subject:"Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers"

On 12 Sep 2012, at 15:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:

Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
precise
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or
even

adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).

I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary
arithmetic,

no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth
Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with
comp,
both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right
to

be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.

There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in
arithmetic).

But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list.
It

is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers
by

Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some
subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I
understand

the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not
unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous
proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
!= or

^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to
be true,

because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond
their

axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
magically know what they are really representing. But this is
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be
granted that

others share this assumption.

Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can
human prove to impartial observer that they magically know what
they are really representing or that they really understand?

The idea is that you can understand what they prove as much as you
understand what they assume, and this independently of what is the
understanding.
If *you* agree with the elementary axioms, and inference rule, then
you agree, or show a flaw, with the deduction presented to you.
The actual interpretation or belief (or disbelief), in the axiom is
private and the scientist is mute on this.
A scientist will never say I know, in its field of competence, or
even outside (but for some reason that is rare: very often scientist
forget the scientific attitude in the field of colleagues, apparently).

Bruno

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans
do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms,
which really don't have that great a track record?

The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and
ontological bets shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to
remain sincere somehow, why restrict ourselves to the habitual ones?

Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing.

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 21:48, benjayk wrote:

Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:

Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and
assume

I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
precise
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle
or even

adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).

I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary
arithmetic,

be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.

There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in
arithmetic).

But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR
list. It

is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original
papers by

Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some
subtle

aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I
understand
the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could
not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not
unique, and

thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous
proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to
mean !=

or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or
alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post)
to be

true,
because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond
their
axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they
somehow
magically know what they are really representing. But this is
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be
granted

that
others share this assumption.

Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can
human
prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are
really

representing or that they really understand?

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do
this,
other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which
really don't

have that great a track record?

Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at
all? I
don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really
is a

proof on?
The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one
to me.

That is why we have other notion than proof---which is of the type
belief (no Bp - p in general), like knowledge, feeling,
experience, etc.

Incompleteness makes possible to recover by intensional nuances:

for a fixed machine B (I identify the machine with her beliefs) all
the Bp, Bp p, Bp Dt, Bp Dt p, etc. concerns exactly the same
arithmetical propositions, but obeys quite different logics
(classical, intuitionist, quantum-like, etc.).

Bruno

Apart from that, it seems human understanding is just delusion in
many
cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we
think we

really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 13 Sep 2012, at 12:40, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
!= or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.


Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.

Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean =
anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined.


Nor do = itself, nor nor.



But even
than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap.


No, it is not. It is in the rule governing = on which you agree on.  
If not you beg the question and take the proving machine for a zombie.  
When I ask my computer to send a mail, he understands very well  
(usually), despite the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the coding.  
Today, it does not observes itself in practice, so the sense is still  
distributed on a much larger spectrum than the specific task that it  
implements, but that's is contingent.



If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings  
together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap  
as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use  
to do

it.


Indeed.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.

How using only arithmetics?


Like a german grammar written in german. PA talks arithmetic, so we  
have to translate in arithmetic. Arithmetic is Turing universal, so we  
can do that without any trouble. We can even so it without classical  
logic, only the usual axioms for =, and diophantine polynomial of  
degree less than 4. It took 70 years to prove this: it is not obvious  
at all, and I find this quite surprising.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,


Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should
study the subject.

You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)


Studying implies questioning the validity all along ;)


Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark  
numerous times.

It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand why
christianity is right..


You seem to talk about Gödel's work, with weird assertion like I  
don't need to study it to say ..., where a simple study of Gödel  
would help you to see that you miss something.





Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are  
willing

to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


LOL  (we don't have to study no more).




Bruno Marchal wrote:



It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not
the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning  
Gödel

numbers in arithmetic itself.


?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.

I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just
demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' -  
there

is no such axiom in arithmetic).


There is no problem at all given that arithmetic contains its  
metalanguage. So we do use a metalanguage, which is just arithmetic  
itself. The second incompleteness theorem

not-provable('0=1') implies not-provable('not-provable('0=1')')
*is* a theorem of arithmetic.
(this is reflected by the fact that G proves ~[]f - ~[](~[]f)).
You do need a part non accessible to the arithmetic-machine to say  
that ~[]f is true, but the machine can guess that.


It is not entirely obvious that we can define provable entirely in  
arithmetic, or in any programming language, but we can, like we can  
define it entirely in German, or in Fortran.
It is no more ambiguous that we can ask a universal to generate the  
prime numbers, or send mails.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).


Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.
Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I  
confuse

everything?


I can't open a parenthesis and provide in one simple sentence the  
basic of mathematical logic.
It takes time for anyone to understand that metamathematics can be  
arithmetized.

There are many good books on that subject.
I would say that the second part of sane2004

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


Hi benjayk,

   This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He  
does not see several things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single  
abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be  
reduced.


On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1- 
indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to  
say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to  
just formulate clearly.




2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be  
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.


This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical  
implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non  
physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.



Bruno






On 9/13/2012 6:40 AM, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to  
mean

!= or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.
Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean  
=
anymore than soap means pope, except if artificially defined.  
But even

than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or soap.
If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings  
together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope pope with soap  
as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use  
to do

it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.

How using only arithmetics?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,

Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should
study the subject.

You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)
Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark  
numerous times.
It is like saying You should really study the bible to understand  
why

christianity is right..
Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you  
are willing

to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the
problem.

You created a problem which is not there.

Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there.



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not
the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning  
Gödel

numbers in arithmetic itself.

?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.
I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it  
just

demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description'  
- there

is no such axiom in arithmetic).


Bruno Marchal wrote:

This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).

Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.
Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I  
confuse

everything?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look
at this
website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html


And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in  
Gödel's

proof. (sigh).
You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong.
I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about  
what

numbers can express together with a meta-level).
If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as  
seperate
axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical  
flaws. It
is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the  
flaws lie
(and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any  
real
attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little  
more than

denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction.

The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they  
abstract so
much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the  
proof)

and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right.
That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-13 Thread meekerdb


On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi benjayk,

This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He does not see several 
things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute structure of 
relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.


They are not unique, but however they are chosen they represent the same structure. There 
is no unique representation of QM: wave functions, Hilbert space, Feynmann paths,...  But 
they all predict the same physics and so represent the same structural relations.



2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be abstracted away without 
making the entire result meaningless.


I have some sympathy with this, but Bruno is trying to explain the physical as 
computational, so he can't very well assume the physical.  Although he frequently refers 
to eliminating the physical, when asked he quickly says he's only explaining the physical 
and eliminating it as *primitive*.  I don't see that as any more problematic or unusual 
than explaining quarks by strings or spacetime by loop-quantum-gravity.  You're not 
*eliminating* anything - you're just trying to explain it.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-13 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/13/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


Hi benjayk,

   This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He 
does not see several things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute 
structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.


On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 
1-indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to 
say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to 
just formulate clearly.


Dear Bruno,

Oh, right, I missed that implication, but do you see my point as 
well? The diagonalization applies to everything, even your result. The 
point that I am trying to emphasize is that we can never be at the 
ultimate level, we can at best point at it and approximate/represent it. 
Any approximation will have dual aspects, one partly logical and 
abstract and the other concrete an physical. The reasoning for this is 
that meaningfulness is 3p, it is never just 1p (if we assumed that it 
was 1-p we would get a degeneracy condition and only have a bet of its 
truth and nowhere to cash in if it where true by many other 1-p's).
 The concept that some people have used for this is the notion of a 
witness in the sense that it is not sufficient for me to know that X 
is true, X must be true to at least two witnesses that are not under my 
control. This explanation is very crude still, my apologies.






2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be 
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.


This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical 
implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non 
physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.


Yes, but I am not considering human perception; I am assuming 
panprotopsychism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Dualism: 
everything is aware and has a 1-p, my conjecture is that the UD 
rides on the unitary evolution of the QM system and thus each and 
every QM ssytem is an observer and has some level of awareness. It is 
for this reason that I am motivated to assume that the universe is 
quantum and that the classical picture is just an image that the 
universe generates via our interactions with each other.





Bruno





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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-13 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/13/2012 1:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/13/2012 4:55 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi benjayk,

This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He 
does not see several things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute 
structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.


They are not unique, but however they are chosen they represent the 
same structure. There is no unique representation of QM: wave 
functions, Hilbert space, Feynmann paths,...  But they all predict the 
same physics and so represent the same structural relations.



2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be 
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.


I have some sympathy with this, but Bruno is trying to explain the 
physical as computational, so he can't very well assume the physical.  
Although he frequently refers to eliminating the physical, when asked 
he quickly says he's only explaining the physical and eliminating it 
as *primitive*.  I don't see that as any more problematic or unusual 
than explaining quarks by strings or spacetime by 
loop-quantum-gravity.  You're not *eliminating* anything - you're just 
trying to explain it.


Brent


Hi Brent,

Well said. I agree! I jsut wanted to highlight a different point of 
view from Bruno's. My comments are not a knock-down of his result, it is 
just an attempt to focus on a different aspect of it.


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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
precise
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).

I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth
Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp,
both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.

There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).

But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by
Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand
the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean != or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true,
because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that
others share this assumption.

I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
numbers in arithmetic itself. This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).

For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this
website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
  On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
 
 
  Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
  I want to
  attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
  and I am
  obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
  discussion.
 
  We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
  precise
  arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
  adress the issue.
  Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
  then we
  still need a super-meta (etc...).
 
  I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
  no need of meta for that.
  You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth
  Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp,
  both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
  be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
  intuitive.
 
  There is no proof that can change this,
  and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
  they just
  introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).
 
  But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
  will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
  is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
  print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by
  Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.
 
 Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
 aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand
 the main idea quite well.

 If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
 unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
 thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof.
 Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
 prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean !=
 or
 ^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

 Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
 level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be
 true,
 because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
 You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
 axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
 magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a
 belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that
 others share this assumption.



Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human
prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really
representing or that they really understand?

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this,
other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't
have that great a track record?

The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and ontological bets
shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to remain sincere somehow, why
restrict ourselves to the habitual ones?

Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing.

m

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread benjayk

Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:

There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I
understand
the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous
proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean !=
or
^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be
true,
because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
magically know what they are really representing. But this is just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted
that
others share this assumption.

Problem of pinning down real representation in itself aside. Can human
prove to impartial observer that they magically know what they are really
representing or that they really understand?

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do
this,
other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't
have that great a track record?

Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at all? I
don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really is a
proof on?
The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one to me.

Apart from that, it seems human understanding is just delusion in many
cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we think we
really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded.

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 12 Sep 2012, at 14:05, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:



Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
precise
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or  
even

adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).


I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth
Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with  
comp,

both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.


There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in  
arithmetic).


But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by
Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some  
subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I  
understand

the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof.


What? this is nonsense.





The embedding is not unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous  
proof.


This does not follow either. *Many* embeddings do not prevent non  
ambiguous embedding.






Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations  
could
prove utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean  
!= or

^6 instead of =, the whole proof is nonsense.


Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.  
That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. What  
will be proved will be shown independent of the choice of the  
embeddings.







Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,


Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously  
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should  
study the subject.




or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to  
be true,

because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.


Gödel could have used it, like in Tarski theorem, but Gödel ingenuosly  
don't use meaning or semantic in he proof. It is a very constructive  
proof, which examplifies the mechanisability of its main  
diagonalization procedure. This has lead to a very great amount of  
results, the most cool being Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem  
for the logic of self-reference.



You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond  
their

axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence,


What do you mean by exists beyond the axiom.?
What transcendent intelligence is doing here?






so that they somehow
magically know what they are really representing. But this is  
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be  
granted that

others share this assumption.


No need of that belief. Machine's belief are just supposed to be made  
of the axioms and the rules generating them, which can include inputs,  
and other possible machines. It is model by Gödel's provability  
predicate for rich machines.





I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the  
problem.


You created a problem which is not there.




It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not  
the proof

as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
numbers in arithmetic itself.


?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,  
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...  
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in  
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.






This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).


Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the  
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this  
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.





For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look  
at this

website:

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-11 Thread benjayk


Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, precise
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we
still need a super-meta (etc...). There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-11 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:



Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume  
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),  
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good  
discussion.


We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,  
precise

arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but  
then we

still need a super-meta (etc...).


I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,  
no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth 1+1=2, and the complex truth  
Paul understood that 1+1=2. Those are very different, but with comp,  
both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to  
be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- 
intuitive.





There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as  
they just

introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).


But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There  
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It  
is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now  
print by Dover) The undecidable, it contains all original papers by  
Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-10 Thread benjayk

at
all about pretending it is something holy that is telling us what to think
and what to do and how to view the world, in the same way that I am not
thinking highly of dogmatic religion. It is harmful IMO and not conducive to
our well-being.
I am only slightly displeased that you act a bit like your reasoning is
beyond doubt by dogmatically rejecting every argument against it (simply
claiming it does not show a flaw, and then asking where the flaw is). You
say that the argument is wrong and that's it - read the paper (...and you
will see that you are wrong).
There is no technical flaw in it, because the flaw is that it is not a
precise argument in the first place (vague assumption=vague or wrong
reasoning=vague or wrong conclusion). You never clearly define what YES
doctor means.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The ideally correct machine is shown, by using the most standard antic
definitions, to have a genuine theology, but you remain free to
consider them as zombie, if that is your theory.
I don't consider *anything* zombie, even the most inert matter. Machines
just don't have clearly determined points of view, IMO.
But I think most persons don't have one either, which is maybe too radical
to even seriously propose (without being ridiculed or be met with
hostility).

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.


Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to  
Plato

than to Aristotle.

The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted,


Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp,  
either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be  
honest, varying.


You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.  
It is simply not my job.





and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true


Nor does any scientific theory prove anything if they are false.




and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations  
can

lead to a 1p of view).


? The assumption is comp (yes doctore + CT). The conclusion is that  
physics is secondary and has to be extracted from arithmetic. The  
gift is that we can use arithmetic to separate the quanta from the  
qualia.

The point is technical.




You say assuming COMP, but COMP is either impossible with respect  
to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible  
due to

matter being non-digital),


This is not valid, unless you assume to be primitively material, which  
is shown to be not the case with the comp hypothesis.





or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion


Unless you have a flaw in mind, the paper illustrate the contrary.



(kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict
reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but  
actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point  
of view.


What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum  
analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot  
react with real oxygen.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them  
on a

meta-level.


On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of
metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at  
that

level on the *meta-level*.


This is just false.



Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).


False. I can only suggest you to study the original paper, or to  
follow some good course in logic.
You just miss the most original and admittedly astonishing part of  
Gödel's proof.





You act like Gödel eliminates the meta-level, but he does not do  
this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because  
otherwise the

whole reasoning ceases to make sense).


Gödel does not eliminate the metalevel. On the contrary it shows that  
machines or formal theory can access to it.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It i#s like saying  study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet).


No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you  
ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting  
like you

are only showing rational consequences of some belief.


I am not acting like. This is what I do.




I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine,  
open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to  
be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional  
at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue  
with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as  
being

obfuscation).


What you call obfuscation is just the originality. I take a problem  
usually addressed by philosopher or theologian, and I show that if we  
assume comp, we can derive testable conclusion.
I know that some philosophers are sick at this, but that is a  
tradition in human history. This is discussed in other

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

  
of your

head is a physical object, and thus non-digital.
You confuse the notions of physically digital and abstractly  
digital.





In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all,
except in a
very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking -
digital
(we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.


You lost me here.


Any actual substitution can't be purely digital, and so the reasoning
doesn't work because it reasons as if the substitution is digital.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-08 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.

Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato
than to Aristotle.
The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted, and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations can
lead to a 1p of view).

You say assuming COMP, but COMP is either impossible with respect to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible due to
matter being non-digital), or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion
(kinda digital, digital at some level are not enough for a strict
reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.

On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is arithmetization of
metamathematics. It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that
level on the *meta-level*. Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).

You act like Gödel eliminates the meta-level, but he does not do this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because otherwise the
whole reasoning ceases to make sense).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It i#s like saying study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet).

No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting like you
are only showing rational consequences of some belief.

I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine, open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as being
obfuscation).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I work in a theory and I do my best to
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not
is another topic.
Well, I am not saying your being *intentionally* misleading or avoiding, but
it certainly appears to me that you are avoiding the issue - perhaps because
you just don't see it.
You are defending your reasoning, while always avoiding the main point that
your reasoning does either depend on unstated assumption (we are already
digital, or only the digital part of a substitution can matter), or rely on
a vague (practically digital substitution) or contradictory (purely digital
substitution, which is not possible, because purely digital is nonsense with
regards to matter) premise.
The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive
abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of view don't
necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus confusing
your reader which thinks that you actually showed a relation between
*actual* points of view and arithmetics).

It doesn't matter whether I like COMP or not. I don't find it a very
fruitful assumption, but that's not the issue.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-06 Thread benjayk

with
regards to
that part of us, unless we consider that level not-me (and this
doesn't
make any sense to me).

Indeed we are not our material body. We are the result of the
activity
of the program supported by that body. That's comp.

I don't have a clue why you believe this is senseless or
inconsistent.
For one thing, with COMP we postulate that we can substitute a brain
with a
digital emulation (yes doctor),

At some level.

yet the brain

The material brain.

and every possible
substitution can't be purely digital according to your reasoning
(since
matter is not digital).

Change of matter is not important if it preserves the right
functionality at some level.
How does that relate to the issue? We have no way of making statements about
the computational functionality of matter (and thus the right level) if
matter is non-digital.
It is ill-defined.

You even say yourself that the correct substitution level is unknowable. But
not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital substitution is
meaningless in a non-digital universe.
Sure we can have *relatively* digital substitutions (like a physical
computer). But you can't derive anything from that, because your reasoning
assumes that the substitution is digital (in a very strict sense of allowing
precise copying etc...).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
argue that
COMP says functionally correct substitution, meaning that it also
has to
be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
derive
anything from this, because a correct implementation may actually
require
a biological brain or even something more.

The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
exist.
But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement,
meaning kinda digital substitution.
In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all, except in a
very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking - digital
(we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Sep 2012, at 20:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually*  
live, I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a  
meaningful 3-p point
of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really  
just an

abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an  
abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?


This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search  
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.


Dear Bruno,

In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is  
not a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about  
representations of 1p not the content of the 1p itself. There are  
situations when the map is not the territory...


The 1p of the machine have no 3p-representations at all. This follows  
simply from Theaetetus definition of knowledge in arithmetic, with  
believability played by provability (as we lost Provable(p) - p),  
and restrict the interview on ideally correct machine.








With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number  
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to  
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).


But you are assuming that numbers can do the work. I beg to  
differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they  
do not do anything at all. There is no action in numbers. To  
represent action we need at least functions to map some object to  
some other different object.


You forget that a universal number associate to each number an  
action mapping number on number.

As I just recall in another post u(i, x) = phi_i(x).







So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like  
1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker.


But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it  
cannot be known in any way?


Its truth is its meaning. It has nothing to do with being known or not  
by an agent.
In logic this is universally accepted for arithmetic, but not for more  
powerful theories.




I can only make sense of your claim here if I stipulate that you  
think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for the content of  
the statement; such that if the statement is true then it does not  
matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how you go  
from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as the  
particular property of the sentence 1+1=2 to the truth of the  
intention of the sentence.


Good. machines already can know that we can't. Bp - p is not provable  
for arbitrary sentence. With comp, Truth is only a private hope,  
somehow.




How is the sentence #8$% not equally true in the absence of any  
thinker and have the same meaning as 1+1=2?



#8$% is a sentence, not a proposition.

When I say that 1+1=2 is true, I mean only that 1 + 1 = 2, not that  
the sentence 1+1=2 is true.


So if you want to know if #8$%  is true, just tell me if #8$% or  
not. perhaps explain the meaning of it.


You might confuse sentence and proposition. It is obvious that IF  
1+1=2 means that Stephen Paul King is 42 km high, it is plausibly  
false, but that would not change the fact that 1 + 1 is equal to 2.




What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that  
there is something above that some how can see the truth of  
1+1=2 and know that it is a true sentence and that it is  
completely immaterial and not a thinker. Plato was a bit more  
circumspect about assuming such things, I hope!


Just saying that 1+1=2, and that such a fact does not depend on me,  
you, or the physical universe. To be communicated, yes, you need a  
physical universe, or a human universe, that is some stable sharable  
computations with the relevant measure, etc. That's the problem I  
explain we have to solve.










It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is  
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X'  
changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable  
of or in X, X', ... .


A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory  
which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your  
sentence.


Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model- 
less theories? Are they even possible?


In first order logic:
A theory has a model (but not as a term in itself) iff it is  
consistent (that is; does not prove f).






We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can  
make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by  
using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).


Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live,
I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful
3-p point
of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just
an

abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.

Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an
abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?

This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.

With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).

So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like
1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker.

It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X'
changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable
of or in X, X', ... .

A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which
is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.
We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make
machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using
the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).

Bruno

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

. More probably you just don't want to lose your  
proof,
because it seems to be very important you (you defended it in  
thousands of
posts). But honestly, this is just ego and has nothing to do with a  
genuine

search for truth.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I 
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 
3-p point

of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction 
(a simulation even!) of a 1-p?


This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search 
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.


Dear Bruno,

In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not 
a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p 
not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is 
not the territory...




With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number 
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to 
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).


But you are assuming that numbers can do the work. I beg to 
differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do 
not do anything at all. There is no action in numbers. To represent 
action we need at least functions to map some object to some other 
different object.




So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like 
1+1=2 remains true in absence of any thinker.


But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it 
cannot be known in any way? I can only make sense of your claim here if 
I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for 
the content of the statement; such that if the statement is true then 
it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how 
you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as 
the particular property of the sentence 1+1=2 to the truth of the 
intention of the sentence. How is the sentence #8$% not equally true 
in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as 1+1=2?
What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there 
is something above that some how can see the truth of 1+1=2 and know 
that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and not 
a thinker. Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things, 
I hope!





It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is 
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X - X' 
changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would be a variable of 
or in X, X', ... .


A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which 
is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.


Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model-less 
theories? Are they even possible?


We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make 
machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using 
the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).


Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a machine 
is, in your sentence here, taken from the intentional stance (or point 
of view) of another entity (that is not the machine in question), so 
that makes it bisimilar to the 1p of a separate entity. Where is the 
contradiction to my claim?



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 03 Sep 2012, at 16:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing  
on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency  
of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses  
the

induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake
of
the emulation without any inner conviction.

I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases
were PA
does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that
the RA level was enough.
Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that  
the RA

level would be enough.


Why?



I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can  
be made
sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low  
level

is enough.


For the ontology. Yes.




This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say  
that we
only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges  
from that

as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers.


I say that this follows from comp.




Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself
can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what  
transcends the
numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also  
completely

beyond our conception of numbers).


?




That's the problem with Gödel as well. His unprovable statement about
numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that  
doesn't
even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He  
really
just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways  
that
can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them  
has

little to do with the numbers themselves).


Gödel already knew that the numbers (theories) can do that. He bet  
that the second incompleteness theorem is a theorem of PA. This will  
be proved by Hilbert and Bernays later. Then Löb generalized this, etc.






I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely  
many

things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely.


Numbers can do that to, relatively to universal numbers. It is the  
whole (technical) point.





Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I  
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- 
p point

of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he
survives through that process.
On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives  
in his

quotes and writings.


He does not survive in writing and quotes. That is only a metaphor.  
But he does survive in the usual sense in the emulation, assuming comp.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some
relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite
different.

Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and
high-level processes.


Like arithmetic.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context
we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to
make
sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer,

and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I 
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p 
point

of view where this isn't true. This point of view is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction 
(a simulation even!) of a 1-p? It seems to me that this would similar to 
having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its 
beliefs as X - X' changes, all while preserving the Bpp term, p would 
be a variable of or in X, X', ... .


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread benjayk

to suggest it. That's the
contradiction.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

If there was something outside the universe
to interpret the simulation, then this would be the level on which
we can't
be substituted (and if this would be substituted, then the level
used to
interpret this substitution couldn't be substituted, etc).
In any case, there is always a non-computational level, at which no
digital
substitution is possible - and we would be wrong to say YES with
regards to
that part of us, unless we consider that level not-me (and this
doesn't
make any sense to me).

Indeed we are not our material body. We are the result of the activity
of the program supported by that body. That's comp.

I don't have a clue why you believe this is senseless or inconsistent.
For one thing, with COMP we postulate that we can substitute a brain with a
digital emulation (yes doctor), yet the brain and every possible
substitution can't be purely digital according to your reasoning (since
matter is not digital).
So if we do a substitution, it could only be a semi-digital or a non-digital
substitution, but then your whole reasoning falls apart (the steps assume
you are solely digital).

COMP is simply contradictory, unless we take for granted your result (we are
already only arithmetical, and so no substitution does really take place -
yes doctor is just a metaphor for I am digital), but then it is
tautological and your reasoning is merely an explanation of what it means if
we are digital.

Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and argue that
COMP says functionally correct substitution, meaning that it also has to
be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't derive
anything from this, because a correct implementation may actually require
a biological brain or even something more.

Actually I don't think you have any problems to understand that on an
intellectual level. More probably you just don't want to lose your proof,
because it seems to be very important you (you defended it in thousands of
posts). But honestly, this is just ego and has nothing to do with a genuine
search for truth.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-03 Thread benjayk

), just as you can practically substitute apple
juice with orange juice as a healthy morning drink. You still can't
substitute it with fuel though, no matter what you do with it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and
computers.
OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that you take
it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes sense in
that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider it
plausible, or honestly even meaningful.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of
what
level we think about computation.

This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level
(unlike comp).
Assuming church-turing thesis ;).

In my opinion that's precisely where it goes wrong. It wants to abstract
from levels, but really just trivializes computation in the process
(reducing it to the lowest level aspect of computation).

I think what a computer computes does only make sense in the context of the
machine. Eg if one turing machine emulates another the emulation just makes
sense if we consider the turing machine that is emulated. Otherwise we can't
state that it emulates anything (because its computation doesn't have to be
interpreted as an emulation).
This is also an argument against CT: If we take it to be true, the notion of
emulation ceases to make sense (because emulation is not an absolute
computational notion, but relates on computation with another).

Even the computation 1+1=2 doesn't make sense apart from context. What do
one thing and two things even mean if we try to completely abstract from
things? Nothing.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate
einstein
(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able
to converse with Einstein.
Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all
(due to
possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write
a post
about this later), that is still not necessarily the case.
It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation.
And I
don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.

No doubt for the first person sense, that's true, even with comp. You
might clarify a bit more your point.
Apparently you know what I mean if you say its true from the first person.
But then considering that this is what we *actually experience*, I don't see
how it makes any sense to try to abstract from that (postulating a 3-p
perspective).

In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the correct
interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like saying
No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can substitute
it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then insert the
result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X.
If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real
einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case we can't
*always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original left to
interpret the emulation).
Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole universe with
an emulation (which is possible according to COMP) than there is nothing
left to interpret the emulation. We couldn't even say whether it is an
emulation or not (because a computation itself is not an emulation, just
it's relation with the orginal). If there was something outside the universe
to interpret the simulation, then this would be the level on which we can't
be substituted (and if this would be substituted, then the level used to
interpret this substitution couldn't be substituted, etc).
In any case, there is always a non-computational level, at which no digital
substitution is possible - and we would be wrong to say YES with regards to
that part of us, unless we consider that level not-me (and this doesn't
make any sense to me).

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread Terren Suydam

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.

Terren

On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

 hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
 potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
 status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
 regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
 computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
 that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
 infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
 arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
 can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the
 infinite computations going through my state.  Otherwise, I think the
 physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
 particulars of how the UD unfolds.

 Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
 ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
 think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my
 state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
 interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
 is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.


 You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we
 might as well think of it's computations as completed.

 I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't
 exist.  The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still
 exists.

 Brent



 Terren

 On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

 But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
 infinities.
 Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any
 given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations
 that
 will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you.

 Brent


 On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

 It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
 computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
 ordinality of the infinities involved.

 Terren

 Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
 computations.
 So
 at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is
 very
 small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

 Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread meekerdb

Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible 
persons?...e.g. materialism.


Bren

On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.

Terren

On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the
infinite computations going through my state.  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.


You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we
might as well think of it's computations as completed.

I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't
exist.  The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still
exists.

Brent



Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net   wrote:

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
infinities.
Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations
that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you.

Brent


On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is
very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 30 Aug 2012, at 06:21, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all
the

potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the
infinite computations going through my state. Otherwise, I think
the

physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

OK. All what counts should be the relative measure. In some state,
some continuations should have a bigger measure, and this should
correspond to more computations going in your current states, and the
most probable next one.

You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia,

Well, with comp Platonia is just a tiny part of arithmetical truth,
and the UD exists there in some provable way. We don't need to think
this to make it true.

then we might as well think of it's computations as completed.

OK.

I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you
can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but
it still exists.

But this mixes different questions. Computations involving PI might
have, from the first person machine's point of view, a high measure,
in case the circle idea-program get some relatively local crucial
rôle (as it is very probable, as the circle is a key in many part of
number theory, and elsewhere).

Bruno

Brent

Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
infinities.
Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since
at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many
computations that

will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you.

Brent

On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren

Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
computations.

So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of
you is

very
small, but non-zero. But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

  On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

 On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

 Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in
 arithmetic.


 This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies
 are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the
 same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation
 of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp.


 No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't
 ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.


 Hi Brent,

 Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase generation
 by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of
 letters appearing on our computer monitors.


   But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that
 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences.


 Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about in
 his step 8.


I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only thing
he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy on the
infinite set of computations that goes through our current state (the one
assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution level) that diverge on
the next step.

Quentin



   Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or
 wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


 Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white rabbit
 problem using ideas from game theory?


 Brent
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase generation by the UD 
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our 
computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a 
time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi Brent, I didn't wrote what is quoted, it's Stephen ;)

Quentin

2012/8/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

  On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 Hi Brent,

 Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase generation
 by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of
 letters appearing on our computer monitors.


 Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations,
 one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually
 generate you.

 Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 2:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/8/29 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net


On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they
abound in arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that
all copies are identical and this by the principle of
indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality
generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state
association to a mind, but this would contradict comp.


No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics
isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by
the UD.


Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer
monitors.



  But I think it is right that there must be an associated
physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world
it experiences.


Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining
about in his step 8.


I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only 
thing he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy 
on the infinite set of computations that goes through our current 
state (the one assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution 
level) that diverge on the next step.


Quentin


Hi Quentin,

You are technically correct, but that merely sidesteps the point.

The problem that I am trying to overcome is the non-uniqueness of 
Godel numberings. There are an infinite number of currect states (of 
which our current state is one) and each of these has an infinite 
number of computations running though them. I agree with this piece of 
the idea, btw. The states are identical to each other in the sense that 
there is nothing that distinguishes them so we need a mechanism that 
relates them in a non-trivial way.
What I am considering is a way to define orderings on them; a way 
to daisy chain them by defining the fixed point of one (a spacial point) 
to be not a fixed point on the next one. There is a rule involved that 
relates the possibility of a state to be a fixed point to whether or not 
it was previously, thereby setting up a precedent rule.
The key is to use the use of a constant by a non-standard model of 
arithmetic as a one-time fixed point (like a unique one time cypher for 
the Godel numbering), so that we can use the plurality of non-equivalent 
non-standard models as a boon and not a curse. We end up with strings of 
strongly related models and a nice way to solve the white rabbit problem.






  Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours
or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white
rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated 
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible 
computations, one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it 
must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero 
chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers.


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase generation by the UD 
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on 
our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a 
time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero chance. The UD seems 
to be ergodic on the Integers.


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage 
short the infinite completion the probability of you is very small, but non-zero.  But 
we already knew that.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Terren Suydam

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren

 Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
 at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very
 small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

 Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 10:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated 
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible 
computations, one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then 
it must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will eventually generate me, but with a measure zero 
chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers.


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite 
computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the 
probability of you is very small, but non-zero.  But we already knew 
that.


Brent


I agree but the details of this are being crudely glossed over and 
they are of utmost importance here! We need a precise definition of the 
at any stage short of the infinite completion term. I suspect that we 
can capture this using the uncountable infinity of non-standard models 
of arithmetic 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_model_of_arithmetic and 
relations between the models to give us a nice formal model.


The existence of non-standard models of arithmetic can be 
demonstrated by an application of the compactness theorem. To do this, a 
set of axioms P* is defined in a language including the language of 
Peano arithmetic together with a new constant symbol x. The axioms 
consist of the axioms of Peano arithmetic P together with another 
infinite set of axioms: for each numeral n, the axiom x  n is included. 
Any finite subset of these axioms is satisfied by a model which is the 
standard model of arithmetic plus the constant x interpreted as some 
number larger than any numeral mentioned in the finite subset of P*. 
Thus by the compactness theorem there is a model satisfying all the 
axioms P*. Since any model of P* is a model of P (since a model of a set 
of axioms is obviously also a model of any subset of that set of 
axioms), we have that our extended model is also a model of the Peano 
axioms. /The element of this model corresponding to x cannot be a 
standard number, because as indicated it is larger than any standard 
number/.


The x would play the role of the inverse of the epsilon of 
proximity to infinite completion.


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


Hi Terry,

I think so too. I wonder if this could be captured by assuming the 
opposite of Cantor continuum hypothesis? Or by thinking of computations 
as integers embedded in hyperreal numbers.


On 8/29/2012 12:04 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.  Of course that 
also implies that you are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still 
remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states 
instantiating you.


Brent

On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Terren Suydam

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the
infinite computations going through my state.  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.

Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.
 Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any
 given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that
 will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you.

 Brent


 On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

 It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
 computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
 ordinality of the infinities involved.

 Terren

 Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations.
 So
 at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is
 very
 small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

 Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary current state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from the
infinite computations going through my state.  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a lesser infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.


You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well 
think of it's computations as completed.


I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist.  The 
number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists.


Brent



Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.
Of course that also implies that you are never complete, since at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating you.

Brent


On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of you is
very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Craig Weinberg

What you are all missing is this:

A particular kind of pattern (in sand or salt) can be generated by 
generating a specific sound (cymatics).

The same pattern would be generated whether or not any human ear was 
present to hear the 'sound' as an audible experience.
The same pattern could be manually generated by other means - sweeping the 
salt into the desired shapes by hand or tiny magnetic robots, etc.
This process would generate no audible experience to anyone.

While we have grown accustomed to thinking of sound waves as something that 
literally exists and causes physical changes, if we pay attention to the 
process of generating sound, we can realize that it can only be generated 
by mechanically vibrating a physical object to begin with. Indeed, without 
a molecule-filled plenum to vibrate, there is no way for sound to propagate 
between solid objects which are separated by space.

This illustrates that the wave itself - the computation, does not exist 
independently of the objects which are participating in the event. The 
event has computable aspects - its predictable effects on objects of 
particular forms and densities, etc, but the sound that is associated with 
the wave in a human mind is not computable. There is no reason to assume 
that the vibratory behaviors which we observe with some (but not all) of 
our other human senses, visual and tactile, is any more of an objective 
definition than the quality of the sound to our ears.

Computation is always only something that material stuff is doing - and 
material stuff is only a tactile-visual presentation.

So why would any kind of oracle requirement of a computation conjure up any 
quality or possibility of an 'experience'? This assumes that scooping salt 
in fancy circles makes sound magically appear in the universe. Computation 
does not need awareness, but awareness needs computation as a way of 
externalizing experience. Computation cannot be primitive because we would 
never know about it - nothing would know about it. Computation is an 
abstract skeleton of relation between objects, but it can never explain 
imagination or sense itself.

Craig


On Sunday, August 26, 2012 2:56:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: 
  
  
  I agree different implementations of intelligence have different 
 capabilities and 
  roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any 
 intelligence (so long 
  as infinities or true randomness are not required). 
  
  And now a subtle point. Perhaps. 
  
  The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence 
 EVEN if 
  infinities and true randomness are required for it. 
  
  Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under 
 the form of a some 
  non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... 
 (say) 
  
  Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my 
 substitution level, 
  because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain 
 into a finite 
  string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor 
 copy me at the 
  right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to 
 the oracle, so I 
  will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on 
 that oracle. 
  
  Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front 
 of that oracle? 
  
  Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in 
 this case, he 
  will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of 
 all finite 
  approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person 
 indeterminacy will have 
  as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where 
 my virtual brain 
  use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. 
  
  A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a 
 computation 
  requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. 

 That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical 
 world and 
 consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides 
 essential 
 interactions with consciousness as a computational process.  Of course 
 that doesn't 
 require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too. 

 Brent 

  
  Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then 
 comp would be just 
  false, and the brain need an infinite interface. 
  
  The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even 
 infinite non 
  computable one. 
  
  Bruno 
  
  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
  
  
  



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Stephen P. King

On 8/27/2012 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.

But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries
pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA
uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).

Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein
through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has
survived, or that he survives through that process.

Dear Bruno,

Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity
capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein!
I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must
come clean about this!

What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0. Or I miss
what you are asking.

Dear Bruno,

The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds.
SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and,
at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.

After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person
plural handled the many minds.

Dear Bruno,

I am trying to get you to explain to us in detail how the copy and
paste operation of a body (as described in your papers) generates copies
of minds that are not identical to each other. BTW, there is a very nice
Google Book of Smorynski's article on self-reference here
http://books.google.com/books?hl=enlr=id=wwXfHT5ka_8Coi=fndpg=PA1dq=logic+of+arithmetical+self-referenceots=51rs_0l3Mlsig=UhcErZpSm4KTECVdkfLfwMF1LBk#v=onepageq=logic%20of%20arithmetical%20self-referencef=false
.

That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).

Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite
different.

Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution
levels?

There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that
you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels
are correct, I would say, by definition.

OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...

Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound
in arithmetic.

This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all
copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one
and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a
necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would
contradict comp. I have a solution to this! Use the relativization that
we can get by relativizing the Tennenbaum theorem! Each mind is
associated with a unique constant that it cannot see, as it is its
Kleene fixed point. That way we can have a true plurality of unique and
distinct minds.
Somewhat surprisingly, it was the poker game
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_man%27s_bluff_%28poker%29 of blind
man's bluff and the book by Smullyan /What Is the Name of This Book?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0139550623 /that
gave me the idea. It

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound 
in arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all 
copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are 
one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there 
is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but 
this would contradict comp.


No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't 
ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.


Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
generation by the UD might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless 
combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.



  But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, 
that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences.


Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about 
in his step 8.


  Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or 
wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white 
rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?




Brent
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Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Aug 2012, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:

I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough
to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true
randomness are not required).

And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate
intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required
for it.

Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example
under the form of a some non compressible sequence
11101111011000110101011011... (say)

Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at
my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for
the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence
operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right
comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to
the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my
consciousness depends on that oracle.

Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in
front of that oracle?

Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs,
and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large
delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the
oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have
as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation
where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part
of the oracle.

A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course
of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.

That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the
physical world and consciousness; that the physical world acts like
the oracle and provides essential interactions with consciousness as
a computational process.

OK.

Of course that doesn't require that the physical world be an oracle
- it may be computable too.

It has to have the two aspects, and, a priori, the random oracles
rules, as they are vastly more numerous. That's the measure, or white
rabbit problem. Physics must be described by something linear at the
bottom and involving deep (in Bennett sense) observer, so as to
stabilize consciousness on long coherent histories.
That would makes us both relatively rare, and yet multiplied in a
continuum, if the physical computation manage well the dovetailing
on the oracles. The math confirms this, but a refutation of comp is
not yet completely excluded too.

Bruno

Brent

Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step,
then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite
interface.

The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input,
even infinite non computable one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing  
on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency  
of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses  
the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the  
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me  
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano  
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases  
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize  
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),  
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein  
through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine  
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has  
survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

   Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the  
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity  
capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you  
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein!  
I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must  
come clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a  
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss what  
you are asking.









That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.


   Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution  
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still  
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that  
you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are  
correct, I would say, by definition.
If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I  
simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will  
automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will  
not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and  
memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?








It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of  
an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many  
context we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple  
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk  
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture  
to make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally  
different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the  
same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is  
totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same  
with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies  
to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am  
willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


   But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a  
physical implementation,


In which modal logic?



what is universal is that not a particular physical system is  
required for the chess program.




With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their  
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs  
and computers.


   I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions  
between separate minds implies seperation of implementations and  
this only happens in the physical realm.


No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that all  
implementations and interactions are already emulated in arithmetic,  
as

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries  
pointing on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example  
Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the  
consistency of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA  
uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the  
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to  
me you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano  
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in  
cases were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize  
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),  
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become  
Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a  
genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that  
he has survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

  Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the  
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity  
capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you  
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of  
Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but  
you must come clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a  
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss  
what you are asking.


Dear Bruno,

   The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple  
minds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single  
mind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.


?

After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person  
plural handled the many minds.














That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.


  Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution  
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still  
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience  
(that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all  
levels are correct, I would say, by definition.


   OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...


Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound  
in arithmetic.






If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I  
simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will  
automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you  
will not see the difference (except for the price of the computer  
and memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?


   Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote I don't become  
Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine  
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has  
survived, or that he survives through that process these seems to  
be the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno  
are not one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be  
come him merely by reading a book just changing your name.


Yes. comp has no problem with many minds.











It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture  
of an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many  
context we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an  
apple because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we  
talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture  
to make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Aug 26, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears


A brain is nothing but a glob of grey goo says the robot.

 There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock.


Yes there is, the clock sauce is the information on what the position of
the atoms in the clock should be in.

 You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not
 do so for a reason.


  You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not
 me.


That is quite simply untrue, I never said everything happens for a reason!
I said everything happens for a reason OR everything does NOT happen for a
reason. Why this is supposed to be controversial escapes me.

 Why should we want to justify anything in the first place.


You tell me, you're the one who brought up justification.

 I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief


Then assuming your beliefs are consistent (a gargantuan assumption I
admit)  you believe that the belief generator in the mind is as
deterministic as a cuckoo clock.


  I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving their unworthiness
 to myself


Baloney.

Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so
 I guess typhoons have free will.


  Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them
 so that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas?


You tell me, you're the one going on and on about how the fact that reasons
can be complex has something to do with the free will noise.

 The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many influences or choose to
 seek a new alternative, but I can.


You choose it because you liked it better than the alternative, so you made
the choice for a reason, and the mechanical bird jumped out of the clock at
noon for a reason too. For months now you have been chanting the word
choose as if it magically sweeps away all problems, it does not

 I made the reason.


And something caused you to make that reason or something did not cause you
to make that reason.  Cuckoo clock or roulette wheel.

 Reasoning is a process


Yes exactly, reasoning is a process, that is to say it is a series of steps
leading to a outcome, a very good example of that would be a computer
program.


  Voluntary manslaughter is not an accident, it is unpremeditated murder.
 There is a difference.


A difference the law is unable to coherently explain which is why criminal
law is such a incredible muddle.

 It sounds like you are saying they [my opinions] are robotic, in which
 case there is no possibility that your robotic opinions could be any closer
 to an objective truth than my robotic opinions.


Not true. If steps in my reasoning have fewer random errors in them than
you have and the process does not start with axioms like everything is
true and everything is false then my robotic opinions will be closer to
the truth than your robotic opinions.

I t's funny that you care about the free market but without any free
 agency to actually use it.


You could make a model approximating how the world economy will evolve if
you assume all 7 billion people are rational agents trying to maximize
their gain. It's only a approximation because some people are not rational
and gain can mean more than just making money, and even so that's far too
complex for even a supercomputer to calculate; so we must make due with a
simplified approximation of a simplified approximation of the real thing.
And I haven't even mentioned things like the weather, earthquakes and
technological progress which can strongly influence economies. The
communists thought they could figure all this out and history proved them
to be not just wrong but spectacularly wrong.

 The reason doesn't matter even if their was one.


Then I don't know what  doesn't matter means because X caused Y and X did
not cause Y doesn't mean anything.

The butterfly wing was the reason. Who cares.


I do.

 The point is that you can't approach the totality of the cosmos and
 consciousness as a mechanical problem.


True, but the totality of the cosmos and consciousness is a mechanical
problem or it is not a mechanical problem.


  I don't think that having reasons or no reasons matters at all.


I believe that's true, that is what you think.

  John K Clark

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012  Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.


  None of them are the reasons of a clock.


Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs at
the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with a
different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a
different reason.

 If you must manufacture reasons,


You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do so
for a reason.

 The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new
 and justify it with a reason later.


You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding the
reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard,
sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and
sometimes we don't even have a clue. And think about the debates on this
list, once you've shown that your opponent has the belief he does for no
reason you feel you've won the debate.

 Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be
 called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon.


Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I
guess typhoons have free will.

 There are countless reasons which can influence me


And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock.

 but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that
 influence


And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no
reason, and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason.
And I don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but
I do know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it
for no reason.

 I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not
 random nor predetermined


More of the  X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt to
prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that you
should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it
will tell you anything about how the world works.

 And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is
 either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to
 agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.


Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must be
true:
1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to.
2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want to.


 My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or
 random?


There could be disagreement about that, I have my opinion and you have
yours, but I know one thing for certain, one of those 2 possibilities must
be true. I produce the particular sequence of ASCII characters that I did
after your sequence about the free will noise for a reason or I did so for
no reason. And I remind you that even a robot doesn't feel like a robot
because he's never sure what he's going to do next until he does it.

 All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved.


All proofs depend on the axioms used and axioms are supposed to be simple
and self evidently true, but your basic axiom is everything is true and
everything is false and so you can prove or disprove and even prove AND
disprove, anything you like.

 if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are
 noise.


If they are random then yes they are noise, but if they are robotic then
they are not, then it is logical and based on truth. And by the way, they
find the word robot offensive, I've seen them cry over the epithet, they
ask us not to use the R word and prefer metallic man.

 The market for eggs is not automatic, nor is it random.


The free market has no difficulty whatsoever determining what the price of
eggs should be.

 despite attempts to beat financial markets using technical analysis
 alone, such attempts repeatedly fail because no formula can account for all
 real world possibilities.


Yes, world economics is much too complicated for a simple formula to
describe its richness, and that's why the free market prove to be superior
to a planned economy like communism, the planners thought they had it all
figured out but in reality they never even came close. And for the same
reason nobody has developed a formula about how air moves inside a
hypersonic jet engine, but nobody thinks its because the engine chooses to
move the air in one way rather than another by using its free will in
some vague mystical way.

 It isn't random, nor is it determined by any historical reason except in
 hindsight.


Except? Not knowing a reason and a reason not existing are two very
different things.

 Why would you speak at all?


I am speaking and obviously I am doing so for a reason or I am doing so for
no reason; I think I'm doing so

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:



I agree different implementations of intelligence have different  
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to  
replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness  
are not required).


And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate  
intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it.


Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under  
the form of a some non compressible sequence  
11101111011000110101011011... (say)


Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my  
substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the  
doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence  
operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the right  
comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the  
oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness  
depends on that oracle.


Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front  
of that oracle?


Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and  
in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in  
between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key  
point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by  
definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual  
brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.


A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a  
computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.


Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then  
comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface.


The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even  
infinite non computable one.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from  
comp before this can be used as an argument here.


Normally??  The holographic principle was extracted from general  
relativity and the Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense  
it should be extracted from something else, but if you can do  
so, please do.  It would certainly impress me.





UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take  
10001000 centuries is not relevant.


Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it  
follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also  
generated by the UDA (along with everything else).


I guess you mean generated by the UD (the UD is a program, UDA is  
just an argument).


More or less OK, but it is not clear if you are not forgetting the  
first person indeterminacy. The real physical world is never  
generated by the UD, it is only recovered by the machines/programs,  
from their first person points of view based on the entire (infinite,  
non computable) domain of indeterminacy.


And this can help to see a sort of hologram at play, as that UD*  
border has to be a fractal structure with itself embedded  
everywhere. But I have never to much dig on that aspect, to be sure.


Unlike Schmidhuber and Tegmark seems to think, comp  does not allow to  
believe that the physical universe is a program among others, at least  
a priori. It is a richer epistemological invariant, not computable a  
priori,  pertaining to a sum on all computations. Schmidhuber and  
Tegmark just abstract themselves from the first person indeterminacy,  
and thus are not really assuming comp, or taking into account the  
existence of consciousness.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:30, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/24/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency
of Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can
prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA
uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for
the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction.

But, proving, believing, knowing, defining, etc. Are not absolute,
and are all relative to the system actually doing the proof, or the
knowing. Once such notion are, even just approximated semi-
axiomatically, they define complex lattices or partial orders of
unequivalent classes of machines, having very often transfinite
order type, like proving for example, for which there is a branch
of mathematical logic, known as Ordinal Analysis, which measures
the strength of theories by a constructive ordinal. PA's strength
is well now as being the ordinal epsilon zero, that is omega [4]
omega (= omega^omega^omega^...) as discovered by Gentzen).

Dear Bruno,

What happens when we take the notion of a system to those that
are not constructable by finite means? What happens to the proving,
believing, knowing defining, interviewing, etc.?

Amazingly, not a lot. That is why I say sometimes that comp can be
weakened a lot. G and G* are sound, not only for PA and ZF (which is
terribly more powerful than PA, with respect to provability, but, I
repeat, the same for computability). If you allow provability to be
even more powerful, and accept infinite inference rule, like the omega-
rule in analysis, or some axiomatic form of second order logic, or
even more non constructive, G and G* will still remains correct and
complete.

If you continue on that path, G and G* will remain correct, but no
more complete. That is the case if you define provability by satisfied
by some models of a rich theory. By Gödel completeness, satified in
all models of the theory, gives the usual provability. But
satisfaction by certain models leads to entities needing some
supllementary axioms to be added on G and G*. But the present comp
theory does not use completeness of G and G*, only the correctness,
and so you need to go really quite close to God, for avoding the
consequences of the arithmetical hypostases.

Now, to prove this is quite difficult. Solovay announced many of this
without proof, and the book by Boolos, the 1993 version gives the
detailed proof, but it is technically hard. I use comp, for reason of
simplicity, but it can be weakened a lot. I suspect that the real
needed axiom is just the assumption of self-duplicability, and not
digitalness.

Bruno

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:


But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake  
of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me  
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,  
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases  
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that  
the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just  
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through  
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with  
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he  
survives through that process.





That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.




It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an  
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context  
we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple  
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk  
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to  
make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,  
and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different  
computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game  
with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally  
different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.  
Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level  
and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have  
some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their  
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and  
computers.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of
processes) is also absolute.
OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it  
true,

necessarily.


That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt  
it less than the yes doctor part of comp, to be specific.




I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of  
what

level we think about computation.


This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level  
(unlike comp).






Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations,  
not with

respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because here instantiation  
and
description of the computation matter - I+II=III and  
9+2=11
describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical  
purposes
(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same  
computation
if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is  
actually

going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their
emulation).


Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnally  
correct substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might be that  
such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actually infinite  
being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of the scope of my  
study.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate  
einstein

(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able
to converse with Einstein.
Apart from the question of whether brains

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread meekerdb


On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:



I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and 
roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long 
as infinities or true randomness are not required).


And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if 
infinities and true randomness are required for it.


Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some 
non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say)


Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, 
because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite 
string. So such sequence operates outside my brain, and if the doctor copy me at the 
right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right interface to the oracle, so I 
will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle.


Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that 
oracle?

Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he 
will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite 
approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have 
as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain 
use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.


A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation 
requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.


That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical world and 
consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides essential 
interactions with consciousness as a computational process.  Of course that doesn't 
require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too.


Brent



Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just 
false, and the brain need an infinite interface.


The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non 
computable one.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:


But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of
the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you 
have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, 
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases 
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has 
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that 
the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just 
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through 
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with 
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he 
survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

Please explain this statement! How is there an Einstein the 
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity 
capable of knowing anything that can be communicated? Surely you are 
not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't 
have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean 
about this!





That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, 
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the 
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite 
different.


Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels?



It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an 
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context 
we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple 
because

we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make
sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, 
and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different 
computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game 
with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally 
different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. 
Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level 
and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have 
some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a 
physical implementation, what is universal is that not a particular 
physical system is required for the chess program.




With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their 
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and 
computers.


I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions between 
separate minds implies seperation of implementations and this only 
happens in the physical realm. Therefore the physical realm cannot be 
dismissed!







Bruno Marchal wrote:


With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of
processes) is also absolute.

OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true,
necessarily.


That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt 
it less than the yes doctor part of comp, to be specific.


How is Deutsch's version different?



I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of 
what

level we think about computation.


This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level 
(unlike comp).


I don't understand either.





Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, 
not with

respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because here

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Sunday, August 26, 2012 11:12:35 AM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012  Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

 a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.


 None of them are the reasons of a clock. 


Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs 
at the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with 
a different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a 
different reason.


A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears assembled by a 
human mind. There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock. There 
is no reasoning going by the clock as a clock. The clock doesn't know what 
time it is. It isn't keeping track of anything. There is no 'it there' to 
know that it has a face or hands or pendulum. These are all human 
interpretations for human reasons.

 If you must manufacture reasons,


You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do 
so for a reason.


You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not me.
 

 The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try 
something new and justify it with a reason later. 


You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding 
the reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard, 
sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and 
sometimes we don't even have a clue. 


Why should we want to justify anything in the first place. Just because we 
are complex beings with many interacting levels of influence doesn't 
disqualify our causally efficacious participation in it. Because something 
seems less than perfect does not mean that it is an illusion.
 

And think about the debates on this list, once you've shown that your 
opponent has the belief he does for no reason you feel you've won the 
debate.


I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief, I put it 
to them to examine their own assumptions and freely change them if they can 
make a greater sense. I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving 
their unworthiness to myself, I win if someone learns something, even if 
its not the person I happen to be talking to.

 Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else 
can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a 
typhoon. 


Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I 
guess typhoons have free will.


Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them so 
that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas?
 

 There are countless reasons which can influence me


And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock.


That's my point. The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many 
influences or choose to seek a new alternative, but I can.

 but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with 
that influence


And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no 
reason, 


No, I made the reason. It has no independent existence. Reasoning is a 
process by which I can make choices, or create new choices. I command my 
reason intentionally (to some extent). The only reason that I do that is 
because I can do that. I have the ability to create new reasons, unlike a 
clock.
 

and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason. And I 
don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but I do 
know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it for no 
reason.

 I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which 
is not random nor predetermined 


More of the  X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt 
to prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that 
you should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it 
will tell you anything about how the world works.  


Not desperate at all. I will be happy to explain to you in any form you 
like, however long it takes why your X must either be Y or not Y edict is a 
fallacy. This is not a new idea. Even from my thin exposure to mathematics 
I am aware of how concepts like non-wellfounded sets and incompleteness 
reveal the arbitrarily simplistic nature of this kind of robotic 
categorization. The universe is not a logic circuit.

 And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that 
everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you 
would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your 
position. 


Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must 
be true:
1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to.
2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want 
to.


Voluntary is not a

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Jason Resch

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 5:04 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk
  benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
 
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
  
   Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or
   nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you want
   into
   this sentence... or like the stuff that monkeys type on typewriters.
  
  
   A sentence (any string of information) can be interpreted in any
  possible
   way, but a computation defines/creates its own meaning.  If you see a
   particular step in an algorithm adds two numbers, it can pretty
 clearly
  be
   interpreted as addition, for example.
  A computation can't define its own meaning, since it only manipulates
  symbols (that is the definition of a computer),
 
 
  I think it is a rather poor definition of a computer.  Some have tried to
  define the entire field of mathematics as nothing more than a game of
  symbol manipulation (see
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(mathematics) ).  But if
  mathematics
  can be viewed as nothing but symbol manipulation, and everything can be
  described in terms of mathematics, then what is not symbol manipulation?
 
 That what it is describing. Very simple. :)



 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  and symbols need a meaning
  outside of them to make sense.
 
 
  The meaning of a symbol derives from the context of the machine which
  processes it.
 I agree. The context in which the machine operates matters. Yet our
 definitions of computer don't include an external context.


A computer can simultaneously emulate the perceiver and the object of
perception.



 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
  
  
   Jason Resch-2 wrote:
   
 The UD contains an entity who believes it writes a single program.
   No! The UD doesn't contain entities at all. It is just a computation.
  You
   can only interpret entities into it.
  
  
   Why do I have to?  As Bruno often asks, does anyone have to watch your
   brain through an MRI and interpret what it is doing for you to be
   conscious?
  Because there ARE no entities in the UD per its definition. It only
  contains
  symbols that are manipulated in a particular way.
 
 
  You forgot the processes, which are interpreting those symbols.
 No, that's simply not how we defined the UD. The UD is defined by
 manipulation of symbols, not interpretation of symbols (how could we even
 formalize that?).


It may not be explicitly defined, but it follows, just as human cognition
follows from hydrogen atoms, given a few billion years.  Entities evolve
and develop within the UD who have the ability to interpret things on their
own.




 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  The definitions of the UD
  or a universal turing machine or of computers in general don't contain a
  reference to entities.
 
 
  The definition of this universe doesn't contain a reference to human
  beings
  either.
 Right, that's why you can't claim that all universes contain human beings.


But the set of all possible universes does contain human beings.
Similarly, the UD contains all processes, and according to
computationalism, would also contain all possible minds.




 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  So you can only add that to its working in your own imagination.
 
 
  I think I would still be able to experience meaning even if no one was
  looking at me.
 Yes, because you are what is looking - there is no one looking at you in
 the
 first place, because someone looking is occur in you.


 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
  
  
   Jason Resch-2 wrote:
   
 The UD itself
isn't intelligent, but it contains intelligences.
   I am not even saying that the UD isn't intelligent. I am just saying
  that
   humans are intelligent in a way that the UD is not (and actually the
   opposite is true as well).
  
  
   Okay, could you clarify in what ways we are more intelligent?
  
   For example, could you show a problem that can a human solve that a
   computer with unlimited memory and time could not?
  Say you have a universal turing machine with the alphabet {0, 1}
  The problem is: Change one of the symbols of this turing machine to 2.
 
 
  Your example is defining a problem to not be solvable by a specific
  entity,
  not turing machines in general.
 But the claim of computer scientists is that all turing machines are
 interchangable,


In a certain sense.  Not in the sense where they have to escape their own
level to accomplish something in a physical universe.


 because they can emulate each other perfectly. Clearly
 that's not true because perfect computational emulation doesn't help to
 solve the problem in question, and that is precisely my point!


You seem to agree that a computer can answer any verbal problem that any
person can.

So it follows that the right program could answer the question of what a
particular person will do in a given situation.  Do you agree?

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:

 The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.

 That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
 through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do.

 It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws
 are just descriptions of what the universe does.

That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain
patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able
to observe and codify. It's just a linguistic accident that we use the
same term law to mean both physical law and the laws that are passed
by parliament. You said you see no evidence that the universe follows
laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science. There would be no
point to science if we thought that the universe behaves arbitrarily.
Indeed, there is arguably no point to anything if the universe does
not follow uniform laws. I assume that when I take a step that the
ground is solid, which I base on its appearance and my experience of
surfaces with such an appearance being solid. But if the universe did
not follow laws, this assumption would be worthless; the ground may
open up and swallow me, so there would be no point taking a step
forward.

 Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately
 described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and
 the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and
 so they will reflect it.

 Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some
 points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it
 does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it
 does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma?

The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about.
If there were no laws there would be no point to science.

 Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great
 precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process,
 but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an
 isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than
 to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as
 the weather.

 Sure, but that is not an argument against my point. Precise probabilities
 are just a way of making the unprecise (relatively) precise. They still do
 not allow us to make precise predictions - they say nothing about what will
 happen, just about what could happen.

If you can calculate that something will happen with 99.9%
probability, I think that is saying what will happen for practical
purposes.

 Also, statistical laws do not tell us anything about the correlation between
 (apparently) seperate things, so they actually inherently leave out some
 information that could very well be there (and most likely is there if we
 look at the data).
 They only describe probabilities of seperate events, not correlation of the
 outcome of seperate events.

 Say you have 1000 dices with 6 sides that behaves statistically totally
 random if analyzed seperately.

 Nevertheless they could be strongly correlated and this correlation is very
 hard to find using scientific methods and to describe - we wouldn't notice
 at all if we just observed the dices seperately or just a few dices (as we
 would usually do using scientific methods).

 Or you have 2 dices with 1000 sides that behaves statistically totally
 random if analyzed seperately, but if one shows 1 the other ALWAYS shows one
 as well. Using 1000 tries you will most likely notice nothing at all, and
 using 1 tries you will still probably notice nothing because there will
 be most likely other instances as well where the two numbers are the same.
 So it would be very difficult to detect the correlation, even though it is
 quite important (given that you could accurately predict what the other
 1000-sided dice will be in 1/1000 of the cases).

 And even worse, if you have 10 dices that *together* show no correlation at
 all (which we found out using many many tries), this doesn't mean that the
 combinated  result of the 10 dices is not correlated with another set of 10
 dices. To put it another way: Even if you showed that a given set of
 macrosopic objects is not correlated, they still may not behave random at
 all on a bigger level because they are correlated with another set of
 objects!

I'm not really sure of your point here. Statistical methods would not
only show a correlation between the dice, but also tell you how many
observations you need to make in order to be confident of a
correlation to an arbitrary degree of certainty. That is the whole
business of statistics.

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 23 Aug 2012, at 19:08, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:49 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:

'You won't be able to determine the truth of this statement by
programming a computer'

If true then you won't be able to determine the truth of this
statement PERIOD. Any limitation a computer has you have the exact
same limitation. And there are many many times the ONLY way to
determine the truth of a statement is by programming a computer, if
this were not true nobody would bother building computers and it
wouldn't be a trillion dollar industry.

To put it another way, it shows you that it is really just obvious
that you are beyond the computer, because you

are the one programming it.

But it's only a matter of time before computers start programing you
because computers get twice as smart every 18 months and people do
not.

Computers do only what we instruct them to do (this is how we
built them)

That is certainly not true, if it were there would be no point in
instructing computers about anything. Tell me this, if you
instructed a computer to find the first even integer greater than 4
that is not the sum of two primes greater than 2 and then stop what
will the computer do? It would take you less than 5 minutes to write
such a program so tell me, will it ever stop?

You might say we only do what we were instructed to do by the laws
of nature, but this would be merely a metaphor, not an actual fact
(the laws of nature are just our approach of describing the world,
not something that is

somehow actually programming us).

We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things
because of the laws of nature, and if we do not then we are random.

We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is
not in the ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is
inconsistent with computationalism.

Bruno

Let's take your example 'Benjamin Jakubik cannot consistently
assert this sentence' is true..

I can just say your sentence is meaningless.

It's not my example it's your example, you said sentences like this
prove that you have fundamental abilities that computers lack, and
that of course is nonsense. Saying something is meaningless does not
make it so, but suppose it is; well, computers can come up with
meaningless gibberish as easily as people can.

The computer can't do this, because he doesn't know what
meaningless is

I see absolutely no evidence of that. If you were competing with the
computer Watson on Jeopardy and the category was meaningless
stuff I'll bet Watson would kick your ass. But then he'd beat you
(or me) in ANY category.

Maybe that is what dinstinguishes human intelligence from
computers. Computers can't recognize meaninglessness or meaning.

Humans often have the same difficulty, just consider how many people
on this list think free will means something.

My computer doesn't generate such questions

But other computers can and do.

and I won't program it to.

But other people will.

John K Clark

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

I don't know either, nobody knows, even the computer doesn't know if  
it will stop until it finds itself stopping;


If a computer stops, it will never know that. If it executes a  
stopping program, then it can.


To stop has no first person meaning. Nobody will ever write in its  
personal diary that he just died, unless metaphorically, or  
approximately perhaps, like with NDE, or some dreams.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.

But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of
the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA
does a proof that RA can't do). That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).
It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can
indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make
sense of it.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of
processes) is also absolute.
OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true,
necessarily.
I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what
level we think about computation.

Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with
respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because here instantiation and
description of the computation matter - I+II=III and 9+2=11
describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical purposes
(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same computation
if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually
going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their
emulation).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein
(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able
to converse with Einstein.
Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all (due to
possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write a post
about this later), that is still not necessarily the case.
It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation. And I
don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk

Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:

The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.

That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do.

It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws
are just descriptions of what the universe does.

That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain
patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able
to observe and codify.

OK, so it is a metaphor, since the laws itself are just what we codified
about the behaviour of the universe (so the universe can't follow laws
because the laws follow the universe).

Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:

You said you see no evidence that the universe follows
laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science.
Science just requires that the universes behaviour is *approximated* by
laws.

Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:

Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately
described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and
the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe
and
so they will reflect it.

Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at
some
points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest
it
does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest
it
does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma?

The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about.
If there were no laws there would be no point to science.
Right, but this doesn't mean that the laws have to be accurate or even can
be accurate. They just need to be accurate enough to be useful to us.
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from  
comp before this can be used as an argument here.


Normally??  The holographic principle was extracted from general  
relativity and the Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense it  
should be extracted from something else, but if you can do so,  
please do.  It would certainly impress me.





UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take  
10001000 centuries is not relevant.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world  
of inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is  
already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine.


There's something wrong with that sentence. An error prone machine  
one that is capable of being wrong, and hence non-computably more  
powerful than itself?


Yes. It makes sense because the identification criteria for the  
inductive inference has been weakened. A machine allowed to do one  
error (that is synthesizing a program giving a wrong output) will  
recognize a non computably vaster class of phenomena, even if wrong on  
some input. See the paper of Case and Smith reference in my url, or  
the book by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk

ask the question, because the program would have to
be more general.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

You're crossing contexts and levels. Certainly, a heart inside a
computer
simulation of some reality isn't going to do you any good if you exist
on
a
different level, in a different reality.
So you are actually agreeing with me? - Since this is exactly the point I
am
trying to make.
Digital models exist on a different level than what they represent, and
it
doesn't matter how good/accurate they are because that doesn't bridge the
gap between model and reality.

But what level something is implemented in does not restrict the
intelligence of a process.
This may be our main disagreement.
It boils down to the question whether we assume intelligence = (turing)
computation.
We could embrace this definition, but I would rather not, since it doesn't
fit with my own conception of intelligence (which also encompasses
instantiation and interpretation).

But for the sake of discussion I can embrace this definition and in this
case I agree with you. Then we might say that computers can become more
intelligent than humans (and maybe already are), because they manifest
computations more efficiently than humans.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

And this seems to be empirically true because there is pretty much no
other
way to explain psi.

What do you mean by psi?
Telepathy, for example.

Are you aware of any conclusive studies of psi?
That depends on what you interpret as conclusive. For hard-headed
skepticists no study will count as conclusive.

There are plenty of studies that show results that are *far* beyond chance,
though.
Also the so called anecdotal evidence is extremely strong.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

I am not saying that nature is infinite in the way we picture it.
It
may
not
fit into these categories at all.

Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so
by
your
own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.

The UD also contains subjective randomness, which is at the heart of
Bruno's argument.
No, it doesn't even contain a subject.

Bruno assumes COMP, which I don't buy at all.

Okay. What is your theory of mind?
I don't have any. Mind cannot be captured or even by described at the
fundamental level at all.

That doesn't seem like a very useful theory. Does this theory tell
you whether or not you should take an artificial brain if it was the only
way to save your life?
Of course it is not a useful theory, since it is not a theory in the first
place.
To answer your question: No. There is no theoretical way of deciding that.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:

Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so  
by your

own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.


That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined,


It is well defined in epistemic interpretations.  But those rely on  
an implicit dualism.



That is what I thought after reading von Neumann, and London--Bauer,  
but then reading Shimony I realized that such a dualism does not make  
sense, and that it leads to solipisism.






and many incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett  
showed we don't need it,


But then we need to derive the classical world from the quantum.


We need to derive the appearance of the classical world. This is well  
explained by Everett+decoherence.
With comp we start from classical arithmetic, and we derive the  
appearance of the quantum, and then we ca use decoherence to explain  
the re-appearance of the classical physical worlds. It is really:


classical === quantum === classical






if we assume comp or weaker.
Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then  
with comp so is the wave.


It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a  
domain (the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non  
solved problem in another domain (the mind body problem).


There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave,


Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem  
is open.  It is of a piece with the problem of deriving the  
classical from the quantum.


I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to  
comp. You have to fix a base to do the math, and then you can show  
that all appearances, from the first person perspective are  
independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand  
empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a  
choice of measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can  
be described in any basis. My feeling is that Everett got this right  
at the start.








nor any known evidences that the wave does collapse.


Collapse appears all the time,


LOL. Show me one.



and a good theory must save appearances.


Everett showed that the appearances are saved, in the memory of the  
observers.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 We might do things because the laws of arithmetic.


If so then we in particular and everything in general is as deterministic
as a cuckoo clock because when you add 2 numbers together you always get
the same answer. I might add that everything is most probably not
deterministic.

 To stop has no first person meaning.


After the instant in time called stop there will be no more entries in my
diary, the meaning of that is pretty clear to me. Or to put it another way,
death means having a last thought.

 Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died,


But they have written this will be my last entry; I believe the Antarctic
explorer Robert Scott wrote something like that in his diary that was found
months later next to his frozen body.

 You are assuming physicalism here,


The only thing I'm assuming is that X is Y or X is not Y.

 which is inconsistent with computationalism.


You're creating a straw man opponent, nobody believes that what a thing is
and what a thing does is the same. Mind, a abstract concept, is what the
brain, a physical object, does. And going fast, a abstract concept, is what
a jet, a physical object, does.

  John K Clark

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012  Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

 I did it for many reasons


And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.


None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, 
then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers 
of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer 
as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons 
though.
 

 some of them my own. 

In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you 
acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know 
yourself.  No matter, they're still reasons. 


No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of 
cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't 
do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a 
reason later.

Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be 
called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. 
There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in 
many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all 
of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor 
predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own.

 Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. 


No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, 
and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not 
grey.


And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is 
either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to 
agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.
 

 It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have 
before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant 
explorations on consciousness and sense-making. 


And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most 
strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your 
ideas. 


And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does 
your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute 
them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me?
 

 Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In 
either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to 
them 


 Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such 
a reason either exists or it does not.


 What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with 
anything?


That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they 
are, then your actions are deterministic. 


That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your opinions 
on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a diversion to 
cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If 
your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't 
opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives.


 What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it 
does not'?


That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses.


An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean 
it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting 
that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than 
saying anything at all. 

 Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. 

And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how 
the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is 
convince yourself  that what you already want to believe is in fact true.  
And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom 
in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, 
you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. 

Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of 
the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are 
proved.


 According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do 
any possible readers of your views.

That is ridiculous.

 
I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your 
stated worldview.


 All of it is either robotic or random. 


What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have 
to do with not having views??

Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they 
are noise.

Since you mention the price of eggs, lets go with that. The market for eggs 
is not automatic, nor is it random. Despite attempts to beat financial 
markets

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Stephen P. King


Point, Set, Match: Craig Weinberg!

On 8/25/2012 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012  Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:

 I did it for many reasons


And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.


None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture 
reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and 
human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons 
from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. 
There are no cuckoo clock reasons though.



 some of them my own.

In other words you have not divulged to others some of the
reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you
don't know yourself.  No matter, they're still reasons.


No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives 
of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock 
can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it 
with a reason later.


Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be 
called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a 
typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can 
choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or 
I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not 
random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own.


 Your argument is that grey must be either black or white.


No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or 
white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either 
grey or not grey.



And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything 
is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would 
have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.



 It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you 
have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant 
explorations on consciousness and sense-making.



And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most 
strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at 
your ideas.



And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What 
does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't 
refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me?



 Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? 
In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying 
attention to them



 Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well 
such a reason either exists or it does not.



 What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with 
anything?



That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of
what they are, then your actions are deterministic.


That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your 
opinions on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a 
diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own 
limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they 
don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me 
or my motives.



 What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or 
it does not'?



That's an even stupider question, true statements always have
uses.


An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't 
mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still 
admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more 
relevant than saying anything at all.


 Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense.

And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure
out how the world works and make it clear that what you really
want to do is convince yourself  that what you already want to
believe is in fact true.  And its going to work too because if you
take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then
you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove
and disprove the same thing at the same time.

Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature 
of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which 
they are proved.



 According to your views, you don't have any views, and 
neither do any possible readers of your views.


That is ridiculous.


I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of 
your stated worldview.



 All of it is either robotic or random.


What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that 
have to do with not having views??


Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, 
they are noise.


Since you mention

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread meekerdb


On 8/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws 
of nature, and if we do not then we are random.



We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the 
ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism.


I don't see that John is assuming that physics is fundamental.  If 
computationalism=conscious thought arises from some kinds of computation. it may still 
require that those kinds of computation, the ones giving rise to conscious thought, must 
also give rise to some form of physics; that there cannot be conscious thought without 
physics.


Brent

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Re: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread Roger Clough

Hi John Clark 

The laws of nature don't prevent me from unintentionally having a car accident.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/24/2012 
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function.
- Receiving the following content - 
From: John Clark 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-23, 16:53:10
Subject: Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On Thu, Aug 23, 2012? Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:



 The laws of nature are such that they demand that we do things intentionally. 
 This means neither random nor completely determined externally.


I see, you did it but you didn't do it for a reason and you didn't do it for no 
reason. I think? Lewis Carroll best summed up your ideas on this subject: 

T was brillig, and the slithy toves
? Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
?? All mimsy were the borogoves,
??? And the mome raths outgrabe.



 Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there 
 be any point in anyone else paying attention to them 

Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either 
exists or it does not. If other people pay attention to my views they do so for 
a reason or they do not do so for a reason. If other people do NOT pay 
attention to my views they do so for a reason or they do not do so for a reason.

? John K Clark




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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread benjayk

they can
only process information/symbols, but entanglement is not informational.
Also, machines necessarily work in steps (that's how we built them), yet
entaglement is instantaneous. If you have to machines then they both have
to
do a step to know the state of the other one.

And indeed entanglement is somewhat magical, but nevertheless we know it
exists.

Effects from entanglement are not instantaneous under many worlds.

From: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html

To recap. Many-worlds is local and deterministic. Local measurements
split local systems (including observers) in a subjectively random
fashion; distant systems are only split when the causally transmitted
effects of the local interactions reach them. We have not assumed any
non-local FTL effects, yet we have reproduced the standard predictions
of QM.
Well, OK, it doesn't really matter (though I don't buy into many-worlds much
more than I buy into single world).
The thing is that a perfect simulation of entanglement still wouldn't be
actual entaglement (since it requires there to be no gap of level - a
classical computer simulating entaglement is not actually entangled with its
surroundings).

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread benjayk

and ambiguity then the answer is
clearly no!
Simply write a program that takes the question X and gives the appropiate
answer Y.
Since all combinations of strings exist the right solution exists for every
question.
Then you would still have to write the right program, though, and for that
you still need a human or a more powerful program.

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

You could of course create a model of that turing machine within that
turing
machine and change their alphabet in the model, but since this was not
the
problem in question this is not the right solution.

Or the problem manipulate the code of yourself if you are a program,
solve
1+1 if you are human (computer and human meaning what the average humans
considers computer and human) towards a program written in a turing
universal programming language without the ability of self-modification.
The
best it could do is manipulate a model of its own code (but this wasn't
the
problem).
Yet we can simply solve the problem by answering 1+1=2 (since we are
human
and not computers by the opinion of the majority).

These are certainly creative examples, but they are games of language. I
haven't seen any fundamental limitation that can't be trivially reflected
back and applied as an equivalent limitation of humans.
You didn't state in which way my problem is invalid. That you consider it
just a game doesn't change the objective conlusion at all.

I actually fully agree with you that the *most* fundamental limitation of
computers apply to humans as well (like for example being a particular thing
with a particular structure). I am not one of these people that project a
magical soul into human that makes them more special than everything else.
But that doesn't change the point that humans can do some things computers
can't, which is very important and relevant.

You might still believe that computers can do, for all intents and purposes,
what humans can do, but I fail to see how similiar examples of
self-reference, self-manipulation, self-relativity don't occur all the time
in high-level contexts.
And this is the reason that I fully expect computers to become much better
than humans in terms of *relatively* low-level tasks (even on the level of
reasoning about complex objectifiable topics), but not with regards to the
most high level subjects (like consciousness, emotion, ambiguity,
spirituality, axioms).
By the way, for a similar reason I believe that humans are in *some ways*
more limited than animals or plants, because they assume and know to much /
are too much concerned with relative notions (and thus can't go back to the
ignorance of animals which is intelligent in that it ignores relatively
superficial issues like descriptions).

So I am not saying humansall, I am just saying that different kinds of
intelligence on different levels (like computer-, animal-, plant-, human-,
spirit-, environmental-, galaxy-, space-intelligence) can't be substituted,
but actually amplify and complement each other. They each have certain
limitations that others don't have.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 3:59 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:

 I am not sure that this is true. First, no one yet showed that nature can be
 described through a set of fixed laws. Judging from our experience, it seems
 all laws are necessarily incomplete.
 It is just dogma of some materialists that the universe precisely follows
 laws. I don't see why that would be the case at all and I see no evidence
 for it either.

The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.
Evidence against it would be if magical things started happening.

 Secondly, even the laws we have now don't really describe that the atoms in
 our brain are rigidly controlled. Rather, quantum mechanical laws just give
 us a probability distribution, they don't tell us what actually will happen.
 In this sense current physics has already taken the step beyond precise
 laws.
 Some scientists say that the probability distribution is an actual precise,
 deterministic entity, but really this is just pure speculation and we have
 no evidence for that.

Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great
precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process,
but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an
isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than
to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as
the weather.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread benjayk

 then show that there can be no one stastical
law for every universe that describes the events of multiverse (including
correlations).

One: There are infinititely many universes.
Two: The universes are correlated.

(since the information about correlation between universes is not contained
in the statistical law for every particular universe)

This even works if you substitute universe with multiverse and multiverse
with multi-multiverse (etc...). So if there is no level at which you can
cap reality, there can be no precise laws (if the events are correlated).

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context  
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does  
not mean

that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.
A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate  
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson  
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of  
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove  
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the  
induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of  
the emulation without any inner conviction.


With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal  
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same  
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of  
processes) is also absolute.


But, proving, believing, knowing, defining, etc. Are not absolute, and  
are all relative to the system actually doing the proof, or the  
knowing. Once such notion are, even just approximated semi- 
axiomatically, they define complex lattices or partial orders of  
unequivalent classes of machines, having very often transfinite order  
type, like proving for example, for which there is a branch of  
mathematical logic, known as Ordinal Analysis, which measures the  
strength of theories by a constructive ordinal. PA's strength is well  
now as being the ordinal epsilon zero, that is omega [4] omega (=  
omega^omega^omega^...) as discovered by Gentzen).


It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein  
(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able  
to converse with Einstein.


If you avoid gently the level confusion for the human person, there is  
no reason to avoid it for the machines.
It is not because universal machine can do all computations, that they  
can do all proofs, on the contrary, being universal and consistent  
will limit them locally, and motivate them to change themselves,  
relatively to their most probable universal histories.


Such infinite progression of self-changing machines have already been  
programmed, by Myhill, and myself, notably. In my more technical work,  
I use Becklemishev results which extends the soundness of G and G* on  
such machines, and prove a completeness theorem for the corresponding  
multimodal logic, with the provability parametrized on the ordinal (I  
say this for those interested and open to computer science as it is  
natural in the frame of the comp hypothesis).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:

Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so by  
your

own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.


That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined, and many  
incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett showed we don't  
need it, if we assume comp or weaker.
Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then with  
comp so is the wave.


It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a domain  
(the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non solved  
problem in another domain (the mind body problem).


There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave, nor any  
known evidences that the wave does collapse.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Thursday, August 23, 2012 4:53:10 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Aug 23, 2012  Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:

  The laws of nature are such that they demand that we do things 
 intentionally. This means neither random nor completely determined 
 externally.


 I see, you did it but you didn't do it for a reason and you didn't do it 
 for no reason. 


I did it for many reasons, some of them my own. Your argument is that grey 
must be either black or white. It's not true. Grey is neither black, white, 
nor is it nor black nor white. Why is this so difficult?
 

 I think  Lewis Carroll best summed up your ideas on this subject: 

 T was brillig, and the slithy toves
   Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
 All mimsy were the borogoves,
   And the mome raths outgrabe.


It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have before) as an 
insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant explorations on 
consciousness and sense-making. Carroll was a mathematician and logician 
(see Dodgson), who published academic works under that name. I have been 
reading Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense* (pdf download: 
http://en.bookfi.org/book/1172079?_ir=1) in which he writes about Carroll's 
use of paradox and esoteric words to point out the multiple layers of sense 
inherent in language. You are reading Carroll on the most simplistic level, 
a childlike level where anything unfamiliar can only be giggled at.

It turns out that Deleuze's understanding of sense using Carroll's examples 
are identical to my own in many ways, especially the big picture 
dialectics. Many philosophical concepts, from mysticism to semiotics have 
repeatedly revealed the same kinds of primordial trichotomies. My ideas 
take a step further in that they anchor direct awareness as a temporal 
algebra in contradistinction to the spatial geometries of indirect 
perception.



  Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would 
 there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them 


 Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason 
 either exists or it does not.


What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with anything? What is 
useful about saying that something 'either exists or it does not'? 
Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense.

 

 If other people pay attention to my views they do so for a reason or they 
 do not do so for a reason. If other people do NOT pay attention to my views 
 they do so for a reason or they do not do so for a reason.


According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do any 
possible readers of your views. All of it is either robotic or random. I am 
saying that if you are right, then there is no point whatsoever for you to 
ever speak again. You are trying to wriggle out of it by subjecting 
anything I say to the same black and white reductionism that you have used 
to invalidate your own ability to participate in your own thought.

Craig
 


   John K Clark





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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 23 Aug 2012, at 16:52, Jason Resch wrote:

The holographic principle places a finite bound on the amount of  
physical information that there can be in a fixed volume.  This  
implies there is a finite number of possible brain states and  
infinite precision cannot be a requirement for the operation of the  
brain.


But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp  
before this can be used as an argument here.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 23 Aug 2012, at 18:11, benjayk wrote:

Or how can you determine whether to program a particular program or  
not? To

do this computationally you would need another program, but how do you
determine if this is the correct one?



You don't.

In theoretical inductive inference theory (Putnam, Gold, Blum, Case  
and Smith, Oherson, Stob, ...), you can show this:
The more machines can be wrong, and relies on other machines, and  
change their minds, and (amazingly enough) change their mind wrongly  
(changing a correct theory for the know facts by an incorrect one),  
from times to times, the more larger are the classes of phenomena that  
they are able to recognize (build correct theories fro them).


And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world of  
inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is  
already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine.


if like some people, you define intelligence by an ability to  
extrapolate series, there is something transcendentally (non- 
computably, even with strong oracles) more powerful than any inference  
inductive machine, it is a couple of inference inductive machines.


All machines evolves, in a non predictable way, through errors, notably.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:


Honestly I do not find the Gödel theorem a limitation for computers.


Indeed, as Judson Webb showed the anti-mechanism argument based on  
Gödel is double edged, when made precise enough it becomes a tool  
making possible to the machine to overcome it.




I think that Penrose and other did a right translation from the  
Gódel theorem to a  problem of a Turing machine,. But this  
translation can be done in a different way.


Penrose was wrong, but eventually got the main point: Gödel's  
incompleteness does not show that we are not machine, but does show  
that we cannot consistently kno which machine we are, as the  
duplication thought experience can also explain more easily. This is  
exploited in AUDA, as it leads to the arithmetical form of the  
indeterminacy.


Gödel already knew in 1931 that theories like his Principia  
Mathematica, or ZF, PA, etc. can prove their own incompleteness  
theorem. PA proves consistent(PA) - non-provable-by-PA(consistent(PA)).

Consistent(PA) is non-provable-by-PA('0 = 1').

The diagonalization is a useful tool to show that non computable  
things exists, and non-provable-by-X or Y, but those diagonalization  
are mostly constructive and computable.





It is possible to design a program that modify itself by adding new  
axioms, included the diagonalizations, so that the number of axioms  
can grow for any need.


Indeed.


This is rutinely done for equivalent problems in rule-based expert  
systems or in ordinary interpreters (aided by humans) in complex  
domains. But reduced to integer aritmetics, A turing machine that  
implements a math proof system at the deep level, that is, in an  
interpreter where new axioms can be automatically added trough  
diagonalizations, may expand the set of know deductions by  
incorporating new axioms trough diagonalization. This is not  
prohibited by the Gódel theorem. What is prohibited is to know all  
true statements on this domain. But this also apply to humans. So a  
computer can realize that a new axiom is absent in his initial set  
and to add it, Just like humans.


Right. G* can be emulated by G. At the propositional modal level, this  
makes a machine able to find all its true but non provable sentences.  
That makes the machine an excellent mystic subject.





I do not see in this a limitation for human free will. I wrote about  
this before.


It helps it. And it gives a role to consciousness as a sort of  
universal accelerator of computations. This relies more on the length  
of proof theorem than incompleteness, but all those things can be  
related precisely.



Bruno


The notion of free will based on the deterministc nature of the  
phisics or computation is a degenerated, false problem which is an  
obsession of the Positivists. Look form degenerated and  
Positivism to find mi opinion about that in this list if you are  
interested.


2012/8/24 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com


On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com 
 wrote:



Jason Resch-2 wrote:

 Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything  
(or
 nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you  
want

 into
 this sentence... or like the stuff that monkeys type on  
typewriters.



 A sentence (any string of information) can be interpreted in any  
possible
 way, but a computation defines/creates its own meaning.  If you  
see a
 particular step in an algorithm adds two numbers, it can pretty  
clearly be

 interpreted as addition, for example.
A computation can't define its own meaning, since it only manipulates
symbols (that is the definition of a computer),

I think it is a rather poor definition of a computer.  Some have  
tried to define the entire field of mathematics as nothing more than  
a game of symbol manipulation (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(mathematics) 
 ).  But if mathematics can be viewed as nothing but symbol  
manipulation, and everything can be described in terms of  
mathematics, then what is not symbol manipulation?


and symbols need a meaning
outside of them to make sense.

The meaning of a symbol derives from the context of the machine  
which processes it.




Jason Resch-2 wrote:



 Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 
  Also, the universal dovetailer can't select a computation. So  
if I

 write
  a
  program that computes something specific, I do something that  
the UD

  doesn't
  do.
 
 
  But you, as the one writing a specific program, is an element  
of the

 UD.
 First, you presuppose that I am a contained in a computation.

 Secondly, that's not true. There are no specific programs in the  
UD. The

 UD
 itself is a specifc program and in it there is nothing in it that
 dilineates
 on program from the others.


 Each program has its own separate, non-overlapping, contiguous  
memory

 space.
This may be true from your perspective, but if you actually run the  
UD it

just uses its own

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-24 Thread meekerdb


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be 
used as an argument here.


Normally??  The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the 
Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense it should be extracted from something 
else, but if you can do so, please do.  It would certainly impress me.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers