On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote:
>
> And how much is that "2 kg" in that 'other' universe?
Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the
reasoning.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You rece
And how much is that "2 kg" in that 'other' universe?
JM
On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
>>> MAT implies a contradiction. You
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
>> MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
>> - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism
>> refutes materia
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
> MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
> - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes
> materialism).
> - the proposition saying that MAT implies NO
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote:
> Bruno,
> I was just quoting you: "And if you do the math, you get
> a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
> mechanism or to refute it." Did you mean "refutes materialism"?
Thanks for quoting the entire sentence
On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
> quite accurately :-)
Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree
as the MGA thread progresses. :)
-- Kory
--~--~-~--~~---
Bruno,
I was just quoting you: "And if you do the math, you get a
physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
mechanism or to refute it." Did you mean "refutes materialism"?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
>
>> *So you're saying tha
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
> So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which
> (let's assume) refutes mechanism,
If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then
mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).
I guess you meant "
*So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which (let's
assume) refutes mechanism, leads inescapably to a mathematical structure
in logic-space which actually constitutes the "physical" universe. And
thus we can justify and explain the physical laws without any reference
to m
Hi m.a.
On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote:
> Dear Bruno,
> Needless to say I feel honored that you've
> taken the time to answer my naive questions.
Naive questions I love.
> But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the
> phrase highlighte
Dear Bruno,
Needless to say I feel honored that you've taken
the time to answer my naive questions. But since you invite such
questions, I do have a problem with the phrase highlighted below.
Exactly what feature of the "fundamental status of physics" is
questioned by co
On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote:
> So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the
> luminiferous aether
Yes. If you mean matter by "fundamental matter".
It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC
shows it). It means that the idea that there are fundam
*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous
aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions
of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of
equations? Gosh.
On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
>
>> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
>> Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can
On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea
> interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble
> contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a
> sculptor to allow the statue to interact
On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
>> Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
>> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
>> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called
>> p
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
> Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious
> like you or me, even when implemen
lso like your ideas such as 'self-
>> observing 'ideal'
>> machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon
>> my poetic
>> distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's
>> home?
>>
>> Gordon
&g
Hi Kory,
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Cheers,
Günther
> Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to
> the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may
> be descriptions of beings wh
On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote:
> Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness,
> racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a
> certain direction on the character's part.
>
> For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
> My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the
> consequences of that conclusion after you accept it.
Not at all. I am just a logician showing that any consistent being
(human, machine, extraterrestrial, angels, gods, etc.) cannot b
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
> Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical
> existence?
That's certainly the prevailing
2008/11/16 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>>
> I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be
> one-to-one (whi
2008/11/16 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>
> I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
> computation can be
Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>>
I'm not sure that works. In the original idea t
If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an
incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if
you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any
physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other
p
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
> the null state?
I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
computation
*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of
substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or
a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different
from the math to be called physical existence?
m.a.
*
Kory Heath wrote
> Imagin
h as 'self-observing 'ideal'
> machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic
> distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home?
>
> Gordon
>
>
>
> --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECT
2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> 2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'
>
> Just what I was saying!
>
I was about to say that...
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because y
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
> just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
> character's part.
>
> For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
> compu
2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
> outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that
> reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root
> there still is material stuff which is
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whe
On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote:
> Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have
> essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
outlined in PC. Although it's a su
On Nov 14, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented
> idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist
> there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not
> implemented".
I can't answer for Bruno, but in my form
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is
the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>
> On
On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
> computations have to be implemented".
Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and
>> me,
>> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
>> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
>> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>>> that only *per
Bruno Marchal skrev:
> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,
> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a
> materialist can and even should interpret this as
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are
On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>> conclusion. So ...
>
> Yes, I'd be interested
>
> Gordon
>
>
> --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
>
> On
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
> conclusion. So ...
Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read
French only with d
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
> it soft or hard wired).
Good poi
al <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
>> argument
>> with people interested in the matter.
>
> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
>
>> Second, it happens th
2008/11/13 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>
> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. Wh
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument
> with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
> tell us what he
On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
>> granted.
>
> I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
> we can't take physical reality for granted
I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality
go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away
from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective.
--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
> granted.
I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the
arguments laid out quite clearly
On 09 Nov 2008, at 23:38, Kory Heath wrote:
> Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand.
> But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I
> think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand,
> they wouldn't convince a philosopher
On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of
> "logical
> possibility".
Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to
state my position would be that I think the standard conception of
"philosophical z
Kory Heath wrote:
>
> On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,
>> like your
>> Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number
>> generator but just
>> happened to behave as if it were conscious.
>
> O
On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,
> like your
> Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number
> generator but just
> happened to behave as if it were conscious.
Ok. That works just as well for
On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic
> physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the
> computation that gives rise to the physical world.
That's also how I understand him. And, in fact,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something
>> the same as creating it?
>
> Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or
> finite pieces of computations).
>
>
>> Ho
Hi Jason,
On 07 Nov 2008, at 22:39, Jason Resch wrote:
> Bruno,
>
> Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the
> same page with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore
> the existence of abstract Turing machines defining the computational
> histories of
Kory Heath wrote:
>
> On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
>> accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible.
>
> I'm not sure what counts as an "accidental zombie". Do you mean
> something like the follo
On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing
> something
> the same as creating it?
Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or
finite pieces of computations).
> How can we decide these entities (what
2008/11/9 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I
> was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett
> who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that
> (for instance) you would have to impleme
On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
> accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible.
I'm not sure what counts as an "accidental zombie". Do you mean
something like the following:
I can write a very shor
On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
> contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
> relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
> and variant, if only that for example ...)
Bruno,
Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page
with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of
abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all
programs, or the equations of string theory defining all true solutions,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
>> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
>>> the
>>> Universa
On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
>> the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encode
Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> time
On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Jason,
>
>
> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
>
> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the
> computer is
> > entirely cut off f
Hi Bruno,
> I can agree for "all computational states" of some (universal) machine.
> If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much
> general. Imo.
I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states ->
depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the differen
Hello Günther,
>
> Hello Bruno,
>
>> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not
>> conscious,
>> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
>> Thus I can conceive zombies.
>
> Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think
> philosophical
> zom
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
> times) in the set of all arithme
On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hi Jason,
>
>
> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is
> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
> > compute
Isn't a zombie equivalent to, say, a spreadsheet that doesn't really perform
the proper calculations, but produces all the right answers for all the data
and functions you happen to put in?
It seems like such an elaborate con-job is far more inefficient and
intensive (and pointlessly so) once you
Hello Bruno,
> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious,
> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
> Thus I can conceive zombies.
Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical
zombies are impossible (=not able to e
Hi Günther,
> unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite
> busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to
> pose
> a question (to Bruno):
>
>>> Which is why I think philosophical zombies
>>> are impossible.
>
> I also think they are impossible,
Hi Jason,
Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
> Bruno,
>
> Thanks I understand now. I must have misread previous posts of yours
> because I had thought you had said "if I = the world, then the world
> is not turing-emulable", but what you are saying is that "if I = the
> world and
Bruno,
Thanks I understand now. I must have misread previous posts of yours
because I had thought you had said "if I = the world, then the world is not
turing-emulable", but what you are saying is that "if I = the world and the
world is not turing emulable then comp is false". Regarding step 6 I
Hello,
unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite
busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to pose
a question (to Bruno):
>> Which is why I think philosophical zombies
>> are impossible.
I also think they are impossible, and you (Bruno) hav
On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
>
>
> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>
>
>
> Bruno,
>
> I have seen you say this many time
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 11:10 AM, Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
>> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>>
>>
>>
> Bruno,
>
> I h
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>
>
>
Bruno,
I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is
so, perhaps I do
Le 03-nov.-08, à 08:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I have reservations about #6: Consciousness is a process, but it
> depends on a context.
That is why I use the notion of generalized brain. I take into account
the possible need of a context. The argument would break only if you
stipulate tha
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