Re: John Searle on consciousness

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, July 27, 2014 5:55:33 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 28 July 2014 04:51, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 4:40 AM, LizR > 
>> wrote:
>>
>> https://www.ted.com/talks/john_searle_our_shared_condition_consciousness
>>>
>>  
>> As the inventor of the Chinese Room, the single stupidest thought 
>> exparament in the history of the world, I don't understand how anyone can 
>> still take anything this clown says seriously.
>>
>
> I think he falls into the same camp as Fred Hoyle - someone who manages to 
> get something completely wrong (in Hoyle's case one of the biggest things 
> imaginable) but in a way that still stimulates a lot of very useful 
> thought.  (I have a copy of Nigel Calder's "Violent Universe" somewhere and 
> I think one of the chapters is called "Prove Fredf Wrong")
>
> As mentioned, his Chinese Room is thoroughly demolished by Dennett and 
> Hofstadter,
>

No, Dennett and Hofdtadter are wrong. Searle is wrong on a lot of things, 
but the Chinese Room is not one of them. The systems reply is just another 
way to bring Santa Claus in to plug the chasm between the idea of 
information and reality of actual experience.

 

> but then one has to bear in mind that they are working from an 
> eliminativist perspective (there is a TED talk by Dennett on the same web 
> page as Searle called "The illusion of consciousness" :-) so *perhaps* 
> they didn't actually do such a good job - not everyone here agrees with the 
> eliminativist approach, after all. Basically their response (iirc) was the 
> "systems response" - the entire system of room plus lookup table, or 
> whatever it is, understands Chinese, even though the person in the room 
> doesn't.
>
> Actually the Chinese room reminds me of the MGA. The CR seeks to show that 
> you can't have consciousness arising from the manipulation of symbols, 
> because consciousness has to be "about something" (as Brent often points 
> out) and whatever a computer does is "just" the movement of electrons 
> around circuits, "syntax without semantics". The MGA seems to show (I 
> think) that you don't even need the electrons, that manipulating matter 
> generally can't be "about something". Unless I got that wrong.
>
> (Bu with luck wrong enough to stimulate some intelligent responses... :-)
>
>

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Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, July 25, 2014 9:15:10 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Jul 2014, at 04:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
> >> PGC, 
> >> 
> >> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he   
> >> is saying. 
> >> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p   
> >> correct. 
> >> 
> >> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p.   
> >> When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be   
> >> correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can   
> >> learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't believe   
> >> comp is correct in some sense. 
> > 
> > Your sum up is misleading. 
> > 
> > I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to   
> > argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding   
> > that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be   
> > refutable, and I give a test. 
> > 
> > No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. 
> > 
> > What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty   
> > of Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct. 
>
> It is a bet. An assumption. They can understand its meaning, but they   
> can justify its truth. So you are right or wrong according to the   
> sense you give to "understand". 
>

Then it's a bet that comp is false also. I can understand why it's meaning 
is incomplete and its truth can only be trivial rather than profound. It's 
a bet that knowledge can exist also. All knowledge can be a bet.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > But we can assume it, and deduce from there. 
> > 
> > People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they   
> > think that they understand that mechanisms in the brain create   
> > consciousness, and that consciousness is a mathematical model within   
> > a program. 
>
> Nobody can understand how a mechanism can get conscious. We can only   
> hope that a sufficiently precise description of oneself ([]p) will   
> preserves the soul ([]p & p), that is, that the substitution will   
> preserve the relation with truth. 
>

I can understand the opposite though. Consciousness can appear mechanical 
from a distance if consciousness is primary. There can't be any 
substitution, but the relation is preserved automatically.


>
>
> > 
> > Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. 
> > 
> > Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the   
> > definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, 
> > 
> > Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we   
> > accept is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or   
> > []p & p. 
>
> Yes. It works for the goal of solving the comp mind-body problem, but   
> of course, it does not work for the mundane beliefs and possible   
> knowledge (which belongs to another topic). 
>

Is the comp mind-body problem one which doesn't include the hard problem?
 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the   
> > idea case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical   
> > consequence that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the   
> > machine itself, and the machine can know that, both from inside 1p   
> > experience, and from reasoning in the comp assumption. 
> > 
> > But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. 
>
> If you read the literature, this is the object of a very long debate,   
> which might begin with Xenophane (about 6th century before JC) up to   
> today. It is here that comp provides a quite interesting new light, as   
> it shows that both the modern (who accept Theaetetus) and the ancients   
> (who want knowledge being non propositional and non natural) get   
> reconciliate: 
>
> Like the modern, we can define, for ideally correct machine, knowledge   
> by the theaetetus method applied to Gödel provability predicate, and   
> this, unlike the moderns believe, lead to a non propositional and non   
> natural notion of knower. 
>
>
>
>
> > They think that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of   
> > neuron ensemble Y. 
>
> Th

Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 2:36:24 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>
>> PGC,
>>
>> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is 
>> saying.
>> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct.
>>
>
> Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask 
> him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to 
> vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and 
> saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense.
>
>
> Your sum up is misleading.
>
> I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to argue 
> for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding that this is 
> vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be refutable, and I give a 
> test. 
>
> No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct.
>

What do you mean by understand comp to be correct? There are plenty of 
Strong AI people who think that they understand comp to be correct.
 

> But we can assume it, and deduce from there.
>

People don't think that they are assuming it for no reason, they think that 
they understand that mechanisms in the brain create consciousness, and that 
consciousness is a mathematical model within a program.
 

> Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute comp. 
>
> Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the definition 
> of Theaetetus of knowledge,
>

Which I don't, but ok, I think that what you are proposing that we accept 
is that knowledge is something like justified true belief, or []p & p.

 

> with believability modelize by provability (which makes sense in the idea 
> case needed for the mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence 
> that the 1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and 
> the machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from 
> reasoning in the comp assumption.
>

But people do think that their 1p can be defined by 3p terms. They think 
that when they experience X, it is merely the firing of neuron ensemble Y. 
In their understanding, X is merely a label that represents Y. Daniel 
Dennett certainly has no problem 'understanding' that his 1p is nothing but 
3p.

This is where I see, if I'm being generous, some inconsistency in the 
assertion that "1p cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine 
itself,", or if less generous I would say there is deep hypocrisy or 
self-deception in holding the contradictory positions that 1) Bruno 
understands that 1p can ultimately be defined in 3p terms, 2) Machines 
cannot do 1, and 3) Bruno could be a machine. It is even more suspect since 
your refuting of my position hinges on 1 and 2 both being true, when it is 
clear to me that any compromise of 1 and 2 weaken 2 so that it has no 
meaning.
 

>
>
>
> The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a 
> great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then 
> it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a 
> universe of arithmetic truths. 
>
>
> Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p objects, 
> but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share some definition 
> with them and agree on that point. The soul of any machine, is not a 
> machine.
>

This too is a sleight of hand. If the soul of a machine is produced by the 
machine, then how can you say that the soul is not a machine? To me, it 
makes mores sense to say that machines are alienated, reduced, 
destructively compressed representations of soul-like phenomena. There is 
no cause for a machine to represent its interior as anything fundamentally 
different than its exterior, all that the math indicates as far as I can 
tell is that some of the qualities which we expect to see in arithmetic are 
hidden. Arithmetic can only suggest a private exterior as an interior, not 
a true aesthetic presence such as the flavor of a carrot. The simpler, and 
more wondrous explanation is that it is the flavor of the carrot which is 
irreducible and direct, while the mechanistic extraction is a generic, 
skeletal ingredient. The machine is part of the soul...the part in which 
souls reflect each other as a neutral coordinate system and constrain their 
appearance through a spatiotemporal or form-functional 
entropy/normalization.



>
>
> Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect created the 
> world, but that is not the world that we actually live in, and no computer 
> program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger, 

Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 23, 2014 4:16:07 AM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
> > On 23 Jul 2014, at 4:33 am, Craig Weinberg  > wrote: 
> > 
> > To be unconscious is not merely to lose the faculties which make our 
> quality of life human, but to lose all faculties. 
>
> Perhaps, but I doubt that you lose your 'self'. A self is immortal. Just 
> like you wake up from the anaesthetic after the surgery. Where your 'self' 
> was during, is an open question (downing tequila sunrises in the bar at 
> Platonia Central???) 
>

I agree, but I think that just means that the self is a deeper, 
transpersonal level of consciousness.
 

>
> Similarly, is the person who is undergoing transportation-with-delay 
> unconscious? 


I don't think that there will be teleportation with delay. Reconstructing a 
body won't even survive as an organism much less a person.


Craig
 

> It is merely said that 'they' (presumably this means their 'self' - 
> whatever that is, which is what I am asking) is 'stored'. While their self 
> is being stored somewhere it doesn't matter if we think of 'them' as 
> unconscious because they will disagree with you from their 1p report on 
> their experience where they will experience no discontinuity of self 
> whatsoever. So the self cannot be a secretion of the mind. You can knock a 
> mind right out and still get a self back when you take all the tubes out 
> after an extraordinary amount of time. 
>
> Schumacher is still Schumacher. Alive and well, in a coma, as a vegetable 
> or dead. A person. 
>
> Kim

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Re: It Knows That It Knows

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, July 19, 2014 11:26:13 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote:
>
> A good thinking habit to cultivate is simplicity. Try and make it as 
> simple as you can.
>
> Consciousness comes in two flavours (that I know of):
>
> 1. I know
>
> 2. I know that I know. (Presumably something to do with remembering that 
> you knew.)
>
> Are there any others?
>

I don't think that consciousness has anything to do with knowing, or nested 
knowing, or self awareness. Consciousness is about one thing: Direct 
perceptual participation. If there is a feeling of warmth or pain - there 
is no knowledge that is required, no self-modeling...only the raw 
appreciation of an aesthetic quality. Most of us are conflate the 
particulars of human consciousness, which is an almost perversely elaborate 
evolution of consciousness, and the fundamental nature of awareness itself. 
In human consciousness, we have layers upon layers of sensation, feeling, 
thought, and intuition which refer to each other coextensively and 
dynamically.

*We* have an intellectual scope of sensitivity within our consciousness 
which can analyze and propose concepts and distinctions. That is the level 
of symbolic manipulation, language, mathematics, etc, but that is not the 
level which allows us to see the sun or pick up a stone. To be unconscious 
is not merely to lose the faculties which make our quality of life human, 
but to lose all faculties. It is only the the human intellect which 
imagines that its native level of mechanical equivalences are synonymous 
with awareness itself.  

Craig

 

>
> Am I correct in assuming the comp substitution level is where 
> consciousness reaches 2? In fact you have to be at 2 to even be able to say 
> you are at 1.
>
> This second level of experience appears to be what defines self-aware 
> consciousness. It is the 'I' who knows, (supposedly) consistently the same 
> as the 'I' that "I" know and vice versa. 
>
> Consciousness is therefore more than the contents of consciousness. Where 
> does this magical ability of matter to organise its own self-organising 
> information system come from? How does the machine construct its own 
> operating system?
>
>
>
> Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL
>
> Email:   kimj...@ozemail.com.au 
>  kmjc...@icloud.com 
> Mobile: 0450 963 719
> Phone:  02 93894239
> Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com
>
>
> *"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain*
>
>  
>

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Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> PGC,
>
> I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he is 
> saying.
> My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p correct.
>

Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p. When I ask 
him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be correct, he seems to 
vacillate between saying that machines can learn to be more correct and 
saying that he himself doesn't believe comp is correct in some sense.

The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false. It's a 
great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and dizzy and sweet then 
it would make perfect sense, however those experiences have no place in a 
universe of arithmetic truths. Comp tells us about a world of the intellect 
if the intellect created the world, but that is not the world that we 
actually live in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a 
finger, tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc.

Craig
 

>
>
> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy <
> multipl...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>>
 Craig,

 You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true. I 
 don't do that, ever. 
 But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am waiting 
 for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument, which mainly 
 assert 
 that it is obvious, but this is true already for the machine's first 
 person 
 point of view, and so cannot work as a valid refutation of comp.

 Bruno



>>> Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV? I 
>>> find your paragraph rather confusing.
>>>  Richard
>>>
>>
>> Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in "comp is 
>> wrong/bad to believe for machine". 
>>
>> For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp entails 
>> set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be consistent for such 
>> machine to assert things like: "What me? A mere machine? No way, I'm much 
>> more high level/smarter/complex than that. Therefore comp must be false." - 
>> Which ISTM is what Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even 
>> much further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in some 
>> 3p verifiable way.
>>
>> Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC
>>  
>>  
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>
>

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Re: Chalmers and Consciousness

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, July 20, 2014 9:58:46 AM UTC-4, David Nyman wrote:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=uhRhtFFhNzQ
>
> This is a TED video of David Chalmers on the Hard Problem. His basic ideas 
> will be pretty well known to most of us on this list although 
> interestingly, he now seems less equivocal about panpsychism than in The 
> Conscious Mind. He talks about the need for "crazy ideas" to tackle the 
> Hard Problem. In this regard, he mentions Daniel Dennett's 
> functionalism-is-everything and his his own formulation of information + 
> panpsychism as examples of such crazy theories. However, IMHO these ideas 
> simply aren't crazy enough to confront the Hardest part of the problem. 
> Both seem blind to the crucial need to *reconcile* the 1p and 3p 
> accounts, albeit they ignore it in opposite ways. Dennett's position is 
> essentially to eliminate the 1p part, whereas panpsychism (with or without 
> "information") just seems incoherent on the reconciliation. Chalmers seems 
> to consider the outstanding problem in the latter case to be "structural 
> mismatch" (i.e. physical things don't appear to be structured like mental 
> things). He proposes that this might be solved by invoking "informational 
> structure" as encoded in physical systems.
>
> However, ISTM that the really Hard problem (at least a priori) is not 
> structural, but referential. IOW, how can phenomena that are (putatively) 
> the mutual *referents* of the mind and the brain be shown, in some 
> rigorous sense, to be equivalent, always assuming that one or the other 
> isn't tacitly eliminated from the explanation? Indeed, if one accepts 
> physics as a self-sufficient level of explanation, what purely 3p 
> justification, or need, is there for claiming that a physical system 
> "refers" at all, as distinct from what is already explained in terms of 
> physical interaction? This is well captured by the Paradox of Phenomenal 
> Judgement (POPJ). The POPJ asks: With reference to what theory 
> (specifically and in detail) is it possible to reconcile the claim that 
> utterances "about" mental phenomena are exhaustively reducible to purely 
> physical processes, with the parallel claim that such utterances refer to 
> 1p phenomena that are not so reducible?
>
> Comp, of course, purports to have the theoretical resources to justify 
> such a reconciliation.  Any other contenders?
>

There is never going to be a viable theory to solve the hard problem which 
doesn't meet qualia halfway. As long as experiences are assumed to be 
effects rather than causes there will always be a gap between what we are 
defining theoretically and what actually exists experientially. In my own 
hypothesis, I try to explain how participatory aesthetic phenomena makes 
sense as the universal fundamental, from which other notions like physical 
structure and mechanical function are derived using symmetry and 
perspective.

Craig


> David
>  

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Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, July 18, 2014 3:08:40 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 8:02:18 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness 
>> that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way 
>> that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math 
>> and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience. ... This is 
>> not to say that everyone who doesn't understand the hard problem has 
>> mindblindness, but I would say it is very likely that having 
>> mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum would tend to result 
>> in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard 
>> problem of consciousness.
>>
>
> That's an interesting autism study. Regarding your above speculations 
> about "consciousness" debates, though, it's important to recognize that 
> this is a fully reversible criticism.  On the one side, empathy deficits 
> might incline people to have a bias against idealism and so on.  But on the 
> other side, those people could equally well speculate that idealists are 
> suffering from biases caused by overactive agency detection and an 
> inaccurate but biologically hardwired theory-of-mind.
>

Overactive agency detection is an unsupportable hypothesis as far as I'm 
concerned. There is a survival advantage to detecting possible danger, but 
agency is no more likely to be dangerous than it is to be beneficial - 
detecting friends, family, allies. It is a completely arbitrary and 
unscientific assumption that a mechanism which treats agency as a threat by 
default would be a benefit. I did a post about it here: 
http://s33light.org/post/1499804865

The idea that it a theory of mind which includes subjective phenomena could 
be as misguided as one which fails to include them doesn't hold much appeal 
for me. It would be like saying that people who are not color blind might 
just be hardwired to see colors that aren't 'real'. It's a fallacy which 
depends on a misplaced expectation of symmetry IMO.


> These kind of fully reversible criticisms come up a lot whenever we're 
> tempted to speculate about the psychological genesis of people's beliefs.  
> Some other examples include:
> * Some Christians tell atheists that they're only atheists because they 
> want to sin.  This is easily reversed to atheists telling Christians that 
> they're only Christians because they want others to want others to think 
> they are righteous.
> * Some liberals tell conservatives that they're only conservatives because 
> they hate minorities/women/poor people/etc.  This is easily reversed to 
> conservatives telling liberals that they're only liberals because they're 
> minorities/women/poor people/etc and they are just going along with the 
> others in that group because of shared 'tribal' sentiment.
>
 

All of those examples might have some truth to them. I don't think that 
they need to be discarded just because they are reversible. The fact that 
each side opposes the reversal (conservatives deny the liberal view of 
conservatism, etc) should not be overlooked also. 


> The primary point is that psychological explanations of other's beliefs, 
> whether the explanations are correct or not, aren't actually relevant to 
> determining the truth or falsity of the beliefs.  The secondary point is 
> that, when we find ourselves tempted to psychologize others rather than 
> address their criticisms, all we achieve is propagating prejudice.
>

There is some truth to that, but I think that fear of propagating prejudice 
can also lead to hiding important truths. The study for me supports my own 
experiences with people who have a strong materialist-functionalist point 
of view. It is not to say that it is impossible to have such a view without 
being autistic, but I do think that there is a significant positive 
correlation and that this study supports that possibility.

Craig

 

>
> Gabe
>

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Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, July 17, 2014 4:25:07 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jul 2014, at 01:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes 
>> to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little 
>> attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of 
>> what truth is in theoretical terms. 
>>
>> Come on!
>>
>
> ?
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can 
>> exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has 
>> been selected or engineered for that purpose. 
>>
>> In which theory? 
>>
>
> What theory details the ontology of inputs?
>
>
> Arithmetic. The subset of true sigma_1 sentences emulate the UD, that is 
> the activity of all programs on all inputs.
>

That only says that activity and inputs exist, but not what they are or 
what laws define them. 
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. 
>> Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which 
>> is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. 
>>
>> You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do 
>> confuse []p and []p & p.
>>
>
> So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views?
>
>
> At least in the same sense that 23 is prime "outside 1p views". 
>

Then programmability becomes another axiom that computationalism needs not 
to require an explanation.
 

>
>
>
>
> Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool?
>
>
> You can see it that way.
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are 
>> concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing 
>> of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, 
>> we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to 
>> our manipulations of it.
>>
>> The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go 
>> and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that 
>> if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then 
>> it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of 
>> action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails 
>> questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us 
>> to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. 
>> Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it 
>> reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well 
>> beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic 
>> is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce 
>> sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a 
>> “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from 
>> etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and 
>> moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied 
>> rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by 
>> step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen 
>> record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined 
>> in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all 
>> sensation.
>>
>> The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but 
>> rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that 
>> does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for 
>> discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself 
>> exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which 
>> cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and 
>> falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood 
>> being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a 
>> Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms 
>> which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection o

Re: Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:22:46 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes 
> to turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little 
> attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of 
> what truth is in theoretical terms. 
>
> Come on!
>

?
 

>
>
>
> The possibility of inputs is assumed from the start, since no program can 
> exist without being ‘input’ into some kind of material substrate which has 
> been selected or engineered for that purpose. 
>
> In which theory? 
>

What theory details the ontology of inputs?
 

>
>
>
>
> You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. 
> Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which 
> is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. 
>
> You are quick. Correct from the 1p machine's view on their own 1p. You do 
> confuse []p and []p & p.
>

So you are saying that programmability is universal outside of 1p views? 
Like infinite computational resources in a dimensionless pool?
 

>
>
>
> Without some initial connection between sensitive agents which are 
> concretely real and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing 
> of information. Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, 
> we have to find something which behaves logically and responds reliably to 
> our manipulations of it.
>
> The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go 
> and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that 
> if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then 
> it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of 
> action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails 
> questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us 
> to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. 
> Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it 
> reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well 
> beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic 
> is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce 
> sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a 
> “Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from 
> etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and 
> moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied 
> rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by 
> step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen 
> record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined 
> in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all 
> sensation.
>
> The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but 
> rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that 
> does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for 
> discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself 
> exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which 
> cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and 
> falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood 
> being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a 
> Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms 
> which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own 
> experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth 
> of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. 
> We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, 
> rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one 
> of the qualities of sense which matters.
>
> The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different 
> than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine 
> cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain 
> of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the 
> person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to 
> be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an 
> experience of a sense of certainty (especially a ‘common sense’) that is an 
> informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither 
> certainty nor uncert

Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:06:27 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Jul 2014, at 15:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf
>  
>
> This test was also originally devised by Wellman and Estes, and involves 
> asking the child what the brain is for. They found that *normal 3-4 year 
> olds already know that the brain has a set of mental functions*, such as 
> dreaming, wanting, thinking, keeping secrets, etc., Some also knew it had 
> physi cal functions (such as making you move, or helping you stay alive, 
> etc.). In contrast , *children with autism (but who again had a mental 
> age above a 4 year old level) appear to know about the physical functions, 
> but typically fail to mention any mental function of the brain* 
> (Baron-Cohen, 1989a)
>
> This paper on autism and theory of mind really shines a light on the most 
> intractable problem within philosophy of mind. In particular
>
> ...children from about the age of 4 years old normally are able to 
> distinguish between appearance and reality, that is, they can talk about 
> objects which have misleading appearances. For example, they may say, when 
> presented with *a candle fashioned in the shape of an apple,* that it 
> looks like an apple but is really a candle. C*hildren with autism*, 
> presented with the 5 same sorts of tests, tend to commit errors of realism, 
> *saying 
> the object really is an apple, or really is a candle, but do not capture 
> the object’s dual identity* in their spontaneous descriptions 
> (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). 
>
> This cartoon from a Psychology Today 
> <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/200805/empathy-mindblindness-and-theory-mind>
>  
> article illustrates the kinds of tests that show whether children have 
> developed what is called a theory of mind; an understanding of the contents 
> of other people's experience: 
>
> "Children with autism are virtually at chance on this test, as likely to 
> indicate one character as the other when asked “Which one knows what’s in 
> the box?”"
>
>
> So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness 
> that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way 
> that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math 
> and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience - one which 
> fails to fully realize the difference between the map and the territory. It 
> makes a lot of sense to be that having a very low-res, two dimensional 
> theory of mind would correlate with having a philosophy of mind which 
> undersignifies privacy and oversignifies mechanistic influences. The low 
> res theory of mind comes with a built in bias toward behaviorism, where all 
> events are caused by public conditions rather than private feelings and 
> experiences.
>
> There are several other interesting findings in the (brief) paper 
> <http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf>.
>  
> Autistic children find it difficult to tell the difference between what 
> they meant to do and what they actually did, so that when they shoot at a 
> target and miss, they don't understand that they intended to hit it but 
> ended up missing it and say that they meant to miss. Overall, the list of 
> deficits in imagination, pragmatics, social mindreading, etc has been 
> called mindblindness. This is not to say that everyone who doesn't 
> understand the hard problem has mindblindness, but I would say it is very 
> likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum 
> would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free 
> will, or the hard problem of consciousness.
>
>
> Craig, you beg the question in a novel interesting way. I agree with the 
> concluding sentence, but that would describe exactly the state of a 
> rationalist who decides to keep comp and materialism, and de facto 
> eliminate the person and consciousness.
>

Maybe all such rationalists have low theory of mind skills?
 

>
> But the big discovery is that when we look at computer science, we can 
> apply to machine (ideally correct believer in arithmetic) the simplest 
> notion of knowledge (Theaetetus), and the incompleteness (which already 
> guaranty universality and the consistence of Church Thesis) prevents any 
> possible confusion between the first person knower and any machine or 3p 
> description, and this already for the machine in their own 1p view, so 
> defined by Theatetus (with believability played by provability in rich 
> enough theory of numbers or digital machines/programs, combinators).
>

I

Re: Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 9:53:43 AM UTC-4, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 16 July 2014 14:02, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
> but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits 
>> on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against 
>> idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness.
>
>
> I must say I've often wondered about this very thing in the course of some 
> online discussions. However I try not to fall prey too readily to any 
> assumption of this sort, to at least temper any tendency on my part to 
> debate the person rather than the argument.
>

I want to agree, and it is important to temper tendencies to debate the 
person, but I think that this is one case where debating someone with low 
theory of mind skills is like debating about color with someone who is 
blind. They just have no possibility of understanding what the discussion 
is about, and (because of their low theory of mind skills) cannot tell the 
difference between a different perspective from their own and being wrong 
(stupid, Dualist, Solipsist, etc).


> David
>

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Gödel of the Gaps

[Craig Weinberg]

So much of our attention in logic and math is focused on using processes to 
turn specific inputs into even more specific binary outputs. Very little 
attention is paid to what inputs and outputs are or to the understanding of 
what truth is in theoretical terms. The possibility of inputs is assumed 
from the start, since no program can exist without being ‘input’ into some 
kind of material substrate which has been selected or engineered for that 
purpose. You can’t program a device to be programmable if it isn’t already. 
Overlooking this is part of the gap between mathematics and reality which 
is overlooked by all forms of simulation theory and emergentism. Without 
some initial connection between sensitive agents which are concretely real 
and non-theoretical, there can be no storage or processing of information. 
Before we can input any definitions of logical functions, we have to find 
something which behaves logically and responds reliably to our 
manipulations of it.

The implications of binary logic, of making distinctions between true/go 
and false/stop are more far reaching than we might assume. I suggest that 
if a machine’s operations can be boiled down to true and false bits, then 
it can have no capacity to exercise intentionality. It has no freedom of 
action because freedom is a creative act, and creativity in turn entails 
questioning what is true and what is not. The creative impulse can drive us 
to attack the truth until it cracks and reveals how it is also false. 
Creativity also entails redeeming what has been seen as false so that it 
reveals a new truth. These capabilities and appreciation of them are well 
beyond the functional description of what a machine would do. Machine logic 
is, by contrast, the death of choice. To compute is to automate and reduce 
sense into an abstract sense-of-motion. Leibniz called his early computer a 
“Stepped Reckoner”, and that it very apt. The word reckon derives from 
etymological roots that are shared with ‘reg’, as in regal, ruler, and 
moving straight ahead. It is a straightener or comb of physically embodied 
rules. A computer functionalizes and conditions reality into rules, step by 
step, in a mindless imitation of mind. A program or a script is a frozen 
record of sense-making in retrospect. It is built of propositions defined 
in isolation rather than sensations which share the common history of all 
sensation.

The computing machine itself does not exist in the natural world, but 
rather is distilled from the world’s most mechanistic tendencies. All that 
does not fit into true or false is discarded. Although Gödel is famous for 
discovering the incompleteness of formal systems, that discovery itself 
exists within a formal context. The ideal machine, for example, which 
cannot prove anything that is false, subscribes to the view that truth and 
falsehood are categories which are true rather than truth and falsehood 
being possible qualities within a continuum of sense making. There is a 
Platonic metaphysics at work here, which conjures a block universe of forms 
which are eternally true and good. In fact, a casual inspection of our own 
experience reveals no such clear-cut categories, and the goodness and truth 
of the situations we encounter are often inseparable from their opposite. 
We seek sensory experiences for the sake of appreciating them directly, 
rather than only for their truth or functional benefits. Truth is only one 
of the qualities of sense which matters.

The way that a computer processes information is fundamentally different 
than the way that conscious thought works. Where a consistent machine 
cannot give a formal proof of its own consistency, a person can be certain 
of their own certainty without proof. That doesn’t always mean that the 
person’s feeling turns out to match what they or others will understand to 
be true later on, but unlike a computer, we have available to us an 
experience of a sense of certainty (especially a ‘common sense’) that is an 
informal feeling rather than a formal logical proof. A computer has neither 
certainty nor uncertainty, so it makes no difference to it whether a proof 
exists or not. The calculation procedure is run and the output is 
generated. It can be compared against the results of other calculators or 
to employ more calculations itself to assess a probability, but it has no 
sense of whether the results are certain or not. Our common sense is a 
feeling which can be proved wrong, but can also be proved right informally 
by other people. We can come to a consensus beyond rationality with trust 
and intuition, which is grounded the possibility of the real rather than 
the realization of the hypothetical. When we use computation and logic, we 
are extending our sense of certainty by consulting a neutral third party, 
but what Gödel shows is that there is a problem with measurement itself. It 
is not just the ruler that is incomplete, or the book of rules, but the 
expe

Autism, Aspbergers, and the Hard Problem

[Craig Weinberg]

http://www.autism-community.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/TOM-in-TD-and-ASD.pdf
 


This test was also originally devised by Wellman and Estes, and involves 
asking the child what the brain is for. They found that *normal 3-4 year 
olds already know that the brain has a set of mental functions*, such as 
dreaming, wanting, thinking, keeping secrets, etc., Some also knew it had 
physi cal functions (such as making you move, or helping you stay alive, 
etc.). In contrast , *children with autism (but who again had a mental age 
above a 4 year old level) appear to know about the physical functions, but 
typically fail to mention any mental function of the brain* (Baron-Cohen, 
1989a)

This paper on autism and theory of mind really shines a light on the most 
intractable problem within philosophy of mind. In particular

...children from about the age of 4 years old normally are able to 
distinguish between appearance and reality, that is, they can talk about 
objects which have misleading appearances. For example, they may say, when 
presented with *a candle fashioned in the shape of an apple,* that it looks 
like an apple but is really a candle. C*hildren with autism*, presented 
with the 5 same sorts of tests, tend to commit errors of realism, *saying 
the object really is an apple, or really is a candle, but do not capture 
the object’s dual identity* in their spontaneous descriptions (Baron-Cohen, 
1989a). 

This cartoon from a Psychology Today 

 
article illustrates the kinds of tests that show whether children have 
developed what is called a theory of mind; an understanding of the contents 
of other people's experience: 

"Children with autism are virtually at chance on this test, as likely to 
indicate one character as the other when asked “Which one knows what’s in 
the box?”"


So often it becomes clear to me in debating the issues of consciousness 
that they are missing something which cannot be replaced by logic. The way 
that many people think, especially those who are very intelligent in math 
and physics, only includes a kind of toy model of experience - one which 
fails to fully realize the difference between the map and the territory. It 
makes a lot of sense to be that having a very low-res, two dimensional 
theory of mind would correlate with having a philosophy of mind which 
undersignifies privacy and oversignifies mechanistic influences. The low 
res theory of mind comes with a built in bias toward behaviorism, where all 
events are caused by public conditions rather than private feelings and 
experiences.

There are several other interesting findings in the (brief) paper 
.
 
Autistic children find it difficult to tell the difference between what 
they meant to do and what they actually did, so that when they shoot at a 
target and miss, they don't understand that they intended to hit it but 
ended up missing it and say that they meant to miss. Overall, the list of 
deficits in imagination, pragmatics, social mindreading, etc has been 
called mindblindness. This is not to say that everyone who doesn't 
understand the hard problem has mindblindness, but I would say it is very 
likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits on the autistic spectrum 
would tend to result in a strong bias against idealism, panpsychism, free 
will, or the hard problem of consciousness.

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Re: Through The Wormhole Episode

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, June 10, 2014 12:48:29 AM UTC-4, Samiya wrote:
>
> Thanks for sharing! 
>

Sure, you're very welcome. 

>
> I found the 'built for a purpose' experiment with children and adults 
> quite interesting.
>

Yes! I forgot about that part actually, but yes very interesting how the 
"why?" and evolves from a teleological default. The expectation of 
teleology is intrinsic to the development of consciousness.
 

> I suppose there are things we know, things we reason and things we desire, 
> and sometimes they all come together, and sometimes they conflict, such 
> that we try to convince ourselves of something that deep down, on the 
> fundamental level, is differently 'hard-wired' within us. 
>
> I thought the truth-machine experiment was flawed. If its a truth-machine, 
> then it should know the truth (have the truth data already) rather than 
> evolving, through user-interaction, in its knowledge of the truth. The flaw 
> here is similar to the fallacy applied to ideas of God where some people, 
> though they admit that there is a God, imagine that God is evolving and 
> learning through creation (experimentation?). We may not be able to 
> comprehend God, but that does not mean that we try to limit God or cast God 
> in the 'image of man'. 
>

The Godel truth-machine doesn't necessarily have all truth data, it just 
has perfect knowledge of whether any given statement is true or false. It's 
a thought experiment, so it doesn't have to make sense, it just has to 
isolate the question of whether logic is absolutely consistent. The fact 
that some statements which refer to themselves are not consistent shows 
either that logic is inconsistent, or that reference is beyond logic. I 
think that clearly it is the latter, if not both. Reference is an aesthetic 
experience which requires sensory participation. What I proposed is that 
the thought experiment can be used to illustrate that more, by showing that 
the elements of the statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false. 
Logical systems and arithmetic truths cannot be fundamental because their 
presence in the first place is not true or false.

Craig


> Samiya 
>
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 7:42 AM, Craig Weinberg  > wrote:
>
>> Through the Wormhole: Is God an Alien Concept? 
>> <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2>
>>
>>
>> http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2
>>
>> If you haven’t seen this episode, I highly recommend it.
>>
>> Early on there is an experiment which shows the effect that reading words 
>> associated with spirituality is correlated with being able to exercise 
>> substantially more willpower. This result is used to help justify the 
>> existence of religion as a part of natural selection, since the benefit of 
>> increased willpower to perform unpleasant tasks would offset the cost of 
>> otherwise difficult to explain rituals and ceremonies. What was not offered 
>> is an explanation of the nature of what it is in particular about concept 
>> of spirituality that causes the effect of amplifying the effectiveness of 
>> personal resolve.
>>
>> In my view, the God concept is a metaphor for consciousness, so that by 
>> referring to the divine, we are reminding ourselves of the primacy of our 
>> own sensory capacities and motive powers. Spiritual concepts assert 
>> teleology over material appearances, and aligns the self rightfully with 
>> teleology rather than a passive object. Part of the reason why religion has 
>> been so effective has been its role as cheerleader for the military, and if 
>> there is some truth to my hypothesis, it would make a lot of sense to mix 
>> the two so that you have a weaponized religion/teleologized military. Of 
>> course, it is a double edged sword (almost literally), as the physical arms 
>> race is mirrored by the immaterial arms race, and fanatical fundamentalism 
>> is born.
>>
>> The last segment (starting 36:35) was on Gödel and incompleteness. In 
>> the example they dramatized, there is an exchange with a universal truth 
>> machine which repeats only true statements. 2+2=4 gets repeated but 2+2=5 
>> does not. The machine famously breaks down when it comes to the prospect of 
>> repeating “I cannot say 2+2=5 twice, I cannot say 2+2=5”, since it is both 
>> true that it cannot say that 2+2=5, but false that it cannot say it two 
>> times in a row.
>>
>> What occurs to me here is to ask whether the machine can just say “2”, or 
>> “plus”, or “equals”? If so, then just by slowing down the machine, it can 
>&

Re: HAL is here!

[Craig Weinberg]

Nah, just more hype. Telling the judges that the computer was a 13 year old 
who speaks English as a second language is tampering. Why not say that they 
are developmentally disabled or a sociopath? No dice. At least they could 
have used 13 year old judges.


On Sunday, June 8, 2014 10:34:10 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> Or is he (it) ?
>
> http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/08/super-computer-simulates-13-year-old-boy-passes-turing-test?CMP=twt_fd
>  

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Through The Wormhole Episode

[Craig Weinberg]

Through the Wormhole: Is God an Alien Concept? 


http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1hexc7_is-god-an-alien-concept_shortfilms?start=2

If you haven’t seen this episode, I highly recommend it.

Early on there is an experiment which shows the effect that reading words 
associated with spirituality is correlated with being able to exercise 
substantially more willpower. This result is used to help justify the 
existence of religion as a part of natural selection, since the benefit of 
increased willpower to perform unpleasant tasks would offset the cost of 
otherwise difficult to explain rituals and ceremonies. What was not offered 
is an explanation of the nature of what it is in particular about concept 
of spirituality that causes the effect of amplifying the effectiveness of 
personal resolve.

In my view, the God concept is a metaphor for consciousness, so that by 
referring to the divine, we are reminding ourselves of the primacy of our 
own sensory capacities and motive powers. Spiritual concepts assert 
teleology over material appearances, and aligns the self rightfully with 
teleology rather than a passive object. Part of the reason why religion has 
been so effective has been its role as cheerleader for the military, and if 
there is some truth to my hypothesis, it would make a lot of sense to mix 
the two so that you have a weaponized religion/teleologized military. Of 
course, it is a double edged sword (almost literally), as the physical arms 
race is mirrored by the immaterial arms race, and fanatical fundamentalism 
is born.

The last segment (starting 36:35) was on Gödel and incompleteness. In the 
example they dramatized, there is an exchange with a universal truth 
machine which repeats only true statements. 2+2=4 gets repeated but 2+2=5 
does not. The machine famously breaks down when it comes to the prospect of 
repeating “I cannot say 2+2=5 twice, I cannot say 2+2=5”, since it is both 
true that it cannot say that 2+2=5, but false that it cannot say it two 
times in a row.

What occurs to me here is to ask whether the machine can just say “2”, or 
“plus”, or “equals”? If so, then just by slowing down the machine, it can 
be made to say two, plus, two, equals, five. By breaking down logic to 
these elements, it can be seen that sensory inputs are beneath the level of 
logic. Whether we say that the machine will repeat isolated elements or it 
won’t, it should be clear that the presence or absence of information is 
not generated by logic, and that in fact, logical inference is derived from 
the relationships among elements which are given. Indeed, just as we can 
utter statements that the logical truth machine cannot, we have no trouble 
uttering isolated elements. We can appreciate and reproduce sounds and 
symbols which have no logical meaning, but rather refer to the aesthetic 
nature of the experience of uttering them. How are we to deny that 
aesthetic properties must be more fundamental than logical properties, and 
that representation (information) cannot exist in the absence of 
presentation (sensory experience)?

There are several other good segments in here, including one with Ben 
Goertzel. I agree with Ben’s views on the universality of spiritual 
qualities within intelligence, however I do not consider AI to be authentic 
intelligence derived from sensory-aesthetic phenomena, but rather simulated 
intelligence, derived from what I imagine to be a kind of grand concourse 
of interstitial protocols. Intelligence can be thought of as 
commercialization or publicizing of subjectivity. An AI, derived from 
generic rules rather than irrationally appreciated aesthetic experiences 
(like, love, pain, pleasure), can deliver a commercial for subjectivity, 
but I think that it will in fact lack any ‘residential’ authenticity. The 
lights are on, and it looks like someone might be home…but they aren’t.

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Re: Top-down causation

[Craig Weinberg]

It seems much more sensible to me that bottom-up emergence and top-down 
divergence are poles of a continuum of trans-causal interaction. I would 
assume that there is also center-out and periphery-in interaction, as well 
as other kinds of harmonic chords of coincident 
entanglement/disentanglement. That the universe could be strictly bottom up 
causality is absurd to me - as absurd as the idea of letters of the 
alphabet learning to read, but at the same time, it makes perfect sense to 
me that every view of the universe, including the bottom-up emergentist 
view, is presented in its most coherent light when reflecting its most 
favorable attention. Every view of the universe can make a tremendous 
amount of sense, given genuine interest in it.


On Wednesday, April 30, 2014 7:47:57 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Emergence means that the higher level is idependent of the substrate 
> and produce effects in the substrate. That means that once emerged, it 
> does not matter if is the result off a darwinian process, a numeric 
> simulation or an intelligent design, it is as it is and start to work 
> with their own rules, influencing above and below it. 
>
> http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/~ellis/nature.pdf 
>
>
>
> -- 
> Alberto. 
>

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:53:57 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 07:01:01PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > > This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random 
> > > source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for 
> > > which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that "real 
> > > randomness" is required, so long as the entropy of the random source 
> > > is sufficiently high. 
> > > 
> > 
> > The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed 
> > intentionally. 
>
> The proof doesn't but Wiles probably did (in his brain, presumably, 
> although he 
> could have used a coin or something else). 
>
> >   
> > 
> > > 
> > > In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness 
> > > from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps 
> > > that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think 
> > > he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually 
> > > involve some "divine spark of inspiration", which is just another term 
> > > for rolling a random number generator). 
> > > 
> > 
> > You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling. 
> > 
>
> That makes no sense. Rolling an RNG is a mechanical process, if ever 
> there was one. Intention to solve Fermat's last theorem is outside the 
> scope of the claim. 
>

If you are intending to solve a problem, anything that you do in the 
service of solving that problem is intentional, even if you employ rolling 
a RNG as a step. Adding a RNG into a computer program does not make it able 
to solve the Halting Problem. It probably doesn't even make the solvability 
of the Halting Problem more or less computable.

Besides, randomness is conceptual. As far as I know, there is no proof of 
actual randomness, nor proof that such proof could exist.

Craig


> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
>  
>
>

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:59:10 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 19 May 2014 07:37, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>>  
>>
>>>  You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.
>>>
>>
>> His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. 
>>
>> To be exact, it's claimed to be *how he arrived at* that answer. The 
> extract says that he arrived at a proof that "no algorithm could have 
> found". How did he find it? 
>

>From what I can gather, Matijasevich proved that the already proven 
unsolvable Halting Problem can be represented as a Diophantine equation, so 
that there is at least one Diophantine equation that can't be solved by a 
Turing machine. I'm sure its more complicated than that, but at this point, 
that's what I'm getting as a general overview.

The paper is far too high powered for my little brain, so I am hoping for 
> an answer for dummies. Did he decide that the answer might have some 
> particular form using intuition, say, tried it, and found it worked? How 
> did he (or anyone) then show there was no algorithm for finding it?
>
> (This is reminiscent of "The Emperor's New Mind", which IIRC attempts to 
> prove that some gifted mathematicians are not machines!)
>
>  
>
>

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 19, 2014 2:40:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 May 2014, at 21:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
>> ‘hardware’ of our Universe
>>
>> I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
>> it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
>> don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:
>>
>> http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/
>>
>> Some highlights:
>>
>>
>> Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
>>> automatically, for example:
>>> ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
>>> Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
>>> to step through all the possible solutions will find one
>>> immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
>>> Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
>>> solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
>>> mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
>>> could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
>>> any Diophantine equation. 
>>>
>>> ...
>>> *Consequence*
>>> In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
>>> Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
>>> had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
>>> questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
>>> obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
>>> proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
>>> found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
>>> the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
>>> computer.
>>>
>>
>> Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some 
>> credibility as well.
>>
>>
>> http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display
>>  
>>
>>
>> You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that.
>>
>> 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be 
>> eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated 
>> after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could 
>> be a case of general law.
>> 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too.
>>
>
> Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we 
> consider machines, 
>
>
> Only digital machines.
>

But how do you know the difference between what a digital machine happens 
to do because of the way that it is implemented (machine + sense + physics) 
rather than what follows from mechanism alone?
 

>
>
>
> or does computationalism have to be grounded, by definition, in elementary 
> means?
>
>
> It does not, but always can, by Church Thesis.
>

Why doesn't it? Why isn't the same loose grounding afforded to 
consciousness? I'm not really sure what would even constitute being always 
allowed to be grounded in the elementary but not having to be.


>
>
>
>  
>
>> You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.
>>
>
> His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. 
>
>
>
> By using Church thesis. The proof consists in showing that the 10th 
> problem of Hilbert is Turing complete. Diophantine polynomials are Turing 
> universal. See below for an example of UD written as a system of 
> Diophantine equations (exponent are abbreviation here(*)
>

>From what I've gathered so far, it seems like the proof shows that the 
halting problem has a Diophantine representation, so that because 
Church-Turing proves the halting problem is not computable, then Hilbert's 
10th problem of whether Diophantine equations can be computed generally 
must be a no. The fact that Wiles did prove a solution to FLT but could not 
have done so using a general algorithm shows, according to Tagg, that Wiles 
is not a Turing machine.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>> And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things 
>> with quite non elementary means.
>>
>
> What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means?
>
>
> Mathematical logic, theoretical computer science.
>

Does it explain where the emergence comes from, or just demonstrates that 
it app

Re: Moneybot Singularity

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 19, 2014 5:52:35 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> What about computer/automated trading software that currently executes the 
> majority of stock trades in the world?  See: 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-frequency_trading
>
> Then there are also those text messaging services where people pay $1 or 
> more per text message to chat with what they think are humans (but are 
> actually bots). Not to mention bitcoin mining, and poker bots.
>

Sure, but what we see is that automated trading software works well, until 
it doesn't, and markets crash. If the global economy does collapse, or is 
gradually collapsing, it may be in no small part due to the cascading 
effects of high frequency trading. Its risks are no less than any trader 
who relies on technical analysis, it just happens much faster.

As for the other methods you mention, I would expect that very few will 
have long lasting success. Eventually counter-bots might make bots 
unprofitable, or they may become illegal. All of these are examples of 
unsustainable, parasitic mechanisms. What I'm talking about is the opposite 
- a machine that does not feed on the deception but actually produces an 
honest value for itself and for civilization.

Craig



> Jason
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>> An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to 
>> create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money 
>> on the internet than it costs?
>>
>> I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of 
>> consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial 
>> transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally 
>> cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for 
>> security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own 
>> money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial 
>> transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing 
>> of account data.
>>
>> Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every 
>> encryption and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will 
>> be able to reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever 
>> seems fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the 
>> form of malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is 
>> successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection 
>> against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the 
>> long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a 
>> moneybot happens to be successful, its use would inevitably destroy 
>> whatever economy that it is introduced into. As the bot’s automatic success 
>> eclipsed the ebbs and flows of the real life financial risk, there would be 
>> no way for a market to compete with a sure thing. We’re already seeing this 
>> happen in the form of automated trades in hedge funds, derivatives, etc, 
>> but that’s another conversation.
>>
>> What would it take to write a moneybot that actually *earns* money 
>> legally without human intervention? Answering this question, if we are 
>> being honest, is probably a much higher priority for working computer 
>> scientists than answering the more philosophical questions about Strong AI. 
>> The question of what a bot would have to say or do on the internet to get 
>> people to willingly part with their money, and to do so without complaints 
>> later on, would seem to be infinitely difficult without the bot being able 
>> to identify personally with human beings living human lives. Modeling only 
>> the behavior of data being sent and received wouldn’t work because the data 
>> has no access to the actual experience of a person receiving merchandise.To 
>> the moneybot, the only difference between successfully selling something 
>> and failing is that there is no complaints received, not that there was 
>> nothing that actually existed to sell in the first place.
>>
>> A moneybot could find, for example, that people spend money at sites like 
>> Amazon.com, and could create a website that looks and acts like a retail 
>> site, but there is nothing that the bot could tell the customer to assure 
>> them that its arbitrarily generated tracking number has caused the delivery 
>> of the package. There is no way for the program to know whether there is 
>> really something to deliver or not, and there is no way for the customer to 
>> ignore the fact that there is noth

Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
> > ‘hardware’ of our Universe 
> > 
> > I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and 
> thought 
> > it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but 
> I 
> > don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: 
> > 
> > http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ 
> > 
> > Some highlights: 
> > 
> > 
> > Some Diophantine equations are easily solved 
> > > automatically, for example: 
> > > ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ 
> > > Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed 
> > > to step through all the possible solutions will find one 
> > > immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, 
> > > Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic 
> > > solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved 
> > > mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations 
> > > could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve 
> > > any Diophantine equation. 
> > > 
> > > ... 
> > > *Consequence* 
> > > In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on 
> > > Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he 
> > > had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our 
> > > questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore 
> > > obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this 
> > > proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have 
> > > found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer 
> > > the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a 
> > > computer. 
> > > 
> > 
>
> This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random 
> source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for 
> which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that "real 
> randomness" is required, so long as the entropy of the random source 
> is sufficiently high. 
>

The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed 
intentionally.
 

>
> In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness 
> from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps 
> that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think 
> he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually 
> involve some "divine spark of inspiration", which is just another term 
> for rolling a random number generator). 
>

You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling.

Thanks
 

>
> Cheers 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
>  
>
>

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Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
> ‘hardware’ of our Universe
>
> I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
> it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
> don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:
>
> http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/
>
> Some highlights:
>
>
> Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
>> automatically, for example:
>> ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
>> Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
>> to step through all the possible solutions will find one
>> immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
>> Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
>> solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
>> mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
>> could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
>> any Diophantine equation. 
>>
>> ...
>> *Consequence*
>> In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
>> Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
>> had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
>> questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
>> obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
>> proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
>> found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
>> the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
>> computer.
>>
>
> Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some 
> credibility as well.
>
>
> http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display
>  
>
>
> You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that.
>
> 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be 
> eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated 
> after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could 
> be a case of general law.
> 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too.
>

Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we 
consider machines, or does computationalism have to be grounded, by 
definition, in elementary means?
 

> You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that.
>

His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. 
 

> And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things 
> with quite non elementary means.
>

What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means? Maybe there is 
something about the implementation of those machines which is introducing 
it rather than computational factors?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Moneybot Singularity

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 5:18:15 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014 08:29, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>>
>>> Craig:
>>> beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation.
>>> H O W E V E R : 
>>> if we "MIX" pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) 
>>> we get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times 
>>> loose. 
>>> I try to verify the exact meanings applies  
>>>
>>
>> Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. 
>>> I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway.
>>> John
>>>
>>  
>> Thanks John, 
>>
>> Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I 
>> probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the 
>> growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it 
>> needed a super-amazing name.
>>
>
> Vernor Vinge.
>
> He called it a technological singularity because it makes the future 
> impossible to predict even in a weak sense. This makes it more like a 
> technological event horizon than a singularity, assuming it occurs (Max 
> Tegmark seems to be both worried and hopeful that it will). A singularity 
> is where something comes to an end, in this case human progress (it ends 
> because it hits the wall of whatever is actually possible, assuming that is 
> finite, or if not it ends because it goes to infinity).
>

Thanks. Yeah, that makes more sense, and I have heard of Vinge, but it 
still seems like a term which as a meaning that is more of a metaphor than 
most people would assume. 

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Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg

[Craig Weinberg]

Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the 
‘hardware’ of our Universe

I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought 
it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I 
don't see any obvious problems with his general approach:

http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/

Some highlights:


Some Diophantine equations are easily solved
> automatically, for example:
> ∃𝑥, ∃𝑦 𝑥² = 𝑦² , 𝑥 & 𝑦 ∈ ℤ
> Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed
> to step through all the possible solutions will find one
> immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica,
> Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic
> solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved
> mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations
> could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve
> any Diophantine equation. 
>
> ...
> *Consequence*
> In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on
> Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he
> had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our
> questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore
> obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this
> proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have
> found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer
> the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a
> computer.
>

Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some 
credibility as well.

http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display
 

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>
>
> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that 
> what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
> be provable in the theory.
>
> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>
> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
> computationalism.
>
>
> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
> truthfully assume it. 
>
>
>
> no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with 
> possible brains.
>

But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are 
just number relations.
 

> It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial 
> reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge.
>

I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable 
as a way to model consciousness.
 

>
>
>
>
> Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
> non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
> 10th problem?
>
>
> No. 
>
>
> Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get 
> someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.
>
>
> Well, you can invite him to make his point. 
>

I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the 
future.
 

> The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non 
> computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non 
> algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use 
> heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity 
> of comp. In fact the first person "[]p & p" is also a non algorithmic 
> entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion 
> between []p and []p & p, or []p in G and []p in G*.
>

I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take 
non-computational first person properties as being associated with 
computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in 
consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is 
non-computational then comp is false, since the production of 
non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor 
does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that 
production.


>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> Penrose thinks that it does:
>
> "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
> knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
> truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
> mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
> truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"
>
>
> Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a 
> knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. 
> By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he 
> does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because 
> it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine.
>
>
> If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is 
> only some computer scientists who do so) 
>
>
> because some are not aware of the difference between []p & p and  []p. 
>

I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by 
comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as 
axioms. I reject all possibili

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
>>>> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
>>>> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
>>>> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
>>>> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
>>>> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means 
>>>> that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
>>>> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, 
>>>> will 
>>>> be provable in the theory.
>>>>
>>>> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers 
>>>> and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>>>>
>>>> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
>>>> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
>>>> computationalism.
>>>>
>>>
>> But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
>> truthfully assume it.
>>
>> I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) 
> it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences.
>

I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust 
Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences.
 

>
> The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the 
> materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at 
> some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE.
>

Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever.

Craig

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Re: Moneybot Singularity

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Craig:
> beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation.
> H O W E V E R : 
> if we "MIX" pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) we 
> get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times 
> loose. 
> I try to verify the exact meanings applies  
>

Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. 
> I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway.
> John
>
 
Thanks John, 

Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I 
probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the 
growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it 
needed a super-amazing name.


>
> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 4:10:11 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>>>
>>> Craig: about your title...
>>> I see no 'realistic' meaning to SINGULARITY (although it may be 
>>> calculated in many fashions by diverse experts...!) 
>>> Taking a STRICT meaning of the term, it has NOTING. Not even 
>>> borderlines, which would belong INTO (forbidden). So the only singularity I 
>>> can fathom is the infinite complexity, the existential world beyond our 
>>> thinking capabilities. 
>>> (My agnosticism speaking).
>>> The 'S'-term serves usefully in many arguments. I discount those. 
>>>
>>
>> Hi John,
>>
>> I'm using Singularity here only in the pop culture sense of a 
>> Technological Singularity in which AI begins to use its eventual superior 
>> intelligence to create exponentially more intelligent AI. The idea of a 
>> Moneybot Singularity would be some kind of a program that generates 
>> exponentially more revenue producing programs.
>>  
>>
>>> Your other term (emphasized): 
>>> *Free will is a feeling with teeth. It allows us to bite into the world 
>>> that we perceive in a way that a deterministic algorithm cannot.*
>>> I don't know about 'free will' either. It is helpful to make the 
>>> faithful afraid, sinful, responsible for bad deeds committed, so the 
>>> eternal forgiveness can be denied from them. Good tool also for worldly 
>>> powers to keep opposition at bay. 
>>>
>>
>> I use free will in a pop culture sense also. If I were to be more precise 
>> I might say 'the continuum of will in which degrees of experienced freedom 
>> are inversely proportionate to distance/entropy'.
>>  
>>
>>> Otherwise: (again my agnosticism talking) whatever occurs is 
>>> 'pressures-related, mostly compensated from diverse ones that may be 
>>> controversial at times. Mind you: I did not call them flatly deterministic: 
>>> in most cases there is a 'choice' which affecting trend to give some 
>>> preference in personal decision ways - maybe against our (self) interest. 
>>> Yes, it is a "feeling". A human pretension of self aggrandizing.  
>>>
>>> What say you?
>>>
>>
>> I agree that up to 99.9...9% of our experience of our own will as free is 
>> exaggerated, but I think that part of being conscious in any way is that at 
>> least 0.0...1% of your experience is completely unique and proprietary. 
>> With that tiny fragment, it becomes possible, through billions of years of 
>> evolution, to hand down ever more powerful shortcuts to amplifying that 
>> seed. As human beings, we do indeed suffer the self-aggrandizing pretense 
>> of feeling our own will as entirely free or entirely ours, but in another, 
>> larger sense, the civilization which we have inherited is a product of the 
>> collective hacking of nature by our species to yield a potential increase 
>> in the degree of freedom (although arguably that increase is only for a 
>> select few in select measures, at the expense of everyone else). In 
>> physical terms though, I think that each frame of reference, each 
>> experience has a germ of unrepeatable and proprietary novelty which is in 
>> direct opposition to computationalist axioms. The universe invented numbers 
>> from 100% free will, even though we might, as human beings, be nested so 
>> deeply within the numbered and structured that we can barely recognize 
>> their origin.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
>>> John Mikes
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>&

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
>> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
>> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
>> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
>> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
>> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>>
>>
>> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means 
>> that what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
>> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
>> be provable in the theory.
>>
>> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
>> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>>
>> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
>> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
>> computationalism.
>>
>
But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot 
truthfully assume it. 

>
> Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
> non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
> 10th problem?
>
>
> No. 
>

Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get 
someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong.
 

>
>
>
> Penrose thinks that it does:
>
> "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
> knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
> truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
> mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
> truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"
>
>
> Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a 
> knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. 
> By adding "knowably" Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he 
> does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because 
> it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine.
>

If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is 
only some computer scientists who do so) then it cannot use a knowably 
sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct 
attribution. 

If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument 
within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved.


>
>
>
>
> The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:
>
> "Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the 
> computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that 
> human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational 
> description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist 
> thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that 
> human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that 
> Penrose and others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte
>
>
> Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please 
> give them.
>

That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness 
convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles 
proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to 
produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem.
 

> Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations?
>

I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that being 
> human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal 
> or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like."
>
>
>
> Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information 
> redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt 
> ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know 
> where they come from, and where we return.
>

You're saying that we are identical to machines on one han

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that 
> the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
> empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
> logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
> logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't 
> know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth.
>
>
> Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that 
> what we prove in a theory written in such logic,  will be true in all 
> interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will 
> be provable in the theory.
>
> Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and 
> machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. 
>
> This means that the truth about number and machines are above what 
> machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume 
> computationalism.
>

Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use 
non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 
10th problem?

Penrose thinks that it does:

"The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a 
knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical 
truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby 
mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical 
truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!"

The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry:

"Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the 
computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that 
human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational 
description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist 
thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that 
human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that 
Penrose and others find so unacceptable." - Geoffrey LaForte

He seems to be saying "I don't like it when people imagine that being human 
can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or 
superior to humans because of the thesis that I like."
 

>
> Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is 
> a transfinite of path possible.
>

But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively 
resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not.
 

>
> And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they 
> can justify it rationally.
>

Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own 
experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over 
many lifetimes.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Is Consciousness Computable?

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:25:09 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, LizR > wrote:
>
> Comp isn't really a theory, so testing it is a bit problematic. It's 
>> "just" a logical argument which purports to show the consequences of taking 
>> seriously the idea that brains are Turing emulable. 
>>
>
> Why do you think it can't be shown that brains are Turing emulable? So 
> far, there has been no natural phenomenon discovered that isn't Turing 
> emulable, 
>

I don't think that is true or meaningful. Something like 'making money' is 
not necessarily Turing emulable (see my post on Moneybot Singularity). We 
can't just build a program that makes money automatically because making 
money involves other conscious agents permitting you to take money from 
their accounts. Nobody can guarantee payouts indefinitely.

There is also the example of the violin and the piano song that I have 
given, in which the song has onomotopoeic lyrics ('plink plink') that have 
a different meaning when played by an authentic piano than it has when 
played by the violin. There is no way for the violin to simulate a song 
which directly references the aesthetic of another instrument's intrinsic 
expression, so the Turing mechanism can only emulate the logic of the 
song's execution, not the aesthetic of the instrument itself.

Setting those kinds of examples aside (and I would imagine that there are 
many more), what does it mean to say that something is a 'natural' 
phenomenon, when clearly our native, natural subjective experience can 
exist entirely without reference to computation. If natural phenomena must 
be emulated computationally, then that implies that there are other 
phenomena in which we are emulating away from. If we consider phenomena 
'natural' to be only those which exist outside of our bodies in public 
space, then it is disastrously presumptuous to hold consciousness to that 
standard, since nobody experiences their own consciousness as existing in 
public space to begin with.

Craig

Stathis Papaioannou
>

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Re: Moneybot Singularity

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 4:10:11 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Craig: about your title...
> I see no 'realistic' meaning to SINGULARITY (although it may be calculated 
> in many fashions by diverse experts...!) 
> Taking a STRICT meaning of the term, it has NOTING. Not even borderlines, 
> which would belong INTO (forbidden). So the only singularity I can fathom 
> is the infinite complexity, the existential world beyond our thinking 
> capabilities. 
> (My agnosticism speaking).
> The 'S'-term serves usefully in many arguments. I discount those. 
>

Hi John,

I'm using Singularity here only in the pop culture sense of a Technological 
Singularity in which AI begins to use its eventual superior intelligence to 
create exponentially more intelligent AI. The idea of a Moneybot 
Singularity would be some kind of a program that generates exponentially 
more revenue producing programs.
 

> Your other term (emphasized): 
> *Free will is a feeling with teeth. It allows us to bite into the world 
> that we perceive in a way that a deterministic algorithm cannot.*
> I don't know about 'free will' either. It is helpful to make the faithful 
> afraid, sinful, responsible for bad deeds committed, so the eternal 
> forgiveness can be denied from them. Good tool also for worldly powers to 
> keep opposition at bay. 
>

I use free will in a pop culture sense also. If I were to be more precise I 
might say 'the continuum of will in which degrees of experienced freedom 
are inversely proportionate to distance/entropy'.
 

> Otherwise: (again my agnosticism talking) whatever occurs is 
> 'pressures-related, mostly compensated from diverse ones that may be 
> controversial at times. Mind you: I did not call them flatly deterministic: 
> in most cases there is a 'choice' which affecting trend to give some 
> preference in personal decision ways - maybe against our (self) interest. 
> Yes, it is a "feeling". A human pretension of self aggrandizing.  
>
> What say you?
>

I agree that up to 99.9...9% of our experience of our own will as free is 
exaggerated, but I think that part of being conscious in any way is that at 
least 0.0...1% of your experience is completely unique and proprietary. 
With that tiny fragment, it becomes possible, through billions of years of 
evolution, to hand down ever more powerful shortcuts to amplifying that 
seed. As human beings, we do indeed suffer the self-aggrandizing pretense 
of feeling our own will as entirely free or entirely ours, but in another, 
larger sense, the civilization which we have inherited is a product of the 
collective hacking of nature by our species to yield a potential increase 
in the degree of freedom (although arguably that increase is only for a 
select few in select measures, at the expense of everyone else). In 
physical terms though, I think that each frame of reference, each 
experience has a germ of unrepeatable and proprietary novelty which is in 
direct opposition to computationalist axioms. The universe invented numbers 
from 100% free will, even though we might, as human beings, be nested so 
deeply within the numbered and structured that we can barely recognize 
their origin.

Craig


> John Mikes
>
>
> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>> An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to 
>> create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money 
>> on the internet than it costs?
>>
>> I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of 
>> consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial 
>> transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally 
>> cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for 
>> security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own 
>> money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial 
>> transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing 
>> of account data.
>>
>> Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every 
>> encryption and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will 
>> be able to reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever 
>> seems fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the 
>> form of malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is 
>> successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection 
>> against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the 
>> long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a 
>> moneybot happens to be successful, 

Moneybot Singularity

[Craig Weinberg]

An interesting little thought experiment to consider: Is there a way to 
create a program or AI moneybot which can figure out how to make more money 
on the internet than it costs?

I see this as a sneaky way to get at the trans-computable nature of 
consciousness as it brings up issues about the ultimate causes of financial 
transactions. As we know, human motives and senses are required to legally 
cause money to change hands. We spend a lot of time developing schemes for 
security that will protect the power of humans to control how their own 
money is spent. Also as we know, the proximate causes of financial 
transaction over the internet are the digital incrementing and decrementing 
of account data.

Even given a souped-up quantum computer which could break every encryption 
and factor, the idea that there could be an algorithm which will be able to 
reliably and legally extract money from the internet forever seems 
fundamentally flawed. We have primitive moneybots already, in the form of 
malware, but releasing malware carries a risk, especially if it is 
successful enough to catch the attention of police. Also, free protection 
against malware tends to spread as fast as the original threat, so that the 
long term prospects seem shaky at best. Finally, even in the case where a 
moneybot happens to be successful, its use would inevitably destroy 
whatever economy that it is introduced into. As the bot’s automatic success 
eclipsed the ebbs and flows of the real life financial risk, there would be 
no way for a market to compete with a sure thing. We’re already seeing this 
happen in the form of automated trades in hedge funds, derivatives, etc, 
but that’s another conversation.

What would it take to write a moneybot that actually *earns* money legally 
without human intervention? Answering this question, if we are being 
honest, is probably a much higher priority for working computer scientists 
than answering the more philosophical questions about Strong AI. The 
question of what a bot would have to say or do on the internet to get 
people to willingly part with their money, and to do so without complaints 
later on, would seem to be infinitely difficult without the bot being able 
to identify personally with human beings living human lives. Modeling only 
the behavior of data being sent and received wouldn’t work because the data 
has no access to the actual experience of a person receiving merchandise.To 
the moneybot, the only difference between successfully selling something 
and failing is that there is no complaints received, not that there was 
nothing that actually existed to sell in the first place.

A moneybot could find, for example, that people spend money at sites like 
Amazon.com, and could create a website that looks and acts like a retail 
site, but there is nothing that the bot could tell the customer to assure 
them that its arbitrarily generated tracking number has caused the delivery 
of the package. There is no way for the program to know whether there is 
really something to deliver or not, and there is no way for the customer to 
ignore the fact that there is nothing delivered. The program can’t 
calculate that the actual Amazon site has a backend fulfillment machine 
which is composed of real manufactured goods, packaging, delivery, etc. The 
bot could conceivably be programmed to understand what such a fulfillment 
enterprise entails, but it has no way to compute the difference between its 
own in silico modeling of an enterprise and the concrete reality that is 
required for people to get boxes on their doorstep. To the bot, financial 
transactions begin and end in the data. All this to say, yet again, that 
the map is not the territory.

Taking this as a metaphor for computationalism in general, our own sensory 
experiences are the brick and mortar presence of the brain’s information 
processing, rather than the neurology of the brain. What is literally in 
the brain cannot, in and of itself, represent that which is not literally 
located in the brain. Internet marketing data can only be used to infer 
what we do and think, it cannot process what we actually experience. A 
computerized salesman faces the insurmountable task of having no model for 
free will. Knowing that financial transactions take place under a 
particular computable criteria does not explain why those transactions 
ultimately exist and how to selectively attract them. The probability of 
success of any given sales approach changes in response to unknowable 
factors which might make a whole class of products or terms unpopular 
overnight. Human agents will change their behavior to suit their own 
preferences rather than to maintain a statistical model of their behavior.

Like a shifting antigen disease, the moneybot would have to constantly 
update its offerings to stay ahead of audiences as they grow resistant, not 
only to specific techniques, but to automated money making schemes in 
general. We ar

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 7:56:53 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
>>> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
>>> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
>>> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
>>> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
>>> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
>>> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
>>> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
>>> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
>>> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
>>> specifically disallowed.
>>>
>>>
>>> Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing 
>>> frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and 
>>> therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical 
>>> colors or effects on listeners). 
>>>
>>> All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is 
>>> not the same as musical red. 
>>>
>>
>> No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play 
>> red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of 
>> the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual 
>> instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano 
>> concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular 
>> pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin 
>> without comprimising the authenticity of the performance.
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map". 
>>> Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean 
>>> whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to 
>>> himself, I guess. PGC
>>>
>>
>> No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit 
>> logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant 
>> influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an 
>> unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving 
>> objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove 
>> his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using 
>> his Craig straw-idiot.
>>
>
> But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians 
> are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical. 
>

Then how could instruments and musicians be reduced to identical arithmetic 
units? As far as I can tell, a yes for irreducible differences is a no to 
computationalism.
 

>
> The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply 
> because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical.
>

But you could make a program that emulates the identical environments, 
programs, numbers, etc. That's what Church-Turing means if extended to the 
Absolute. That is computationalism.
 

>
> So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp, 
> some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what 
> seems like tautology. 
>

I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the 
failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be 
empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of 
logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows 
logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logi

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>
>
> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>
>
> I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
> piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
> formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
> symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
> then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
> try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
> specifically disallowed.
>
>
> Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency 
> range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore 
> different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or 
> effects on listeners). 
>
> All you are "proving" is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not 
> the same as musical red. 
>

No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play 
red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of 
the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual 
instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano 
concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular 
pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin 
without comprimising the authenticity of the performance.
 

>
> Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving "machine is automated map". 
> Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean 
> whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could "prove" this kind of thing to 
> himself, I guess. PGC
>

No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic 
that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence 
in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, 
scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 
'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections 
exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig 
straw-idiot.

Craig


>
>  
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the 
> abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in 
> which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated 
> map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must 
> take place within sensory-motive-time<>space-energy-mass.
>
>
> I will wait for you to prove this statement.
>

I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how 
piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be 
formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal 
symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, 
then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to 
try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is 
specifically disallowed.
 

>
>
> Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough.
>>
>> I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But 
>> that's is tautological in your non-comp theory.
>>
>
> It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as 
> I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can 
> generate qualia by itself.
>
>
> Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we 
> agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p 
> with her []p & p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation 
> with truth.
>

I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p & p. They are all just steps 
in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere.

Craig
 

>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>
>
> There is no art without sense. 
>
>
> Then substitute "art" by "mean". 
>
>
> If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not 
> sense?) 
>
>
>
> Deriving sentence, syntactically. 
>
>
Doesn't sentence have to make sense?
 

>
>
> without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense.
>
>
>
> ?
>

Because it is getting along fine without it.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal 
> sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions.
>
>
> ?
>

All logic is a kind of sense, but sense is not a kind of logic.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible 
> to make an error in logic. 
>
>
> That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory 
> can use it at another level. 
>
>
> Where are other levels coming from? 
>
>
> Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc.
>

Why would interactions entail a separate, fallible kind of logic?
 

>
>
>
>
> Why would they by able to make errors?
>
>
> For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which 
> makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false 
> proposition like "I am inconsistent", and others are superficial, like a 
> programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, 
> including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions).
> In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new 
> computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. 
>

It's not clear that there can be any difference between true and false 
without sense, especially if we are saying that the UD plows ahead 
regardless of incoherence. Saying "I am inconsistent" would not be an 
error, it would simply be yet another inevitable thing that will be said 
eventually. If the UD cannot tell the difference between programs that make 
sense and programs that don't, then why would any program generated by the 
UD be any more sensitive?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be 
> wrong when referring to the plane altitude.
>
>
> You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real 
> technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial 
> - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an 
> altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as 
> error.
>
>
> Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic.
>

How do you know that the ideal machine that proves the existence of 
non-ideal machines is really ideal? What makes ideal machines fall into 
non-ideal states?


>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
> There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable 
> in every state of consciousness. 
>
>
> It is still needed when you communicate to others.
>
>
> Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it 
> doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed 
> through sense experience.
>
>
> I don't know what is sense. 
>

It is participatory aesthetic phenomena. Sensory-motive participation. 
Nested presence and representation.
 

> It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything.
>

Sure, that's the whole idea: to explain everything. Computationalism tries 
to do the same thing only with computation instead of sense.
 

> You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, 
> still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of 
> "primordial sense".
>

Arithmetic is derived from insensitivity or reduction of sense. 
Representation is a function of inter-qualitative distanc

Re: God is an atheist!

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 8, 2014 11:45:32 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 5:25 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:40:58 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>>  
>>>
>>>> In this -single universe- context, the fine tuning of the physical 
>>>> constants are miracles by the way, so the hypothesis is true.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I tend to agree. This is why I reject the single universe -- it's an 
>>> extraordinary claim with no evidences.
>>>
>>
>> Why would the expectation of singularity be any more extra-ordinary than 
>> the expectation of multiplicity?
>>
>
> Because of the finely tuned physical constants.
>

Finely tuned physical constants is consistent with a sense-primitive 
universe. Physics conforms to experience, so it is only finely tuned 
relative to an expectation of alternate, sense-independent physics.
 

>  
>
>> Our ordinary experience is that we share many common realities and that 
>> those realities are very consistent.
>>
>
> I agree.
>  
>
>> In a multiverse, I would expect much more interruption of our 
>> expectations.
>>
>
> Why?
> Suppose Everett is right. Is interpretation recovers the classical world 
> from the many worlds. Why wouldn't that be enough?
>

Because there would have to be many more worlds which are shades of 
semi-classical, non-classical, and non-sensical instead. Multiverse to me 
seems good for only one thing: To rescue our expectations of mechanism and 
pimordial unconsciousness. Once we admit that view is no less compulsive 
than anthropomorphism, then there is no reason to impose the machina ex 
deus of near-infinite multiplicity.
 

>  
>
>>  I would not expect that singularity/unity would hold the kind of 
>> significance that it seems to for us.
>>
>
> Why?
>

Because in a MWI ontology, all uniqueness would be an irrelevant illusion.
 

> We are made of cells that are self-contained and interact only locally. 
> Wouldn't that already break our sense of unity?
>  
>
>> We care about what is unique vs what is redundant. Why?
>>
>
> Because organisms that are good at pattern recognition are more resilient 
> that organisms that are not?
>

Why would pattern recognition be related to uniqueness though?
 

>  
>
>> This assumible hypothesis means, by the multiverse assumption  that this 
>> has already happened somewhere somehow. And very well we may be, here and 
>> now, the product of it.
>>
>>>
>>> Sure. I am fairly convinced that we already live inside such a 
>>> simulation. That just means that the structure of the multi-verse is a 
>>> fractal. Not so surprising, but fun to think about.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think that simulation of any kind is possible without a 
>> foundation of consciousness to be simulated in the first place. If that's 
>> true, and the universe is made of 100% genuine awareness, then the 
>> probability of a 'simulation' becomes trivial. Simulation does not exist, 
>> it is only an idea that genuine awareness has about the difference between 
>> direct and indirect awareness. The idea can be true locally, but not 
>> ultimately. In the absolute sense, nothing can be "simulated".
>>
>
> I think I agree. I see the simulation as just a set of things that can be 
> experienced. If comp is true, and some Lovecraftian creature in a 
> non-euclidian reality is running the universal dovetailer where we exist, 
> it cannot really be said that the Great Old Ones created us. They just 
> unleashed us, I guess. There's no point in starting a cult to worship them 
> -- although there could be some entertainment value in that.
>

Even so, Uberthulhu has the same problem that we do. The explanatory gap is 
not explained, only miniaturized and hidden behind the alien-ness of 
disembodied dovetailing.

Thanks,
Craig
 

>
> Cheers
> Telmo.
>  
>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Telmo.
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> 2014-05-08 13:36 GMT+02:00 spudboy100 via Everything List <
>>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com>:
>>>>
>>>>  What if God is a Boltzmann Brain? He is likely not, but what they 
>>>>> heck, it's a shot at looking at the issue from another angle. Another 
>>>>> thoug

Re: God is an atheist!

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:40:58 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Alberto G. Corona 
> 
> > wrote:
>  
>
>> In this -single universe- context, the fine tuning of the physical 
>> constants are miracles by the way, so the hypothesis is true.
>>
>
> I tend to agree. This is why I reject the single universe -- it's an 
> extraordinary claim with no evidences.
>

Why would the expectation of singularity be any more extra-ordinary than 
the expectation of multiplicity? Our ordinary experience is that we share 
many common realities and that those realities are very consistent. In a 
multiverse, I would expect much more interruption of our expectations. I 
would not expect that singularity/unity would hold the kind of significance 
that it seems to for us. We care about what is unique vs what is redundant. 
Why?
This assumible hypothesis means, by the multiverse assumption  that this 
has already happened somewhere somehow. And very well we may be, here and 
now, the product of it.

>
> Sure. I am fairly convinced that we already live inside such a simulation. 
> That just means that the structure of the multi-verse is a fractal. Not so 
> surprising, but fun to think about.
>

I don't think that simulation of any kind is possible without a foundation 
of consciousness to be simulated in the first place. If that's true, and 
the universe is made of 100% genuine awareness, then the probability of a 
'simulation' becomes trivial. Simulation does not exist, it is only an idea 
that genuine awareness has about the difference between direct and indirect 
awareness. The idea can be true locally, but not ultimately. In the 
absolute sense, nothing can be "simulated".

Craig

 

>
> Telmo.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> 2014-05-08 13:36 GMT+02:00 spudboy100 via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com >:
>>
>>  What if God is a Boltzmann Brain? He is likely not, but what they heck, 
>>> it's a shot at looking at the issue from another angle. Another thought, is 
>>> thing of the Big Mind (shrug) as doing the multiverse using the Schrodinger 
>>> universal wave function, and allow me to use hugh evertt the 3rd's 
>>> interpretation, ok? This is a ultra-gigantic amount of cosmii to initiate 
>>> biology inside of, a thankless task, that would poop anyone out 
>>> (anthropomorphism here) even God. Let's not cling frantically to 
>>> what Aquinas thought about God. Atheist Shmatheist. By the way your graphic 
>>> or whatever couldn't appear on this boys email. 
>>>   
>>>  
>>> -Original Message-
>>> From: LizR >
>>> To: everything-list >
>>> Sent: Thu, May 8, 2014 1:09 am
>>> Subject: God is an atheist!
>>>
>>>
>>> ​
>>> As hopefully the above will demonstrate, if I managed to upload the 
>>> picture...
>>>   -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>>> To post to this group, send email to 
>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com
>>> .
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>   
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
>>> To post to this group, send email to 
>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com
>>> .
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Alberto. 
>>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>> .
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>
>
> There is no art without sense. 
>
>
> Then substitute "art" by "mean". 
>

If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not 
sense?) without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop 
sense.

I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal 
sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions.
 

>
>
>
> If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible 
> to make an error in logic. 
>
>
> That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory 
> can use it at another level. 
>

Where are other levels coming from? Why would they by able to make errors?
 

> The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be 
> wrong when referring to the plane altitude.
>

You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real 
technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial 
- sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an 
altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as 
error.
 

>
>
>
> There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable 
> in every state of consciousness. 
>
>
> It is still needed when you communicate to others.
>

Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it 
doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed 
through sense experience.
 

>
>
>
>
> That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires 
> a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an 
> impersonal sense.
>  
>
> That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is 
> just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low 
> level, that's correct.
> A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of 
> any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined).
>
>
> Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited 
> aesthetic qualities.
>
>
> You are not trying to understand.
>

I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you 
are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that 
does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. What 
I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what awareness 
is about - which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or 
self-reference but with presence itself. I am explaining why aesthetic 
experience cannot originate from any sort of mechanism, and why all 
mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and motivational contexts.
 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>
>
> But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
> defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
>
>
> Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next 
> post in the math thread. 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>
>
> "Derive" requires sequence and sense.
>
>
> Not at all.
>
> Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from 
> axioms? 
>
> Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law 
> is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned.
>
>
Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense going on 
to keep the simulation going. 

>
&g

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 5, 2014 9:12:45 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
> Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
>>>
>> I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist 
>> independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. 
>>
>
> That seems to be a "no". So if things don't exist independently of sensory 
> experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the 
> planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it?
>

Yes, Uranus existed before Herschel - Uranus existed before any biological 
phenomenon was present on Earth, but that does not mean that the universe 
is devoid of sensory experience before that. It does not mean that matter 
is something other than a sensory experience. We use a light bulb to create 
light locally, but that does not mean that light is produced only by bulbs 
or that all light is reducible to the activity of light bulbs.

The view of Pansensitivity that I have is completely indifferent to biology 
or human existence. It's indifferent to all possible forms and functions 
also. The idea is that beneath every 'p' there must first be an a priori 
aesthetic (sensory) context and an a priori motive to alter that context. 
The consequence of the sense>motive>sense^2 relation is minimally necessary 
for any number, logical proposition, statement, 'thing', etc. Before 
anything can be said to 'exist' there must first be a capacity to 1) 
discern a difference between existence and non-existence, 2) make such a 
difference, and 3) *appreciate* having made the difference. I consider 
these three aspects to be different from each other in one sense and parts 
of the same primordial/irreducible identity in another.

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What generates Platonia?
>
>
>
> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>
> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
> scientifically.
>
>
> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
> you need arithmetic.
>
>
> How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? 
>
>
> If you agree on logic and
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>
>
> Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
> inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
> statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
>
>
> No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. 
>

There is no art without sense. If logic could be accomplished without sense 
then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. There would be no 
need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of 
consciousness. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very 
tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on 
modeling concepts in an impersonal sense.
 

> That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is 
> just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low 
> level, that's correct.
> A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of 
> any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined).
>

Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited 
aesthetic qualities.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>
>
> But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
> defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
>
>
> Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next 
> post in the math thread. 
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>
>
> "Derive" requires sequence and sense.
>
>
> Not at all.
>

Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from 
axioms? 
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me 
> that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist 
> without sequence.
>
>
> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete 
> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. 
> That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and 
> lambda calculus.
>
> Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about.
>
>
> The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of 
> sense, not the other way around. 
>
>
> Sense is a vagu

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>>
>> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
>> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
>> you need arithmetic.
>>
>
> How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? 
>
>
> If you agree on logic and
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
> x+0 = x
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> x*0=0
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. 
>

Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be 
inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated 
statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition.
 

> Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the "Gödel beta function", 
> based on a generalization of a famous chinese "lemma", about set of modular 
> equations in arithmetic.
>
> Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine 
> lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can 
> define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the 
> natural numbers.
>

But "eventually" means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your 
defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start.
 

>
> It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), 
> etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms.
>

"Derive" requires sequence and sense.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me 
> that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist 
> without sequence.
>
>
> It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete 
> language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism.
> You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. 
> That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and 
> lambda calculus.
>
> Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about.
>

The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of 
sense, not the other way around. Before arithmetic can exist, there must 
exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of 
recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, 
etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>> It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which 
>> prevents you from seeing this. 
>>
>
> Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of 
> math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something 
> to question.
>
>
> On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is of 
> the type verifiable. That's how science work.
> Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the key.
>

There are other lamps...other keys.

Craig
 

>
> I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I insist a 
> lot.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>  
>
>> You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order 
>> language.
>>
>
> I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who 
> is writing them?
>  
>
>> I doubt you can define "expectation of sequen

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> What generates Platonia?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>
>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>
>
> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
> scientifically.
>
>
> To define, is a reasonable precise sense, "expectations", "sequence", 
> "identity", "position", or "motivation" (which I doubt is a simple notion) 
> you need arithmetic.
>

How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? It is 
the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that 
sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without 
sequence.


> It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which 
> prevents you from seeing this. 
>

Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of 
math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something 
to question.
 

> You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order 
> language.
>

I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who 
is writing them?
 

> I doubt you can define "expectation of sequence" in such a simple way.
>

How can you doubt it? 
 

> How will you define "sequence" without mentioning some function from N 
> (the set of natural numbers) to some set?
>

With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to 
count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived 
from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an 
apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'.
 

>
> Again, I remind you that "simple" means "simple in the 3p sharable sense", 
> not "simple" in the 1p personal experiential sense.
>

Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p 
without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p.
 

> All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, 
>

If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason 
why all scientists fail to solve the hard problem. (which is exactly my 
argument).
 

> and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them. 
>

I can't remember what it was like before I learned arithmetic, but I can 
still understand that we all live for years without those notions. There is 
at least one culture today that has no arithmetic.
 

>  Something like "expectation" might already have a different meaning for 
> spiders, for different humans, etc.
>

Either way, it is undeniably more primitive than arithmetic in my view. 

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>
> Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
>

I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist 
independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths.
 

>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, May 1, 2014 7:21:19 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of 
> words, 
>

You think that we were born with words?

 

> many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning at 
> all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words, 
> and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words, 
> including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly 
> mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some 
> measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501
>
>
> On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> What generates Platonia?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
>>> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
>>> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>>>
>>
>> Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
>> doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
>> complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
>> keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
>> scientifically.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>> .
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What generates Platonia?
>
>
>
> Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can 
> generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent.
>
> Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in 
> Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start.
>

Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start 
doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less 
complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I 
keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it 
scientifically.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common 
>> sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking 
>> about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from 
>> ordinary human experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, 
>> and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it.
>>
>
> I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would 
> still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to 
> understand how to be myself to be a dodge.
>
>
>
> By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial 
> brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at 
> some inadequate level.
>

Yes, but that's because comp cannot conceive of a brain as being different 
from a kidney, heart, etc, but in reality, of course, the difference 
between a person's brain and anything else in the universe is of the 
highest possible significance, while the difference between kidneys, hearts 
etc is irrelevant except with respect to function. If we put on the 
blinders of comp, we fail to see that consciousness entails personal 
presence above all other functions, and that presence is not a function or 
configuration of numbers at all.
 

>
>
>
>
> You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what 
> you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the 
> difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not 
> proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, 
> and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your 
> sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is 
> not water.
>
>
>
> I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too.
>

Too, bad, they are probably the only way that we can understand the reality 
of nature.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
> If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is 
> the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of 
> absurdity, error, and catastrophe. 
>
>
>
> To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, 
>

I am starting from X. As soon as we come to aesthetic experience, we get a 
contradiction.
 

> without adding anything to X. 
> If not, you are just advertizing another theory.
>

 I think my argument is pretty straightforward. If computation can exist 
without consciousness, then there is no room in computationalism for 
consciousness. All computations can be performed unconsciously, if any can 
be.


>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between 
>> automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans 
>> make terrible slaves.
>>
>>
>> OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! 
>>
>
> Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave?
>
>
> Well, thanks for the warning. 
>

Numbers are not creative, they are recursive.


Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is 
arguably creative,


Creative how?

 and that is why Emil Post used the term  "creative" to describe them. They 
> can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So 
> recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity.


We don't know that recursiveness suggests creativity, or if it does, that 
may be only in response to the creativity of our inquiry.
 

> What you say is not more than: "machine are not clever, they are machine". 
>> It is only your same begging of the question.
>>
>
Machines are clever, but they have no understanding, no presence...not 
because they are machines, but because machines are maps with no territory.
 

>
>> I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no 
>> argument.
>>
>
I have the same conclusion about your argument.

Craig 
 
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> 
>
>
> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>
>
> What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
> that "consciousness is generated by computation"? 
>
>
> "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in 
> the Aristotelian era. 
> How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of 
> matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain 
> product. 
> I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a 
> level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or 
> experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non 
> Turing emulable object) at that level.
>
>
> We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking 
> about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring 
> it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
> If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated 
> by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is 
> generating his consciousness.
>
>
> Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real 
> object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you 
> have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness 
> particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions 
> among some infinite sets of computations. 
>
>
> I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading 
> back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the 
> brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I 
> presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of 
> computation to  generate consciousness. 
>
>
> It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain 
> only make that consciousness relatively manifestable.
>

What generates Platonia?
 

>
>
>
>
> The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of 
> computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the 
> consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates 
> consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time.
>
>
>
> I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your 
> argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is 
> based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, 
> which is provably false for machine.
>

I do not assume that formal things cannot yield informal things, I assume 
that informal things take on a formal appearance from a distance, which 
means that a copy of a formal thing can only copy a superficial part of the 
total informal (as the total informal is ultimately 'prime' as well as 
'primeness').
 

>
>
>
>
> Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be 
> conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior 
> remains invariant.
>
>
> It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is 
> no going back.
>
>
> Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are 
> infinitely many going back possible.
>

Another area where comp refers to a theoretical universe in which nobody 
actually lives.
 
... 
Craig

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> 
>
>
>> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
>> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>>
>
> What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
> that "consciousness is generated by computation"? 
>
>
> "consciousness is generated by computation" is misleading, especially in 
> the Aristotelian era. 
> How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of 
> matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain 
> product. 
> I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a 
> level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or 
> experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non 
> Turing emulable object) at that level.
>

We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking 
about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring 
it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun.
 

>
>
>
>
> If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated 
> by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is 
> generating his consciousness.
>
>
> Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real 
> object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you 
> have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness 
> particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions 
> among some infinite sets of computations. 
>
>
I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading 
back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the 
brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I 
presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of 
computation to  generate consciousness. The ability of computation to 
generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital 
functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If 
you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure 
what you have been arguing all this time.
 

>
>
>
>
> In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a   
>> consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of   
>> all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that   
>> comp does not marry well with materialism). 
>>
>> By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which   
>> asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). 
>>
>> UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and   
>> assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done   
>> at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both   
>> consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. 
>
>
> If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for 
> consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from 
> arithmetic be something other than tautology?
>
>
> Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My 
> point is that comp is testable. 
> Comp makes theology an experimental science.
>
> In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories.
>

You're the one who keeps demanding proof of the unprovable from me. I don't 
ask for proof, only sense.
 

>  
>
>
>  
>
>> Then AUDA (the   
>> arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's   
>> predicate of probability,  how to make the derivation, and derives the   
>> propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp +   
>> Theaetetus is testable. 
>>
>
> It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, 
> linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive 
> degree.
>
>
> That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies 
> that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently 
> of being useful.
>

Well, comp would have to imply that or else admit that it was a false 
theory.
 

>
>
>
>
> It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic 
> phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I 
> can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the 

Re: Graham Hancock on The Plant Teachers (Banned TED Talk)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 12:44:32 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 4/15/2014 4:38 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>  
> An interesting related hypothesis is that language originated 
>> from synesthesia caused by psychadelics.
>>
>>  Telmo.
>>   
>>  
>>  I had heard that Telmo. Do you have a reference, a link?
>>  
>
>  Unfortunately not. I think I heard in a talk. Might be related to 
> McKenna's "stoned ape" theory, but I can't find anything...
>
>
> That seems very far-fetched considering that animals already exhibit 
> rudimentary language and that its selective advantage for a tool making 
> social animal is huge.  I don't see how synesthesia could do anything but 
> confound and confuse the development of language.
>

I don't have any particular view on the possible role that psychedelics 
played in human evolution, but I can see how synesthesia could be an 
advantage if there were reason to think that it were present in some 
meaningful way. There is a guy who has acquired musical savant ability 
because he can see graphic symbols of notes that show him how to play. That 
sort of thing could be developed for language just as easily. The one who 
can see or hear or taste the sensibility of language could very well be in 
the best position to build consistent and aesthetically harmonized ways of 
integrating verbal language with gestures and writing. It would only be 
confusing if consciousness was an isolated program that can only build from 
the bottom up rather than the unifying resource of all phenomenabut 
there is no reason that we have to assume something like that.

Craig


> Brent
>  

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 2:26:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the 
> representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, 
> relatively to some universal number or system.
>

I agree that a local person needs representation to localize their 
experience, but that does not mean that universal numbers are not also 
representations for conditioning the primordial (sensory) presence. Numbers 
are not creative, they are recursive. Numbers can extend the creativity of 
an existing substrate to the extent that the substrate is intrinsically 
creative.

Craig
 

>
> Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of 
> the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. 
>
> I appreciate the intervention. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>
>
>
> That is a very good idea. 
>
> That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of 
> (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p 
> describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but 
> well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in 
> self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian 
> machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the 
> definition of know(p) by []p & p.
>
> That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the 
> fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly 
> so, from that necessarily existing point of view.  It explains the 
> existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person 
> perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ...

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

continued

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
>
>
>
> > and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from   
> > awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore   
> > computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/ 
> > produce/lead to awareness/sense/ 
> > 
> > 
> > Do you agree with 0+1=1? 
> > Do you agree with 0+2=2? 
> > 
> > Yes, but so what? 
>
> So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree   
> on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more,   
> of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter   
> and consciousness in a testable way. 
>

What is the testable way of explaining consciousness?
 

>
>
>
>
> > I agree with "B" and "P" are associated with lips, or that blue +   
> > red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of   
> > mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or   
> > gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. 
>
> You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if   
> true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still   
> talk like if I was pretending the contrary. 
> It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your   
> string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie). 
> It is the second one that I challenge you to prove. 
>

Proof may not be the proper expectation. By Occam's razor we can see that 
the computer need not feel that it has lips in order to make a 'B' sound 
come out of a speaker. The speaker functions as mouth, lips, lungs, and 
voicebox but it has no connection to those things or their experiences. The 
sun in law is designed from the outside in to mimic external behaviors. Why 
would internal experiences match our expectations? Why should there be any 
internal experiences on that level at all?
 

>
>
> > 
> > If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. 
> > 
> > Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to   
> > say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot   
> > exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you   
> > illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law. 
> > 
> > I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X   
> > then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is   
> > explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where   
> > arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities.   
> > I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see   
> > indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and   
> > I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of   
> > those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately   
> > amounts to a support for comp. 
>
>
> But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or   
> supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since   
> the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point. 
>
> All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from   
> ~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non   
> existence of something. 
>

and I repeat that I agree you are correct in saying that it cannot be 
proved logically, but I am saying that nothing about consciousness is 
logical to begin with, so the expectation of that kind of deduction working 
for consciousness is not valid. There is no argument for why I can move my 
fingers just by moving them, but it is nonetheless as true as any truth can 
possibly be.
 

>
>
>
> > > You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged 
> > 
> > I have never said that. You symmetrize again. 
> > 
> > By aligning the defense of comp 
> > 
> > 
> > I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet   
> > seen an argument. 
> > 
> > The argument is that the map is not the territory. 
>
> The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the   
> territory, 


I think only metaphorically
 

> and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map   
> whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers   
> too. 
> Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there   
> are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical   
> (self-r

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > Craig, 
> > > 
> > > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get 
> > > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument 
> > > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > > 
> > > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical 
> > > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper 
> > > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume 
> > > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which 
> > > logic seems to arise. 
> > > 
> > > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > I will just sum up: 
> > > 
> > > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You 
> > > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I 
> > > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on 
> > > this. 
> > > 
> > > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as 
> > > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > > 
> > > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is 
> > > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > > 
> > > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a 
> > > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My 
> > > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes 
> > > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out 
> > > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
> > 
> > 
> > It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
> > 
> > If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. 
> > 
> > Proof? 
> > 
> > Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain   
> > anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that   
> > consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need   
> > computation then. 
>
> You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a   
> doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. 
>

That rebuttal doesn't convince me that I should doubt my reasoning. It 
sounds like you're just saying that my argument offends you.
 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by   
> > computation" 
> > 
> > Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I   
> > have insisted on this many times. 
> > 
> > "In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the   
> > human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing   
> > system and that thinking is a form of computing. " - 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind 
> > 
> > The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that   
> > consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation,   
> > then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion.   
> > What do you say that comp asserts? 
>
> That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the   
> brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. 
>

What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than 
that "consciousness is generated by computation"? If sun in law is not a 
doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, 
then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his 
consciousness.

In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a   
> consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of   
> all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that   
> comp does not marry well with materialism). 
>
> By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which   
>

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving 
> that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive 
> participation and move our legs by ourselves.
>  
>
> and   
> just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need   
> this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, 
>
>
> You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel 
> down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's 
> not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single 
> coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing 
> back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude 
> interventions.
>  
>
> and for   
> this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the   
> training in "scientific" argumentation. 
>
>
> There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns 
> politeness but actually buries consciousness alive.
>
>
> Rhetoric.
>
> You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an 
> argument.
>
>
> Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument?
>
>
> How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating 
> himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric 
> variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in 
> linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and 
> empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that 
> don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your 
> ideas on "sense".
>

Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are others 
not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that what I'm 
saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'.  As long as 
others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting together a 
new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is resisting 
it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas being 
discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other.


> Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself "as his 
> equal confronting him", mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your 
> own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, 
> because why else would you seek this validation? 
>

I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea - either 
for Bruno or someone else.
 

>
> Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster 
> discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome:
>

Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc.
 

> you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise 
> linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work 
> on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, 
> which is also unconvincing as of today. 
>

If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the 
aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view 
predicts.
 

>
> Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal 
> thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its 
> limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, 
> including Bruno, to spoon feed you. 
>

How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me? I'm not 
looking for input from Bruno, I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately 
fails and how it can be inverted to find a new solution that makes more 
sense. 
 

>  
> Craig
>  
> 
> ...

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> His mind is reverse engineered from mind-like circuits that again 
> represent nothing else. The mind *is* the circuit. For a natural person, 
> the mind is a vehicle for personal attention - a glove of cognitive 
> transformations. I don't insult your sun-in-law lightly or out of 
> prejudice, I only explain why he is likely only a shadow of human 
> intelligence cast in mechanical clothing.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to   
>> > represent distance between categories of experience. 
>>
>> Well, nice, but that is already what the machine does, and it makes   
>> this testable. 
>>
>
> I don't think that the machine creates any qualities or appreciates them, 
> it only quantifies some common aspects of theoretical/generic experience.
>
>
> I know you don't think, but that is not an argument. 
>

The assertion that the machine does create such qualities and appreciation 
is not an argument either. The question is which seems more plausible given 
everything that we can understand.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for   
>> > its non Turing emulability. 
>> > 
>> > The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it   
>> > is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this   
>> > be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask   
>> > why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object.   
>> > It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects   
>> > completely that we could make that assumption. 
>>
>> You avoid the question. 
>>
>
> I don't see how. You are assuming that the brain produces consciousness 
>
>
>
> Not at all. Please study comp and its consequence. 
>

This isn't about the consequence of comp, its about the attempt to force a 
validation of comp by bringing the Church-Turing and the brain into it.


>
>
> whereas my view is that the brain is a representation of human qualities 
> of consciousness from the 3p body view. 
>
>
> As any physical object. That is a comp consequence.
>

Yes, but then how can you use that view of the brain to justify comp? We 
agree that the brain, even assuming it is Turing emulable, is only a 
footprint of the total consciousness, so why would emulating a footprint 
lead to the foot? It's the same thing over and over again. I say the map is 
not the territory and you say that makes me a racist against maps.
 

>
>
>
> The 3p view may or may not be Turing emulable, as it is influenced by 
> phenomena which is ~p immeasurable.
>
>
> The phsyical 3p viex is not Turing emulable indeed. Again, that is a 
> consequence of comp.
>

That's why I say that your " 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body 
would be responsible for   
> its non Turing emulability." is invalid because it presumes that the 
possibility of the brain being Turing emulable would validate comp. If the 
footprint is a machine, then the foot must be also...I assert that it does 
not follow logically.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non- 
>> > comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. 
>> > 
>> > My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by   
>> > argument, 
>>
>> But I proved it can. It is the main whole point. Comp can be defeated   
>> by reason, and by experiments. You have still not study it. 
>>
>
> No, I'm saying that is false falsifiability in this case. We cannot trust 
> the square theory to judge its own completeness, as it will find that 
> indeed it seems to be square. This is what Godel is all about. 
>
>
> You make to big jumps.
>

I still make it to the other side.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> All I am doing is adapting it to consciousness so that the whole of 
> arithmetic truth and logic constitutes a kind of formal system which cannot 
> contain awareness itself.
>
>
>>
>>
>> > so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be   
>> > proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or   
>> > theory. Feeling doesn't have to be correct in its content, but the   
>> > fact of feeling is the only undeniable fact. 
>>
>> yes. That

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Craig, 
> > 
> > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get   
> > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument   
> > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > 
> > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical   
> > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper   
> > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume   
> > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which   
> > logic seems to arise. 
> > 
> > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > 
> > 
> > I will just sum up: 
> > 
> > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You   
> > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I   
> > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on   
> > this. 
> > 
> > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as   
> > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > 
> > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is   
> > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > 
> > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a   
> > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My   
> > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes   
> > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out   
> > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
>
>
> It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
>
>
> If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. 
>
>
> Proof?
>

Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If 
comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness 
creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then.
 

>
>
>
>
> For the statement that comp makes "consciousness is generated by 
> computation" 
>
>
> Comp does not say "consciousness is generated by computation". I have 
> insisted on this many times.
>

"In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human 
mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and 
that thinking is a form of computing. " - 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind

The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that 
consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it 
seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say 
that comp asserts?


>
>
>
> we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, 
>
>
>
> Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no 
> more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error.
>

Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces 
consciousness.
 

>
>
> I read below, and I do not see argument. Only rhetorical tricks, including 
> attribution of many things I have never said.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> otherwise we aren't saying anything.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- 
> > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 
>
>
> Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from   
> that. You do an error in logic. That's all. 
>
>
> The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it 
> an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible.
>  
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. 
> > 
> > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be   
> > anything other than sense, 
>
> Then truth = sense, as I said.
>
>
> It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of 
> cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth.
>
>  
>
> But is is a cosmic or universal form of   
> sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,   
> even making them delusion. 
>
>
> I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh 

Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 11, 2014 11:21:29 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Apr 2014, at 4:47 am, spudb...@aol.com  wrote:
>
> Interesting, Professor Marchal. From what I have read some lucid dreamers 
> can actually feel the metal top of a car, or the feel of a wooden fence as 
> the dream 'walks' by. Plus, the dreamer knows he is dreaming.
>
>
>
> Last night I had a lucid dream (must be this thread getting into the 
> unconscious and stirring all sorts of things up.) Your typical flying 
> dream, complete with the waving of arms/wings flapping in order to 
> levitate. It was all quite natural and easy. I “flew” up outside the 
> apartment block where I live, to inspect the outside of the building (in 
> “reality” we are about to undergo a re-pinning operation as the mortar is 
> crumbling in spots) and I remember assuring myself as I was zooming around 
> the outside that “yes, this is obviously where I live”. At the same time, 
> “I” was able to observe myself in the act of believing falsity.
>  
>
I could see that the building I was hovering outside (just like an avatar 
> in Second Life”) looked absolutely NOTHING like the building in which I 
> really live, yet I both believed it was the true and correct building and 
> simultaneously observed myself in the act of believing something false. 
> Both states involved a level of self-observation and belief.
>

Nice. I think this hints at the narrowness of modal assumptions about 
consciousness. Qualia is not just belief or a function of belief, as it can 
be both believed and disbelieved on different levels of awareness at the 
same time.
 

>
> Kim
>
> 
>
> Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL
>
> Email: kimj...@ozemail.com.au 
> Mobile:   0450 963 719
> Landline: 02 9389 4239
> Web:   http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com
>
> "Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain
>
>
>
>  
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Craig, 
> > 
> > I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get   
> > closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument   
> > against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
> > 
> > I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical   
> > about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper   
> > aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume   
> > to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which   
> > logic seems to arise. 
> > 
> > so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. 
> > 
> > 
> > I will just sum up: 
> > 
> > 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You   
> > defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I   
> > am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on   
> > this. 
> > 
> > I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as   
> > much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. 
> > 
> > I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is   
> > the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. 
> > 
> > Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a   
> > realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My   
> > argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes   
> > relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out   
> > immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. 
>
>
> It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. 
>

If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. For the statement that 
comp makes "consciousness is generated by computation" we have to assume 
first that comp is not already consciousness itself, otherwise we aren't 
saying anything.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> > My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- 
> > comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 
>
>
> Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from   
> that. You do an error in logic. That's all. 
>

The "error" in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it 
an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. 
> > 
> > I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be   
> > anything other than sense, 
>
> Then truth = sense, as I said.


It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of 
cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth.

 

> But is is a cosmic or universal form of   
> sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways,   
> even making them delusion. 
>

I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking 
of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either 
makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can 
detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us 
with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it 
was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem 
wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of 
sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not 
take concepts like "1" and "=" for granted, but sees them as generalized 
stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially 
visual and tactile).
 

>
>
>
>
> > and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit   
> > part of my conjecture. 
>
> truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. 
>

Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates.
 

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but   
> > not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory,   
> > against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the   
> > question. 
> > 
> > By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic   
> > sense to transcend logical truth, 
>
> There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. 
>

Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that begin 
wit

Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 10, 2014 3:51:40 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 11 April 2014 02:17, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 9:55:08 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 10 April 2014 04:09, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since 
>>>> their presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. 
>>>>
>>>
>>> My dream caused this thread to come into existence, and you to make the 
>>> statement quoted above. Hence you have "refuted yourself thus!" :-)
>>>
>>>
>> No, we can't smuggle in our real world experience of dreams affecting our 
>> behavior into the theoretical world that functionalism would allow. If we 
>> do, it's begging the question; we are saying in effect 'Music must have an 
>> effect on cars, since cars come with radios'. Music might make you drive 
>> your car faster or miss your exit, but that doesn't mean that music itself 
>> should be explained as arising from the manufacture of automobiles. If you 
>> look only at what a car requires, and are careful not to smuggle in what 
>> *your use* of a car includes, then we can see that evolution can only 
>> really account for physiological behaviors, not subjectivity. All 
>> subjective experiences could and would be replaced by unconscious 
>> automation in a purely biological view of life.
>>
>
> Fine, so a counter example is dismissed as "smuggling in" because you 
> don't like it. When I use a word it means what I want it to mean... ffs. If 
> that's your idea of a reasonable response, excuse me while I put you on my 
> ignore list.
>

You're projecting your refusal to be wrong on to me. My example stands. It 
has nothing to do with what I like, it just makes more sense.
 

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Craig, 
>
> I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to 
> a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not 
> valid, you vindicate being illogical, 
>

I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about 
factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of 
nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic 
alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise.
 

> so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help.
>
>
> I will just sum up:
>
> 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending 
> ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere 
> defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this.
>

I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on 
occasion, but that's ok with me either way.
 

> I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the 
> confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>

Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic 
expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can 
only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that 
the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from 
the start. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of 
non-comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric.
 

> 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time.
>

I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything 
other than sense, and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's 
an explicit part of my conjecture.
 

> I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for 
> an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If 
> you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question.
>

By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to 
transcend logical truth, you beg the question. We are symmetric here too.
 

> 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can 
> only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a 
> formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the 
> theory is about.
>

No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with 
yours. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended 
to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view 
of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. My view though 
is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to 
detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To give arithmetic entities 
experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is 
arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines 
that find themselves to be conscious?
 

> 4) You take "sense" for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. 
> Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an 
> argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more 
> computer science and logic.
>

We can just turn that around and say you take "arithmetic" for granted, and 
you object to elementary sense. You are saying that the assumptions of comp 
cannot be challenged unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions 
of comp with new assumptions. 
 

> 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume or not 
> a physical reality,
>

I assume sensory-motive interaction. Physicality and realism are a set of 
qualities which potentially arise through modulations of 
sensitive/insensitive interaction.

or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David Nyman. 
> It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem.
>

I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind and 
body. Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to 
represent distance between categories of experience.
 

> 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for its non 
> Turing emulability.
>

The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it is 
backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this be 
conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask why we 
would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. It is only if 
we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects completely that we could 
make that assumption.
 

> Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-comp, it 
> is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again.
>

My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by 
argument, so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be 
proved, but that does not mean it is not 

Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 9:55:08 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 10 April 2014 04:09, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>>
>> Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their 
>> presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. 
>>
>
> My dream caused this thread to come into existence, and you to make the 
> statement quoted above. Hence you have "refuted yourself thus!" :-)
>
>
No, we can't smuggle in our real world experience of dreams affecting our 
behavior into the theoretical world that functionalism would allow. If we 
do, it's begging the question; we are saying in effect 'Music must have an 
effect on cars, since cars come with radios'. Music might make you drive 
your car faster or miss your exit, but that doesn't mean that music itself 
should be explained as arising from the manufacture of automobiles. If you 
look only at what a car requires, and are careful not to smuggle in what 
*your use* of a car includes, then we can see that evolution can only 
really account for physiological behaviors, not subjectivity. All 
subjective experiences could and would be replaced by unconscious 
automation in a purely biological view of life.


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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 12:47:01 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 6:09 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 8, 2014 6:51:13 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 9 April 2014 04:58, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only 
>>>>> until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for 
>>>>> or 
>>>>> against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited 
>>>>> extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures 
>>>>> etc 
>>>>> is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what 
>>>>> mechanisms have evolved and why. 
>>>>>
>>>>> For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being 
>>>>> "for" protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making 
>>>>> them 
>>>>> harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some 
>>>>> experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the 
>>>>> stripes gave.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need 
>>>> not have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). 
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Sorry old chap could you clarify 
>>>
>>
>> Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their 
>> presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior.
>>
>
> How do you know that? It's plausible that they play a role in training for 
> future scenarios, for example.
> I'm not discounting that there might be more to it than that -- I am 
> fascinated by dreams too -- but to claim that they are irrelevant to 
> behavior seems quite a stretch.
>

We could always invent a justification for them, but I don't think that we 
have to. There is no reason that any experience within consciousness better 
explains some behavior than would an unconscious mechanism explanation. 

Craig

I 

>
> Cheers,
> Telmo.
>  
>
>>
>>  -- 
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>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 5:42:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Another part 2
>
> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the 
>>> mathematics accessible to the machine. 
>>>
>>>
>>> No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm 
>>> suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a 
>>> reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation.
>>>
>>>
>>> A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It 
>>> refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical 
>>> terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.
>>>
>>>
>>> False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. 
>>>
>>
>> You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must 
>> be a valid argument? 
>>
>>
>> Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is 
>> a valuation of a statement. A semantics. 
>>
>
> It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across 
> sensory experiences.
>
>
> For the 1p.
>

Anything beyond 1p is begging the question. We can't know if truth extends 
beyond the nested collective 1p.

 

> Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny that science has 
> any ability to handle such question, but comp, even if wrong, provides the 
> counter-example. You deny it from your theory, but that is trivial and beg 
> the question.
>

There may indeed be advantages to studying theories that are wrong rather 
than studying realities that might be impossible to model theoretically, 
but that doesn't deny science from stretching to fit the new reality.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. 
>>
>>
>> You confuse p and []p & p.
>>
>
> No, I deny "& p" altogether.
>
>
>
> Then you can prove that 0=1. The " & p" has to be added, the machines 
> already "know" this. 
>

I can suggest that 'prove', '0', '=', and '1' are all sensible conditions 
which can be expanded or contracted to suit the intended context. 0 can be 
'almost 1' in some context, or it can be the opposite of 1 in another 
context, or it can be an irreducible part of a continuum in another context.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> They appear before logic and cognition.
>>
>>
>> At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make sense 
>> of such terms.
>>
>
> In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not 
> logic without sense.
>
>
> In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in this 
> discussion.
>

The only thing that I'm interested in discussing is my theory. It's my 
theory that makes comp invalid, why would you try to censor it?

 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. 
>>>
>>
>> I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.
>>
>>
>> That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more sense" 
>> is not an argument, especially in this context.
>>
>
> More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic.
>
>
> Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be 
> illogical as this point, you make my point.
>

Logic cannot be applied to aesthetic experience. It is false that it can be 
applied to anything and it is false that pointing this out makes my point 
illogical.
 

>
>
>  
>
>>
>> How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail 
>> machine) knows that it can't feel? 
>>
>>
>>
>> I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, 
>> and what I derive from the assumption. 
>>
>> But I thought you were saying that you have an argum

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 4:58:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
>>
>>
>> But then why are we discussing? 
>>
>
> To make more sense of everything.
>  
>
>> Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the 
>> sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
>>
>
> If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp 
> makes no sense.
>
>
> For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but 
> that is what is debated, and you beg the question again.
>

You are the one who is saying that sense making is limited to 1p. How is 
that begging the question to ask you to clarify your contradiction that 
comp makes sense beyond 1p, but that sense making is limited to 1p at the 
same time.
 

>
>
>
>> I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, 
>>
>
> Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine 
> function would point outside of computation.
>
>
> ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine.
>

Sure. In my view, machines reflect a particular range of sensible 
relations, so that they do indeed tap into what I would call a 
'meta-theroetical' library, but that library is a generic reflection that 
can be used to impersonate sense, but not experience it.
 

>
>
>
>> Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation 
>> theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it 
>> is.
>>
>
> Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can 
> still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.
>
>
> You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it 
> remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in 
> the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can 
> prove everything.
>

What we are used to thinking of as valid or non-valid has to more deeply 
considered when it comes to consciousness. We cannot argue with the method 
that we use to move our fingers or taste coffee. 
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the 
>> other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true?
>>
>>
>> Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory 
>> with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on 
>> many things.
>>
>>
> You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in 
> understanding consciousness.
>
>
>
> I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one 
> which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky.
>

If its primitive, it doesn't fall from the sky, the sky falls from it.
 

>
>
>> The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.
>>
>>
>> What would a UM say to the doctor?
>>
>>
>> The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a 
>> conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other 
>> direction. 
>>
>
> That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder 
> what is 3-I there to do?
>
>
>
> Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right 
> substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct 
> machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p & p, which obeys a quite 
> different logic.
>

It sounds like the 3-I is just an address.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another 
>> machine.
>> The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of 
>> any possible justification.
>> That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.
>>
>> Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non 
>> formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the 
>> machine.
>>
>>
>> Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. 
>>
>>
>> Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As 
>> you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.
>>
>

Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 8, 2014 6:51:13 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 9 April 2014 04:58, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only 
>>> until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for or 
>>> against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited 
>>> extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures etc 
>>> is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what 
>>> mechanisms have evolved and why. 
>>>
>>> For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being "for" 
>>> protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making them 
>>> harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some 
>>> experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the 
>>> stripes gave.
>>>
>>
>> Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need 
>> not have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). 
>>
>
>  Sorry old chap could you clarify 
>

Dreams need not have any possible evolutionary justification, since their 
presence or absence is irrelevant to behavior. 

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 7, 2014 11:03:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 8 April 2014 09:41, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>> On Monday, April 7, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>>>
>>> 2014-04-07 22:25 GMT+02:00 Craig Weinberg :
>>>
>>>> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but 
>>>>> that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other 
>>>>> things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing 
>>>>> to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely 
>>>> precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to 
>>>> mistake it for anything else. 
>>>>
>>>> If you say so...  
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in 
>>>>> order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous 
>>>>> ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the 
>>>>> subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you 
>>>>> conscious of, but everithing. 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so 
>>>> that we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more 
>>>> easily 
>>>> confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but 
>>>> we 
>>>> shouldn't take them seriously.
>>>>  
>>>>
>>> You could as easily say it as well that plants are aliens. and Craig is 
>>> the father of Dark Vader. Yes . You can say so. But it is not something 
>>> based on the theory of evolution, that is, natural selection and 
>>> evolutionary biology.
>>>
>>
>> What I'm saying though is that the theory of evolution can be used to 
>> advance or deny any position on dreams that we care to take. It's all 
>> reverse engineered story telling.
>>
>> There is an element of this in all evolutionary explanations, but only 
> until we are in a position to gather enough evidence to make a call for or 
> against some idea. Evolution has been observed in action, to a limited 
> extent, and the links between genes and various behaviours, structures etc 
> is becoming clearer, so we have a better idea as time goes on what 
> mechanisms have evolved and why. 
>
> For example I recently read something about zebra's stripes being "for" 
> protecting them from insects (I think it was) rather than making them 
> harder for carnivores to spot. This was because someone had done some 
> experiments to distinguish between several theories of what advantage the 
> stripes gave.
>

Sure, but mechanisms which have an effect on the world of the body need not 
have an impact on something that doesn't (like dreams). 

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, April 7, 2014 4:38:42 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2014-04-07 22:25 GMT+02:00 Craig Weinberg 
> >:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>>>
>>> Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but 
>>> that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other 
>>> things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing 
>>> to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). 
>>>
>>
>> These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely 
>> precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to 
>> mistake it for anything else. 
>>
>> If you say so...  
>
>>
>>> But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in 
>>> order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous 
>>> ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the 
>>> subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you 
>>> conscious of, but everithing. 
>>>
>>
>> You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so 
>> that we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more easily 
>> confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but we 
>> shouldn't take them seriously.
>>  
>>
> You could as easily say it as well that plants are aliens. and Craig is 
> the father of Dark Vader. Yes . You can say so. But it is not something 
> based on the theory of evolution, that is, natural selection and 
> evolutionary biology.
>

What I'm saying though is that the theory of evolution can be used to 
advance or deny any position on dreams that we care to take. It's all 
reverse engineered story telling.
 

>  
>>> And maybe, sometimes the elaborative mechanism of the dreams does work 
>>> very well. In some sense it is precognitive. 
>>>
>>> That is in order to protect your sacred skepticism ;) 
>>>
>>> 2014-04-06 7:13 GMT+02:00, Russell Standish : 
>>> > On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, 
>>> an 
>>> >> enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need 
>>> to 
>>> >> beat about the bush here. Some dreams "foretell" or synchronistically 
>>> >> coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic 
>>> >> representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain 
>>> this 
>>> >> away. 
>>> >> 
>>> > 
>>> > Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole 
>>> > life. I would call that rate "coincidence". Not statistically 
>>> > significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate 
>>> > of precognitive dreams  would be much higher, just like some people 
>>> > are more "accident prone" than others. 
>>> > 
>>> > Cheers 
>>> > 
>>> > -- 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> >  
>>>
>>> > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
>>> > Principal, High Performance Coders 
>>> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>>> > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>>> > 
>>> >  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
>>> >  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
>>> > 
>>> >  
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > -- 
>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups 
>>> > "Everything List" group. 
>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
>>> an 
>>> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. 
>>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>>> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 
>>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 
>>> > 
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Alberto. 
>>>
>>  -- 
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>
>
>
> -- 
> Alberto. 
>

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 3:13:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 06 Apr 2014, at 07:13, Russell Standish wrote: 
>
> > On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had   
> >> many, an enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't   
> >> think we need to beat about the bush here. Some dreams "foretell"   
> >> or synchronistically coincide with near-future events (usually   
> >> cloaked in some symbolic representation). Period. Jung certainly   
> >> thought so. We cannot explain this away. 
> >> 
> > 
> > Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole 
> > life. I would call that rate "coincidence". Not statistically 
> > significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate 
> > of precognitive dreams  would be much higher, just like some people 
> > are more "accident prone" than others. 
>
> I thought making precognitive dreams, and that is one of the reason   
> why I decide to have a dream diary. I continued to have such dreams,   
> but the diary made me realize that in mot case, that was more a type   
> of déjà-vu phenomenon, the predicted events occurs before the dreams.   
> So this can be judged only from massive amount of case, with the dream   
> being dated, and the pre-seen event too, and I have never found such   
> data. 
>

Your methods may be altering the results though. If you try to objectify 
meta-phenomenal experiences, they begin to reflect back the kind of 
attention you are employing and are reduced to whatever 
coincidental/insignificant form that will reinforce the prejudice.

Craig
 

> So I am not sure if there are serious evidences, which of course, by   
> itself, does not refute the precognition theory. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > Cheers 
> > 
> > -- 
> > 
> > 
>  
>
> > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> > Principal, High Performance Coders 
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> > 
> > Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
> > (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
> > 
>  
>
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,   
> > send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . 
> > To post to this group, send email to 
> > everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>
> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 2:45:35 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Probably you saw people visiting houses in your neighbourhood, but 
> that did not reached consciousnees you were busy thinking about other 
> things. (I will not insert here these funny videos of people failing 
> to recognize a bear in the middle of a scene). 
>

These kinds of dismissals are not scientific. When you have a genuinely 
precognitive experience, you would really have to bend over backward to 
mistake it for anything else. 


> But according with a theory of evolutionary psychology, dreams are in 
> order to be prepared for possible threats specially the most dangerous 
> ones. The material of the dreams is taken from past events, and the 
> subconscious takes into account not only the things that were you 
> conscious of, but everithing. 
>

You could just as easily say that dreams are in order to confuse us so that 
we will be unprepared for possible threats to weed out the more easily 
confused members of the species. Just-so stories are fun to make up, but we 
shouldn't take them seriously.
 

>
> And maybe, sometimes the elaborative mechanism of the dreams does work 
> very well. In some sense it is precognitive. 
>
> That is in order to protect your sacred skepticism ;) 
>
> 2014-04-06 7:13 GMT+02:00, Russell Standish 
> >: 
>
> > On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an 
> >> enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to 
> >> beat about the bush here. Some dreams "foretell" or synchronistically 
> >> coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic 
> >> representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain 
> this 
> >> away. 
> >> 
> > 
> > Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole 
> > life. I would call that rate "coincidence". Not statistically 
> > significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate 
> > of precognitive dreams  would be much higher, just like some people 
> > are more "accident prone" than others. 
> > 
> > Cheers 
> > 
> > -- 
> > 
> > 
>  
>
> > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> > Principal, High Performance Coders 
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> > 
> >  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
> >  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
> > 
>  
>
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> Groups 
> > "Everything List" group. 
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
> an 
> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . 
> > To post to this group, send email to 
> > everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>
> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 
> > 
>
>
> -- 
> Alberto. 
>

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:44 AM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 05:42:10AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an 
> enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to 
> beat about the bush here. Some dreams "foretell" or synchronistically 
> coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic 
> representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this 
> away. 
> > 
>
> Not sure about that. It's happened maybe 2-3 times to me in my whole 
> life. I would call that rate "coincidence". Not statistically 
> significant. YMMV :). Also, presumably by chance, some people's rate 
> of precognitive dreams  would be much higher, just like some people 
> are more "accident prone" than others. 
>

We would have to factor in the possibility that a bias toward coincidence 
(in subjects, scientists, or even the public) could alter the results. To 
seriously consider consciousness the fundamental phenomenon, we must expect 
that matters which could potentially define consciousness itself one way or 
another would be suppressed by occult means. If the universe is made of 
bias, we cannot expect it to play by the rules that it uses to keep us 
guessing.



> Cheers 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>
>  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
>  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) 
>  
>
>

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 5, 2014 3:42:10 PM UTC-4, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6 Apr 2014, at 2:23 am, Craig Weinberg > 
> wrote:
>
> It's just showing you that your awareness extends beyond your personal 
> definition of here and now
>
>
>
> Finally you got to it. It was a precognitive dream. I have had many, an 
> enormous number throughout my life in fact, so I don't think we need to 
> beat about the bush here. Some dreams "foretell" or synchronistically 
> coincide with near-future events (usually cloaked in some symbolic 
> representation). Period. Jung certainly thought so. We cannot explain this 
> away.
>

Exactly. At this point, I think that the reluctance to admit the reality of 
this phenomenon no longer deserves the benefit of the doubt. Certainly we 
would want to be open to other explanations, but I see no reason to 
seriously entertain the prejudiced views which insist that our naive 
partitioning of 'now' happens to be a universal constant.
 

>
> Kim Jones B. Mus. GDTL
>
> Email:   kimj...@ozemail.com.au 
>  kmjc...@icloud.com 
> Mobile: 0450 963 719
> Phone:  02 93894239
> Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com
>
>
> *"Never let your schooling get in the way of your education" - Mark Twain*
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

Another part 2

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the 
>> mathematics accessible to the machine. 
>>
>>
>> No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm 
>> suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a 
>> reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.
>>
>>
>> No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation.
>>
>>
>> A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses 
>> to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. 
>> Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.
>>
>>
>> False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. 
>>
>
> You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must 
> be a valid argument? 
>
>
> Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is 
> a valuation of a statement. A semantics. 
>

It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across 
sensory experiences.
 

>
>
>
> Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. 
>
>
> You confuse p and []p & p.
>

No, I deny "& p" altogether.
 

>
>
>
> They appear before logic and cognition.
>
>
> At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make sense 
> of such terms.
>

In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not 
logic without sense.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. 
>>
>
> I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.
>
>
> That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more sense" 
> is not an argument, especially in this context.
>

More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by 
>> scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then you 
>> put yourself out of the dialog.
>>
>
> Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses to see 
> all of the light.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to 
>> rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to 
>> rotate yourself).
>>
>>
>> I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. 
>>
>>
>> This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational". 
>>
>>
>> Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit 
>> ourselves to the rationality of strict logic.
>>
>>
>>
>> = "give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my 
>> prejudice against machine";
>>
>>
>> "Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my 
>> prejudice against consciousness".
>>
>>
>>
>> UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and 
>> theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when you 
>> assume computationalism.
>>
>> It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in law, and 
>> other possible machines, ability to manifest personal consciousness.
>>
>
> It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not be 
> manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is manifestation 
> itself.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required 
>> before logic.
>>
>>
>> Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that 
>> does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies.
>>
>>
>> No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An 
>> array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy.
>>
>>
>> Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason about 
>> consciousness. You m

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue
>
>
> this means you say []~comp is true.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
> Nice. 
>
>
>  
>
>
> Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in 
> that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above 
> was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of 
> comp.
>
>
> I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
>
>
> But then why are we discussing? 
>

To make more sense of everything.
 

> Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the 
> sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
>

If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp 
makes no sense.


>
>  
>
>
>
>
> just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 
> 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You 
> would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind 
> of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your 
> ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism 
> has to say about intuition, which is... not much.
>
>
> Why?
>
>
> Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.
>
>
> But this is based on arithmetic.
>

Ah, you are confusing the arithmetic with the sensible conditions that the 
arithmetic is pointing to. 


>
>
> comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this 
> many times. 
> As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.
>
>
> What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it?
>
>
>
> You are the only one who deny a theory here.
>
>
> By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p 
> perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp.
>
>
> I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, 
>

Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function 
would point outside of computation.
 

> and cannot be used to refute logically comp. 
>

Why not? Aren't you just jumping to a conclusion like 'since there are 
drive through  restaurants, it means that we cannot assume that cars are 
not hungry'.
 

> I am not denying non-comp. Not at all.
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that 
> comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.
>
>
> We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also 
> can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is 
> generated statistically by aesthetics.
>
>
>
> Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first.
>

In my theory, 1 = 1 is reflects a particular set of mathematical 
expectations. I don't make any claims on the contents of arithmetic, only 
on the nature of what arithmetic derives from.

 

>
>
>
>  
>
>
> But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. 
> The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type "let us abandon 
> logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and has zero argumentative 
> value.
>
>
> We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source 
> of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people 
> get from Godel. 
>
>
> We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We 
> don't need Gödel for this.
>

even better
 

>
>
>
> The truth does not require argumentation value. 
>
>
> Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation 
> theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it 
> is.
>

Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can 
still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor.
 

>
>
>
> If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the 
> other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true?
>
>
> Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with 
> more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many 
> things.
>

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use 
>>> it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not 
>>> apply it to "refute" comp.
>>>
>>
>> Comp can't be refuted logically. 
>>
>>
>> Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted 
>> logically, arithmetically, and empirically.
>>
>
> It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in bias of 
> logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego have their 
> biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical thinking have an agenda 
> which undersignifies its competition.
>
>
>
> You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which 
> empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to be 
> illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter. 
>

You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict 
logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were talking 
about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports the limits of 
logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that standard if my view 
is true. 
 

>
> How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the table, 
> but here you put a gun on the table.
>

Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It acts like 
it is following laws but it cheats and then blames something else. At least 
I'm telling you it's a gun, you've convinced yourself that your gun is just 
a polite hypothesis.


> The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part of 
> common sense, and war or violence.
>

It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense that 
it cannot parse the germ of sense, which is absolutely unprecedented. 
Identity is not just uncommon, but the opposite - unrepeatable, 
proprietary, anti-mechnical. There is no choice at all. There is the 
illusion of logic and the reality of having to carve some kind of genuine 
sanity out of this thing, moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us 
permission, we lose the moment.
 

>
> Your theory is "don't ask", but I realize also "don't argue". 
>

Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact that it 
doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a logical machine. 
It is comp which ultimately makes asking and arguing irrelevant, but it 
does so like a vampire - obligating us to invite us in..be fair to the 
imposter and let him take your brain. 
 

>
> That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but that is 
> not an argument against comp.
> (And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course).
>

It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory. If it comes down to 
choosing between the certainty of life and awareness as you know it and 
taking a gamble on logic and computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If 
we aren't being faced with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would 
we gamble with our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>>> Randomness comes up in comp predictions?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. At step seven, as the UD will notably dovetail on all normal 
>>> differentiation, on a continuum. The iterated WM self-duplication is a part 
>>> of UD*.
>>>
>>
>> What becomes random, and why?
>>
>>
>>
>> Are you OK with step 3 of the UDA?
>>
>
> I don't think so. Teleportation?
>
>
>
> No, the FPI. The fact that you cannot predict, in your personal diary, 
> what you will write tomorrow, when you will be copied and sent at two 
> different places simultaneously (or not).
>

Nothing like that is going to happen. There aren't going to be any copies 
of me.
 

>
>
>
>
> Sociopaths and actors refute comp. Blindsight refutes comp. Keyboard 
> passwords refute comp. Sports refute comp. etc.
>
>
> You do have a problem with logic.
>

Maybe I do, because I don't see how that follows. When I list examples, you 
change the subject every time.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> I am just saying that you have not prove that comp is false. Telling me 
>> that I have not proved comp will not do the work, as comp implies that no 
>> such proof can ever exist.
>>
>
> It's not a matter of proof, because proof has nothing to do with 
> cons

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in 
> the context of a sense making experience.
>
>
> Did I ever said the contrary?
>
>
> Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense 
> making and sense experience.
>
>
> It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. 
> That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical 
> representation. 
> Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove 
> the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The 
> universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. 
>
>
> It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame 
> of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If 
> there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to 
> shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding 
> numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes 
> everything (including, but not limited to numbers).
>
>
> You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of 
> many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some 
> work).
>
>
> Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to 
> do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not 
> mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers.
>
>
>
> Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. 
> But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse 
> ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
>
> I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue
>
>
> this means you say []~comp is true.
>

Yes.
 

>
> Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in 
> that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above 
> was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of 
> comp.
>

I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
 

>
>
>
> just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 
> 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You 
> would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind 
> of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your 
> ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism 
> has to say about intuition, which is... not much.
>
>
> Why?
>

Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a 
> gift by Santa Klaus.
>
> And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence 
> of Santa Klaus.
>
> Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my 
> entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.
>
>
> I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the 
> impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that 
> it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.
>
>
>
> Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. 
> But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or 
> defining autonomous intent. 
>
>
> I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to 
> explain qualia and awareness.
>
>
>
> It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect 
> predictions. 
>
> But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>
>
> There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, 
> then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.
>
>
>
> comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this 
> many times. 
> As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.
>
>
> What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it?
>
>
>
> You are the only one who deny a theory here.
>

By saying that ~comp is

Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, April 5, 2014 1:35:26 AM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 5 April 2014 15:10, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 4, 2014 6:00:09 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> Last night just before I woke up I had a dream about a guy coming to the 
>>> door selling religion, so to speak - the details were a bit weird, as in 
>>> most dreams, but that was the gist of it - I sent him away, saying "no 
>>> thanks we don't indulge" or words to that effect.
>>>
>>> I've never had a dream of that sort, at least not that I can recall.
>>>
>>> A few minutes ago, for the first time since we've been in this house (1 
>>> and a half years) - indeed the first time in a lot longer than that - a guy 
>>> came to the door with a copy of the "Watchtower" and a personal message 
>>> from God. I sent him away, but ... I was a bit shaken.
>>>
>>> Charles also had a weird recurring dream for several years about a 
>>> situation he has now found himself in, to do with work, which has freaked 
>>> him out a bit, although his makes more sense as a "worry dream".
>>>
>>> Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence ... isn't it?
>>>
>>
>> Personally I think that you have to add in the fact that you took notice 
>> of the happenstance, so already it was a potential coincidence. By the time 
>> it recurs, it is slightly more than a coincidence. What does it mean? I 
>> think not much but it offers a glimpse into the larger nature of time as 
>> rooted in experience rather than physics.
>>
>> I'm not sure I understand what you mean. I took notice of it because 
> it was quite an unusual and memorable dream 
>

Right, that's why it was already a pattern. Being unusual and memorable is 
a kind of coincidence in itself. Your personal awareness is being alerted 
that there is something to notice that may be clarified later.
 

> - not so much the detail about the guy being a bible basher (although that 
> was unusual) but some of the attendant details - odd features that made me 
> tell Charles about it as soon as I woke up.
>

Yes, it's not about the contents of the dream as much as the alignment of 
the dream with future reality. It's just showing you that your awareness 
extends beyond your personal definition of here and now, and reflecting 
back to you that you consider that kind of thing an intrusion. Not that I'm 
a dream expert, it could mean something else, I'm just going by my 
experience with synchronicity. The fact that you told Charles about it too 
can be considered even another coincidence, as far as it being something 
that you chose to do in response to the dream instead of doing nothing and 
forgetting about it. 

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Re: My scepticism took a small knock today

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, April 4, 2014 6:00:09 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> Last night just before I woke up I had a dream about a guy coming to the 
> door selling religion, so to speak - the details were a bit weird, as in 
> most dreams, but that was the gist of it - I sent him away, saying "no 
> thanks we don't indulge" or words to that effect.
>
> I've never had a dream of that sort, at least not that I can recall.
>
> A few minutes ago, for the first time since we've been in this house (1 
> and a half years) - indeed the first time in a lot longer than that - a guy 
> came to the door with a copy of the "Watchtower" and a personal message 
> from God. I sent him away, but ... I was a bit shaken.
>
> Charles also had a weird recurring dream for several years about a 
> situation he has now found himself in, to do with work, which has freaked 
> him out a bit, although his makes more sense as a "worry dream".
>
> Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence ... isn't it?
>

Personally I think that you have to add in the fact that you took notice of 
the happenstance, so already it was a potential coincidence. By the time it 
recurs, it is slightly more than a coincidence. What does it mean? I think 
not much but it offers a glimpse into the larger nature of time as rooted 
in experience rather than physics.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in 
> the context of a sense making experience.
>
>
> Did I ever said the contrary?
>
>
> Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense 
> making and sense experience.
>
>
> It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. 
> That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical 
> representation. 
> Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove 
> the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The 
> universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. 
>
>
> It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame 
> of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If 
> there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to 
> shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding 
> numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes 
> everything (including, but not limited to numbers).
>
>
> You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of 
> many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some 
> work).
>

Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to 
do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not 
mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers.
 

>  
>

>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
> All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a 
> gift by Santa Klaus.
>
> And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence 
> of Santa Klaus.
>
> Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my 
> entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense.
>
>
> I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the 
> impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that 
> it is safe from gaining autonomous intent.
>
>
>
> Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. 
> But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or 
> defining autonomous intent. 
>
>
> I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to 
> explain qualia and awareness.
>
>
>
> It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect 
> predictions. 
>
> But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp.
>

There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, 
then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt.


>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
> But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating 
> formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, 
> interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. 
>
> But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the 
> use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. 
>
>
> Not valid by what epistemology though? 
>
>
> Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal 
> standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but 
> then made explicit.
>
>
> It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for 
> consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness 
> comes from logic.
>
>
>
> Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess 
> you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie.
>
> You make my point.
>

You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness 
by the standard of logic, even though we know from the start that our 
access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, 
and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to 
make him seem human.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>
>
>
> It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to 
> refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial.
>
>
>
> If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it 
> explicit. 
>
>
> I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all 
> possible logic with the deeper reality of sense.
>
>
> Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know 
> th

Re: My model re Comp and Life re the Everything

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 30, 2014 7:21:29 PM UTC-4, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> Hi everyone:
>  
> I am currently interested in two questions:
>  
> Does my model of why there are dynamic universes within the Everything 
> [latest version is below] include Bruno's Comp?  Hi Bruno.
>  
> If life is inherently self destructive under any reasonable definition of 
> life [see some of my recent posts], then how does this impact the 
> Everything since I see it as a restriction [selection] on the scope of 
> possible universes? 
>  
> Comments welcome. 
>  
> Thanks
>  
> Hal Ruhl
>  
>  
>  
>
> DEFINITIONS:
>
>  
>
> i) Distinction:
>
>  
>
> That which enables a separation such as a particular red from other colors.
>

I call this Sense.
 

>  
>
> ii) Devisor:
>
>  
>
> That which encloses a quantity [zero to every] of distinctions. [Some 
> divisors are thus collections of divisors.] 
>

I would call this a quale (as in qualia)
 

>  
>
> iii): Define “N”s as those divisors that enclose zero distinction.   Call 
> them Nothing(s).
>

This is not necessary to me. Something that functions only to enclose and 
does not enclose anything need not be reified. It's not 'Nothing', there 
just isn't anything there to define.
 

>  
>
> iv): Define “S”s as divisors that enclose a non zero number of 
> distinctions but not all distinctions.  Call them Something(s). 
>

These are still just qualia. There doesn't need to be a 'nothing' defined, 
so any sense encounter or sense distinction is 'something'. Note that by 
saying that sense encounter, I am extending sense even beneath the level of i) 
Distinction. We need not be able to experience distinct difference to have 
awareness. Awareness makes distinctions and appreciated the, but 
distinctions are not things in themselves. We can tell the difference 
between anger and sadness, but they need not be distinct, nor does either 
one need to be made distinct to be felt. Anger is a self-evident condition 
of (our) experience which is not generated by distinctions.
 

>  
>
>  
>
> MODEL:
>
>  
>
> 1) Assumption # A1: There exists a set consisting of all possible 
> divisors. Call this set “A”.
>

I would call this the Absolute.
 

>  
>
> “A” encompasses every distinction. “A” is thus itself a divisor by 
> definition (i) and therefore contains itself an unbounded number of times 
> [“A” contains “A” which contains “A” and so on. 
>

So far so good.
 

>  
>
> 2) An issue that arises is whether or not an individual specific divisor 
> is static or dynamic. That is: Is its quantity of distinction subject to 
> change? It cannot be both.
>

It can be both, neither, or one and not the other in some frame of 
reference ('in some sense'). In your terms I would say that each 
Divisor/Quale (Q) is made distinct from A by its signature perspectives of 
A (A minus Q), and its signature perspectives of every Other Q (O). For me 
the Earth is flat or round. For an rabbit it is only flat. For a rabbit on 
a spaceship it is only a round image. What is static or dynamic is a 
function of the relative scale of Q to O. 

 

>  
>
> This requires that all divisors individually enclose the self referential 
> distinction of being static or dynamic. 
>

I can move or I can sit still. I need not choose a label of which one I am.
 

>  
>
> 3) At least one divisor type - the “N”s, by definition (iii), enclose no 
> such distinction but by (2) they must enclose this one.
>

Lost me there. Why would nothing have to be defined as static or dynamic. 
Nothing can be neither. Stasis and motion are distinctions (qualia) just 
like everything else.
 

>   This is a type of incompleteness.  [A complete divisor can answer any 
> self meaningful question but not necessarily consistently i.e. sometimes 
> one way sometimes another] That is the “N”s cannot answer this question 
> which is nevertheless meaningful to them.  [The incompleteness is taken 
> to be rather similar functionally to the incompleteness of some 
> mathematical Formal Axiomatic Systems – See Godel.]
>

Once you define something as Nothings, you can't do anything with them. 
They are neither complete nor incomplete. They are certainly not capable of 
becoming aware of the meaningfulness of a question. Incompleteness relates 
to the limitations of formal representation, not to ontology. 

 
>
> The “N” are thus unstable with respect to their initial condition.  They 
> each must at some point spontaneously enclose this stability distinction.  
> They thereby transition into “S”s. 
>

I can get behind a notion of Almost Nothing (±N), in which case I would 
agree in the instability in which there is a fluctuation toward and away 
from distinction. The transition is not objective though - it is the 
perspective, the window of sense through which distinctions are made that 
is giving the appearance of transition. From the perspective of A, beyond 
time, the transition is eternal, instantaneous, and everything in between.

  
>
> 4) By (3) Transitions bet

Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:35:18 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 27 March 2014 04:00, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-
>>>> is-not-a-computation-2
>>>>
>>>> Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without 
>>>> knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his 
>>>> argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on 
>>>> consciousness, ... and on matter. 
>>>>
>>>
>>> He's just another example of the growing number of people who are 
>>> familiar with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that 
>>> consciousness does not arise through computation.
>>>
>>>
>>> He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 
>>> 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at 
>>> least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.
>>>
>>
>> You don't know what he knows.
>>
>
> You know what he publishes, which is a good proxy.
>

What he publishes gives me every indication that he knows his way around 
computer science.

 

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 6:40:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
>>
>>
>> Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without 
>> knowing it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his 
>> argument is along the line of begging the question entirely on 
>> consciousness, ... and on matter. 
>>
>
> He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar 
> with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does 
> not arise through computation.
>
>
> He is just awakening to the comp mind-body problem, (like all 
> 1p-machines), but not yet to its solution, which is indeed shocking, at 
> least for people unaware of Everett, FPI, and all that.
>

You don't know what he knows.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 9:19:35 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 25 March 2014 02:59, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>>
>> If you are living, you already understand what living is.
>>
>
> Are you telling me a potato plant - which is undeniably alive - 
> understands what living is? If so, this seems to either elevate potatoes to 
> conscious beings, or else to reduce the meaning of "understand" to 
> something trivial.
>

I would not imagine that there is any understanding of life as a potato, 
but there is probably an understanding of water, temperature, probably soil 
density...not in those terms obviously, but there is an experience going 
on. A plants life might be more comparable with the life of a single 
emotion. A blooming flower looks like a feeling. The whole life of that 
flower may, in some sense, 'be' that feeling. Not a feeling that belongs to 
the thing that we see as a flower, but a feeling in general. Just as the 
gold qualities of gold don't belong to any piece of gold in particular, 
most experiences in the universe may not be localized in the same way that 
a freaked out hominid's mind is.

Craig 

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 11:42:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Mar 2014, at 21:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
>
>
> Come on, the guy believe in Aristotelian theology, clearly without knowing 
> it, and he believes that a computer is material, etc. Then his argument is 
> along the line of begging the question entirely on consciousness, ... and 
> on matter. 
>

He's just another example of the growing number of people who are familiar 
with AI from the inside who are willing to admit that consciousness does 
not arise through computation.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 24, 2014 5:15:04 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
> He gives six evidences.
>
> First, he falls for quantum pseudoscience.
>

He only says that what has been observed suggests that it is possible that 
consciousness is fundamental.
 

> Second, he says that he personally failed to make AI when he tried and 
> incorrectly implies that difficulty means impossibility.
>

You overlook the possibility that he failed because it does happen to be 
impossible. You incorrectly imply that difficulty means possibility.

 

> Third, he brings up the hard problem and uses it to make an argument from 
> ignorance.
>

That doesn't mean the complete absence of progress on it should be 
dismissed.
 

> Fourth, he says he doesn't know how to define what he means by 
> consciousness, and then makes another argument from ignorance.
>

There is no evidence that suggests that consciousness needs to be defined. 
What definition do you claim contradicts his argument?
 

> Fifth, he repeats the mistaken Berkeley's Master argument.
>

Unconvincing.
 

> Sixth, he falls for NDE pseudoscience.
>

He explicitly states that he does not insist that the evidence is valid, 
only that there are increasingly high quality studies which contradict the 
narrow, normative view of consciousness. He is not wrong.


> Unconvincing. 
>

Unsubstantiated criticism.

Craig
 

>
> On Monday, March 24, 2014 3:36:43 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
>>
>

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Re: Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 24, 2014 5:13:26 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 25 March 2014 07:36, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>
>> http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2
>>
>
>
> He could make similar arguments claiming consciousness is not chemistry.
>

In that case, he would still be correct.
 

>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Nova Spivack on 'Consciousness is More Fundamental Than Computation'

[Craig Weinberg]

http://www.novaspivack.com/uncategorized/consciousness-is-not-a-computation-2

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Continued...
>
> On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>
>> I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of 
>>> reality.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is 
>> not.
>>
>
> Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.
>
>
>
> It depends on the theory we assume. 
>

You don't see the double standard there?
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, 
>>> and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical 
>>> evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the 
>>> study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and 
>>> this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't take arithmetic for granted.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. 
>>>
>>
>> Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. 
>> Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it 
>> does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.
>>
>>
>> Question begging.
>>
>
> If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging?
>
>
> Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies 
> only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already 
> derivable from comp.
>

The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does 
not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. The fact that it is unbelievable 
is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our 
expectations from comp do not match, and indeed are counter-factual.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of 
>>> consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is 
>>> forever incompatible with empirical evidence.
>>>
>>>
>>> Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a 
>>> solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to 
>>> attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of 
>>> []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and 
>>> knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.
>>>
>>>
>>> Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I 
>>> care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.
>>>
>>>
>>> I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?
>>>
>>
>> Because consciousness is what cares.
>>
>>
>>
>> Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.
>>
>
> Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.
>
>
> No, that self-consciousness. 
>

That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 
'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. 
>>>
>>> I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put 
>>> sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and 
>>> you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p 
>>> & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow 
>>> waters of modal logic 

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

Continued...

On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>
> I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of 
>> reality.
>>
>
>
> Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is 
> not.
>

Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either.
 

>
>
> I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, 
>> and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical 
>> evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the 
>> study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive.
>>
>>
>> It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. 
>>
>>
>> Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this 
>> includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis.
>>
>>
>> I don't take arithmetic for granted.
>>
>>
>>
>> Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. 
>>
>
> Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. 
> Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it 
> does on Earth: to keep track of things and events.
>
>
> Question begging.
>

If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging?
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of 
>> consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is 
>> forever incompatible with empirical evidence.
>>
>>
>> Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a 
>> solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to 
>> attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of 
>> []p & p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and 
>> knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description.
>>
>>
>> Truth and knowledge, []p & p...these things are meaningless to me. All I 
>> care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing.
>>
>>
>> I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue?
>>
>
> Because consciousness is what cares.
>
>
>
> Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this.
>

Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>> And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. 
>>
>> I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put 
>> sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and 
>> you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p 
>> & p to the usual "scientific and 3p" []p. 
>>
>>
>> I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow 
>> waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of  sense.
>>
>>
>> Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not 
>> studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o
>>
>
> I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying 
> to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the 
> way.
>
>
> The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense 
> other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman 
> error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into 
> pseudo-religion.
>

It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. It's about grounding 
physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of 
God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and 
prejudice toward this possibility interesting.


Craig

 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig 
>
>> ...
>
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 21, 2014 2:11:17 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 21, 2014 12:42:13 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the 
>> assumptions from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical 
>> models of consciousness arise.
>>
>
> OK.  Would you mind defining which assumptions you're thinking of?
>

The assumptions that forms and functions can exist independently of 
perception and participation.
 

>  
>
>>  
>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>> They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is not a prediction of CTM.  Here's a relevant quote from the 
>>> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Turing himself seems to have been of 
>>> the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing 
>>> the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it 
>>> would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have 
>>> suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the 
>>> human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps 
>>> through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the 
>>> human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same 
>>> thing in all relevant respects."
>>>
>>
>> Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans 
>> and modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that 
>> consciousness is driven by logic and computation. 
>>
>
> Right, modality (in)dependent communication neither supports nor opposes 
> the idea that consciousness is computation.  
>

No, the fact that modality independent communication does not appear until 
human experience does oppose the idea that consciousness is computation, 
since computation is by definition modality independent.
 

> In CTM, brains doing modality-dependent computations would have minds 
> experiencing sense-data qualia, and brains doing modality-independent 
> computations would have minds experiencing abstract qualia.
>
> Argh, CTM has nothing to do with brains. That would be a BTM.

Craig
 

> -Gabe
>

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Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 21, 2014 1:04:46 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 8:48:30 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:01:43 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:16:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>>>   It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of 
>>>>> sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into 
>>>>> those associations.  There's nothing obviously intractable about 
>>>>> describing 
>>>>> such data input and analysis in computational terms.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger 
>>>> or food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and 
>>>> five 
>>>> (
>>>> http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png
>>>> )
>>>>
>>>
>>> BTW, that chart is about the most-conserved words in the Indo-European 
>>> family of languages.  It says nothing either way about what the earliest 
>>> words were.
>>>
>>
>> Most conserved = earliest words that are still in use.
>>
>
> Indeed, but that doesn't rescue the original point.  The earliest words 
> still in use today don't tell us what the earliest words were. 
>

Right, but it can still tell us something about how communication 
progresses.
 

>  
>
>> Computationalism need not have anything to do with the brain. It's about 
>> consciousness arising from computation, i.e., it supports strong AI, which 
>> would not be about brains.
>>
>
> Ah, that's an important comment.  You are indeed talking about a specific 
> kind of CTM that wasn't clear to me.  Thanks for clarifying.  The usual 
> sense of CTM is that consciousness is literally computation, not that it 
> arises from computation.
>

Either way, we would not expect computations to emerge as 
modality-dependent.
 

>  
>
>> The brain doesn't figure into this at all. My point was that if 
>> consciousness is computation, and qualia are just complex computational 
>> labels, then we should expect languages to develop from simple, 
>> modal-independent forms to modal-dependent forms in which computations 
>> become so diversified that the lose any common vocabulary. Would you agree 
>> that this is precisely the opposite of what is seen in nature?
>>
>
> Yes, I still agree about how we observe language to form.  It's just that 
> your characterization of CTM as making the predictions you mention is 
> wrong.  It only makes those predictions when supplemented with additional 
> assumptions that are not generally part of CTM.
>

I'm not so much interested in defining CTM, as in exploding the assumptions 
from which CTM and other mechanistic, information-theoretical models of 
consciousness arise.
 

>  
>
>> They don't reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM.
>>
>
> That is not a prediction of CTM.  Here's a relevant quote from the 
> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "Turing himself seems to have been of 
> the opinion that a machine operating in this way would literally be doing 
> the same things that the human performing computations is doing—that it 
> would be 'duplicating' what the human computer does. But other writers have 
> suggested that what the computer does is merely a 'simulation' of what the 
> human computer does: a reproduction of human-level performance, perhaps 
> through a set of steps that is [at] some level isomorphic to those the 
> human undertakes, but not in such a fashion as to constitute doing the same 
> thing in all relevant respects."
>

Again, either way the development of modality-dependence in non-humans and 
modality-independence in humans does not support the idea that 
consciousness is driven by logic and computation. That is clearly a more 
recent development. In the same way, any instance of computation we can 
find can be reduced to a deeper level of sensory-motive interaction. 

Craig


> -Gabe
>

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Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:01:43 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:16:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>>  
>>
>>>   It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of 
>>> sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into 
>>> those associations.  There's nothing obviously intractable about describing 
>>> such data input and analysis in computational terms.
>>>
>>
>> If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or 
>> food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five (
>> http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png
>> )
>>
>
> BTW, that chart is about the most-conserved words in the Indo-European 
> family of languages.  It says nothing either way about what the earliest 
> words were.
>

Most conserved = earliest words that are still in use.
 

>  
>
>> Sure, yeah I'm not saying that animals can't reason abstractly, I'm 
>> pointing out yet another example where the computationalist theory fails to 
>> match up with what it would predict. If we apply CTM to communications, we 
>> should expect all language to develop independent of modality and develop 
>> modal dependence through increasing layers of complexity. CTM demands that 
>> qualia is complex, not simple - that something like pain is not actually a 
>> feeling but in fact a tremendously complex computation that is labeled as a 
>> feeling by a complex computation (for no particular reason, other than 
>> labels could theoretically be feelings). 
>>
>
> Pardon?  The computational theory of mind is an attempt to explain what 
> the mind is and how it relates to the brain.  It doesn't make any 
> predictions about how the brain should function unless you add a host of 
> additional assumptions.  To get to your prediction, you'd need CTM plus 
> assumptions like these:
>
> * The mind-computation is fundamental and the brain is derivative of it. 
>

Computationalism need not have anything to do with the brain. It's about 
consciousness arising from computation, i.e., it supports strong AI, which 
would not be about brains.
 

> The brain is a physical reification of the mind-computation that "fleshes 
> out" the mind-computation with somewhat arbitrary additional physical 
> detail.
> * The mind-computation underlying the brain is an indepedent process from 
> any computation underlying the brain's environment.
>

The brain doesn't figure into this at all. My point was that if 
consciousness is computation, and qualia are just complex computational 
labels, then we should expect languages to develop from simple, 
modal-independent forms to modal-dependent forms in which computations 
become so diversified that the lose any common vocabulary. Would you agree 
that this is precisely the opposite of what is seen in nature?
 

>
> If we keep CTM but reject these assumptions, then we can't conclude that 
> language should develop independently of modality
>

But it doesn't.
 

> and develop it due to the outworking of the mind-computation adding 
> increasing layers of complexity.  If instead the mind-computation is 
> derivative of the brain, as most advocates of CTM suppose, then the brain's 
> development would constrain the computation, not the reverse. 
>

If the brain is constrained, even more reason to presume 
modality-independence from the start. If you don't have a lot of RAM, then 
your text is more likely to have fewer fonts, and the first digital systems 
have only a single font. What we see in nature is that everyone but us has 
lots of alphabets and fonts but they don't share a common logic. They don't 
reduce to a binary code like we would expect them to in CTM.
 

> If the mind-computation is embedded in a larger computation, say, of the 
> universe, then there is no reason to expect it to develop independently.
>

The reason is that computation is based on simple logical rules which are 
independent of complex labels that are supposed to be interpreted as qualia.
 

>
> All that is to say that I think you're using a very particular variation 
> on CTM.  Your conclusions are sensible regarding it, but they don't apply 
> to CTM generally.
>

I think that they apply to any philosophy or theory which is sympathetic to 
the idea that computation or information is more fundamental than qualia or 
consciousness

Craig
. 

>
> -Gabe
>

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Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 20, 2014 11:09:39 AM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:25:44 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:06:37 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> But all the forms of language do share a common logical basis, according 
>>> to many linguists.  How is it relevant to the logic of a language that it 
>>> can be expressed in different modalities?
>>>
>>
>> It's not relevant to the logic of the language, its relevant to the 
>> overall nature of language. If language were logical, then they would be 
>> universally modality-independent, but what the evidence seems to indicate 
>> is that pure logic or information is not the relevant aspect in developing 
>> language. What matters is the aesthetic engagement. It's about touching and 
>> feeling, not knowing and believing. 
>>>
>>>
> Why would a logical language have to modality-independent? 
>

Because the whole point of logic is to be modality independent.We use logic 
to program computers so that all of our computers can talk to each other. 
If we add a new kind of file for flavors, we don't need to change the 
language, only add a new piece of hardware to stimulate our taste buds or 
brain.
 

> My language developed, presumably, because my brain had sensory data and 
> reward signals it could use to form associations between useful sensory 
> coincidences.
>

Can't your brain form associations between useful sensory coincidences 
without language? Think of your immune system for example. Hundreds of 
billions of cells making billions of new cells all the time...all 
coordinated and integrated to identify and neutralize pathogens. They 
presumably form useful and critically important associations, yet with no 
brain, and possibly no language. I think that the less we presume about the 
development of anything related to consciousness the better off we'll be.
 

>   It formed increasingly high-level associations between bundles of 
> sensory data, eventually also combining sounds and vocal behavior into 
> those associations.  There's nothing obviously intractable about describing 
> such data input and analysis in computational terms.
>

If that were true, the oldest words would describe things like danger or 
food, but they don't. They are concepts like I, who, two, three and five 
(http://media.tumblr.com/8b5d411063f5291737c4a36681474205/tumblr_inline_mmrdbhECQY1qz4rgp.png)

I'm not saying that language isn't computational, I'm saying that for every 
animal except humans, the computational aspect is not primary.
 

>  
>
>>  Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts 
>>> across aesthetic modalities,
>>>
>>
>> That appears untrue.  I know birds, mammals, some molluscs, and some fish 
>> can reason abstractly about motor behaviors and achieve the same goal with 
>> very different kinds of motor behaviors.
>>
>> You'll have to argue with the Wiki about that...
>>
>> "Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible 
>> properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally 
>> impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song 
>> repertoire equally in visual display. Indeed, in the case of animal 
>> communication, message and modality are not capable of being disentangled. 
>> Whatever message is being conveyed stems from intrinsic properties of the 
>> signal." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech
>>
>> 'Intrinsic properties of the signal' = aesthetic texture.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>
> Ah - You didn't specify at first that the "abstraction layer" had to be 
> about communication.  It looked like you were intending to make a general 
> point about aesthetic modality and information content.  As a general point 
> it's untrue.  Lots of animals reason abstractly in certain circumstances.  
> But I could believe it's true or nearly true about communication.  
>

Sure, yeah I'm not saying that animals can't reason abstractly, I'm 
pointing out yet another example where the computationalist theory fails to 
match up with what it would predict. If we apply CTM to communications, we 
should expect all language to develop independent of modality and develop 
modal dependence through increasing layers of complexity. CTM demands that 
qualia is complex, not simple - that something like pain is not actually a 
feeling but in fact a tremendously complex computation that is labeled as a 
feeling by a complex computation (f

Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 20, 2014 12:05:08 AM UTC-4, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 20 March 2014 15:25, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
>
>> It means that birds squawk because they like the feeling and sound of it. 
>> The intention of using the squawking to convey information is optional and 
>> evolves much later.
>>
>
> As stated, that strikes me as unlikely, because simply squawking for the 
> hell of it is liable to get you eaten, or to give away your location to 
> your prey. So it carries a negative evolutionary "cost" (so to squawk) and 
> seems unlikely to have evolved *just *because birds enjoy doing it.
>

Not necessarily. If the other birds like the squawking also, they may stick 
around and their collective squawking may drive away predators, or make 
them more confident and vigilant. The squawking may invigorate the birds 
(after all, roosters have been used as something of a natural alarm clock 
for humans). I challenge anyone to come up with one of these just-so 
stories about evolution that cannot be negated by an equally likely 
counter-narrative. Without knowing the totality of the environment, 
exterior and interior, past and future, there is really no way to falsify 
any hypothesis about behaviors that involve subjectivity. For purely 
morphological phenomena, purely evolutionary explanations work well, but 
there is nothing scientific in my view about presuming that life is 
essentially about survival and work. The universe is primarily decorative 
IMO. It's about play. The work is in the service of more interesting play.



> However, that having been said, it *also* seems very unlikely to me that 
> squawking appeared because it was useful for communication. Because it 
> wouldn't have been, to start with - noises can only convey information once 
> someone else knows what they mean - and of course, evolution can't "look 
> ahead" to see that something might come in useful in 100 generations time.
>

Yes, exactly. 

>
> It seems most likely to me that certain sounds just tend to accompany 
> certain physical actions or emotional states (or both) as a by-product, 
>

Emergence and by-products are Santa Claus to me. The universe is a 
by-product of the unknown to begin with.
 

> and that for some of these noises there isn't any evolutionary pressure to 
> keep them quiet (as there would be, say, to stop a bird of prey shrieking 
> with joy when it sees a potential dinner scampering across the grass 
> below). So most noises made by animals would start as "spandrels" - 
> by-products of existence with no significance. 
>

The concept of spandrels only makes sense if there is some compelling 
reason to expect that some mutation had some initial reason for propagating 
that is no longer relevant, but in cases like these, when we are really 
talking about the entire animal kingdom's desire to gesture and make 
noises, I think it's wayy too convenient of an explanation.
 

> Some noises would, in fact, have an evolutionary cost, and hence selection 
> pressure would tend to suppress them. This has happened to cats, for 
> example, for various movements accompanying hunting. Others might be useful 
> for panicking prey or letting you locate other members of your species, 
> even if they didn't convey any information except "I'm here!" And some 
> would be evolutionarily neutral, so evolving a method of keeping them quiet 
> would be more trouble than it was worth from the viewpoint of a selfish 
> gene 
>

> But given that such noises existed, over time they might come to be 
> recognised by other members of the same species as denoting certain things 
> - hence members of the species "realised" they could get useful information 
> from some noise their species made (or their genes did, at least). 
>

I doubt it. Useful information is overrated. "*It is a tale told by an 
idiot, full of sound and fury signifying nothing.*" Life is experience, not 
information.
 

> Once that happened, the information content of the noise would be able to 
> co-evolve with the ability to detect and understand it, and once that 
> process started, it could branch out into unexpected side-alleys - mating 
> cries, warning cries, and even in our case a full-blown language.
>

We use language to convey information, information would not need anything 
else to convey itself. How could it? We are real, and our language is real, 
but the information that we convey through our language is only the 
relation between us, our experience, and our language. We are not part of 
information, information is a description of what we impart to each other.

Craig 

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Re: Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 10:06:37 PM UTC-4, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 8:24:33 PM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Another knife in the heart of CTM, IMO...
>>
>
> It took several minutes of Googling to find a plausible expansion of CTM, 
> at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ . I guess 
> objectively that's hardly any work at all compared to what would have been 
> needed in the past, but in the modern world it feels like that makes "CTM" 
> incredibly cryptic. :D
>  
>
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech
>>  
>>
>>> A striking feature of language is that it is modality-independent. 
>>> Should an impaired child be prevented from hearing or producing sound, its 
>>> innate capacity to master a language may equally find expression in 
>>> signing [...]
>>>
>>> This feature is extraordinary. Animal communication systems routinely 
>>> combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is 
>>> modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for 
>>> example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. "
>>>
>>
>> This would be hard to explain if consciousness were due to information 
>> processing, as we would expect all communication to share a common logical 
>> basis. 
>>
>
> But all the forms of language do share a common logical basis, according 
> to many linguists.  How is it relevant to the logic of a language that it 
> can be expressed in different modalities?
>

It's not relevant to the logic of the language, its relevant to the overall 
nature of language. If language were logical, then they would be 
universally modality-independent, but what the evidence seems to indicate 
is that pure logic or information is not the relevant aspect in developing 
language. What matters is the aesthetic engagement. It's about touching and 
feeling, not knowing and believing.
 

>  
>
>> The fact that only human language is modality invariant suggests that 
>> communication, as an expression of consciousness is local to aesthetic 
>> textures rather than information-theoretic configurations.
>>
>
> "local to aesthetic textures ..." -- would you mind recasting the sentence 
> into more concrete terms?  I haven't the foggiest idea what you're trying 
> to communicate.
>

It means that birds squawk because they like the feeling and sound of it. 
The intention of using the squawking to convey information is optional and 
evolves much later.


>  Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts 
>> across aesthetic modalities,
>>
>
> That appears untrue.  I know birds, mammals, some molluscs, and some fish 
> can reason abstractly about motor behaviors and achieve the same goal with 
> very different kinds of motor behaviors.
>

You'll have to argue with the Wiki about that...

"Animal communication systems routinely combine visible with audible 
properties and effects, but not one is modality independent. No vocally 
impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for example, could express its song 
repertoire equally in visual display. Indeed, in the case of animal 
communication, message and modality are not capable of being disentangled. 
Whatever message is being conveyed stems from intrinsic properties of the 
signal." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech

'Intrinsic properties of the signal' = aesthetic texture.

Craig



> -Gabe
>

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Modality Independence

[Craig Weinberg]

Another knife in the heart of CTM, IMO...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_speech
 

> A striking feature of language is that it is modality-independent. Should 
> an impaired child be prevented from hearing or producing sound, its innate 
> capacity to master a language may equally find expression in signing [...]
>
> This feature is extraordinary. Animal communication systems routinely 
> combine visible with audible properties and effects, but not one is 
> modality independent. No vocally impaired whale, dolphin or songbird, for 
> example, could express its song repertoire equally in visual display. "
>

This would be hard to explain if consciousness were due to information 
processing, as we would expect all communication to share a common logical 
basis. The fact that only human language is modality invariant suggests 
that communication, as an expression of consciousness is local to aesthetic 
textures rather than information-theoretic configurations.

Since only humans have evolved to create an abstraction layer that cuts 
across aesthetic modalities, it would appear that between aesthetic 
modality and information content, aesthetic modality is the more 
fundamental and natural phenomenon. Information is derived from conscious 
presentation, not the other way around.

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I 
>> say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that 
>> it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make 
>> them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response 
>> has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more 
>> advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except 
>> that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds 
>> of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no 
>> reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't 
>> produce computation.
>>
>>
>>
>> You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. 
>>
>
> I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument 
> against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in 
> presuming equality with living creatures, 
>
>
> ?
> The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior. Your 
> "theory" single out the living. 
>

I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced 
histories and generic information. Our histories just so happen to follow 
the biological>zoological>anthropological branch, but I would not expect 
any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic 
information.


>
> but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which 
> computation is not apparent.
>
>
> Behavior is not apparent. 
>

Why not?
 

>
>
> Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, 
>> or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp 
>> does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, 
>> infinitely many bodies).
>>
>
> Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, 
> with no improvement on bridging it.
>
>
> On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person 
> reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of 
> knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of 
> quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You 
> make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts 
> nor the papers.
>

The gap is still there. Math offers no first person theory of computation, 
nor third person theory of qualia, it only correlates the *idea* of first 
and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) with the idea 
of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps).


> Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, 
>> unless you mean God,
>>
>
> God has to make sense too.
>
> That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific explanation. 
> You just make your case worst.
>

Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality. 
 

>
>
> Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish.
>>
>
> Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick 
> up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, 
> information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about 
> pointing out the mistake of comp.
>
>
> But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the 
> question, or play with words.
>

CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic 
qualities. It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary 
novelty, etc. It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for 
the truth.
 

>
> You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with 
>> respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first 
>> person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest 
>> definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, 
>> and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's 
>> understanding of incompleteness.
>>
>
> This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have 
> explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you 
> say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical m

Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I 
> say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that 
> it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make 
> them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response 
> has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more 
> advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except 
> that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds 
> of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no 
> reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't 
> produce computation.
>
>
>
> You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. 
>

I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument 
against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in 
presuming equality with living creatures, but very right wing in presuming 
lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent.

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Video of VCR

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:31:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life 
> it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience 
> which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way 
> around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 
> 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, 
> only stored and processed.
>
>
>
> Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, 
> or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp 
> does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, 
> infinitely many bodies).
>

Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, 
with no improvement on bridging it.
 

>
> Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, 
> unless you mean God, 
>

God has to make sense too.
 

> but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun 
> in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can 
> discuss this anymore.
>

His genuine role is not in the spectacle, it is in the intangible 
processing of meaningless data.
 

>
> Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish.
>

Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick 
up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, 
information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about 
pointing out the mistake of comp.
 

> You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with 
> respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first 
> person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest 
> definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, 
> and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's 
> understanding of incompleteness.
>

This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have 
explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you 
say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your 
view is not? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily and 
escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Why doesn't Bruno machine 
succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness?
 

>
> Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry.
>

Maybe that's what 1p machines say when they are infected with the comp 
virus ;)
 

>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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