Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 07-mars-07, à 04:40, Jesse Mazer wrote :

> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/ 
> 0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750
>
> Jesse

That is: 14 Mar 2001: Jesse wrote (in part):

> A lot of people have a lot of different ideas about TOE's on this  
> list, so
>  maybe the global measure issue could help clarify where we all stand  
> in
>  relation to each other...do people have specific proposals about  
> this?  I
>  guess the other relevant question is, what is the set of "everything"  
> that
>  you're putting the measure on...all computations?  All mathematical
>  structures?  All observer-moments?


John M asked also:

> BTW:
> what do you mean by "interviewing the L-machine?


Jesse's question is *the* important question in the list. I just recall  
it. But also, I will take the opportunity of John's question to explain  
a bit more the interview of the Lobian machine, and what that is, and  
how it helps to provide answers to Jesse's questions, when we assume  
explicitly the comp hyp. Asap, because I'm busy. I will try to give  
answers without too much technical details, but that is really what  
makes that exercise difficult. I hope I can do that already this week.   
Of course everyone can use the question of Jesse to make a bit more  
precise where they stand from the others indeed, I'm interested too.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Well thanks Russell. Note that I was not doing a critic. I have the  
usual problem with the word "philosophy", which in many places (on the  
continent means just "marxism" or the more ("postmodern") relativism.  
But here I was mainly "complaining" that sometimes people talk like if  
I was proposing some new theory or vision, like some honest pholosopher  
can do.
I am more modest than that, or ... less modest perhaps.  I just take  
seriously a very old "theory" (mechanism) and try to explain the  
consequences: the testable breakdown of materialism.

Best Regards,

Bruno



Le 04-avr.-07, à 04:16, Russell Standish a écrit :

>
> On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Mark,
>>
>> Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what
>> Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not
>> trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I
>
> I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that
> Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed
> Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists,
> and probably more than the average professional philosopher.
>
> Cheers
>
> --  
>
> --- 
> -
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics   
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
> --- 
> -
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what 
> Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not 
> trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I 

I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that
Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed
Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists,
and probably more than the average professional philosopher.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Mark,

Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what 
Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not 
trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I 
said in the joining post my initial goal was just to understand 
molecular biology, or more precisely to understand the relation between 
molecular biology and biochemistry. In that context I have eventually 
discover Godel's proof, and through it I have guess an abstract 
biology, not dependent upon any chemistry. But this was presupposing 
some form of what later I called "comp" and I eventually realized that 
if I could relate that abstract biology with "real biology" then, in 
some deep global sense, it is (bio)chemistry which should obey to the 
law of abstract biology (despite James D. Watson's slogan). So, it is 
very early that I did understand that comp entails a reversal between 
mind and matter, between physics and machine's number theoretical 
bio-psycho-theo-logy. The rest in the effort to communicate that 
*problem*: I mean, that if comp is true, then the physical science have 
to be reduced to an abstract digital biology.

This is all what I say: if COMP is true, then the laws of physics are 
not primary. Comp is really a precise version of what Peter called 
standard computationalism. It is just a computer science update of 
Descartes' Mechanism, the idea that we are, from a correct third person 
point of view, machine (cf "yes doctor"). The fact that "matter" (as 
substrate; not as appearances) disappears is just an unavoidable 
consequence of comp. This I can, and I already have, explain on the 
list in all details (just ask if you want we go through the UDA again). 
I know we are wrong on this mind/body issue since more than 1500 years, 
i.e. since the scientist, due to "political pression" abandoned 
theology to the political authorities.  The millenium before it is 
plain that the intellectuals were aware that the mind/matter primacy 
question was an OPEN problem. All what I show is that with comp, it is 
still an open probIem. I think the Roman Church has some responsibility 
in making many people taking for granted that matter is an independent 
primary substrate making up our reality. It is a sort of "metaphysical 
demagogy", given that we have been probably "programmed" by million of 
years evolution to take our neighborhood for granted. Of course this 
idea could be true of course, but then comp has to be false. For comp 
being false you have to put in our body some infinite non computable 
object, that is, something which cannot be emulated even by a quantum 
computer.  People are free trying to develop such theories, but those 
who are serious until now have to make speculative move (like the 
falsity of QM, for example). Actually people are free to take the 
reversal result as an argument against comp, but then it is certainly 
not a knock down, for the reason that computer science is full of 
counter-intuitive results.

Indeed the second part of my work consists in interviewing a 
(sufficiently chatty, lobian) universal machine, and the discovery is 
that the machine introduced many subtle nuances on the 
geometrical/physical difference corresponding to the difference between 
necessary points of view (1-person, 3-person, 3-person plural, 
computable, true, provable, etc.). Now, when you just define the 
computationalist notion of matter, which, by the UDA, is given the 
third person sharable measure on uncertainty on accessible UD states, 
in the language of a lobian machine, you get a quantum logic which 
confirms (≠ proves) comp, and thus does not (yet) refute it.



Le 02-avr.-07, à 17:36, Mark Peaty a écrit :

>
> Bruno:
>> With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between
>> numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the
>> level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted
>> with many infinities, but this should not be considered as
>> problematical.
>
> MP: But what *relation* is there really?



I will say more in a post to John, but the relation are any one that 
you can define with classical logic languages and  addition and 
multiplication. For example, the relation "x is little than y" , which 
has the definition: Ez(x + z = y)   (Ez = it exists a number z), or the 
relation (x divides y) which has the definition Ez(x * z) = y. Godel 
has shown you can define most computer science notion in arithmetic, 
meaning by similar definition (involving only addition and 
multiplication). His result show that we cannot unify completely 
arithmetical truth, i.e. there is no theory capable of proving all true 
arithmetical proposition.




> I just feel like this
> kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.


I don't think so at all. The list is just a bit pedagogical so many 
explanations are repeated. I have no idea how many people really get 
the whole UDA.




> Platonia is 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John Mikes]

Mark,
you asked interesting questions, but I think the fundamental ones are still
'out there':
MP:(bold and in bold):
"I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
I would ask (joining your heresy):

1. Where did numbers come from? (an answer may be: They are GOD to believe
in).

2. How do they act?
Bruno wrote: the relationship between numbers. How does a "RELATIONSHIP"
act? it is an abstraction. Only substrates IN relationship act. The numbers
are abstractions (or: the contents we assign to them are abstractions?) so
here we face abstractions of abstractions. If one considers the
not-so-physical world (numbers?)
  -  a-spatial  -  (and of course   -  a-temporal  -), your question is out
of whack.
*MP next:
" what I am saying is that numbers need something which is not numbers -
   (to exist - my addition-JM)"
I believe it can be incorporated into the identification of
  "n u m b er "

if you ask only about their existence. Anything exists what we think about -
if not otherwise: in our thought. (I just had some exchange on this with
Stathis in a different aspect.)

John M
[EMAIL PROTECTED]







On 4/2/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Bruno:
> > With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between
> > numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the
> > level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted
> > with many infinities, but this should not be considered as
> > problematical.
>
> MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this
> kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.
> Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist
> anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within
> phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven
> fact, it is a glorious assumption!
>
> I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
> Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT
> numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big
> numbers which could represent everything significant about
> you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer
> working out that it knows that it knows something really
> important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be
> related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying
> is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or
> by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it
> 'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of
> this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve
> the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As
> far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all
> explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are
> doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression.
>
> There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little
> book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died
> in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go
> along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a
> decade or more ago - that the representational power of
> mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical
> objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can
> mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world
> because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous
> evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements,
> sub-atomic particles and so forth.
>
> For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual
> heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a
> person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'.
> There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a
> modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go
> back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are
> possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time
> before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining
> processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed
> system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...]
> will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money
> being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world.
> For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise
> that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a
> fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> >
> >>
> >> Thank you Bruno!
> >>
> >> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
> >> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
> >> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
> >> comp and see where it leads.
> >>
> >> It seems that self-re

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

Bruno:
> With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between 
> numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
> level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted 
> with many infinities, but this should not be considered as 
> problematical.

MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this
kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.
Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist
anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within
phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven
fact, it is a glorious assumption!

I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT
numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big
numbers which could represent everything significant about
you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer
working out that it knows that it knows something really
important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be
related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying
is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or
by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it
'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of
this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve 
the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As 
far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all 
explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are 
doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression.

There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little 
book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died 
in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go 
along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a 
decade or more ago - that the representational power of 
mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical 
objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can 
mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world 
because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous 
evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements, 
sub-atomic particles and so forth.

For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual 
heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a 
person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'. 
There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a 
modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go 
back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are 
possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time 
before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining 
processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed 
system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...] 
will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money 
being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world. 
For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise 
that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a 
fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'.



Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> 
>>
>> Thank you Bruno!
>>
>> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
>> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
>> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
>> comp and see where it leads.
>>
>> It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
>> of
>> anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be 
>> the
>> flavour of the new millennium.
>>
>> Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
>> to
>> pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
>> of
>> concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
>> But
>> what I am thinking about is this bit:
>>
>> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
>> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the
>> infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
>> the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
>> the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
>> self-continuation.
>>
>>  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
>> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
>> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
>> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
>> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
>> What
>> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
>> infinite regression.
> 
> 
> 
> With comp, wh

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John Mikes]

That's all fine and I appreciate the position (once we 'have gotten' to
circumstances providing the idea of a Loeb machine) - what I want to inject
is Dr. Johnson's stone,
which is not 'mind-stuff'' and in his shoe DID HURT (his mind). Not vice
versa.
Please, let it go as a remark outside the discussion.
John

On 3/28/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Hi Brent,
>
> As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended
> to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on
> some point which are perhaps somehow important ...
>
> Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> >>
> >>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> >>> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> >>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
> >>>
> >>> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
> >>> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
> >>
> >>
> >> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
> >> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis.
> >
> > I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)
> >
> > Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any
> > mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater
> > explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's "some things
> > exist and others don't".
>
>
> The goal of the UDA is not  to explain anything. The goal of the UD
> Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not
> explain neither appearance of matter nor mind.
> UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body
> problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You
> have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain
> matter from mind, cf the reversal).
>
> Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it
> begin to give positive and verifiable informations on
> matter/appearances.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Brent,

As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended 
to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on 
some point which are perhaps somehow important ...

Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
>>> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
>>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>>>
>>> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
>>> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
>>
>>
>> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
>> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis.
>
> I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)
>
> Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any 
> mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater 
> explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's "some things 
> exist and others don't".


The goal of the UDA is not  to explain anything. The goal of the UD 
Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not 
explain neither appearance of matter nor mind.
UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body 
problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You 
have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain 
matter from mind, cf the reversal).

Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it 
begin to give positive and verifiable informations on 
matter/appearances.

Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 21-mars-07, à 17:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :



> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the
>>> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an
>>> inherent relation like being relatively prime?
>>
>>
>> It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number
>> of a proof of f, etc.
>
> I didn't think godel numbering was unique?  If I just cite a number, 
> like 12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or 
> not?





The whole point of Godel's proof is that, exactly like you can define 
"prime" in the language of Peano Arithmetic PA (or weaker non lobian 
entity like Robinson Arithmetic),  you *can* define "being the godel 
number of a proof by PA"  *in* PA.

In all situation, when we are using a language we have to agree on some 
convention. Even the question "is the number 12345678987654321 prime or 
not" presuppose the conventional use of base ten position notation for 
number and the arithmetical definition of primeness.
The same occurs for the notion of arithmetical provability.
Of course the finite string "12345678987654321" could be a godel number 
of a proof or not depending of the way you represent the variable or 
the quantifier or the connector in term of numbers, but the *string* 
"12345678987654321" will represent a prime number or not according to 
the way you represent decimal numbers in Pean Arithmetic. It is just 
because we already agree, since high-school, on conventional notation 
for number that you can directly talk about the *number* 
123456787654321".  If we would have learn in high school some canonical 
way to represent proof (in PA) by numbers, like those used to explain 
to PA what a proof is, I would have been able to say yes or no 
directly.

Now, concerning Peano Arithmetic (PA), obviously (ask if not) 
12345678987654321 is NOT the godel number of a proof of f 
(independently of any choiçce of proof representation). This is because 
PA is consistent, so no number can represent a  proof of a falsity f.
And a lobian machine like ZF can prove that.

Note that, although Stathis defends many argument which are going in 
the direction of the ultimate consequence of comp, I do agree with some 
critics you are doing here and there. To believe that the observer 
moment OM are disconnected is perhaps a remnant ASSA thought (Absolute 
Self Sampling Assumption).

Let us try to be a little more specific. From a computational point of 
view, a computation can be considered equivalent with a proof of an 
arithmetical statement having the shape "it exists a number having this 
or that decidable property", that is "En P(n)" (it exists a n such that 
P(n)). So the universal dovetailer infinite execution is equivalent 
with the set of true Sigma1 sentences together with their proofs. So we 
can define easily a notion of atomical (primitive) third person 
"Observer Moment" by them. I put OM in quotes, because strictly 
speaking OM are conceived as first person experience and not as third 
person computational states. The UD Argument does force us to take 
those distinction into account. In particular it  shows that, to 
predict anything physical, among other things, we have to define a 
notion of first person plural indeterminacy, bearing on the OMs as seen 
by a machine itself embedded in UD*.

What happens is that each internal view, or hypostases, like the first 
plural person points of view, are defining a non trivial (thanks to 
Godel & Co.) mathematical and quasi geometrical structure on the OMs. 
That is each hypostases relate the OMs. They single out arithmetical 
relations in between the OMs. They remains disconnected, in a sense, 
like the numbers themselves can be considered disconnected. But of 
course, numbers are connected to each other by the usual arithmetical 
relations (definable in term of sums and products), and when the 
internal points of view are taken into account, we got for each of them 
a collection of different connections. If you recall some of my older 
post, the three primary hypostases rise Kripke multiverses, and the 
secondary (material, physical, natuiral) hypostases rise Scot-Montague 
sort of continuum topological multiverses, where the OMs appears to be 
as connected as "points" on continuous manifolds.

Now if comp is correct, it is expected that the relations between the 
OMs, from some first person point of view, restricted to the atomical 
Sigma1 propositions (by the UDA) gives rise to the laws of physics, 
defined by what is invariant for all observer point of views (arguably 
given by the third or fourth or fifth "hypostases"). Those are indeed 
the one which technically give purely arithmetical interpretation of 
Quantum Logic, the real signification of which remains to be seen (to 
be sure).

The lobian machine already gives some clues that a *physical* 
computation has to be given by a

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
>> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
>> inherent relation like being relatively prime?
> 
> 
> It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
> of a proof of f, etc.

I didn't think godel numbering was unique?  If I just cite a number, like 
12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or not?

Brent

> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> > 
> 
> 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
> numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
> inherent relation like being relatively prime?


It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
of a proof of f, etc.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
> 
>>
>> Thank you Bruno!
>>
>> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
>> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
>> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
>> comp and see where it leads.
>>
>> It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
>> of
>> anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be 
>> the
>> flavour of the new millennium.
>>
>> Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
>> to
>> pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
>> of
>> concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
>> But
>> what I am thinking about is this bit:
>>
>> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
>> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the
>> infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
>> the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
>> the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
>> self-continuation.
>>
>>  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
>> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
>> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
>> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
>> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
>> What
>> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
>> infinite regression.
> 
> 
> 
> With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between 
> numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
> level of those relations. 

What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, 
e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an inherent relation 
like being relatively prime?

Brent Meeker


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :

>
>
> Thank you Bruno!
>
> You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
> illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
> to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
> comp and see where it leads.
>
> It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
> of
> anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be 
> the
> flavour of the new millennium.
>
> Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
> to
> pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
> of
> concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
> But
> what I am thinking about is this bit:
>
> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the
> infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
> the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
> the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
> self-continuation.
>
>  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
> What
> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
> infinite regression.



With comp, what holds 'your lot" together are the relation between 
numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted 
with many infinities, but this should not be considered as 
problematical.







>
> **
> A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid
> explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in
> principle* to  measure the state of something

Why can't we measure the state of something? Even with just QM, the 
many-world idea has been invented for abandoning the idea that a 
measurement pertubates what is observed.



> and therefore *we* must
> acknowledge the indeterminacy

We must acknowledge indeterminacy once we postulate comp, given that it 
makes us self-duplicable, and indeed self-duplicated "all the time".

Bruno


> and so must everything else which exists
> because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, 
> and
> if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless
> it can come up with a good excuse!]?
>
> [Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real 
> number
> an infinite process?]
>
> **
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit :
>>
>>
>>
>>> Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. 
>>> Oh
>>> well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes 
>>> that
>>> can happen!
>>>
>>
>>
>> Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea
>> trivial, and both the "everything hyp"  and the "comp hyp" would loose
>> any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp,
>> *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for
>> that).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there
>>> are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic
>>> universes.
>>>
>>> It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will
>>> 'stick
>>> to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it
>>> probably
>>> isn't true!
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Mohsen:
>>
>>> I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of
>>> Countable and Uncountable has been considered.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The
>> comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis
>> that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine.
>>
>> 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov)
>> from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have
>> to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases.  With comp, we are 
>> duplicable.
>> I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be "pasted" in 
>> Washington
>> and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where:
>> a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An 
>> external
>> (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in 
>> Moscow.
>> b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I 
>> will
>> feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once.
>

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 06-mars-07, à 07:44, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit :

>
> Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
> I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but 
> not all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put 
> it we might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, 
> which is very interesting.
>
>
> 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
> but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
> machine instead).
>
> 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
> only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
> all infinitely often, + all variations, + all "real" oracles (and those
> oracles are uncountable).
>
> Let me know where's my mistake:
>
> 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of 
> that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our 
> world.


I don't think so. Worlds or world-views emerge globally from UD* (UD's 
execution).




>
> 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, 
> regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite 
> power.


Not really. An history can be revised infinitely often so that our 
first person historical point of view could be infinite and even 
uncountable.


>
> 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.


Like many, especially in the recent posts, forget the points of view 
distinctions.



>
> 4.A universal state is not countable.

Probably false from a 3 person view. Probably true from 1 person view.



>
> Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
> with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
>  were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
> have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
> all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.
>
> But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to 
> represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the 
> uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
> What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of 
> universes.

With comp, this arguably follows indeed.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/19/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
> > outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist,
> without
> > benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
> > non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is,
> why
> > should computations have a privileged ontological status in the
> everything?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> >
>
> That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given "priveleged
> ontological status" are the descriptions (or infinite length strings -
> binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the
> outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered
> as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary).


OK, I just read "bitstring" as something generated by a computer, but I see
that you deliberately differentiate the descriptions from the Schmidhuber
ensemble, making your theory more general:

http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
> outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without
> benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
> non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why
> should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything?
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 

That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given "priveleged
ontological status" are the descriptions (or infinite length strings -
binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the
outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered
as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary).


-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without
benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why
should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything?

Stathis Papaioannou


On 3/19/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are
> overrun
> > with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the
> calculation
> > of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which
> explains
> > the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
> > non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next
> moment:
> > what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the
> orderly
> > computational worlds' relative measure?
>
> Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't
> succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why.
>
> Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call
> "robustness" of the observer, and robustness is not a general property
> of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so
> intractable in comp.
>
> I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers
> from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not
> yet
> calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust
> observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white
> rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but
> perhaps I'm being overly optimistic.
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
>
> 
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 04:02:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
> honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
> associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
> Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
> to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 

No - just the non-white rabbitness of it :) And a few other things...

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun
> with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation
> of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains
> the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
> non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment:
> what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly
> computational worlds' relative measure?

Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't
succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why.

Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call
"robustness" of the observer, and robustness is not a general property
of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so
intractable in comp.

I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers
from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not yet
calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust
observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white
rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but
perhaps I'm being overly optimistic.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
>> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
>> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>>
>> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
>> logic, as well as epistemic ones?
> 
> 
> Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
> primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. 

I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)  

Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, 
exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your 
UDA as compared to Peter's "some things exist and others don't".

>It is just 
> up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
> This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
> of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
> materialism and computationalism. 

When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from 
the conjunction of materialism and computationalism.  IIRC you said there was 
not a contradiction.

But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really 
see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it.

Brent Meeker

>The argument should make us more 
> modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
> 
> Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
> interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
> an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
> knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
> the (arithmetical hypostases):
> 
> p  (truth)
> Bp (provable)
> Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)
> 
> Bp & Dp (gamblings)
> Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)
> 
> And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
> hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
> what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
> explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
> multiverse.
> 
> It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
> theology) experimentally testable.
> 
> As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
> discovery:
> 
> The universal machine (talks bits)
> The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
> qubits).
> 
> The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
> to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
> both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
> 
> I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
> honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
> associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
> Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
> to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> > 
> 
> 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John M]

I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A),  comp,  the P-words (Platonia, 
Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only 
for the adepts. Not in Mark's required "plain language". (English or what?) 
(I still stumble among them).  
My question now:
How do we distinguish "Everything" from "Almost Everything"? We are still 
'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it:  the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. 
How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real 
total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called 
(our?) "Everything"? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect 
may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense 
(happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). 
How are we better? 
We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the 
laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). 
Ad vocem 'smarter': 
I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be 
smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does 
that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia 
ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old 
Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality 
and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - 
i.e. better wisdom. 
So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now.

Regards

John M 
 

  - Original Message ----- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument




  Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

  > But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
  > universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
  > arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
  >
  > And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
  > logic, as well as epistemic ones?


  Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
  primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
  up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
  This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
  of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
  materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
  modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

  Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
  interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
  an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
  knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
  the (arithmetical hypostases):

  p  (truth)
  Bp (provable)
  Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

  Bp & Dp (gamblings)
  Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

  And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
  hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
  what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
  explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
  multiverse.

  It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
  theology) experimentally testable.

  As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
  discovery:

  The universal machine (talks bits)
  The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
  qubits).

  The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
  to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
  both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

  I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
  honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
  associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
  Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
  to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.

  Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  


  -- 
  No virus found in this incoming message.
  Checked by AVG Free Edition.
  Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.12/724 - Release Date: 3/16/2007 
12:12 PM


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>
> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?


Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
the (arithmetical hypostases):

p  (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
multiverse.

It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
theology) experimentally testable.

As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
discovery:

The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
qubits).

The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>>  But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> >>  universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> >>  arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
> >
> >
> > And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures?
>
> I guess that depends on what you mean by "mathematical structures".  I
> would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical
> structure.  I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory
> "structures".  If you regard "mathematics" as a game of propositions it just
> means every wff is a theorem.  But if you regard "mathematics" as existing
> (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss.


What I meant was the naive interpretation of "everything exists": cartoon
characters in cartoon worlds *just there* rather than generated by some
computer simulation or set of physical laws, as our universe seems to be. If
you look at only computations in Platonia, you could argue that such
structures (which as a matter of fact could be generated computationally, so
perhaps non-mathematical was a poor choice of words) would be of low
measure. However, what of the ones "outside" the computer? It seems to me
they should have the same ontological status as the abstract computer, but
it is then impossible to assign them a measure which makes the weirder ones
less likely, as has been done with computation.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
>  > If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like
> being
>  > the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is
> more like
>  > waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your
> bedroom
>  > overnight without there being any lottery. We could say "that's
> just the
>  > way it is", but it could have been an infinite number of other
> ways as
>  > well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise
> that
>  > you and every other particular thing exist.
> 
> It's no explanation either.  It's just "Everything exists and what
> you experience is just what you experience."  which Occam's razor
> trimes to "What you experience is just what you experience". 
> 
> 
> You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic 
> principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical 
> constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake 
> of argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? 

No I would agree that an ensemble theory that includes some measure relative to 
a well define anthropomorphic principle has some explanatory power.  For 
example I would expect it to show that there is a higher probability of an 
intelligent life form finding intelligence to be rare and widely scattered.  
From what we know now, it seems that there could universes in which almost 
every star had a planet with intelligent life and one would be more likely to 
find oneself in such a universe than in the one we observe.  Vic has only 
considered "everything" in the very narrow sense of a range of values for the 
19 parameters of the standard model - not the much broader "everything" of 
Tegmark or even Bruno.

>Of course, we are then 
> left with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of 
> any explanation, including theological ones.
> 
>  >The only thing that needs
>  > ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than
>  > something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we
> experience
>  > could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia,
> that
>  > would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia
>  > can't not run.
> 
> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything"). 
> 
> 
> And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? 

I guess that depends on what you mean by "mathematical structures".  I would 
take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical structure.  
I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory "structures".  If 
you regard "mathematics" as a game of propositions it just means every wff is a 
theorem.  But if you regard "mathematics" as existing (even in Platonia) I'm at 
a loss.

Brent Meeker

>There 
> seems to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a 
> fantastic world should be ontologically privileged compared to the 
> fantastic world just existing complete in itself, not generated by any 
> computation. This would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western 
> philosophy, including Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that 
> everything is made of numbers.
> 
> One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are 
> overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the 
> calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, 
> which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't 
> explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude 
> in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be 
> less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure?
> 
> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
> logic, as well as epistemic ones? 
> 
> 
> No, it would be like a block universe.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> 
> > 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being
> > the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like
> > waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom
> > overnight without there being any lottery. We could say "that's just the
> > way it is", but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as
> > well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that
> > you and every other particular thing exist.
>
> It's no explanation either.  It's just "Everything exists and what you
> experience is just what you experience."  which Occam's razor trimes to
> "What you experience is just what you experience".


You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic
principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical
constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake of
argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? Of course, we are then left
with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of any
explanation, including theological ones.

>The only thing that needs
> > ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than
> > something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience
> > could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that
> > would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia
> > can't not run.
>
> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic
> (which would be a much smaller "everything").


And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? There seems
to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a fantastic
world should be ontologically privileged compared to the fantastic world
just existing complete in itself, not generated by any computation. This
would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western philosophy, including
Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that everything is made of
numbers.

One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun
with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation
of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains
the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment:
what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly
computational worlds' relative measure?

And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in logic, as
> well as epistemic ones?


No, it would be like a block universe.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
>  > There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
>  > infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
>  > zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
>  > dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about
> observers,
>  > and once you are that fantastically improbable person,
> 
> In other words, "That's just the way it is.", which comports with my
> complaint that such theories are empty.
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
>  >it becomes a
>  > certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
>  > versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
>  > perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
>  > impossibility a local certainty.
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being 
> the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like 
> waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom 
> overnight without there being any lottery. We could say "that's just the 
> way it is", but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as 
> well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that 
> you and every other particular thing exist. 

It's no explanation either.  It's just "Everything exists and what you 
experience is just what you experience."  which Occam's razor trimes to "What 
you experience is just what you experience".

>The only thing that needs 
> ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than 
> something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience 
> could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that 
> would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia 
> can't not run. 

But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe?  or 
Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a 
much smaller "everything").

And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in logic, as 
well as epistemic ones?


Brent Meeker
"An explanation that could explain anything, fails to explain at all."


>That's highly speculative, of course: maybe the brain 
> will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe someone will come up 
> with a formulation of computationalism which defeats 
> Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical 
> Universe without ultimate explanation.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> > 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
> > infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
> > zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
> > dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers,
> > and once you are that fantastically improbable person,
>
> In other words, "That's just the way it is.", which comports with my
> complaint that such theories are empty.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> >it becomes a
> > certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
> > versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
> > perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
> > impossibility a local certainty.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou


If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the
one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking
up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight
without there being any lottery. We could say "that's just the way it is",
but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the
other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other
particular thing exist. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is
the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were
possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an
abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question,
because the machine in Platonia can't not run. That's highly speculative, of
course: maybe the brain will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe
someone will come up with a formulation of computationalism which defeats
Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical
Universe without ultimate explanation.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/16/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
>  > I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and
> other small
>  > numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e.
> almost all
>  > of them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist"
> doesn't help
>  > answer that.  But if the integers are something we "make up"
> (or are
>  > hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
>  > acquainted with small ones.
>  >
>  >
>  > OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation.
> Suppose
>  > the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
>  > infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
>  > effectively zero? And yet here you are.
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
> 
> Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is
> almost zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just
> like my winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is
> improbable - but someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative
> measure.  Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers -
> yet we are acquainted with some and not others.  So why is the
> "acquaintance measure" of small integers so much greater than that
> of integers greater than 10^10^20 ( i.e. almost all of them).  What
> picks out the small integers?
> 
> 
> There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is 
> infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is 
> zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky 
> dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, 
> and once you are that fantastically improbable person, 

In other words, "That's just the way it is.", which comports with my complaint 
that such theories are empty.

Brent Meeker

>it becomes a 
> certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future 
> versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person 
> perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global 
> impossibility a local certainty.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> 
> 
> > 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Jesse Mazer]

Torgny Tholerus  wrote:
>
>When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I
>myself call "unnatural numbers".  An unnatural number U is an integer
>that is bigger than every natural number N.  And the inverse of an
>unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number.

Actually, mathematicians have already developed ideas along these 
lines--google "hyperreal numbers" (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperreal_number for starters) and 
"non-standard analysis" (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_analysis ). And if you enter 
"nonstandard analysis" on amazon you can also find some formal 
introductions, such as 
http://www.amazon.com/Lectures-Hyperreals-Introduction-Nonstandard-Mathematics/dp/038798464X/

Jesse

_
Exercise your brain! Try Flexicon. 
http://games.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmemailtaglinemarch07


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/16/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
> > numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
> > of them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help
> > answer that.  But if the integers are something we "make up" (or are
> > hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
> > acquainted with small ones.
> >
> >
> > OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
> > the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
> > infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
> > effectively zero? And yet here you are.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
>
> Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
> zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
> winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is improbable -
> but someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each
> integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted
> with some and not others.  So why is the "acquaintance measure" of small
> integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
> almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?


There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero
or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you
have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you
are that fantastically improbable person, it becomes a certainty that you
will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant
anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within
the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

John M skrev:

  
  
  
  
  I looked at your paper, interesting. 
  One question:
  what do you mean by "exist"
  (Notably: "does NOT exist)?
   
  We think about it (no matter in how vague terms
and weak understanding), we talk about it, our mind has a place in our
thinking for that term, - does this not suffice for (in a WIDER???
meaning) existence?

When human beings think of "infinity", they think of a *very* big set,
where the end of the set is hidden in a big black cloud, far, far
away.  In that way they can say that you have a mapping of the set onto
a true subset of the set, because they only see the visible part of the
set, and there it is true that there is such a mapping there.  But what
happens inside the cloud they don't see.  They don't see that there are
mappings missing in the end of the set...

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com  To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]  For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en  -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

Brent Meeker skrev:
> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>   
>> I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3
>> pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.
>> 
> Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist.  I actually 
> agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* 
> impossible.  I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent 
> number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from 
> logic and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of 
> inference.
>
> But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and 
> convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals).  This doesn't 
> bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics 
> as an approximate model and only using as much "infinity" as seems useful.
>   

When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I 
myself call "unnatural numbers".  An unnatural number U is an integer 
that is bigger than every natural number N.  And the inverse of an 
unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number.  You 
can count with these unnatural number in the same way as ordinary 
integers.  So you will have that U+1 is not equal to U, and N*N << 
sqrt(U), and so on.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>  Suppose the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1,
Tegmarks argument does not require that the universe is infinite.  It 
only requires that the universe is *very* big.  So the universe can 
still be finite.  If the universe is *enough* big it will contain many 
exact copies of our own part of the universe...

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/16/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the
> identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not
> in such or such cartesian picture, even the "concrete" knots I put in
> my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.


There are related examples, like letters of the alphabet, which survive even
non-topological transformations and defy any algorithmic specification.
Nevertheless, any particular concrete example of a knotted string or letter
on a page is completely captured by a physical description. There is no
special knottiness or letterness ingredient that needs to be added to ensure
that they are knots or letters.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi Brent,
> 
> On Friday 16 March 2007 00:16:13 Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>
>>> > wrote:
>>>  > But these ideas illustrate a problem with
>>>  > "everything-exists".  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
>>>  > self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to
>>>
>>> assign
>>>
>>>  > any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick
>>>
>>> out this
>>>
>>>  > rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
>>>  > possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something
>>>
>>> picks out
>>>
>>>  > this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
>>>  >
>>>  >
>>>  > Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because
>>>
>>> there is
>>>
>>>  > no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the
>>>
>>> other
>>>
>>>  > objects in Platonia?
>>>  >
>>>  > Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>> I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
>>> numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
>>> of them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help
>>> answer that.  But if the integers are something we "make up" (or are
>>> hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
>>> acquainted with small ones.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
>>> the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
>>> infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
>>> effectively zero? And yet here you are.
>>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
>>
>> Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
>> zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
>> winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but
>> someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer
>> has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with
>> some and not others.  So why is the "acquaintance measure" of small
>> integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
>> almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?
>>
>> Brent Meeker
> 
> If you see each integer with a successor notation, 2 is S(1) and 3 is S(2) 
> which is S(S(1)) and so on, you see that "big" integers contains the "small" 
> integers and the smalls are over represented... just a though ;-)
> 
> Quentin

Yes, I think there's a grain of truth in that.  The integers aren't *just out 
there*.  By Peano's, or anyone else's, axioms they are generated as needed.  We 
don't want to run out so we (except Torgny) always allow one more, but we never 
need the whole set at once until we want to make diagonalization arguments.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi Brent,

On Friday 16 March 2007 00:16:13 Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> > > wrote:
> >  > But these ideas illustrate a problem with
> >  > "everything-exists".  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
> >  > self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to
> >
> > assign
> >
> >  > any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick
> >
> > out this
> >
> >  > rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
> >  > possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something
> >
> > picks out
> >
> >  > this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
> >  >
> >  >
> >  > Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because
> >
> > there is
> >
> >  > no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the
> >
> > other
> >
> >  > objects in Platonia?
> >  >
> >  > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
> > numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
> > of them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help
> > answer that.  But if the integers are something we "make up" (or are
> > hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
> > acquainted with small ones.
> >
> >
> > OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
> > the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
> > infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
> > effectively zero? And yet here you are.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
>
> Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
> zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
> winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but
> someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer
> has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with
> some and not others.  So why is the "acquaintance measure" of small
> integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
> almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?
>
> Brent Meeker

If you see each integer with a successor notation, 2 is S(1) and 3 is S(2) 
which is S(S(1)) and so on, you see that "big" integers contains the "small" 
integers and the smalls are over represented... just a though ;-)

Quentin

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
> 
>  > But these ideas illustrate a problem with
>  > "everything-exists".  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
>  > self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to
> assign
>  > any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick
> out this
>  > rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
>  > possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something
> picks out
>  > this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
>  >
>  >
>  > Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because
> there is
>  > no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the
> other
>  > objects in Platonia?
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
> numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
> of them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help
> answer that.  But if the integers are something we "make up" (or are
> hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
> acquainted with small ones. 
> 
>  
> OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose 
> the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an 
> infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure 
> effectively zero? And yet here you are.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou

Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost 
zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning 
the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to 
win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer has zero measure in 
the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others.  So 
why is the "acquaintance measure" of small integers so much greater than that 
of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them).  What picks out 
the small integers?

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/15/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> > But these ideas illustrate a problem with
> > "everything-exists".  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
> > self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign
> > any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this
> > rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
> > possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out
> > this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
> >
> >
> > Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is
> > no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other
> > objects in Platonia?
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
> numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of
> them.  A theory that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help answer
> that.  But if the integers are something we "make up" (or are hardwired by
> evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones.


OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose the
universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an infinite
number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure effectively zero? And
yet here you are.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Brent Meeker]

John M wrote:
> Bruno and Brent:
> Are we back at the "Aris-total" i.e. the "sum" considered "more" than 
> its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes 
> more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. 

But components are only part of a reductionist model - it also includes the 
interactions of the components, e.g how an electron interacts with a proton.  
To identify scientific reductionism with 'component-analysis' is a straw man.  
No one is satisfied with a reductionist model that just names components - the 
model must be able to go the other way and synthesize the behavior of the thing 
modeled.  Modeling a hydrogen atom as an electron interacting via photons with 
a proton is a successful model because it predicts behavoir of the hydrogen 
atom, e.g. it EM spectrum, its stability, the heat capacity of an H2 gas.

>Qualia, 
> functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item.
> It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say
> a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa.
>  
> First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
> observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in 
> other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if 
> you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its 
> calculations).  

How small does n have to be?  Does n=0 correspond to seeing photons?

>Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in 
> bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing 
> such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied  them. Of course 
> none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the 
> original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist.  

What's a "proper observation"? and why does its non-existence matter?

> It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood, 
>  just regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has 
> provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as 
> the total and utter   the Aristotelian maxim.
>  
> One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying 
> the so called parts we discovered so far.
> We can think only within our already acquired knowledge.

Then how can we ever acquire additional knowledge?  The whole point of models 
like particles is to extrapolate beyond what we can observed.  When such 
extrapolations agree with further observations we put greater credence in them. 
 When the credence is great enough we start taking the model to be "known" - at 
least until we find a problem with it.  This is nothing esoteric, it's the way 
we learn what tables and chairs are as well as protons and electrons.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[John M]

Bruno and Brent:
Are we back at the "Aris-total" i.e. the "sum" considered "more" than its 
(material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than 
what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even 
out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. 
It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say 
a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. 

First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other 
observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the 
means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations).  Same 
with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D 
sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 
'studied'/applied  them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the 
proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' 
does exist.  
It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood,  just 
regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT 
time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter   
the Aristotelian maxim. 

One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying the so 
called parts we discovered so far. 
We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. 

John M

  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  > 
  > 
  > Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
  > 
  > On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > 
  >  > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
  > electron +
  >  > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
  >  > components;
  > 
  > 
  > Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
  > entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
  > looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
  > but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
  > genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
  > 
  > Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
  > somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
  > there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
  > explain it further.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  > That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
  > to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
  > Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp, 
  > then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
  > we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
  > but numbers.

  If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like 
Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like 
statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

  > 
  > 
  > You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
  > don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
  > and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
  > next to each other?
  > 
  > 
  > Locally yes. 

  I'm not sure what you mean by "locally".  Since they have opposite charge 
they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen 
atom state by emission of photons.

  Brent Meeker

  >In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
  > corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
  > open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.
  > 
  > There is no sense to say
  > an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
  > self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
  > psychology/theology.
  > 
  > Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
  > 
  > 
  > Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
  > what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
  > 
  > 
  > Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
  > defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
  > from yo

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John M]

I looked at your paper, interesting. 
One question:
what do you mean by "exist"
(Notably: "does NOT exist)?

We think about it (no matter in how vague terms and weak understanding), we 
talk about it, our mind has a place in our thinking for that term, - does this 
not suffice for (in a WIDER??? meaning) existence? 
I agree: it is  logically (physically?) hardly identifiable but do we stand 
only on a (material?) physical basis? 
And I make no difference between infinite small and infinite big. None of them 
understandable. Brent's 'infinitesimal' is a good idea in this topic, yet I 
consider it scale-oriented, an infinitesimally close in 1000 orders of 
magnitude smaller scale can be 'miles' away. (No 'real' miles implied) - 

Best regards

John M
- Original Message - 
  From: Torgny Tholerus 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:58 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument


Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : (among others)

  Infinity is a logically impossible concept. Infinity Does Not Exist.
  -- 
  Torgny Tholerus



--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>>
>> Infinity is a logically impossible concept.
>>
>> I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some 
>> early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
>> not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
>> been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
>> back on this later.
> I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 
> pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.
> 
> -- 
> Torgny Tholerus

Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist.  I actually 
agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* 
impossible.  I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent 
number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from logic 
and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of inference.

But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and 
convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals).  This doesn't 
bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics as 
an approximate model and only using as much "infinity" as seems useful.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> 
> On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>  > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
> electron +
>  > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
>  > components;
> 
> 
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
> genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
> 
> Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
> somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
> there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
> explain it further.
> 
> 
> 
> That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
> to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
> Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp, 
> then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
> we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
> but numbers.

If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian 
quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical 
mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

> 
> 
> You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
> don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
> and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
> next to each other?
> 
> 
> Locally yes. 

I'm not sure what you mean by "locally".  Since they have opposite charge they 
will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom 
state by emission of photons.

Brent Meeker

>In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
> corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
> open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.
> 
> There is no sense to say
> an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
> psychology/theology.
> 
> Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
> 
> 
> Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
> what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
> 
> 
> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
> identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
> for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
> 
> I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
> Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate
> physical reality.
> 
> 
> I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. 

A remark only a mathematician could make ;-)

I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding in 
space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by 
having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material.

Brent Meeker


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
  
  Infinity is a logically impossible concept.
  
I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come
back on this later.
  

I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3
pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com  To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]  For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en  -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---





infinity.doc
Description: MS-Word document

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

> Infinity is a logically impossible concept.


I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;).  Some 
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
back on this later.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  > You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron 
> +
> > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
> > components;
>
>
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
> genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
>
> Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, 
> an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a 
> hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it 
> further.


That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
Of course if the hidden factor is given by the "many worlds" or comp, 
then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But 
then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) 
exists, but numbers.


> You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I 
> don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton 
> and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there 
> next to each other?

Locally yes. In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
open if such "physical state" acn ever be prepared, even locally.

>  There is no sense to say
> an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
> psychology/theology.
>
> Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.


> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
>  identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see 
> the
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
> for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
>
> I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the 
> Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical 
> reality.
>

I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the 
identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not 
in such or such cartesian picture, even the "concrete" knots I put in 
my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 13-mars-07, à 18:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying 
> reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely 
> doubtful given its incompatibility with general relativity.


All right. But note that both String Theory and Loop Gravity (the main 
attempt to marry QM and GR) keep the quantum theory and changes the GR. 
Note that the most weird aspect of the quantum have been verified, and 
also that comp only predicts large feature of that weirdness.
(Note that QM should be completely false for coming back to aristotle, 
making QM an approximation makes its weirdness more weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
> 
> 
> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  > Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>  >> On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* < [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  >> >> wrote:
>  >>
>  >> Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>  >>> How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
>  >> Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the
> universe is
>  >> finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
>  >> logically impossible concept.
>  >>
>  >>
>  >> I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go
> together. The
>  >> integers are discrete, but not finite.
>  > No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of
>  > integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can
>  > construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of
> the set
>  > of all integers.
> 
> This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)
> 
>  >
>  > Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
>  > discrete.
> 
> That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like
> the interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.
> 
> But these ideas illustrate a problem with
> "everything-exists".  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
> self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign
> any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this
> rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
> possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out
> this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? 
> 
>  
> Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is 
> no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other 
> objects in Platonia?
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou

I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers 
but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them.  A theory 
that just says "all integers exist" doesn't help answer that.  But if the 
integers are something we "make up" (or are hardwired by evolution) then it 
makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/15/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


>
> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
> >> On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
> >>> How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
> >> Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
> >> finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
> >> logically impossible concept.
> >>
> >>
> >> I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The
> >> integers are discrete, but not finite.
> > No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of
> > integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can
> > construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set
> > of all integers.
>
> This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)
>
> >
> > Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
> > discrete.
>
> That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like the
> interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.
>
> But these ideas illustrate a problem with "everything-exists".  Everything
> conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems
> impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to
> pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
> possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out this
> rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?


Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no
way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects
in Platonia?

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>> On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>> > wrote:
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>>> How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
>> Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
>> finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
>> logically impossible concept.
>>
>>
>> I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The 
>> integers are discrete, but not finite.
> No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of 
> integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can 
> construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set 
> of all integers.

This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)

> 
> Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is 
> discrete.

That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like the 
interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.

But these ideas illustrate a problem with "everything-exists".  Everything 
conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible 
to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this 
rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is possible is 
possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, 
we can ask why THAT measure?

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  
  
Stathis Papaioannou skrev:

  How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
  

Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a logically
impossible concept.
  
  
I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The
integers are discrete, but not finite. 
  
  

No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of
integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can
construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set
of all integers.

Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
discrete.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com  To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]  For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en  -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
>
> On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer
> > screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what
> > Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an
> > illusion. *
> >  I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational
> > according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the
> > distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational
> > numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
> > I mean there's some irrational distance out there!
> >
>
> How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
>
> Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is finite,
> and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a logically impossible
> concept.
>

I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The
integers are discrete, but not finite.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Torgny Tholerus]

Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
   
  
Not necessarily. If you draw a
diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a
discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates.
Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. 


I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is
irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such
diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be
made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal
pixels) 
I mean there's some irrational distance out there!
  
   
  How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.

Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a logically
impossible concept.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com  To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]  For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en  -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> Bent, Stathis,
>  
> Suppose that space is discrete. It has some elementary unit. Let's call 
> it SU.
> Suppose there are 3 of these units out there in a right triangular 
> fashion( L shape)
> Then what is the distance between two distant angles? is it made up of 
> some integer numbers of space unit? Pythagoras' theorem says no. You 
> might say we can not measure such distance because when we're talking 
> about elements of space there should be nothing smaller than it... So 
> what is that distance? How you gonna make a discrete space when it's 
> intuitively continuous.

How are you going to circumnavigate the Earth when it's intuitively flat?  
Maybe you can't arrange such a triangle for the smallest units.  The metric 
that gives x^2 + y^2 = r^2 only one possibility (and one we think doesn't apply 
near matter because of general relativity).

Brent Meeker


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

Bent, Stathis,

Suppose that space is discrete. It has some elementary unit. Let's call it
SU.
Suppose there are 3 of these units out there in a right triangular fashion(
L shape)
Then what is the distance between two distant angles? is it made up of some
integer numbers of space unit? Pythagoras' theorem says no. You might say we
can not measure such distance because when we're talking about elements of
space there should be nothing smaller than it... So what is that distance?
How you gonna make a discrete space when it's intuitively continuous.

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron +
> > proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
> > components;
>
>
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
> genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.


Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an
intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden
factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further.

> or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton
> > because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary
> > and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.
>
> In general this is not the case.


You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't
think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an
electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each
other?

> And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more
> > impressive reduction.
>
>
> But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom
> can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a
> part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all
> decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you
> have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron
> will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing,
> follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into
> a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the
> election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object "atom of
> hydrogen" is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person
> plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say
> an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
> psychology/theology.


Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

> As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D
> > coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical
> > circle or triangle.
>
> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
> identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
> for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html


I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic
ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality.

> Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
> > reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to
> > reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not
> > work...
>
> OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify
> reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in
> some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to
> refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their
> relation).
>
> I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal
> Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
> then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is
> anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many
> practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but
> this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the
> many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if
> they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if
> comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter
> emerges (logico-arithmetically, not "temporally") from mind and number.
>
> You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you
> cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of
> "relative bodies" to a mind. "relative bodies" are only defined by
> infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.
>
> (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus
> for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to
> already suspect that Arist

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
> it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
> theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.
> *
> I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational
> according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the
> distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational
> numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
> I mean there's some irrational distance out there!
>

How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then 
> proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except 
> that it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a 
> theorem.  So you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or 
> even a Sherlock Holmes story.  You may suppose these things "exist" in 
> some sense, but clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your 
> computer.
>  
> 
> Now I got it.
>  
> Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (/You are 
> assuming the same to oppose/)- which is begging the question.  From the 
> operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), 

Yes, but if they are not operational it is not clear how they relate to our 
world of experience.  Generally they are taken to be idealized models.

>all 
> measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same 
> unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational 
> numbers)).  

No.  For example the most accurate measurement to confirm Pythogora's theorem 
now possible would be to use ultraviolet light and count the number of 
wavelengths along each side and the diagonal.  Those counts would all be 
integers.  At present this is a practical experimental limit and so one can 
imagine using shorter wavelengths and making more accurate measurements - which 
will still come out as integers.  But according to current theories of general 
relativity and quantum mechanics there is also a limit to how short the wave 
length can be; an in-principle limit.  Measurements never yield numbers that 
are not integers (or ratios of integers).

Brent Meeker

>Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure 
> that some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those 
> equations have some real counterparts).  Similarly imaginary numbers are 
> introduced to complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - 
> except some people think the integers are not.
> You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point!
> 
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.
> 
> 
> > 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

 Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then
proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except that
it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem.  So
you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock
Holmes story.  You may suppose these things "exist" in some sense, but
clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your computer.


Now I got it.

Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (*You are
assuming the same to oppose*)- which is begging the question.  From the
operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), all
measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same
unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational
numbers)).  Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure that
some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those equations
have some real counterparts).  Similarly imaginary numbers are introduced to
complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - except some people
think the integers are not.
You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point!

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> 
> 
> 
> OK, but it seems that we are using "reductionism" differently.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps. I am not so sure.
> 
> 
> You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron
> + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
> components;
> 
> 
> 
> Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior 
> entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from 
> looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, 
> but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. 
> It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.

Not only that, but QM admits of negative information, so some of the 
information you get from observing the parts may be cancelled out in a more 
comprehensive measurement.

> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton
> because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary
> and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.
> 
> 
> In general this is not the case.
> 
> 
> 
> And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another,
> more impressive reduction.
> 
> 
> 
> But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom 
> can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a part 
> of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all decimal) 
> position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you have to 
> take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron will, for 
> going from position x to the position y you are computing, follow the 
> path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into a white 
> rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the election 
> and come back to y. 

Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying 
reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely doubtful 
given its incompatibility with general relativity.

Brent Meeker

>Same with the UD, the object "atom of hydrogen" is 
> only defined relatively to an infinity of first person plural 
> expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say an atom 
> is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of 
> self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's 
> psychology/theology.
> 
> 
> 
> As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a
> 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular
> physical circle or triangle. 
> 
> 
> Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is 
> defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation 
> from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it 
> changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot 
> identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the 
> global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for 
> sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
> People can look here for a cute knot table:
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
> 
> 
> 
> Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
> reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails
> to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not
> work...
> 
> 
> OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify 
> reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in 
> some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to 
> refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their 
> relation).
> 
> I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal 
> Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
> then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is 
> anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many 
> practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but 
> this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the 
> many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if 
> they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if 
> comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter 
> emerges (logico-arithmetically, not "temporally") from mind and number.
> 
> You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you 
> cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of 
> "relative bodies" to a mind. "relative bodies" are only defined by 
> infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.
> 
> (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus 
> for old platonist reasons, a priori

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> /Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not self-contradictory. 
>  Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock 
> Holmes exists in some Platonic realm.
> /
>  
> Brent,
>  
> What do you mean by that? 

Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then 
proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except that it 
should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem.  So you can 
regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock Holmes 
story.  You may suppose these things "exist" in some sense, but clearly they 
don't exist in the same sense as your computer.

>I do not get your point.
> Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples 
> in which we need them!
> Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases 
> in which the distance between two points should be irrational.

Only under the assumption that space has a Euclidean metric - which is begging 
the question.  From the operational viewpoint, all measurements yield integers 
(in some units).  Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure 
that some integer equations have solutions.  Similarly imaginary numbers are 
introduced to complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - except some 
people think the integers are not.

Brent Meeker


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

Tangentially:

Brent: 'doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic
realm ...'

MP: For those who occasionally like a clever and entertaining
read unencumbered by deep social comment can I recommend the
adventures of Ms Thursday Next in 'The Eyre Affair' a novel by
Jasper FForde, and in the sequels, the names of which I have
forgotten at the moment. The author shows what could happen if
Platonia started really getting out of hand.




Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Brent Meeker wrote:
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
>> /All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real
>>  numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a 
>> convenience (since calculus is easier than finite 
>> differences).  There is no evidence that defining an 
>> instantaneous state requires uncountable information. /
>> 
>> What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real
>>  numbers are mathematical, so they should have a
>> counterpart in real world.
> 
> Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not 
> self-contradictory.  Sherlock Holmes stories are 
> mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in 
> some Platonic realm.
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
> > 
> 
> 

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

*Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.*
I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according
to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is
an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of
another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
I mean there's some irrational distance out there!

-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.


On 3/13/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>  On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  *Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
> > Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
> > in some Platonic realm.
> > *
> >
> > Brent,
> >
> > What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
> > Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples
> > in which we need them!
> > Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases
> > in which the distance between two points should be irrational.
> >
>
> Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
> it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
> theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
>
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



> OK, but it seems that we are using "reductionism" differently.




Perhaps. I am not so sure.


> You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + 
> proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its 
> components;


Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior 
entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from 
looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, 
but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not 
genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.





> or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton 
> because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary 
> and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.

In general this is not the case.



> And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more 
> impressive reduction.


But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom 
can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a 
part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all 
decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you 
have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron 
will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, 
follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into 
a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the 
election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object "atom of 
hydrogen" is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person 
plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say 
an atom is part of the UD. It is "part" of the necessary discourse of 
self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's 
psychology/theology.



> As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D 
> coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical 
> circle or triangle. 

Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is 
defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation 
from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it 
changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot 
identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the 
global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling 
for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
People can look here for a cute knot table:
http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html


>
> Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that 
> reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to 
> reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not 
> work...

OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify 
reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in 
some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to 
refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their 
relation).

I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal 
Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is 
anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many 
practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but 
this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the 
many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if 
they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if 
comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter 
emerges (logico-arithmetically, not "temporally") from mind and number.

You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you 
cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of 
"relative bodies" to a mind. "relative bodies" are only defined by 
infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.

(I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus 
for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to 
already suspect that Aristotle was wrong).


> unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction.


Of course, but *that* would make any explanation a reductionism.

Bruno




>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>> > Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to 
>> explain
>> > it. What's wrong with that?
>>
>>
>> Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception)
>> can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA 
>> is
>> all about. First person expection (b

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

*Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
> Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
> in some Platonic realm.
> *
>
> Brent,
>
> What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
> Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples
> in which we need them!
> Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in
> which the distance between two points should be irrational.
>

Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it
will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

*Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
in some Platonic realm.
*

Brent,

What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in
which we need them!
Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in
which the distance between two points should be irrational.

-- 
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> /All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in 
> the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since 
> calculus is easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that 
> defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information. /
> 
> What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are 
> mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. 

Why?  "Mathematical" means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock Holmes 
stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some 
Platonic realm.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

OK, but it seems that we are using "reductionism" differently. You could say
that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it
exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; or you could say
that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components
appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the
hydrogen atom. And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just
another, more impressive reduction. As for knots, can't any particular
physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to
describing a particular physical circle or triangle.

Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to
reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work...
unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction.

Stathis Papaioannou

On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain
> > it. What's wrong with that?
>
>
> Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception)
> can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is
> all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already
> global notion relying on the whole UD*.
> And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that
> indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is
> what "violation of bell's inequality" or more generally "quantum
> information " is all about. This has been my first "confirmation of
> comp by nature": non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp.
>
> A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of
> knots (see the table of knots:
>
> http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
>
> A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle).
> You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure
> is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure,
> contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of
> computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the
> following two impressive papers:
>
> http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf
> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114
>
> I know that Derek Parfit call "comp" the reductionist view". this is a
> very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of
> any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> > On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :
> >>
> >> > I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist)
> >> ...
> >>
> >>
> >> How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making
> >> hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually
> >> testable.
> >>
> >> No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or
> >> an
> >> ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical,
> >> including "grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise
> >> tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are
> >>  complex matter.
> >>
> >> Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something
> >> quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
> >> Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about
> >> "oneself".
> >>
> >> "Science" or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to
> >> what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an
> >> invitation be reductionist?
> >>
> >> I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and
> >> possible.
> >>
> >> With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G
> >> to G* for example), then faith "has to" grow super-exponentially.
> >
> >
> >  >
> >
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain 
> it. What's wrong with that?


Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception) 
can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is 
all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already 
global notion relying on the whole UD*.
And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that 
indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is 
what "violation of bell's inequality" or more generally "quantum 
information " is all about. This has been my first "confirmation of 
comp by nature": non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp.

A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of 
knots (see the table of knots:

http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html

A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle). 
You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure 
is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure, 
contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of 
computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the 
following two impressive papers:

http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114

I know that Derek Parfit call "comp" the reductionist view". this is a 
very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of 
any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans.


Bruno





>
> On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :
>>
>> > I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) 
>> ...
>>
>>
>> How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making
>> hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually
>> testable.
>>
>> No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or 
>> an
>> ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical,
>> including "grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise
>> tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are
>>  complex matter.
>>
>> Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something
>> quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
>> Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about 
>> "oneself".
>>
>> "Science" or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to
>> what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an
>> invitation be reductionist?
>>
>> I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and
>> possible.
>>
>> With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G
>> to G* for example), then faith "has to" grow super-exponentially.
>
>
>  >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[John M]

Bruno, 
please read my italic comments between your lines.
Thanks for Stathis to rush to my rescue (reductionsm),  
Stathis wrote:
Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. 
What's wrong with that?
I will try to write my own version, a bit (not much)  different.

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2007 10:45 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :


I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ...



  How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses 
enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable.
  My take on "reductionist" is to 'reduce' the observation to a 
boundary-enclosed "model" as our choice. It is a necessity for us, because we 
are not capable to encompass the totality and all its ramifications into our 
mind's work at once. Reduced (reductionist ) view is the way how humanity 
gathered our knowledge of the world. (Probably other animals do the same thing 
at their mind-level). 
  What I see here - and thank you, Bruno, for it, -  you are using a more 
advanced view of science than what I referred to as the conventional - 
historic, topically fragmented "sciences" of old. Where e.g. physics is based 
on the 'primitive' physical (material) worldview and  biology is what Darwin 
visualized. 
  Reductionist sciences established our technology. You use it, I use it. We 
just start to 'think' beyond it.
  *
  No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an 
ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including 
"grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of 
our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter.
  I wish we had more of "your" scientists. Academia as a general establishment 
is not so advanced yet.

  Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite 
interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
  Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about "oneself".
  Now this is exactly what I mean. I would like to read a definition of 
'science' as you formulate it. Then again: how many 'scientists' have ever 
heard of a Lobian m?
  We are living here (list) in a vacuum and I was talking non-vacuum. 
  *
  "Science" or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what 
the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be 
reductionist?
  Here we go again: is the 'machine' superhuman? does it tell us things beyond 
our comprehension? How? "We" (Loeb etc.) invented and outlined it and its 
functionality. How can it be beyond those limits? 
  *
  I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible.
  "Faith" in what? Not in 'hearsay', not in Alice-land, not in (really) reduced 
models of age-old worldviews. The 'supernatural' is a cop-out for the modesty 
to say:
  "I know not"  . 
  *
  With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* 
for example), then faith "has to" grow super-exponentially.
  I hope you have (Mark's) PLAIN ENGLISH TRANSLATION  to that in 
non-mathematico lingo.
  *
  Bruno

  regards
  John

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it.
What's wrong with that?

On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :
>
> > I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ...
>
>
> How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making
> hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually
> testable.
>
> No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an
> ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical,
> including "grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise
> tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are
> complex matter.
>
> Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something
> quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
> Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about "oneself".
>
> "Science" or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to
> what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an
> invitation be reductionist?
>
> I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and
> possible.
>
> With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G
> to G* for example), then faith "has to" grow super-exponentially.
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :

> I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ...


How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making 
hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually 
testable.

No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an 
ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, 
including "grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are 
complex matter.

Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something 
quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about "oneself".

"Science" or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to 
what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an 
invitation be reductionist?

I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and 
possible.

With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G 
to G* for example), then faith "has to" grow super-exponentially.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/11/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

  SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... '
>
> MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who
> threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of
> acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind
> and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is
> like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the
> destination*?


I'm not the best person on this list to answser, but I think the tidal
forces as you pass the event horizon of a very massive black hole would not
be enough to destroy you, since tidal forces are proportional to M/r^3 while
the Schwarzschild radius is proportional to M. Tidal forces will increase as
you approach the singularity, which is inevitable once you pass the event
horizon, but the time for this to happen is proportional to M. This refers
to your time frame: for the devil who threw you in, it would appear that you
never reach the event horizon.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Mark Peaty]

  SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... '

MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who 
threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of 
acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind 
and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is 
like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the 
destination*?
 
Regards
Mark Peaty  CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
 


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 3/9/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
>
> MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
> 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
> within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
> hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
> would it not?
>
>  
> Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive 
> enough black hole.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>  
>
> >

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[John Mikes]

Dear Jesse,
thanks for the cool and objective words.
I take it back (not what I said: I mean the topic) further. Our edifice of
physical science
is a wonderful mental construct, balanced by applied math, all on quantities
fitting the reduced models of historical observations from the hand-ax on.
Explanations grew out from all consecutive levels  of our epistemic
enrichment and served as indisputable basis for later explanations (even if
they 'corrected' them, like the more than a dozen entropies and still
counting). Assumptions make good basis for thousands of level in consecutive
build-up we still use 'atoms', 'molecules' 'gravity' 'electricity', 'photon'
etc. etc. as our basis. Then comes your judgement that one theory in this
building looks finer than another. The learned
(brainwashed) scientist-mind finds them as natural as fish the nonexistence
of water. The huge amount of knowledge blocks any naive (elementary)
scrutiny of the basics.

I do not argue with your learned examples; within the system matches are
found especially quantitative ones, visualizing our select domain and
scale-restrictions.
'Observational evidence' is a belief in our up-to-date instrumental readings
explained INTO the theoretical faith as evidence. Wilson found the
"background radiation" because he had readings they were fitable and he new
about the idea of such possibility in view of the Big Bang (- assumption -
as we believe it today in our present cosmology). Eric Lerner's book (90s?)
presented some doubts (The Big Bang Never Was (title approximate) -) I added
some more upon my feeble thinking. How many "ether"s and "phlogista" do we
still have?
We got rid of "elan vitale" - but did we really?
I do not start a crusade against conventional science and understand the
reluctance of the practitioners to accept the endangerment of their wisdom.
Reductionist thinking (science) is the only one our mind is capable of
exercising (mine included), but I feel it is time to take a breath and a
wider view to elevate from the age-old concepts to the acceptance of
something else, without paradoxes, givens, axioms, in interconnection of
them all and ready for a change. Human science went through changes over the
millennia, even fundamental ones at times, there are more to come. I
remember the time when tachyon-observation was denied as false, because they
seemed FTL and this was prohibited. Theory over observed. I do not claim
that 'my views' are the call for a future, I did not invent them, just
picked up changing views (not so few on this list) and opened my mind to let
them in. Since I was not committed to the 'old' I had no problem. I allow
myself to be wrong and argue cautiously:
you may be right, I may be wrong, but I have to see that in a view broader
than the conventional physical teaching. I don't believe today my own
'macromolecules' I made and got patented, they are good within the old
theory. I saw 'effects' and applied the 'wisdom'  to explain them without
scrutiny. They worked. Not perfectly, as all we have has flaws (e.g.
airplanes fall out from the sky, medicines fail, buildings collapse, etc.,)
but we  are very confident in our science.  Well, I am not without scrutiny.

I love assumptions: they push forward our advancement. Just do not allow
them to become facts and basis for many levels of consecutive conclusions
without a grain of salt.

Your expressions ("Most physicists believe", "they are fairly confident",
or: "general
relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity" and I do not go into
'gravity'. nor into the words of curvature of spacetime) are carefully
chosen. Religious people talk more straightforward in their religious
argumentation.

Excuse my lengthy reply,  I enjoyed your argument.
Regards

John M


On 3/10/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> John M:
>
> >
> >Cher Quentin,
> >let me paraphrase (big):
> >
> >so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to
> fantasize.
> >Especially if it sounds helpful.
>
> Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general
> relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence
> that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian
> gravity,
> like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the
> gravitational
> lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation
> which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs
> to
> be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting
> GPS
> satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large
> collapsing
> star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either
> expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift
> was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last
> two
> decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely
> black
> holes with telescopes.
>
> Most physicists believe ge

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Jesse Mazer]

John M:

>
>Cher Quentin,
>let me paraphrase (big):
>
>so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. 
>Especially if it sounds helpful.

Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general 
relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence 
that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian gravity, 
like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the gravitational 
lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation 
which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs to 
be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting GPS 
satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large collapsing 
star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either 
expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift 
was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last two 
decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely black 
holes with telescopes.

Most physicists believe general relativity's predictions will cease to be 
accurate at the "Planck scale" of very short distances and times and very 
high energy densities, and that at these scales it will need to be replaced 
by a quantum theory of gravity. So although they are fairly confident that 
GR is correct about large collapsing stars forming a black hole with an 
"event horizon" and a size proportional to its mass (given by the 
'Swarzschild radius'), they think that the prediction of a singularity of 
infinite density at the center could be wrong, and that we'll need a theory 
of quantum gravity to understand what's really going on there.

Jesse

_
The average US Credit Score is 675. The cost to see yours: $0 by Experian. 
http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=660600&bcd=EMAILFOOTERAVERAGE


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[John M]

Cher Quentin,
let me paraphrase (big):

so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. 
Especially if it sounds helpful.Then  
some mathematically loaded minds calculated within this assumption with 
quantities taken from other assumptions (pardon me: quantizing within other 
models in science). 
Then someone takes the results for real and examines if it "gives" infinity - a 
good game in the assumed topic. 
Then Olala: there it is. So: call it singularity. What? the 3+th level of an 
assumption, already taken as a fact in science. 
Careful analysis can show similar 'evolution' of other fiction into scientific 
facts. 

I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) I happily 
use the results and even DID contribute to it, but when it comes to 
understanding - or at least evaluate reasonability, I use Occam's COMB to 
remove the added conclusions upon assumptions.
No hard feelings, it is MY opinion, and I am absolutely no missionary.

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Quentin Anciaux 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 6:03 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Hi John,

  Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations 
  describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does 
  the "infinity" is "real" (we must still be in accordance about what it means) 
  is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, 
  singularity existence is a real question.

  Quentin

  On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote:
  > i ENVY YOU, guys, to "know" so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
  > I would not go further than "according to what is said about them, they may
  > wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity".
  > Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
  > Dark Matter (the assumed), we just "don't know" - it all may be neatly
  > stuffed
  > in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
  > indiscernible
  > structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
  > it all into a - well - singularity-content.
  >
  > Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
  > speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!
  >
  > John M
  >
  > On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > > On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > >
  > > MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
  > >
  > > > 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
  > > > within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
  > > > hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
  > > > would it not?
  > >
  > > Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
  > > black hole.
  > >
  > > Stathis Papaioannou
  >
  > 



--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/10/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

i ENVY YOU, guys, to "know" so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
> I would not go further than "according to what is said about them, they
> may
> wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity".
> Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how
> much
> Dark Matter (the assumed), we just "don't know" - it all may be neatly
> stuffed
> in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
> indiscernible
> structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
> it all into a - well - singularity-content.
>
> Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
> speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!
>
>

We don't know. We only guess on the basis of our best evidence and theories.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi John,

Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations 
describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does 
the "infinity" is "real" (we must still be in accordance about what it means) 
is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, 
singularity existence is a real question.

Quentin

On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote:
> i ENVY YOU, guys, to "know" so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
> I would not go further than "according to what is said about them, they may
> wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity".
> Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
> Dark Matter (the assumed), we just "don't know" - it all may be neatly
> stuffed
> in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
> indiscernible
> structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
> it all into a - well - singularity-content.
>
> Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
> speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!
>
> John M
>
> On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
> >
> > > 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
> > > within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
> > > hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
> > > would it not?
> >
> > Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
> > black hole.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> 


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[John Mikes]

i ENVY YOU, guys, to "know" so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
I would not go further than "according to what is said about them, they may
wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity".
Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
Dark Matter (the assumed), we just "don't know" - it all may be neatly
stuffed
in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
indiscernible
structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
it all into a - well - singularity-content.

Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!

John M

On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
> > 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
> > within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
> > hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
> > would it not?
>
>
> Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
> black hole.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/9/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


>  Stathis:
> your starting the argument: "IF" the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to
> imply"...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the "law-like" is a breakable
> compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the
> White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of "all possible")
>

I was merely pointing out that it is a problem to be explained, and Russell
has provided one explanation. As for the "if", well, we wouldn't want to get
too dogmatic about the things we discuss here, would we?

 Now to the meat of it:
> have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to
> survive? Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some
> notion of the most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the
> 'mind' of an amoeba?
> Just asking questions in extension of ourselves.
>

You are perhaps asking about paleopsychology, a field I don't know anything
about, if anyone does. However, I was talking about what it means to survive
rather than the process whereby survival might be ensured.

Stathis Papaioannou

  - Original Message -
> *From:* Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
> SP wrote to BM:
> How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter
> what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which
> are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.
>
> You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This
> can theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival
> of your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own
> world if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time.
> The white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe
> these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't
> observe them.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
> >
>

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
> 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
> within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
> hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
> would it not?


Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
black hole.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[John M]

Stathis:
your starting the argument: "IF" the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to 
imply"...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the "law-like" is a breakable 
compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the 
White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of "all possible")
Now to the meat of it: 
have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to survive? 
Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some notion of the 
most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the 'mind' of an 
amoeba? 
Just asking questions in extension of ourselves.

John

  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
  SP wrote to BM:
  How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. 
The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are 
law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. 

  You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can 
theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of your 
physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world if it is 
infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The white rabbit 
universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe these theories are 
wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't observe them. 

  Stathis Papaioannou


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

[Mark Peaty]

SP:' You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event 
horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being 
inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.'

MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance 
within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black 
hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, 
would it not?

2/   I once heard someone on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's 
Radio National Science Show [on every Saturday after the midday news] 
describing our universe in these terms. His point was that whatever we 
might think about what was 'beyond' the bounds of 'our' universe, 
nothing from here can escape to 'there'. As I understand it this is in 
line with Einstein's concept of the universe being closed in upon 
itself, the key cause of which is gravity, the curvature of space-time.


MP: Going off at a tangent, I have a question which is quite possibly a 
dumb question that just needs to be asked because it CAN be asked.

Preamble: The expansion of the universe, characterised by the Hubble 
Constant I believe, is usually explained non-mathematically by analogy 
with the stretching of the surface of a balloon as the balloon is 
inflated. The balloon surface is stretched uniformly, pretty much, by 
its having everywhere the same tensile strength and elasticity and by 
the force which causes the deformation being applied equally all over 
because it is the averaged effect of all the gas particles within the 
contained volume. That much makes sense, and the overall effect is to 
cause point locations on the surface of the balloon to recede from one 
another at a rate which is proportional at any given moment to the 
distance between the points, measured along the surface.

Question: Would it be mathematically equivalent, or significantly 
different,  to consider the measured change in size and in distances as 
a uniform *contraction* of the metric, ie the measuring system, rather 
than an expansion of the location, so to speak. In particular, why is it 
not feasible to consider the Big Bang and subsequent Inflationary epoch 
as being in effect a collapse?

 
Regards
Mark Peaty  CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
 


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 3/8/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>
> NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of
> possible
> post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a
> post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and
> other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater
> talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a
> characteristic
> of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black
> whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind:
> concentration
> itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O
>
>
> You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event 
> horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being 
> inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/8/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible
> post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a
> post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and
> other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater
> talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic
> of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black
> whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration
> itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O
>

You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event horizon of
a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being inside the event
horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

[Mark Peaty]

Firstly a big thank you to Russell Standish for providing that 
incredibly succinct 'bit stream' summary of universal-dovetailer 
ontology. [Though only a vocational mathematician would seriously call 
it 'very simple' even if it does have less than 1% of Bruno's word count 
for his essay on the subject.] Having the two approaches to the problem 
at hand has allowed me to get a bit of purchase on the beasty.

Thanks also to Stathis for that simple and lovely, 'obvious', question 
from left-field. I am now convinced that, no matter what others might 
say, each number is in fact a process. Bruno referred to some kind of 
Platonia, some unspeakably not-anywhere place as the source of numbers 
and other mathematical objects or relationships. That is all well and 
good but as far as I can see - still - the numbers and other 
mathematical objects that people use are words in the strictest sense. 
They arise in human minds through inter-subjective induction, empathic 
copying [mirror neurons], interaction with the world, etc. But they are 
created anew in each brain that learns them, same as all other 
constructs. Their fantastic power comes about because they reflect - 
emulate and simulate - emergent properties of the rest of the universe.

That this happens so successfully in so many people leads me to infer 
that the underlying principle organising the human mind, just as that 
organising the Great IT, the Multiverse, what ever, is harmonic resonance.

**
Meanwhile -
SP: 'How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment 
in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create 
psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person 
today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, 
the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is 
necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors 
are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.'

MP: Yep! I am a story! I am not like a story, I *am* a story. It is *my* 
story and I'm sticking to it, except when I find there are aspects of it 
I don't like. The problem [or a problem] is that this does not take away 
any of the intrinsic paradox of our experience. As I have said many 
times our experience is what it is like to be the portrayal of self in 
the world created within one's brain. The rendition in its details is 
effectively *about* being a person in his/her world, moment by moment. 
The experience we argue about, and other, possibly less benighted, 
persons write poetry and songs about, is simply what it is like to be 
this rendition. The primary practical paradox for each of us is that 
unless this distinction is pointed out repeatedly, we mistake the 
rendition, the story,  for the world itself. We are doomed to live ever 
like this. From the recesses of my dark corner it looks as if Bruno can 
show us conclusively that this subjective-objective distinction is an 
inherent feature of any kind of universe that we humans have any real 
hope of understanding.

and as per the first part above, I think that the answer to the binding 
question in each domain is harmonic resonance. As far as I can see it 
accounts for why the pure gasses like to form molecular pairs; there 
have been reports recently that our sense of smell relies on inter and 
intra molecular vibrations as the fundamental [pun unintended] mechanism 
for detection and recognition of minuscule amounts of thousands of 
different airborne molecules; Steven Lehar has been banging his head 
against the wall for many years trying to point out to people how 
harmonic resonance can easily explain a huge range of Gestalt type 
capabilities clearly effected within the brain; correlations of brain 
wave frequencies have been discovered marking temporally related 
activities of the hippocampus and cortical regions shown through MR 
imaging to be involved in the creation or activation of memories. And 
the list goes on.

NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible 
post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a 
post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and 
other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater 
talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic 
of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black 
whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration 
itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O

 
Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
>
> A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
> [infin

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

So are sets of cardinality \aleph_2 or sets of cardinality
\aleph_{\aleph_0}.

On the other hand, one set of cardinality 2^\aleph_0 appears to be big
enough to explain all of observed reality.

Maybe Tegmarkism is going too far...

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 11:19:03AM +0330, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> *All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the
> equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is
> easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an
> instantaneous state requires uncountable information.*
> 
> What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are
> mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever
> that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability.
> But I think your answer is the best shot.
> 
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.
> 
> > 

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

*All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the
equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is
easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an
instantaneous state requires uncountable information.*

What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are
mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever
that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability.
But I think your answer is the best shot.

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 04:30:57PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
> > >selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my "Why
> > >Occams Razor" paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
> > >of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
> > >published since 2004.
> >
> > The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption,
> > where you say that the "natural measure induced on the ensemble of
> > bitstring
> > is the uniform one." This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs
> > including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not
> > much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the
> > laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably
> > include
> > some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or
> > another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in
> > one
> > of my first posts on this list:
> >
> >
> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750
> 
> 
> If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical
> evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all
> (which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific
> measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea
> is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment,
> running the UD and counting the relative number of structures?
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 

True, and this was the sense in which I adopted it for the
paper. 

However, I think there is an even better argument. By interposing
another suitable onto function (f:{0,1}*->{0,1}* say) between the
observer and the ensemble of strings, one can make the ensemble of
bitstrings have any measure one likes.

So by composing the observer function O(x) with f(x), we can perform
the treatment for an arbitrary measure as though the we had an
observer O(f(x)) observing strings selected from a uniform measure.

In short terms, one can write "Without loss of generality, assume a
uniform measure over the strings".

Whichever way you cut it, structure is still in the eye of the
observer :)

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> >Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
> >selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my "Why
> >Occams Razor" paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
> >of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
> >published since 2004.
>
> The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption,
> where you say that the "natural measure induced on the ensemble of
> bitstring
> is the uniform one." This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs
> including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not
> much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the
> laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably
> include
> some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or
> another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in
> one
> of my first posts on this list:
>
>
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750


If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical
evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all
(which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific
measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea
is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment,
running the UD and counting the relative number of structures?

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Jesse Mazer]

Russell Standish wrote:

>
>Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
>selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my "Why
>Occams Razor" paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
>of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
>published since 2004.

The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption, 
where you say that the "natural measure induced on the ensemble of bitstring 
is the uniform one." This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs 
including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not 
much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the 
laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably include 
some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or 
another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in one 
of my first posts on this list:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750

Jesse

_
Play Flexicon: the crossword game that feeds your brain. PLAY now for FREE.  
  http://zone.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmtagline


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 12:46:32PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> > > How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in
> > > ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological
> > > continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday
> > > because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories,
> > > woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and
> > > sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated,
> > > but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.
> >
> > How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter
> > what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which
> > are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.
> 
> 
> You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can
> theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of
> your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world
> if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The
> white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe
> these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't
> observe them.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 

Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my "Why
Occams Razor" paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
published since 2004.

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> > How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in
> > ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological
> > continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday
> > because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories,
> > woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and
> > sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated,
> > but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.
>
> How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter
> what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which
> are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.


You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can
theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of
your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world
if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The
white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe
these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't
observe them.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
>  
> 
> A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled.
> What
> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
> infinite regression.
> 
>  
> How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in 
> ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological 
> continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday 
> because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, 
> woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and 
> sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, 
> but it doesn't matter how this is achieved. 

How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. 
The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are 
law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.

Brent Meeker


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/6/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
> of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
> ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
> [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
> that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What
> holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
> infinite regression.


How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in
ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological
continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday
because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories,
woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient
for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't
matter how this is achieved. If you suddenly die today and are miraculously
recreated inside the event horizon of a black hole, no-one will ever be able
to find you again but you will be able to find yourself.

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mark Peaty]

Thank you Bruno!

You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of 
illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire 
to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* 
comp and see where it leads.

It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of 
anything that is "interesting" in all this, which rather seems to be the 
flavour of the new millennium.

Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to 
pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of 
concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But 
what I am thinking about is this bit:

6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict 
the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the 
infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at 
the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute 
the statistics bearing on all consistent first person 
self-continuation.

 A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation 
of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the 
ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n 
[infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' 
that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What 
holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another 
infinite regression.

**
A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid 
explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in 
principle* to  measure the state of something and therefore *we* must 
acknowledge the indeterminacy and so must everything else which exists 
because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, and 
if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless 
it can come up with a good excuse!]?

[Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real number 
an infinite process?]

**

 

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit :
>
>
>   
>> Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh
>> well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that
>> can happen!
>> 
>
>
> Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea 
> trivial, and both the "everything hyp"  and the "comp hyp" would loose 
> any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, 
> *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for 
> that).
>
>
>
>
>   
>> Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there
>> are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic
>> universes.
>>
>> It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 
>> 'stick
>> to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it 
>> probably
>> isn't true!
>> 
>
>
>
> I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:
>
>
>
>
> Mohsen:
>   
>> I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of 
>> Countable and Uncountable has been considered.
>> 
>
>
>
>
> 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The 
> comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis 
> that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine.
>
> 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) 
> from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have 
> to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases.  With comp, we are duplicable. 
> I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be "pasted" in Washington 
> and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where:
> a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external 
> (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow.
> b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will 
> feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once.
>
> 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the 
> result will not depend on possible large delays between the 
> reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical 
> character of the reconstitution.
>
> 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, 
> but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing 
> machine instead).
>
> 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not 
> only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them 
> all infinitely often, + all variations, + all "real" oracles (and those 
> oracles are uncountable).
>
> 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict 
> the results of any experiment/experience, I have to "localize" all the 
> infinitely many instant

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Brent Meeker]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
> 
> Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
> I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not 
> all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we 
> might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is 
> very interesting.
> 
> 
> 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
> but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
> machine instead).
> 
> 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
> only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
> all infinitely often, + all variations, + all "real" oracles (and those
> oracles are uncountable).
> 
> Let me know where's my mistake:
> 
> 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of 
> that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world.
> 
> 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, 
> regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power.
> 
> 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.
> 
> 4.A universal state is not countable.
> 
> Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
> with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
> were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
> have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
> all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.
> 
> But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to 
> represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the 
> uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
> What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of 
> universes.

All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the 
equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier 
than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous 
state requires uncountable information.

Brent Meeker

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not all
your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we might
be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is very
interesting.


4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
machine instead).

5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
all infinitely often, + all variations, + all "real" oracles (and those
oracles are uncountable).

Let me know where's my mistake:

1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of that)
history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world.

2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, regardless of
compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power.

3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.

4.A universal state is not countable.

Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.

But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to represent
instantaneous state of a universe, not about the uncountability of possible
universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of
universes.



-- 
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Mar 06, 2007 at 12:48:40PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 3/6/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> 
> > Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to
> > understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a
> > random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
> > with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
> > were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
> > have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
> > all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.
> 
> 
> Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places?
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 

Yes, of course. 

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 3/6/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to
> understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a
> random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
> with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
> were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
> have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
> all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.


Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places?

Stathis Papaioannou

--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---