subject:"Comp"

Quentin
The Horse Fucker wrote:

> 
> So can you or not entertain the idea that matter is emergent of something
> else ?
> 
> If you answer yes, that means your argument that you're making here is
> dull... and so that you lied... if you answer no, that means you lied when
> you say you could... either way you lied QED
>

Do you have a example of a computation of 1+1 being done without using the
laws of physics or do you not; and if not what the hell are you babbling
about?


And by the way, given your fondness for horses you might also want to
know a mule in the biblical sense.

  John Mendacity Clark




>

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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

2015-06-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-06-23 19:06 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered
>>> computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of
>>> a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even
>>> 1+1; and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how
>>> to do such a thing.
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> Says the guy who can clearly doubt that matter could maybe not be
>> ontologically primary... The same guy who says "I don't affirm that matter
>> is primary or not unlike Bruno blablabla"... but nonetheless the only
>> argument he always uses is that matter must be primary and round and round
>> we go
>>
>
> Apparently Quentin knows of an example of a computation of 1+1 having
> been performed without 
> physical instantiation
> , I was not aware of such a momentous event so I'm eager to hear all the
> details!! Mr. Anciaux you have the floor:
>

So can you or not entertain the idea that matter is emergent of something
else ?

If you answer yes, that means your argument that you're making here is
dull... and so that you lied... if you answer no, that means you lied when
you say you could... either way you lied QED



>
>   John K Clark
>
>>
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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
wrote:

>> 
>> People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered
>> computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of
>> a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even 1+1;
>> and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how to do
>> such a thing.
>>
>
> > 
> Says the guy who can clearly doubt that matter could maybe not be
> ontologically primary... The same guy who says "I don't affirm that matter
> is primary or not unlike Bruno blablabla"... but nonetheless the only
> argument he always uses is that matter must be primary and round and round
> we go
>

Apparently Quentin knows of an example of a computation of 1+1 having been
performed without 
physical instantiation
, I was not aware of such a momentous event so I'm eager to hear all the
details!! Mr. Anciaux you have the floor:

  John K Clark

>
>

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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

2015-06-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-06-23 18:00 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> > consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where
>> unfettered computationalism leads.
>
>
> People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered
> computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of
> a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even 1+1;
> and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how to do
> such a thing.
>

Says the guy who can clearly doubt that matter could maybe not be
ontologically primary... The same guy who says "I don't affirm that matter
is primary or not unlike Bruno blablabla"... but nonetheless the only
argument he always uses is that matter must be primary and round and round
we go... we'll all be long dead before that circle john clark machine
escapes from its loop. Again a guy who affirm he *can* entertain an idea
just for the sake of the discussion and always use the same argument which
is basically that that very same idea is false and cannot be discussed...
surely, a person normally constituted should call such a person a liar
(that will certainly again put in light his problem with horses arses...)

Quentin

>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman  wrote:
>>
>>> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
>>>
>>> I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear
>>> weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute
>>> consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair,
>>> Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of
>>> Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a
>>> first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other
>>> words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain
>>> precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is,
>>> than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori
>>> sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise
>>> of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather
>>> elusive sort.
>>>
>>
>> It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may
>> not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism
>> leads.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

2015-06-23 Thread David Nyman

Read the rest of the sentence. It makes a difference.
On 23 Jun 2015 4:45 pm, "John Clark"  wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 9:59 AM, David Nyman  wrote:
>
> > In other words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles
>> to explain precisely how a non-conscious system would be different
>
>
> Struggles?? The answer is obvious, a non-conscious system would be stupid
> and a conscious system would not be. If Darwin was correct that MUST be
> true otherwise there would be no reason for random mutation and natural
> selection to have produced a conscious being, and we all know
> with absolute certainty that it did at least once and probably many
> billions of times.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>>
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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where
> unfettered computationalism leads.


People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in "unfettered
computationalism", everybody else knows there is not one single example of
a computation being made without a physical instantiation, not even 1+1;
and nobody has even the ghost of a hint of a hunch of an idea of how to do
such a thing.

  John K Clark




>
> On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman  wrote:
>
>> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
>>
>> I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear
>> weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute
>> consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair,
>> Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of
>> Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a
>> first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other
>> words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain
>> precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is,
>> than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori
>> sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise
>> of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather
>> elusive sort.
>>
>
> It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may
> not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism
> leads.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>  --
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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 9:59 AM, David Nyman  wrote:

> In other words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles
> to explain precisely how a non-conscious system would be different

Struggles?? The answer is obvious, a non-conscious system would be stupid
and a conscious system would not be. If Darwin was correct that MUST be
true otherwise there would be no reason for random mutation and natural
selection to have produced a conscious being, and we all know
with absolute certainty that it did at least once and probably many
billions of times.

  John K Clark

>

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Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

2015-06-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Monday, June 22, 2015, David Nyman  wrote:

> http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951
>
> I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear
> weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute
> consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair,
> Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of
> Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a
> first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other
> words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain
> precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is,
> than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori
> sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise
> of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather
> elusive sort.
>

It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may
not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism
leads.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

2015-06-22 Thread David Nyman

http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951

I'd be interested in a more technical analysis, but in my view one clear
weakness at the outset is the lack of a robust motivation to attribute
consciousness to *anything at all* in particular (which, to be fair,
Aaronson acknowledges). ISTM that a besetting problem of most Theories of
Mind is just such an inability to motivate a convincing a priori role for a
first-person view (as distinct from its third person description). In other
words, any ToM that proceeds from physics as a given struggles to explain
precisely how a non-conscious system would be different (other, that is,
than the putative absence of consciousness in an entirely a posteriori
sense). Whatever its other shortcomings may be, at least comp (in the guise
of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather
elusive sort.

David

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Comp Confirmed? At least for worms

2014-12-18 Thread Jason Resch

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/weve-put-worms-mind-lego-robot-body-180953399/?no-ist

It is claimed that the robot behaved in ways that are similar to observed *C.
elegans*. Stimulation

of the nose stopped forward motion. Touching the anterior and posterior
touch sensors made the robot move forward and back accordingly. Stimulating
the food sensor made the robot move forward.

Video of a robot controlled by an uploaded worm brain:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWQnzylhgHc

Download your own worm brain today:
http://www.openworm.org/

Jason

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-02 Thread LizR

On 2 September 2014 04:58, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz  wrote:
>
> > What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
>> accept FPI,[...]
>>
>
> Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single person on
> planet Earth that is confused by the difference between the first person
> and the third person; and I don't think that Bruno's claims to have found
> such a difference constitutes a major scientific discovery.
>

Whether it does or not is irrelevant to his argument.

>
> > is John seriously going to contend that MWI is nonsensical scientific
>> "baby talk"?
>>
>
> No, but John is going to contend that "comp" is  scientific baby talk.
> You really should get out of the habit of using it because if you say it
> anywhere else except this list, like at a scientific conference, people are
> going to look at you like you're an imbecile.
>

Or with polite incomprehension, more likely, just like if I mentioned the
MWI in everyday conversation.

None of your above comments constitute an argument, and neither did your
comment that you can't be bothered "explaining again" what's wrong with
comp. The fact that everyone else can see wha Bruno's talking about,
whether they agree or not, seems to indicate that we have a bit of a
"tronnies" situation here.

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 01 Sep 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz  wrote:

> What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really  
can't accept FPI,[...]

Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single  
person on planet Earth that is confused by the difference between  
the first person and the third person; and I don't think that  
Bruno's claims to have found such a difference constitutes a major  
scientific discovery.

Sure, I use the traditional meaning, made precise in the context of  
self-duplication. But if you don't confuse them, why do you keep  
saying "W & M", given that we have made precise "W" and "M" designates  
the first person experiences, as described in the personal diary.

> is John seriously going to contend that MWI is nonsensical  
scientific "baby talk"?

No, but John is going to contend that "comp" is  scientific baby talk.

You mean computationalism, I guess.

You really should get out of the habit of using it because if you  
say it anywhere else except this list, like at a scientific  
conference, people are going to look at you like you're an imbecile.

Of course, you will say "computationnalism implies non- 
physicalism" (for example), but on a slide you might write something  
like comp, or even C-> ~P. It is an abbreviation. What we abbreviate  
sometimes by "comp", or CTM, or digital mechanism, is made precise in  
papers, posts, reference, etc. Then we do a reasoning. You stop at  
step 3, without giving any understandable clue we might understand.

BTW, MGA stands for "Movie Graph Argument", which is step 8, but can  
be read independently. It is the older step 1, actually. Someone sent  
a copy recently on the list, and Russell just finished a paper on that  
subject, that he submitted to the list, for comment, and that I will  
comment later. Maudlin made a similar argument (they are not entirely  
equivalent, or perhaps they are).

The UDA 1-7 steps are more easy than MGA, (step 8) which is more  
involved in intensional notions, like counterfactuals. Its importance  
can also be doubted, especially if the math confirms the machine  
physics resemblance with our empiric physics.

Bruno

 John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 01 Sep 2014, at 14:58, Pierz wrote:

What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really  
can't accept FPI, then he can't accept MWI either,

Yes, that points has been made clear, many times, by Quentin and others.

yet that theory is perfectly straightforward and clear, and, at  
least if the informal straw poll cited in Tegmark's recent book is  
anything to be believed, possibly the dominant interpretation of QM  
at the moment. And if it isn't yet, it probably will be within a few  
years. Even if not, is John seriously going to contend that MWI is  
nonsensical scientific "baby talk"? He is obviously a highly  
intelligent man, and I don't believe for a second  that he can't  
grasp the logic of MWI.

Nor of the FPI.

For some reason he fakes not to understand the point. He asks for  
precisions, and when we remind him of the precisions, he said that  
then it is trivial, but is unable to justify why he does not go to the  
next step.

What comes across from these absurd, circular exchanges is the very  
opposite of rationality. Fundamentally John just hates your claim to  
original ideas

Which I have never made. I entirely focus on the subject. Only in "the  
amoeba's secret"  I was asked by the publishers to tell the story of  
the thesis.

My philosophy forbid me to claim originality, it is not just part of  
science. It is the subject of history of science, an interesting  
topic, out of my topic.

and the fact that people take those ideas seriously and find them  
interesting. I don't know where all the rage comes from. Maybe being  
right all the time makes you that way.

I think some people have programmed into themselves simple rules like  
"Any text containing words like

consciousness
mind
soul
artficial intelligence
computer
quantum
god

with different combination of ""and " and "or" between them, is  
crackpot.

So they mocks things and when they are shown having fall in the  
"literalist" error, not having seen the abstract relation which does  
not depends on the terming for being testable, they can't admit having  
been shown wrong on something so much obvious, if only they would have  
listen to me once.  I have never met them, ever. It is a mixture of  
autism, perversion and cowardliness.

Where does the rage comes from? Ouh la la!

Most of the time the rage comes from an unsolved trauma combined with  
a lack of self-confidence or its opposite over-confidence.

BTW, I just finished The Amoeba's Secret. It was like wading into  
deep water one step at a time. The water was up to my chin and I was  
just keeping my nose above water, skipping on one toe a little when  
the bottom got a bit deeper than I could reach. And then all of a  
sudden you went over the continental shelf. And so I had to just  
kind of swim over that chapter until I reached shore on the other  
side. Hmm. Guess I'll have to dig up that modal logic lesson I  
missed on the list a while back.

The modal thing is really only a tool which helps. The key thing is  
machine's ability of self-reference, and the nuance necessarily  
brought by the incompleteness phenomenon, of which the machine can be  
aware (with reasonable definitions).

Still, it was fascinating.

Glad you feel so, the subject is fascinating.

Bruno

On Sunday, August 24, 2014 8:58:24 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2014, at 03:59, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept "yes  
doctor" + Church thesis.

Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that  
computationalism is true is about the same as the probability that  
I am not the only conscious being universe,and that is pretty damn  
high. As for "comp", I neither believe nor disbelieve in it, I am  
just bored by it.

>>> but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is  
correct,

>> Fine, so "comp" isn't correct,

> that does not follow logically

Fine, so "comp" is correct,

> We know also, as we assume comp [...]

> I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade  
acronyms.

> Could you once stop making useless distracting ad hominem non  
sensical remark?

I would be glad to, just stop speaking scientific baby talk and  
stop writing silly homemade acronyms.
>>>>  before I can give you that precise answer I need to know  
what you mean by "the H-guy". Does it mean:

1) John Clark?
2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
 >>> Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04,  
the step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the  
beginning.

>> So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 yo

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-01 Thread Pierz



On Tuesday, September 2, 2014 2:58:53 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz > 
> wrote:
>
> > What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't 
>> accept FPI,[...]
>>
>
> Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single person on 
> planet Earth that is confused by the difference between the first person 
> and the third person; and I don't think that Bruno's claims to have found 
> such a difference constitutes a major scientific discovery.  
>
> > is John seriously going to contend that MWI is nonsensical scientific 
>> "baby talk"? 
>>
>
> No, but John is going to contend that "comp" is  scientific baby talk.  
> You really should get out of the habit of using it because if you say it 
> anywhere else except this list, like at a scientific conference, people are 
> going to look at you like you're an imbecile.
>
> Whatever. It's tiresome to type "computationalism" ten times in a post, 
just as it's tiresome to type "Many Worlds Intepretation" over and over. 
Hence we abbreviate. But my point is this: Do you accept that MWI is a 
deterministic theory? If so do you accept that it also predicts apparent 
randomness in observations at the quantum level? How do you explain this? 
Do you accept that randomness arises because of the duplication/division of 
the observer? Because if you accept that, you just accepted "FPI", whether 
or not you like the acronym. If you don't, then I'm afraid your grasp of 
MWI is poor. 
 

>  John K Clark
>

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-01 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 6:58 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz  wrote:
>
>
> No, but John is going to contend that "comp" is  scientific baby talk.
> You really should get out of the habit of using it because if you say it
> anywhere else except this list, like at a scientific conference, people are
> going to look at you like you're an imbecile.
>

Lol! And this is a nuanced point, to anybody seeking respectability in
scientific context:

Don't deal with the actual contents of arguments as this might make you
look bad to people yacking at great conferences.

That's solid scientific attitude in yo face: How you look is more important
than your stupid arguments, technicalities, and truths... you morons! So
get in line, already.

I like that John is consistent, arguing in this fashion; because he has to
flip-flop on finding pronouns ambiguous and unacceptable to finding them
trivial and "nobody on earth..." so much, which must be hard, over the
years.

Admirable. Inspiring.

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-01 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz  wrote:

> What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
> accept FPI,[...]
>

Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single person on
planet Earth that is confused by the difference between the first person
and the third person; and I don't think that Bruno's claims to have found
such a difference constitutes a major scientific discovery.

> is John seriously going to contend that MWI is nonsensical scientific
> "baby talk"?
>

No, but John is going to contend that "comp" is  scientific baby talk.  You
really should get out of the habit of using it because if you say it
anywhere else except this list, like at a scientific conference, people are
going to look at you like you're an imbecile.

 John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-09-01 Thread Pierz

What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't 
accept FPI, then he can't accept MWI either, yet that theory is perfectly 
straightforward and clear, and, at least if the informal straw poll cited 
in Tegmark's recent book is anything to be believed, possibly the dominant 
interpretation of QM at the moment. And if it isn't yet, it probably will 
be within a few years. Even if not, is John seriously going to contend that 
MWI is nonsensical scientific "baby talk"? He is obviously a highly 
intelligent man, and I don't believe for a second  that he can't grasp the 
logic of MWI. What comes across from these absurd, circular exchanges is 
the very opposite of rationality. Fundamentally John just hates your claim 
to original ideas and the fact that people take those ideas seriously and 
find them interesting. I don't know where all the rage comes from. Maybe 
being right all the time makes you that way.

BTW, I just finished The Amoeba's Secret. It was like wading into deep 
water one step at a time. The water was up to my chin and I was just 
keeping my nose above water, skipping on one toe a little when the bottom 
got a bit deeper than I could reach. And then all of a sudden you went over 
the continental shelf. And so I had to just kind of swim over that chapter 
until I reached shore on the other side. Hmm. Guess I'll have to dig up 
that modal logic lesson I missed on the list a while back. Still, it was 
fascinating.

On Sunday, August 24, 2014 8:58:24 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Aug 2014, at 03:59, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> > By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept "yes doctor" + 
>> Church thesis.
>>
>
> Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that computationalism 
> is true is about the same as the probability that I am not the only 
> conscious being universe,and that is pretty damn high. As for "comp", I 
> neither believe nor disbelieve in it, I am just bored by it. 
>  
>
>> >>> but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is 
>> correct,
>>
>  
>
> >> Fine, so "comp" isn't correct,
>>
>  
>
> > that does not follow logically
>
>
> Fine, so "comp" is correct,
>  
>
>> > We know also, as we assume comp [...]
>>
>  
>
> > I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade acronyms.
>>
>  
>
> > Could you once stop making useless distracting ad hominem non sensical 
>> remark?
>
>
> I would be glad to, just stop speaking scientific baby talk and stop 
> writing silly homemade acronyms.
>
>> >>>>  before I can give you that precise answer I need to know what you 
>> mean by "the H-guy". Does it mean:
>>
>> 1) John Clark?
>>>
>>> 2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
>>>
>>>  >>> Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the 
>> step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.
>
>  
>
> >> So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you just say 
>> the answer, whatever the hell it is, has always been the same and then give 
>> a link to the same long paper that is full of imprecise vague pronouns. 
>
>
>> > What is vague? You have already asked. I define precisely the 1-you 
>> (content of the diary you can find in your pocket, with the usual indexical 
>> use of "your"), and the 3-you (content of the diary of an external 
>> observer, not entring in the tele-boxes).
>>
>
> So yet again rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you 
> just continue with more bafflegab
>
>  So I ask again, does "the H guy" refer to  #1 "John Clark", or does it 
>>> refer to #2  "the fellow currently experiencing Helsinki"?
>>
>>
>> I have already answered this many times,
>>
>
> Then please answer it just one more time. Pretty please, it will only take 
> you one ASCII symbol to do so, either a "1" or a "2".  I don't need another 
> dissertation, I just need a 1 or a 2.  
>
> > Non sense. It can't be 100% Mars and 25% hell.
>>
>
> Yes it can if you're dealing with adjectives and not nouns, adjectives 
> like John Clark. I can definitely send a green something to Mars and maybe 
> send a green something to hell, So there is a 100% chance there is 
> something green on Mars and a 25% chance there is something green in hell. 
>
>
> Ad hominem re

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 24 Aug 2014, at 03:59, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept "yes  
doctor" + Church thesis.

Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that  
computationalism is true is about the same as the probability that I  
am not the only conscious being universe,and that is pretty damn  
high. As for "comp", I neither believe nor disbelieve in it, I am  
just bored by it.

>>> but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is  
correct,

>> Fine, so "comp" isn't correct,

> that does not follow logically

Fine, so "comp" is correct,

> We know also, as we assume comp [...]

> I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade  
acronyms.

> Could you once stop making useless distracting ad hominem non  
sensical remark?

I would be glad to, just stop speaking scientific baby talk and stop  
writing silly homemade acronyms.
>>>>  before I can give you that precise answer I need to know what  
you mean by "the H-guy". Does it mean:

1) John Clark?
2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
 >>> Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04,  
the step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.

>> So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you  
just say the answer, whatever the hell it is, has always been the  
same and then give a link to the same long paper that is full of  
imprecise vague pronouns.

> What is vague? You have already asked. I define precisely the 1- 
you (content of the diary you can find in your pocket, with the  
usual indexical use of "your"), and the 3-you (content of the diary  
of an external observer, not entring in the tele-boxes).

So yet again rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2  
you just continue with more bafflegab

So I ask again, does "the H guy" refer to  #1 "John Clark", or does  
it refer to #2  "the fellow currently experiencing Helsinki"?

I have already answered this many times,

Then please answer it just one more time. Pretty please, it will  
only take you one ASCII symbol to do so, either a "1" or a "2".  I  
don't need another dissertation, I just need a 1 or a 2.

> Non sense. It can't be 100% Mars and 25% hell.

Yes it can if you're dealing with adjectives and not nouns,  
adjectives like John Clark. I can definitely send a green something  
to Mars and maybe send a green something to hell, So there is a 100%  
chance there is something green on Mars and a 25% chance there is  
something green in hell.

Ad hominem remarks, rethorical tricks, and you end for the 1000th time  
with your usual confusion between first person and third person, that  
you abstract away before complaining on lack on precision.

All this has been explained many times before, and I will nor more  
reply to your "objection", unless you succeed in convincing someone  
else to explain it in a post which focus on the subject.

Bruno

  John K Clark

because hell doesn't sound like much fun. But that's just John  
Clark, Bruno Marchal may feel differently and there is no disputing  
matters of taste.

> b) with a non-destructive eavesdropping?

Then it doesn't matter if Eve intercept things or not because she  
doesn't interfere and lets things proceed as originally planned, so  
there is a 100% chance that John Clark will remain on Earth and a  
100% chance John Clark will go to Mars; provided that Mars is a  
nice place John Clark would not hesitate in pushing that button.

In this case it is teleportation, so the "original" on Earth is  
always supposed to be destroyed, but I will not quibble on this.

I will just ask you how do you will explain this to the "John Clark"  
reconstituted by Eve in Hell? Certainlmy, he will think that his  
previous reasoning was wrong, OK?

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept "yes doctor" +
> Church thesis.
>

Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that computationalism is
true is about the same as the probability that I am not the only conscious
being universe,and that is pretty damn high. As for "comp", I neither
believe nor disbelieve in it, I am just bored by it.


> >>> but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is correct,
>


>> Fine, so "comp" isn't correct,
>


> that does not follow logically


Fine, so "comp" is correct,


> > We know also, as we assume comp [...]
>


> I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade acronyms.
>


> Could you once stop making useless distracting ad hominem non sensical
> remark?


I would be glad to, just stop speaking scientific baby talk and stop
writing silly homemade acronyms.

> >>>>  before I can give you that precise answer I need to know what you
> mean by "the H-guy". Does it mean:
>
> 1) John Clark?
>>
>> 2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
>>
>>  >>> Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the
> step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.



>> So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you just say
> the answer, whatever the hell it is, has always been the same and then give
> a link to the same long paper that is full of imprecise vague pronouns.


> > What is vague? You have already asked. I define precisely the 1-you
> (content of the diary you can find in your pocket, with the usual indexical
> use of "your"), and the 3-you (content of the diary of an external
> observer, not entring in the tele-boxes).
>

So yet again rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you
just continue with more bafflegab

So I ask again, does "the H guy" refer to  #1 "John Clark", or does it
>> refer to #2  "the fellow currently experiencing Helsinki"?
>
>
> I have already answered this many times,
>

Then please answer it just one more time. Pretty please, it will only take
you one ASCII symbol to do so, either a "1" or a "2".  I don't need another
dissertation, I just need a 1 or a 2.

> Non sense. It can't be 100% Mars and 25% hell.
>

Yes it can if you're dealing with adjectives and not nouns, adjectives like
John Clark. I can definitely send a green something to Mars and maybe send
a green something to hell, So there is a 100% chance there is something
green on Mars and a 25% chance there is something green in hell.

  John K Clark






>
>
>
>
> because hell doesn't sound like much fun. But that's just John Clark,
> Bruno Marchal may feel differently and there is no disputing matters of
> taste.
>
> > b) with a non-destructive eavesdropping?
>>
>
> Then it doesn't matter if Eve intercept things or not because she doesn't
> interfere and lets things proceed as originally planned, so there is a 100%
> chance that John Clark will remain on Earth and a 100% chance John Clark
> will go to Mars; provided that Mars is a nice place John Clark would not
> hesitate in pushing that button.
>
>
> In this case it is teleportation, so the "original" on Earth is always
> supposed to be destroyed, but I will not quibble on this.
>
> I will just ask you how do you will explain this to the "John Clark"
> reconstituted by Eve in Hell? Certainlmy, he will think that his previous
> reasoning was wrong, OK?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
> --
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>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread meekerdb

On 8/23/2014 4:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 3:47 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

> But entropy is relative constraints, in this case coarse graining.

Yes, entropy is the logarithm of the number of microstates that produce the same 
macrostate times a constant; so the entropy of a square foot of steam is Boltzman's 
Constant.times the logarithm of the number of ways you could arrange water molecules and 
still have the same volume pressure and temperature. Ice would have a lower entropy than 
stem because ice is in a rigid lattice of particles so there are fewer ways to arrange 
 H20 molecules and still have it be ice. There are a lot more ways to arrange H2O 
molecules and still have it be steam.

You're assuming there's only one possible constraint (and that it's macroscopic).  There 
are many possible constraints and one of them would be to specify the complete wave 
function, which makes the von Neumann entropy zero and it stays zero under evolution via 
the SWE. Or from the standpoint of your more classical example, if you specify the point 
in phase space corresponding to all the molecules of the system then that's the only 
arrangement satisfying that constraint and it's evolution is deterministic so the entropy 
doesn't change.

> If you take the equation of physics seriously, they are time-symmetric

Yes, but that doesn't mean that the world must be time-symmetric because our world is 
the way it is because of the laws of physics AND because of initial conditions. As I 
said before, if things started out (the Big Bang) with the lowest entropy there could be 
then, whatever the laws of physics are and however they change the state of things, that 
change must be in the direction of increased entropy because entropy can't get lower 
than the lowest it can go.

> (assming MWI)

Assuming anything!

Not assuming collapse of the wave function in a measurement or state 
preparation.

The known laws of physics are time-symmetric under any quantum interpretation, but our 
world most certainly is not, so if the laws of physics are not responsible for time's 
asymmetry there is only one other thing that could be, initial conditions. Things 
started out in a super low entropy state 13.8 billion years ago and everything  has been 
unwinding toward higher entropy ever since. In a billion trillion years or so things 
will reach a state of maxim entropy and after that it will be impossible to perform work 
in the universe. And that will be that.

> and entropy never changes.

You can't explain entropy's behavior with just the laws of physics alone, in fact it's 
more general than that; even if Newtonian physics was 100% correct you couldn't predict 
what entropy or anything else will do with the laws of physics alone, just as important 
are initial conditions. Physicists started to have a good understanding of entropy about 
1880 or so and they had everything they need to have predicted the Big Bang way back 
then, but unfortunately they did not.

> But at the coarse-grained level of description, where entropy increases,

But you can't state what you're trying  to prove, we're trying to figure out why entropy 
increases in one time direction but not the other when the laws of physics work the same 
in both direction.

It's because we can only live and read clocks and make records in the direction of 
increasing entropy - which is why "entropy increases" is (globally) a tautology.

> there are fewer past states that could produce the present than there are 
future
states into which the present can evolve.

I know that, but the question is why there were fewer past states. It's easy to figure 
out why the laws of physics will cause the entropy tomorrow to be larger than today, 
there are just VASTLY more high entropy stated than low so things will almost certainly 
change into one of them. But by using the same reasoning when asked what sort thing 
evolved into our present state we'd have to say it almost certainly came from one of 
those very very very very numerous high entropy states. And so if we had nothing but the 
laws of physics to work with we would state the second law of physics as follows "Things 
at the present time are in the lowest entropy state there can be and so entropy will be 
higher in the future and was higher in the past".

But this is clearly ridiculous, we must be ignoring something important, and that thing 
is initial conditions.

> But that the exact same physics applies to a universe that "collapses" 
into a very
very low entropy  states. But if we lived in such a universe, we'd live our 
lives
and form our memories in the direction of expansion and we'd say we live in 
an
expanding universe (as we do) and that's why the 2nd law globally is a 
tautology.

But creature in that universe would have something in common with us, we would both note 
that the fundamental laws of physics work th

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 3:47 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> But entropy is relative constraints, in this case coarse graining.

Yes, entropy is the logarithm of the number of microstates that produce the
same macrostate times a constant; so the entropy of a square foot of steam
is Boltzman's Constant.times the logarithm of the number of ways you could
arrange water molecules and still have the same volume pressure and
temperature. Ice would have a lower entropy than stem because ice is in a
rigid lattice of particles so there are fewer ways to arrange  H20
molecules and still have it be ice. There are a lot more ways to arrange
H2O molecules and still have it be steam.

> > If you take the equation of physics seriously, they are time-symmetric
>

Yes, but that doesn't mean that the world must be time-symmetric because
our world is the way it is because of the laws of physics AND because of
initial conditions. As I said before, if things started out (the Big Bang)
with the lowest entropy there could be then, whatever the laws of physics
are and however they change the state of things, that change must be in the
direction of increased entropy because entropy can't get lower than the
lowest it can go.

> > (assming MWI)
>

Assuming anything! The known laws of physics are time-symmetric under any
quantum interpretation, but our world most certainly is not, so if the laws
of physics are not responsible for time's asymmetry there is only one other
thing that could be, initial conditions. Things started out in a super low
entropy state 13.8 billion years ago and everything  has been unwinding
toward higher entropy ever since. In a billion trillion years or so things
will reach a state of maxim entropy and after that it will be impossible to
perform work in the universe. And that will be that.

> and entropy never changes.

You can't explain entropy's behavior with just the laws of physics alone,
in fact it's more general than that; even if Newtonian physics was 100%
correct you couldn't predict what entropy or anything else will do with the
laws of physics alone, just as important are initial conditions. Physicists
started to have a good understanding of entropy about 1880 or so and they
had everything they need to have predicted the Big Bang way back then, but
unfortunately they did not.

> But at the coarse-grained level of description, where entropy increases,
>

But you can't state what you're trying  to prove, we're trying to figure
out why entropy increases in one time direction but not the other when the
laws of physics work the same in both direction.

> > there are fewer past states that could produce the present than there
> are future states into which the present can evolve.
>

I know that, but the question is why there were fewer past states. It's
easy to figure out why the laws of physics will cause the entropy tomorrow
to be larger than today, there are just VASTLY more high entropy stated
than low so things will almost certainly change into one of them. But by
using the same reasoning when asked what sort thing evolved into our
present state we'd have to say it almost certainly came from one of those
very very very very numerous high entropy states. And so if we had nothing
but the laws of physics to work with we would state the second law of
physics as follows "Things at the present time are in the lowest entropy
state there can be and so entropy will be higher in the future and was
higher in the past".

But this is clearly ridiculous, we must be ignoring something important,
and that thing is initial conditions.

> > But that the exact same physics applies to a universe that "collapses"
> into a very very low entropy  states. But if we lived in such a universe,
> we'd live our lives and form our memories in the direction of expansion and
> we'd say we live in an expanding universe (as we do) and that's why the 2nd
> law globally is a tautology.

But creature in that universe would have something in common with us, we
would both note that the fundamental laws of physics work the same in both
time directions but our minds do not, both of us can only remember things
from one time direction but not the other, and both of us would note that
the universe as a whole doesn't behave the same in both time directions
either, it gets larger in one direction and smaller in the other. And
although we remember the past and they member the future we both would have
to assume initial conditions at one end of the timeline to make sense out
of things, the laws of physics alone aren't enough.

  John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Aug 2014, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not  
stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined  
that "primitive physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we  
don't assume particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in  
physical theories.




I know what "primitive" means.  The point of the question was  
what does "physical" mean.  I think it just means stuff we agree  
on the 3p sense - the  dominant invariant  
measure across 1p experience.  But by that definition numbers  
and arithmetic are "physical".


The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.


But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.



Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that  
assumption. When saying "yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality  
rich enough to sustain a doctor, and computers. But we can be  
neutral on the nature of that stability, and understand that  
eventually comp questions it.




My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and  
"observation" mean?



Good question.

with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being  
inputed", if I can say. It is when an input  "variable", or  
billions of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.


OK.  That implies some boundary between "in" and "out", some  
persistent meaning of "inside".




A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the  
button, find yourself in some box, and open the door. The "read(X)  
of your "program" will get instantiated into read(Moscow), or  
read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it  
by empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted  
from reasoning + the local axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a  
duplication in W and in M.


The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and  
indeed that's why we must hope to find the physical laws as  
invariant for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1 complete  
arithmetical reality.


I think "invariant" in that context means the same as Stenger's  
point-of-view-invariance.


I agree it is the same invariant, except that Stenger is neutral on  
"1p, 1p-plural, or 3p). But OK. The context is a bit different, as  
Tenger assume a physical realitu obeying QM, and I assume comp.




But what seems to be invariant are the probabilities of Born's  
rule.  What I'm trying to see is whether CTM can shed any light on  
the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.


It leads to Everett, normally, or at least to that sort of explanation.



Naively, it seems to imply the many-minds interpretation: invariance  
relative to "observers".


"Many-Mind" is unclear to me. I read Albert and Loewer, and I am not  
convinced, although there are some similarities. Again Albert & Loewer  
assume SWE, and I do not. I assume only the addition and  
multiplication laws of non negative integers: 0, its successor, its  
successor's successor, etc.




But physicists who propose this view take "mind" to a primitive,  
which CTM does not.  Under CTM the computers at CERN may be plenty  
mindful enough to have a viewpoint.


I doubt we let them instropecting, or developping viewpoints. They are  
slaves, with strong blinders. It is normal, they don't want computers  
asking social security and doing strike :)








The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t


That's supposed to formalize Prob(p)=1??  I can understand []p &  
<>p, but I don't see how <>t (there is some world that contains a  
true proposition?) model Prob(p)=1.



Thanks to incompleteness, <>t -> <>[]f, so imagine that you are in  
world alpha, and <>t is true there. it means that there is a world  
beta accessible from alpha, where you are are, in which []f is true,  
but this can only means that beta is a cul-de-sac world. Well, imagine  
you "arrive" in that cul-de-sac world. Now []f is true. But f- 
>, #,  is true, and thus [](f->#), which by Kripke formula  
entails []f -> []#, and so []#. So anything would have probability  
one, if [] was used for the probability. So, to get a "probability",  
incompleteness asks for making explicit the demand of consistency  
(which is equivalent in the Kripke semantics, with "I am not in a no  
cul-de-sac world". You get then natural idea that P(A) =

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Aug 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".

 > By definition you believe in comp,

If you say so, I guess you should know as you invented the word, so  
I guess the definition of "comp" is "the stuff that John Clark  
believes".

more precisely the stuff needed to accept step 0, 1, 2, ...

By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept "yes doctor"  
+ Church thesis.

> but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is  
correct,

Fine, so "comp" isn't correct,

That does not follow logically. if we are consistent machine, there  
are many propositions xhich can be true, although we cannot prove  
them, like self-consistency, or the existence of a reality capable of  
satisfying all our beliefs, etc.

and since "comp" isn't correct can we please stop talking about the  
stupid thing?

> so that philosophical zombies are logically conceivable.

Although I think its rather unlikely it is logically conceivable  
that I am the only conscious being in the universe; however it is  
not logically conceivable that intelligence and consciousness are  
unrelated and Evolution still managed to produce one conscious  
being, and yet I know for a fact that it did. Therefore  
philosophical zombies are logically inconceivable.

A more rigorous version of this would should that philosophical  
zombies are logically unplausible if we bet on the evoloution theory  
(with comp we can go further, and argue that they don't make sense).  
But here I was not supposing things like comp, or evolution, just logic.

> What you mean is that you believe that there is a flaw in UDA,

That is not my area of expertise so I'm not competent to judge if  
the Universal Dance Association is good at teaching ballet or not.

>  We know also, as we assume comp [...]

I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade acronyms.

Could you once stop making useless distracting ad hominem non sensical  
remark?

 >> before I can give you that precise answer I need to know what  
you mean by "the H-guy". Does it mean:

1) John Clark?
2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?

> Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the  
step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you just  
say the answer, whatever the hell it is, has always been the same  
and then give a link to the same long paper that is full of  
imprecise vague pronouns.

What is vague? You have already asked. I define precisely the 1-you  
(content of the diary you can find in your pocket, with the usual  
indexical use of "your"), and the 3-you (content of the diary of an  
external observer, not entring in the tele-boxes).

So I ask again, does "the H guy" refer to  #1 "John Clark", or does  
it refer to #2  "the fellow currently experiencing Helsinki"?

I have already answered this many times, and we did agree more than  
once on this. it is John Clark, before the experience is done, and it  
concerns all John Clark first person future experiences, ad re- 
explained above.

> And yes, we know that you John Clark, will be in both city, after  
the experience is completed. But this does not answer the question,  
which is about what you expect your life will turn in.

Explain who Mr. You is

It works with anybody. Just proceed in the thought experience.

and John Clark will answer that question.

> it will not turn into "I have the superposed experience of being  
in the two city at once".

Maybe, maybe not, it depends on who Mr. I is.

No, with comp, it will never be the superposed experience.

> You are on Earth, and you need, for some reason, to go urgently on  
Mars. Bad luck, you can't really afford the 100% secure quantum  
classical teleportation channel Earth-Mars, but you have enough  
money to take a channel where it is known that the probability of  
eavesdropping is 1/4.
Now there will be two questions, according to the fact that the  
eavesdropping is destructive, or not.

The eavesdropping is destructive when Eve, the "pirate", intercepts  
the message, and prevents it to attain Mars.
The eavesdropping is non-destructive when Eve intercepts the  
message, copies it, and let it attain Mars.

In both question the probability of eavesdropping is 1/4, and it is  
supposed that Eve reconstitutes you in Hell, or some bad place.
You are on Earth, just before pushing the button. How do you  
evaluate your chance to find yourself in hell?

a) with a destructive eavesdropping?

Don't know

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-23 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Aug 2014, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/22/2014 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:




On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.



On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:


What I mean is, your formulation, the words you use, add a certain  
numinous quality to the description of what seem (to a non- 
mathematician) to be dry abstract numerical transformations. Do  
they truly develop a discourse about the transcendant?


Good question.
The fact is that I could explain to you the notion of arithmetical  
truth. I can define it in the same sense that I can define you  
what is an Hilbert space. Arithmetical Truth, although not  
definable in the arithmetic language admits definition in slight  
extension of arithmetic, on which machines can points correctly too.
yet, as far the very notion of arithmetical truth is unnameable  
(Tarski theorem, also found by Gödel). Nor can the machine  
generates, even working an infinite time, the whole set of  
arithmetical truth. If she tries, she will be lead to adding  
recurrently new axioms. There are no finite or constructively- 
infinite machine/theory capable of unifying the "simple"  
arithmetical reality.


Isn't the UD a constructively-infinite machine



Not really. the UD is a finite machine (like all machines, programs,  
numbers).


UD*, the description of the computation done by the UD is infinite.





that will generate all arithmetical truths,


Only the sigma_1 one.  The set of all arithmetical truth is beyond all  
machines, and even all nameable gods (non-machines, but having still a  
well-defined mathematical definition, like the pi_i et sigma_i truth  
notion, with i bigger than one, for example.






including all those additional axioms?


In a branching way, yes. Like PA+ Washington, and PA + Moscow, to sum  
up.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/22/2014 11:48 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

> The second law is only approximately true for finite systems (in either
time or
space). Globally it's a tautology: the arrow-of-physical-time points in the
direction of increasing entropy, whichever way you chose coordinate time.

It's not a tautology. The second law can explain why tomorrow will almost certainly be
more disordered (have a higher entropy) than today, it's just because there are
astronomically (too weak a word but the best I could find) more disordered states than
ordered ones. However by using the exact same logic and the fact that the state of
things today evolved from the state of things yesterday and because there are
astronomically more such disordered states than ordered ones we must conclude that
things today almost certainly evolved from one of those very numerous disordered states
that existed yesterday. So entropy was almost certainly higher yesterday than today. But
that's nuts!

But entropy is relative constraints, in this case coarse graining. I you take the equation
of physics seriously, they are time-symmetric (assming MWI) and entropy never changes.
But at the coarse-grained level of description, where entropy increases, there are fewer
past states that could produce the present than there are future states into which the
present can evolve.

Everybody thinks that entropy will be higher tomorrow but nobody really thinks it's true
that entropy was also higher yesterday, and yet it is undeniable that you can not deduce
a asymmetry in time (time's arrow) from thermodynamics or from any of the known laws of
physics alone; this dichotomy is sometimes called Loschmidt's Paradox or Loschmidt's
Objection. To deduce the arrow of time and get rid of Loschmidt's Paradox the laws of
physics are not enough, you must make an additional assumption about initial conditions
called "The Past Hypothesis", it's the assumption that the universe started out in a
very very low entropy state, as low as you can go. And therefore there was only one
direction it could evolve, toward a higher entropy state.

Except that the exact same physics applies to a universe that "collapses" into a very very
low entropy states. But if we lived in such a universe, we'd live our lives and form our
memories in the direction of expansion and we'd say we live in an expanding universe (as
we do) and that's why the 2nd law globally is a tautology.

Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I
don't think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive physical".

Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't assume
particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in physical theories.

I know what "primitive" means. The point of the question was what does "physical"
mean. I think it just means stuff we agree on the 3p sense - the dominant invariant
measure across 1p experience. But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are
"physical".

The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.

But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.

Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that assumption. When saying
"yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality rich enough to sustain a doctor, and
computers. But we can be neutral on the nature of that stability, and understand that
eventually comp questions it.

My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and "observation"
mean?

Good question.

with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being inputed", if I can say.
It is when an input "variable", or billions of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.

OK. That implies some boundary between "in" and "out", some persistent meaning of
"inside".

A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the button, find yourself in
some box, and open the door. The "read(X) of your "program" will get instantiated into
read(Moscow), or read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it by
empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted from reasoning + the local
axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a duplication in W and in M.

The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and indeed that's why we
must hope to find the physical laws as invariant for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1
complete arithmetical reality.

I think "invariant" in that context means the same as Stenger's point-of-view-invariance.
But what seems to be invariant are the probabilities of Born's rule. What I'm trying to
see is whether CTM can shed any light on the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
Naively, it seems to imply the many-minds interpretation: invariance relative to
"observers". But physicists who propose this view take "mind" to a primitive, which CTM
does not. Under CTM the computers at CERN may be plenty mindful enough to have a viewpoint.

The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t

That's supposed to formalize Prob(p)=1?? I can understand []p & <>p, but I don't see how
<>t (there is some world that contains a true proposition?) model Prob(p)=1.

Brent

(or []p & <>p, that is equivalent in G), with "[]" the name-description of the machines
or of its set of beliefs. An RE set by comp + the fact that we decide to handle only
simple ideal machines.

When one makes an "empirical observation" does one then have knowledge?

With some luck, as we can be dreaming.

With science, the more we know, less less sure we know that we know. The more our
beliefs became stable, the less we can justify them.

The opening of the eyes does not reveal the truth, it only enlarge the spectrum of the
possible, and you get more doubts, unless you lie to yourself. But you can find
theoretical pearls, that is assumption which makes you move forward, in a more complex
and rich reality, for the best, or the worst (depending partially on you).

All this *in* the computationalist theory. (I mean that I am not asserting truth, but
describing what machines believing in computationalism can say).

Bruno

Brent

"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on object that we can
detect empirically, like particles, forces, waves, space, time, temperature, etc.

Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They might assume 0, and
its successor, but you don't need a laboratory, nor any *observation* to believe in
them, a priori.

Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it includes arithmetical, but
that would makes more confusing the comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic,
that is, derive the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete
theory (with comp in the background).

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-22 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> > The second law is only approximately true for finite systems (in either
> time or space).  Globally it's a tautology: the arrow-of-physical-time
> points in the direction of increasing entropy, whichever way you chose
> coordinate time.
>

It's not a tautology. The second law can explain why tomorrow will almost
certainly be more disordered (have a higher entropy) than today, it's just
because there are astronomically (too weak a word but the best I could
find) more disordered states than ordered ones. However by using the exact
same logic and the fact that the state of things today evolved from the
state of things yesterday and because there are astronomically more such
disordered states than ordered ones we must conclude that things today
almost certainly evolved from one of those very numerous disordered states
that existed yesterday. So entropy was almost certainly higher yesterday
than today. But that's nuts!

Everybody thinks that entropy will be higher tomorrow but nobody really
thinks it's true that entropy was also higher yesterday, and yet it is
undeniable that you can not deduce a asymmetry in time (time's arrow) from
thermodynamics or from any of the known laws of physics alone; this
dichotomy is sometimes called Loschmidt's Paradox or Loschmidt's Objection.
To deduce the arrow of time and get rid of Loschmidt's Paradox the laws of
physics are not enough, you must make an additional assumption about
initial conditions called  "The Past Hypothesis", it's the assumption that
the universe started out in a very very low entropy state, as low as you
can go. And therefore there was only one direction it could evolve, toward
a higher entropy state.

  John K Clark

>
>
>   The second law is wrong in the same universe that 2 +2 =5, that is to
> say the same universe where logic does not hold. I do not think such a
> universe exists.
>
> Perhaps the first law is just as fundamental as the second, perhaps not.
> Right now we believe in the first law not because it would be illogical to
> believe otherwise but just because so far we've never seen mass-energy
> created or destroyed. I doubt it but it's not inconceivable that tomorrow
> we will, but it is inconceivable that tomorrow 2+2 will be 5 or that the
> second law is wrong.
>
>
> In a general relativistic universe that's expanding there's no time-like
> Killing field and so there's no canonical way to define total energy.  GR
> conserves stress-energy locally but in general the total is undefined.
> John Baez has a nice discussion of the problem.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not  
stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined  
that "primitive physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we  
don't assume particles, or space, or time,usually  
assumed in physical theories.




I know what "primitive" means.  The point of the question was what  
does "physical" mean.  I think it just means stuff we agree on the  
3p sense - the dominant invariant measure across 1p experience.   
But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are "physical".


The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.


But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.



Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that  
assumption. When saying "yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality rich  
enough to sustain a doctor, and computers. But we can be neutral on  
the nature of that stability, and understand that eventually comp  
questions it.




My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and  
"observation" mean?



Good question.

with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being  
inputed", if I can say. It is when an input  "variable", or billions  
of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.


A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the button,  
find yourself in some box, and open the door. The "read(X) of your  
"program" will get instantiated into read(Moscow), or  
read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it by  
empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted from  
reasoning + the local axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a  
duplication in W and in M.


The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and  
indeed that's why we must hope to find the physical laws as invariant  
for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1 complete arithmetical reality.


The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t   (or []p & <>p,  
that is equivalent in G), with "[]" the name-description of the  
machines or of its set of beliefs. An RE set by comp + the fact that  
we decide to handle only simple ideal machines.




When one makes an "empirical observation" does one then have  
knowledge?


With some luck, as we can be dreaming.

With science, the more we know, less less sure we know that we know.  
The more our beliefs became stable, the less we can justify them.


The opening of the eyes does not reveal the truth, it only enlarge the  
spectrum of the possible, and you get more doubts, unless you lie to  
yourself. But you can find theoretical pearls, that is assumption  
which makes you move forward, in a more complex and rich reality, for  
the best, or the worst (depending partially on you).


All this *in* the computationalist theory. (I mean that I am not  
asserting truth, but describing what machines believing in  
computationalism can say).


Bruno










Brent

"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on  
object that we can detect empirically, like particles, forces,  
waves, space, time, temperature, etc.


Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They  
might assume 0, and its successor, but you don't need a laboratory,  
nor any *observation* to believe in them, a priori.


Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it  
includes arithmetical, but that would makes more confusing the   
comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic, that is, derive  
the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete  
theory (with comp in the background).


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-22 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".
>>
>
>
 > By definition you believe in comp,
>

If you say so, I guess you should know as you invented the word, so I guess
the definition of "comp" is "the stuff that John Clark believes".

> > but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is correct,
>

Fine, so "comp" isn't correct, and since "comp" isn't correct can we please
stop talking about the stupid thing?

> so that philosophical zombies are logically conceivable.
>

Although I think its rather unlikely it is logically conceivable that I am
the only conscious being in the universe; however it is not logically
conceivable that intelligence and consciousness are unrelated and Evolution
still managed to produce one conscious being, and yet I know for a fact
that it did. Therefore philosophical zombies are logically inconceivable.

> What you mean is that you believe that there is a flaw in UDA,
>

That is not my area of expertise so I'm not competent to judge if the
Universal Dance Association is good at teaching ballet or not.

>  We know also, as we assume comp [...]
>

I don't assume your baby talk jargon or your silly homemade acronyms.

 >> before I can give you that precise answer I need to know what you mean
>> by "the H-guy". Does it mean:
>> 1) John Clark?
>> 2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
>>
>
> > Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the step
> 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>

So rather than simply answering my question with #1 or #2 you just say the
answer, whatever the hell it is, has always been the same and then give a
link to the same long paper that is full of imprecise vague pronouns. So I
ask again, does "the H guy" refer to  #1 "John Clark", or does it refer to
#2  "the fellow currently experiencing Helsinki"?

> And yes, we know that you John Clark, will be in both city, after the
> experience is completed. But this does not answer the question, which is
> about what you expect your life will turn in.
>

Explain who Mr. You is and John Clark will answer that question.

> it will not turn into "I have the superposed experience of being in the
> two city at once".
>

Maybe, maybe not, it depends on who Mr. I is.

> You are on Earth, and you need, for some reason, to go urgently on Mars.
> Bad luck, you can't really afford the 100% secure quantum classical
> teleportation channel Earth-Mars, but you have enough money to take a
> channel where it is known that the probability of eavesdropping is 1/4.
> Now there will be two questions, according to the fact that
> the eavesdropping is destructive, or not.
>
> The eavesdropping is destructive when Eve, the "pirate", intercepts the
> message, and prevents it to attain Mars.
> The eavesdropping is non-destructive when Eve intercepts the message,
> copies it, and let it attain Mars.
>
> In both question the probability of eavesdropping is 1/4, and it is
> supposed that Eve reconstitutes you in Hell, or some bad place.
> You are on Earth, just before pushing the button. How do you evaluate your
> chance to find yourself in hell?
>
> a) with a destructive eavesdropping?
>

Don't know about Mr. You, we've never been introduced, but there is a 75%
chance  John Clark will go to Mars and a 25% chance John Clark will go to
hell; John Clark would be very reluctant to push that button even if the
odds were 100% Mars and 25% hell because hell doesn't sound like much fun.
But that's just John Clark, Bruno Marchal may feel differently and there is
no disputing matters of taste.

> b) with a non-destructive eavesdropping?
>

Then it doesn't matter if Eve intercept things or not because she doesn't
interfere and lets things proceed as originally planned, so there is a 100%
chance that John Clark will remain on Earth and a 100% chance John Clark
will go to Mars; provided that Mars is a nice place John Clark would not
hesitate in pushing that button.

  John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/22/2014 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:

On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.

On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:

What I mean is, your formulation, the words you use, add a certain
numinous
quality to the description of what seem (to a non-mathematician) to be
dry
abstract numerical transformations. Do they truly develop a discourse
about the
transcendant?

Good question.
The fact is that I could explain to you the notion of arithmetical truth. I
can
define it in the same sense that I can define you what is an Hilbert space.
Arithmetical Truth, although not definable in the arithmetic language admits
definition in slight extension of arithmetic, on which machines can points
correctly too.
yet, as far the very notion of arithmetical truth is unnameable (Tarski
theorem,
also found by Gödel). Nor can the machine generates, even working an
infinite time,
the whole set of arithmetical truth. If she tries, she will be lead to
adding
recurrently new axioms. There are no finite or constructively-infinite
machine/theory capable of unifying the "simple" arithmetical reality.

Isn't the UD a constructively-infinite machine that will generate all arithmetical truths,
including all those additional axioms?

Brent

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/22/2014 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 7:19 PM, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

>> Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what
is not.
Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
war? Yes.
Is it physically possible that 2+2=5 ? No. Is it physically possible
that the
second law of thermodynamics is wrong? No. Is it physically possible
that the
first law of thermodynamics is wrong? I don't know.

> So it isn't obvious. (The second law can be wrong for arbitrary amounts
of time,
actually.)

The second law is not wrong about that because the second law says nothing about what
entropy might do over arbitrarily short amounts of time, it only speaks about what
entropy is certain to do as time approaches infinity.

The second law is only approximately true for finite systems (in either time or space).
Globally it's a tautology: the arrow-of-physical-time points in the direction of
increasing entropy, whichever way you chose coordinate time.

The second law is wrong in the same universe that 2 +2 =5, that is to say the same
universe where logic does not hold. I do not think such a universe exists.

Perhaps the first law is just as fundamental as the second, perhaps not. Right now we
believe in the first law not because it would be illogical to believe otherwise but just
because so far we've never seen mass-energy created or destroyed. I doubt it but it's
not inconceivable that tomorrow we will, but it is inconceivable that tomorrow 2+2 will
be 5 or that the second law is wrong.

In a general relativistic universe that's expanding there's no time-like Killing field and
so there's no canonical way to define total energy. GR conserves stress-energy locally
but in general the total is undefined. John Baez has a nice discussion of the problem.

Brent

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"


On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't 
think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't assume particles, 
or space, or time, usually assumed in physical theories.




I know what "primitive" means.  The point of the question was what does "physical" 
mean.  I think it just means stuff we agree on the 3p sense - the dominant invariant 
measure across 1p experience.  But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are 
"physical".


The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.


But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.  My question is what, within your 
theory, does "empirical" and "observation" mean?  When one makes an "empirical 
observation" does one then have knowledge?


Brent

"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on object that we can 
detect empirically, like particles, forces, waves, space, time, temperature, etc.


Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They might assume 0, and its 
successor, but you don't need a laboratory, nor any *observation* to believe in them, a 
priori.


Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it includes arithmetical, but 
that would makes more confusing the  comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic, 
that is, derive the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete theory 
(with comp in the background).


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-22 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 7:19 PM, LizR  wrote:

 >> Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what is
>> not. Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
>> war? Yes. Is it physically possible that 2+2=5 ? No. Is it physically
>> possible that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong? No. Is it
>> physically possible that the first law of thermodynamics is wrong? I don't
>> know.
>>
>
> > So it isn't obvious. (The second law can be wrong for arbitrary amounts
> of time, actually.)
>

The second law is not wrong about that because the second law says nothing
about what entropy might do over arbitrarily short amounts of time, it only
speaks about what entropy is certain to do as time approaches infinity. The
second law is wrong in the same universe that 2 +2 =5, that is to say the
same universe where logic does not hold. I do not think such a universe
exists.

Perhaps the first law is just as fundamental as the second, perhaps not.
Right now we believe in the first law not because it would be illogical to
believe otherwise but just because so far we've never seen mass-energy
created or destroyed. I doubt it but it's not inconceivable that tomorrow
we will, but it is inconceivable that tomorrow 2+2 will be 5 or that the
second law is wrong.

 John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:




On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.



On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:


What I mean is, your formulation, the words you use, add a certain  
numinous quality to the description of what seem (to a non- 
mathematician) to be dry abstract numerical transformations. Do they  
truly develop a discourse about the transcendant?


Good question.
The fact is that I could explain to you the notion of arithmetical  
truth. I can define it in the same sense that I can define you what  
is an Hilbert space. Arithmetical Truth, although not definable in  
the arithmetic language admits definition in slight extension of  
arithmetic, on which machines can points correctly too.
yet, as far the very notion of arithmetical truth is unnameable  
(Tarski theorem, also found by Gödel). Nor can the machine  
generates, even working an infinite time, the whole set of  
arithmetical truth. If she tries, she will be lead to adding  
recurrently new axioms. There are no finite or constructively- 
infinite machine/theory capable of unifying the "simple"  
arithmetical reality.










Or do they merely mechanically prove their inability to compute  
everything?


Well, they are universal with respect to the computable, so they can  
compute everything computable. of course, we knows that there are  
many non computable functions. But there are other nuances: there  
prpositions which they cannot prove, yet are true, and they can find  
it (by betting, etc.). There are true propositions that they can not  
prove, and neither bet. There are truth that the machine can bet,  
yet cannot even express, without becoming inconsistent. there are  
truth that the machine cannot express at all, etc.


The incompleteness does not just separate the arithmetical truth in  
two parts (the provable/the true but not provable), it introduces  
nuance between "justification" ([]p), "knowledge ([]p & p),  
observable ([]p & <>p), sensible ([]p & <>p & p). And most of those  
nuances inherit the separation with truth. That is why we end with 8  
typically different views in and on the (nont nameable by such by  
the machine) arithmetical reality.


If I'm to have any chance of understanding what you are on about,  
I'm going to at least a translation of the symbols. I've been  
reading the wikipedia entries on modal logic so I assume [] relates  
to the necessity operator and <> to the possibility operator?


That is the so called alethic interpretation of the modalities. It is  
the one corresponding also to Leibniz semantics, which I have  
explained sometimes ago. The corresponding theory is S5 (with notably  
main axioms:

<>A -> []<>A.

But in the comp context, in AUDA, the box corresponds to Gödel's  
arithmetical provability predicate, which by Gödel's theorem, obeys  
like a belief (we don't have the axioms []A -> A, by incompleteness,  
and instead of the alethic <>A -> []<>A, we have on the contrary that  
<>A -> ~[]<>A: if A is consistent then I cannot prove that A is  
consistent. Solovay solved the problem of finding a modal theory  
axiomatizing the arithmetical and machine self-references. he found  
two logics G and G*. I can come back on this. Normally this is  
explained in the seocnd part of the sane04 paper.






So can you explain what []p & <>p means? It's provable(necessary?)  
that p and it's possible that p doesn't really mean much to me. I  
haven't really grokked this stuff yet.


Yopu might look for Kripke in the archive. basically []p means that p  
is true in all worlds that I can access, and <>p means that there is  
an accessible  world. The belief predicate cannot be a probability  
predicate, because with G we can have cul-de-sac world, in which []p  
is "vacuously true", despite p is impossible/inconsistent. By adding  
the "& <>p", we ensure that p is true in all worlds that I can access,  
and that there is such a world, and that defines indeed a sort of  
probability one. I will come back on this.











Perhaps you see all this drama playing out in the maths not because  
it is there in the maths intrinsically, not because you are a  
machine, but because you are a man of imagination, seeing your own  
soul in the numbers the way early astrologers saw their soul in the  
stars. Maybe the fit with the analysis of qualia truly means that is  
where the qualia fit. To me it's more of a sketchy fit, suggestive  
perhaps, like the bear in the sky which I can see if I squint. But I  
can't argue the case until I understand the maths better.


No. The link with consciousness is made clear by the "yes doctor"  
hypothesis, and the rest in math, verified by peers, etc.

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 Aug 2014, at 21:38, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> intelligence and consciousness would need to be unrelated for a  
smart zombie to exist, but if that were the case then Evolution  
could never have produced a conscious being and yet I know for a  
fact that it did as least once. Therefore unlike fire breathing  
dragons philosophical zombies are not only nonexistent but are also  
logically contradictory.

> Proof?

I have explained 6.02*10^23 times why Evolution could have never  
produced consciousness if it wasn't linked to intelligence;  if you  
disagree with some aspect of my argument then say so and we'll  
thrash it out, but don't just mindlessly squawk "proof?".

> With comp, both *matter appearances* [...]

Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".

Boring repetitive rethorical trick. By definition you believe in comp,  
as your quote above illustrates very well (your argument assumes comp,  
but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is  
correct, so that philosophical zombies are logically conceivable. Not  
really plausible, yet logically conceivable.

What you mean is that you believe that there is a flaw in UDA, but  
your many attemps has been debunked many times, by many people on this  
list.

> I still wait your solution to the exercise in my last post to you.

Huh, what exercise?

> Do you agree with the answer given (by Liz and others)?

I honestly have no idea what you're talking about.

I alluded to my reply to you that I made the 07 Aug 2014, and that I  
called "August Exam", and which you have not yet answered.

Let me copy it below, to save your time:

=

Hi all,

This is my reply to John Clark. You can skip toward the last paragraph  
as it happens that the post ends with an exercise for everybody.

A test of your understanding of the First Person Indeterminacy (FPI).

It should not be difficult. It is the Exam Surprise of August :)

On 05 Aug 2014, at 18:27, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 4, 2014  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>  the comp  FPI is the simplest and strongest form of indeterminacy.

Well good for "comp" and good for the Foreign Policy Initiative.

> It does not need the quantum physics assumption

And quantum physics most assuredly does not need it!

Everett QM needs it.

> the real question is: do you accept that the indeterminacy on what  
you (the H-guy) can expect

No I do not,

Could you quote the entire paragraph?

the question has a precise answer

Yes, you gave it in your preceding post. It was "I don't know", and  
that is the FPI. We moved to step 4.

and does not require probability, but before I can give you that  
precise answer I need to know what you mean by "the H-guy". Does it  
mean:

1) John Clark?
2)  The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?

Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the  
step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

3) The fellow currently experiencing Moscow?

This looks like a precision, but is not.

4) The fellow currently experiencing Washington?
5) Any of the copies who remembers experiencing Helsinki?

You have agreed enough about identity to say that comp entails we  
survive teleportation. So, you know the answer.

We ask you, John Clark, and the question is asked to you some moment  
before you push the button.

And yes, we know that you John Clark, will be in both city, after the  
experience is completed. But this does not answer the question, which  
is about what you expect your life will turn in. We know also, as we  
assume comp, that it will not turn into "I have the superposed  
experience of being in the two city at once". It can only be "I have  
the feeling of being in a precise city x". x is not ambiguous, it is  
undetermined before you push the button and open the door.

If it's #1 the answer is Moscow and Washington. If it's #2 the  
answer is oblivion. If it's #3 the answer is Moscow. If it's #4 the  
answer is Washington. If it's #5 the answer is Moscow and  
Washington. So the moral is, ask me a precise question and be  
careful with the ambiguous pronouns and I will give you a precise  
answer without any need of probabilities.

I answer by an exercise for everybody.

You are on Earth, and you need, for some reason, to go urgently on  
Mars. Bad luck, you can't really afford the 100% secure quantum  
classical teleportation channel Earth-Mars, but you have enough money  
to take a channel where it is known that the probability of  
eavesdropping is 1/4.

Now there will be two questions, according to the fact that the  
eavesdropping is destructive, or not.

The

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not stuff  
- but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined that  
"primitive physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't  
assume particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in physical  
theories.




I know what "primitive" means.  The point of the question was what  
does "physical" mean.  I think it just means stuff we agree on the  
3p sense - the dominant invariant measure across 1p experience.  But  
by that definition numbers and arithmetic are "physical".


The physical is concerned with the empirically observable. "primitive  
physical" means that we assume primitive observable on object that we  
can detect empirically, like particles, forces, waves, space, time,  
temperature, etc.


Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They might  
assume 0, and its successor, but you don't need a laboratory, nor any  
*observation* to believe in them, a priori.


Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it includes  
arithmetical, but that would makes more confusing the  comp necessity  
to derive physics from arithmetic, that is, derive the observable from  
what we can justify from any Turing complete theory (with comp in the  
background).


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread Pierz



On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, August 18, 2014 9:19:32 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:
>
> Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to 
> the doctor. 
>
>
> Nor do I.
>
> Actually, even if comp is true, I might say "no", because I might not 
> trust the doctor's skill, or the choice of the level. 
>
>
> It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on 
> someone else first. If they appear to be fine after the operation then I 
> guess I'll go under the knife - and have to swallow the logical 
> consequences whole! 
>
>
> Me too.
>
>
>
>
> Your reply helps. I suppose what I feel is missing from the account is the 
> *necessity* of qualia, because it seems to me that everything that exists, 
> necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp account, the necessity for 
> there to be an interior to mathematics remains mysterious. 
>
>
> All machines introspecting itself, in the standard sense of Gödel, or 
> Kleene,  is bound up to develop discours about something unnameable which 
> transcend them. But when you study the mathematical sructure of that 
> transcendent reality, it fits with previous analysis of qualia and quanta.
>
>
> "Discourse", "unnameable", "transcendant": how the qualia sneak in even as 
> we try to explain them! 
>
>
> Yes, it is in their nature. 
>
>
>
>
> What I mean is, your formulation, the words you use, add a certain 
> numinous quality to the description of what seem (to a non-mathematician) 
> to be dry abstract numerical transformations. Do they truly develop a 
> discourse about the transcendant? 
>
>
> Good question.
> The fact is that I could explain to you the notion of arithmetical truth. 
> I can define it in the same sense that I can define you what is an Hilbert 
> space. Arithmetical Truth, although not definable in the arithmetic 
> language admits definition in slight extension of arithmetic, on which 
> machines can points correctly too. 
> yet, as far the very notion of arithmetical truth is unnameable (Tarski 
> theorem, also found by Gödel). Nor can the machine generates, even working 
> an infinite time, the whole set of arithmetical truth. If she tries, she 
> will be lead to adding recurrently new axioms. There are no finite or 
> constructively-infinite machine/theory capable of unifying the "simple" 
> arithmetical reality. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Or do they merely mechanically prove their inability to compute 
> everything? 
>
>
> Well, they are universal with respect to the computable, so they can 
> compute everything computable. of course, we knows that there are many non 
> computable functions. But there are other nuances: there prpositions which 
> they cannot prove, yet are true, and they can find it (by betting, etc.). 
> There are true propositions that they can not prove, and neither bet. There 
> are truth that the machine can bet, yet cannot even express, without 
> becoming inconsistent. there are truth that the machine cannot express at 
> all, etc. 
>
> The incompleteness does not just separate the arithmetical truth in two 
> parts (the provable/the true but not provable), it introduces nuance 
> between "justification" ([]p), "knowledge ([]p & p), observable ([]p & 
> <>p), sensible ([]p & <>p & p). And most of those nuances inherit the 
> separation with truth. That is why we end with 8 typically different views 
> in and on the (nont nameable by such by the machine) arithmetical reality. 
>
> If I'm to have any chance of understanding what you are on about, I'm 
going to at least a translation of the symbols. I've been reading the 
wikipedia entries on modal logic so I assume [] relates to the necessity 
operator and <> to the possibility operator? So can you explain what []p & 
<>p means? It's provable(necessary?) that p and it's possible that p 
doesn't really mean much to me. I haven't really grokked this stuff yet.

>
>
>
>
> Perhaps you see all this drama playing out in the maths not because it is 
> there in the maths intrinsically, not because you are a machine, but 
> because you are a man of imagination, seeing your own soul in the numbers 
> the way early astrologers saw their soul in the stars. Maybe the fit with 
> the analysis of qualia truly means that is where the qualia fit. To

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread Pierz



On Thursday, August 21, 2014 9:00:39 AM UTC+10, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon 
>> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such 
>> an animal actually exists. 
>>
>
> Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which case 
> they exist somewhere.
>  
>
>> > Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere 
>>> formalism, but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being 
>>> more than abstract relationships between numbers. 
>>>
>>
>> What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between 
> numbers?
>
> My point precisely Liz. So how do subjective experiences get into it? Comp 
is based on the yes doctor bet or the assumption that consciousness arises 
from computations. I'm pointing out the basic unexplained oddness of this, 
which seems odder once we abstract away the physical machine - at least 
then we could imagine some physical "magic" putting the consciousness in, 
though I'll admit physical magic is a pretty shit explanation too!
 

> (Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp is 
> correct) that "abstract" relations are more real than real ones.)
>

 

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread LizR

On 22 August 2014 08:00, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 7:00 PM, LizR  wrote:
>
>  There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
>>> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
>>> an animal actually exists.
>>>
>>
>> > Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which
>> case they exist somewhere.
>>
>
> The multiverse doesn't care if I believe in it or not, it either exists or
> it doesn't. Although I could be wrong I think the multiverse idea is
> logically consistent, but even if I'm right and it is that doesn't prove it
> exists.
>

Ri-i-i-ight, fine, if you're going to nitpick the phraseology that's your
privilege.

>
> > a consequence of the multiverse is that all physically possible events
>> happen within it.
>>
>
> Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what is
> not. Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
> war? Yes. Is it physically possible that 2+2=5 ? No. Is it physically
> possible that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong? No. Is it
> physically possible that the first law of thermodynamics is wrong? I don't
> know.
>

So it isn't obvious. (The second law can be wrong for arbitrary amounts of
time, actually.)

>
> > It's possible (if comp is correct) that
>>
>
> Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about scientific baby talk like
> "comp".
>
> Or about normal scientific talk either, to judge by your comments above.

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 7:00 PM, LizR  wrote:

There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
>> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
>> an animal actually exists.
>>
>
> > Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which
> case they exist somewhere.
>

The multiverse doesn't care if I believe in it or not, it either exists or
it doesn't. Although I could be wrong I think the multiverse idea is
logically consistent, but even if I'm right and it is that doesn't prove it
exists.

> a consequence of the multiverse is that all physically possible events
> happen within it.
>

Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what is
not. Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
war? Yes. Is it physically possible that 2+2=5 ? No. Is it physically
possible that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong? No. Is it
physically possible that the first law of thermodynamics is wrong? I don't
know.

> It's possible (if comp is correct) that
>

Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about scientific baby talk like
"comp".

 John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> intelligence and consciousness would need to be unrelated for a smart
>> zombie to exist, but if that were the case then Evolution could never have
>> produced a conscious being and yet I know for a fact that it did as least
>> once. Therefore unlike fire breathing dragons philosophical zombies are not
>> only nonexistent but are also logically contradictory.
>>
>
> > Proof?
>

I have explained 6.02*10^23 times why Evolution could have never produced
consciousness if it wasn't linked to intelligence;  if you disagree with
some aspect of my argument then say so and we'll thrash it out, but don't
just mindlessly squawk "proof?".

> With comp, both *matter appearances* [...]
>

Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".

> I still wait your solution to the exercise in my last post to you.
>

Huh, what exercise?

> Do you agree with the answer given (by Liz and others)?
>

I honestly have no idea what you're talking about.

 John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread meekerdb


On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't 
think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't assume particles, or 
space, or time, usually assumed in physical theories.




I know what "primitive" means.  The point of the question was what does "physical" mean. I 
think it just means stuff we agree on the 3p sense - the dominant invariant measure across 
1p experience.  But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are "physical".


Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 21 Aug 2014, at 11:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.

Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness  
required life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires  
consciousness with or without life? I do not even understand how  
something can be required by definition.



Computationalism is the doctrine which asserts that consciousness can  
be preserved through the substitution of body parts at some  
description level.


Without consciousness, this would not make sense.

It is an hypothesis in "philosophy of mind", or "theology" (whatever).

It is sometimes confused with the statement that the physical reality  
(whatever that is) can be simulated exactly by a computer, or  
generated by some program, and I have often explained that this is a  
priori in opposition of comp, where the physical reality became the  
result of the FPI on *all* computations: this a priori cannot be  
simulated by a program.


Consciousness does not require life per se. It requires, with comp,  
only one computation, except that you will need all computations to  
give some stability for that conscious experiences. But you have  
already got all computations when you assume elementary arithmetic, or  
any Turing complete theory.


*Human* consciousness requires very plausibly the type of life we know  
on Earth, at least for a large part of its story, but even this will  
requires that consciousness emerges from the infinity of computations  
which exists as a consequence of arithmetic. Indeed, everything  
physical emerges from the measure on all computations.


Bruno









On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many  
World Theories?


To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the  
SWE, QM)


In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the  
stability of the physical laws, or the invariant in the observations.




Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical  
came from life.


Hmm... Life of the numbers, in a different sense that "terrestrial  
life".





I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe  
would still evolve

but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.


?
I don't remember.
All this is justified by the UDA, in the comp (not related a priori  
to QM) frame.






The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to  
the Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI  
for that reason.


We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition. Then the  
TOE is given by two little formula like:


Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

And nothing more. I could take only addition and multiplication of  
natural numbers.


You might miss something in the UDA, which should answer your  
question.


Bruno





Richard


On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in  
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the  
early universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be  
observers observing the interior of stars for them to be  
"physically real"?  What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


Brent
--
Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where  
theory is god.


Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of  
most scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it  
is a theology.


Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).




It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a  
"know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is anything that  
observes - i.e. notices anything at all.


It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a  
universal number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and  
with Everett QM, we can extend the notion of observer greatly. No  
problem.





No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,


No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But  
the existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context  
rich enough to postulate computationalism.




the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for  
themselves.


Why?




No arithmetix either!

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Surely, it's because computationalism is a theory of the mind... Don't you
think?
Le 21 août 2014 11:52, "Richard Ruquist"  a écrit :

> Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.
>
> Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness required
> life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires consciousness with or
> without life? I do not even understand how something can be required by
> definition.
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many World
>> Theories?
>>
>>
>> To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the SWE, QM)
>>
>> In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the
>> stability of the physical laws, or the invariant in the observations.
>>
>>
>>
>> Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical came
>> from life.
>>
>>
>> Hmm... Life of the numbers, in a different sense that "terrestrial life".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe would
>> still evolve
>> but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.
>>
>>
>> ?
>> I don't remember.
>> All this is justified by the UDA, in the comp (not related a priori to
>> QM) frame.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
>> Copenhagen Interpretation CI
>> in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for
>> that reason.
>>
>>
>> We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition. Then the TOE
>> is given by two little formula like:
>>
>> Kxy = x
>> Sxyz = xz(yz)
>>
>> And nothing more. I could take only addition and multiplication of
>> natural numbers.
>>
>> You might miss something in the UDA, which should answer your question.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
>>> survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
>>> we might live some "phase transition" between different physical realms.
>>> Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
>>> at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
>>> universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
>>> the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?  What does
>>> "physically real" mean in your theory?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>> --
>>> Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where
>>> theory is god.
>>>
>>>
>>> Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of most
>>> scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it is a theology.
>>>
>>> Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a
>>> "know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
>>> BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is *anything* that
>>> observes - i.e. notices *anything* at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a universal
>>> number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and with Everett QM, we
>>> can extend the notion of observer greatly. No problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,
>>>
>>>
>>> No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But the
>>> existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context rich enough
>>> to postulate computationalism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for themselves.
>>>
>>>
>>> Why?
>>>
>>>
>>&g

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-21 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.

Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness required
life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires consciousness with or
without life? I do not even understand how something can be required by
definition.


On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many World
> Theories?
>
>
> To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the SWE, QM)
>
> In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the
> stability of the physical laws, or the invariant in the observations.
>
>
>
> Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical came
> from life.
>
>
> Hmm... Life of the numbers, in a different sense that "terrestrial life".
>
>
>
>
> I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe would
> still evolve
> but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.
>
>
> ?
> I don't remember.
> All this is justified by the UDA, in the comp (not related a priori to QM)
> frame.
>
>
>
>
> The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
> Copenhagen Interpretation CI
> in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for
> that reason.
>
>
> We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition. Then the TOE
> is given by two little formula like:
>
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
>
> And nothing more. I could take only addition and multiplication of natural
> numbers.
>
> You might miss something in the UDA, which should answer your question.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
>> survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
>> we might live some "phase transition" between different physical realms.
>> Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
>> at all.
>>
>>
>> Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
>> universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
>> the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?  What does
>> "physically real" mean in your theory?
>>
>> Brent
>> --
>> Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where theory
>> is god.
>>
>>
>> Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of most
>> scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it is a theology.
>>
>> Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a
>> "know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
>> BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is *anything* that
>> observes - i.e. notices *anything* at all.
>>
>>
>> It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a universal
>> number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and with Everett QM, we
>> can extend the notion of observer greatly. No problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,
>>
>>
>> No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But the
>> existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context rich enough
>> to postulate computationalism.
>>
>>
>>
>> the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for themselves.
>>
>>
>> Why?
>>
>>
>>
>> No arithmetix either!
>>
>>
>> Then you are not agnostic on the computationalist hypothesis. By some
>> miracle, a bit like Craig, you seem to believe that you know that comp is
>> false. I am agnostic, and will be, as long as comp is not refuted.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> John M
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
>>> survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousnes

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 21 Aug 2014, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 08:30:56AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a  
universal machine


I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE".  Who is doing the
choosing? Under comp we've already assumed a universal dovetailer.



It is a choice of ontology capable of universal computation. eg
choosing between arithmetic or combinators.

The point is that nobody needs to make that choice, as it has no
consequences for phenomenological physics.


Exactly.

Bruno




Cheers

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 21 Aug 2014, at 01:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark  wrote:

There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing  
dragon powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't  
prove that such an animal actually exists.


Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in  
which case they exist somewhere.


Do we know that?  If we know 2+2=5 doesn't hold in any universe, how  
do we know about complex things like fire-breathing dragoons.   
That's something that bothers me about everythingism.  Lots of  
things are impossible in QM, like cloning an unknown state.  Bruno  
says Newtonian physics is impossible under comp (because there's no  
FPI).  So I think some agnosticism should be spared for "everything  
happens somewhere".


Agreed. But I guess people always means everything consistent. "2+2=5"  
is just inconsistent, or it means something else than what we mean by  
such expression (and it is a wordplay)








> Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere  
formalism, but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics  
being more than abstract relationships between numbers.


What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between  
numbers?


They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.  Bruno says they're not stuff -  
but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive  
physical".


Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't  
assume particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in physical  
theories.


Bruno






Brent



(Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp  
is correct) that "abstract" relations  are more real  
than real ones.)



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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 20 Aug 2014, at 18:55, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Pierz  wrote:

> In "The Conscious Mind", Chalmers bases his claim that materialism  
has failed to provide an explanation for consciousness

It's not just materialism, a philosopher like Chambers would not be  
satisfied with any explanation of the form "X causes consciousness",  
not if X is atoms or information, and not even if X is God or the  
soul; in fact nobody seems to know what Chalmers means by  
"explanation".  And Chambers doesn't know either.

> on a distinction between 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience,  
where logical supervenience simply means that if A supervenes on B,  
then B logically and necessarily entails A

The spring equinox always comes before the tax filing deadline of  
April 15 in the USA, but that does not necessarily mean that the  
equinox causes the tax.

> we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie

And I have no reason to think that you are not a intelligent zombie,  
except that Evolution had no way to produce such a being.  Chambers  
believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it must  
be logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie,  
but young children can conceive that 2+2 = 5.

I doubt this. What happens is that they might just not conceive that  
2+2 = 4.

> then it seems that consciousness cannot logically supervene on the  
physical.

There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing  
dragon powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't  
prove that such an animal actually exists. However intelligence and  
consciousness would need to be unrelated for a smart zombie to  
exist, but if that were the case then Evolution could never have  
produced a conscious being and yet I know for a fact that it did as  
least once. Therefore unlike fire breathing dragons philosophical  
zombies are not only nonexistent but are also logically contradictory.

Proof?

> There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails  
or even suggests the arising of subjective experiences in any  
system, biological or otherwise.

You know for a fact that when the biological activity of your brain  
changes with drugs or surgery or electrical stimulation your  
subjective experience changes. You know for a fact that when your  
subjective experience changes the purely materialistic chemistry of  
your brain also changes. And you believe these 2 facts don't even  
suggest that materialism just might have something to do with  
consciousness?  This is the sort of thing that gives philosophy a  
bad name.

> Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere  
formalism, but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics  
being more than abstract relationships between numbers.

Well if you don't like materialism and you don't like  
abstractions either then what do you like? What's left?

With comp, both *matter appearances* (an aspect of consciousness)  
becomes a mathematical phenomenon, an invariant of universal machine  
self-transformation.

I still wait your solution to the exercise in my last post to you. Do  
you agree with the answer given (by Liz and others)?

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 20 Aug 2014, at 17:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/20/2014 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in  
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?


I think I answered this yesterday. I expressed myself badly here.  
We cannot get the "real" physical reality without observers, as it  
is define by the 1p FPI measure, which requires observers  
(universal numbers), but we can have, in UD*, digital  
approximations of such physical realities, and some can be devoid  
of any observers.


So you think the observers are needed in order to define measures  
and recover the Born rule?


Yes.





But what constitutes an observer?


A universal (and preferably Löbian) machine.





Won't you need a measure on observers?


Why?




This seems to be the many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics.



We don't assume anything in physics. We have simpler axioms, implicit  
in QM.


From QM you can define K and S and proves Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).  
But with comp, to solve the mind-body problem, we have no choice: we  
must derive QM from Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). That is the point. Z1*  
is only the begining of the solution. It shows that classical comp is  
plausible already, as we get exactly the needed quantization and  
quantum logic to make sense of that derivation.


Bruno










Are you saying there must have been observers in the early  
universe, even before the recombination?


No.



  Must there be observers observing the interior of stars for them  
to be "physically real"?


No. Not even in the real physical reality. It is enough we share  
enough (deep) computations with the stars.





What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


It means it emerges from the first person indeterminacy, in the UDA  
way.


??

Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 20 Aug 2014, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
> Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd  
say yes to the doctor.
> It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device  
work on someone else first.
> If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll  
go under the knife - and
> have to swallow the logical consequences whole! Your reply  
helps. I suppose what I feel
> is missing from the account is the *necessity* of qualia,  
because it seems to me that
> everything that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in  
the comp account, the
> necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics remains  
mysterious. My guess is
> that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot  
more right than
> materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general  
relativity and QM are "wrong",
> i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next step is to read the  
Amoeba's Secret and see if
> I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p & p -  
the maths is still

> largely a mystery to me.
>
> However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more  
curious questions to you about
> the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes,  
there's no universe, I know,
> but I lack words: this apparent "space" we inhabit?). The  
question comes up in the comp
> account about the physical explanation for the origin of the  
Löbian organism the
> self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance of matter  
(allegedly). Liz and
> Brent were throwing around this "if a tree falls in the forest"  
question on the MGA
> thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the  
long, deep history of matter
> sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative  
origin story if the
> observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to recall you  
talking about the idea
> that the observer's self consistency demands that it also find  
a consistent account of
> itself in the "material hypostases". OK, I can go with that,  
but something here still
> troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive  
any more than we can
> dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as  
fictive. How do you see the
> relationship between these accounts (the exterior physical and  
the machine
> psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic  
explanation of the fluky
> coincidences of the laws of nature resembles the machine  
psychology account - in that
> the requirements of existing as a complex self-aware machine in  
a sense "cause" the laws
> of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical  
consistency constrains the
> environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's  
almost strange that it's
> taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is that  
the "laws" work, that they

> are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see.

Check out the book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by my friend Vic  
Stenger.  It goes *part*

way in explaining this.

I'm not sure how much more explanation it requires. The anthropic  
principle plus multiverse will do it, won't it?

Stenger's approach to physics is that it is based on point-of-view- 
invariance, i.e. we want physical laws to hold for everyone in  
every time and place and direction and state of motion,  
and...whatever else we can include.  It's sort of what we mean by  
"physical law" in contrast to geographical or historical  
accident.  He shows that we can get a suprising amount out of this  
(at least surprising if you don't already know who Emma Noether  
was).

... or if you don't know the consequence of comp, where physics is
  1) invaruant for all universal machine

But within comp that's just a definition of "physics".  It doesn't  
tell you what the invariants are.

?
The invariant are given by the Z1* logics, and some variant.

Noether's theorem relates symmetry in a Lagrangian to a conserved  
quantity.

The UDA generalizes this for the whole physics.

  2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a  
universal machine

I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE".  Who is doing the  
choosing?

You, or me. I mean anyone interested in Everything.

Under comp we've already assumed a universal dovetailer.

It is the choice of the basic Turing universal formalism.

We don't assume a universal dovetailer. Its existence is derivable from:

Kxy = x
Sxyz

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many  
World Theories?


To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the SWE,  
QM)


In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the  
stability of the physical laws, or the invariant in the observations.




Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical  
came from life.


Hmm... Life of the numbers, in a different sense that "terrestrial  
life".





I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe  
would still evolve

but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.


?
I don't remember.
All this is justified by the UDA, in the comp (not related a priori to  
QM) frame.






The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to  
the Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI  
for that reason.


We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition. Then the  
TOE is given by two little formula like:


Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

And nothing more. I could take only addition and multiplication of  
natural numbers.


You might miss something in the UDA, which should answer your question.

Bruno





Richard


On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in  
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the  
early universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be  
observers observing the interior of stars for them to be  
"physically real"?  What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


Brent
--
Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where  
theory is god.


Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of  
most scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it is  
a theology.


Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).




It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a  
"know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is anything that  
observes - i.e. notices anything at all.


It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a  
universal number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and with  
Everett QM, we can extend the notion of observer greatly. No problem.





No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,


No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But the  
existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context rich  
enough to postulate computationalism.




the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for  
themselves.


Why?




No arithmetix either!


Then you are not agnostic on the computationalist hypothesis. By  
some miracle, a bit like Craig, you seem to believe that you know  
that comp is false. I am agnostic, and will be, as long as comp is  
not refuted.


Bruno





John M



On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in  
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the  
early universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be  
observers observing the interior of stars for them to be  
"physically real"?  What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

PS "Fire breathing dragoons <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragoon>" indeed!
Tres amusant.


On 21 August 2014 13:24, LizR  wrote:

> On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>   There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
>>> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
>>> an animal actually exists.
>>>
>>
>>  Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which
>> case they exist somewhere.
>>
>> Do we know that?  If we know 2+2=5 doesn't hold in any universe, how do
>> we know about complex things like fire-breathing dragoons.
>>
>
> Well, the former is logically impossible. The latter isn't, according to
> Mr Clark, so assuming he's right, "everythingism" gives it some (probably
> tiny) measure of reality in a multiverse in which all logically possible
> consequences of the LoP are instantiated, by definition.
>
>
>> That's something that bothers me about everythingism.  Lots of things are
>> impossible in QM, like cloning an unknown state.  Bruno says Newtonian
>> physics is impossible under comp (because there's no FPI).  So I think some
>> agnosticism should be spared for "everything happens somewhere".
>>
>
> It depends whether a consequence of the multiverse is that all physically
> possible events happen within it. I'm told that is the case (and anything
> else would entail it having greater complexity, hence gets "occamed out"
> from immediate consideration). However, I don't see that your final
> sentence above bears any obvious relation to the two in front of it, so yet
> again I find myself unable to follow what you're getting at.
>
>>  > Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere
>>>> formalism, but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being
>>>> more than abstract relationships between numbers.
>>>>
>>>
>>>What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between
>> numbers?
>>
>> They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.
>>
>
> I have no idea what that means.
>
>
>> Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any
>> better defined that "primitive physical".
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>  (Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp is
>> correct) that "abstract" relations are more real than real ones.)
>>
>>
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark  wrote:
>
>>
>>   There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
>> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
>> an animal actually exists.
>>
>
>  Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which
> case they exist somewhere.
>
> Do we know that?  If we know 2+2=5 doesn't hold in any universe, how do we
> know about complex things like fire-breathing dragoons.
>

Well, the former is logically impossible. The latter isn't, according to Mr
Clark, so assuming he's right, "everythingism" gives it some (probably
tiny) measure of reality in a multiverse in which all logically possible
consequences of the LoP are instantiated, by definition.


> That's something that bothers me about everythingism.  Lots of things are
> impossible in QM, like cloning an unknown state.  Bruno says Newtonian
> physics is impossible under comp (because there's no FPI).  So I think some
> agnosticism should be spared for "everything happens somewhere".
>

It depends whether a consequence of the multiverse is that all physically
possible events happen within it. I'm told that is the case (and anything
else would entail it having greater complexity, hence gets "occamed out"
from immediate consideration). However, I don't see that your final
sentence above bears any obvious relation to the two in front of it, so yet
again I find myself unable to follow what you're getting at.

> > Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere formalism,
>>> but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being more than
>>> abstract relationships between numbers.
>>>
>>
>>What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between
> numbers?
>
> They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE.
>

I have no idea what that means.


> Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any
> better defined that "primitive physical".
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>  (Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp is
> correct) that "abstract" relations are more real than real ones.)
>
>
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

(I don't see why comp is equivalent to the CI, mind you. Or what the
"requirement for observers in my mind" means...)


On 21 August 2014 13:16, LizR  wrote:

> Is IIUC "If I Understand Correctly" ? (IIUC?)
>
>
>
> On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>> >
>> > The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
>> > Copenhagen Interpretation CI
>> > in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for
>> that
>> > reason.
>> > Richard
>> >
>>
>> I don't see this. 1p phenomenology in a Multiverse is equivalent to
>> Copenhagen in some sense. We have an appearance of wavefunction
>> collapse, for example. But why do you say that CI is falsified? It is
>> just an interpretation, and thus compatible with all empirical
>> evidence supporting quantum mechanics, IIUC.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>> 
>> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>> Principal, High Performance Coders
>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>>
>>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
>>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
>>
>> 
>>
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>
>

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

Is IIUC "If I Understand Correctly" ? (IIUC?)



On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> >
> > The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
> > Copenhagen Interpretation CI
> > in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for
> that
> > reason.
> > Richard
> >
>
> I don't see this. 1p phenomenology in a Multiverse is equivalent to
> Copenhagen in some sense. We have an appearance of wavefunction
> collapse, for example. But why do you say that CI is falsified? It is
> just an interpretation, and thus compatible with all empirical
> evidence supporting quantum mechanics, IIUC.
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
>
> 
>
> --
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-20 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> 
> The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
> Copenhagen Interpretation CI
> in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for that
> reason.
> Richard
> 

I don't see this. 1p phenomenology in a Multiverse is equivalent to
Copenhagen in some sense. We have an appearance of wavefunction
collapse, for example. But why do you say that CI is falsified? It is
just an interpretation, and thus compatible with all empirical
evidence supporting quantum mechanics, IIUC.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-20 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 08:30:56AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >  2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a universal 
> > machine
> 
> I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE".  Who is doing the
> choosing? Under comp we've already assumed a universal dovetailer.
> 

It is a choice of ontology capable of universal computation. eg
choosing between arithmetic or combinators.

The point is that nobody needs to make that choice, as it has no
consequences for phenomenological physics.

Cheers 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a
nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such an animal
actually
exists.

Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which case they exist
somewhere.

Do we know that? If we know 2+2=5 doesn't hold in any universe, how do we know about
complex things like fire-breathing dragoons. That's something that bothers me about
everythingism. Lots of things are impossible in QM, like cloning an unknown state. Bruno
says Newtonian physics is impossible under comp (because there's no FPI). So I think some
agnosticism should be spared for "everything happens somewhere".

> Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere
formalism, but
it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being more than
abstract
relationships between numbers.

What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between numbers?

They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't
think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive physical".

Brent

(Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp is correct) that
"abstract" relations are more real than real ones.)

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"


On 8/20/2014 3:49 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:


Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it 
must be
logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie, but young 
children
can conceive that 2+2 = 5.

And that objects cease to exist when hidden. There comes a point where children learn 
about the "continuity of things" as it were. (Interesting that you should choose that 
example of something that is imporssible in any universe...)


It's well known that 2+2=5...for very large values of 2.

Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark  wrote:

>
> There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
> an animal actually exists.
>

Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which case
they exist somewhere.


> > Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere formalism,
>> but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being more than
>> abstract relationships between numbers.
>>
>
> What else could maths be, apart from abstract relationships between
numbers?

(Maybe that word "abstract" causes problems? It's possible (if comp is
correct) that "abstract" relations are more real than real ones.)

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark  wrote:

> Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it
> must be logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie,
> but young children can conceive that 2+2 = 5.
>
> And that objects cease to exist when hidden. There comes a point where
children learn about the "continuity of things" as it were. (Interesting
that you should choose that example of something that is imporssible in any
universe...)

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-20 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Pierz  wrote:

> In "The Conscious Mind", Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
> failed to provide an explanation for consciousness
>

It's not just materialism, a philosopher like Chambers would not be
satisfied with any explanation of the form "X causes consciousness", not if
X is atoms or information, and not even if X is God or the soul; in fact
nobody seems to know what Chalmers means by "explanation".  And Chambers
doesn't know either.

> on a distinction between 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where
> logical supervenience simply means that if A supervenes on B, then B
> logically and necessarily entails A
>

The spring equinox always comes before the tax filing deadline of April 15
in the USA, but that does not necessarily mean that the equinox causes the
tax.

> we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie
>

And I have no reason to think that you are not a intelligent zombie, except
that Evolution had no way to produce such a being.  Chambers believes that
if philosophers can conceive of something then it must be logically
possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie, but young children
can conceive that 2+2 = 5.

> then it seems that consciousness cannot *logically* supervene on the
> physical.
>

There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
an animal actually exists. However intelligence and consciousness would
need to be unrelated for a smart zombie to exist, but if that were the case
then Evolution could never have produced a conscious being and yet I know
for a fact that it did as least once. Therefore unlike fire breathing
dragons philosophical zombies are not only nonexistent but are also
logically contradictory.

> There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails or even
> *suggests* the arising of subjective experiences in any system,
> biological or otherwise.
>

You know for a fact that when the biological activity of your brain changes
with drugs or surgery or electrical stimulation your subjective experience
changes. You know for a fact that when your subjective experience changes
the purely materialistic chemistry of your brain also changes. And you
believe these 2 facts don't even suggest that materialism just might have
something to do with consciousness?  This is the sort of thing that gives
philosophy a bad name.

> Gödel's theorem might show that mathematics is more than mere formalism,
> but it does not allow us to make the leap to mathematics being more than
> abstract relationships between numbers.
>

Well if you don't like materialism and you don't like abstractions
either then what do you like? What's left?

  John K Clark

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"


On 8/20/2014 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and 
have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some 
"phase transition" between different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a 
physical reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?


I think I answered this yesterday. I expressed myself badly here. We cannot get the 
"real" physical reality without observers, as it is define by the 1p FPI measure, which 
requires observers (universal numbers), but we can have, in UD*, digital approximations 
of such physical realities, and some can be devoid of any observers.


So you think the observers are needed in order to define measures and recover the Born 
rule?  But what constitutes an observer?  Won't you need a measure on observers?  This 
seems to be the many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics.






Are you saying there must have been observers in the early universe, even before the 
recombination?


No.



  Must there be observers observing the interior of stars for them to be "physically 
real"?


No. Not even in the real physical reality. It is enough we share enough (deep) 
computations with the stars.





What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


It means it emerges from the first person indeterminacy, in the UDA way.


??

Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"


On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:



On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:

On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
> Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes 
to the
doctor.
> It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on 
someone else
first.
> If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll go under 
the
knife - and
> have to swallow the logical consequences whole! Your reply helps. I 
suppose what
I feel
> is missing from the account is the *necessity* of qualia, because it 
seems to me
that
> everything that exists, necessarily exists, and as it stands in the comp
account, the
> necessity for there to be an interior to mathematics remains mysterious. 
My
guess is
> that comp is wrong, but it may be that it is still a whole lot more right 
than
> materialism. It may be wrong in the same way that general relativity and 
QM are
"wrong",
> i.e., correct, but to some limit. My next step is to read the Amoeba's 
Secret
and see if
> I can start to wrap my head around the S4Grz and the []p & p - the maths 
is still
> largely a mystery to me.
>
> However I wanted to put some less argumentative and more curious 
questions to
you about
> the way you imagine the comp-driven universe to be (yes, there's no 
universe, I
know,
> but I lack words: this apparent "space" we inhabit?). The question comes 
up in
the comp
> account about the physical explanation for the origin of the Löbian 
organism the
> self-consistency of whose mind creates the appearance of matter 
(allegedly). Liz
and
> Brent were throwing around this "if a tree falls in the forest" question 
on the MGA
> thread. The account whereby the observer arises out of the long, deep 
history of
matter
> sure looks convincing. What is the status of this alternative origin 
story if the
> observer is actually grounded in Platonia? I seem to recall you talking 
about
the idea
> that the observer's self consistency demands that it also find a 
consistent
account of
> itself in the "material hypostases". OK, I can go with that, but 
something here
still
> troubles me. We can't surely dismiss these origins as fictive any more 
than we can
> dismiss the other observers we find in our environment as fictive. How do 
you
see the
> relationship between these accounts (the exterior physical and the machine
> psychological)? It occurs to me that in some ways the anthropic 
explanation of
the fluky
> coincidences of the laws of nature resembles the machine psychology 
account - in
that
> the requirements of existing as a complex self-aware machine in a sense 
"cause"
the laws
> of the universe to be what they are. The need for logical consistency 
constrains
the
> environment and its laws in very specific, complex ways. It's almost 
strange
that it's
> taken us so long to realize just how extraordinary it is that the "laws" 
work,
that they
> are capable of creating the complexity and beauty we see.

Check out the book "The Comprehensible Cosmos" by my friend Vic Stenger.  
It goes
*part*
way in explaining this.

I'm not sure how much more explanation it requires. The anthropic principle plus 
multiverse will do it, won't it?


Stenger's approach to physics is that it is based on point-of-view-invariance, i.e. we 
want physical laws to hold for everyone in every time and place and direction and state 
of motion, and...whatever else we can include.  It's sort of what we mean by "physical 
law" in contrast to geographical or historical accident.  He shows that we can get a 
suprising amount out of this (at least surprising if you don't already know who Emma 
Noether was).


... or if you don't know the consequence of comp, where physics is
  1) invaruant for all universal machine


But within comp that's just a definition of "physics".  It doesn't tell you what the 
invariants are.  Noether's theorem relates symmetry in a Lagrangian to a conserved quantity.



  2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a universal machine


I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE".  Who is doing the choosing? Under comp 
we've already assumed a universal dovetailer.




Emmy Noether stiil needs a notion of space, or direction, and  time ..., or some 
physical universe; but she makes indeed already a good deal in the derivation of 
physical

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 20 Aug 2014, at 07:08, Kim Jones wrote:





On 18 Aug 2014, at 5:33 am, meekerdb  wrote:

Is there a kind of soul that is independent of memory but is a  
"person"?


Well, you'd want to hope so by now, surely. After all, if there  
isn't, then "What's It All (been) About, Alfie?"


No cul-de-sacs. Consciousness sails on via FPI. You cannot  
experience a no-world world, so there is (apparently) no rest "rest  
eternal" for the wicked or the poor by ducking into a "death world"  
where you cease to exist.


Existence for consciousness is mandatory; obviously. Consciousness  
then mandates "unconsciousness" or the dreamworld repository of all  
those things about our archetypal self we cannot experience at will  
but are subjected to via dreams, premonitions, intuitions, hunches,  
wisdom of all sorts.


The amnesiac no-memory-between-instantiations thing might be  
explained by the fact that every possible instantiation of you is up  
and running right now and there are now very many histories smeared  
across the MV. Which memories would you default to following death  
in one universe? Why don't I possess a memory spanning from Gronk  
the Caveman all the way through lives scattered over 200 or so  
thousand years of homo sapiens to me here right now? Must have  
something to do with that god damned first person thing again. Bruno  
should get the Nobel Prize for discovering FPI.


Thanks. I would appreciate :)

Yet Obama signed the NDAA-12, after getting the Peace Nobel prize, so  
well, ...  And, in Paris and Brussels they can even make prize  
disappearing.


Well, as long as they don't made the number 17 disappearing ...


But a person is a very stable thing. Quantum Immortality: "a  
conscious entity cannot cease to exist". That's a good basic  
definition of a "person". Perhaps. A stable information pattern that  
persists and is self-conscious.


OK.




Could live happily on a hard disk somewhere.



I would not say that he can live on a hard disk, it needs the relation  
with the universal numbers, below and above the substitution level. It  
actually has those relations, but if you want it sharing them with  
you, you need to find a universal number already stable in your  
(probable) environments to "implement" it. We use computers today, and  
nature used brains, and genomes before.


Bruno




Kim

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 20 Aug 2014, at 02:53, David Nyman wrote:


On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer,  
a reversal between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have  
a big 3p reality: the  arithmetical reality which contains computer  
science and the machine's dream-support (the relevant computations).  
So the reversal is made possible and sensical, because it is  
supported by the arithmetical relations driving the "consciousness  
fluxes" in the relatively most probable continuations.


Yes, I understand. I hope I've shaken off my former "1p absolutism"  
in the course of familiarising myself with your ideas. That said, I  
suspect that there is often an illegitimate sleight of the  
imagination in play in discussions of the 3p reality. ISTM that  
there is often (though not in your case, I hasten to add) the  
implicit assumption of a kind of default or meta- knower that goes  
on interpreting "what's really there" in the absence of any other  
observer.


Oh, I can indulge myself in that sort of activity. I do it when I say  
that God knows if the number 8975400769223777011109090567488 is  
prime or not, despite no one among us know that. That is, when I  
intepret Plotinus Outer God, the One, by the arithmetical truth, I can  
use the expression God knows p, for the mathematical (and non  
arithmetical, but set theoretical )) statement according to which the  
structure (N, +, *) satisfies p.


But the question "can (N,+,*) be a person?" is, well, open to be made  
precise. If it is, it cannot be Löbian.






So in that light it just seems "obvious", for example, that the moon  
exists primarily as a brute 3p fact and any subsequent observation  
of it is merely some contingent secondary relation.


I think it is "obvious" because it is based on billions of years of  
"nature's brainwashing", with a short relief from 500 BC to 500 AC,  
during which science appears and disappears.



It's almost as if we're overcompensating for the infantile belief  
that objects disappear when they can't be seen.


Some kids believes that when they close their eyes, they become  
invisible. At least they can laugh a lot when they made adults  
behaving like the kid would have disappeared.





In comp terms, however, it is clear that the moon can be no such  
brute fact, but rather the resultant of a complex potential for the  
lawlike appearance of a moon under suitable observational constraints.


Yes. Of course, "the moon exist" FAPP, and we don't need comp to send  
robots and people on Mars. But for question like "where do we come  
from?, what can be hoped and/or feared OK?, etc." the bigger the  
consistent pictures we can get, the more we can understand how much we  
are ignorant on this.






In this vein I offer the well-known limerick of Ronald Knox:

There was a young man who said "God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the quad."

Reply:
"Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd;
I am always about in the quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by, Yours faithfully, God."


OK. And note that this makes sense with the classical Newtonian  
physics, but no more for comp, nor quantum mechanics. Even God can't  
describe a classical boolean structure of the observable, and the  
observable is an epistemological or doxastical notion, but God can see  
the outer possible boolean structure from which those epistemologies  
develop. With comp God needs only to know arithmetic, and to recognize  
itself, or not, in the infinite cloudy space of the person's  
experiences.


Bruno





David

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

2014-08-20 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno,

Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many World
Theories?
Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical came
from life.
I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe would
still evolve
but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.

The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for that
reason.
Richard


On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:
>
> On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
> survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
> we might live some "phase transition" between different physical realms.
> Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
> at all.
>
>
> Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
> universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
> the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?  What does
> "physically real" mean in your theory?
>
> Brent
> --
> Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where theory
> is god.
>
>
> Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of most
> scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it is a theology.
>
> Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).
>
>
>
>
> It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a
> "know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
> BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is *anything* that
> observes - i.e. notices *anything* at all.
>
>
> It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a universal
> number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and with Everett QM, we
> can extend the notion of observer greatly. No problem.
>
>
>
> No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,
>
>
> No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But the
> existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context rich enough
> to postulate computationalism.
>
>
>
> the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for themselves.
>
>
> Why?
>
>
>
> No arithmetix either!
>
>
> Then you are not agnostic on the computationalist hypothesis. By some
> miracle, a bit like Craig, you seem to believe that you know that comp is
> false. I am agnostic, and will be, as long as comp is not refuted.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> John M
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
>> survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
>> we might live some "phase transition" between different physical realms.
>> Obviously, we cannot get a physical reality in which there is no observers
>> at all.
>>
>>
>> Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early
>> universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers observing
>> the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?  What does
>> "physically real" mean in your theory?
>>
>> Brent
>>
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:



Ah no, I'm not mistaking the map for the territory. I don't know  
why you say that.  I'm saying the territory is infinite in all  
directions (according to my guess), but our maps are finite and so  
have to have false boundaries drawn around them.


I said that because it is our maps that are infinite.  If you take  
the natural numbers and arithmetic as the ontology of your TOE,  
you've assumed an infinite map.


I disagree. The natural numbers will give the ontology, and it is an  
infinite realm, even infinitely complex, and not unifiable by any  
effective theory. But the map are the effective theories, not the  
realm that they attempt to describe. Map, theories, needs to be  
finite, or at least axiomatizable (= recursively enumerable, by a  
theorem of Craig).






There is no observable infinity, it's an abstraction we've  
invented.  It might be right or it might not.  The very title of  
this list implies it consists of people whose preferred map is  
"everything".  So it is not modest agnosticism to suppose the  
territory is infinite - that not something known.


The comp is eminently finite: it is Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz), and  
nothing more except some identity axioms.


Bruno







Brent

That allows  them to be accurate to some approximation, but I am  
hypothesizing we'll never close the loop completely.


Brent
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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which  
you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early  
universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers  
observing the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?   
What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


Brent
--
Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where  
theory is god.


Hmm Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of most  
scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it is a  
theology.


Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).




It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a  
"know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is anything that  
observes - i.e. notices anything at all.


It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a  
universal number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and with  
Everett QM, we can extend the notion of observer greatly. No problem.





No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,


No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But the  
existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context rich  
enough to postulate computationalism.




the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for  
themselves.


Why?




No arithmetix either!


Then you are not agnostic on the computationalist hypothesis. By some  
miracle, a bit like Craig, you seem to believe that you know that comp  
is false. I am agnostic, and will be, as long as comp is not refuted.


Bruno





John M



On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which  
you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?  Are you saying there must have been observers in the early  
universe, even before the recombination?  Must there be observers  
observing the interior of stars for them to be "physically real"?   
What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"



On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which  
you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some  
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between  
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical  
reality in which there is no observers at all.


Why not?


I think I answered this yesterday. I expressed myself badly here. We  
cannot get the "real" physical reality without observers, as it is  
define by the 1p FPI measure, which requires observers (universal  
numbers), but we can have, in UD*, digital approximations of such  
physical realities, and some can be devoid of any observers.




Are you saying there must have been observers in the early universe,  
even before the recombination?


No.



  Must there be observers observing the interior of stars for them  
to be "physically real"?


No. Not even in the real physical reality. It is enough we share  
enough (deep) computations with the stars.





What does "physically real" mean in your theory?


It means it emerges from the first person indeterminacy, in the UDA way.

Bruno






Brent

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Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"