sage -
> From: "David Nyman"
> To:
> Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
> Subject: Re: Dreaming On
>
>
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > Another point that has got rather lost here is that
> computationalists
> > tend to be a lot more concer
And HP stands for???
- Original Message -
From: "David Nyman"
To:
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> tend to be a lot more concerned
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
>>> if it can't, we need another strategy to
>>> disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
>>> conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
>>> comp.
>> There is no ambiguity in the reduction of c
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>>if it can't, we need another strategy to
>> disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
>> conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
>> comp.
>
> There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation
> to physics.
H
What are the common relevant physical details of all the proposed executing
scheme ?
Quentin
2009/9/24 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/24 Flammarion
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> > > > 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> >
> >
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> > > 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > > > Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
> > > > physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is ju
2009/9/24 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> > 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> >
> > > Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
> > > physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
> > > +structure.
> > > The difference is that the
On 24 Sep, 16:16, "david.nyman" wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
> > physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
> > +structure.
> > The difference is that the structure is finer-grained.
>
> Agreed.
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> Right..so you are using "third person" to mean "cognitive"
> and 1st person to mean "experiential"...?
I assume that when the term "cognitive" is used it is intended to be
cashed out in some third-person way. However, many terms seem to be
used somewhat promiscuously so
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
> physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
> +structure.
> The difference is that the structure is finer-grained.
Agreed. But the harping was motivated entirely by its relevanc
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
> >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
> >> computational types.
>
> > They might do inexplocably. But the significant poin
On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> > Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> > tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
> > has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
>
> It hasn't got lost - e.g. t
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>
> >> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
> >> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
> >> computational types.
>
> > They might do inexplocably. But the significant poin
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
> Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
> tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
> has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said "I have no
quarrel with th
2009/9/24 Flammarion :
>> If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
>> that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
>> computational types.
>
> They might do inexplocably. But the significant point
> is that nothing else solves the HP either,
If
On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion wrote:
> On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
> > >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> > >> >> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> > >> >> the realisation of a comp
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >> >> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
> >> >> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't
> >>
2009/9/23 Brent Meeker :
>> True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a
>> first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't
>> intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal
>> of first-person experience - yes? I didn't think that
2009/9/23 Flammarion :
>
>> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>> >> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
>> >> the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't
>> >> you say so? And how would that now influence you
On 23 Sep, 08:00, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>
> >> So I do it again /o\
>
> >> Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
>
> >> Level 0 is not part of
On 23 Sep, 03:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
inherent in MR.
>
> Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the
> development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
> Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical function of a
> specie
On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
> >> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
> >> argument?
>
> > I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>
> >>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
> >> cause consciousnes
David Nyman wrote:
> On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> What would make a theory of consciousness a
>>> physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
>>> physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
>>> relation between them. Such a t
On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> What would make a theory of consciousness a
> > physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
> > physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
> > relation between them. Such a theory would of course esc
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>>
>> So I do it again /o\
>>
>> Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
>>
>> Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how
>> you
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>
>>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
>>> argument?
>> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>>
>>> You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>>> cause consciousness. But did you also mean
2009/9/22 Flammarion :
>> So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
>> argument?
>
> I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
>
>>You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
>> cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
>
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Well little problem in gmail sorry.
>
> So I do it again /o\
>
> Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
>
> Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
> relate physically running a program on a computer, and run
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>
> >> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
> >> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
> >> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
> >> computation could
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an
abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in
Sorry I wanted to write "it does *add* nothing".
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, a
2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> > 2009/9
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
> On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/22 Flammarion
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> >
> > > > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > > > by a computa
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> > > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > > by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
>
> > If a le
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
> What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
> that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
> virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
> means that demanding that it further supervene on dist
2009/9/22 Flammarion
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> > The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> > by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
>
>
> If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
> it i
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> The level "0" has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
> by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
it is testable because "small world" materia
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
>> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
>> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
>> and hence in principle implementable by any physica
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
> So then question then becomes how close together do the intermediate points
> have to
> be to constitute the "same" experience.
> An interesting question. We might investigate it empirically by noting how
> closely the
> brain processes during one experience of X are
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
>
>>> Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
>>> The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
>>> necessitates making the relation between experience and process
>>> *explicitly* physical, and actually a
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker :
>> Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
>> The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
>> necessitates making the relation between experience and process
>> *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting this inevitably r
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker :
>
>> You regard "doing the same computation" as a purely formal (=
>> non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
>> because we talk about "a computation" at a very high level of
>> abstraction. But when we ask what makes t
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker :
> You regard "doing the same computation" as a purely formal (=
> non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
> because we talk about "a computation" at a very high level of
> abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal sequence or that
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>
>
>>> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
>>> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
>>> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
>>> computation could be identical to any
2009/9/11 Flammarion :
>> I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
>> realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
>> consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised
>> computation could be identical to any mental state.
>
> That doesn't
Brent,
I guess you know my reply to this, but I want to make it clear, for
the benefit of the general discussion. I add a point though.
On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> But isn't that because the "computational" in CTM is abstracted away
> from a context in which there is acti
On 10 Sep, 23:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker :
>
> > But isn't that because the "computational" in CTM is abstracted away
> > from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same
> > problem that leads to the question, "Does a rock compute every
> > function?" W
On 10 Sep, 14:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/9 Flammarion :
>
> >> What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
> >> arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
>
> > It is strictly an argument against the claim that
> > computation causes consciousness , as oppos
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker :
> But isn't that because the "computational" in CTM is abstracted away
> from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same
> problem that leads to the question, "Does a rock compute every
> function?" When looking at a physical process as a computation
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>>> Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to
>>> be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their
>>> apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why
>>> the fine-grained differen
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker :
>
>> Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to
>> be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their
>> apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why
>> the fine-grained differences make no difference at the
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/9 Flammarion :
>
>
>>> What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
>>> arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
>>>
>> It is strictly an argument against the claim that
>> computation causes consciousness , as opposed
>> to th
2009/9/9 Flammarion :
>> What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
>> arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
>
> It is strictly an argument against the claim that
> computation causes consciousness , as opposed
> to the claim that mental states are identical
On 9 Sep, 01:39, David Nyman wrote:
> > 1. Computationalism in general associates that consciousness with a
> > specific comptuer programme, programme C let's say.
> > 2. Let us combine that with the further claim that programme C
> > causes cosnciousness, somehow leveraging the physical c
On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/3 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman wrote:
> >> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> >> and is thus not any particular physical
> >> >> object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
> >> >> computational type, and
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> and is thus not any particular physical
>> object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
>> computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose
>> physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to
>> instantiate the rele
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> > i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
> > the question
>
> Well, a computation is a type,
A type of computation is a type.
A token of a type of computation is a token.
> and is thus not any parti
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
> i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
> the question
Well, a computation is a type, and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
computational type, and is indeed a physical object, al
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
>> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
>> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
>> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physical
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
> >> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
> >> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
> >> indee
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>
> > But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> > relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
> > at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> >
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>
> >> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
> >> character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
> >> fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as
> >> possessing intern
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
> But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
> relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
> at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
> higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying
2009/9/2 Flammarion :
>> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
>> character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
>> fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as
>> possessing internal temporal duration and differentiation.
>
> Easi
On 02 Sep 2009, at 03:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But only by isolating a bit of computation from the rest of universe.
> And it doesn't show that a computation supervenes on zero physical
> activity. And even if it did show that, it would not follow that
> mental
> computation *does* superven
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
> > anythign more for the specious present than a "snapshop" some of
> > which is out of date?
>
> Well, as well as the question of what constitutes
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>>> successive capsules thro
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker
>
>
>>> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
>>> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
>>> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
>>> and hence in principl
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker
> > I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
> > but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
> > postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
> > and hence in principle implementable by any phys
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
>> not analyzable in terms of physics.
>>
>
> Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
> present is very odd in the face of either the f
On 28 Aug, 21:30, John Mikes wrote:
> *Is the 'hard problem' and 'outside' factor? Maybe, for the closed inventory
> we have in today's conventional sciences. Our interpretations are temporary,
> as I call it (after Colin H) our "perceived reality" (of today), but
> different from the ancient fo
David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>>> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
>>> it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
>>> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
>>> it or refute
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
> time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
> anythign more for the specious present than a "snapshop" some of
> which is out of date?
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such snapshots, one m
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
> not analyzable in terms of physics.
Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
present is very odd in the face of either the flux or block view of
time in physics. Int
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on
the
basis of that assumption. If you pref
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > David Nyman wrote:
>> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>> >>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>> >>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the comp
On 1 Sep, 18:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
> How did we get from a hypothetical that "I am virtualised" to something
> being *forced*? This is like saying "I might be virtualised" entails "I
> must be virtualised".
CTM postulates that "my mind is a computation". The standard rider is
"...of my brai
On 1 Sep, 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
> First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
> consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
> component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
> inferences or premises is wrong, it is not shown tha
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>
>
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> >>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
> >>> physics.
>
> >> It m
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>
>> By comp, mainly by Church thesis only, you (in the third person
>> sense)
>> are implemented in the mathematical UD. OK?
>
>
> The mathemaitcal UD doesn't exist.
Do you agree that it exist
On 01 Sep 2009, at 19:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
>>> computability of
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> It may be easy to lose sight,
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion wrote:
> > If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
> > it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
> > would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
> > it or refute it with precise counter-ar
David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
>
>> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
>> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
>> physically and not theref
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>> physics.
>>
>
> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
> argument is against CTM
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
>>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>>> "real reality", fair enough,
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
> >>> ontological
> >>> commitment.
>
> >>
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
> > OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> > specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
> > physica
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
> physically and not therefore part of the HP and not
> theref
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>> That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
>>> ontological
>>> commitment.
>>
>> No, it is the same arithmetical truth, but fro
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
> Bruno wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
Not at all. This definitely convinces me that you have not even try to
begin to read the proof.
Ontically you can say there is a bottom. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, (that is
0 and the succ
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> That is th
On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the stack, there are no virtualisations runnin
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> That is the point. I should s
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> That is the point. I should say that my starting p
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:52, David Nyman wrote:
>
> 2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>> Bruno hasn't
>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>>> on some such basis is actually untenable.
>>
>>
>> I don't think I have ever said that.
>
> No, you're right. However I was r
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> before encountering Bruno's views was agains
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
>> befor
On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
Yes, it sounds logically compelling
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
CTM on
the basis of
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