Re: What day is it?

On 9 September 2015 at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 9/09/2015 1:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellet

Re: What day is it?

On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> >> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 9 September 20

Re: What day is it?

On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 8 Septem

Re: What day is it?

On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellet

Re: What day is it?

On 9 September 2015 at 02:40, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/8/2015 5:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-09-08 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett : > >> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruc

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> On 8 September

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> I will ask you the same question as I

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude from the > fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or tails that the > world does not

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 16:50, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/09/2015 3:59 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 8 September 2015 at 08:52, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> On 8/09/2015 8:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker wr

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 08:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 8/09/2015 8:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker < > meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >&g

Re: What day is it?

On 8 September 2015 at 09:19, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/7/2015 3:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker < > meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioan

Re: What day is it?

On Tuesday, September 8, 2015, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/6/2015 10:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 7, 2015, Brent Meeker < > meeke...@verizon.net > > wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/6/2015 7:20 PM, Jason Resch wr

Re: What day is it?

distribution to approximate > in repeated trials. > It's the same kind of randomness that emerges from multiverse theories. You presumably estimate probabilities in everyday life, and generally it serves you well. Do you conclude from this that multiverse theories are wrong, and there

Re: What day is it?

elf in either Monday or Tuesday when you wake up. Someone else might answer that there is not really a "you" any more as there are two branches, so the question is meaningless. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Ev

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

On Tuesday, September 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 31 Aug 2015, at 14:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > >> >> On 31 Aug 2015, at 00:42, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> On Sun, Aug 3

Re: Uploaded Worm Mind

at, then we know something else is required. >> > > > I can imagine that the rat will have a "normal behavior", but as he cannot > talk to us, we might fail to appreciate some internal change or even some > anosognosia. The rat would not be a zombie rat, but still be in a qui

Re: If the universe is computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options?

On Thursday, August 27, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > > > > Forwarded Message Subject: Re: If the universe is > computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options? Date: > Wed, 26 Aug 2015 17:32:37 +1000 From: Stathis Papaioannou > > Rep

Re: If the universe is computational, what is the computing platform? What are the options?

uot;Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On 14 August 2015 at 12:45, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > > On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote: > > > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > ​>>​​

Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> > ​>>​ >>> ​ if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and >>> only one city did you end up seeing?" has n

1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

ime point they might not be the "same" persisting individual, since they could as easily be linked by false memories. Nevertheless, the illusion of continuity is both valid and important. It is both valid and important that each observer believes he will see one and only one city, even tho

Re: Michelangelo's Stone: an Argument against Platonism in Mathematics

nes - they are in the eye of the beholder. However, that is not an argument against the independent reality of mathematical structures. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscr

Re: Closest Continuer Theory

ally through the body that personhood is demonstrated to other people. > I expect that strangers I pass in the street will accord me the status of > personhood, even though I have not demonstrated to them that I can pass a > Turing test. The person in a coma is worth preserving because

Re: A riddle for John Clark

rse he will end up in, so non-computable randomness returns, despite the overall determinism. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails f

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 26 June 2015 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On Friday, June 26, 2015, meekerdb > meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >> >> On 6/25/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> >>> ISTM

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On Friday, June 26, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/25/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > ISTM there's an equivocation here between a continuation in consciousness >> and continuation in body. If we say "the person" is just a continuum of >> co

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On Wednesday, June 24, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/22/2015 11:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb > wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05

Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

On 24 June 2015 at 02:00, John Clark wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where >> unfettered computationalism leads. > > > People like Bruno are the only ones who believe in

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 23 June 2015 at 16:52, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb > meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >> >> On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meek

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meeker

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 23 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: > meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb >> meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stath

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kel

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> The "closest continue

Re: Has this come up before? Seems to qualify as a non-comp theory.

of AUDA) makes an intelligible attempt at an explanation of this rather > elusive sort. > It's another effort to avoid at any cost the idea that consciousness may not need physical instantiation, which is where unfettered computationalism leads. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You receive

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On Monday, June 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett > <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote: >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> The "

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> >> >> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both >> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong >> in your vie

Re: A riddle for John Clark

On 22 June 2015 at 17:05, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 22 June 2015 at 16:35, Bruce Kellett > John Clark wrote: >> >> After they diverge they will still both identify with the same >> person, John Clark, HOWEVER

Re: A riddle for John Clark

thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer until

Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal

On Thursday, June 18, 2015, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > >> >>> "You" are the person reading this sentence >>> >>> >>> >> OK, but then it would be meaningless to talk about

Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal

On Wednesday, June 17, 2015, John Clark wrote: > On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > >> We're talking about multiple (probably infinite) copying and branching, >> so who the hell is "you"? >> > > > "You" are

Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal

On Wednesday, June 17, 2015, John Clark wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 16, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > The many worlds as an ensemble are determinate, but which world you will >> end up in is not. >> > > Forget "you", which world A

Re: A (somewhat) different angle on the reversal

e many worlds as an ensemble are determinate, but which world you will end up in is not. This is because you feel that you end up in only one world even though copies of you end up in multiple worlds. Subjectively (from the 1p perspective) you end up in one world, while objectively (from the 3p perspec

Re: super intelligence and self-sampling

gt; OK, but the same argument can easily be made otherwise: why should you find yourself living in tiny New Zealand rather than populous China? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscri

Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason

change is physicalism in metaphysics. It >> becomes testable, and false if comp is true. >> > > But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong > AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a > computer does not entail tha

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

On Tuesday, June 9, 2015, LizR > wrote: > On 8 June 2015 at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> It seems here that you've snuck an extra assumption into comp1. We know >> that brains can be conscious, and we assume that computations can also be >> conscious.

Re: The scope of physical law and its relationship to the substitution level

le hypothesis. How > does materialism explain consciousness? How does comp explain the > appearance of a material universe? > > Over to you. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe fr

Re: Samiya proved right

> On 3 Jun 2015, at 3:47 am, Samiya Illias wrote: > > > >> On 02-Jun-2015, at 10:23 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >>> On 02 Jun 2015, at 04:18, Samiya Illias wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 30, 2015 at 10:05 PM, Samiya Illias wrote: > On 30-May-2015, at 6:38

Re: Samiya proved right

On Monday, June 1, 2015, Samiya Illias wrote: > > > On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 5:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> On 1 June 2015 at 06:37, John Mikes > > wrote: >> > LizR: >> > I find it "funny" if so many thinking minds on this list (

Re: Samiya proved right

p etc. > JM I think Samiya would say that if God thinks beheadings, floggings and stonings are good, then they are good, by definition. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe fr

Re: Samiya proved right

If a human tortures someone for fun, that's bad, but if God does it, that's fine. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails

Re: Samiya proved right

On Saturday, May 30, 2015, Samiya Illias wrote: > > > On 29-May-2015, at 5:41 pm, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, May 30, 2015, Samiya Illias > wrote: > >> >> >> On Fri, May 29, 2015 at 7:33 AM, LizR wrote: >> >>>

Re: Samiya proved right

tps://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@google

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 29 May 2015 at 00:09, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:55 PM, Russell Standish > wrote: >> >> On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> > >> > A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 28 May 2015 at 13:55, Russell Standish wrote: > On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 01:23:20PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> A stroke results in objective and subjective changes, such as the inability >> to move a limb, understand language or see. These are gross examples

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Thursday, May 28, 2015, Russell Standish wrote: > On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 11:22:59PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > But that is not what happens when brain tissue is destroyed, as in a > > stroke. Qualia do actually fade, and entire sensory and > >

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Russell Standish > wrote: > >> On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 08:17:39PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: >> > > Not at all. My suggestion is that there wouldn't be any partial >

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

subscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more optio

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Monday, May 25, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/24/2015 4:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 25 May 2015 at 07:51, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 5/24/2015 11:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> In a virtual environment, destroying the b

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Monday, May 25, 2015, Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, May 24, 2015 at 07:19:46PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 24 May 2015, at 10:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > >I can't really see an alternative other than Russel'

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 25 May 2015 at 07:51, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/24/2015 11:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > In a virtual environment, destroying the body destroys the consciousness, > > but both are actually due to the underlying computations. > > > How can those thumped kn

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Monday, May 25, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 24 May 2015, at 10:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Saturday, May 23, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 22 May 2015, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

ct person" won't think > either. So far as we have observered *only* bodies think. If comp implies > the contrary isn't that so much the worse for comp. > In a virtual environment, destroying the body destroys the consciousness, but both are actually due to the underlyi

Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Saturday, May 23, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 May 2015, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Friday, May 22, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 21 May 2015, at 01:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On We

Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Friday, May 22, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > On 21 May 2015, at 01:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, May 20, 2015, Jason Resch wrote: > > Partial zombies are absurd because they make the concept of consciousness > meaningless. > > &

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

ould involve a change in behaviour from the normal brain, as well as a change in qualia. You would be driving with no awareness of driving, and when asked about it you would say you were aware of driving, but you would be either delusional or lying. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this mes

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

in order to show that there is a difference between the two. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Wednesday, May 20, 2015, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:54 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> On 19 May 2015 at 11:05, Jason Resch > > wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 10:05 AM, St

Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Tuesday, 19 May 2015, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 12:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > >> > >> Not necessarily, just as an actor may not be conscious in the same way >> >> as me. But I suspect the Blockhead would be conscious; the intuitio

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 19 May 2015 at 15:42, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: > > > -Original Message- > From: everything-list@googlegroups.com > [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou > Sent: Monday, May 18, 2015 10

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 19 May 2015 at 11:05, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 10:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wr

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 19 May 2015 at 14:45, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: >> >> On 19 May 2015 at 11:02, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> > I think you're not taking into account the level of the functional >>

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

way as me. But I suspect the Blockhead would be conscious; the intuition that a lookup table can't be conscious is like the intuition that an electric circuit can't be conscious. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

reliance on logical, in > which contradictions are "impossible"; but in fact contradictions are > properties of language and what we have thought "impossible" in the past > based on language, we've found to be the case in fact and had to adjust our > language

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

nce in kind, not degree, between the impossible and the highly improbable. In ordinary life we can take them as equivalent, and do so multiple times a day without thinking about it, but not in philosophical discussions such as these. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are sub

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 18 May 2015, at 17:05, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > >> >> On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> &g

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 May 2015, at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch > wrote: > > Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html> > sho

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 18 May 2015 at 16:04, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 12:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Chalmer's fading quailia argument s

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On Saturday, May 16, 2015, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/15/2015 10:10 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch > wrote: > > Chalmer's fading quailia argument <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html> > shows

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

> On 13 May 2015, at 11:59 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > Chalmer's fading quailia argument shows that if replacing a biological neuron > with a functionally equivalent silicon neuron changed conscious perception, > then it would lead to an absurdity, either: > 1. quaila fade/change as silicon

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

's > view that consciousness is just produced by some subset of neurons that only > accesses "memory" (other neurons?). It's all that you said, but ultimately behaviour is due to motor neurons sending signals to muscles, and all the other associated machinery sets the tim

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > em

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

they did it because that's the way their brain is it's not their fault, and if they did it due to irreducible randomness it's not their fault. However, punishment and reward can be used to guide behaviour in desirable directions, whether it is driven by determinism or randomness. --

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

that would have been present if the artificial neurons had not been installed. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

On 13 May 2015 at 13:36, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/12/2015 7:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 13 May 2015 at 12:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/12/2015 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote: &

Re: What does the MGA accomplish?

it is conventionally taken as evidence that your >>> theory has been falsified. The MGA puts Bruno's theory in this category: it >>> has been falsified by the experimental results. >>> >> >> Would that it were so. But so far as I can see Bruno's theor

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

ains lead to consciousness. The fading qualia thought experiment suggests that reproducing brain behaviour will also reproduce consciousness. It doesn't matter how the brain behaviour is reproduced: whether by a computer, a RNG, a recording, or God the argument still goes through. -- Stathis Papaioann

Re: Reconciling Random Neuron Firings and Fading Qualia

momentarily until the RNG starts producing noise. If anything, this example is an indication that handling the counterfactuals is not necessary for consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" gr

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

On 13 May 2015 at 09:16, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/12/2015 12:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 12 May 2015, at 10:37 am, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 10:23:31AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > The final straw would have to be indivisi

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

> On 12 May 2015, at 10:40 am, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> On 12 May 2015, at 8:25 am, Russell Standish wrote: >>> >>> It won't be a specific electron that will switch consciousness off >>> regardless of the

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

> On 12 May 2015, at 10:37 am, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 10:23:31AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> The final straw would have to be indivisible, otherwise you could make a >> partial zombie by replacing half the straw. &g

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

> On 12 May 2015, at 8:25 am, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:51:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> On Monday, May 11, 2015, Russell Standish wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, May 10, 2015 at 06:33:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrot

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

usness survives brain tissue replacement until a certain electron in a certain atom changes orbital, at which point consciousness instantly vanishes but behaviour remains unchanged, resulting in a full zombie. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to th

Re: What does the MGA accomplish?

a human with a physical brain? If it implements > (physically) the right computations should it not be conscious? Is there > some contention that a physical computation is not the same as some more > fundamental arithmetical compuatation or do MGA / Olympia only aim to show > some flaw

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

On 11 May 2015 at 04:41, meekerdb wrote: > On 5/10/2015 3:58 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 10 May 2015 at 08:59, Russell Standish wrote: > >> In fact physical systems are not capable of computation at all, >> without an observer to provide symbolic

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

On 9 May 2015 at 19:39, Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 05:12:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> This reminds me of Putnam's "a rock implements every finite state >> machine" argument. According to some one time pad the rock implem

My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

t on a physical implementation of computation. If this is granted, there is no reductio ad absurdum (assuming you do think the conclusions are absurd) with either Putnam's argument or Maudlin's argument. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

On Saturday, May 9, 2015, Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 12:43:32PM +1200, LizR wrote: > > On 8 May 2015 at 05:14, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Thursday, May 7, 2015, Russell Standish > wrote: > &g

Re: The dovetailer disassembled

s is obviously useless as a computer, and no more interesting than saying that a block of marble contains every possible statue. But consider the case where the computation implemented is a self-contained virtual environment or an entity dreaming without inputs or outputs. This cannot be dismissed

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

he intuition that it cannot possibly be so. > The MGA will fail in exactly the same way, in the same > circumstance. However, Bruno is quite clear that he doesn't rely on > astronomically improbably event ocurring, so this is simply a side > issue that needs pinching off. The UD

Re: My comments on "The Movie Graph Argument Revisited" by Russell Standish

On 8 May 2015 at 10:14, Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:14:42AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> Why can't playing the equivalent of a recording made de novo (i.e. there >> was no original) instantiate the conscious moment for the first t

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