Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 10/15/2013 3:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/15 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. Energy and matter (and the universe whatever it is), is composed by the sum What does sum mean? And how does is constitute a piece of matter? of the infinity of computations going through your state as it is defined by an infinity of computations (and not one), it is not computed. But that's not a definition. It's saying the piece of matter is *constituted* by an infinity of computations. That is a misleading phrasing. The matter is not constituted of anything. It is an appearance coming from the FPI on all computations. But what associates the computations to a piece of matter that we *define* ostensively? The FPI. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote: On 10/15/2013 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Oct 2013, at 12:45, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: On the contrary: I assume only that my brain (or generalized brain) is computable, then I show that basically all the rest is not. In everything, or just in arithmetic, the computable is rare and exceptional. Richard: Wow. This contradicts everything I have ever though Bruno was claiming. How does anything exist if it is not computed by the or a machine? We assume the arithmetical truth. In particular we assume that all closed formula written in the language of arithmetic (and thus using logical symbol + the symbol 0, s (+1), + and *) are all either true or false, independently of us. From this we cannot prove that matter exists, or not, but we can prove that the average universal numbers will (correctly) believe in matter (but it will not know that it is correct). That's not at all clear to me. A universal number encodes proofs - is that what you mean by it believes something? Yes. (I am thinking about the Löbian universal numbers). But how is this something identified at 'matter'? It should follow from the step seven. So, if you have no problem in believing propositions like there is no biggest prime number are true independently of me and you, and the universe, then you can understand that the proposition asserting the existence of (infinitely many) computations in which you believe reading my current post, is also true independently of us. The appearance of matter emerges from the FPI that the machines cannot avoid in the arithmetical truth. Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). And I thought the generalized brain did the computations, Only the computations associated to your mind. not that it was only computed. How does Bruno show that all the rest which presumably includes energy and matter is not computed. Bruno is constantly confusing me. I guess you missed the step seven of the UDA, and are perhaps not aware that arithmetical truth is incredibly big, *much* bigger than what any computer can generate or compute. Then my, or your, mind is associated to *all* computations going through your actual state of mind, That sounds like an uncomputable totality. No, by virtue of the closure of the set of partial (includes the total functions) computable functions for diagonalization, or equivalently, by the existence of universal machines/numbers, that totality is computable/enumerable, and that is why we do have a UD. What happens is that most interesting subset will be uncomputable, so that the FPI entails a priori the non computability of *some* physical things (which can be only the apparent collapse of the wave, but it could be more than that too: open problem). Bruno Brent and below your substitution level there are infinitely many such computations. They all exist in arithmetic, and the FPI glues them, in a non computable way, in possible long and deep physical histories. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient resources to run the universal dovetailer. Good point. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer). She will not feel the split, nor even notice any split. Bruno (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: For John Clark
But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'. The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience. A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: For John Clark Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200 On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote:On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer).She will not feel the split, nor even notice any split. Bruno (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/16 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com * But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.* Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'. The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience. A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. And he would be wrong, because that assume that every subjective future has exactly the same measure... as comp should be at least compatible with MWI (which is compatible with QM and should respect actual measured probability), it's not the case... So I feel such a person is not a genuine comp practitioner. Quentin She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise. -- From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: For John Clark Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200 On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have *all*the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an *appearance* of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer). She will not feel the split, nor even notice any split. Bruno (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as fertile an area as you imply. A revolutionary contemporary result (Gödel's incompleteness) shows that the oldest definition of knowledge (greeks, chinese, indians) can be applied to the oldest philosophy, mechanism, and that this is indeed very fertile, if only by providing an utterly transparent arithmetical interpretation of Plotinu's theology, which is the peak of the rationalist approach in that field, and you say that this instill any confidence in mechanism? and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments? Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears that there has not been any promise for it in quite some time. It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics cannot lie, G* proves []f Even Peano Arithmetic can lie. Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie. Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such. Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves []f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor. Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines (a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non- monotonical umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant mistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f, like I dream, I die, I get mad, I am in a cul-de-sac I get wrong etc. It will depend on the intensional nuances in play. Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or colored pixels instead? Why not. Humans can do that too. If I asked a person to turn some data into music or art, no two people would agree on what that output would be and no person's output would be decipherable as input to another person. Computers, on the other hand, would automatically be able to reverse any kind of i/o in the same way. I don't see how. One computer could play a file as a song, and another could make a graphic file out of the audio line out data which would be fully reversible to the original binary file. If the computer can do it, me too. it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct sufficiently rich machines. Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either? No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify that if they are correct they can't express it, and if they are consistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they can eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbers get entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma. Universal machines can lie, and can crash. That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they must, not that they can lie intentionally because they enjoy it or out of sadism. That sounds like an opportunistic inference. I think that computationalism maintains the illusion of legitimacy on basis of seducing us to play only by its rules. The technical points is that low level rules leads to no rules at the higher levels. You continue to criticized 19th century reductionist conception of machines. We know today that such a reductionist view of machines is plain wrong. It says that we must give the undead a chance to be alive - that we cannot know for sure whether a machine is not at least as worthy of our love as a newborn baby. You cannot do that comparison. Is an newborn alien worthy of human love? Other parameters than thinking and
Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ Neuroscience research involving epileptic patients with brain electrodes surgically implanted in their medial temporal lobes shows that patients learned to consciously control individual neurons deep in the brain with thoughts. Subjects learned to control mouse cursors, play video games and alter focus of digital images with their thoughts. The patients were each using brain computer interfaces, deep brain electrodes and software designed for the research. The article below offers more detail. Controlling Individual Cortical Nerve Cells by Human Thought Five years ago, neuroscientist Christof Koch of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), neurosurgeon Itzhak Fried of UCLA, and their colleagues discovered that a single neuron in the human brain can function much like a sophisticated computer and recognize people, landmarks, and objects, suggesting that a consistent and explicit code may help transform complex visual representations into long-term and more abstract memories. Now Koch and Fried, along with former Caltech graduate student and current postdoctoral fellow Moran Cerf, have found that individuals can exert conscious control over the firing of these single neurons—despite the neurons’ location in an area of the brain previously thought inaccessible to conscious control—and, in doing so, manipulate the behavior of an image on a computer screen. The work, which appears in a paper in the October 28 issue of the journal Nature, shows that “individuals can rapidly, consciously, and voluntarily control neurons deep inside their head,” says Koch, the Lois and Victor Troendle Professor of Cognitive and Behavioral Biology and professor of computation and neural systems at Caltech. The study was conducted on 12 epilepsy patients at the David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, where Fried directs the Epilepsy Surgery Program. All of the patients suffered from seizures that could not be controlled by medication. To help localize where their seizures were originating in preparation for possible later surgery, the patients were surgically implanted with electrodes deep within the centers of their brains. Cerf used these electrodes to record the activity, as indicated by spikes on a computer screen, of individual neurons in parts of the medial temporal lobe—a brain region that plays a major role in human memory and emotion. Prior to recording the activity of the neurons, Cerf interviewed each of the patients to learn about their interests. “I wanted to see what they like—say, the band Guns N’ Roses, the TV show House, and the Red Sox,” he says. Using that information, he created for each patient a data set of around 100 images reflecting the things he or she cares about. The patients then viewed those images, one after another, as Cerf monitored their brain activity to look for the targeted firing of single neurons. “Of 100 pictures, maybe 10 will have a strong correlation to a neuron,” he says. “Those images might represent cached memories—things the patient has recently seen.” The four most strongly responding neurons, representing four different images, were selected for further investigation. “The goal was to get patients to control things with their minds,” Cerf says. By thinking about the individual images—a picture of Marilyn Monroe, for example—the patients triggered the activity of their corresponding neurons, which was translated first into the movement of a cursor on a computer screen. In this way, patients trained themselves to move that cursor up and down, or even play a computer game. But, says Cerf, “we wanted to take it one step further than just brain–machine interfaces and tap into the competition for attention between thoughts that race through our mind.” To do that, the team arranged for a situation in which two concepts competed for dominance in the mind of the patient. “We had patients sit in front of a blank screen and asked them to think of one of the target images,” Cerf explains. As they thought of the image, and the related neuron fired, “we made the image appear on the screen,” he says. That image is the “target.” Then one of the other three images is introduced, to serve as the “distractor.” “The patient starts with a 50/50 image, a hybrid, representing the ‘marriage’ of the two images,” Cerf says, and then has to make the target image fade in—just using his or her mind—and the distractor fade out. During the tests, the patients came up with their own personal strategies for making the right images appear; some simply thought of the picture, while others repeated the name of the image out loud or focused their gaze on a particular aspect of the image. Regardless of their tactics, the subjects quickly got the hang of the task, and they were successful
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as fertile an area as you imply. A revolutionary contemporary result (Gödel's incompleteness) shows that the oldest definition of knowledge (greeks, chinese, indians) can be applied to the oldest philosophy, mechanism, and that this is indeed very fertile, if only by providing an utterly transparent arithmetical interpretation of Plotinu's theology, which is the peak of the rationalist approach in that field, and you say that this instill any confidence in mechanism? It doesn't instill confidence of your interpretation of incompleteness. For myself, and I am guessing for others, incompleteness is about the lack-of-completeness of mathematical systems rather than a hyper-completeness of arithmetic metaphysics. Do you say that Gödel was a supporter of the Plotinus view, or are saying that even he didn't realize the implications. and that paper and pencils are the preferred instruments? Maybe I was premature in saying it was promissory...it would appears that there has not been any promise for it in quite some time. It is almost applicable, but the hard part is that it is blind to its own blindness, so that the certainty offered by mathematics comes at a cost which mathematics has no choice but to deny completely. Because mathematics cannot lie, G* proves []f Even Peano Arithmetic can lie. Mathematical theories (set of beliefs) can lie. Only truth cannot lie, but nobody know the truth as such. Something that is a paradox or inconsistent is not the same thing as an intentional attempt to deceive. I'm not sure what 'G* proves []f' means but I think it will mean the same thing to anyone who understands it, and not something different to the boss than it does to the neighbor. Actually it will have as much meaning as there are correct machines (a lot), but the laws remains the same. Then adding the non-monotonical umbrella, saving the Lôbian machines from the constant mistakes and lies they do, provides different interpretation of []f, like I dream, I die, I get mad, I am in a cul-de-sac I get wrong etc. It will depend on the intensional nuances in play. Couldn't the machine output the same product as musical notes or colored pixels instead? Why not. Humans can do that too. If I asked a person to turn some data into music or art, no two people would agree on what that output would be and no person's output would be decipherable as input to another person. Computers, on the other hand, would automatically be able to reverse any kind of i/o in the same way. I don't see how. By scanning the image or recording the sound in the same way that it was encoded to be played in the first place. One computer could play a file as a song, and another could make a graphic file out of the audio line out data which would be fully reversible to the original binary file. If the computer can do it, me too. You can't make a graphic file out of a song that 'is' the data of a song. Your artistic interpretation will not match anyone else's. it cannot intentionally tell the truth either, and no matter how sophisticated and self-referential a logic it is based on, it can never transcend its own alienation from feeling, physics, and authenticity. That is correct, but again, that is justifiable by all correct sufficiently rich machines. Not sure I understand. Are you saying that we, as rich machines, cannot intentionally lie or tell the truth either? No, I am saying that all correct machines can eventually justify that if they are correct they can't express it, and if they are consistent, it will be consistent they are wrong. So it means they can eventually exploits the false locally. Team of universal numbers get entangled in very subtle prisoner dilemma. Universal machines can lie, and can crash. That sounds like they can lie only when they calculate that they must, not that they can lie intentionally
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never
predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man, or I
feel being the M-man.
That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can predict
that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the Helsinki Man can also
predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into the Moscow Man or the
Washington Man, but is unable to know which because I the Helsinki Man
don't know if the next photon that will enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man
will come from Moscow or Washington. I the Helsinki Man can make a third
prediction, even if the predictions made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to
be wrong (actually they won't be wrong in this instance but it wouldn't
matter if they were) I the Helsinki Man would still feel like I the
Helsinki Man.
If you are OK with this, please proceed.
I'm not OK with this and will not proceed.
the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
Pascal or Boltzman were:
1) Some events have no cause.
Only those believing in the collapse
You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying was
wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse. And the
founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing over the
difference between a event with no cause and a event with a cause that can
never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.
that Feynman called a collective hallucination.
Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective
hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him say
that about wave collapse. When did he say it? What is the entire
quotation? Google can't seem to find anything like that.
I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone capable
of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized as X.
The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the problem
comes when you a third party who never remembers being X starts talking
about X to yet another third party in a world that has 2 things in it
that have a equal right to call themselves X because duplication chambers
exist. If somebody hides behind pronouns in such a world anything can be
proven.
So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory of
pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to explain
Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to hide behind and
without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove.
The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he, but
before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear what all
his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.
Without using pronouns please explain who the hell Mr. 1 is and then
maybe I can answer your questions.
Without using pronouns, I lost my job.
John Clark does not think Bruno Marchal knows what a pronoun is.
You confuse [blah blah]
There is one thing John Clark is most certainly not confused about, unless
used very very carefully pronouns will cause endless confusion in a world
where duplicating chambers exist.
John K Clark
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Re: For John Clark
On Oct 16, 2013, at 2:38 AM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp practitioner'. The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome this 'real me' would experience. A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise. I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective. I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%. There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label chris peck. This allows you to say: chris peck experiences all outcomes but that does not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome. The experiences are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds. In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA. Jason From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: For John Clark Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200 On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and after the measurement. It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is multiplied along with the body of the observer). She will not feel the split, nor even notice any split. Bruno (However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
Bruno Marchal viahttp://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=1311182ctx=mail googlegroups.com 2:47 AM (8 hours ago) to everything-list On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:02, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Nobody is perfect :) (You are not alone, physicalism is believed by almost everybody those days) Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. Of course, I do not assume such a universe. I assume only that I am Turing emulable. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. OK. And then the reasoning (UDA), if you do assume some physicalism, is that we are not Turing emulable. You are working in a non comp theory. Not sure this solves anything, as now you can't justify matter (you assume it), and are back to the usual mind-body problem, with an non satisfying identity between mind and matter. Bruno Richard: I guess you did not read my paper afterall. The Metaverse machine is what computes matter and its energy from the get-go. I grant you that I assume such a Metaverse. But the universe with its limited computations are given by known physics. Regarding MWI vs Wave Collapse , here is some interesting data: Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in slow motion. http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015 On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient resources to run the universal dovetailer. Good point. Bruno -- --**--** Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --**--** -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-listhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-listhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those who ignore the importance of first person views and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. John K Clark On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing? Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati. Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet. Poldolsky: It's certainly consistent as far as we have heard it. Everett: All of the consistency of ordinary physics is preserved by the correlation structure of this state. Podolsky: It looks like we would have a non-denumberable infinity of worlds. Everett: Yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: For John Clark
It was from the book The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III, a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? Jason On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those who ignore the importance of first person views and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. John K Clark On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will obey the same laws independent of the presence or absence of one another. Hence, why insist on having certain selection of one of the elements as being real and all of the others somehow mysteriously vanishing? Furry: This means that each of us, you see, exists on a great many sheets or versions and it's only on this one right here that you have any particular remembrance of the past. In some other ones we perhaps didn't come here to Cincinnati. Everett: We simply do away with the reduction of the wave packet. Poldolsky: It's certainly
Re: For John Clark
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: It was from the book The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III, a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the word non-denumerable in that book? I must have missed it. What page? So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what? John K Clark Jason On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those who ignore the importance of first person views and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. John K Clark On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the results of measurements will be in accord with what one predicts from the ordinary picture of quantum mechanics. That is very briefly it. Podolsky: Somehow or other we have here the parallel times or parallel worlds that science fiction likes to talk about so much. Everett: Yes, it's a consequence of the superposition principle that each separate element of the superposition will
Why we can't trust 3p descriptions of reality
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Re: For John Clark
2013/10/16 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: It was from the book The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III, a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the word non-denumerable in that book? I must have missed it. What page? So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic... POV plays a role. So as I said to you before, be consistent and reject MWI. If you accept assigning a probability of seeing spin up/down before measuring, you should accept the same for Bruno's thought experiment, or you must reject both, or look like a fool. Quentin Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what? John K Clark Jason On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.comwrote: When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those who ignore the importance of first person views and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. John K Clark On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at Xaviar College: Everett: Well, the picture that I have is something like this: Imagine an observer making a sequence of results of observations on a number of, let's say, originally identical object systems. At the end of this sequence there is a large superposition of states, each element of which contains the observer as having recorded a particular definite sequence of the results of observation. I identify a single element as what we think of as an experience, but still hold that it is tenable to assert that all of the elements simultaneously coexist. In any single element of the final superposition after all these measurements, you have a state which describes the observer as having observed a quite definite and apparently random sequence of events. Of course, it's a different sequence of events in each element of the superposition. In fact, if one takes a very large series of experiments, in a certain sense one can assert that for almost all of the elements of the final supeprosition the frequencies of the
Re: For John Clark
On 10/16/2013 10:48 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: It was from the book The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III, a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the word non-denumerable in that book? I must have missed it. What page? So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what? So then the uncertainty of John Clark in Bruno's teleportation is the same as in Everett's MWI, which I think is all Bruno wants to show because he has a theory in which everybody is 'duplicated' countless times as in MWI in which interaction with the environment induces MW splits even in the absence of specific measurements. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: It was from the book The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III, a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the word non-denumerable in that book? I must have missed it. What page? I will have to check later. But I found the page in Google books (but it shows now page number unfortunately): http://books.google.com/books?id=dqgqPjqIyJoCpg=PT204dq=All+of+the+consistency+of+ordinary+physics+is+preserved+by+the+correlation+structure+of+this+state.hl=ensa=Xei=uuJeUqGFL-iMyAGn84HYDQved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepageq=All%20of%20the%20consistency%20of%20ordinary%20physics%20is%20preserved%20by%20the%20correlation%20structure%20of%20this%20state.f=false So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do not understand why you do not see how the same can arise through duplication of observers by teleportation to two locations. And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference is that first person uncertainty remains even in cases when the entire system and its evolution is known. For example, a deterministic program running on a computer whose evolution can be entirely predicted. If it forks into two paths and those paths diverge, an AI or any other conscious entity within that program cannot from their point of view predict their experience after the fork, despite that the entire process is deterministic and in principle could be entirely derived beforehand. Could you explain to me why subjective indeterminacy arises in MWI but not in step 3 of Bruno's UDA? In Bruno's United Dance Association proof, and in Everett's interpretation, and in every other interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and in classical physics too, John Clark doesn't know what John Clark is going to see next. So what? if you agree with that, move on to the next steps and see how the computational theory of mind, together with arithmetical realism, necessarily lead to the appearance of a physical world. That is the so what, a falsifiable theory of everything that arises from among the barest set of starting assumptions, and explains many aspects of quantum mechanics. Jason John K Clark Jason On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 10:50 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.comwrote: When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those who ignore the importance of first person views and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. In the end I flipped a coin, it cane out tails so I opened it. I didn't read anything I disagreed with or hadn't seen before with one exception. I already knew Everett believed in a infinity of worlds but this is the first time I heard him say they were non-denumerable, so I'm glad I opened it. John K Clark On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: (And others who ignore the importance of first person views when it comes to duplication.) I invite you to read what Hugh Everett had to say on the matter: I believe that my theory is by far the simplest way out of the dilemma, since it results from what is inherently a simplification of the conventional picture, which arises from dropping one of the basic postulates--the postulate of the discontinuous probabilistic jump in state during the process of measurement--from the remaining very simple theory, only to recover again this very same picture as a deduction of what will appear to be the case for observers. He notes the appearance of probability from the perspective of observers, despite an entirely deterministic theory, saying: Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense*that there is no way for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle. So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view. Even an observer who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict its entire evolution could not predict their next experience. Finally, we have this exchange between Everett and other physicists, including Nathan Rosen, Podolsky, Paul Dirac, Yakir Aharanov, Eugene Wigner, and Wendell Furry at
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 11:41:46AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in slow motion. http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015 The headline is sensationlist and misleading. What is being done is a series of weak measurements that capturing the change from a superposition to a non superposed state. An MWIer would say this is capturing the process of decoherence. It is most certainly not demonstrating wave function collapse is occurring, interesting though the experiment is for technical reasons. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 16 Oct 2013, at 17:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com 2:47 AM (8 hours ago) to everything-list On 15 Oct 2013, at 19:02, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Nobody is perfect :) (You are not alone, physicalism is believed by almost everybody those days) Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. Of course, I do not assume such a universe. I assume only that I am Turing emulable. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. OK. And then the reasoning (UDA), if you do assume some physicalism, is that we are not Turing emulable. You are working in a non comp theory. Not sure this solves anything, as now you can't justify matter (you assume it), and are back to the usual mind-body problem, with an non satisfying identity between mind and matter. Bruno Richard: I guess you did not read my paper afterall. I read it, but as you said, we start from very different assumption, and many things you say about PA seems a bit weird for a logician. The Metaverse machine is what computes matter and its energy from the get-go. I grant you that I assume such a Metaverse. But the universe with its limited computations are given by known physics. But that universe, if it exists, must be justified by using + and * and the numbers only, if comp is assumed. Regarding MWI vs Wave Collapse , here is some interesting data: Measurement-induced collapse of quantum wavefunction captured in slow motion. http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-snatch-a-peep-into-quantum-paradox-1.13899?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20131015 A slow motion movie of the wave collapse is a slow motion movie of a differentiating multiverse. Everett theory predicts such motions. Bruno On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Oct 2013, at 23:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 01:02:13PM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: Arithmetical truth escapes largely the computable arithmetical truth (by Gödel). Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. Then you might well be interested in the Movie Graph Argument, which deals directly with the case where the universe doesn't have sufficient resources to run the universal dovetailer. Good point. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
On 16 Oct 2013, at 16:46, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can
never predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the
W-man, or I feel being the M-man.
That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can
predict that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the
Helsinki Man can also predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into
the Moscow Man or the Washington Man, but is unable to know which
because I the Helsinki Man don't know if the next photon that will
enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man will come from Moscow or
Washington.
OK. We agree. You do grasp enough of the FPI to proceed to step 4.
I the Helsinki Man can make a third prediction, even if the
predictions made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to be wrong
(actually they won't be wrong in this instance but it wouldn't
matter if they were) I the Helsinki Man would still feel like I the
Helsinki Man.
We completely agree on this.
With your theory of identity, both the M-man and the W-man are the H-
man.
If you are OK with this, please proceed.
I'm not OK with this
???
and will not proceed.
???
the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that
neither Pascal or Boltzman were:
1) Some events have no cause.
Only those believing in the collapse
You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying
was wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse.
And the founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing
over the difference between a event with no cause and a event with a
cause that can never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.
They were under the spell of Vienna positivism. Einstein said about
this that he would have preferred to be plumber than to hear things
like that.
Anywy, with comp and/or Everett, we have no more any reason to believe
in event without cause.
that Feynman called a collective hallucination.
Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective
hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him
say that about wave collapse.
It is in a footnote in his little book on light. I don't have it under
my hand for now.
When did he say it? What is the entire quotation? Google can't seem
to find anything like that.
Ah! You force me to do research in my (new) apartment. Let me pray
that it is not in some box ...
... I found it, and the quote. It is page 108 of my french edition
Lumière et Matière, une étrange histoire, which is a translation of
his book QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.
The exact quote in french is: Il est bon de garder à présent à
l'esprit ce principe général si l'on ne veut pas tomber dans toutes
sortes de confusions telles que la 'réduction du paquet d'ondes' et
autres effets magiques.
I translate: It is good to keep that general idea in mind if we want
to avoid all sorts of confusions like 'the reduction of the wave
packet' or other magical effect.
(the general idea is that the wave represents an amplitude of
probability, whose squared gives the probability).
I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized
as X.
The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the
problem comes when you a third party who never remembers being X
starts talking about X to yet another third party in a world that
has 2 things in it that have a equal right to call themselves X
because duplication chambers exist. If somebody hides behind
pronouns in such a world anything can be proven.
Only see a problem here, when there is just an indetermination on a
subjective outcome.
So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a
theory of pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to
explain Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to
hide behind and without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal
is attempting to prove.
No made ill use of pronouns, and you mock when I added the necessary
nuances: notably the distinction between first person pov and third
person pov, completely defined in sharable 3p terms.
The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he,
but before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear
what all his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.
Nor did I.
You confuse [blah blah]
And when I provide precise and of course more lengthy explanations,
you just skip them. This can't help you.
There is one thing John Clark is most certainly not confused about,
unless used very very carefully pronouns will cause endless
confusion in a world where
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 16 Oct 2013, at 14:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as fertile an area as you imply. A revolutionary contemporary result (Gödel's incompleteness) shows that the oldest definition of knowledge (greeks, chinese, indians) can be applied to the oldest philosophy, mechanism, and that this is indeed very fertile, if only by providing an utterly transparent arithmetical interpretation of Plotinu's theology, which is the peak of the rationalist approach in that field, and you say that this instill any confidence in mechanism? It doesn't instill confidence of your interpretation of incompleteness. For myself, and I am guessing for others, incompleteness is about the lack-of-completeness of mathematical systems rather than a hyper-completeness of arithmetic metaphysics. The whole point here is that the machines prove their own theorem about themselves. The meta-arithmetic belongs to arithmetic. I don't say much more than what the machines already say. I just need the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), just to compare with the machine's theory (S4Grz), like I need QM to compare with the machines's statistics on computation seen from inside. Do you say that Gödel was a supporter of the Plotinus view, or are saying that even he didn't realize the implications. Gödel was indeed a defender of platonism, at the start. But he has been quite slow on Church thesis, and not so quick on mechanism either. That is suggested notably by his leaning toward Anselm notion of God. The reductionist view of machines may be wrong, but that doesn't mean that its absence of rules at higher level translates into proprietary feelings, sounds, flavors, etc. Why would it? Why not? Evidences are that a brain does that. You need to find something non-Turing emulable in the brain to provide evidences that it does not. In theory it could, sure, but the universe that we live in seems to suggest exactly the opposite. But we can understand what is that universe, and why it suggests this, for the machine embedded in that apparent universe. It says that we must give the undead a chance to be alive - that we cannot know for sure whether a machine is not at least as worthy of our love as a newborn baby. You cannot do that comparison. Is an newborn alien worthy of human love? Other parameters than thinking and consciousness are at play. What are those parameters, and how do they fit in with mechanism? The parameters are that love asks for some close familiarity. It fits with mechanism through long computational histories. Anyway, it is up to you to find something non mechanical. I don't defend comp, I just try to show why your methodology to criticize comp is not valid. To fight this seduction, You beg the question. You are the one creating an enemy here. Just from your prejudice and lack of reflexion on machines. Sometimes an enemy creates themselves. That is weird for an enemy about which you reject the autonomy. we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can be opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we want, because that is what makes us superior to recorded logic. We are alive, so we get to do whatever we want to that which is not alive. Here you are more than invalid. You are frightening. We have compared you to racist, and what you say now reminds me of the strategy used by Nazy to prove that the white caucasian were superior. Lies, lies and lies. We can lie, machines can lie, but I am not sure it is the best science, or the best politics. With comp, God = Truth, and lies are Devil's play. If there is a chance that a machine will be born that is like me, only billions of times more capable and more racist than I am against all forms of life, wouldn't you say that it would be worth trying to stop at all costs? Should we prevent human birth because it might lead to people like Hitler? You are
Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Here's an etext! Happy hunting :)
http://ia700700.us.archive.org/18/items/QuantumElectrodynamics/Feynman-QuantumElectrodynamics.pdf
On 17 October 2013 10:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 16 Oct 2013, at 16:46, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The point is that with the step 3 protocol, you (the H-guy) can never
predict among {W, M}, if the result will be I feel being the W-man, or I
feel being the M-man.
That's because neither will happen, however I the Helsinki Man can predict
that I the Helsinki Man will see only Helsinki. I the Helsinki Man can also
predict that I the Helsinki Man will turn into the Moscow Man or the
Washington Man, but is unable to know which because I the Helsinki Man
don't know if the next photon that will enter the eye of I the Helsinki Man
will come from Moscow or Washington.
OK. We agree. You do grasp enough of the FPI to proceed to step 4.
I the Helsinki Man can make a third prediction, even if the predictions
made by I the Helsinki Man turn out to be wrong (actually they won't be
wrong in this instance but it wouldn't matter if they were) I the Helsinki
Man would still feel like I the Helsinki Man.
We completely agree on this.
With your theory of identity, both the M-man and the W-man are the
H-man.
If you are OK with this, please proceed.
I'm not OK with this
???
and will not proceed.
???
the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying 2 things that neither
Pascal or Boltzman were:
1) Some events have no cause.
Only those believing in the collapse
You can say that what the founders of Quantum Mechanics were saying was
wrong if you like, but they were talking about wave collapse. And the
founders of Quantum Mechanics would also say that arguing over the
difference between a event with no cause and a event with a cause that can
never be detected even in theory is a waste of time.
They were under the spell of Vienna positivism. Einstein said about this
that he would have preferred to be plumber than to hear things like that.
Anywy, with comp and/or Everett, we have no more any reason to believe in
event without cause.
that Feynman called a collective hallucination.
Hmm, I've heard lots of people say that reality is a collective
hallucination and I know a few Feynman sayings but I never heard him say
that about wave collapse.
It is in a footnote in his little book on light. I don't have it under my
hand for now.
When did he say it? What is the entire quotation? Google can't seem to
find anything like that.
Ah! You force me to do research in my (new) apartment. Let me pray that it
is not in some box ...
... I found it, and the quote. It is page 108 of my french edition
Lumière et Matière, une étrange histoire, which is a translation of his
book QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter.
The exact quote in french is: Il est bon de garder à présent à l'esprit
ce principe général si l'on ne veut pas tomber dans toutes sortes de
confusions telles que la 'réduction du paquet d'ondes' et autres effets
magiques.
I translate: It is good to keep that general idea in mind if we want to
avoid all sorts of confusions like 'the reduction of the wave packet' or
other magical effect.
(the general idea is that the wave represents an amplitude of probability,
whose squared gives the probability).
I do not need more about identity than your definition. Anyone
capable of remembering having been X, has the right to be recognized as X.
The problem has never been X calling himself X, that's fine; the problem
comes when you a third party who never remembers being X starts talking
about X to yet another third party in a world that has 2 things in it
that have a equal right to call themselves X because duplication chambers
exist. If somebody hides behind pronouns in such a world anything can be
proven.
Only see a problem here, when there is just an indetermination on a
subjective outcome.
So, asking me to not use pronouns, in what is in great part a theory of
pronouns, is like asking me to square the circle.
Yes, just as John Clark thought. It is theoretically impossible to explain
Bruno Marchal's ideas without using ill defined pronouns to hide behind and
without assuming the very things that Bruno Marchal is attempting to prove.
No made ill use of pronouns, and you mock when I added the necessary
nuances: notably the distinction between first person pov and third person
pov, completely defined in sharable 3p terms.
The only explanation given is I is I and you is you and he is he, but
before Euclid even started his first proof he made crystal clear what all
his terms meant, and Euclid never said a line is a line.
Nor did I.
You confuse [blah blah]
And when I provide precise and of course more lengthy explanations, you
just skip them. This can't help
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). A switch on the pain centre would be good.not to mention the pleasure centre. Wireheading, anyone? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Why we can't trust 3p descriptions of reality
:D My son made some of those sorts of videos a couple of years ago when he was 11 or 12. On 17 October 2013 06:53, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://i2.kym-cdn.com/entries/icons/medium/000/010/655/stop-motion-skateboarding.gif -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and plain old fashioned uncertainty. The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way. * Take the dice or die! as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was just being pedantic but it got my attention. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 16 October 2013 06:02, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Richard: I guess I am too much a physicist to believe that uncomputible arithmetical truth can produce the physical. Since you read my paper you know that I think computations in this universe if holographic are limited to 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) which is very far from infinity. I just do not believe in infinity. In other words, I believe the largest prime number in this universe is less than 10^120. So I will drop out of these discussions. My assumptions differ from yours. So what happens if someone proves that, say, 2^200 - 1 is a prime number? Personally I find a statements about prime numbers in this universe to be rather odd. Would 17 remain prime in an empty universe? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime number? Fortunately, I got the right answer! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? I think that it means that neurons are subject to our direct intention, rather than creating the illusion of intention on top of mechanistic processes. It shows that our own brain, down to the individual neuron level can be controlled intuitively, as we would if we had found that we had grown a new arm. Just as the brain can cause changes in the body, our personal motivation can cause changes in the brain. As for the ontology of 'voluntary', it does, now that you mention it, imply that our role of consciousness not merely to predict, or to be unpredictable, but also to dictate. It's hard to claim that the brain is mechanistic when its own cells are being directly controlled, without some other organ in between acting as a brain's brain. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? A switch on the pain centre would be good.not to mention the pleasure centre. Wireheading, anyone? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Why we can't trust 3p descriptions of reality
Pretty cool. I made a claymation film as a kid for a class once. Fun times. What struck me was how easy it is to pull the mind of an audience along a fictional narrative without even doing anything physically impossible. This is like the AI robot/zombie/puppet who comes up with the right answers and we fill in the gaps to assume that they have some subjective experience of reasoning. On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:33:50 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: :D My son made some of those sorts of videos a couple of years ago when he was 11 or 12. On 17 October 2013 06:53, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: http://i2.kym-cdn.com/entries/icons/medium/000/010/655/stop-motion-skateboarding.gif -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 09:56, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? I think that it means that neurons are subject to our direct intention, rather than creating the illusion of intention on top of mechanistic processes. It shows that our own brain, down to the individual neuron level can be controlled intuitively, as we would if we had found that we had grown a new arm. Just as the brain can cause changes in the body, our personal motivation can cause changes in the brain. But everything that we think and feel follows from some physical activity in the neurons, just like every other biological function. Tachycardia is caused by the heart beating faster, the heart does not beat faster because of tachycardia. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:09:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). There isn't really any room for an autonomous 'it' though when I'm introspectively controlling parts of my own brain. If my will can control what a neuron does then it is my will that controls the neuron, not the brain being passively driven by its own input. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
On 10/16/2013 3:49 PM, LizR wrote: By the way, my son (14) asked me the other day what's the oddest prime number? Fortunately, I got the right answer! 2, because it's the only one that's even. Brent There are 10 kinds of people. Those who think in binary and those who don't. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 17 October 2013 09:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? I think that it means that neurons are subject to our direct intention, rather than creating the illusion of intention on top of mechanistic processes. It shows that our own brain, down to the individual neuron level can be controlled intuitively, as we would if we had found that we had grown a new arm. Just as the brain can cause changes in the body, our personal motivation can cause changes in the brain. But everything that we think and feel follows from some physical activity in the neurons Not at all. What we think and feel leads activity in the neurons also. Right now, I can plan to take a walk tomorrow morning, and lo and behold, activity in my body will follow activity in the neurons which follow my intention. Neuron activity may have no more to do with what we think and feel than traffic patterns have in determining the culture of a city. , just like every other biological function. Tachycardia is caused by the heart beating faster, the heart does not beat faster because of tachycardia. Tachycardia is the heart beating faster. They mean the same thing. It's like saying that drag racing is caused by driving cars fast, but cars are not driven fast because they are in a race. It's impossible to understand consciousness if you look at the world only from the view that consciousness gives you of conditions outside of your body. Until we recognize our interior experience as a phenomenon no less physically real than any quark or galaxy, we are going to be doomed to chasing our tail looking for our own insides by taking measurements of our outsides. I think that the big revelation is to consider that the interior of everything is not isomorphic to the exterior, and is, in our case, contra-isomorphic. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 12:41, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:09:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). There isn't really any room for an autonomous 'it' though when I'm introspectively controlling parts of my own brain. If my will can control what a neuron does then it is my will that controls the neuron, not the brain being passively driven by its own input. I'm not sure what will means here. It seems to be an emergent / high-level description which perhaps needs to be broken down into a neuronal level description, given what we're discussing...? Nor am I sure what passive means in the context of autonomy (the two are somewhat opposed, surely). I'm not sure what it means for the brain to be passively driven by its own input (where input includes memories, experiences, etc) when it's constantly rewiring itself, making and breaking connections...? (Presumably it's ultimately driven by the laws of physics, but so is everything else, so that would make the entire universe passively driven which makes the concept meaningless, or at least redundant!) The brain is normally assumed to be essentially a large collection of interconnected neurons. There isn't anything else in there that I know of that is relevant to a discussion of how it functions (well, there are blood vessels and glial cells and whatever, but I don't know if they're relevant to a discussion of the brain functions we're interested in, though they are obviously needed in a supporting role). On that view, giving the brain the ability to control parts of itself more directly than it would normally be able to (through training and feedback, or with wires etc) is just introducing more connections, filling in some links that nature happens to have not provided, but not fundamentally different from what goes on in there already. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The probability problem in Everettian quantum mechanics
Or the largest prime number less than 10^120, because it's the biggest prime number...?!?!? :) There are two secrets to success. The first is not to give away everything you know... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can be opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we want, because that is what makes us superior to recorded logic. We are alive, so we get to do whatever we want to that which is not alive. Craig, these are murky waters you're fishing in this time. I forgot who said the following: X is giving reasons for why reasoning is bad. His reasoning was bad. Here you are more than invalid. You are frightening. We have compared you to racist, and what you say now reminds me of the strategy used by Nazy to prove that the white caucasian were superior. Lies, lies and lies. We can lie, machines can lie, but I am not sure it is the best science, or the best politics. With comp, God = Truth, and lies are Devil's play. If there is a chance that a machine will be born that is like me, only billions of times more capable and more racist than I am against all forms of life, wouldn't you say that it would be worth trying to stop at all costs? How could a machine be racist if it is totally incapable of any form of relation or sentience, according to you? But thanks for warning us about the way you proceed. This does not help for your case, I am just the beginning. Your sun in law will make me seem like Snoopy. If the above holds and you're not just playing, then these ideas make you totally mainstream: hunger for opportunistic dominance and perverted sense of liberty so expansive that we poison the very air we breathe and the soil that grounds our homes. You'd be saying nothing new at all, just the opposite in fact. The opportunism program is so old, cockroaches run it successfully and will continue to do so. They also eat their young. Makes sense, consistent with opportunism, but not the apex of aesthetics to put it mildly. To anybody with the luxury of cultivating an aesthetic sense, even when inevitable, that is merely ugly and to be avoided. PGC Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:12:34 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 12:41, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:09:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). There isn't really any room for an autonomous 'it' though when I'm introspectively controlling parts of my own brain. If my will can control what a neuron does then it is my will that controls the neuron, not the brain being passively driven by its own input. I'm not sure what will means here. It seems to be an emergent / high-level description which perhaps needs to be broken down into a neuronal level description, given what we're discussing...? Juts the opposite. Neuronal level descriptions are to me clearly divergent from high level description (will). It might help to think of neuronal descriptions as microphysiological rather than conflating them with microphenomenal descriptions. It's not so much high level phenomenology emerging from low level physiology, bit personal level descriptions and sub-personal level descriptions of phenomenology correspond to physiological and microphysiological descriptions. We are not made of what neurons do any more than a movie is made of what the pixels of a video screen do. Nor am I sure what passive means in the context of autonomy (the two are somewhat opposed, surely). I'm not sure what it means for the brain to be passively driven by its own input (where input includes memories, experiences, etc) It's begging the question to assume that input includes memories and experiences. As far as we can tell, all that the brain should need as input would be electrical or neurochemical signals. There is no sign of any 'experiences' there. That's what I thought that you meant by autonomous - driven by purely bio-mechanical interactions, not aesthetically experienced content. when it's constantly rewiring itself, making and breaking connections...? (Presumably it's ultimately driven by the laws of physics, but so is everything else, so that would make the entire universe passively driven which makes the concept meaningless, or at least redundant!) I think that we are driving physics as much as physics is driving us. If that were not the case, then our experience would not make much sense in a universe that is driven only by its own unconscious automaticity. The brain is normally assumed to be essentially a large collection of interconnected neurons. The brain, like the entire body, is a single living cells which has divided into a multiplicity of self-reflections. I think that our understanding of the brain is on par with our understanding of astronomy before Galileo. There isn't anything else in there that I know of that is relevant to a discussion of how it functions (well, there are blood vessels and glial cells and whatever, but I don't know if they're relevant to a discussion of the brain functions we're interested in, though they are obviously needed in a supporting role). On that view, giving the brain the ability to control parts of itself more directly than it would normally be able to (through training and feedback, or with wires etc) is just introducing more connections, filling in some links that nature happens to have not provided, but not fundamentally different from what goes on in there already. Still, the fact that every person finds their own way to manipulate their own individual neuron suggests that consciousness is indeed sub-personal as well as personal. We have to find our way around our own brain from the inside - with no hands or eyes, and no sub-brain to 'process sense data' to allow us to improve in our training. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 5:34:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 14:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 3:45:38 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can give you the code in Lisp, and it is up to you to find a good free lisp. But don't mind too much, AUDA is an integral description of the interview. Today, such interviews is done by paper and pencils, and appears in books and papers. You better buy Boolos 1979, or 1993, but you have to study more logic too. Doesn't it seem odd that there isn't much out there that is newer than 20 years old, That is simply wrong, and I don't see why you say that. But even if that was true, that would prove nothing. It still seems odd. There are a lot of good programmers out there. If this is the frontier of machine intelligence, where is the interest? Not saying it proves something, but it doesn't instill much confidence that this is as fertile an area as you imply. A revolutionary contemporary result (Gödel's incompleteness) shows that the oldest definition of knowledge (greeks, chinese, indians) can be applied to the oldest philosophy, mechanism, and that this is indeed very fertile, if only by providing an utterly transparent arithmetical interpretation of Plotinu's theology, which is the peak of the rationalist approach in that field, and you say that this instill any confidence in mechanism? It doesn't instill confidence of your interpretation of incompleteness. For myself, and I am guessing for others, incompleteness is about the lack-of-completeness of mathematical systems rather than a hyper-completeness of arithmetic metaphysics. The whole point here is that the machines prove their own theorem about themselves. Which is why their proofs are not reliable as general principles. If you ask people who cannot hear about music, they might confirm each others view that music consists only of vibrations that you can feel through your body. The meta-arithmetic belongs to arithmetic. I don't say much more than what the machines already say. I just need the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), just to compare with the machine's theory (S4Grz), like I need QM to compare with the machines's statistics on computation seen from inside. I think that all theories of logic are incestuous and ungrounded. Do you say that Gödel was a supporter of the Plotinus view, or are saying that even he didn't realize the implications. Gödel was indeed a defender of platonism, at the start. But he has been quite slow on Church thesis, and not so quick on mechanism either. That is suggested notably by his leaning toward Anselm notion of God. Platonism is alright, but it just doesn't go far enough. It takes the ability to sense forms for granted. The reductionist view of machines may be wrong, but that doesn't mean that its absence of rules at higher level translates into proprietary feelings, sounds, flavors, etc. Why would it? Why not? Evidences are that a brain does that. You need to find something non-Turing emulable in the brain to provide evidences that it does not. No, I don't need to find something non-Turing emulable in the brain, any more than I need to find something non-pixel descriptive in a TV set to provide evidence that a TV show can have characters and dialogue. In theory it could, sure, but the universe that we live in seems to suggest exactly the opposite. But we can understand what is that universe, and why it suggests this, for the machine embedded in that apparent universe. I have no problem with using mathematics to describe a theoretical universe. I don't even say that such a universe could not be real, I only say that the universe which hosts our experience does not quite make sense as a mathematical universe. It says that we must give the undead a chance to be alive - that we cannot know for sure whether a machine is not at least as worthy of our love as a newborn baby. You cannot do that comparison. Is an newborn alien worthy of human love? Other parameters than thinking and consciousness are at play. What are those parameters, and how do they fit in with mechanism? The parameters are that love asks for some close familiarity. It fits with mechanism through long computational histories. You can have long computational histories without inventing love, surely? Anyway, it is up to you to find something non mechanical. I don't defend comp, I just try to show why your methodology to criticize comp is not valid. I already am something non mechanical, and all of the qualia that has ever been experienced. To fight this seduction, You beg the question. You are the one creating an enemy
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 13:49, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:12:34 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 12:41, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:09:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). There isn't really any room for an autonomous 'it' though when I'm introspectively controlling parts of my own brain. If my will can control what a neuron does then it is my will that controls the neuron, not the brain being passively driven by its own input. I'm not sure what will means here. It seems to be an emergent / high-level description which perhaps needs to be broken down into a neuronal level description, given what we're discussing...? Juts the opposite. Neuronal level descriptions are to me clearly divergent from high level description (will). It might help to think of neuronal descriptions as microphysiological rather than conflating them with microphenomenal descriptions. It's not so much high level phenomenology emerging from low level physiology, bit personal level descriptions and sub-personal level descriptions of phenomenology correspond to physiological and microphysiological descriptions. We are not made of what neurons do any more than a movie is made of what the pixels of a video screen do. The pixels have an obvious cause outside themselves. That isn't obvious with neurons and consciousness (I'm not wearing my comp hat at the moment, unless you want to bring that in?) Nor am I sure what passive means in the context of autonomy (the two are somewhat opposed, surely). I'm not sure what it means for the brain to be passively driven by its own input (where input includes memories, experiences, etc) It's begging the question to assume that input includes memories and experiences. As far as we can tell, all that the brain should need as input would be electrical or neurochemical signals. There is no sign of any 'experiences' there. That's what I thought that you meant by autonomous - driven by purely bio-mechanical interactions, not aesthetically experienced content. My point was that input isn't necessarily just something received from outside. And yes, to a materialist, at least, the brain does appear to just need electrical and neurochemical signals. when it's constantly rewiring itself, making and breaking connections...? (Presumably it's ultimately driven by the laws of physics, but so is everything else, so that would make the entire universe passively driven which makes the concept meaningless, or at least redundant!) I think that we are driving physics as much as physics is driving us. If that were not the case, then our experience would not make much sense in a universe that is driven only by its own unconscious automaticity. How do we do that? The brain is normally assumed to be essentially a large collection of interconnected neurons. The brain, like the entire body, is a single living cells which has divided into a multiplicity of self-reflections. I think that our understanding of the brain is on par with our understanding of astronomy before Galileo. Well that may be so, but it's hard to have a discussion based on as yet undiscovered future science! There isn't anything else in there that I know of that is relevant to a discussion of how it functions (well, there are blood vessels and glial cells and whatever, but I don't know if they're relevant to a discussion of the brain functions we're interested in, though they are obviously needed in a supporting role). On that view, giving the brain the ability to control parts of itself more directly than it would normally be able to (through training and feedback, or with wires etc) is just introducing more connections, filling in some links that nature happens to have not provided, but not fundamentally different from what goes on in there already. Still, the fact that every person finds their own way to manipulate their own individual neuron suggests that consciousness is indeed sub-personal as well as personal. We have to find our way around our own brain from the inside - with no hands or eyes, and no sub-brain to 'process sense data' to allow us to improve in our training. Split brain operations have long suggested that consciousness is sub-personal. I'm not sure how we find our way around our brains *except *from the
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:18:28 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 2:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 4:21:34 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2013, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: we must use what is our birthright as living beings. We can be opportunistic, we can cheat, and lie, and unplug machines whenever we want, because that is what makes us superior to recorded logic. We are alive, so we get to do whatever we want to that which is not alive. Craig, these are murky waters you're fishing in this time. I forgot who said the following: X is giving reasons for why reasoning is bad. His reasoning was bad. Murky, yes. I think that consciousness and life are trans-rational, trans-measurable, and trans-ontological. Here you are more than invalid. You are frightening. We have compared you to racist, and what you say now reminds me of the strategy used by Nazy to prove that the white caucasian were superior. Lies, lies and lies. We can lie, machines can lie, but I am not sure it is the best science, or the best politics. With comp, God = Truth, and lies are Devil's play. If there is a chance that a machine will be born that is like me, only billions of times more capable and more racist than I am against all forms of life, wouldn't you say that it would be worth trying to stop at all costs? How could a machine be racist if it is totally incapable of any form of relation or sentience, according to you? Not according to me, I'm going along with Bruno. By his view, I am a machine, or a product of a machine, so if I am racist against machines, then it is inevitable that there will be machines who are similarly racist against humans or biology - the only difference being that they may be placed in a position to exert much more control on the world. But thanks for warning us about the way you proceed. This does not help for your case, I am just the beginning. Your sun in law will make me seem like Snoopy. If the above holds and you're not just playing, then these ideas make you totally mainstream: hunger for opportunistic dominance and perverted sense of liberty so expansive that we poison the very air we breathe and the soil that grounds our homes. You'd be saying nothing new at all, just the opposite in fact. Even if that's not what I think that I advocate personally, my point is that there is no reason to assume that an AI would be any different, given that we are machines. The opportunism program is so old, cockroaches run it successfully and will continue to do so. They also eat their young. Makes sense, consistent with opportunism, but not the apex of aesthetics to put it mildly. To anybody with the luxury of cultivating an aesthetic sense, even when inevitable, that is merely ugly and to be avoided. I agree, but that's because I'm not a machine. The part of me that is a machine is no better or worse than a cockroach. Craig PGC Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 10:52, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 17 October 2013 09:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? I think that it means that neurons are subject to our direct intention, rather than creating the illusion of intention on top of mechanistic processes. It shows that our own brain, down to the individual neuron level can be controlled intuitively, as we would if we had found that we had grown a new arm. Just as the brain can cause changes in the body, our personal motivation can cause changes in the brain. But everything that we think and feel follows from some physical activity in the neurons Not at all. What we think and feel leads activity in the neurons also. Right now, I can plan to take a walk tomorrow morning, and lo and behold, activity in my body will follow activity in the neurons which follow my intention. Neuron activity may have no more to do with what we think and feel than traffic patterns have in determining the culture of a city. , just like every other biological function. Tachycardia is caused by the heart beating faster, the heart does not beat faster because of tachycardia. Tachycardia is the heart beating faster. They mean the same thing. It's like saying that drag racing is caused by driving cars fast, but cars are not driven fast because they are in a race. Whichever way you look at it with the heart, the cars or the brain, it is a sequence of physical events A-B-C etc. Event B may correspond to choosing coffee over tea or it may correspond to tachycardia, but it was *caused* by event A. Sometimes, B may be random or uncaused, like radioactive decay. But you have a concept of B being spontaneous, which means (as far as I can work out) neither caused by antecedent physical events nor uncaused by antecedent physical events. And that seems not only wrong, but meaningless. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Current events
Anybody else concerned about the typhoon now bearing down on Fukushima? If it slices up the coast and strikes Fukushima will those damaged and weather exposed reinforced concrete monolithic structures withstand the horizontal stresses. Am especially concerned about the SFP above reactor #4 (it is sitting ten floors up in the air) and that building is in bad shape and is far too radioactive to work around. That is the one they plan on trying to remove, especially the hot fuel from - a very dangerous act with Zirconium clad fuel rods and one that speaks volumes about how really desperate the situation is in that SFP. There is enough still very hot spent fuel in that SFP to wreak havoc on this earth if #4 or the other units there should fail in this once in a decade storm. Hopefully the typhoon misses. In the next hours will see. Happening now on planet earth, which no matter where our heads are at, is where our feet are planted. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 October 2013 14:08, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How could a machine be racist if it is totally incapable of any form of relation or sentience, according to you? Not according to me, I'm going along with Bruno. By his view, I am a machine, or a product of a machine, so if I am racist against machines, then it is inevitable that there will be machines who are similarly racist against humans or biology - the only difference being that they may be placed in a position to exert much more control on the world. I don't remember Bruno saying that. (Unless one considers arithmetic to be a machine?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Current events
The trouble is we will be getting once in a decade storms (and once in a lifetime events of all types) more and more often, unless the IPCC are completely wrong (the latest view seems to be that they were too conservative in their last report). So yes I'm concerned about this, and about everything else that's going on upon the dark and troubled Earth. On 17 October 2013 14:17, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: Anybody else concerned about the typhoon now bearing down on Fukushima? If it slices up the coast and strikes Fukushima will those damaged and weather exposed reinforced concrete monolithic structures withstand the horizontal stresses. Am especially concerned about the SFP above reactor #4 (it is sitting ten floors up in the air) and that building is in bad shape and is far too radioactive to work around. That is the one they plan on trying to remove, especially the hot fuel from – a very dangerous act with Zirconium clad fuel rods and one that speaks volumes about how really desperate the situation is in that SFP. There is enough still very hot spent fuel in that SFP to wreak havoc on this earth if #4 or the other units there should fail in this once in a decade storm. Hopefully the typhoon misses. In the next hours will see. Happening now on planet earth, which no matter where our heads are at, is where our feet are planted. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Current events
I think it has either arrived or missed by now, it was due to make landfall on Wednesday, I think. Wikipedia states 17 people killed and 50 missing, unfortunately. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/us-japan-typhoon-idUSBRE99E09H20131015 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 9:11:37 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 17 October 2013 10:52, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 17 October 2013 09:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:23:33 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 16 October 2013 23:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: http://neurosciencenews.com/human-thought-can-voluntarily-control-neurons-in-brain/ And what do you think this article shows, Craig? Something about voluntary meaning neither determined nor random? I think that it means that neurons are subject to our direct intention, rather than creating the illusion of intention on top of mechanistic processes. It shows that our own brain, down to the individual neuron level can be controlled intuitively, as we would if we had found that we had grown a new arm. Just as the brain can cause changes in the body, our personal motivation can cause changes in the brain. But everything that we think and feel follows from some physical activity in the neurons Not at all. What we think and feel leads activity in the neurons also. Right now, I can plan to take a walk tomorrow morning, and lo and behold, activity in my body will follow activity in the neurons which follow my intention. Neuron activity may have no more to do with what we think and feel than traffic patterns have in determining the culture of a city. , just like every other biological function. Tachycardia is caused by the heart beating faster, the heart does not beat faster because of tachycardia. Tachycardia is the heart beating faster. They mean the same thing. It's like saying that drag racing is caused by driving cars fast, but cars are not driven fast because they are in a race. Whichever way you look at it with the heart, the cars or the brain, it is a sequence of physical events A-B-C etc. It's not a sequence, it's different scopes of simultaneous. I decide to go to the store. That's A. I get in the car and the car drives to the store. That's B. The physical event B is cause by personal motive A. There is no physical event which specifically would have caused A if it were not for my personal contribution in 'clutching' together various histories and narratives to arrive at a novel cause which is entering the public universe from a private vantage point that I am saying is trans-ontological. Event B may correspond to choosing coffee over tea or it may correspond to tachycardia, but it was *caused* by event A. No cause exists without awareness that has 1) memory, and 2) an application of causality to that memory. Cause, like simultaneity, is not absolute, it is a fictional perspective generated through a particular type of awareness, IMO. Sometimes, B may be random or uncaused, like radioactive decay. But you have a concept of B being spontaneous, which means (as far as I can work out) neither caused by antecedent physical events nor uncaused by antecedent physical events. And that seems not only wrong, but meaningless. Spontaneous is primordial. It comes before cause and before all antecedents. It is before the beginning. All causes can be traced back to the spontaneous. You are looking at the consequence of that spontaneity as it appears to our body, after the fact, as public measurements. That is not fundamental, it is derived from the more fundamental - the capacity to appreciate form and participate in function which must precede all repeating functions or stable forms. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 9:03:19 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 13:49, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:12:34 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 12:41, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 7:09:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 11:57, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:32:44 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Interesting! One part of the brain controlling another (I guess it does this anyway but not in the same way). The question is, what is controlling the first part of the brain? I'm not sure if it's controlled, exactly. Some would consider it autonomous, although it has a lot of input that drives it - both from the rest of the brain and the environment (which I guess means the rest of the body, including the senses). There isn't really any room for an autonomous 'it' though when I'm introspectively controlling parts of my own brain. If my will can control what a neuron does then it is my will that controls the neuron, not the brain being passively driven by its own input. I'm not sure what will means here. It seems to be an emergent / high-level description which perhaps needs to be broken down into a neuronal level description, given what we're discussing...? Juts the opposite. Neuronal level descriptions are to me clearly divergent from high level description (will). It might help to think of neuronal descriptions as microphysiological rather than conflating them with microphenomenal descriptions. It's not so much high level phenomenology emerging from low level physiology, bit personal level descriptions and sub-personal level descriptions of phenomenology correspond to physiological and microphysiological descriptions. We are not made of what neurons do any more than a movie is made of what the pixels of a video screen do. The pixels have an obvious cause outside themselves. That isn't obvious with neurons and consciousness (I'm not wearing my comp hat at the moment, unless you want to bring that in?) The pixels don't have an obvious cause outside themselves unless you smuggle your knowledge of electronics into it. Neurons are a character within our conscious experience as much as our experience coincides with some of the behaviors of neurons. We have no reason at all to imagine that a brain has anything to do with 'consciousness' except because we are taking our own word that we are conscious. On the level that we understand the brain and neurons, there could be no such thing as awareness. Nor am I sure what passive means in the context of autonomy (the two are somewhat opposed, surely). I'm not sure what it means for the brain to be passively driven by its own input (where input includes memories, experiences, etc) It's begging the question to assume that input includes memories and experiences. As far as we can tell, all that the brain should need as input would be electrical or neurochemical signals. There is no sign of any 'experiences' there. That's what I thought that you meant by autonomous - driven by purely bio-mechanical interactions, not aesthetically experienced content. My point was that input isn't necessarily just something received from outside. And yes, to a materialist, at least, the brain does appear to just need electrical and neurochemical signals. I'm trying to show that actual memories and experiences are different from changes in the brain. We can explain everything that the brain does without ever guessing that there could be experiences outside of the brain tissue being 'represented' in some way. when it's constantly rewiring itself, making and breaking connections...? (Presumably it's ultimately driven by the laws of physics, but so is everything else, so that would make the entire universe passively driven which makes the concept meaningless, or at least redundant!) I think that we are driving physics as much as physics is driving us. If that were not the case, then our experience would not make much sense in a universe that is driven only by its own unconscious automaticity. How do we do that? The same way that the subjects train themselves to control their neurons, or that I move my fingers to push the keyboard to input the data that you see through your brain/eyes/screen. We are physics. We are not reducible to low level public physics, we are personal level private physics. I think that it might work something like this: http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ The brain is normally assumed to be essentially a large collection of interconnected neurons. The brain, like the entire body, is a single living cells which has divided into a multiplicity of self-reflections. I think that our understanding of the brain is on par
RE: Current events
Yeah your right: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24550492 It's crazy that comparatively so little has been done to stabilize and entomb that site; considering the ultimate consequences should any number of the structures fail. A case of misplaced priorities that unfortunately could become a civilization ending event. At this point entombing the whole thing seems to be the only option - don't think anybody has the tech to handle a hot mass of corium melt. I would estimate that entombing Fukushima will cost many trillions of dollars over hundreds and hundreds - if not hundreds of thousands of years. But that is chump change compared to the cost of doing nothing. As you noted large once in a hundred year weather events are going to most likely become more common as the planet roils in shedding heat out into space. That place is hell on earth. In one of the reactor buildings - I forget which even the best radiation hardened robots we have only last a few minutes before the intense gamma ray flux literally fries them and the telemetry they can gather is of extremely poor quality due the intense gamma ray emissions in that area. I think all we can do at this point is to entomb - at massive cost - and contain this hell from the rest of the planet. This is one of those problems that is so horrible that no one wants to deal with it or think about it; preferring almost anything to this activity. Nobody wants to own this. Fukushima is like an orphan child and the Japanese government would love it to just go away and let it focus instead on important things like preparing for the Olympics. the insanity of the apparent priorities is truly rich, but also potentially tragic for all of humankind. I am unimpressed with Japan's efforts and ability to manage this disaster and am concerned that they have been in a reactive mode and are flailing around and trying to pretend that they can focus on other things - like the Olympics. How many close calls will Fukushima survive before it can finally be stabilized? From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 6:30 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Current events I think it has either arrived or missed by now, it was due to make landfall on Wednesday, I think. Wikipedia states 17 people killed and 50 missing, unfortunately. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/us-japan-typhoon-idUSBRE99E09H2013 1015 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 15:04, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The pixels don't have an obvious cause outside themselves unless you smuggle your knowledge of electronics into it. Neurons are a character within our conscious experience as much as our experience coincides with some of the behaviors of neurons. We have no reason at all to imagine that a brain has anything to do with 'consciousness' except because we are taking our own word that we are conscious. On the level that we understand the brain and neurons, there could be no such thing as awareness. Smuggle your knowledge of electronics into explaining the operation of an electronic device??? If we can't take our word for it that we're conscious, whose word can we take for it? How can there be no such thing as awareness when we have good working models of eyes, the visual cortex, and so on? TBH I think you're just throwing out objections randomly; if you aren't, I don't have a clue what you're trying to say. I think it's time for me to retire in confusion. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 9:19:13 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 14:08, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: How could a machine be racist if it is totally incapable of any form of relation or sentience, according to you? Not according to me, I'm going along with Bruno. By his view, I am a machine, or a product of a machine, so if I am racist against machines, then it is inevitable that there will be machines who are similarly racist against humans or biology - the only difference being that they may be placed in a position to exert much more control on the world. I don't remember Bruno saying that. (Unless one considers arithmetic to be a machine?) Yes, if I understand his view correctly, Bruno considers arithmetic to be behind mechanism, mechanism to be behind awareness, and awareness to be behind physics. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 9:11:02 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-**containing) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) A human being is the collective self experience received during the phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its own perception. That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then either those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something else. If they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the above-quoted statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a machine doesn't grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then - depending on the nature of that something else - it's possible that other things have it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to know what that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For example, I believe Bruno thinks the something else is an infinite sheaf of computations.) Have you considered that it might be the body which is part of a sheaf of experiences? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Current events
Japan is only doing the same as the rest of the world, of course - pretending there's nothing wrong, carrying on as usual and hoping the world will sort itself out (which it will, no doubt, but maybe not with the human race still around). Fukushima just happens to be a particularly ghastly example of the sort of problems we've created for ourselves. Meanwhile Barak Obama continues to not fulfil his promises about a green economy, Putin is such a wimp he can't take a few peaceful protests about Arctic oil drilling without throwing his toys out the cradle, the Aussies have just withdrawn from the carbon tax scheme (why they don't use solar power for everything in that climate is beyond me) and our very own Prime Minister in New Zealand continues to head towards the most environmentally destructive policies he can in the name of short term supposed boosts to the economy, or more likely just making the rich richer... (And we wonder why SETI hasn't picked up any signs of intelligent life...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On 17 October 2013 16:12, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 9:11:02 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-**containing**) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) A human being is the collective self experience received during the phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its own perception. That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then either those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something else. If they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the above-quoted statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a machine doesn't grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then - depending on the nature of that something else - it's possible that other things have it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to know what that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For example, I believe Bruno thinks the something else is an infinite sheaf of computations.) Have you considered that it might be the body which is part of a sheaf of experiences? Since Bruno started trying to explain comp to me, I have indeed considered that. It could be, for example, via the mechanism you mentioned in your previous post: Bruno considers arithmetic to be behind mechanism, mechanism to be behind awareness, and awareness to be behind physics. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:03:21 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 15:04, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: The pixels don't have an obvious cause outside themselves unless you smuggle your knowledge of electronics into it. Neurons are a character within our conscious experience as much as our experience coincides with some of the behaviors of neurons. We have no reason at all to imagine that a brain has anything to do with 'consciousness' except because we are taking our own word that we are conscious. On the level that we understand the brain and neurons, there could be no such thing as awareness. Smuggle your knowledge of electronics into explaining the operation of an electronic device??? You don't know its an electronic device, you only know that there are pixels because you can look at the screen closely. It's like the stop motion video. You would have to suppress your knowledge of stop motion video and what is possible in real life if you wanted to imagine how the video would look to someone who had no experience with video editing. To such a person, the video could seem like evidence of impossible things happening. This is the case when we look at the data presented by neuroscientific instruments. We are seeing a limited narrative which we have interpreted under certain assumptions. If we used only those assumptions, and suppressed our knowledge of consciousness, there would be nothing which neuroscience reports that could lead us to discover any such thing as consciousness. In his book Aping Mankind, Raymond Tallis talks about the failure of neuroscience and evolutionary biology to examine this view, what he calls the prospective view of consciousness. Any theory of consciousness can make sense retrospectively, since you already know how its supposed to turn out - with consciousness as an end result, but only a theory of consciousness which makes sense prospectively can help us with the Hard Problem and Explanatory Gap. If we can't take our word for it that we're conscious, whose word can we take for it? We would have to take the word of neuroscience. If neuroscientific data were enough to lead us to consciousness, then that is all that we would need. If consciousness were like some other form or function, we could simply measure whether something was conscious or not without having any idea what consciousness is. We have to begin to approach consciousness by forgetting that there has ever been any such thing. How can there be no such thing as awareness when we have good working models of eyes, the visual cortex, and so on? We have good working models of cameras and video editing hardware too, but that doesn't mean that they imply awareness at all. TBH I think you're just throwing out objections randomly; if you aren't, I don't have a clue what you're trying to say. I'm trying to say that our contemporary approach to understanding awareness is fatally flawed. It suffers from a leaky philosophical vacuum, and maybe the premature confidence of a teenage civilization that imagines it to be finishing a race that is only halfway done. I think it's time for me to retire in confusion. Have a good night! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On 17 October 2013 16:29, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'm trying to say that our contemporary approach to understanding awareness is fatally flawed. It suffers from a leaky philosophical vacuum, and maybe the premature confidence of a teenage civilization that imagines it to be finishing a race that is only halfway done. OK, that's something I can understand (and even agree with). So do you have some idea about how we *should* be understanding awareness, and can you explain it simply, and preferably without doing violence to, for example, our understanding of how TV sets work? (Or if you do have to do violence to that notion, could you only do so after explaining how and why you need to do violence to it, rather than throwing the idea into the conversation willy-nilly and expecting the audience to understand?!) Explaining in the style of Bruno and comp, for example, would be good... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:39:49 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 16:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I'm trying to say that our contemporary approach to understanding awareness is fatally flawed. It suffers from a leaky philosophical vacuum, and maybe the premature confidence of a teenage civilization that imagines it to be finishing a race that is only halfway done. OK, that's something I can understand (and even agree with). So do you have some idea about how we *should* be understanding awareness, and can you explain it simply, and preferably without doing violence to, for example, our understanding of how TV sets work? (Or if you do have to do violence to that notion, could you only do so after explaining how and why you need to do violence to it, rather than throwing the idea into the conversation willy-nilly and expecting the audience to understand?!) Explaining in the style of Bruno and comp, for example, would be good... I have a lot written already. It depends which aspects you are interested in. Philosophy of mind positions? Mathematical abstractions? Diagrams? Podcasts or videos? http://multisenserealism.com/about/introduction/ http://multisenserealism.com/consciousness-problems-and-possible-solutions/the-four-problems-of-studying-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/about/why-pip-and-msr-solves-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/a-new-theory-of-information/multisense-mathematics/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/trini1.jpg http://multisenserealism.com/about/radio-and-tv-interviews/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
Let's start at the very beginning. (It's a very good place to start.) On 17 October 2013 16:56, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:39:49 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 16:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I'm trying to say that our contemporary approach to understanding awareness is fatally flawed. It suffers from a leaky philosophical vacuum, and maybe the premature confidence of a teenage civilization that imagines it to be finishing a race that is only halfway done. OK, that's something I can understand (and even agree with). So do you have some idea about how we *should* be understanding awareness, and can you explain it simply, and preferably without doing violence to, for example, our understanding of how TV sets work? (Or if you do have to do violence to that notion, could you only do so after explaining how and why you need to do violence to it, rather than throwing the idea into the conversation willy-nilly and expecting the audience to understand?!) Explaining in the style of Bruno and comp, for example, would be good... I have a lot written already. It depends which aspects you are interested in. Philosophy of mind positions? Mathematical abstractions? Diagrams? Podcasts or videos? http://multisenserealism.com/about/introduction/ http://multisenserealism.com/consciousness-problems-and-possible-solutions/the-four-problems-of-studying-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/about/why-pip-and-msr-solves-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/a-new-theory-of-information/multisense-mathematics/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/trini1.jpg http://multisenserealism.com/about/radio-and-tv-interviews/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: WSJ Article On Why Computers Make Lame Supermarket Cashiers
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:18:39 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 16:12, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 9:11:02 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 14:05, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:51:17 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 October 2013 13:48, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: No, that's begging the question. A human body may be a machine, but that does not mean that a human experience can be created from the outside in. That's what all of these points are about - a machine does not build itself from a single reproducing cell. A machine does not care what it is doing, it doesn't get bored or tired. A machine is great at doing things that people are terrible at doing and vice versa. There is much more evidence to suggest that human experience is the polar opposite of mechanism than that it could be defined by mechanism. So what is a human being, if not a (very complicated, molecular-component-**containing**) machine? (Or is machine being defined in a specialised sense here?) A human being is the collective self experience received during the phenomenon known as a human lifetime. The body is only one aspect of that experience - a reflection defined as a familiar body in the context of its own perception. That's cool, but if the body is a (complicated, etc) machine, then either those experiences are part of the machine, or they're something else. If they're part of the machine then you're wrong in some of the above-quoted statements (and you contradicted yourself by saying that a machine doesn't grow from a cell, by the way) If it's something else, then - depending on the nature of that something else - it's possible that other things have it, and we don't recognise the fact. It would be important to know what that something else is before one can construct an argument. (For example, I believe Bruno thinks the something else is an infinite sheaf of computations.) Have you considered that it might be the body which is part of a sheaf of experiences? Since Bruno started trying to explain comp to me, I have indeed considered that. It could be, for example, via the mechanism you mentioned in your previous post: Bruno considers arithmetic to be behind mechanism, mechanism to be behind awareness, and awareness to be behind physics. I would have agreed with Bruno completely a few years ago, but since then I think that it makes more sense that arithmetic is a kind of sense than that sense could be a kind of arithmetic. I think that mechanism is a kind of arithmetic and arithmetic is a kind of sense, as is private awareness a kind of sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Current events
There is something to be said for the hypothesis that there are no advanced technological civilizations in the universe because they invariably destroy themselves in the blink of an eye after they are fist born. Not what I would have wished, but in our own case we certainly seem to be bearing it out. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Wednesday, October 16, 2013 8:16 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Current events Japan is only doing the same as the rest of the world, of course - pretending there's nothing wrong, carrying on as usual and hoping the world will sort itself out (which it will, no doubt, but maybe not with the human race still around). Fukushima just happens to be a particularly ghastly example of the sort of problems we've created for ourselves. Meanwhile Barak Obama continues to not fulfil his promises about a green economy, Putin is such a wimp he can't take a few peaceful protests about Arctic oil drilling without throwing his toys out the cradle, the Aussies have just withdrawn from the carbon tax scheme (why they don't use solar power for everything in that climate is beyond me) and our very own Prime Minister in New Zealand continues to head towards the most environmentally destructive policies he can in the name of short term supposed boosts to the economy, or more likely just making the rich richer... (And we wonder why SETI hasn't picked up any signs of intelligent life...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Human Thought Can Voluntarily Control Neurons in Brain
On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:58:27 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: Let's start at the very beginning. (It's a very good place to start.) I think before anything can 'begin' there already has to be awareness or sense. Presence. A capacity to discern difference from indifference and to participate in projecting that discernment as an effect. Without that, there is no difference between nothingness and something that can ever become a 'beginning'. To get to a beginning, there would have to be a lot more sensible tendencies - a sense of memory, a sense of cause, etc. It gets difficult because at this primitive level of the cosmos, time is not coherent, so it is as much the distant past as the far future, as it is the present moment. It is not an event in time, it is the solitude implicit within every time, every beginning. On that level, all of eternity is a single tick of an infinitely slow clock which has not even begun yet, but its perpetual expectation is the infinite well of entropy-negentropy that keeps everything spinning. On 17 October 2013 16:56, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, October 16, 2013 11:39:49 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 17 October 2013 16:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I'm trying to say that our contemporary approach to understanding awareness is fatally flawed. It suffers from a leaky philosophical vacuum, and maybe the premature confidence of a teenage civilization that imagines it to be finishing a race that is only halfway done. OK, that's something I can understand (and even agree with). So do you have some idea about how we *should* be understanding awareness, and can you explain it simply, and preferably without doing violence to, for example, our understanding of how TV sets work? (Or if you do have to do violence to that notion, could you only do so after explaining how and why you need to do violence to it, rather than throwing the idea into the conversation willy-nilly and expecting the audience to understand?!) Explaining in the style of Bruno and comp, for example, would be good... I have a lot written already. It depends which aspects you are interested in. Philosophy of mind positions? Mathematical abstractions? Diagrams? Podcasts or videos? http://multisenserealism.com/about/introduction/ http://multisenserealism.com/consciousness-problems-and-possible-solutions/the-four-problems-of-studying-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/about/why-pip-and-msr-solves-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/ http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/a-new-theory-of-information/multisense-mathematics/non-well-founded-identity-principle/ http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/trini1.jpg http://multisenserealism.com/about/radio-and-tv-interviews/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
