step 3. There is no other form
> of duplication involved. Step 7 introduces the dovetailer, with the
> possibility of multiple computational threads passing through the same
> conscious state. But that is not duplication —
>
>
>
> It is duplication (multiplication) by the invariance of delays, the
> virtual/physical first person invariance, etc.
> You can call them “arithmetical preparation” but they put us, here and
> now, in front of an infinite self-multiplication.
>
> it is just separate persons having the same thoughts by chance.
>
>
> But then, they are the same person, and they are confronted with the
> global (on the UD work) first person indeterminacy.
>

That is an enormous leap of faith. There is no reason to suppose that they
are the same person, not just many persons that happen to have the same
though by chance. This is your standard "cat=dog" argument -- a superficial
similarities implies identity.




> Nothing to do with entanglement in either case. You do not find the
> quantum formalism anywhere.
>
>
> By reversing a theorem by Goldblatt, the “material modes” of
> self)reference do give the necessary beginning of the quantum formalism.
>

Balderdash.


> You ignore the translation of the UDA in arithmetic.
>

Arithmetic does not exist independently.


>
>>
>>> The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the
>>> quantum notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion
>>> of superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product.
>>>
>>
>> That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement.
>>
>>
>> If you prove this, and assuming QM correct, you refute Mechanism (modulo
>> a logical possible malevolent “bostromian” simulation).
>>
>
> OK, then Mechanism is falsified. Because you have not shown that quantum
> entanglement arises from personal duplication.
>
>
> False. We miss the existence of objet to which entanglement applies, but
> we have the fact that if they appear, there will be entanglement.
>

As I have said before, hubris!


> Wr do explain the quantum logic aspect of any possible “nature” available
> to machines.
>
> The goal is not in doing physics. Physics does that quite well. The goal
> is in explaining where physics come from, and this without adding
> ontological commitment incompatible with mechanism and the existence of
> consciousness.
>

You have not explained where physics comes from because you have not
derived any useful results. It's all "cat=dog"!

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTdi8j-uxBb7u8aRybQSCXQC7GCQBf5LWxCZe_6XMtR5Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 16:26, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 5:17 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 2:33 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:47 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It 
>>> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>>> 
>>> And it depends on the model. 
>>> 
>>> Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something 
>>> depend on what you are talking about.
>>> When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is arithmetic, 
>>> and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.
>> 
>> But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms for 
>> example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of 
>> arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something hypothesized from 
>> empirical observation.
>> 
>> I see a 100% analagous situation to the natural sciences:
>> 
>> "There's more than one model of gravitation for example. But, you say I mean 
>> the gravitation of our universe...but gravitation is something hypothesized 
>> from empirical observation."
> 
> "Model" means different, almost complementary, things in physics and 
> mathematical logic.  Physicist would call Newton's theory a model of gravity, 
> the physical phenomenon.  Mathematicians would axiomatize Newton's theory and 
> then look around  for something that satisfied the axioms, which they would 
> call "the model". 
> 
> Then peanos axioms wouldn't be a model in that sense, the integers would be.
> 
>  
> The physical phenomenon, gravity, would not be a model of Newton's theory, 
> because it doesn't correctly model the advance of the perihelion of Mercury.
> 
>> 
>> Axiomatic systems are just like theories in the sciences. They attempted to 
>> systematize what is out there. But we can never be sure our models correctly 
>> reflect the reality. We can only hope to improve our models over time to 
>> become more powerful in what they can explain.
> 
> Explanation is cheap.  Prediction is dear.
> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>>  
>>> Which is why it's undefinable within the 
>>> system. 
>>> 
>>> Could you clarify this point?
>> 
>> There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.
>> 
>> 
>> I think you mean "provable" is relative to the model. 
> 
> 
> What do you mean by more than one model of PA? What are the other models to 
> which you refer?

Brent refers to the non standard models of PA, which have bizarroid positive 
integer which are infinite.  

A no standard model of arithmetic has the shape:

0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ….
… Omega-4, Omega-3, Omega-2, Omega-1, Omega, 
Omega+1, Omega+2, Omega+3...

That is N in company of a copy of Z, or actually as many copies of Z you want.

That verifies the RA and PA axioms. The Omegas are all bigger than any finite 
naturel numbers. They are called non-standard natural numbers. Tennenbaum (I 
think, should verified) has shown that addition and multiplication are not 
computable on those omegas.

We cannot make those omegas disappearing, without adding a second order axiom.

They disappear with the full induction axiom:

For all X and for all x (X(0) and (X(x) -> X(x+1)) -> for all x X(x).

That axioms is second order, because it quantify on a arbitrary property 
(definable or not in the language). With axioms, all models of arithmetic 
become isomorphic; but we loss the check-ability of the proofs (and 
compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem, completeness, etc.).

>  
> 
> No, provable depends only on the axioms and the rules of inference.  "True" 
> depends on the model.  Everything provable is true in every model.  But the 
> truth value of what isn't provable can vary depending on the model.
> 
> I am OK with everything here.
>  
> 
>> In Newton's gravity you could "prove" something about the expected orbital 
>> velocity of Mercury in that model. It just wouldn't be true when compared to 
>> reality.
> 
> Right, and we only have one reality.
> 
>>>  
>>> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true 
>>> that snow is white."
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How is it different?
>> 
>> Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers. 
>> 
>> Do we agree that the true properties of the natural numbers are objective?  
>> If so no need to debate this any further.
> 
> It's a matter of equivocating on "the natural numbers".  If you regard them 
> as a theory of things, the way you learn them at your mother's knee, then 
> there are 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 13:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 5:50 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 10 May 2019, at 15:16, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter the 
>> annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that indeterminacy 
>> is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated.
>> 
>> In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum 
>> superposition continuing after a measurement has been made.
> 
> Which duplication experiments. The one is step 3, or the one in step seven? 
> The whole point is that the second one should give the entanglement, and that 
> is why I study the modes of self-reference corresponding to it, and there, we 
> do find a quantum formalism. 
> 
> I am talking about person duplication as in step 3. There is no other form of 
> duplication involved. Step 7 introduces the dovetailer, with the possibility 
> of multiple computational threads passing through the same conscious state. 
> But that is not duplication —


It is duplication (multiplication) by the invariance of delays, the 
virtual/physical first person invariance, etc.
You can call them “arithmetical preparation” but they put us, here and now, in 
front of an infinite self-multiplication.




> it is just separate persons having the same thoughts by chance.

But then, they are the same person, and they are confronted with the global (on 
the UD work) first person indeterminacy.



> Nothing to do with entanglement in either case. You do not find the quantum 
> formalism anywhere.

By reversing a theorem by Goldblatt, the “material modes” of self)reference do 
give the necessary beginning of the quantum formalism.

You ignore the translation of the UDA in arithmetic.




> 
>>  
>> The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the 
>> quantum notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion of 
>> superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product.
>> 
>> That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement.
> 
> If you prove this, and assuming QM correct, you refute Mechanism (modulo a 
> logical possible malevolent “bostromian” simulation).
> 
> OK, then Mechanism is falsified. Because you have not shown that quantum 
> entanglement arises from personal duplication.

False. We miss the existence of objet to which entanglement applies, but we 
have the fact that if they appear, there will be entanglement. Wr do explain 
the quantum logic aspect of any possible “nature” available to machines.

The goal is not in doing physics. Physics does that quite well. The goal is in 
explaining where physics come from, and this without adding ontological 
commitment incompatible with mechanism and the existence of consciousness.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRvK%3DUr68%2BZw-6Sk0FsvCbqK-JyJ22yLdHz_8hEpfEFvQ%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BDE5EA56-CD20-4D3D-BD43-D55705E450ED%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 08:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 7:29:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they are 
>> theorems derived from the axioms.
>> 
>> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements 
>> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.
> 
> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.  
> 
>> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be 
>> proved.
> 
> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> An axiom system A being complete just means that for every (syntactically 
> well-formed) sentence s in the language of A, either s or ~s can be proved 
> via the rules of deduction of A.
> 
> 
> 
> BTW, while Church-Turing is not a useful "thesis”,

Honestly, that is non sense.




> Curry-Howard is.
> 
>   proofs = programs

That is a string philosophical claim. It makes some sense in intuitionist 
logic, but is too much extensional in classical logic. It is something deep and 
important, but it is not as rich and fertile as Church-Turing thesis. 



> 
> (The informal word "model" does not come up in programming language theory - 
> PLT - that I can surmise, except in the context of a "model of 
> computation/programming" - lambda calculus, pi calculus, functional, 
> process-oriented. Its use in physics is a bit confusing. For example, 
> regarding the equation of the Standard Model as written out by mathematical 
> physicist Matilde Marcolli:
> 
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
> 
> 
> is the equation itself of the Standard Model here a "model", or is the 
> interpretation of this equation a "model”?)

A model is a very well defined notion in mathematical logic, and it has nothing 
to do with “standard model of particles” which is a theory, and where the 
intended model in the physical reality (fundamental or not, "really existing" 
or not).

Careful: in "the standard model of arithmetic" and "the standard model of 
particle physics”; model are used in quite different sense. In the logician 
terming, the second one should be called the standard theory of particles.

Bruno





> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e9d026a6-8100-492f-a141-09c6aee4c6f0%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/36000C92-EC79-430E-B3F8-CB0FF52E81A0%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of 
> successful theories which have explanatory power.
> 
> That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our most 
> successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to 
> acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent. So 
> quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know.
> 
> So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic is 
> successful, after all)
> 
> Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real". 
> Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective 
> agreement about them.


Who invented the humans?

It is easier to explain the humans from the numbers than the contrary.



>  
> 
> Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of our 
> observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think that 
> English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality?
> 
> Because arithmetical realism explains more while assuming less.
> 
> The trouble with this is that it does no such thing. Arithmetical realism 
> does not even explain consciousness, much less physics. Can mechanism explain 
> the quale 'red’?

Yes, But you need to understand the difference between p, []p, []p & p, etc.




> 
> .
>  
>  I think they are an excellent starting point. It is much easier, 
> conceptually for me to accept 2+2=4 is true, has always been and always will 
> be true, and needs no reason to be true,
> 
> But that is a matter of definition, not of ontology. Truth in arithmetic does 
> not imply existence.

It implies the existence of the solutions of a universal Diophantine equation, 
which explains the physical and the qualia when we assume mechanism.




>  
> rather than the alternative, which is to accept the physical universe as we 
> see it exists on its own, independently of anything else or any other reason. 
> For what reason would such a physical universe exist, why does it have this 
> form, was it caused by something else, is there more beyond it?
> 
> As I have said, science does not answer 'why' questions. It describes and 
> predicts -- which is as good an understanding as you will ever get.

That looks like post roman christian propaganda. Don’t search why. Shut up and 
calculate. This is a lasting prejudices of the Aristotelian (weakly 
materialist) era.




>  
> Arithmetical realism provides a simple, elegant answer to these questions, 
> and moreover answers many more questions than assuming the physical universe 
> at the start.
> 
> No, it does not. Arithmetical realism does not actually answer any questions. 
> It cannot explain consciousness any more than it can explain the existence of 
> space and time, much less derive their properties.

Proof? It looks you have read the posts nor the papers mentioned there. Read 
them ans ask specific question, if interested.

Bruno




>  
> Believing that there is something mind-independent to explain is better -- as 
> long as one explores what this might mean, rather than assuming the answer 
> from the start.
> 
> We both assume something mind independent. You think it is the physical 
> universe, I think it is the integers.  My assumption of the integers not only 
> explains why we have an objective field of mathematics, but with Mechanism, 
> it explains the emergence of the appearance of the physical universe (without 
> having to assume the physical universe). So I get to explain two things with 
> one assumption.
> 
> But mechanism has not done this. It is claimed that it can explain physics, 
> but we have yet to see any evidence that it can explain anything.
>  
> Since you start with physicalism, and deny the objective existence of 
> arithmetical truth, you are confronted with the problem of explaining where 
> arithmetical truth comes from. You say it comes from axioms but since Godel 
> this has been known to be false.  Your assumption can explain the physical 
> universe, but not the objective nature of arithmetical truth.
> 
> Incompleteness is not an objection to my contention that arithmetical truth 
> is a deduction from the axioms. If some alternative notion of 'truth' calls 
> some proposition that is not a theorem 'true', then you simply expand you 
> axiom base. Nothing particularly profound here. The same is true of physical 
> theories -- if they do not explain something that is observed (viz. 'true'), 
> we change the theory.
> 
> Further, I don't see any hope for how you can ever hope to explain why the 
> physical universe has the laws that it does.
> 
> 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 02:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they are 
>> theorems derived from the axioms.
>> 
>> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements 
>> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.
> 
> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.  

OK. Here are seven one: any RA theory with one axiom deleted can be extended 
into a complete and decidable theory. Once you have the seven axioms(*), that 
is no more possible. You can add as many axioms as you want, as long as they 
are recognisable as axioms, the theory will be incomplete. 

I guess Jason meant “enough rich theory” or “Turing universal theory”.




> 
>> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be 
>> proved.
> 
> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
> logical inference...such as "empirically true”.

Or such as true in the standard model of arithmetic.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6356661-df48-36eb-2ac6-70430b5b4a5f%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AF1E11CF-E8D4-4778-8205-F18641109ACB%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 01:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 1:20 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019, at 00:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. 
 My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that 
 mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? 
 There is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's 
 sense.
>>> 
>>> But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI projects 
>>> like Watson
>> 
>> I mention this outside of our main discussion: Watson is mostly IBM 
>> marketing hype for scientifically-illiterate business executives. I say this 
>> as an AI researcher, not an AI-denialist. It does not deserve a place 
>> alongside serious research endeavors in the field. The Jeapordy player was 
>> cool, some nice papers came out of it (I have them and have read them all), 
>> but that is about it. The rest is just a bullshit business brand around 
>> cloud-stuff and old-fashioned business IT.
>> 
>> https://www.computerworld.com/article/3321138/did-ibm-put-too-much-stock-in-watson-health-too-soon.html
>>  
>> 
>> https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/07/02/is-ibm-watson-a-joke/ 
>> 
>> https://gizmodo.com/why-everyone-is-hating-on-watson-including-the-people-w-1797510888
>>  
>> 
>> https://www.techrepublic.com/article/stop-the-hype-the-real-value-of-ibm-watson-is-driving-small-incremental-business-value/
>>  
>> 
>> https://venturebeat.com/2017/06/08/you-can-call-it-hype-but-watson-is-getting-marketers-roi/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Etc.
>> 
>>> and AlphaGO. 
>> 
>> AlphaGO is pretty cool. My feeling is that you are doing with AI what 
>> physicists tend to accuse outsiders to the field of doing with quantum 
>> physics: mysticism. I'm not accusing you of being the Deepak Chopra of 
>> AI-mysticism, I hold you in much higher regard than that, but I think maybe 
>> you lack the depth of understanding to see that there isn't as much there 
>> there as you might assume.
>> 
>> AlphaGO is essentially a minimax decision tree. Go is infamous for leading 
>> to combinatorial explosion even more severely than chess, so decision trees 
>> where considered a no-go for a long time. The genius move here is to train a 
>> feed-forward neural network to prune the tree, providing something akin to 
>> intuition and making the decision tree both tractable and effective against 
>> expert human players. Reinforcement learning was used to train the tree by 
>> having the agents play against themselves (not in the first iteration of 
>> AlphaGO, but I think we can simplify a bit for the purpose of this 
>> discussion).
>> 
>> This is all very neat and clever, but nothing was discovered in terms of 
>> computer science that wasn't already well-known in the 1980s. It just so 
>> happens that these approaches finally became feasible due to sufficiently 
>> powerful hardware. Now, this is no small achievement, and I have maximum 
>> respect for the AlphaGO team. But I failed to see what was learned in terms 
>> of how intelligence works, let alone what this has to do with consciousness, 
>> anymore than say, performing some linear algebra with NumPy or whatever.
>> 
>>> The building blocks are perception, information processing, values, and 
>>> action.
>> 
>> Well, if "perception" is a building block then there is already an implicit 
>> perceiver, so you are begging the question. Reminds me of this joke:
>> 
>> Easy way to make your own megaphone!
>> You just need:
>> 
>> 1- Some duct tape
>> 2- A megaphone
>> 
>>>   You say "there is no accounting" but that's because you're using 
>>> "accounting" as a synonym for "explain".  The accounting in scientific 
>>> theory is in terms of a model that works.  You're demanding of a theory of 
>>> consciousness that will do for consciousness what general relativity does 
>>> not do for the metric or for the stress-energy tensor, what Darwin did not 
>>> do for reproduction with variation.
>> 
>> Darwin didn't have the full story, but now the main things are accounted 
>> for. We know how nucleic acids can be sequenced in very long molecules, thus 
>> digitally encoding the shape of proteins, that then fold into 3D shapes 
>> according to the laws of physics and can interact and compose themselves in 
>> 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 May 2019, at 00:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 2:33 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:47 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It 
>>> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>>> 
>>> And it depends on the model. 
>>> 
>>> Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something 
>>> depend on what you are talking about.
>>> When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is arithmetic, 
>>> and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.
>> 
>> But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms for 
>> example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of 
>> arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something hypothesized from 
>> empirical observation.
>> 
>> I see a 100% analagous situation to the natural sciences:
>> 
>> "There's more than one model of gravitation for example. But, you say I mean 
>> the gravitation of our universe...but gravitation is something hypothesized 
>> from empirical observation."
> 
> "Model" means different, almost complementary, things in physics and 
> mathematical logic.  Physicist would call Newton's theory a model of gravity, 
> the physical phenomenon.  Mathematicians would axiomatize Newton's theory and 
> then look around  for something that satisfied the axioms, which they would 
> call "the model".  The physical phenomenon, gravity, would not be a model of 
> Newton's theory, because it doesn't correctly model the advance of the 
> perihelion of Mercury.

Yes. That vocabulary différence is a source of a lot of confusion. 



> 
>> 
>> Axiomatic systems are just like theories in the sciences. They attempted to 
>> systematize what is out there. But we can never be sure our models correctly 
>> reflect the reality. We can only hope to improve our models over time to 
>> become more powerful in what they can explain.
> 
> Explanation is cheap.  Prediction is dear.

Prediction is dear, OK. But explanation is even more dear, if the goal is 
“understanding”, instead of “surviving” or “making money”.



> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>>>  
>>> Which is why it's undefinable within the 
>>> system. 
>>> 
>>> Could you clarify this point?
>> 
>> There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.
>> 
>> 
>> I think you mean "provable" is relative to the model. 
> 
> No, provable depends only on the axioms and the rules of inference.  "True" 
> depends on the model.  Everything provable is true in every model.  But the 
> truth value of what isn't provable can vary depending on the model.

I guess Jason used the word model in the sense of theory. (Cf above). Sometimes 
I use model also in that sense, because of the context.

The notion of Model models reality, the notion of theory models machines and 
numbers ...



> 
>> In Newton's gravity you could "prove" something about the expected orbital 
>> velocity of Mercury in that model. It just wouldn't be true when compared to 
>> reality.
> 
> Right, and we only have one reality.

Monism.  OK. But when doing metaphysics or theology, we must not decide what 
that reality is at the start.



> 
>>>  
>>> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true 
>>> that snow is white."
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How is it different?
>> 
>> Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers. 
>> 
>> Do we agree that the true properties of the natural numbers are objective?  
>> If so no need to debate this any further.
> 
> It's a matter of equivocating on "the natural numbers".  If you regard them 
> as a theory of things, the way you learn them at your mother's knee, then 
> there are objective truths "Two garbanzo beans plus two chick peas make four 
> beans." the way "Snow is white."  But if you want to evaluate the truth of 
> "2+2=4" that's a  proposition in arithmetic.  If it's PA then it's true in 
> every model because it's a theorem.  But when you say there are true 
> statements of arithmetic that aren't provable in PA, what they are depends on 
> the model.

Hmm… No.



> 
> I'm sure Bruno can explain this better than I can.  I only took a couple of 
> semesters of symbolic logic.


The non provable truth are all well defined in the arithmetical truth, which by 
definition is the standard model. They have all the shape “the machine x will 
stop”, when in truth, they will not stop, but PA or ZF cannot prove that it 
will non stop. 

Typically, all the arithmetical interpretation of the G* \ G proposition are 
true in the standard model, and non provable by the corresponding Löbian entity 
(even the non 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:56:05 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable 
> effectiveness of math". 
>

As *Max Tegmark* points out, all of our scientific theories (he was talking 
about physics, checked out on computers) do not need infinities:

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/ 


Our challenge as physicists is to discover this elegant way and the 
infinity-free equations describing it—the true laws of physics. To start 
this search in earnest, we need to question infinity. I’m betting that we 
also need to let go of it.

So infinity-free mathematics is what Tegmark says is the thing to do.

@philithrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f9aec462-955c-4613-809a-398d21995141%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 4:56 PM Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

> On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>
> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to
> prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>
>
> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and
> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
>
>
> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>
> Jason
>
>
> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>
>
> There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable
> effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is true?
> No, but then again the same applies to all promising ideas.
>

The "unreasonable effectiveness of math" is not in the least unreasonable.
After all, we designed mathematics to describe the physical world. The fact
that it is successful just means that we are cleverer than some people give
us credit for! It is not evidence for anything magical about mathematics.


> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our
> experience.
>
>
> Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep having
> all these discussions.
>

Physics (and the other sciences) are unreasonably effective at describing
and accounting for our experiences. Platonism does not have any runs on the
board at all.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSJx13n4Hg4dzmqQsxprX4jL61cgG7Qq4gTiBNs%3Do_aRA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 00:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>> 
 Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to 
 prove: all computations are realised in all models of arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
>>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain. What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
> 
> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,

There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable 
effectiveness of math". Does this mean that mathematical realism is true? No, 
but then again the same applies to all promising ideas.

>  and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our experience.

Nothing so far can account for our experience, this is why we keep having all 
these discussions.

Telmo.

> 
> Bruce 
> 

> --
>  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
>  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>  Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>  To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .
>  For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e991a7e6-c30c-4726-b53d-ed7e68184783%40www.fastmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/16/2019 12:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 7:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/15/2019 8:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different
notion of "real". Integers are invented by humans, even
though there is intersubjective agreement about them.



I would say we invented theories (axioms) to study them, but that
the properties of integers were always there waiting to be
discovered. Prove me wrong.


Were there always infinitely many of them?


Oh what? Integers? Probably.


Prove you're right.


It predicts things no other theory in science has which fits with our 
observations.


But it doesn't need to be infinite to do that.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c6d1ae66-bd37-dd6f-cffc-05287da39829%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 7:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/15/2019 8:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real".
>> Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective
>> agreement about them.
>>
>
>
> I would say we invented theories (axioms) to study them, but that the
> properties of integers were always there waiting to be discovered. Prove me
> wrong.
>
>
> Were there always infinitely many of them?
>

Oh what? Integers? Probably.


>
> Prove you're right.
>

It predicts things no other theory in science has which fits with our
observations.

Jason



>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ad589d2-17f7-e2c9-c464-36d95c81d985%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgn8RGreKzohaR-atVeRXLr81hVcmFxcsE1KCG-kNt7NQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 7:20 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/15/2019 7:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 7:29 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
>>> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>>>
>>
>> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements
>> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.
>>
>>
>> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.
>>
>
>
> You are right, but in the above context we were speaking of arithmetical
> statements, for which my statement is correct.
>
>
>>
>> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be
>> proved.
>>
>>
>> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of
>> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
>>
>
> Even entirely within the system there's such statements that you know are
> true but not provable.
>
>
> HOW do you know they are true?  Because they say they are not provable?
>
> Brent
>


That's the trick Godel used to constructively build such statements, yes.

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUi6jbm4Q2WuqKabQw%3D6W4Hs%2Bj12swm66GFVLLtzePbgBg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 May 2019, at 22:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It 
>> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>> 
>> And it depends on the model. 
>> 
>> Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something 
>> depend on what you are talking about.
>> When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is arithmetic, 
>> and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.
> 
> But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms for 
> example. 


The standard model. It is the intersection of all models. 

We cannot define the “real”, or “standard” natural number in first order logic, 
but we can do it in second order arithmetic, or in set theory, etc.

The non standard natural numbers are very weird, their addition and 
multiplication are not computable.  The only role they could “logically” play 
is a role of oracle, but to invoke them is again introducing non computable 
infinities, for what?

The whole of science assume the standard number. The non standard numbers are 
like the limit of analysis, and indeed can be used to reintroduce the 
infinitesimal in analysis, but I think that the arithmetical epsilon-delat 
definition is better. 




> But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of arithmetic...but the 
> natural numbers are something hypothesized from empirical observation.

In the Aristotelian theology. But eventually this one is inconsistent with 
Digital Mechanism, which needs to explain the persistence of the hallucination 
from the logic of the dreams of the universal numbers.




> 
>>  
>> Which is why it's undefinable within the 
>> system. 
>> 
>> Could you clarify this point?
> 
> There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.

But all standard natural numbers are standard in all models. What you prove in 
PA is true in all models. The machines behave the same, and think the same in 
all model of RA, PA (and ZF, ZFC, ZFC+Ind, etc.).

The notion of natural numbers is the simplest and clearest notion in the whole 
of science. It is bad philosophy to introduce doubt on 2+2=4. That would put 
Mechanism in jeopardy, but that would put all theories in jeopardy, with some 
exception in the non Turing universal small realities.




>>  
>> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true 
>> that snow is white."
>> 
>> 
>> How is it different?
> 
> Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers.

No. The natural numbers are defined by simple axioms and rules. I have given 
their definition in the combinators languages, and very often directly in 
predicate calculus.

Our familiarity with comes from some use we lake of them with respect to 
distinguishable object, but to define the natural number by referring to a 
physical world or to human psychology is typically not how the mathematicians 
operates. 

Our intuition of the natural numbers is already as complex to explain as to 
explain consciousness. But we do have that intuition, like most animals, and 
like all Löbian Turing universal machine, actually.




>   But what mathematicians (like Goedel) prove theorems about is the axiomatic 
> system.  That's why Bruno makes the point that provability is well defined 
> but truth isn't  (in mathematics).

Not really. The mathematical logician does define the arithmetical truth. Model 
theoryis developed in set theory. The truth that Bruno and Brent cannot define 
is not the arithmetical truth, but the bruno-truth and the Brent-truth,  
assuming that we have similar complexity. 

Now with mechanism we cannot really define the arithmetical truth, but that 
reflect only that we have to use a richer theory than arithmetic to define it, 
and mathematician do use much richer theories, all the time, with a level of 
confidence which is common and plausibly deserve on some large portion of set 
theory. Above, you need God, which is probably an abstract and ultimate form of 
your definition per-ostension, except that with mechanism, the ostension is not 
on the physical universe, but on the arithmetical reality we look inward, 
notably by doing math.

Bruno 






> 
> Brent
>> 
>> Jason 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgQZz3nO%2BOKaiWZrtmbVivC8E_0BtwfjhW7hm9PjRoZ_Q%40mail.gmail.com
>>  
>> 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[PGC]

On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 6:45:43 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2019, at 01:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. 
> My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that 
> mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There 
> is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
>
>
> But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI projects 
> like Watson and AlphaGO.  The building blocks are perception, information 
> processing, values, and action.  You say "there is no accounting" but 
> that's because you're using "accounting" as a synonym for "explain".  The 
> accounting in scientific theory is in terms of a model that works. 
>
>
> With “model” in the logical sense of “theory”. OK.
>
>
>
> You're demanding of a theory of consciousness that will do for 
> consciousness what general relativity* does not do* for the metric or for 
> the stress-energy tensor, what Darwin* did not do* for reproduction with 
> variation.  Maybe someday Bruno's theory will yield some interesting 
> prediction (of the future), but until then it's a theory doesn't do any 
> work.
>
>
> It does. Once you are interested in consciousness, it does work, 
>

Not for yours truly. Your very frequent insistence on "fit" merely concedes 
a lack of evidence to show that indeed everything you claim, can be mined 
from arithmetical self-reference. 
 

> and it explains also the existence of a theological trap, and how to not 
> fall in it, and this has been confirmed when you look at the history and 
> compare the platonician period and the Aristotelian. It is really the 
> difference between peace and war, prosperity and poverty. 
>

So now, if we're skeptical of your theory, we opt for war and poverty? Show 
us the money! Bring us world peace!
 

>
> What you mean, is that it does not work as well as current physical 
> theories, but even this is false, in the sense that physics works only by 
> assuming an identity thesis which is, let us say, non intelligible, pure 
> magic.
>

It's as magic as the identity you assume when flooding this list with 
another set of responses. 
 

> In that sense, mechanism works much better than physics today. And with 
> mechanism, physics does work only by putting the mind under the rug, that 
> is denying that when we do a physical experience, at some point we use of 
> first person experience, if only to note where is the needle.
>

Some people are known to have handled needles without assuming mechanism. 
Some managed to not impoverish themselves or start wars in the process. 
 

>
> So what you mean, is that Mechanism is not as efficacious than physical 
> theories, FAPP. And that is true, but that is equivalent with saying 
> quantum mechanics is to reject in everyday life, because it is easier to 
> make a pizza using elementary classical physics that using Schroedinger 
> equation.
>

No, it just means that when we make a pizza a certain size with one choice 
of topping, that the pizza will not change in size. We do this 
automatically. And if the size or the toping does change, we return the 
pizza, it's associated theories, and ask for our money back! Everybody 
would. Without QM and without mechanism. Imagine that. 
 

>
> Physics is the right tool for doing prediction, but to explain why it 
> works, without denying the conscious experience, we need serious 
> metaphysics.
>
>
Of which you are the only supplier in the world right? Now you need to 
cover the blasphemies here with another thousand "responses". When I hear 
"serious" applied to metaphysics, I feel good.
 

>
>
> So far it doesn't even account for the effect of holding your breathe too 
> long or ingesting LSD. 
>
>
> How do you know that? It does this rather well.
>
>
That was a nice trap, and you waltz right into it as the expert of 
theological traps.
 

>
>
>   The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model.
>
>
> But consciousness is not neural firing. You cannot identify a first person 
> event with third person event, unless you make them both into very special 
> sort of infinities.
>
>
>
>   But the mysterians of consciousness want to pooh-pooh that because it 
> doesn't talk about how their consciousness "feels".  But neither does 
> Bruno's .
>
>
> No, that is wrong. You need to study a bit more. The fact that G*proves 
> all modes of self)ferefence equivalent, but that the machine cannot see 
> this explains all the discourse on consciousness, and its relation with 
> matter. Ask any question on this, but you might revised a bit my papers.
>

Lol, the aesthetics department of mechanism? Let's take a guess "We don't 
know?" It is there or it isn't. If 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

And why should I care what the Quran says?

Brent
"Science flies to the moon.  Religion flies into buildings."
   --- Vic Stenger

On 5/15/2019 7:47 PM, Samiya Illias wrote:
The Quran presents a similar idea of one gigantic sky layered into 
seven skies, each with its own laws/commands/affair. Please read 
excerpt below


...
Revisiting Surah alFussilat (Explained in Detail), we read:

ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ فَقَالَ لَهَا 
وَلِلْأَرْضِ ائْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ
فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَىٰ فِي كُلِّ 
سَمَاءٍ أَمْرَهَا_*وَزَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ وَحِفْظًا*_ذَٰلِكَ تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ


Then He directed (Himself) towards the heaven while it (was) smoke, 
and He said to it and to the earth, "Come both of you willingly or 
unwillingly." They both said, "We come willingly."
Then He completed them (as) seven heavens in two periods and He 
revealed in each heaven its affair. *_And We adorned the heaven, [the 
world] with lamps and (to) guard_*. That (is the) Decree (of) the 
All-Mighty, the All-Knower.
[Al-Quran 41:11 <https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/11/>-12 
<https://www.islamawakened.com/quran/41/12/>]

...
excerpt from: 
http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html 
<http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html?m=0>


On 15-May-2019, at 8:41 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:


Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of 
One Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is 
the same thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not 
sure if all domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?



-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
To: everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>>

Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon


On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:




On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:




Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was
proven not only to be not human defined, but to be not human
definable.




(This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)

From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/

"Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):

http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf 
<http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf>



The final slides:



*The Continuum Hypothesis is settled*

On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.

The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
models are connected and how one may reach them from each
other while preserving or omitting certain features.

Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
most important essential facts are known.

Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
mathematical world or many



Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
*
*
*Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax *(to some 
extent)*and semantics!*


If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and 
possible theories on that reality.


It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many 
mathematical worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere 
with realism, on the contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, 
on which everybody agree. The standard arithmetical truth is 
definable with a bit of set theory, on which most people agree (as it 
is the intersection of all models of the theories RA or PA). That is 
as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, Analysis, 
and physics, remains full of sense, but have became phenomenological.







There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.

For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set 
theory) and false in another.


That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.

Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical 
propositions than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally 
independent of the axiom of choice or the continuum hypotheses.


Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves 
much more than RA.


Bruno





@philipthrift


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, 
send an email to everything-

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Samiya Illias]

The Quran presents a similar idea of one gigantic sky layered into seven skies, 
each with its own laws/commands/affair. Please read excerpt below 

...
Revisiting Surah alFussilat (Explained in Detail), we read: 

ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ وَهِيَ دُخَانٌ فَقَالَ لَهَا وَلِلْأَرْضِ 
ائْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ
فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَىٰ فِي كُلِّ سَمَاءٍ 
أَمْرَهَاوَزَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ وَحِفْظًا ذَٰلِكَ 
تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ

Then He directed (Himself) towards the heaven while it (was) smoke, and He said 
to it and to the earth, "Come both of you willingly or unwillingly." They both 
said, "We come willingly."
Then He completed them (as) seven heavens in two periods and He revealed in 
each heaven its affair. And We adorned the heaven, [the world] with lamps and 
(to) guard. That (is the) Decree (of) the All-Mighty, the All-Knower. 
[Al-Quran 41:11-12] 
... 
excerpt from: 
http://signsandscience.blogspot.com/2018/11/separate-in-space.html 

> On 15-May-2019, at 8:41 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
> Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same 
> thing as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all 
> domains followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
> Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
> 
> 
>> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only 
>> to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> (This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>> 
>> From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/
>> 
>> "Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
>> 
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
>> than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf
>> 
>> 
>> The final slides:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
>> 
>> On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
>> It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.
>> 
>> The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
>> CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
>> models are connected and how one may reach them from each
>> other while preserving or omitting certain features.
>> 
>> Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
>> most important essential facts are known.
>> 
>> Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
>> mathematical world or many
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
>> 
>>  Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and 
>> semantics!
> 
> If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
> reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
> theories on that reality.
> 
> It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical 
> worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the 
> contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The 
> standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which 
> most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA 
> or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, 
> Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became 
> phenomenological. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
>> 
>> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
>> and false in another.
> 
> That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
> 
> Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
> than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
> choice or the continuum hypotheses.
> 
> Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much 
> more than RA. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 2:18 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 14 May 2019, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>
>> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>
>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst
>> possible failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing
>> I can be certain to exist.
>>
>>
>> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von
>> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to
>> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical
>> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations,
>> describes observed phenomena.
>>
>>
>> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I
>> used the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that
>> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or
>> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I
>> make clear what I mean:
>>
>> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my
>> favorite scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological
>> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness.
>> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally
>> equivalent p-zombie does the trick.
>>
>> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because
>> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?
>>
>> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say.
>> My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that
>> mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There
>> is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
>>
>> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is
>> not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails.
>> It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with
>> Platonism. I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far,
>> is not compatible with physicalism.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>
> You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible
> with physicalism.
>
>
> Consciousness is only incompatible with physicalism + mechanism.
>

So just drop mechanism!


> It is nice, because the canonical theory of consciousness given by the
> machine itself explains consciousness (as best as logically possible), and
> explain constructively the appearance of matter, so that we can evaluate
> and test the theory by comparing with nature.
>

You begin to sound like a string theorist -- we have a constructive theory
that will make predictions that can be compared with experiment -- but not
just yet. We still have to work out exactly what the theory (viz. string
theory/physics via mechanism) is..

String theory has clearly failed. Its supposed promise has not been
fulfilled, and all the predictions that it has ever made (and there aren't
many)  have failed the experimental test. Exactly the same is true of
mechanism -- your supposed prediction of quantum mechanics is rather like
the string theorists' claim that they have predicted gravity!

Just give Brent's engineering approach some time to work.
>
>
> Read my papers. Physicalism and Mechanism cannot work together at all. You
> have to abandon Mechanism to save physicalism. But the evidences favours
> much more mechanism than physicalism (which seems to be only an habit of
> thought).
>
> Platonism has not accounted for the physical universe
>
>
> That is plain false. Mechanism explains entirely, qualitatively and
> qualitatively, where the belief in a physical universe comes from, where
> physicalism has to make an ontological commitment, which we try to always
> avoid when doing science.
>

The semantic thesis of scientific realism claims that the entities posited
by our best theories are the actual "furniture of the universe" -- which is
an ontological claim. So, in that view, science is completely about
ontological claims -- that is what the scientific realist is about --
finding out what the universe is made of (viz. its ontology)!


> Only Mechanism explain why we believe in a physical universe, why that
> belief is correct, despite that physical universe is no more an ontological
> thing.
>
> -- Bruno keeps saying that this is just "a work in progress”.
>
> Yes, but the whole propositional theories have already been found. Some
> comparison have already been done, and physicalism is already refuted (when
> assuming mechanism), and tested plausibly false by the experiments, notably
> those already done in quantum mechanics.
>

Your claims about quantum mechanics are laughable. See the comments on
string theory and gravity above.



> So the same for 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 11 May 2019, at 01:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to
 prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.

>>>
>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and
>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
>>>
>>>
>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, and mechanism is a failed
> idea because it cannot account for our experience.
>
>
> 99,9 % of the mathematician are realist,
>

On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The other days of the week they are
all nominalists.


> without even thinking about this. But I would say that 100% of all
> scientists are arithmetical realist, which is more than what we need to
> study Mechanism (which eventually requires only sigma_1 arithmetical
> realism, just to understand that the Universal Dovetailer is a non stopping
> program.
>
> The first order theory of the real numbers does not require arithmetical
> realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical functions reintroduce
> the need of being realist on the integers. Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the
> integers  in that theory.
>
> If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which axioms you
> reject among,
>
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y))
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> Some people add some metaphysical baggage in “realism” which is not
> there., “Arithmetical realism” is just the doctrine according to which the
> axioms above make sense. Usually, they are implicitly taught in primary
> school.
> It is used only for the Church-Turing thesis and the (mathematical)
> definition of “digital machine”.
>
> Bruno
>

You are just using your personal Humpty-Dumpty dictionary to define
"realism". Arithmetical realism is a bit more than just the axioms above --
it is a metaphysical notion. And if you think you can get away without
acknowledging your metaphysics, then you are dreaming.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQDgjbCL2Px9VUJ%3Dm%3D9wV1paL89mcTFvo77%3DwafhwK78Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/15/2019 9:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 May 2019, at 23:46, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 wrote:



On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot be 
derived from or defined by labels.

And it depends on the model.  Which is why it's undefinable within the system.  And also why 
it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true that snow is white.”

?

I don’t see the difference. The standard model of arithmetic is given by the 
intersection between all models.


Isn't the intersection of all models just the provable part?

Brent


See my other recent explanations.

Bruno




Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/816e0c3c-76cc-82c8-a3b3-18f6af30b042%40verizon.net.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab8bbe0f-a236-9628-c030-4de2928ca181%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/15/2019 8:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Mathematical logic distinguish well the name of a thing and the thing 
itself. You confuse “0” and 0.


Also, when you say that something does not exist, you might give us 
your metaphysical axioms. Taken literarily, what you say is like 
saying that the equation x - 4 = 0 has no solution.


That's confusing "Satisfies a predicate." with "exists".  Such a 
definition of "exists" is only relative to a context.  Compare, "There 
exists a physician companion of Sherlock Holmes."


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13f30fc5-3fd9-9b09-17c5-f198c540b5a8%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/15/2019 8:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of
"real". Integers are invented by humans, even though there is
intersubjective agreement about them.



I would say we invented theories (axioms) to study them, but that the 
properties of integers were always there waiting to be discovered. 
Prove me wrong.


Were there always infinitely many of them?

Prove you're right.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4ad589d2-17f7-e2c9-c464-36d95c81d985%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/15/2019 7:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 7:29 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are
true if they are theorems derived from the axioms.


This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are
statements that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.


That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.



You are right, but in the above context we were speaking of 
arithmetical statements, for which my statement is correct.




In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what
can be proved.


That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is
outside of logical inference...such as "empirically true".


Even entirely within the system there's such statements that you know 
are true but not provable.


HOW do you know they are true?  Because they say they are not provable?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1f08ad00-890c-8802-175f-73235c7b4d2e%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 11:06:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2019, at 00:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> in which we can interpret the proposition. “2+2=4” is true if it is the 
> case that 2 + 2 = 4.
>
>
> Semantics is a big deal in programming language theory.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science)
>
>
> Yes, and that is inherited by mathematical logic, which study mainly the 
> relation w-between theories and their model (model means semantical 
> structure, in logic).
>
>
>
> Is there a calculus of experience, and a semantics of experiences (qualia)?
>
>
>
> Yes, with Mechanism, it is given by precise mathematical theories (S4Grz1, 
> Z1*, X1*). The proper non communicable parts are given by Z1* \ Z1, X1* \ 
> X1. Note that S4Grz1* = S4Grz1 (the soul agree with God about the soul).
>
>
> That's the scientific question.
>
>
> Yes.
>
> Bruno
>
> *There is a hidden code of nature—the code written into its fabric. Our 
> theories—our hypothetical code—are our evolving best-guess translations of 
> the code of nature, which remains hidden from our knowledge—within 
> nature-in-itself.*
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

On truth statements, they are only as true as the genre of fiction they are 
written in allow them to be.
(which is basically what Rorty says about "truth" 
[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY ])

Mathematical logic is to programming language theory as pure mathematics is 
to applied mathematics.

Your experience calculus looks like (as I mentioned before) of the type the 
MIRI/CSAIL Lob research group does:

Lob's theorem in Friendly AI   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMi1KkKCVCg

An Introduction to Lob’s Theorem in MIRI Research
http://intelligence.org/files/lob-notes-IAFF.pdf


@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45c6b5a2-c2b5-4965-bfff-226f8220b57b%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 10:31:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
>
> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set 
> theory) and false in another.
>
>
> That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
>
> Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical 
> propositions than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent 
> of the axiom of choice or the continuum hypotheses.
>
> Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much 
> more than RA. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

The set-theoretic multiverse of Hamkins

  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.4223.pdf


goes beyond the model-theoretic forcing methods of Cohen, with a framework 
for a multiverse of dialects (my word) of set theory, each with their own 
definition of "set". I'm not a set theorist, but can read the paper 
approximately  well, and it was enough to get him from City University New 
York to Oxford.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Biography

In September 2018, Hamkins moved to the University of Oxford 
 to become Professor of 
Logic in the Faculty of Philosophy and Sir Peter Strawson Fellow in 
Philosophy in University College, Oxford 
.


@philipthrift


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/992c5ede-0609-4ee7-bb8c-6da22283dded%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 May 2019, at 02:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not 
>> able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It 
>> goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism.
> 
> Because Platonism is theology.  It's all "explanation" and no 
> prediction...just like "everythingism”. 

That is plain false. 




> It has never succeeded anywhere because it never puts itself to the test.

It has. I thought that physics refutes mechanism, until I discovered Everett.



>   It remains in a perfect Platonic world in which ours is a corruption or a 
> random incident. 

You show here you have not read or try to understand. Of course, it is the 
opposite. The physical reality become full of laws, becoming probably being 
laws, where physics can never decide if it is physical laws, or geographical 
laws.




> As Sean Carroll puts it, "All human progress has been made by studying the 
> shadows on the cave wall.”

We start from that, but the real progress is when we assume a reality beyond 
that, like Einstein (that is: even the Aristotelian agree on this). The 
progress is made by relating the shadows through first principles and equations.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/60b25baf-1b5e-07bb-3e1b-686c2cb6a8be%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7BCF6E5C-A9F0-4F00-8625-EB3AB89094BB%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 May 2019, at 01:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
>> body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. 
>> What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
>> accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
> 
> But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI projects like 
> Watson and AlphaGO.  The building blocks are perception, information 
> processing, values, and action.  You say "there is no accounting" but that's 
> because you're using "accounting" as a synonym for "explain".  The accounting 
> in scientific theory is in terms of a model that works. 

With “model” in the logical sense of “theory”. OK.



> You're demanding of a theory of consciousness that will do for consciousness 
> what general relativity does not do for the metric or for the stress-energy 
> tensor, what Darwin did not do for reproduction with variation.  Maybe 
> someday Bruno's theory will yield some interesting prediction (of the 
> future), but until then it's a theory doesn't do any work.

It does. Once you are interested in consciousness, it does work, and it 
explains also the existence of a theological trap, and how to not fall in it, 
and this has been confirmed when you look at the history and compare the 
platonician period and the Aristotelian. It is really the difference between 
peace and war, prosperity and poverty. 

What you mean, is that it does not work as well as current physical theories, 
but even this is false, in the sense that physics works only by assuming an 
identity thesis which is, let us say, non intelligible, pure magic. In that 
sense, mechanism works much better than physics today. And with mechanism, 
physics does work only by putting the mind under the rug, that is denying that 
when we do a physical experience, at some point we use of first person 
experience, if only to note where is the needle.

So what you mean, is that Mechanism is not as efficacious than physical 
theories, FAPP. And that is true, but that is equivalent with saying quantum 
mechanics is to reject in everyday life, because it is easier to make a pizza 
using elementary classical physics that using Schroedinger equation.

Physics is the right tool for doing prediction, but to explain why it works, 
without denying the conscious experience, we need serious metaphysics.



> So far it doesn't even account for the effect of holding your breathe too 
> long or ingesting LSD. 

How do you know that? It does this rather well.



>   The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model.

But consciousness is not neural firing. You cannot identify a first person 
event with third person event, unless you make them both into very special sort 
of infinities.



>   But the mysterians of consciousness want to pooh-pooh that because it 
> doesn't talk about how their consciousness "feels".  But neither does Bruno's 
> .

No, that is wrong. You need to study a bit more. The fact that G*proves all 
modes of self)ferefence equivalent, but that the machine cannot see this 
explains all the discourse on consciousness, and its relation with matter. Ask 
any question on this, but you might revised a bit my papers.



>He talks about "arithmetic, seen from the inside" as though that was more 
> than a Platonic metaphor.  

Yes, it is an arithmetical fact, even without Mechanism, in which case the 
internal viewer are zombies, but they are still there as a fact, and they deny 
to be zombie, although they are already aware that can’t prove this to you.

Bruno 





> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6d7eae1d-f2b7-3fe9-2643-cd0db62b915e%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/17F6206E-D96E-4A76-AD0C-F9D91F2D2143%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 May 2019, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes  > wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> 
>>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>>> certain to exist.
>> 
>> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
>> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
>> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
>> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
>> describes observed phenomena.
> 
> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used 
> the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that 
> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or 
> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I 
> make clear what I mean:
> 
> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my favorite 
> scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological 
> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. 
> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally 
> equivalent p-zombie does the trick.
> 
> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because 
> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?
> 
> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
> body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. 
> What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
> accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
> 
> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not 
> able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It 
> goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism. 
> I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, is not 
> compatible with physicalism.
> 
> Telmo.
> 
> You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible with 
> physicalism.

Consciousness is only incompatible with physicalism + mechanism. It is nice, 
because the canonical theory of consciousness given by the machine itself 
explains consciousness (as best as logically possible), and explain 
constructively the appearance of matter, so that we can evaluate and test the 
theory by comparing with nature.



> Just give Brent's engineering approach some time to work.

Read my papers. Physicalism and Mechanism cannot work together at all. You have 
to abandon Mechanism to save physicalism. But the evidences favours much more 
mechanism than physicalism (which seems to be only an habit of thought).



> Platonism has not accounted for the physical universe

That is plain false. Mechanism explains entirely, qualitatively and 
qualitatively, where the belief in a physical universe comes from, where 
physicalism has to make an ontological commitment, which we try to always avoid 
when doing science. Only Mechanism explain why we believe in a physical 
universe, why that belief is correct, despite that physical universe is no more 
an ontological thing.



> -- Bruno keeps saying that this is just "a work in progress”.

Yes, but the whole propositional theories have already been found. Some 
comparison have already been done, and physicalism is already refuted (when 
assuming mechanism), and tested plausibly false by the experiments, notably 
those already done in quantum mechanics.



> So the same for consciousness.

Non computationalist theory of consciousness are up to now too much fuzzy to be 
tested. Such things do not  yet exist, and even if Mechanism is refuted, you 
will need the computationalist theory of mind (Mechanism) to develop a genuine 
non computationalist theory. 
Like the understanding of the infinite requires some understanding of the 
finite, the non-computable requires the understanding of the computable. Note 
that the universal machine are only partial computable.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSctFqjGoW2bcJsGHi_jtNo_tDEQFk_w3E_po%3DBRzS9aw%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 May 2019, at 00:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 4:36:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>> certain to exist.
> 
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
> describes observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical 
> construct is solely and precisely that it is  expected to work."  I see two 
> approaches to this, one (of which I have been the main advocated on this 
> list) might be called "the engineering approach"  while the other is the 
> philosophical approach.  The philosophical approach either takes 
> consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like Cosmin) or tries to 
> equate it with something within a theory based on something else (like 
> Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is that there can be no 
> p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, as JKC 
> is won't to point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave us Turing, 
> LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the philosophical approach 
> "predicts" various things we've know for a century or more and various 
> contradictory things about the future (as Bohr said, "Prediction is hard, 
> especially about the future.") my money is on the engineering approach.
> 
> Brent   
> 
> 
> 
> I think this is right, without getting into defining the whole 
> physicalism/materialism thing.
> 
> The article  
> 
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ 
> 
> 
> by Daniel Stoljar  
> (who wrote a textbook on the subject) is as good as any, I guess.
> 
> I'lll just say one should soon become bored to death taking about the 
> definition of physicalism/materialism.
> 
> Now it is clear scientists come up with models (and theories, and frameworks, 
> and paradigms), and they take their "model" and likely "implement" it in some 
> programming language and use that program to match to experimental or 
> observational data, and they maybe use a statistical program to say"that 
> looks like a good match".
> 
> But the elephant in the room is semantics: What is the interpretation of the 
> "entities" of the model.

The reality in which we can interpret the proposition. “2+2=4” is true if it is 
the case that 2 + 2 = 4.



> 
> Semantics is a big deal in programming language theory.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science) 
> 


Yes, and that is inherited by mathematical logic, which study mainly the 
relation w-between theories and their model (model means semantical structure, 
in logic).


> 
> Is there a calculus of experience, and a semantics of experiences (qualia)?


Yes, with Mechanism, it is given by precise mathematical theories (S4Grz1, Z1*, 
X1*). The proper non communicable parts are given by Z1* \ Z1, X1* \ X1. Note 
that S4Grz1* = S4Grz1 (the soul agree with God about the soul).



> 
> That's the scientific question.

Yes.

Bruno



> 
> There is a hidden code of nature—the code written into its fabric. Our 
> theories—our hypothetical code—are our evolving best-guess translations of 
> the code of nature, which remains hidden from our knowledge—within 
> nature-in-itself.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2cca5659-de7f-4131-944b-78d81b23ed72%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA3AEC5B-FA4F-4068-AF35-4ABABABBCEF8%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 May 2019, at 23:46, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot be 
>> derived from or defined by labels.
> 
> And it depends on the model.  Which is why it's undefinable within the 
> system.  And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true that 
> snow is white.”

?

I don’t see the difference. The standard model of arithmetic is given by the 
intersection between all models. See my other recent explanations.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/816e0c3c-76cc-82c8-a3b3-18f6af30b042%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A529D140-BF68-4BCD-8422-63436D7C7774%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 May 2019, at 23:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> From: Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
 On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:
 On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch >>> > wrote:
 On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:
 
 Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to 
 prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
 
 But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
 mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
 
 
 You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
 
 Jason
 
 The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
 
 There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, 
 what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
 (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
 mathematicians,
>>> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
>>> mathematicians are   nominalists! (And 
>>> I had this from a professional mathematician!)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That's an anecdote, not data.
>>>  
>>>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
>>> 
>>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
>>> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory 
>>> in a field.
>>> 
>>> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view 
>>> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive 
>>> theory.
>> 
>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>> certain to exist.
> 
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
> interpret, they mainly make models.


That idea is just typical after the closure of Plato’s Academy, and the 
stealing of theology by the Sate.

Science can study the how and the why. To claim that the why is not amenable to 
science is a trick to keep the statu quo in metaphysics/theology. It is pure 
argument per authority. It is not valid.




> By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, with the addition of 
> certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The 
> justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that 
> it is  expected to work."  I see two approaches to this, one (of which I have 
> been the main advocated on this list) might be called "the engineering 
> approach"  while the other is the philosophical approach.  The philosophical 
> approach either takes consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like 
> Cosmin) or tries to equate it with something within a theory based on 
> something else (like Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is 
> that there can be no p-zombies,

No. Mechanism assumes only that *I* will not become a zombie when I get the 
artificial digital brain, and then the reasoning implies that those emulated in 
arithmetic cannot be zombie too.


> i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, as JKC is won't to 
> point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave us Turing, LISP,

That comes, in your term, in the philosophical approach, when trying the solve 
paradoxes in the foundation of mathematics. The discovery of the universal 
digital machine comes from the intersection of mathematics and philosophy (like 
CT is itself in that intersection). It shows also that with some hypothesis, 
like Digital Mechanism, a part of philosophy becomes approachable by 
mathematics and can be done with the scientific attitude. 



> Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the philosophical approach "predicts" 
> various things we've know for a century or more and various contradictory 
> things about the future (as Bohr said, "Prediction is hard, especially about 
> the future.") my money is on the engineering approach.


Computer science illustrates that the philosophical approach is close to the 
engineering approach. It is not a coincidence that I work in an engineering 
department. They knew that I found QM by pure reasoning, and it 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Some years ago, some astronomer or cosmologist introduced the idea of One 
Gigantic Universe, but many, many, "domains," which, for me, is the same thing 
as Everett's-Deutsch's-Tegmark's multiverses. I am not sure if all domains 
followed the identical laws, or varied, or..?


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Wed, May 15, 2019 11:31 am
Subject: Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon



On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:





Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only to 
be not human defined, but to be not human definable.



(This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
>From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/
"Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp- content/uploads/Is-there-more- 
than-one-mathematical- universe.pdf


The final slides:

The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.It is incorrect to 
describe it as an open question.
The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how theCH both holds and 
fails throughout the multiverse, of how thesemodels are connected and how one 
may reach them from eachother while preserving or omitting certain features.
Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but themost important 
essential facts are known.
Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just onemathematical world or many

Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
         Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and 
semantics!

If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
theories on that reality.
It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical 
worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the 
contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The 
standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which 
most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA 
or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, 
Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became phenomenological. 





There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
and false in another.

That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
choice or the continuum hypotheses.
Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much more 
than RA. 
Bruno




@philipthrift



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06ca3480-cdf1-426b-9f38-404bc2fa1550%40googlegroups.com.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/07CE2D6F-E36D-45E6-883E-E9A13C4812B3%40ulb.ac.be.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1625287452.1090267.1557934879733%40mail.yahoo.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 May 2019, at 08:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 3:49 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 11:20 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> From: Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
>> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>> 
>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
>> is manifestly a pipe dream.
>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>> 
>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, what 
>> evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
>> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
>> mathematicians,
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
> mathematician!)
> 
> 
> That's an anecdote, not data.
>  
>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
> 
> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory in 
> a field.
> 
> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view 
> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive 
> theory.
> 
> That is false. Taking the pre-existence of all conscious states (a natural 
> consequences of Platonism) is the only theory in science I am aware of that 
> plausibly explains why our universe has:
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf 
> I have started to read this paper. It seems to be just another take on 
> computationalist arguments such as given by Bruno. It could be criticised in 
> detail, but the main problem I see is the rejection of scientific realism at 
> the start, and the unquestioned assumption of mathematical realism. Defining 
> 'things' by relationships loses the distinction between physics and 
> mathematics, which is the cause of all the trouble.
> 
> Simple physical laws that are probabilistic
> Persistent regularities
> An external world that contains the observer
> Inter-subjective agreement on physical laws
> These are just empirical observations. We choose laws that are as simple as 
> possible to describe observations. There is nothing profound in that.
>  
> Simple initial conditions
> Who said the initial conditions of the universe were simple? 
> Observation of a universe that evolves in time
> What is time in General relativity. It is merely a local phenomenon. 
> Observation of a universe with an absolute beginning in time
> Does it? There are plenty of cosmological theories where this is not the 
> case. 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/physics/0001020.pdf 
> 
> Why Occam's razor works
> Why the postulates of QM hold
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
> 
> Why physics is quantum mechanical
> Bruno has not proved this.

Yes I did.





> The real question is why do we observe a classical world? 
> Why certain qualia are incommunicable
> All quail are incommunicable by definition. Not something that requires 
> explanation.

So you agree that there are incommunicable truth. Nice.

But that phenomenon *is* explained with mechanism.




>  
> Why do you consider it a failure?  Where does Nominalism succeed where 
> Platonism fails?
> 
> Scientific realism rejects platonism.

Since the closure of Plato Academy. To be sure, I translate “platonism” by 
“mathematical realism”.

But scientific realism does not reject arithmetical realism, which is much 
weaker than the fuzzy mathematical realism (on which I am myself rather 
skeptical).

Bruno




> And scientific realism is where the progress has been made. And that is 
> nominalism wrt mathematics.
> 
> I await your reason, argument, or evidence.
> 
> Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. And 
> arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things.
> 
> What is a thing anyway?
> 
> Maybe the relationships are all that 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only 
> to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
> 
> 
> 
> (This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)
> 
> From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/ 
> 
> 
> "Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):
> 
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf
>  
> 
> 
> 
> The final slides:
> 
> 
> 
> The Continuum Hypothesis is settled
> 
> On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
> It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.
> 
> The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
> CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
> models are connected and how one may reach them from each
> other while preserving or omitting certain features.
> 
> Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
> most important essential facts are known.
> 
> Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
> mathematical world or many
> 
> 
> 
> Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.
> 
>  Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax (to some extent) and 
> semantics!

If it has a semantic, it is not just a language, there is a 
reality/model/semantic, and we have to distinguish languages and possible 
theories on that reality.

It is obvious (for a mathematical logician) that there are many mathematical 
worlds, but like in physics, this does not interfere with realism, on the 
contrary. Now, I use only arithmetical realism, on which everybody agree. The 
standard arithmetical truth is definable with a bit of set theory, on which 
most people agree (as it is the intersection of all models of the theories RA 
or PA). That is as acceptable as any theorem in analysis. With Mechanism, 
Analysis, and physics, remains full of sense, but have became phenomenological. 


> 
> 
> 
> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
> 
> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set theory) 
> and false in another.

That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.

Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical propositions 
than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent of the axiom of 
choice or the continuum hypotheses.

Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much more 
than RA. 

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06ca3480-cdf1-426b-9f38-404bc2fa1550%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/07CE2D6F-E36D-45E6-883E-E9A13C4812B3%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 May 2019, at 04:52, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> From: Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
>> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>> 
>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
>> is manifestly a pipe dream.
>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>> 
>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, what 
>> evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
>> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
>> mathematicians,
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
> mathematician!)
> 
> 
> That's an anecdote, not data.
>  
>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
> 
> 
>> what is your alternative?)
> Nominalism.
> 
> 
> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not only 
> to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
> 
> What has arithmetical truth got to do with it? Numbers are just names, not 
> existing things.


Mathematical logic distinguish well the name of a thing and the thing itself. 
You confuse “0” and 0.

Also, when you say that something does not exist, you might give us your 
metaphysical axioms. Taken literarily, what you say is like saying that the 
equation x - 4 = 0 has no solution.





>  
> 
>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our experience.
>> 
>> So you believe an AI that was functionally equivalent to you would be a 
>> philosophical zombie?
> Not at all. That does not follow.
> 
> If it doesn't follow then the functionally equivalent AI would be conscious. 
> Therefore mechanism.  What am I missing?
> 
> The fact that mechanism does not follow from the possibility of AI.

That is right. Digital Mechanism is a stringer axiom than the strong AI thesis. 
Logically.

So you believe that a digital copy would not be a zombie, but would not be 
“you”?




>  
>> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind,
> Maybe for some philosophers of mind. But there are many other possibilities, 
> most of which are more convincing.
> 
> 
>> what is your alternative?)
> Why should I have an alternative? I can know that a theory does not work 
> without providing a theory that does work.
> 
> 
> Above you said there are other possibilities which are more convincing. What 
> are they and why are they more convincing?
> 
> I do not have to provide a final theory. Anything else would be more 
> convincing than mechanism, entailing, as it does, arithmetical realism.

Mechanism assumes CT, which makes no sense at all without (sigma-1) 
arithmetical realism.

QM, with all current Hamiltonian/Lagrangian known today, implies Digital 
Mechanism. The theory of evolution requires digital mechanism (formed later by 
the discovery of the digital genetic code). 

Then QM confirms also Mechanism, and it is the only theory which explain both 
first person experience, and how it relates to matter and a possibly very 
simple reality.

Physicalism failed on consciousness since long, up to the point that the 
materialist philosopher of mind which are a bit serious, like Dennett, feel 
obliged to make consciousness disappearing.

If the logic S4Grz1, or Z1* or X1* depart from nature, then we would have some 
evidence that mechanism is false, but that is not (yet) the case.

You assume a physical realism, which is not a problem, but then you assume also 
that the physical realm is the fundamental realm, which is OK with your 
non-mechanism.

The problem is only for those who want an ontological physical realm, and 
mechanism.

Now, the evidences abound for Digital Mechanism, and there is just not one 
evidence for primitive matter. There is only the Aristotelian axiom that matter 
is primitive matter, made into state religion for a long time in our history.

When doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific method, we cannot begin 
by an ontological commitment. We must start with equations on which everyone 
(interested) agree, and study the consequence of harder axioms so that we can 
test the consequences.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 8:30 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>
 Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of
 successful theories which have explanatory power.

>>>
>>> That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our
>>> most successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to
>>> acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent.
>>> So quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know.
>>>
>>
>> So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic
>> is successful, after all)
>>
>
> Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real".
> Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective
> agreement about them.
>


I would say we invented theories (axioms) to study them, but that the
properties of integers were always there waiting to be discovered. Prove me
wrong.



>
>
> Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of
>>> our observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think
>>> that English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality?
>>>
>>
>> Because arithmetical realism explains more while assuming less.
>>
>
> The trouble with this is that it does no such thing. Arithmetical realism
> does not even explain consciousness, much less physics.
>

I don't think you have studied the results deeply enough to have reached
this conclusion. It might be more appropriate to say "I am not aware of how
arithmetical realism can explain physics".  Have you found a flaw in
Bruno's paper? His doctoral review did not. Have you found an error in the
reasoning of Markus Muller's paper?

It's not enough to say "the assumption is wrong", the assumption is what
you and I are debating. When I say arithmetical realism could explain
physics, and you say no it can't, then you need to show the flaw in those
papers, because I am making the implicit assumption of arithmetical realism
when I say "it can explain X".

It's not enough to say well that assumption just can't possibly be true.
Show or explain why it can't!


> Can mechanism explain the quale 'red'?
>

I thought you were a mechanist?


>
> .
>
>
>>  I think they are an excellent starting point. It is much easier,
>> conceptually for me to accept 2+2=4 is true, has always been and always
>> will be true, and needs no reason to be true,
>>
>
> But that is a matter of definition, not of ontology. Truth in arithmetic
> does not imply existence.
>

I think truth is all you need.  E.g., "the program that implements Bruce
Kellets's brain has the belief that it is consciousness and is experiencing
reading a post on the everything list", if true, implies and entails your
consciousness. No need to reify anything.


>
>
>> rather than the alternative, which is to accept the physical universe as
>> we see it exists on its own, independently of anything else or any other
>> reason. For what reason would such a physical universe exist, why does it
>> have this form, was it caused by something else, is there more beyond it?
>>
>
> As I have said, science does not answer 'why' questions. It describes and
> predicts -- which is as good an understanding as you will ever get.
>

That's an instrumentalist approach and is devoid of understanding. I find
that a needless hobbling of what science ought to be. (Like when Einstein
said science without religion is lame).  Given the choice between a science
that predicts and a science that explains and predicts, I'll take the
latter.


>
>
>> Arithmetical realism provides a simple, elegant answer to these
>> questions, and moreover answers many more questions than assuming the
>> physical universe at the start.
>>
>
> No, it does not. Arithmetical realism does not actually answer any
> questions. It cannot explain consciousness any more than it can explain the
> existence of space and time, much less derive their properties.
>

Why can't it?



>
>
>> Believing that there is something mind-independent to explain is better
>>> -- as long as one explores what this might mean, rather than assuming the
>>> answer from the start.
>>>
>>
>> We both assume something mind independent. You think it is the physical
>> universe, I think it is the integers.  My assumption of the integers not
>> only explains why we have an objective field of mathematics, but with
>> Mechanism, it explains the emergence of the appearance of the physical
>> universe (without having to assume the physical universe). So I get to
>> explain two things with one assumption.
>>
>
> But mechanism has not done this. It is claimed that it can explain
> physics, but we have yet to see any evidence that it can explain anything.
>

You haven't, you have yet to read the papers. Either that 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 May 2019, at 00:38, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/8/2019 11:28 PM, smitra wrote:
>> On 08-05-2019 21:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>> On 5/5/2019 7:06 PM, smitra wrote:
 Or perhaps it's a mistake to attribute consciousness to particular 
 physical systems. Instead of saying that this computer or that brain is or 
 isn't conscious, we could postulate that there exists (in some sense) 
 consciousness, and that consciousness can find itself in some location, 
 and where it finds itself in, is implicitly defined by the content of the 
 consciousness itself.
 
 If we then consider the set of all conscious states, then each element of 
 that set contains a subjective description of some conscious thought which 
 also contains in it where and when this thought is supposed to have 
 happened and who it belongs to. But that description of itself won't 
 contain enough information to fully specify what precise algorithm 
 generated it. My conscious thoughts won't contain all the information 
 necessary to reconstruct my brain in the exact state it is now. This means 
 that there are a large number of different physical systems that are each 
 consistent with being me in the subjective state I'm in right now.
 
 But I can still pin myself down to being in an environment that from a 
 macroscopic point of view must look the same as what I'm seeing right now. 
 There is then a large number of different physical local environments 
 within which brains are located that can be said to represent me. I'm all 
 of them, not one particular item. There is a one-to-one relationship 
 between me getting more localized inside this set and me changing due to 
 adding more information to my conscious state.
 
 Systems that are a lot less complex than our brain obviously run much 
 simpler algorithms than our brains are running. These algorithms with at 
 best less awareness, would then not be able to localize themselves as 
 precisely as we can. But since the state space of the computer is much 
 smaller
>>> 
>>> State space of the computation or of the computer, the "mind" or the 
>>> "brain".
>>> 
 , a question like: "is this AI conscious?" implies a far more precise 
 localization of the AI's consciousness than in case of us.
>>> 
>>> Hmm.  I was with you up till that.  Your earlier said that the AI
>>> being simpler would imply it was LESS localized in physical space,
>>> which I agreed with.  Now you seem to say the opposite?
>>> 
>> 
>> Yes, it's indeed going to be less localized but that would mean that it 
>> won't fit into the device we've set up. So, when we point to our device and 
>> imagine the conscious AI to be in there, it's not actually in that 
>> particular device we're looking at.
>> 
>> This coarse grained view goes a long way to address the problems implied by 
>> thought experiments where one replaces the transistors of the computer or 
>> the neurons of the brain by a devices that perform the exact same action as 
>> is actually happening in the instant the AI is supposed to feel something 
>> but would fail to perform the correct action in a counterfactual situation. 
>> You could then replace the brain by a recording of brain processes and that 
>> recording would then be conscious.
>> 
>> The problem is then with attempting to localize conscious in such a fine 
>> grained picture that's too small to accommodate the algorithm that is 
>> actually running. In a more course grained picture there do exist 
>> counterfactuals on nearby branches that the consciousness itself cannot 
>> resolve. So, in the MWI we should picture ourselves as being located on 
>> bundles of branches, not on single branches.
> 
> Right.  That's Julian Barbour's metaphor of streams in a channel. That means 
> that "we" exist at the coarse grained level, like other quasi-classical 
> stuff.  That was pretty much Bohr's point.  The classical world is 
> necessarily where we exist and do science

This is coherent with Everett too. Your formulation is more neutral than Bohr, 
which requires an explicit dualism and some precise cut-off between the quantum 
realm and the classical realm, that nobody has found.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Saibal
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ed54c56-15ae-e0a3-6fb3-830a14b1ed24%40verizon.net.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 May 2019, at 01:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
> 
> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
> is manifestly a pipe dream.
> 
> 
> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
> 
> Jason
> 
> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, and mechanism is a failed idea 
> because it cannot account for our experience.

99,9 % of the mathematician are realist, without even thinking about this. But 
I would say that 100% of all scientists are arithmetical realist, which is more 
than what we need to study Mechanism (which eventually requires only sigma_1 
arithmetical realism, just to understand that the Universal Dovetailer is a non 
stopping program.

The first order theory of the real numbers does not require arithmetical 
realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical functions reintroduce the 
need of being realist on the integers. Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers  in 
that theory.

If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which axioms you reject 
among,

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Some people add some metaphysical baggage in “realism” which is not there., 
“Arithmetical realism” is just the doctrine according to which the axioms above 
make sense. Usually, they are implicitly taught in primary school.
It is used only for the Church-Turing thesis and the (mathematical) definition 
of “digital machine”.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRON3vdt4GwUdvbCFnhp98Ges2OyXFAD7dgoThNomJv3w%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1917E2A0-3E26-402B-8B21-2CAC19FAB4FF%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 May 2019, at 00:30, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:24:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Wittgenstein is sum up with his “what we cannot talk about should not be 
>> talked
>> about”, but that is self-defeating (What are you talking about Mr
>> Wittgenstein?).
>> 
> 
> Only if he couldn't talk about what he is talking about. But it seems
> like he could, so perhaps therefore he thought he should?

But then he talk about what he is saying that he can’t talk about, 
contradicting himself.

Lao-Ze was closer to the “Gödelian solution”. He sais only “the wise stay mute, 
the fool talk”, by which he meant, if X is wise X stays mute. He does not say 
that he is wise. You can only deduce “If I am wise I should stay mute”. It is 
closer to the second incompleteness theorem:

<> t  -> ~ [] <> t.   (If I iam consistent then I cannot assert my consistency).

Bruno


> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190510223048.GA3946%40zen.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/75A9CD9A-8DA3-47C4-99E0-CA94565F82C5%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 7:29 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
>> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>>
>
> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements
> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.
>
>
> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.
>


You are right, but in the above context we were speaking of arithmetical
statements, for which my statement is correct.


>
> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be
> proved.
>
>
> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of
> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
>

Even entirely within the system there's such statements that you know are
true but not provable.

Jason


>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6356661-df48-36eb-2ac6-70430b5b4a5f%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgJ-sWbRoZWerZHdakwzs_AXFDodPzEQPuZAowTfSNQ6w%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 May 2019, at 18:48, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:25 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> Turing was interested in intelligence and, being a scientist, he knew he 
> >> couldn't say anything about consciousness unless he made the assumption 
> >> that observable intelligent behavior implies consciousness.
>  
> > But that was due to the influence of the young Wittgenstein and the whole 
> > Vienna philosophy (positivism).
> Today this is shown false, as there is a theory explains consciousness, and 
> verified by facts.
> 
> It's false? So you have found a way of detecting consciousness in other 
> people or things without using the assumption that intelligent behavior 
> implies consciousness! Wow, this is huge news let's hear all about it! I'm 
> all ears! 


No, we can’t detect consciousness. I was saying that today positivisme is 
abandoned. It is the idea that we have to abandon the concept of consciousness 
because we can’t detect it which has been abandonned. Many people understand 
the “hard problem of consciousness” (a materialist formulation of the Mind-Body 
problem).
Then with Mechanism, a subproblem of the consciousness problem is to derive the 
physical laws by the statistics on all computations. Turing’s 
behaviourism/positivism made him miss that problem.



>  
> >> As for Godel, I don't think the philosophical musings he made after about 
> >> 1955 when his only friend Albert Einstein died are worth much, there is no 
> >> pleasant way to say this but the poor man went nuts.
>  
> > Only the late years. Gödel was interested in theology since his youth, 
> 
> So even when young Godel was a bit nuts, that seems to be an occupational 
> hazard of great mathematicians.

Mathematics is born from theology. “Mathematician” has meant “skeptical on 
physicalism” for the platonists (using the modern terms to be short).



> Godel was one of the greatest mathematicians in the world but he was the only 
> type of theologian it is possible to be, terrible.   

?


Bruno




> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv26i%3DgZSuF%3DdA1eFzCDWDQNYVqN8WxqADrCQTGqk6iQog%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FDD1AE44-147C-4C1C-9BE3-25A0891B2CEA%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 6:14 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot
 be derived from or defined by labels.

>>>
>>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
>>> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>>>
>>
>> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements
>> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms. In other words truth
>> =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be proved.
>>
>
> Read what I said. "Arithmetical statements are true if they are theorems
> derived from the axioms." I think that you might agree with this.
>

My apologies, I took your "if" for an "if and only if".



> But this does not mean that there are not true things that are not
> theorems of the given axiom system (if you extend the notion of 'truth') --
> but they are theorems in a more powerful (extended) axiom system.
> Incompleteness is only a problem if you think that the axiom system you
> started from covers everything. This is not unlike physics -- we start from
> some theory and find things that a true but which cannot be derived within
> the theory. So we go to a new, extended, better theory.
>

Yes exactly.


>
> Incompleteness is not particularly powerful or mysterious.
>


I think it's a headshot for nominalism, or any theory that holds math is
human invented. As you say, we keep having to come up with better systems
of axioms. Why would we need to if math is human invented? What drives the
selection of new axioms if arithmetical truth is not objective and an
object of reality that we study?


>
> In arithmetic we define the integers. We find that these have properties
> that are not fully axiomatizable. So what. We have created a world (model)
> which we explore and discover certain things. But we created this world. We
> could create any number of worlds -- the world of sets, Riemannian
> manifolds, or whatever. These would all have their own incompleteness
> results. But they are all created worlds. Once created, they have an
> independent existence. But the physical world differs in that we did not
> create it -- it is the ultimate given.
>

It's the most obvious given, after consciousness. But as for ultimate, I'm
not so sure.

Jason


>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTQ4Y%3DP0R%3D3rb08A%3Di3a9tfO7duHrmE%3DzJf5mXboU_-3w%40mail.gmail.com
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjJjoT-zMKPh1bJ21Mm-8A3v%3D_MyVh%3DyzKjnC9RNF_eUw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 5:17 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/14/2019 2:33 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:47 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It
>>> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>>>
>>> And it depends on the model.
>>
>>
>> Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something
>> depend on what you are talking about.
>> When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is
>> arithmetic, and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.
>>
>>
>> But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms for
>> example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of
>> arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something hypothesized from
>> empirical observation.
>>
>
> I see a 100% analagous situation to the natural sciences:
>
> "There's more than one model of gravitation for example. But, you say I
> mean the gravitation of our universe...but gravitation is something
> hypothesized from empirical observation."
>
>
> "Model" means different, almost complementary, things in physics and
> mathematical logic.  Physicist would call Newton's theory a model of
> gravity, the physical phenomenon.  Mathematicians would axiomatize Newton's
> theory and then look around  for something that satisfied the axioms, which
> they would call "the model".
>

Then peanos axioms wouldn't be a model in that sense, the integers would be.



> The physical phenomenon, gravity, would not be a model of Newton's theory,
> because it doesn't correctly model the advance of the perihelion of Mercury.
>
>
> Axiomatic systems are just like theories in the sciences. They attempted
> to systematize what is out there. But we can never be sure our models
> correctly reflect the reality. We can only hope to improve our models over
> time to become more powerful in what they can explain.
>
>
> Explanation is cheap.  Prediction is dear.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Which is why it's undefinable within the
>>> system.
>>
>>
>> Could you clarify this point?
>>
>>
>> There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.
>>
>
>
> I think you mean "provable" is relative to the model.
>
>
What do you mean by more than one model of PA? What are the other models to
which you refer?


>
> No, provable depends only on the axioms and the rules of inference.
> "True" depends on the model.  Everything provable is true in every model.
> But the truth value of what isn't provable can vary depending on the model.
>

I am OK with everything here.


>
> In Newton's gravity you could "prove" something about the expected orbital
> velocity of Mercury in that model. It just wouldn't be true when compared
> to reality.
>
>
> Right, and we only have one reality.
>
>
>>
>>> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true
>>> that snow is white."
>>>
>>>
>> How is it different?
>>
>>
>> Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers.
>>
>
> Do we agree that the true properties of the natural numbers are
> objective?  If so no need to debate this any further.
>
>
> It's a matter of equivocating on "the natural numbers".  If you regard
> them as a theory of things, the way you learn them at your mother's knee,
> then there are objective truths "Two garbanzo beans plus two chick peas
> make four beans." the way "Snow is white."  But if you want to evaluate the
> truth of "2+2=4" that's a  proposition in arithmetic.  If it's PA then it's
> true in every model because it's a theorem.  But when you say there are
> true statements of arithmetic that aren't provable in PA, what they are
> depends on the model.
>

I'm not sure if you answered the question. If you did your answer wasn't
clear to me.

You answered there's objective facts concerning the arithmetic of garbanzo
beans, and there's objective mathematical facts that are relative to the
model, but would you say there's objective truth for arithmetic?

Would you say it true that there's an unlimited number of quantities of
garbanzo beans which cannot be arranged in a two dimensional grid with both
sides of that grid being more than 1 garbanzo beans in length?

Further would you say this statement was true before garbanzo beans
appeared on Earth?

Jason


>
> I'm sure Bruno can explain this better than I can.  I only took a couple
> of semesters of symbolic logic.
>
> Brent
>
>
> Jason
>
>
>> But what mathematicians (like Goedel) prove theorems about is the
>> axiomatic system.  That's why Bruno makes the point that provability is
>> well defined but truth isn't  (in mathematics).
>>
>> 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 5:50 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 10 May 2019, at 15:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter the
>> annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that indeterminacy
>> is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated.
>>
>
> In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum
> superposition continuing after a measurement has been made.
>
>
> Which duplication experiments. The one is step 3, or the one in step
> seven? The whole point is that the second one should give the entanglement,
> and that is why I study the modes of self-reference corresponding to it,
> and there, we do find a quantum formalism.
>

I am talking about person duplication as in step 3. There is no other form
of duplication involved. Step 7 introduces the dovetailer, with the
possibility of multiple computational threads passing through the same
conscious state. But that is not duplication -- it is just separate persons
having the same thoughts by chance. Nothing to do with entanglement in
either case. You do not find the quantum formalism anywhere.


>
>> The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the
>> quantum notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion
>> of superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product.
>>
>
> That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement.
>
>
> If you prove this, and assuming QM correct, you refute Mechanism (modulo a
> logical possible malevolent “bostromian” simulation).
>

OK, then Mechanism is falsified. Because you have not shown that quantum
entanglement arises from personal duplication.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRvK%3DUr68%2BZw-6Sk0FsvCbqK-JyJ22yLdHz_8hEpfEFvQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 May 2019, at 15:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:51 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 7 May 2019, at 01:04, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea that 
>> you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't not be 
>> able to tell the difference?
>>  
>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a 
>> finitely describable TM.
>> 
>> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean 
>> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind.
>> 
>> That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven at 
>> best.
>>  
>>   And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person, 
>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively 
>> random at a low level.  Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is 
>> not TM emulable.
>> 
>> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the 
>> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not 
>> objective).
>> 
>> That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first 
>> person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought 
>> experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in 
>> that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no 
>> viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution. Bruno seeks to avoid 
>> this fact this by defining a first person-plural (1pp) point of view. But 
>> that is just another name for what is normally considered the third person 
>> perspective.
> 
> That is impossible. The first person plural is when two persons enter the 
> annihilation box. They will share the indeterminacy, but that indeterminacy 
> is still 1p. The “3p” see only two guys being duplicated.
> 
> In your duplication experiments, but not in QM; no one 'sees' the quantum 
> superposition continuing after a measurement has been made.

Which duplication experiments. The one is step 3, or the one in step seven? The 
whole point is that the second one should give the entanglement, and that is 
why I study the modes of self-reference corresponding to it, and there, we do 
find a quantum formalism. 



>  
> The mechanist definition of the first person plural correspond to the quantum 
> notion of entanglement, or what I describe often as the contagion of 
> superposition, due to the linearity of the tensor product.
> 
> That is totally meaningless; your 1pp has nothing to do with entanglement.

If you prove this, and assuming QM correct, you refute Mechanism (modulo a 
logical possible malevolent “bostromian” simulation).



>  
> The unitary quantum evolution explains why the observer feels like there as 
> been a reduction, but also make them impossible to occur in the 3p global 
> picture.
> 
> The 3p notion coming from classical person duplication experiments does not 
> apply to QM. 3p in QM is simply what can be objectively agreed on by 
> independent observers -- the common sense grammatical notion of the third 
> person.

I do not assume QM, of course.




>  
>> Changing the name does not change the substance. The randomness of QM is 
>> third person and objective.
> 
> Then you introduce a collapse, and QM is simply false globally. All the 
> attempts to make sense of this have led to difficulties. So your assertion 
> seems to be wishful thinking.
> 
> There is no necessity for collapse. It is just that there is no external 
> observer who can see fully unitary evolution.

Good.


>  
> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to prove: 
> all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
> 
> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and mechanism 
> is manifestly a pipe dream.


2+2+4 is far easiest to believe and explain that the existence of the human 
mind. Assuming real numbers and waves is equivalent or stronger than  assuming 
the elementary axiom of arithmetic. You might formalise your theory so that we 
can compare them.

Bruno

PS I have already to go. Will read the many posts in this thread later.



> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 7:29:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they 
>> are theorems derived from the axioms. 
>>
>
> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements 
> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms. 
>
>
> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.  
>
> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be 
> proved.
>
>
> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
>
> Brent
>



An axiom system *A* being complete just means that for every (syntactically 
well-formed) sentence *s* in the language of *A*, either *s* or ~*s* can be 
proved via the rules of deduction of *A*.



BTW, while Church-Turing is not a useful "thesis", Curry-Howard is.

  proofs = programs

(The informal word "model" does not come up in programming language theory 
- PLT - that I can surmise, except in the context of a "model of 
computation/programming" - lambda calculus, pi calculus, functional, 
process-oriented. Its use in physics is a bit confusing. For example, 
regarding the equation of the Standard Model as written out by mathematical 
physicist Matilde Marcolli:

 
https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png

is the equation itself of the Standard Model here a "model", or is the 
interpretation of this equation a "model"?)

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e9d026a6-8100-492f-a141-09c6aee4c6f0%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>
>>> Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of
>>> successful theories which have explanatory power.
>>>
>>
>> That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our
>> most successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to
>> acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent.
>> So quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know.
>>
>
> So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic
> is successful, after all)
>

Nothing is wrong, except that you are using a different notion of "real".
Integers are invented by humans, even though there is intersubjective
agreement about them.


Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of
>> our observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think
>> that English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality?
>>
>
> Because arithmetical realism explains more while assuming less.
>

The trouble with this is that it does no such thing. Arithmetical realism
does not even explain consciousness, much less physics. Can mechanism
explain the quale 'red'?

.


>  I think they are an excellent starting point. It is much easier,
> conceptually for me to accept 2+2=4 is true, has always been and always
> will be true, and needs no reason to be true,
>

But that is a matter of definition, not of ontology. Truth in arithmetic
does not imply existence.


> rather than the alternative, which is to accept the physical universe as
> we see it exists on its own, independently of anything else or any other
> reason. For what reason would such a physical universe exist, why does it
> have this form, was it caused by something else, is there more beyond it?
>

As I have said, science does not answer 'why' questions. It describes and
predicts -- which is as good an understanding as you will ever get.


> Arithmetical realism provides a simple, elegant answer to these questions,
> and moreover answers many more questions than assuming the physical
> universe at the start.
>

No, it does not. Arithmetical realism does not actually answer any
questions. It cannot explain consciousness any more than it can explain the
existence of space and time, much less derive their properties.


> Believing that there is something mind-independent to explain is better --
>> as long as one explores what this might mean, rather than assuming the
>> answer from the start.
>>
>
> We both assume something mind independent. You think it is the physical
> universe, I think it is the integers.  My assumption of the integers not
> only explains why we have an objective field of mathematics, but with
> Mechanism, it explains the emergence of the appearance of the physical
> universe (without having to assume the physical universe). So I get to
> explain two things with one assumption.
>

But mechanism has not done this. It is claimed that it can explain physics,
but we have yet to see any evidence that it can explain anything.


> Since you start with physicalism, and deny the objective existence of
> arithmetical truth, you are confronted with the problem of explaining where
> arithmetical truth comes from. You say it comes from axioms but since Godel
> this has been known to be false.  Your assumption can explain the physical
> universe, but not the objective nature of arithmetical truth.
>

Incompleteness is not an objection to my contention that arithmetical truth
is a deduction from the axioms. If some alternative notion of 'truth' calls
some proposition that is not a theorem 'true', then you simply expand you
axiom base. Nothing particularly profound here. The same is true of
physical theories -- if they do not explain something that is observed
(viz. 'true'), we change the theory.

Further, I don't see any hope for how you can ever hope to explain why the
> physical universe has the laws that it does.
>

Maybe that is just geography. In some theories, other universes have
different laws. So why bother to explain why we see these laws and not
others? They are just a feature of the local landscape -- geography.

Why is it quantum mechanical, why are the laws so simple compared to the
> total information state of the universe,
>

We can explain that by observing that we propose laws that are as simple as
possible, consistent with the data. The laws are simple because we make
them that way!


> do altogether other universes exist?  There is hope of getting answers to
> these questions starting from the assumption of the integers, but there is
> not if your starting assumption is the physical universe itself.
>

There is no evidence that any of these questions can be answered by
starting from arithmetical realism. Besides, one does not ask why the orbit
of the earth is 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true
if they are theorems derived from the axioms.


This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are 
statements that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms.


That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.

In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can 
be proved.


That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
logical inference...such as "empirically true".


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6356661-df48-36eb-2ac6-70430b5b4a5f%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/14/2019 1:20 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:



On Tue, May 14, 2019, at 00:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:



On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to 
say. My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount 
to that mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the 
building blocks? There is no accounting, there is no description in 
yours or van Neumann's sense.


But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI 
projects like Watson


I mention this outside of our main discussion: Watson is mostly IBM 
marketing hype for scientifically-illiterate business executives. I 
say this as an AI researcher, not an AI-denialist. It does not deserve 
a place alongside serious research endeavors in the field. The 
Jeapordy player was cool, some nice papers came out of it (I have them 
and have read them all), but that is about it. The rest is just a 
bullshit business brand around cloud-stuff and old-fashioned business IT.


https://www.computerworld.com/article/3321138/did-ibm-put-too-much-stock-in-watson-health-too-soon.html
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/07/02/is-ibm-watson-a-joke/
https://gizmodo.com/why-everyone-is-hating-on-watson-including-the-people-w-1797510888
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/stop-the-hype-the-real-value-of-ibm-watson-is-driving-small-incremental-business-value/
https://venturebeat.com/2017/06/08/you-can-call-it-hype-but-watson-is-getting-marketers-roi/

Etc.


and AlphaGO.


AlphaGO is pretty cool. My feeling is that you are doing with AI what 
physicists tend to accuse outsiders to the field of doing with quantum 
physics: mysticism. I'm not accusing you of being the Deepak Chopra of 
AI-mysticism, I hold you in much higher regard than that, but I think 
maybe you lack the depth of understanding to see that there isn't as 
much there there as you might assume.


AlphaGO is essentially a minimax decision tree. Go is infamous for 
leading to combinatorial explosion even more severely than chess, so 
decision trees where considered a no-go for a long time. The genius 
move here is to train a feed-forward neural network to prune the tree, 
providing something akin to intuition and making the decision tree 
both tractable and effective against expert human players. 
Reinforcement learning was used to train the tree by having the agents 
play against themselves (not in the first iteration of AlphaGO, but I 
think we can simplify a bit for the purpose of this discussion).


This is all very neat and clever, but nothing was discovered in terms 
of computer science that wasn't already well-known in the 1980s. It 
just so happens that these approaches finally became feasible due to 
sufficiently powerful hardware. Now, this is no small achievement, and 
I have maximum respect for the AlphaGO team. But I failed to see what 
was learned in terms of how intelligence works, let alone what this 
has to do with consciousness, anymore than say, performing some linear 
algebra with NumPy or whatever.


The building blocks are perception, information processing, values, 
and action.


Well, if "perception" is a building block then there is already an 
implicit perceiver, so you are begging the question. Reminds me of 
this joke:


Easy way to make your own megaphone!
You just need:

1- Some duct tape
2- A megaphone

  You say "there is no accounting" but that's because you're using 
"accounting" as a synonym for "explain".  The accounting in 
scientific theory is in terms of a model that works.  You're 
demanding of a theory of consciousness that will do for consciousness 
what general relativity/*does not do*/ for the metric or for the 
stress-energy tensor, what Darwin/*did not do*/ for reproduction with 
variation.


Darwin didn't have the full story, but now the main things are 
accounted for. We know how nucleic acids can be sequenced in very long 
molecules, thus digitally encoding the shape of proteins, that then 
fold into 3D shapes according to the laws of physics and can interact 
and compose themselves in ways that eventually generate complex 
organisms, that can interact to mix their respective strands of 
nucleic acids and create incubating environments for new, similar 
organisms to be generated.


There are several scientific fields dedicated to the numerous details 
that I am glossing over in the silly explanation above.


That's why people tend to think science explains more than it does. In 
well developed fields the explanations can get very deep and go thru a 
lot of diverse fields.  Our explanation of consciousness is still 
shallow.  it's pretty much limited to what will shut off consciousness 
or give halluciantions, and some mapping of functions in the brain.  But 
when the explanation gets deep and detailed, will you still notice that 
it leads to a "dead end"?  Do you notice that general relativity "dead 
ends" with no explanation of why 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot
>>> be derived from or defined by labels.
>>>
>>
>> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
>> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>>
>
> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements
> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms. In other words truth
> =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be proved.
>

Read what I said. "Arithmetical statements are true if they are theorems
derived from the axioms." I think that you might agree with this. But this
does not mean that there are not true things that are not theorems of the
given axiom system (if you extend the notion of 'truth') -- but they are
theorems in a more powerful (extended) axiom system. Incompleteness is only
a problem if you think that the axiom system you started from covers
everything. This is not unlike physics -- we start from some theory and
find things that a true but which cannot be derived within the theory. So
we go to a new, extended, better theory.

Incompleteness is not particularly powerful or mysterious.

In arithmetic we define the integers. We find that these have properties
that are not fully axiomatizable. So what. We have created a world (model)
which we explore and discover certain things. But we created this world. We
could create any number of worlds -- the world of sets, Riemannian
manifolds, or whatever. These would all have their own incompleteness
results. But they are all created worlds. Once created, they have an
independent existence. But the physical world differs in that we did not
create it -- it is the ultimate given.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTQ4Y%3DP0R%3D3rb08A%3Di3a9tfO7duHrmE%3DzJf5mXboU_-3w%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/14/2019 2:33 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:47 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for
it. It
> cannot be derived from or defined by labels.

And it depends on the model. 



Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about
something depend on what you are talking about.
When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is
arithmetic, and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning
arithmetic.


But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's
axioms for example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers
model of arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something
hypothesized from empirical observation.


I see a 100% analagous situation to the natural sciences:

"There's more than one model of gravitation for example. But, you say 
I mean the gravitation of our universe...but gravitation is something 
hypothesized from empirical observation."


"Model" means different, almost complementary, things in physics and 
mathematical logic.  Physicist would call Newton's theory a model of 
gravity, the physical phenomenon.  Mathematicians would axiomatize 
Newton's theory and then look around  for something that satisfied the 
axioms, which they would call "the model".  The physical phenomenon, 
gravity, would not be a model of Newton's theory, because it doesn't 
correctly model the advance of the perihelion of Mercury.




Axiomatic systems are just like theories in the sciences. They 
attempted to systematize what is out there. But we can never be sure 
our models correctly reflect the reality. We can only hope to improve 
our models over time to become more powerful in what they can explain.


Explanation is cheap.  Prediction is dear.





Which is why it's undefinable within the
system. 



Could you clarify this point?


There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the
model.



I think you mean "provable" is relative to the model.


No, provable depends only on the axioms and the rules of inference. 
"True" depends on the model.  Everything provable is true in every 
model.  But the truth value of what isn't provable can vary depending on 
the model.


In Newton's gravity you could "prove" something about the expected 
orbital velocity of Mercury in that model. It just wouldn't be true 
when compared to reality.


Right, and we only have one reality.


And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true
that snow is white."


How is it different?


Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers.


Do we agree that the true properties of the natural numbers are 
objective?  If so no need to debate this any further.


It's a matter of equivocating on "the natural numbers".  If you regard 
them as a theory of things, the way you learn them at your mother's 
knee, then there are objective truths "Two garbanzo beans plus two chick 
peas make four beans." the way "Snow is white."  But if you want to 
evaluate the truth of "2+2=4" that's a  proposition in arithmetic.  If 
it's PA then it's true in every model because it's a theorem.  But when 
you say there are true statements of arithmetic that aren't provable in 
PA, what they are depends on the model.


I'm sure Bruno can explain this better than I can.  I only took a couple 
of semesters of symbolic logic.


Brent



Jason

But what mathematicians (like Goedel) prove theorems about is the
axiomatic system. That's why Bruno makes the point that
provability is well defined but truth isn't  (in mathematics).

Brent


Jason
-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the

Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit

https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgQZz3nO%2BOKaiWZrtmbVivC8E_0BtwfjhW7hm9PjRoZ_Q%40mail.gmail.com

.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:47 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It
>> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>>
>> And it depends on the model.
>
>
> Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something
> depend on what you are talking about.
> When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is
> arithmetic, and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.
>
>
> But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms for
> example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of
> arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something hypothesized from
> empirical observation.
>

I see a 100% analagous situation to the natural sciences:

"There's more than one model of gravitation for example. But, you say I
mean the gravitation of our universe...but gravitation is something
hypothesized from empirical observation."

Axiomatic systems are just like theories in the sciences. They attempted to
systematize what is out there. But we can never be sure our models
correctly reflect the reality. We can only hope to improve our models over
time to become more powerful in what they can explain.



>
>
>
>> Which is why it's undefinable within the
>> system.
>
>
> Could you clarify this point?
>
>
> There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.
>


I think you mean "provable" is relative to the model.  In Newton's gravity
you could "prove" something about the expected orbital velocity of Mercury
in that model. It just wouldn't be true when compared to reality.

>
>
>> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true
>> that snow is white."
>>
>>
> How is it different?
>
>
> Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers.
>

Do we agree that the true properties of the natural numbers are objective?
If so no need to debate this any further.

Jason


> But what mathematicians (like Goedel) prove theorems about is the
> axiomatic system.  That's why Bruno makes the point that provability is
> well defined but truth isn't  (in mathematics).
>
> Brent
>
>
> Jason
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgQZz3nO%2BOKaiWZrtmbVivC8E_0BtwfjhW7hm9PjRoZ_Q%40mail.gmail.com
> 
> .
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c8ccb7d1-0417-4718-aae2-484716798892%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhqBMhAbbO9z4225FsqOUpSqTvK2JvQ7rbYenHAKU5aQA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/14/2019 9:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It
> cannot be derived from or defined by labels.

And it depends on the model. 



Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something 
depend on what you are talking about.
When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is 
arithmetic, and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.


But which arithmetic?  There is more than one model of Peano's axioms 
for example.  But , you say, I mean the natural numbers model of 
arithmetic...but the natural numbers are something hypothesized from 
empirical observation.



Which is why it's undefinable within the
system. 



Could you clarify this point?


There is more than one model of PA and "true" is relative to the model.


And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true
that snow is white."


How is it different?


Snow is defined ostensively, as are the natural numbers.  But what 
mathematicians (like Goedel) prove theorems about is the axiomatic 
system.  That's why Bruno makes the point that provability is well 
defined but truth isn't  (in mathematics).


Brent


Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgQZz3nO%2BOKaiWZrtmbVivC8E_0BtwfjhW7hm9PjRoZ_Q%40mail.gmail.com 
.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c8ccb7d1-0417-4718-aae2-484716798892%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Telmo Menezes]

On Tue, May 14, 2019, at 00:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
>> body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. 
>> What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
>> accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
> 
> But there are models that work. That was my point in citing AI projects like 
> Watson

I mention this outside of our main discussion: Watson is mostly IBM marketing 
hype for scientifically-illiterate business executives. I say this as an AI 
researcher, not an AI-denialist. It does not deserve a place alongside serious 
research endeavors in the field. The Jeapordy player was cool, some nice papers 
came out of it (I have them and have read them all), but that is about it. The 
rest is just a bullshit business brand around cloud-stuff and old-fashioned 
business IT.

https://www.computerworld.com/article/3321138/did-ibm-put-too-much-stock-in-watson-health-too-soon.html
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/07/02/is-ibm-watson-a-joke/
https://gizmodo.com/why-everyone-is-hating-on-watson-including-the-people-w-1797510888
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/stop-the-hype-the-real-value-of-ibm-watson-is-driving-small-incremental-business-value/
https://venturebeat.com/2017/06/08/you-can-call-it-hype-but-watson-is-getting-marketers-roi/

Etc.

>  and AlphaGO. 

AlphaGO is pretty cool. My feeling is that you are doing with AI what 
physicists tend to accuse outsiders to the field of doing with quantum physics: 
mysticism. I'm not accusing you of being the Deepak Chopra of AI-mysticism, I 
hold you in much higher regard than that, but I think maybe you lack the depth 
of understanding to see that there isn't as much there there as you might 
assume.

AlphaGO is essentially a minimax decision tree. Go is infamous for leading to 
combinatorial explosion even more severely than chess, so decision trees where 
considered a no-go for a long time. The genius move here is to train a 
feed-forward neural network to prune the tree, providing something akin to 
intuition and making the decision tree both tractable and effective against 
expert human players. Reinforcement learning was used to train the tree by 
having the agents play against themselves (not in the first iteration of 
AlphaGO, but I think we can simplify a bit for the purpose of this discussion).

This is all very neat and clever, but nothing was discovered in terms of 
computer science that wasn't already well-known in the 1980s. It just so 
happens that these approaches finally became feasible due to sufficiently 
powerful hardware. Now, this is no small achievement, and I have maximum 
respect for the AlphaGO team. But I failed to see what was learned in terms of 
how intelligence works, let alone what this has to do with consciousness, 
anymore than say, performing some linear algebra with NumPy or whatever.

>  The building blocks are perception, information processing, values, and 
> action.

Well, if "perception" is a building block then there is already an implicit 
perceiver, so you are begging the question. Reminds me of this joke:

Easy way to make your own megaphone!
You just need:

1- Some duct tape
2- A megaphone

>  You say "there is no accounting" but that's because you're using 
> "accounting" as a synonym for "explain". The accounting in scientific theory 
> is in terms of a model that works. You're demanding of a theory of 
> consciousness that will do for consciousness what general relativity** does 
> not do** for the metric or for the stress-energy tensor, what Darwin** did 
> not do** for reproduction with variation.

Darwin didn't have the full story, but now the main things are accounted for. 
We know how nucleic acids can be sequenced in very long molecules, thus 
digitally encoding the shape of proteins, that then fold into 3D shapes 
according to the laws of physics and can interact and compose themselves in 
ways that eventually generate complex organisms, that can interact to mix their 
respective strands of nucleic acids and create incubating environments for new, 
similar organisms to be generated.

There are several scientific fields dedicated to the numerous details that I am 
glossing over in the silly explanation above.

Under physicalism, for consciounsness, we have nada. Unless we start with the 
megaphone.

>  Maybe someday Bruno's theory will yield some interesting prediction (of the 
> future), but until then it's a theory doesn't do any work. So far it doesn't 
> even account for the effect of holding your breathe too long or ingesting 
> LSD. 

You know I appreciate Bruno and his work very much, but this is besides the 
point here. I am not arguing that Bruno has the answers (or not), just that 
physicalism accomplishes nothing that idealism does not, and in fact 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:52:54 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 11:22 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:14:48 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>>
>>  
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
>> successful model".
>>
>> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>>
>> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
>
> http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness
>
> Summary 
>
> Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a 
> satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the 
> specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness 
> surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as 
> well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to 
> explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears 
> sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of 
> conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained 
> prominence, *none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a 
> foundation upon which to build a definitive model.*
>
>
> A successful model has predictive power and consilience in a certain 
> domain.  It doesn't have to predict everything to be successful.  Newton's 
> theory of gravity didn't explain why lead is heavier than iron or why the 
> planets had the orbits they have.  I only meant that the neurobiological 
> theory of the brain is successful in predicting that specific chemicals 
> that interact with neurotransmitters will affect conscious thoughts and 
> electrical stimulation of the brain will produce thoughts specific to the 
> location.  All the models mentioned in your link implicitly assume this 
> foundation of neural activity.   I notice however that Jeff Hawkins model 
> of memory->prediction is not included, although I think he's one of the 
> most  serious researchers  https://numenta.com/
>
> Brent 
>


"Neural-firing patterns" (information processing - which alone could be 
simulated in a conventional supercomputer - may be a big part of a theory, 
but may not be the whole thing. A chemical role is likely critical.



Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective
https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/2/4/26/htm

...
4. Panpsychism

Some proponents of information-processing theories have recently appealed 
to the philosophy of panpsychism In its most common form, as advocated for 
example in, panpsychism is primarily justified by philosophical reasoning, 
namely that it is unintelligible to get consciousness from unconscious 
matter. With physicalists, panpsychists share the standard intuition that 
macroscopic properties inevitably are the result of the dynamics of 
elementary, microscopic entities. However, they differ from standard 
physicalists in that they assume that matter, even in its most basic form, 
is conscious. Panpsychism could thus be distinguished from physicalism by 
its ontological commitment to some form of mentality inherent in all forms 
of matter.

There are problematic issues though. It seems implausible to just “merge” 
psychological with physical properties; the structures of physical and 
psychological theories are very different from each other. For example, on 
the (sub-)atomic scale individuality is a misnomer (something like “an 
individual electron” does not exist). On the level of psychology just the 
opposite is true: Individuals abound. Accordingly, the introduction of 
“proto-consciousness”, a precursor of consciousness in elementary physical 
systems, seems necessary.

The belief in proto-consciousness, however, brings with it a problem of 
emergence: How do higher forms of consciousness result from a complex 
combination of proto-consciousness? This has been called the “combination 
problem” for panpsychism, which becomes even more pressing once one has 
taken a molecular perspective. If quarks and electrons are 
(proto-)conscious, what about atoms and molecules? Atoms and molecules form 
cells which in turn form tissue that makes up the whole organism. This 
question thus naturally leads to the puzzle of identifying the point of 
emergence of higher forms of consciousness starting with 
proto-consciousness. Judging purely from empirical knowledge, it is 
implausible that it takes place at a lower level than other life-processes 
(i.e., lower than at the level of biochemistry); and it is also implausible 
that it exclusively takes place at much higher levels either, because much 
of what is biologically relevant already takes place (or is initiated) at 
the level of cellular and molecular interactions 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 11:22 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:14:48 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

The physical model that says consciousness is the brain
processing information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very
successful model.

Brent




I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating:
"a very successful model".

Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific
consensus?

Now that is what I would call mysterian.

@philipthrift



http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness


Summary

Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely 
that a satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require 
the specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of 
consciousness surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of 
abstraction as well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that 
they are proposed to explain. At present, however, no single model of 
consciousness appears sufficient to account fully for the 
multidimensional properties of conscious experience. Moreover, 
although some of these models have gained prominence, *none has yet 
been accepted as definitive, or even as a foundation upon which to 
build a definitive model.*




A successful model has predictive power and consilience in a certain 
domain.  It doesn't have to predict everything to be successful. 
Newton's theory of gravity didn't explain why lead is heavier than iron 
or why the planets had the orbits they have.  I only meant that the 
neurobiological theory of the brain is successful in predicting that 
specific chemicals that interact with neurotransmitters will affect 
conscious thoughts and electrical stimulation of the brain will produce 
thoughts specific to the location.  All the models mentioned in your 
link implicitly assume this foundation of neural activity.   I notice 
however that Jeff Hawkins model of memory->prediction is not included, 
although I think he's one of the most  serious researchers  
https://numenta.com/


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8348f2d5-c4ce-1f89-ae81-a71b5d2b8190%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:06 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:45 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I am not sure I have the time to delve into Muller's paper to find out
>>> his reasons. He is clearly misguided, because there are many viable
>>> cosmological theories that do not have a beginning of time (such as eternal
>>> inflation and related ideas) -- even if time is universally defined, which
>>> is very doubtful.
>>>
>>
>> To be clear, his result does not rule out inflation, he finds only that
>> observers can expect that there we will find a beginning in history where
>> if we try to penetrate more deeply into what happened before, it devolves
>> into a multitude of indistinguishable possibilities.
>>
>
> So he is not proposing an absolute beginning to time after all!
>
> ..
>

I don't want to go down the rabbit hole of what is meant by "absolute
beginning", but I will leave you with these excerpts from the paper I
referenced, if they help:

In particular, we will see that our theory predicts (under the assumption
> just mentioned) that observers should indeed expect to see two facts which
> are features of our physics as we know it: first, the fact that the
> observer seems to be part of an external world that evolves in time (a
> “universe”), and second, that this external world seems to have had an
> absolute beginning in the past (the “Big Bang”).


If she continues computing backwards to retrodict earlier and earlier
> states of her universe, she will typically find simpler and more “compact”
> states, with measures of entropy or algorithmic complexity decreasing —
> simply because she is looking at earlier and earlier stages of an unfolding
> computation43. At some point, Abby will necessarily arrive at the state
> that corresponds to the initial state of the graph machine’s computation
> (right after the machine U has read the prefix q), where simplicity and
> compactness are maximal. At this point, two cases are possible: either
> Abby’s method of computing backwards will cease to work; or Abby will
> retrodict a fictitious sequence of “states before the initial state”,
> typically with increasing complexity backwards in time [100].


In both cases, Abby will identify a singular state in the past, where the
> universe was particularly “small” and “simple” in the algorithmic sense. If
> Abby reconstructs the previous history of her universe (the computational
> process giving rise to her asymptotic measure µ), she will see that
> complexity unfolded after this stage in a way that resembles an abstract
> computation according to simple probabilistic laws. Thus, she may call this
> initial state the “Big Bang”, and hypothesize that time had its beginning
> in this moment. This is a striking consistency with our actual physical
> observations. We will discuss further details of this in Section 11.




>
> No they didn't. Zeh's ideas of decoherence go some distance, but Everett
>>> is totally irrelevant to this.
>>>
>>
>> Do you think something more than decoherence is needed to get there?
>>
>
> Yes. You need to reduce the superposition to a mixture.
>
> 
>

What will this require in your opinion, new postulates, or simply a better
understanding of the existing postulates?


>
>
>> You seem to be using the old scholastic notion of nominalism.
>>> "In more recent usage, 'nominalism' is often employed as a label for any
>>> repudiation of abstract entities, whether universals or particulars, and
>>> thus embraces the rejection of such things as propositions, sets, and
>>> numbers."  (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, OUP, 2005)
>>>
>>
>> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot
>> be derived from or defined by labels.
>>
>
> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
> are theorems derived from the axioms.
>

This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements
that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms. In other words truth
=/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be proved.


> "Snow is white" (Brent) is true because it corresponds with the facts.
> These are different notions of truth.
>
> .
>
>
>>
>>> We might discover some of their properties, but we can never know the
>>> "thing" in itself. Theoretical entities are generally dealt with by
>>> nominalism, as above.
>>>
>>
>> Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of
>> successful theories which have explanatory power.
>>
>
> That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our
> most successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to
> acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent.
> So quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know.
>
>
So what is wrong with the theory that the integers are real? (arithmetic is
successful, after all)


>
> 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It
> > cannot be derived from or defined by labels.
>
> And it depends on the model.


Saying truth depends on the model is like saying facts about something
depend on what you are talking about.
When I said arithmetical truth, it should be clear the model is arithmetic,
and so arithmetical truth are the facts concerning arithmetic.


> Which is why it's undefinable within the
> system.


Could you clarify this point?


> And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true
> that snow is white."
>
>
How is it different?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgQZz3nO%2BOKaiWZrtmbVivC8E_0BtwfjhW7hm9PjRoZ_Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 1:18:39 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 10:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>
> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>
>  
>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
> successful model".
>
>
> It correctly predicts the degree of effects on consciousness from the 
> chemical affinities of molecules that will combine with neurotransmitter 
> molecules like acytelcholine.   Can you panpsychism predict that?  Can it 
> even predict that if you hold your breath long enough you will pass out?
>
>
> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>
>
> Yes, it is a scientific consensus (as much as anything is)  that neuronal 
> firing that is transmitted, or inhibited, by chemicals released 
> presynaptically is necessary for conscious thought.  Have you not heard of 
> anesthsia?  What is the panpsychic theory of anesthesia?
>
> Brent
>
>
> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>
>

*[no model] has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a foundation 
upon which to build a definitive model* 

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness


I think any review of the scientific literature on *consciousness *shows 
that the scientific consensus is that there is no model yet:

The Science of Consciousness (TSC) 2019 
https://www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch/

I am really mystified that there are scientists who think there is. Where 
did this idea come from?

Perhaps that idea is just among some physicists, who perhaps have a narrow 
conception of things: There is the Standard Model of particles, and that's 
the only theory (of all matter) that is needed.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/071180d3-a8e3-4719-83d1-1ba2fc11fcb4%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:14:48 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>
>  
>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
> successful model".
>
> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>
> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>
> @philipthrift
>


http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness

Summary

Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a 
satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the 
specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness 
surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as 
well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to 
explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears 
sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of 
conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained 
prominence, *none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a 
foundation upon which to build a definitive model.*

!philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1308aed5-14ec-410a-afd0-eb814141c8d1%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 10:18 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 7:04:14 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even
though he
> is not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and
Platonism
> fails. It goes without saying that all of modern science is
compatible
> with Platonism.

Because Platonism is theology.  It's all "explanation" and no
prediction...just like "everythingism".  It has never succeeded
anywhere
because it never puts itself to the test.  It remains in a perfect
Platonic world in which ours is a corruption or a random
incident.  As
Sean Carroll puts it, "All human progress has been made by
studying the
shadows on the cave wall."

Brent


The reason Sean Carroll states /that line/ of course s that he*is a 
Platonist!*


No, he just doesn't agree with your idea of what is matter.

Brent



@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bed82734-5039-416b-8de6-e57c8cf1a328%40googlegroups.com 
.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ed9acc78-8ec1-5b0b-40b6-c31f8ea51624%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 10:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing
information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model.

Brent




I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a 
very successful model".


It correctly predicts the degree of effects on consciousness from the 
chemical affinities of molecules that will combine with neurotransmitter 
molecules like acytelcholine.   Can you panpsychism predict that?  Can 
it even predict that if you hold your breath long enough you will pass out?




Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?


Yes, it is a scientific consensus (as much as anything is)  that 
neuronal firing that is transmitted, or inhibited, by chemicals released 
presynaptically is necessary for conscious thought.  Have you not heard 
of anesthsia?  What is the panpsychic theory of anesthesia?


Brent


Now that is what I would call mysterian.

@philipthrift


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4d637a96-2720-eb68-b0a1-eefef19ab31e%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 7:04:14 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> > It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he 
> > is not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism 
> > fails. It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible 
> > with Platonism. 
>
> Because Platonism is theology.  It's all "explanation" and no 
> prediction...just like "everythingism".  It has never succeeded anywhere 
> because it never puts itself to the test.  It remains in a perfect 
> Platonic world in which ours is a corruption or a random incident.  As 
> Sean Carroll puts it, "All human progress has been made by studying the 
> shadows on the cave wall." 
>
> Brent 
>
>
The reason Sean Carroll states *that line* of course s that he* is a 
Platonist!*

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bed82734-5039-416b-8de6-e57c8cf1a328%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>
 

> Brent
>



I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
successful model".

Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?

Now that is what I would call mysterian. 

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2815e21a-b4f7-46e0-ac5a-d509e4c5a8c1%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he 
is not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism 
fails. It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible 
with Platonism.


Because Platonism is theology.  It's all "explanation" and no 
prediction...just like "everythingism".  It has never succeeded anywhere 
because it never puts itself to the test.  It remains in a perfect 
Platonic world in which ours is a corruption or a random incident.  As 
Sean Carroll puts it, "All human progress has been made by studying the 
shadows on the cave wall."


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/60b25baf-1b5e-07bb-3e1b-686c2cb6a8be%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:55 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say.
> My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that
> mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There
> is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
>
>
> But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI projects
> like Watson and AlphaGO.  The building blocks are perception, information
> processing, values, and action.  You say "there is no accounting" but
> that's because you're using "accounting" as a synonym for "explain".  The
> accounting in scientific theory is in terms of a model that works.  You're
> demanding of a theory of consciousness that will do for consciousness what
> general relativity* does not do* for the metric or for the stress-energy
> tensor, what Darwin* did not do* for reproduction with variation.  Maybe
> someday Bruno's theory will yield some interesting prediction (of the
> future), but until then it's a theory doesn't do any work. So far it
> doesn't even account for the effect of holding your breathe too long or
> ingesting LSD.   The physical model that says consciousness is the brain
> processing information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful
> model.  But the mysterians of consciousness want to pooh-pooh that because
> it doesn't talk about how their consciousness "feels".  But neither does
> Bruno's .   He talks about "arithmetic, seen from the inside" as though
> that was more than a Platonic metaphor.
>
> Brent
>

Very well said, Brent. I will have to try and remember this. Thanks.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLThQZAxGu3RdzrfJqDdB-H%3DAgxR77fGb1JybNz4zindfQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to 
say. My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to 
that mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building 
blocks? There is no accounting, there is no description in yours or 
van Neumann's sense.


But there are models that work.  That was my point in citing AI projects 
like Watson and AlphaGO.  The building blocks are perception, 
information processing, values, and action.  You say "there is no 
accounting" but that's because you're using "accounting" as a synonym 
for "explain".  The accounting in scientific theory is in terms of a 
model that works.  You're demanding of a theory of consciousness that 
will do for consciousness what general relativity/*does not do*/ for the 
metric or for the stress-energy tensor, what Darwin/*did not do*/ for 
reproduction with variation.  Maybe someday Bruno's theory will yield 
some interesting prediction (of the future), but until then it's a 
theory doesn't do any work. So far it doesn't even account for the 
effect of holding your breathe too long or ingesting LSD.   The physical 
model that says consciousness is the brain processing information by 
neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model.  But the 
mysterians of consciousness want to pooh-pooh that because it doesn't 
talk about how their consciousness "feels".  But neither does Bruno's 
.   He talks about "arithmetic, seen from the inside" as though that was 
more than a Platonic metaphor.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6d7eae1d-f2b7-3fe9-2643-cd0db62b915e%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible
> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be
> certain to exist.
>
>
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to
> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical
> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations,
> describes observed phenomena.
>
>
> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used
> the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that
> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or
> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I
> make clear what I mean:
>
> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my
> favorite scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological
> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness.
> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally
> equivalent p-zombie does the trick.
>
> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because
> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?
>
> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say.
> My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that
> mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There
> is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.
>
> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is
> not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails.
> It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with
> Platonism. I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far,
> is not compatible with physicalism.
>
> Telmo.
>

You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible
with physicalism. Just give Brent's engineering approach some time to work.
Platonism has not accounted for the physical universe -- Bruno keeps saying
that this is just "a work in progress". So the same for consciousness.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSctFqjGoW2bcJsGHi_jtNo_tDEQFk_w3E_po%3DBRzS9aw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Telmo Menezes]

On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>> 
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
 On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>  wrote:
>>> From: *Jason Resch* 
>>> 
 On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch  
> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>  wrote:
>>> 
 Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact 
 to prove: all computations are realised in all models of 
 arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
>>> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
>>> 
>> 
>> You sound certain. What is your evidence?
>> 
>> Jason
> 
> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
 
 There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were 
 none, what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is 
 false? (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, 
 among mathematicians,
>>> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
>>> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
>>> mathematician!)

>> 
>> That's an anecdote, not data.
> 
>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
 
 It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
 justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory 
 in a field.
>>> 
>>> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view 
>>> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive 
>>> theory.
>> 
>> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
>> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
>> certain to exist.
> 
> I think this misunderstands what science does. In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to 
> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical 
> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, 
> describes observed phenomena.

I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I used the 
words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that consciousness 
does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or supernatural. To be 
precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I make clear what I mean:

1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my favorite 
scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological complexification. 
Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. There is simply no 
reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally equivalent p-zombie does the 
trick.

2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because 
spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles?

3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. My 
body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that mass. What 
amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There is no 
accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense.

It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is not 
able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. It goes 
without saying that all of modern science is compatible with Platonism. I am 
pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, is not compatible 
with physicalism.

Telmo.

>  The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely 
> that it is expected to work." I see two approaches to this, one (of which I 
> have been the main advocated on this list) might be called "the engineering 
> approach" while the other is the philosophical approach. The philosophical 
> approach either takes consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like 
> Cosmin) or tries to equate it with something within a theory based on 
> something else (like Bruno). One thing both approaches seem to rely on is 
> that there can be no p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of 
> consciousness, as JKC is won't to point out. Given that the engineering 
> approach gave us Turing, LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the 
> philosophical approach "predicts" various things we've know for a century or 
> more and various contradictory things about the future 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 1:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:45 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> I am not sure I have the time to delve into Muller's paper to find out
>> his reasons. He is clearly misguided, because there are many viable
>> cosmological theories that do not have a beginning of time (such as eternal
>> inflation and related ideas) -- even if time is universally defined, which
>> is very doubtful.
>>
>
> To be clear, his result does not rule out inflation, he finds only that
> observers can expect that there we will find a beginning in history where
> if we try to penetrate more deeply into what happened before, it devolves
> into a multitude of indistinguishable possibilities.
>

So he is not proposing an absolute beginning to time after all!

..

No they didn't. Zeh's ideas of decoherence go some distance, but Everett is
>> totally irrelevant to this.
>>
>
> Do you think something more than decoherence is needed to get there?
>

Yes. You need to reduce the superposition to a mixture.




> You seem to be using the old scholastic notion of nominalism.
>> "In more recent usage, 'nominalism' is often employed as a label for any
>> repudiation of abstract entities, whether universals or particulars, and
>> thus embraces the rejection of such things as propositions, sets, and
>> numbers."  (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, OUP, 2005)
>>
>
> But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It cannot be
> derived from or defined by labels.
>

What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they
are theorems derived from the axioms. "Snow is white" (Brent) is true
because it corresponds with the facts. These are different notions of truth.

.


>
>> We might discover some of their properties, but we can never know the
>> "thing" in itself. Theoretical entities are generally dealt with by
>> nominalism, as above.
>>
>
> Most scientists would say quarks are real, because they are part of
> successful theories which have explanatory power.
>

That is the semantic part of scientific realism -- the entities in our most
successful theories correspond to elements of reality. That is just to
acknowledge that the ontology is theory dependent -- not mind independent.
So quarks may or may not be real -- we will probably never know.


Calabi-Yau manifolds are mathematical constructs, depending on the
>> definitions of topological manifolds. They are certainly theoretical items
>> that have no mind-independent existence.
>>
>
> Most string theorists would guess that Calabi-Yau manifolds are real,
> because they are part of successful theories which have explanatory power.
>

Most stirring theorist are hooked on a failed theory. String theory is not
a successful theory, and it has no explanatory power.


> The more you keep pushing this, the closer you get to seeing there is some
> truth to the Quine Putnam indispensability argument. You can't remove
> mathematical objects and numbers from our scientific theories.
>

Why would I want to? Mathematics is useful for describing the results of
our observations and experiments. It is a convenient language. Do you think
that English sentences are part of a mind-independent reality?


What separates the existent from the non-existent?
>
>
> It might be that at a certain level of description it becomes
> impossible to adequately represent the world other than mathematically. 
> ...
> So yeah, you might think, if we eventually did have a one-to-one
> mapping, what could be the grounds for denying that reality was
> mathematical? I'm not really sure. I suppose I'm very skeptical of 
> anything
> in philosophy that purports to explain the difference between abstract
> maths and maths that's substantiated. Because in the end, what could
> possibly explain that difference in terms of?  Like, I reject the question
> 'What breathes fire into the equations?' Because anything you say is just
> gonna be figurative, right? Because you'd say, 'Well, there's the abstract
> maths and then the actual universe is a sort of substructure of all the
> possible structure there could be. So what's the difference between the
> uninstantiated structure and the instantiated structure?'  Well, the
> philosopher will say there's a primitive instantiation relation or
> something--you could invent some metaphysical language to talk about it,
> but to me that's no different from saying that some of the maths has pixie
> dust in it. It's not going to do any work. Because what could it possibly
> connect to that would have any meaning?  If you ask questions in science
> like 'What causes an earthquake?' you appeal to conceptual resources and
> those are non-empty because they're tied to observation. But maths--pure
> maths isn't tied to observation. If the theory of everything id a
> mathematical theory, how would you test it? It 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 4:36:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
> certain to exist.
>
>
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
> describes observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical 
> construct is solely and precisely that it is  expected to work."  I see two 
> approaches to this, one (of which I have been the main advocated on this 
> list) might be called "the engineering approach"  while the other is the 
> philosophical approach.  The philosophical approach either takes 
> consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like Cosmin) or tries to 
> equate it with something within a theory based on something else (like 
> Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is that there can be no 
> p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, as 
> JKC is won't to point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave us 
> Turing, LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the philosophical 
> approach "predicts" various things we've know for a century or more and 
> various contradictory things about the future (as Bohr said, "Prediction is 
> hard, especially about the future.") my money is on the engineering 
> approach.
>
> Brent   
>
>

I think this is right, without getting into defining the whole 
physicalism/materialism thing.

The article  

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

by Daniel Stoljar  
(who 
wrote a textbook on the subject) is as good as any, I guess.

I'lll just say one should soon become bored to death taking about the 
*definition* of physicalism/materialism.

Now it is clear scientists come up with models (and theories, and 
frameworks, and paradigms), and they take their "model" and likely 
"implement" it in some programming language and use that program to match 
to experimental or observational data, and they maybe use a statistical 
program to say"that looks like a good match".

But the elephant in the room is s*emantics*: What is the interpretation of 
the "entities" of the model.

Semantics is a big deal in programming language theory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science)

Is there a calculus of experience, and a semantics of experiences (qualia)?

That's the scientific question.

*There is a hidden code of nature—the code written into its fabric. Our 
theories—our hypothetical code—are our evolving best-guess translations of 
the code of nature, which remains hidden from our knowledge—within 
nature-in-itself.*

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2cca5659-de7f-4131-944b-78d81b23ed72%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
But then what is arithmetical truth? We have no label for it. It 
cannot be derived from or defined by labels.


And it depends on the model.  Which is why it's undefinable within the 
system.  And also why it's not the same as the "true" in "It is true 
that snow is white."


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/816e0c3c-76cc-82c8-a3b3-18f6af30b042%40verizon.net.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:




On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch > wrote:


On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce
Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


Then with mechanism, we get the
many-histories from a simple fact to
prove: all computations are realised
in  all models of arithmetic.


But arithmetic does not exist
independently of the human mind, and
mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.


You sound certain.  What is your evidence?

Jason


The is no evidence for mathematical realism,


There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even
if there were none, what evidence do you have
against it for you to be so sure it is false?
(mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of
mathematics, among mathematicians,


On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of
the week most mathematicians are nominalists! (And I
had this from a professional mathematician!)


That's an anecdote, not data.

 The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.


It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires
some justification or reason, given that it would overturn a
predominate theory in a field.


No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that 
this view has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, 
not a progressive theory.


Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst 
possible failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only 
thing I can be certain to exist.


I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical 
construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, 
describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical 
construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work."  I see 
two approaches to this, one (of which I have been the main advocated on 
this list) might be called "the engineering approach"  while the other 
is the philosophical approach.  The philosophical approach either takes 
consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like Cosmin) or tries to 
equate it with something within a theory based on something else (like 
Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is that there can be 
no p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, 
as JKC is won't to point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave 
us Turing, LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the 
philosophical approach "predicts" various things we've know for a 
century or more and various contradictory things about the future (as 
Bohr said, "Prediction is hard, especially about the future.") my money 
is on the engineering approach.


Brent




I await your reason, argument, or evidence.


Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. 
And arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things.


What are “things”? You just use lack of rigor and pretend you have an 
argument.


Telmo.


what is your alternative?)


Nominalism.


Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth
was proven not only to be not human defined, but to be
not human definable.


What has arithmetical truth got to do with it?


The independence of arithmetical truth /is/ Platonism.  With it
you get all the consequences of that infinite truth:

  * The truth that 9 is composite implies the existence of its
factor 3.
  * The truth of the Nth state of the machine during the
execution of a Kth program implies the existence of the
execution 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:45 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 5:42 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 1:20 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 3:49 PM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 11:20 PM Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett <
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

> From: Jason Resch 
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett <
> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch <
>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett <
>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>

 Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple
> fact to prove: all computations are realised in  all models of 
> arithmetic.
>

 But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind,
 and mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.


>>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>>
>
> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were
> none, what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is
> false? (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics,
> among mathematicians,
>
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week
> most mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a 
> professional
> mathematician!)
>

 That's an anecdote, not data.

>>>
>>>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
>>>
>>
>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires
>> some justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate
>> theory in a field.
>>
>
> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this
> view has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a
> progressive theory.
>

 That is false. Taking the pre-existence of all conscious states (a
 natural consequences of Platonism) is the only theory in science I am aware
 of that plausibly explains why our universe has:

- https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf

 I have started to read this paper. It seems to be just another take on
>>> computationalist arguments such as given by Bruno. It could be criticised
>>> in detail, but the main problem I see is the rejection of scientific
>>> realism at the start, and the unquestioned assumption of mathematical
>>> realism. Defining 'things' by relationships loses the distinction between
>>> physics and mathematics, which is the cause of all the trouble.
>>>
>>
>>>
- Simple physical laws that are probabilistic
   - Persistent regularities
   - An external world that contains the observer
   - Inter-subjective agreement on physical laws

 These are just empirical observations. We choose laws that are as
>>> simple as possible to describe observations. There is nothing profound in
>>> that.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Falling apples were just empirical observations until Newton gave a
>> theory that provided an account of why apples fell.
>>
>
> No he didn't. Newton gave a theory that describes both how apples fall and
> planets orbit the sun. It doesn't tell us why apples fall. Science provides
> 'how' answers, not 'why' answers. Newton was very careful to point out that
> he wouldn't make hypotheses beyond the observable facts -- no 'why' answers.
>
>
- Simple initial conditions

 Who said the initial conditions of the universe were simple?
>>>

- Observation of a universe that evolves in time

 What is time in General relativity. It is merely a local phenomenon.
>>>

- Observation of a universe with an absolute beginning in time

 Does it? There are plenty of cosmological theories where this is not
>>> the case.
>>>
>>
>> There is a time (Big Bang) which we cannot make meaningful predictions
>> about what happened before. Muller's paper goes into more details about
>> what specifically an observer could predict about the beginnings of their
>> universe.
>>
>
> I am not sure I have the time to delve into Muller's paper to find out his
> reasons. He is clearly misguided, because there are many viable
> cosmological theories that do not have a 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[PGC]

On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 3:11:41 PM UTC+2, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett > 
> wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:

> From: Jason Resch >
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>

 Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact 
> to prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
>

 But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
 mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.


>>> You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
>>>
>>> Jason 
>>>
>>
>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism, 
>>
>
> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were 
> none, what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is 
> false? (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, 
> among mathematicians,
>
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
> mathematician!)
>

 That's an anecdote, not data.

>>>  
>>>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
>>>
>>
>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
>> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory 
>> in a field.
>>
>
> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this 
> view has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a 
> progressive theory.
>
>
> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
> certain to exist.
>

Then you may suffer from a lack of imagination. A lot of things can be said 
to exist and who says there has to be some "prime ontological status"? 

Nazi's and many populists lately also accorded certain beings prime 
ontological status and were certain of their generous contribution towards 
humanity. They were also very keen on ideas like purity, purging, 
originality, and excluding the non-prime kind of people. If those things 
are even merely in the realm of possibility/range of any kind of discourse, 
we leave science, philosophy, metaphysics, and step beyond woo-woo theology 
into fanaticism or arguably psychiatric domains. PGC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3c0520b8-bf60-4138-b25e-7f7d41b1830e%40googlegroups.com.

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Telmo Menezes]

> On 13. May 2019, at 05:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 2:00 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
>>> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:52 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>> 
 On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>> 
> On Sun, May 12, 2019 at 9:04 PM Bruce Kellett  
> wrote:
 
> From: Jason Resch 
>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 6:02 PM Bruce Kellett  
>>> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 11:42 PM Jason Resch 
>>>  wrote:
 On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 8:16 AM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:
> 
>> Then with mechanism, we get the many-histories from a simple fact to 
>> prove: all computations are realised in  all models of arithmetic.
> 
> But arithmetic does not exist independently of the human mind, and 
> mechanism is manifestly a pipe dream.
> 
 
 You sound certain.  What is your evidence?
 
 Jason
>>> 
>>> The is no evidence for mathematical realism,
>> 
>> There is plenty given in my other post to you. Even if there were none, 
>> what evidence do you have against it for you to be so sure it is false? 
>> (mathematical realism is the leading philosophy of mathematics, among 
>> mathematicians,
> On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.The other days of the week most 
> mathematicians are nominalists! (And I had this from a professional 
> mathematician!)
> 
 
 That's an anecdote, not data.
>>>  
>>>  The truth of these issues is not determined by counting heads.
>> 
>> It does not. But your conviction that Platonism is false requires some 
>> justification or reason, given that it would overturn a predominate theory 
>> in a field.
> 
> No, you have to give evidence in support of platonism, given that this view 
> has been a philosophical failure, leading to a dead end, not a progressive 
> theory.

Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
certain to exist.

>  
>> I await your reason, argument, or evidence.
> 
> Arithmetical realism is part of platonism, if not the whole of it. And 
> arithmetical realism is manifestly false -- numbers are not things.

What are “things”? You just use lack of rigor and pretend you have an argument.

Telmo.

>  
>> what is your alternative?)
> Nominalism.
> 
 
 Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not 
 only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>>> 
>>> What has arithmetical truth got to do with it?
>> 
>> The independence of arithmetical truth is Platonism.  With it you get all 
>> the consequences of that infinite truth:
>> The truth that 9 is composite implies the existence of its factor 3.
>> The truth of the Nth state of the machine during the execution of a Kth 
>> program implies the existence of the execution trace of program K, etc.
> 
> You are making the usual mistake of taking the existential quantifier over a 
> domain as an ontological statement.
>  
>>> Numbers are just names, not existing things.
>> 
>> Again, where is your evidence?  I gave you mine in support of Platonism.
> 
> You gave no viable evidence for platonism.
>  
>>   If you have no evidence contrary to Platonism you should at least remain 
>> undecided/agnostic/humble on the matter.
> 
> Why? Platonism rests on a confusion. I reject that confusion, and hence 
> platonism. What replaces it at the simplest level is nominalism -- numbers 
> are names, not things.
>  
>>> and mechanism is a failed idea because it cannot account for our 
>>> experience.
>> 
>> So you believe an AI that was functionally equivalent to you would be a 
>> philosophical zombie?
> Not at all. That does not follow.
 
 If it doesn't follow then the functionally equivalent AI would be 
 conscious. Therefore mechanism.  What am I missing?
>>> 
>>> The fact that mechanism does not follow from the possibility of AI.
>> 
>> Correct, it doesn't. But it does follow from the consciousness of AI, for if 
>> AI is not conscious, then you get philosophical zombies. (as I stated above).
> 
> I do not accept your argument. I have rejected your basic theory, so I 
> thereby reject all its consequences. If the AI is functionally equivalent to 
> a brain, then AI is conscious as the brain is conscious -- consciousness is a 
> function of the brain.
>  
>> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind,
> Maybe for some philosophers of mind. But there are many other 
> possibilities, most of which are more convincing.
> 
> 
> 
>> what is your alternative?)
> Why should I have an alternative? I can know that a theory does not work 
> without providing a theory that does work.
> 
 Above you said there are other possibilities which are more