On 9 September 2015 at 13:40, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 9/09/2015 1:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellet
On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 9 September 20
On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
>
>
> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 8 Septem
On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellet
On 9 September 2015 at 02:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 9/8/2015 5:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-09-08 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :
>
>> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruc
On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 8 September
On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> I will ask you the same question as I
On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude from the
> fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or tails that the
> world does not
On 8 September 2015 at 16:50, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 8/09/2015 3:59 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 8 September 2015 at 08:52, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 8/09/2015 8:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker wr
On 8 September 2015 at 08:52, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 8/09/2015 8:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker <
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>&g
On 8 September 2015 at 09:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 9/7/2015 3:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker <
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioan
On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 7, 2015, Brent Meeker <
> meeke...@verizon.net
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/6/2015 7:20 PM, Jason Resch wr
distribution to approximate
> in repeated trials.
>
It's the same kind of randomness that emerges from multiverse theories. You
presumably estimate probabilities in everyday life, and generally it serves
you well. Do you conclude from this that multiverse theories are wrong, and
there
elf in either Monday or Tuesday when
you wake up. Someone else might answer that there is not really a "you" any
more as there are two branches, so the question is meaningless.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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"Ev
On Tuesday, September 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 31 Aug 2015, at 14:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, August 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Aug 3
at, then we know something else is required.
>>
>
>
> I can imagine that the rat will have a "normal behavior", but as he cannot
> talk to us, we might fail to appreciate some internal change or even some
> anosognosia. The rat would not be a zombie rat, but still be in a qui
On Thursday, August 27, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
>
>
>
> Forwarded Message Subject: Re: If the universe is
> computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options? Date:
> Wed, 26 Aug 2015 17:32:37 +1000 From: Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Rep
uot;Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.
On 14 August 2015 at 12:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
> >
> > On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > >>
On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
> >>
>>> if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and
>>> only one city did you end up seeing?" has n
ime point
they might not be the "same" persisting individual, since they could as
easily be linked by false memories. Nevertheless, the illusion of
continuity is both valid and important. It is both valid and important that
each observer believes he will see one and only one city, even tho
nes - they are in the eye of the beholder.
However, that is not an argument against the independent reality of
mathematical structures.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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ally through the body that personhood is demonstrated to other people.
> I expect that strangers I pass in the street will accord me the status of
> personhood, even though I have not demonstrated to them that I can pass a
> Turing test.
The person in a coma is worth preserving because
rse he will end up in, so non-computable randomness
returns, despite the overall determinism.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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On 26 June 2015 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Friday, June 26, 2015, meekerdb > meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/25/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> ISTM
On Friday, June 26, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
> On 6/25/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> ISTM there's an equivocation here between a continuation in consciousness
>> and continuation in body. If we say "the person" is just a continuum of
>> co
On Wednesday, June 24, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
> On 6/22/2015 11:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb > wrote:
>
>> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05
On 24 June 2015 at 02:00, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where
>> unfettered computationalism leads.
>
>
> People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in
On 23 June 2015 at 16:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb > meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meek
On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb wrote:
> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meeker
On 23 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb >> meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stath
On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb wrote:
> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kel
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The "closest continue
of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather
> elusive sort.
>
It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may
not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism
leads.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You receive
On Monday, June 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett > <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> The "
On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both
>> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong
>> in your vie
On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett > John Clark wrote:
>>
>> After they diverge they will still both identify with the same
>> person, John Clark, HOWEVER
thinking that he was, just a bit
taller and a bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy would be a
continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy was in a coma when
created, the 1% copy would be the continuer until
On Thursday, June 18, 2015, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
>
>> >>> "You" are the person reading this sentence
>>>
>>>
>>> >> OK, but then it would be meaningless to talk about
On Wednesday, June 17, 2015, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
> >> We're talking about multiple (probably infinite) copying and branching,
>> so who the hell is "you"?
>>
>
> > "You" are
On Wednesday, June 17, 2015, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
> > The many worlds as an ensemble are determinate, but which world you will
>> end up in is not.
>>
>
> Forget "you", which world A
e many worlds as an ensemble are determinate, but which world you will
end up in is not. This is because you feel that you end up in only one
world even though copies of you end up in multiple worlds. Subjectively
(from the 1p perspective) you end up in one world, while objectively (from
the 3p perspec
gt;
OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find
yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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change is physicalism in metaphysics. It
>> becomes testable, and false if comp is true.
>>
>
> But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong
> AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a
> computer does not entail tha
On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR > wrote:
> On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know
>> that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be
>> conscious.
le hypothesis. How
> does materialism explain consciousness? How does comp explain the
> appearance of a material universe?
>
> Over to you.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe fr
> On 3 Jun 2015, at 3:47 am, Samiya Illias wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 02-Jun-2015, at 10:23 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On 02 Jun 2015, at 04:18, Samiya Illias wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 10:05 PM, Samiya Illias
wrote:
> On 30-May-2015, at 6:38
On Monday, June 1, 2015, Samiya Illias wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 5:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
>> On 1 June 2015 at 06:37, John Mikes > > wrote:
>> > LizR:
>> > I find it "funny" if so many thinking minds on this list (
p etc.
> JM
I think Samiya would say that if God thinks beheadings, floggings and
stonings are good, then they are good, by definition.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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If a human tortures
someone for fun, that's bad, but if God does it, that's fine.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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On Saturday, May 30, 2015, Samiya Illias wrote:
>
>
> On 29-May-2015, at 5:41 pm, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 30, 2015, Samiya Illias > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 29, 2015 at 7:33 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>>
tps://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@google
On 29 May 2015 at 00:09, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:55 PM, Russell Standish
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >
>> > A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such
On 28 May 2015 at 13:55, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such as the inability
>> to move a limb, understand language or see. These are gross examples
On Thursday, May 28, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:22:59PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > But that is not what happens when brain tissue is destroyed, as in a
> > stroke. Qualia do actually fade, and entire sensory and
> >
On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Russell Standish > wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial
>
subscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more optio
On Monday, May 25, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/24/2015 4:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 25 May 2015 at 07:51, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 5/24/2015 11:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> In a virtual environment, destroying the b
On Monday, May 25, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 07:19:46PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 24 May 2015, at 10:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >I can't really see an alternative other than Russel'
On 25 May 2015 at 07:51, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/24/2015 11:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > In a virtual environment, destroying the body destroys the consciousness,
> > but both are actually due to the underlying computations.
>
>
> How can those thumped kn
On Monday, May 25, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 24 May 2015, at 10:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 23, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 22 May 2015, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri
ct person" won't think
> either. So far as we have observered *only* bodies think. If comp implies
> the contrary isn't that so much the worse for comp.
>
In a virtual environment, destroying the body destroys the consciousness,
but both are actually due to the underlyi
On Saturday, May 23, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 22 May 2015, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 22, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 21 May 2015, at 01:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On We
On Friday, May 22, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>
> On 21 May 2015, at 01:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 20, 2015, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Partial zombies are absurd because they make the concept of consciousness
> meaningless.
>
>
&
ould
involve a change in behaviour from the normal brain, as well as a
change in qualia. You would be driving with no awareness of driving,
and when asked about it you would say you were aware of driving, but
you would be either delusional or lying.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this mes
in order to show that there is a difference
between the two.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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On Wednesday, May 20, 2015, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:54 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
>> On 19 May 2015 at 11:05, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 10:05 AM, St
On Tuesday, 19 May 2015, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>>
> >> Not necessarily, just as an actor may not be conscious in the same way
>> >> as me. But I suspect the Blockhead would be conscious; the intuitio
On 19 May 2015 at 15:42, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List
wrote:
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou
> Sent: Monday, May 18, 2015 10
On 19 May 2015 at 11:05, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wr
On 19 May 2015 at 14:45, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>>
>> On 19 May 2015 at 11:02, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> > I think you're not taking into account the level of the functional
>>
way
as me. But I suspect the Blockhead would be conscious; the intuition
that a lookup table can't be conscious is like the intuition that an
electric circuit can't be conscious.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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"
reliance on logical, in
> which contradictions are "impossible"; but in fact contradictions are
> properties of language and what we have thought "impossible" in the past
> based on language, we've found to be the case in fact and had to adjust our
> language
nce in kind, not degree, between the impossible and the
highly improbable. In ordinary life we can take them as equivalent, and do
so multiple times a day without thinking about it, but not in philosophical
discussions such as these.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are sub
On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 May 2015, at 17:05, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
&g
On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch > wrote:
>
> Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html>
> sho
On 18 May 2015 at 16:04, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 12:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> Chalmer's fading quailia argument s
On Saturday, May 16, 2015, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/15/2015 10:10 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch > wrote:
>
> Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html>
> shows
> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Chalmer's fading quailia argument shows that if replacing a biological neuron
> with a functionally equivalent silicon neuron changed conscious perception,
> then it would lead to an absurdity, either:
> 1. quaila fade/change as silicon
's
> view that consciousness is just produced by some subset of neurons that only
> accesses "memory" (other neurons?).
It's all that you said, but ultimately behaviour is due to motor
neurons sending signals to muscles, and all the other associated
machinery sets the tim
.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
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> em
they did it because that's the
way their brain is it's not their fault, and if they did it due to
irreducible randomness it's not their fault. However, punishment and
reward can be used to guide behaviour in desirable directions, whether
it is driven by determinism or randomness.
--
that would have been present if the artificial
neurons had not been installed.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On 13 May 2015 at 13:36, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/12/2015 7:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 13 May 2015 at 12:25, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> meekerdb wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/12/2015 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
&
it is conventionally taken as evidence that your
>>> theory has been falsified. The MGA puts Bruno's theory in this category: it
>>> has been falsified by the experimental results.
>>>
>>
>> Would that it were so. But so far as I can see Bruno's theor
ains lead to consciousness. The fading qualia thought
experiment suggests that reproducing brain behaviour will also
reproduce consciousness. It doesn't matter how the brain behaviour is
reproduced: whether by a computer, a RNG, a recording, or God the
argument still goes through.
--
Stathis Papaioann
momentarily until
the RNG starts producing noise. If anything, this example is an
indication that handling the counterfactuals is not necessary for
consciousness.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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On 13 May 2015 at 09:16, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/12/2015 12:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2015, at 10:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 10:23:31AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The final straw would have to be indivisi
> On 12 May 2015, at 10:40 am, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> On 12 May 2015, at 8:25 am, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>> It won't be a specific electron that will switch consciousness off
>>> regardless of the
> On 12 May 2015, at 10:37 am, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 10:23:31AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> The final straw would have to be indivisible, otherwise you could make a
>> partial zombie by replacing half the straw.
&g
> On 12 May 2015, at 8:25 am, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:51:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> On Monday, May 11, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, May 10, 2015 at 06:33:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrot
usness survives brain tissue
replacement until a certain electron in a certain atom changes orbital, at
which point consciousness instantly vanishes but behaviour remains
unchanged, resulting in a full zombie.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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a human with a physical brain? If it implements
> (physically) the right computations should it not be conscious? Is there
> some contention that a physical computation is not the same as some more
> fundamental arithmetical compuatation or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show
> some flaw
On 11 May 2015 at 04:41, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/10/2015 3:58 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10 May 2015 at 08:59, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> In fact physical systems are not capable of computation at all,
>> without an observer to provide symbolic
On 9 May 2015 at 19:39, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 05:12:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> This reminds me of Putnam's "a rock implements every finite state
>> machine" argument. According to some one time pad the rock implem
t on a physical implementation of computation. If this is granted,
there is no reductio ad absurdum (assuming you do think the conclusions are
absurd) with either Putnam's argument or Maudlin's argument.
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Stathis Papaioannou
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On Saturday, May 9, 2015, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote:
> > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish > wrote:
> &g
s is obviously useless as a computer, and no
more interesting than saying that a block of marble contains every
possible statue. But consider the case where the computation
implemented is a self-contained virtual environment or an entity
dreaming without inputs or outputs. This cannot be dismissed
he intuition that it
cannot possibly be so.
> The MGA will fail in exactly the same way, in the same
> circumstance. However, Bruno is quite clear that he doesn't rely on
> astronomically improbably event ocurring, so this is simply a side
> issue that needs pinching off.
The UD
On 8 May 2015 at 10:14, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:14:42AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there
>> was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first t
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