subject:"Re\: Aristotle the Nitwit"

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 29 Jul 2016, at 21:30, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> No idea what   " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth  
knowing.

> See preceding posts.

I tried that. It didn't help.

You might need to be more specific and quote the passage you don't  
understand.

>> If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can be  
duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and  
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1- 
view, EVERYTHING!

> Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the  
whole computational histories are duplicated.

Yes

> Above you agree that the W-experience and the M-experience are  
different,

Certainly. Only a fool would disagree.

OK, but from this a twelve-years schoolboy or schoolgirl get already  
the point.

>  but if the device duplicates every thing,

It does if computationalism is correct, and I think it is.

 > we should then have two experiences in W and two experiences in  
M, but then again. That is not the case, so we get a contradiction,  
and you were wrong.
Oh for heaven's sake! Obviously they’re identical when the  
duplication is made, but after that they can and will differ if they  
see different things, like different cities. And what's with this  
two experiences in W stuff? If  I stepped into the duplicating  
machine in Helsinki and then do it again in Washington then there  
would be 2 bodies in Washington that looked just like me, but there  
would still only be one person until one of the bodies saw an aspect  
of Washington and formed a memory the other didn't have.

> Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person  
point of view, with or without computationalism.

If computationalism is true and if Charles Darwin was right then the  
correct arrangement of atoms can indeed duplicate a first person  
view from its first person point of view. Otherwise no.

> It just does not make any sense.

No it would make perfect sense, it's just that if a first person  
view from its first person point of view were duplicated then things  
would be odd, not logically inconsistent not physically impossible,  
just odd. And the reason your "proof" is worthless is that very near  
that beginning the assumption is made that things can't be odd. But  
things can be odd.

Let me try something different; but I will go with numbered questions.  
I will proceed when I get the answer.

Question 1 (30-07-2016)

We are in the step 3 protocol (read and annihilated in Helsinki,  
copied in Washington and Moscow soon after).

Now, we add that in both Washington and Moscow, you will receive a cup  
of coffee.

Do you agree that in Helsinki, the H-guy who believes he survive  
teleportation/duplication, can expect to certainly drink a cup of  
coffee soon (assuming computationalism, the correctness of the  
substitution level, the default hypotheses, ...). That is, would you  
agree that in Helsinki P(H-guy will-feel-drinking-coffee) = 1.

I think you have already answered this by the affirmative some times  
ago, but I want to be sure.

Of course, anyone can play the game.

Bruno

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-29 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >> No idea what   " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth
>> knowing.
>
>

> See preceding posts.

I tried that. It didn't help.

>> If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can
>> be duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and velocity,
>> not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-view, *EVERYTHING*
>> !
>
>

> Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the whole
> computational histories are duplicated.

Yes

> > Above you agree that the W-experience and the M-experience are different,

Certainly. Only a fool would disagree.

> >  but if the device duplicates every thing,

It does if computationalism is correct, and I think it is.

 > we should then have two experiences in W and two experiences in M, but
> then again. That is not the case, so we get a contradiction, and you were
> wrong.

Oh for heaven's sake! Obviously they’re identical when the duplication is
made, but after that they can and will differ if they see different things,
like different cities. And what's with this two experiences in W stuff? If
 I stepped into the duplicating machine in Helsinki and then do it again in
Washington then there would be 2 bodies in Washington that looked just like
me, but there would still only be one person until one of the bodies saw an
aspect of Washington and formed a memory the other didn't have.

> > Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of
> view, with or without computationalism.

If computationalism is true and if Charles Darwin was right then the
correct arrangement of atoms can indeed duplicate a first person view from
its first person point of view. Otherwise no.

> It just does not make any sense.

No it would make perfect sense, it's just that if a first person view from
its first person point of view were duplicated then things would be odd,
not logically inconsistent not physically impossible, just odd. And the
reason your "proof" is worthless is that very near that beginning the
assumption is made that things can't be odd. But things can be odd.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 28 Jul 2016, at 21:56, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> there are two 3-1 "I",

No idea what  "two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt  
it is worth knowing.

See preceding posts.

> Turing emulable telepathy.

No idea what  "Turing emulable telepathy" is and very  
much doubt it is worth knowing.

It means that to be in both city *from the 1p view" you need to make  
the two brains into one connected machines, but with the given  
protocol, that means you need spooky action at a distance.

>>> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views  
from the 1-view pov.

>> Why on earth not?

> Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are  
both the H-guy,

Yes, both are the H-guy, but they are not equal to each other.

We agree on this.

> but now living incompatible first person experience.

Obviously if they see different things, like different cities,   
then they will have different experiences and diverge, but I'm  
talking about the capabilities of the duplicating machine itself  
and you said "The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views  
from the 1-view pov."

Yes. That follows from computationalism indeed.

 And why are they incompatible first person experience?

Because you would need spooky action at a distance. This the preceding  
posts for more on this.

Because the duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from  
the 1-view pov. And round and round we go, you're assume what  
you're trying to prove.

You lost me here.

If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can be  
duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and  
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1- 
view, EVERYTHING!

Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the whole  
computational histories are duplicated. Above you agree that the W- 
experience and the M-experience are different, but if the device  
duplicates every thing, we should then have two experiences in W and  
two experiences in M, but then again. That is not the case, so we get  
a contradiction, and you were wrong.

If the machine can't do that then computationalism is wrong,  
but you can't just assume computationalism can't do something  
(like duplicate the 1-view pov)

The H-1-view is duplicated in the 3-1 picture, but obviously, the M  
and W 1-views are not, from the 1-view povs.

and then claim you've proven something about computationalism.

>>>It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture

>> This gets to the very key of the issue! If true then  
it's not a people duplicating machine, there is something about  
consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can produce

> Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.

Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,

Indeed. It is true. It follows from computationalism, as you just said.

you just assume it's not true ( by assuming "The duplicating machine  
never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov") and then a few  
steps later claim to have proven something.

>> and computationalism is dead wrong. 

> Why?

Because if computationalism is right then the duplicating  
machine CAN duplicate the 1-view from the 1-view pov, if it  
can't then computationalism is wrong. It's as simple as  
that.

Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point  
of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any  
sense. The 1-views are indexicals. You can't duplicate a "now" either.

> On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from  
computationalism, and "yes" consciousness is not something produced  
by any arrangement of atoms.

No, you've derived this not from computationalism but from the  
assumption that computationalism is wrong,

?

>> Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything  
at all because until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't  
exist.

> Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist  
either, and so you are saying that all probabilities never make  
sense. It is obviously ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a  
reduction of absurdum.

Before the coin toss I can tell you exactly who I want to make a  
prediction about the outcome but in your scenario you tell me, if  
it's not the Helsinki Man then who on earth is it that you want to  
make a prediction before the duplication about what's going to  
happen afterward? If it's the Helsinki Man (who else could it be?)  
then the correct prediction would be "the copy that sees Moscow will  
become the Moscow Man and the copy that sees Washington will become  
the Washington Man". What more is there to say? What more is there  
to predict?

The unique first person view that the H-guy is about to live. You

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-28 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> there are two 3-1 "I",
>

No idea what 

"
two 3-1 "I"
 " is 
and very much doubt it is worth knowing.

> > 
> Turing emulable telepathy.
>

No idea what 

"
Turing emulable telepathy
" is 
and very much doubt it is worth knowing.

> >
>>> >>
>>> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view
>>> pov.
>>
>>
> 
>> >> 
>> Why on earth not?
>
> > 
> Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H-guy,
>

Yes, both are the H-guy, but they are not equal to each other.

> > 
> but now living incompatible first person experience.
>

Obviously if they see different things, like different cities,  then they
will have different experiences and diverge, but I'm talking about the
capabilities of the duplicating machine itself and you said "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov.
"
And why are they 
incompatible first person experience
? Because the
duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov
. And round and round we go, you're assume what you're trying to prove.

If
computationalism
 is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the
atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost everything, not
everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that
then
computationalism
 is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism
 can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim you've
proven something about computationalism.

> >
>>> >>
>>> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture
>>
>>
> >> 
>> This gets to the
>> very 
>> key of the issue! If true then it's not a people duplicating machine,
>> there is something about consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can
>> produce
>
> > 
> Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.
>

Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you just
assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.

>> 
>> and computationalism is
>> 
>> dead wrong.
>>  
>>
> > 
> Why?
>

Because if

computationalism
 is right then the
 duplicating machine
*CAN*
 duplicate the 1-view from the 1-view pov
, if it can't then 

computationalism
 is wrong. It's as simple as that.

> > 
> On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from computationalism, and
> "yes" consciousness is not something produced by any arrangement of atoms.
>

No, you've derived this not from
computationalism
 but from the assumption that 
computationalism
 is wrong, if you do that it's easy to reach the conclusion that no
arrangement of atoms can produce consciousness. I'm surprised it took you 7
steps, you must work slow.

>> >> 
>> Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all because
>> until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist.
>> 
>>
>  

> 
> Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and so
> you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is obviously
> ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of absurdum.

Before the coin toss I can tell you exactly who I want to make a
prediction about the outcome but in your scenario you tell me, if it's not
the Helsinki Man then who on earth is it that you want to make a
prediction before the duplication about what's going to happen afterward?
If it's the Helsinki Man (who else could it be?) then the correct
prediction would be "the copy that sees Moscow will become the Moscow Man
and the copy that sees Washington will become the Washington Man". What
more is there to say? What more is there to predict?

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 28 Jul 2016, at 01:12, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:
>>> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1- 
view.

>> Then which one has  THE UNIQUE 1-view, the  
Moscow man or the Washington man?

> Both, from the 1-p views,

How on earth can both have THE 1-p view, or have anything else for  
that matter, if that thing is UNIQUE?   

Because there are two 3-1 "I", but they don't add to make some super-I  
present simultaneously in two cities, unless you add non Turing  
emulable telepathy.

So, they will both live a different 1p experience, and as the giy in  
Helsinki knew that in advance, "The" unique experience that he *will*  
live is just indeterminate. The best prediction is thus "W v M" and  
both confirm this when looking in their diaries. In W, the W-guy see  
in his diary "W v M", and he sees W, and so get the confirmation.  
Similarly in M. All you need is to read the definition of the 1 and 3  
views, and do the very simple math.

>> everybody involved Knew everything so nobody was  
surprised by any of events after the events that transpired after  
duplication so nobody learned anything new.

> Wrong, both learns which cities they are in,

I just saw a black cat.
I have become The Black Cat Seeing Man.
Why am I The Black Cat Seeing Man and not The White Cat Seeing Man?
Because I just saw a black cat.

I just saw Moscow.
I have become the Moscow Seeing Man.
Why am I the Moscow Seeing Man and not the Washington Seeing Man?
Because I just saw Moscow.

Excellent. But in our case, that guy remembers also what he wrote in  
Helsinki, and so can confirm "W v M", and refute "W & M", and "M",  
etc. same for the M-guy.

> and both knows that they could never have guess this.

This? It's true Neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow Man could  
have guessed "this", and they couldn't have guessed anything else  
either because before the duplication neither the Washington Man nor  
the Moscow man even existed.

That is just utterly ridiculous. You could say that when we throw a  
coin, there is no probability of outcome, because the guy having  
thrown the coin does not exist.

However the Helsinki Man could most certainly have predicted that  
the copy of himself who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and  
the copy of himself who saw Washington would become the Washington  
Man.  What else is there to predict? What is "this"?

The passage from the 3-1 description ("the copy of himself who saw  
Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the copy of himself who saw  
Washington would become the Washington Man"), to the specific W, or M  
experience that the H-guy is now actually living. The point is that  
both confirm the "W v M but I don't know which one" written in the  
diary.

> The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then the W- 
guy refutes this,

Yesterday somebody predicted that today a male would see Moscow.

To which he is specially related, as we have agreed that the M-guy and  
the W-guy keep intact their H-guy identity.

I am a male and yet today I don't see Moscow. Therefore the  
prediction has been refuted and no male saw Moscow today.  

Answering a fuzzy version of the thought experience can hardly bring  
clarity to your point.

> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the  
1-view pov.

Why on earth not?

Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H- 
guy, but now living incompatible first person experience.

> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture

This gets to the very key of the issue! If true then it's not a  
people duplicating machine, there is something about consciousness  
that no arrangement of atoms can produce

Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.

and computationalism is dead wrong. 

Why? On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from  
computationalism, and "yes" consciousness is not something produced by  
any arrangement of atoms. the arrangement of the atoms is just a way  
for that consciousness to manifest itself in some place in the  
relative and indexical way.

> The W guy has tto write W in his diary, and that is something  
he (the HW-guy) could never have known in advance

Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all  
because until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist. 

Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and  
so you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is  
obviously ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of  
absurdum.

QED.

Bruno

 John K Clark 

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-27 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >
>>> >>
>>> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view.
>>
>>
> >> 
>> Then which one has
>> 
>>
>> *THE UNIQUE* 1-view, the Moscow man or the Washington man?
>>
> > 
> Both, from the 1-p views,
>

How on earth can both have *THE *1-p view, or have anything else for that
matter, if that thing is *UNIQUE*?   

>> 
>> everybody involved
>>  K
>> new everything so nobody was surprised by any of events after the events
>> that transpired after duplication so nobody learned anything new.
>
>
> > 
> Wrong, both learns which cities they are in,
>

I just saw a black cat.
I have become The Black Cat Seeing Man.
Why am I The Black Cat Seeing Man and not The White Cat Seeing Man?
Because I just saw a black cat.

I just saw Moscow.
I have become the Moscow Seeing Man.
Why am I the Moscow Seeing Man and not the Washington Seeing Man?
Because I just saw Moscow.

I believe both though experiments are of equal philosophical profundity.
Zero.

> > 
> and both knows that they could never have guess this.
>

This? It's true Neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow Man could have
guessed "this", and they couldn't have guessed anything else either because
before the duplication neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow man even
existed. However the Helsinki Man could most certainly have predicted that
the copy of himself who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the copy
of himself who saw Washington would become the Washington Man.  What else
is there to predict? What is "this"?

> 
> The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then the W-guy refutes
> this,
>

Yesterday somebody predicted that today a male would see Moscow. I am a
male and yet today I don't see Moscow. Therefore the prediction has been
refuted and no male saw Moscow today. 

> 
> The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov.
>

Why on earth not?

> > 
> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture
>

This gets to the
very 
key of the issue! If true then it's not a people duplicating machine, there
is something about consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can produce
and computationalism is

dead wrong.

But
then 
you're assuming the very thing you're trying to prove,

> 
> The W guy has tto write W in his diary, and that is something he (the
> HW-guy) could never have known in advance
>

Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all because
until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist.

John K Clark 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Jul 2016, at 00:29, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 10:57 AM, Bruno   Marchal  
 wrote:
>> there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is  
known after the experiment but not before,

> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view.

Then which one has THE UNIQUE 1-view, the Moscow man or the  
Washington man?

Both, from the 1-p views, which is what is asked.

>> but before the experiment the Helsinki Man already knew  
that the one that will see Moscow will become the Moscow  
man;
> Yes, but he know also that the one in Washington will see  
Washington.

Exactly, everybody involved knew everything so nobody was  
surprised by any of events after the events that transpired after  
duplication so nobody learned anything new.

Wrong, both learns which cities they are in, and both knows that they  
could never have guess this. Indeed, the W bet would have been refuted  
by the W-guy, and vice versa, and, as they assumes comp, they know  
that in advance.

You keep (faking) forgetting to read the diaries.

>>so what exactly is that one new bit of information? 

> W for the H-guy feeling being in W.

That's not new information, The Helsinki man already knew that  
when the Helsinki man walked into the Helsinki man duplicating  
machine the Helsinki man's body would be duplicated.

Excellent.

and the Helsinki man also knew that when the Helsinki man saw  
Washington the Helsinki Man would turn into the Washington man.

Brilliant. This shows well the 3-1 symmetry (which is part of the  
protocol, of course).

There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was obtained  
by anyone about anything,

Wrong. Both are astonished, as they both know what you said above, but  
see only one of them, so get that one bit of information.

> M for the H-guy feeling being in M.

That's not new information,

Of course it is. He could not have guesss that in Halsinki. Would he  
have guess that and write "M", the W guys woiuld havce served as  
counter-examples, given that we interview both copies to get the 1- 
view statistics.

The Helsinki man already knew that when the Helsinki man walked into  
the Helsinki man duplicating machine the Helsinki man's body would  
be duplicated. and the Helsinki man also knew that when the Helsinki  
man saw Moscow the Helsinki Man would turn into the Moscow man.  
There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was obtained  
by anyone about anything,

That is contradicted by both 1-views.

>>>  and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".

>> I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was  
the "W & M" prediction about?
> About the future first person experience expected by the guy  
in Helsinki,

If the guy in Helsinki just walked into a Helsinki guy duplicating  
machine then there is no such thing as THE future first person  
experience there is only A future first person experience 
. I Mean... what is it about the word "duplicated" that confuses  
you? 
>>> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) =  
P(W) = 1/2.

>> OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability  
of who seeing what? 

> Of seeing W.

Of who seeing W.

The H-guy, which becomes two person in the 3-1 picture, but still only  
1 person in any 1p views available with computaionalism and this  
protocol.

There is and has always been a 100% probability (not 50%) that the  
sight of W will turn the H man into the W man.

> Or of seeing M.

And there is and has always has been a 100% probability (not  
50%) that the sight of M will turn the H man into the M  
man. And  because H has been duplicated there is a 100%  
probability of both these things happening.

Let is verify. The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then  
the W-guy refutes this, and vice-versa.

 >> but Bruno Marchal didn't answer the question,   
what was that one bit of information do YOU have after the  
experiment that YOU didn't have before?

Please, don't forget that in this duplicating experience, we get two  
person views, and thus your question admits two different answers.

If it has two different answers then obviously the personal  
pronoun "YOU" is ambiguous in this situation;

Not a iota.
We have agreed that you represent the two copies, in the 3p. Then it  
is a matter of simple logic to deduce from this that both will see  
only one city, and so we get the FPI.

so unless Bruno Marchal enjoys speaking gibberish Bruno Marchal  
should stop using the word "YOU" when dealing with situations where  
YOU duplicating machines exist.

The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view  
pov. It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture. Here you  
(fale) missing the 1-3 difference again.

You just do the confusion more and more clearly.

> from the HM, and from

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-26 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 10:57 AM, Bruno

Marchal  wrote:

> >> 
>> there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is known after
>> the experiment but not before,
>
> > 
> In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view.
>

Then which one has

*THE UNIQUE* 1-view, the Moscow man or the Washington man?

> >> 
>> but before the experiment the Helsinki Man already knew that
>> t
>> he one that will see Moscow
>>  will become the Moscow man;
>>
> > 
> Yes, but he know also that the one in Washington will see Washington.
>

Exactly, everybody involved
knew everything so nobody was surprised by any of events after the events
that transpired after duplication so nobody learned anything new.

>>
>> so what exactly is that one new bit of information? 
>
>
> > 
> W for the H-guy feeling being in W.
>

That's not new information, The Helsinki man already knew that when the
Helsinki man walked into the Helsinki man duplicating machine the Helsinki
man's body would be duplicated. and the Helsinki man also knew that when
the Helsinki man saw Washington the Helsinki Man would turn into the
Washington man. There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was
obtained by anyone about anything,

> 
> M for the H-guy feeling being in M.

That's not new information, The Helsinki man already knew that when the
Helsinki man walked into the Helsinki man duplicating machine the Helsinki
man's body would be duplicated. and the Helsinki man also knew that when
the Helsinki man saw Moscow the Helsinki Man would turn into the Moscow
man. There were no surprises, not one bit of new information was obtained
by anyone about anything,

> >
>>> >> 
>>> and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".
>>> 
>>>
>>
> >> 
>> I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was the
>> 
>> "W & M"
>>  prediction about?
>>
> > 
> About the future first person experience expected by the guy in Helsinki,
>

If the guy in Helsinki just walked into a Helsinki guy duplicating machine
then there is no such thing as *THE* 
future first person experience
there is only *A* 

future first person experience
. I Mean... what is it about the word "duplicated" that confuses you? 

> >
>>> >>
>>> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) = 1/2.
>>
>>
> >> 
>> OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability of who seeing
>> what? 
>
> > 
> Of seeing W.
>

Of who seeing W. There is and has always been a 100% probability (not 50%)
that the sight of W will turn the H man into the W man.

> 
> Or of seeing M.
>

And there
is and has always
has
been a 100% probability
(not 50%) 
that the sight of
M
 will turn the H man into the
M
 man.
 And  because H has been duplicated there is a 100% probability of both
these things happening.

>
>> >> 
>> but
>> 
>> Bruno Marcha
>> 
>> l
>> 
>> didn't answer the question,
>> 
>>  what was that one bit of information do
>> 
>> *YOU*
>> **
>> have after the experiment that
>> 
>> *YOU*
>> **
>> didn't have before?
>> 
>>
>
> Please, don't forget that in this duplicating experience, we get two
> person views, and thus your question admits two different answers.
>

If it has two different answers then obviously the personal pronoun "*YOU*"
is ambiguous in this situation; so unless Bruno Marchal enjoys speaking
gibberish Bruno Marchal should stop using the word "*YOU*" when dealing
with situations where *YOU* duplicating machines exist.

> > 
> from the HM, and from the HW guys, they get one bit of information, that
> they were not disposing before pushing on the button
>

That's simply not true. Everybody knew that after pushing the button the H
guy would have 2 bodies, and everybody knew beforehand that seeing M would
turn one of those bodies into the M man and seeing W would turn the other
body into the W man. And that is exactly what happened, nobody was
surprised at anything and nothing new was learned by anybody.   

> 
> One said, "goddam, I see only Washington and not Moscow, I got that one
> bit of information predicted by computationalism!", and the other said
> "goddam, I see only Moscow and not Washington, I got that one bit of
> information predicted by computationalism!".
>

And both would say "Goddamn I got that information long before my bodies
were duplicated and before I'd ever seen Moscow or Washington, I knew it
back when there was only one Helsinki man and I was him.

 John K Clark

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> John K Clark 
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Jul 2016, at 22:40, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 1:16 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> So which one will become the Moscow Man? The one that will  
see Moscow. What more is there to say?

> That it confirms the prediction "W v M" made in Helsinki,

But there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is  
known after the experiment but not before,

In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1-view. Yes, in  
*that* sense. NO, if we stay in the 3p or 3-1p picture.

but before the experiment the Helsinki Man already knew that t 
he one that will see Moscow will become the Moscow man;

Yes, but he know also that the one in Washington will see Washington.

And he knows that in the 1p picture, from Helsinki to either cities,  
that first person picture will only see W, or M.

so what exactly is that one new bit of information? 

W for the H-guy feeling being in W.
M for the H-guy feeling being in M.

No bits of information in that 3-1 picture, but, obviously, one bit in  
the HW first person picture, and one bit in the HW picture.

> and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".

I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was the "W &  
M" prediction about?

About the future first person experience expected by the guy in  
Helsinki, who, believes he will survive the experience, as he assumes  
computationalism, + the correctness of the choice of the  substitution  
level, etc.,

I magine the guy in Helsinki saying "don't tell me if I am in W *or*  
in M, just give me the cup of coffee, and I will try to guess, from  
the coffee taste, if I am in W *or* if I am in M.

Obviously that guy manage to use its own 3-1 description, but still  
refer to the two indexical "I", whose meaning depends on the location  
of the person we interview (to go forward extracting the probability  
calculus from the domain of the sound computational extensions).

> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) =  
1/2.

OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability of who  
seeing what? 

Of seeing W.

Or of seeing M.

In this very simple and particular protocol, the H-guy is arguably  
(using computationalism) 100% ignorant. That's why P(W) = P(M) = 1/2.

>>So what was that one bit of information do you have after  
the experiment that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and  
Washington is one is that one bit of new information that you have  
now but didn't have before a zero or a one? 

> The M-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to M  
(that gives him one bit of first person information, that it can  
write in his personal diary), and likewise the W-man lived the  
apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to W, giving him one bit of  
information too.

That's nice, but Bruno Marchal didn't answer the  
question,  what was that one bit of information do YOU have  
after the experiment that YOU didn't have before?

Please, don't forget that in this duplicating experience, we get two  
person views, and thus your question admits two different answers. The  
first person "you" surviving in W get the W bit, and the first person  
"you" surviving in M get the M bit.

 If this really is a question and is not gibberish then it has a one  
word answer, all John Clark wants to know is if that one word is  
zero or one. Is that so hard?

Yes, because that is just impossible. In a duplicating person  
experience, the first person is duplicated, in the 3-1 picture, and  
remains one and unique in the 1-pictures.

So, we get two answers, and in the general case (step 7) we get  
infinitely ma,ny answers, and that is why it is crucial to find the  
right statistics, or uncertainty measure.

In the paper and most posts, I quickly insist that the relevant  
difference between the 1p and the 3p view, is that the 1p view is  
described in memories or diaries which are duplicated with the  
observer, and so of courses the 1-views get multiplied, and that is  
what the statistic is all about.

> In the 3p description, we go from 0 bit to 0 bit, but in the  
1p experiences we go from 0 bit to 1 bit.

Irrelevant. What one new bit of information did YOU get after the  
experimental that YOU didn't have before?

As we have both agree that YOU became two different guys seeing  
different cities, the answer has to be relative to the indexical  
meaning of "I", and thus, from the HM, and from the HW guys, they get  
one bit of information, that they were not disposing before pushing on  
the button and opening the reconstitution box.

In this post, it seems you ask me something which is obviously  
impossible, and indeed is why the duplication brings an indeterminacy.  
I can invite you to do the experience, and if I was able to tell you  
in advance that bit of information, well, there would no FPI, wouldn't  
it?

You just *never* read the diary of the Washington and

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-25 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 1:16 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> So which one will become the Moscow Man? The one that will see Moscow.
>> What more is there to say?
>
>
> > 
> That it confirms the prediction "W v M" made in Helsinki,
>

But there was supposed to be one new bit of information that is known after
the experiment but not before, but before the experiment the Helsinki Man
already knew that
t
he one that will see Moscow
 will become the Moscow man; so what exactly is that one new bit of
information? 

> > 
> and that it refutes the prediction "W & M".
> 
>

I don't know if it refutes it or not, what exactly was the
"W & M"
 prediction about?

> 
> Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) = 1/2.
>

OK there is a 50-50 probability, but a 50-50 probability of who seeing
what? 

>> >>
>> So what was that one bit of information do you have after the experiment
>> that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and Washington is one is
>> that one bit of new information that you have now but didn't have before a
>> zero or a one? 
>
>
> > 
> The M-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to M (that gives him
> one bit of first person information, that it can write in his personal
> diary), and likewise the W-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M"
> to W, giving him one bit of information too.
>

That's nice, but

Bruno Marcha

l

didn't answer the question,

 what was that one bit of information do

*YOU*
**
have after the experiment that

*YOU*
**
didn't have before?

If this really is a question and is not gibberish then it has a one word
answer, all John Clark wants to know is if that one word is zero or one.
 Is that so hard?

> > 
> In the 3p description, we go from 0 bit to 0 bit, but in the 1p
> experiences we go from 0 bit to 1 bit.
>

Irrelevant. What one new bit of information did *YOU* get after the
experimental that *YOU* didn't have before?

John K Clark 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Jul 2016, at 00:06, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 24, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> You betray that you are so much Aristotelian that

Aristotle was a nitwit. 

> It is *the* very idea of Plato that

Plato was a nitwit.

> Aristotle in a nutshell

Should remain in his nutshell because there is absolutely  
positively nothing Aristotle can contribute to modern science, and  
the same thing goes to Plato.

>> So there are an infinite number of Bruno Marchals in  
Everett's Many Worlds but all of them are zombies with no  
consciousness except for one, the one in this world; THAT AND ONLY  
THAT Bruno Marchal has THE FPI.

Of course not! I have no clue how you derive this.

Then I will give you a clue, the clue is "THE".

> They have all the FPI,

They can all have A FPI, but all of them can't have THE FPI.

> You brag not reading the papers,

A proof is not like a novel, in a novel if you get to a bad part  
you can keep on reading in the hope that it will get better,   
but proofs never get better after errors so only a fool would keep  
reading after one is found.

>> Bruno is unable to answer the simple question " After "you"  
have been duplicated what one and only one city will "you" end up  
seeing, Moscow or Washington?"

> Given that there has been a duplication, we have (in the 3-1  
view) two first person views, and to get them, by the definition  
given, we need to ask the question to both copies.

So after asking all the questions to everybody you want to ask  
questions to and after the "you" duplicating experiment is long over  
what one and only city do "you" conclude "you" ended up seeing,  
Washington or Moscow? If this question has no answer (and gibberish  
has no answer) then it's not a thought experiment, it's a thought  
muddle.   

> Both says I see only one city

That doesn't answer the question! What one and only one city did  
"you" end up seeing? If that question has no answer then stop using  
personal pronouns if people duplicating machines are around.

 > without having been able to predict which one in advance.

Which one? Before they were duplicated and saw different things  
there was only one. Afterwords I would predict that the one that saw  
Washington would be the Washington Man and the one that saw Moscow  
would be the Moscow Man. What else is there to predict?  What else  
is there to say?

> So both confirms the FPI.

Both can't have much less confirm THE FPI.

 > both agree that they could not predict that answer in advance

It's not just "in advance", even when it's all over nobody knows  
what the answer turned out to be because nobody then or now knows  
what the hell the question was. 

> they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when  
opening the door

When the doors were opened was when the 2 diverged, until then it  
was one individual with 2 identical brains running in parallel.

Right.

And one of them didn't become the Moscow Man and then saw Moscow,  
instead one of them saw Moscow and that experience turned him into  
the Moscow Man.

Right.

So which one will become the Moscow Man? The one that will see  
Moscow. What more is there to say?

That it confirms the prediction "W v M" made in Helsinki, and that it  
refutes the prediction "W & M".

Then, given the numerical identity, it gives P(M) = P(W) = 1/2.

 > they knew in advance that they would get one bit of  
information.

So what was that one bit of information do you have after the  
experiment that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and  
Washington is one is that one bit of new information that you have  
now but didn't have before a zero or a one? 

The M-man lived the apparent "collapse" from "W v M" to M (that gives  
him one bit of first person information, that it can write in his  
personal diary), and likewise the W-man lived the apparent "collapse"  
from "W v M" to W, giving him one bit of information too. In the 3p  
description, we go from 0 bit to 0 bit, but in the 1p experiences we  
go from 0 bit to 1 bit. As both copies witnesses this in their diary,  
and as the H-guy can emulate this necessary happening, they both  
confirm the FPI.

Bruno

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-24 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jul 24, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> You betray that you are so much Aristotelian that
>

Aristotle was a nitwit. 

>
>
>  It is *the* very idea of Plato that

Plato was a nitwit.

> 
> Aristotle in a nutshell
> 
>

Should remain in his nutshell because there is
absolutely positively nothing Aristotle can contribute to modern science,
and the same thing goes to Plato.

>> >> 
>> So there are an infinite number of Bruno Marchals in Everett's Many
>> Worlds but all of them are zombies with no consciousness except for one,
>> the one in this world; THAT AND ONLY THAT Bruno Marchal has *THE* FPI.
>
>
> Of course not! I have no clue how you derive this.
>

Then I will give you a clue, the clue is "*THE"*.

> > 
> They have all the FPI,
>

They can all have* A* FPI, but all of them can't have *THE* FPI.

> > 
> You brag not reading the papers,
>

A proof is not like a novel, in a novel if you get to a bad part you can
keep on reading in the hope that it will get better, 

but proofs never get better after errors so only a fool would keep reading
after one is found.

> >> 
>> Bruno is unable to answer the simple question " After "you" have been
>> duplicated what one and only one city will "you" end up seeing, Moscow or
>> Washington?"
>
>
> > 
> Given that there has been a duplication, we have (in the 3-1 view) two
> first person views, and to get them, by the definition given, we need to
> ask the question to both copies.
>

So after asking all the questions to everybody you want to ask questions
to and after the "you" duplicating experiment is long over what one and
only city do "you" conclude "you" ended up seeing, Washington or Moscow? If
this question has no answer (and gibberish has no answer) then it's not a
thought experiment, it's a thought muddle.   

>
>  Both says I see only one city
>

That doesn't answer the question! What one and only one city did "you" end
up seeing? If that question has no answer then stop using personal pronouns
if people duplicating machines are around.

> 
without having been able to predict which one in advance.

Which one? Before they were duplicated and saw different things there was
only one. Afterwords I would predict that the one that saw Washington would
be the Washington Man and the one that saw Moscow would be the Moscow Man.
What else is there to predict?

 What else is there to

say?

> > 
> So both confirms the FPI.
>

Both can't have much less confirm *THE* FPI.

> 
both agree that they could not predict that answer in advance

It's not just "in advance", even when it's all over nobody knows what the
answer turned out to be because nobody then or now knows what the hell the
question was. 

>
>  they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when opening the
> door

When the doors were opened was when the 2 diverged, until then it was one
individual with 2 identical brains running in parallel. And one of them
didn't become the Moscow Man and then saw Moscow, instead one of them saw
Moscow and that experience turned him into the Moscow Man. So which one
will become the Moscow Man? The one that will see Moscow. What more is
there to say?   

> 
they knew in advance that they would get one bit of information.

So what was that one bit of information do you have after the experiment
that you didn't have before? If Moscow is zero and Washington is one is
that one bit of new information that you have now but didn't have before a
zero or a one? 

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


Errata:

On 24 Jul 2016, at 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is Moscow and not Washington for all of them, and Washington and  
not Moscow for all for them, but the key point is that both agree  
that they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when  
opening the door, they knew in advance that they would get one bit  
of information.


Read instead:

It is Moscow and not Washington for half of them, and Washington and  
not Moscow for half of them, but the key point is that both agree that  
they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when opening  
the door, they knew in advance that they would get one bit of  
information.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 23 Jul 2016, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> "our world" cannot be taken as a primitive notion in our  
setting.

If nothing else I admire your courage, most people would be  
embarrassed to admit that they don't accept reality. 

Interesting. You betray that you are so much Aristotelian that you  
forget some people could disagree with them.
It is *the* very idea of Plato that what we see might not be the  
*PRIMITIVE* reality.

Aristotle in a nutshell: what we see = reality (that lead to the  
contemporain physicalism)

Plato in a nutshell: what we see = symptom of some unknown reality  
that we can search (led to Xeusippes "mathematicalism" and diverse  
form of neopythagoreanism.

> QM without collapse can arguably be mentioned as an evidence  
"the FPI exists".

So there are an infinite number of Bruno Marchals in Everett's  
Many Worlds but all of them are zombies with no consciousness except  
for one, the one in this world; THAT AND ONLY THAT Bruno Marchal has  
THE FPI.

Of course not! I have no clue how you derive this. They have all the  
FPI, and that is why there is a FPI. Nothing collapse the wave, and of  
course, nothing collapse the many computations in arithmetic.
But the key computationalist point, is that for all copies, they feel  
like a dissymetry has been introduced and they feel like a collapse,  
and this in QM-without collapse (Everett), in the local physical  
computationalist FPI (step 3), and in the global FPI (step 7).

>> So "What one and only one experience will The Helsinki  
Man experience?" is not a question with a indeterminate answer, it's  
just an asinine question.

> You forget having an once of empathy for the copies here. You  
should try to be polite with your selves.

According to Bruno Marchal only I have THE FPI, so why should I be  
empathic or polite to zombies? It would be like being kind to a  
rock. Just to be clear, "I" is defined as the person having THE FPI,  
and THE FPI is defined as THE FPI I am having.

I don't know if you fake it, but you reason like misunderstandinbg  
everything I said in the post and oin the papers. You brag not reading  
the papers, but you seem to not read the post either.

>> Math alone can't confirm anything, it can just tell  
us that certain results follow from certain assumptions. But you're  
assumptions are worse than wrong, they're gibberish. 

> I think that you confuse "confirming", and making something  
true.

Math can't make anything true, it can show that something is true  
IF AND ONLY IF the assumptions that the math uses are true.
If the assumptions are not true or not false either (aka gibberish,  
as in your case) math can't make or do or prove or do anything with  
it.  If you stick nonsense into the math machine nonsense will come  
spewing out accomplishing nothing.

>> Not only that, "you" cannot know which one even after the  
experiment is over because it's not a question, it's just words with  
a question mark at the end. 

> This is so easily shown wrong. I did  it many times,

Bruno Marchal has done it so many times that now Bruno is  
unable to answer the simple question " After "you" have been  
duplicated what one and only one city will "you" end up seeing,  
Moscow or Washington?"

Given that there has been a duplication, we have (in the 3-1 view) two  
first person views, and to get them, by the definition given, we need  
to ask the question to both copies.

And both confirms the statement predicted by the computationalist in  
Helsinki. Both says I see only one city without having been able to  
predict which one in advance. So both confirms the FPI.

This question (assuming it really is a question and is not just  
gibberish with a question mark at the end) is indeed simple, in that  
it should have a one word answer known to everybody after the  
experiment is completed, but Bruno Marchal has given the answer so  
many times Bruno has forgotten if that one word is Moscow or  
Washington.

It is Moscow and not Washington for all of them, and Washington and  
not Moscow for all for them, but the key point is that both agree that  
they could not predict that answer in advance, and that when opening  
the door, they knew in advance that they would get one bit of  
information.

It is very easy, and very clear. You need just to keep in mind that  
the question is on the accessible 1-views.

Bruno

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-23 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jul 22, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> "our world" cannot be taken as a primitive notion in our setting.
>

If nothing else I admire your courage, most people would be embarrassed to
admit that they don't accept reality. 

> 
> QM without collapse can arguably be mentioned as an evidence "the FPI
> exists".

So there are an infinite number of Bruno Marchals in Everett's Many Worlds
but all of them are zombies with no consciousness except for one, the one
in this world; THAT AND ONLY THAT Bruno Marchal has *THE* FPI.

>> 
>> So "What one and only one experience will The Helsinki Man experience?"
>> is not a question with a indeterminate answer, it's just an asinine
>> question.
>
>
> > 
> You forget having an once of empathy for the copies here. You should try
> to be polite with your selves.
>

According to Bruno Marchal only I have *THE* FPI, so why should I be
empathic or polite to zombies? It would be like being kind to a rock. Just
to be clear, "I" is defined as the person having *THE* FPI, and *THE* FPI
is defined as *THE* FPI I am having.

>> 
>> Math alone can't confirm anything,
>>  
>> it can just tell us that certain results follow from certain assumptions.
>> But you're assumptions are worse than wrong, they're gibberish. 
>
>
> > 
> I think that you confuse "confirming", and making something true.
>

Math can't make anything true, it can show that something is true IF AND
ONLY IF the assumptions that the math uses are true. If the assumptions are
not true or not false either (aka gibberish, as in your case) math can't
make or do or prove or do anything with it.  If you stick nonsense into the
math machine nonsense will come spewing out accomplishing nothing.

>> >> 
>> Not only that, "you" cannot know which one even after the experiment is
>> over because it's not a question, it's just words with a question mark at
>> the end. 
>
>
> > 
> This is so easily shown wrong. I did  it many times,
>

Bruno Marchal has done it so many times that

now Bruno is unable to answer the simple question " After "you" have been
duplicated what one and only one city will "you" end up seeing, Moscow or
Washington?" This question (assuming it really is a question and is not
just gibberish with a question mark at the end) is indeed simple, in that
it should have a one word answer known to everybody after the experiment
is completed, but Bruno Marchal has given the answer so many times Bruno
has forgotten if that one word is Moscow or Washington.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 21 Jul 2016, at 20:15, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> "THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI  
duplicating machines "THE FPI" does not exist.

> The FPI requires duplicating machines.

We haven't invented duplicating machines yet, does that mean FPI  
doesn't exist in our world? 

QM without collapse can arguably be mentioned as an evidence "the FPI  
exists".
Then with computationalism the FPI exists, although no machine can  
prove it, but all can prove it exist "as far as they are consistent/ 
sound machines.

"our world" cannot be taken as a primitive notion in our setting.

>> What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3  
view"?  

> 3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both  
places. 3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in  
both places and I attribute a genuine first person experience to both

In other words the Helsinki man's "genuine first person  
experience" would be experienced by both.

Exactly.

So "What one and only one experience will The Helsinki Man  
experience?" is not a question with a indeterminate answer, it's  
just an asinine question.

You forget having an once of empathy for the copies here. You should  
try to be polite with your selves.

> The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not  
the 3-1 view. 

Then it's just a case of jargon inflation to impress the rubes,  
but I'm not a rube and I am not impressed. I had already figured out  
that if 1 view were the same as 3 view you wouldn't have given them  
different names.

But wait ...

> The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view

Then the best way to emphasize that is to never say 1-1-view  
again.

Yes, it is useful when compared with the 3-view. In the math: the 1- 
view and the 1-1-view are equivalent because [1]p <-> [1][1]p is a  
(scheme) of theorem in Löbian arithmetic.

But the 3-view ([0]p, beweisbar('p') is not equivalent to [1]p, from  
the machine 1-self and 3-self views. G* can prove the equivalence but  
the machine cannot, neither in the 3-view, nor in the 1-view. Like  
with the UDA, all that follows from logic and arithmetic/computer- 
science.

>> At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when  
it's all over and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is  
known,

> Which cat?

The only cat in the box that we can see in the observable  
universe, that cat.

> We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and  
alive, in the 3-1 view,

Sorry, I've lost track of what  the 3-1 view is, but I do know  
that in no view in the observable universe "the cat is all the time  
dead and alive".

> Then the math confirms this up to now.

Math alone can't confirm anything,

I think that you confuse "confirming", and making something true.

it can just tell us that certain results follow from certain  
assumptions. But you're assumptions are worse than wrong, they're  
gibberish. 

>> Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "remember having  
been in Helsinki " John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this  
will be "not in the 1-p" forgetting that in a world that has 1-p  
duplicating machines there is no such thing as "THE 1-p".

> Then you die,

Maybe, that depends entirely on what the hell "he" means, and the  
meaning seems to shift even within a single sentence, but whatever  
the hell that  god damned personal pronoun means what's important is  
that if at least one thing (and the more the merrier) tomorrow  
remembers being John Clark today then John Clark will live for at  
least another 24 hours.

> If computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at  
both places,

No there would  be "a 1p" at both places, and that would be true  
even if computationalism was false.

> "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty

And  the one "you" will live with certainty is  
"the 1p". And round and round  we go.

> although you cannot know which one in advance.

Not only that, "you" cannot know which one even after the  
experiment is over because it's not a question, it's just words with  
a question mark at the end. 

This is so easily shown wrong. I did  it many times, but there is no  
deafer person than the one who does not make the homework, and come  
back with critics debunked since long.

> "Which one" makes no sense in the 3p view, but get already  
clear meaning in the 3-1 view.

There is no such thing as THE 3-1 view.

I can understand why you say (incorrectly though) that there is  
nothing as "the" 1-view, but eventually this is just *your*  
difficulties in handling the indexicals. But to say that there is no  
such thing as THE 3-1 view, in this context and protocol, you lost me  
completely.

Bruno

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-21 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> 
>> "THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI duplicating
>> machines 
>> "THE FPI" does not exist.
>>
>
> > 
> The FPI requires duplicating machines.
>

We haven't invented duplicating machines yet, does that mean FPI doesn't
exist in our world? 

>> >> 
>> What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3 view"?  
>
>
> > 
> 3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places.
>  
> 3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places and I
> attribute a genuine first person experience to both
>

In other words the Helsinki man's "
genuine first person experience
"
would be experienced by 
both
. So "What one and only one experience will The Helsinki Man experience?"
is not a question with a indeterminate answer, it's just an asinine
question.

> 
> The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not the 3-1 view.
>  
>

Then it's just a case of jargon inflation to impress the rubes, but I'm
not a rube and I am not impressed. I had already figured out that if 1 view
were the same as 3 view you wouldn't have given them different names.

> 
> The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view

Then the best way to emphasize that is to never say 1-1-view again.

>> 
>> At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all over
>> and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known,
>
>
> > 
> Which cat?
>

The only cat in the box that we can see in the observable universe, that
cat.

> > 
> We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and alive, in the
> 3-1 view,
>

Sorry, I've lost track of what  the 3-1 view is, but I do know that in no
view in the observable universe "the cat is all the time dead and alive".

> > 
> Then the math confirms this up to now.
>

Math alone can't confirm anything, it can just tell us that certain
results follow from certain assumptions. But you're assumptions are worse
than wrong, they're gibberish. 

>> 
>> Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "remember having been in
>> Helsinki
>>  
>> " John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be "not in the 1-p"
>> forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating machines there is no
>> such thing as "THE 1-p".
>
>
> > 
> Then you die,

Maybe, that depends entirely on what the hell "he" means, and the meaning
seems to shift even within a single sentence, but whatever the hell that
 god damned personal pronoun means what's important is that if at least one
thing (and the more the merrier) tomorrow remembers being John Clark today
then John Clark will live for at least another 24 hours.

> > 
> If computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at both places,
>

No there would  be "a 1p" at both places, and that would be true even
if computationalism
was false.

> > 
> "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty
>

And 
 the one
"
you
"
will live with certainty
 is "the 1p". And round and round  we go.

> 
> although you cannot know which one in advance.
>

Not only that, "you" cannot know which one even after the experiment is
over because it's not a question, it's just words with a question mark at
the end. 

> > 
> "Which one" makes no sense in the 3p view, but get already clear meaning
> in the 3-1 view.
>

There is no such thing as THE 3-1 view.

 John K Clark

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 20 Jul 2016, at 01:31, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and  
fractured logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.

> No problem,

If there really is no problem why does Bruno Marchal refuse to to  
use Mr. He's name? Because the theory would fall apart that's why.

I did it, and you did not reply.

 >  we agree on who "he" is at all times."he" is both copies,  
as both remember having been in Helsinki.

Then answer just one question, how many people  remember  
being in Helsinki?

Two. Indeed both confirmed "HW v HM", which is equivalent to H & (W v  
M)"

> The FPI comes from the fact that alhtough he is both, he  
(both guy) can only feel to be one of them.

"THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI  
duplicating machines  "THE FPI" does not exist.

The FPI requires duplicating machines.

>>Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one  
city and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"?

> Both in the 3-1 view.

What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3  
view"?  

3p view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places.

3-1 view: the bodies of the H-guy is reconstituted in both places and  
I attribute a genuine first person experience to both guys (and thus I  
listen to them, or read their personal diary, and both confirmed W v M.

> One of them with the 1-1 view.

What the hell is the difference between "THE 1-1 view" and "THE  
1-view"?  And which ONE of the TWO did it turn out to have  
"THE 1-1 view", was it Moscow or Washington?

The 1-1 view is just an expression emphasizing that it is not the 3-1  
view. The 1-1-view is equivalent with a 1-view, not attributed to  
another body, but to the indexical body (or diary/memory) to which the  
experiencer has some direct access (usually through neurons).

At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all  
over and the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known,

Which cat? We know all the time that the cat is all the time dead and  
alive, in the 3-1 view, which here is the universal wave. But yes, in  
each branch, the cat observer, when he observes the cat with some  
alive/dead apparatus, will see only the cat being dead, or alive, but  
this is because he splitted/differentiate, like in the WM-duplication.

> That's why in Helsinki, we got an indeterminacy.

Nothing as profound as that, all that happened is that in  
Helsinki somebody spouted some gibberish and stuck a question mark  
at the end of it.

Not at all. Even using pronouns, or not, the question is cristal  
clear, and the means of verification is very simple. It is just that  
you seem to infer we get a 3p indeterminacy, but we get "only" a 1p  
indeterminacy, like in Everett, but in a much larger context, and that  
explains eventually why physics cannot be the fundamental science,  
once we bet on Mechanism. Then the math confirms this up to now.

>> John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as  
Bruno Marchal explains exactly what P is supposed to be a  
probability of. Until then is is neither correct nor  
incorrect, it's just gibberish  

> The probability of seeing W. Or of seeing M, for the H-guy.

But before you said "he", The Helsinki guy,  "is  
both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki." 
.  So the guy seeing Washington at 9:01 am Thursday  
morning remembers  being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday  
morning, so the probability of that guy seeing  
Washington  is 1 not 1/2. But that guy is not alone, the guy  
seeing Moscow at 9:01am Thursday morning also  
remembers being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday  
morning, so the probability of that guy seeing Moscow  
is 1 not 1/2.  Therefore the probability of the guy  
seeing Helsinki at  8:59 am on Thursday morning seeing BOTH  
Washington and Moscow at 9:01 Thursday morning is 100% not 50%.

For the 3-1 view, that is correct, but avoid the question asked. I  
think you played that trick a lot. Repeating errors does not correct  
them.

Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "remember having been  
in Helsinki" John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be  
"not in the 1-p" forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating  
machines there is no such thing as "THE 1-p". 

Then you die, and computationalism is false, making my point. If  
computationalism is correct, then there is a "the 1-p" at both places,  
and that is what we talk about. "a "the" " does not seem english, but  
that is indeed because english is not well suited to a world with  
duplicating machine. "the 1p" is the one you will live with certainty,  
although you cannot know which one in advance. "Which one" makes no  
sense in the 3p view,

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-19 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 3:47 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured
>> logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.
>
>
> > 
> No problem,

If there really is no problem why does Bruno Marchal refuse to to use Mr.
He's name? Because the theory would fall apart that'
s why.

> > 
>  we agree on who "he" is at all times."he" is both copies, as both
> remember having been in Helsinki.

Then answer just one question, how many people 

remember being in Helsinki?

> 
> The FPI comes from the fact that alhtough he is both, he (both guy) can
> only feel to be one of them.

"THE FPI" comes from nothing because in a world with FPI duplicating
machines 

"THE FPI" does not exist.

>> >>
>> Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one city
>>  
>> and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"?
>
>
> > 
> Both in the 3-1 view.
> 
>

What the hell is the difference between "3-1 view" and "3 view"?  

> >
> One of them with the 1-1 view.
>

What the hell is the difference between "
THE 1
-1 view" and "
THE
1-view"?  And which
ONE of the TWO
 did it turn out
to have "THE 1-1 view"
,
w
as it Moscow or Washington?

At least with the Schrodinger Cat thought experiment when it's all over and
the box is opened the state of the cat's health is known, but we NEVER find
out what
ONE 
city "he" ended up seeing which means
 assigning probabilities to such a event is just ridiculous so
 it's not a thought experiment at all
,
it's a thought muddle. The only thing indeterminate about it is
the 
experimental protocol and the
 ever shifting
meaning of personal pronouns.

> 
> That's why in Helsinki, we got an indeterminacy.
>

Nothing as profound as that, all that happened is that in Helsinki
somebody spouted some gibberish and stuck a question mark at the end of it.

>> >> 
>> John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as Bruno Marchal
>> explains exactly what P is supposed to be a probability of.
>>  
>> Until then is is neither correct nor incorrect, it's just gibberish  
>
>
> > 
> The probability of seeing W. Or of seeing M, for the H-guy.
>

But before you said "he", The Helsinki guy
,

"
i
s both copies, as both remember having been in Helsinki
.
"
.
  So
the guy seeing
Washington
at 9:01 am Thursday morning remembers
 being the Helsinki guy
at 8:59 am on Thursday morning, 
so
the

probability
of that guy seeing Washington  is
 1 not 1/2
. But that guy is not alone,
the guy seeing Moscow

at 9:01am
Thursday morning 
also 
remembers being the Helsinki guy at 8:59 am on Thursday morning,

so the

probability of that guy seeing Moscow is

1 not 1/2.
 Therefore the probability of the guy seeing Helsinki at
 8:59 am on Thursday morning
 seeing BOTH Washington and Moscow at 9:01 Thursday morning is 100% not
50%.

Even though Bruno conceded that "He" means "
remember having been in Helsinki
" John Clark is sure Bruno's response to this will be "not in the 1-p"
forgetting that in a world that has 1-p duplicating machines there is no
such thing as "THE 1-p". 

> 
>> >> 
>> "He" just walked into a "he" duplicating machine so there is absolutely
>> no contradiction between:
>> 1)  He will see either Moscow, or Washington and never in both cities
>> 2) John Clark (aka The Helsinki Man) will see both Moscow AND Washington.
>
>
> > 
> There is a contradiction if we identify the 3p and the 1p view,
>

But "he" just walked into a 1p view duplicating machine, therefore there
is no such thing as "THE 1p view", therefore there is no contradiction.
It's odd certainly, our technology isn't yet good enough to make
1p view duplicating machine
 so it seems very odd indeed, but there is no paradox, there is no
logical contradiction. It's just odd nothing more.

> >
>>> >>
>>> You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies
>>
>> >> 
>> Are you sure you really want me to do that? If so I'd have to conclude
>> that I will see both cities at the same time.
>
>
>
> > 
> But that contradicts the "1)"
>

Not if there are 2 I's, and there are because I just walked into a I
duplicating machine.  

You told me to take the point of view of both so I will, I see Moscow AND
I see Washington at the same time; the Washington Man doesn't and the
Moscow Man doesn't but "I" does if "I" means what Bruno Marchal just said
that personal pronoun should mean, but then Bruno changes the fundamental
meanings of personal pronouns several times in each post so it's hard to
keep up.

>> >> 
>> There is no such thing as "THE 1p" in a world with 1p duplicating
>> machines.
>
>
> > 
> That is contradicted by what copies says.
>

If BOTH copies say "mine is THE 1p and there is no other" then THAT is a
contradiction and both copies are Imbeciles.

> > 
> you will not become a monster with two heads.
>  
> You

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 18 Jul 2016, at 23:38, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> The Helsinki guy now that he will survive,

Only if there is a person or if there are persons who remember  
being the Helsinki guy. 

No problem.

> and that he cannot have the simultaneous first person  
experience

 That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and  
fractured logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.

No problem, we agree on who "he" is at all times. "he" is both copies,  
as both remember having been in Helsinki. The FPI comes from the fact  
that alhtough he is both, he (both guy) can only feel to be one of them.

> There is no such thing as THE first person experience,  
there is only A first person experience.

> "The" refers to that experience of seeing only one city  
and not the other

Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one  
city and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"?

Both in the 3-1 view.
One of them with the 1-1 view.
That's why in Helsinki, we got an indeterminacy.

Bruno, to be meaningful language in a world that has personal  
pronoun duplicating machines just can't be used in the same way its  
used in our world that doesn't have such devices.

>> Both Moscow AND Washington are accessible because  
there are people in BOTH Washington and Moscow who remember being  
the Helsinki Man and neither city is more favored because both  
memories are equally vivid.

> Excellent. Both Washington  AND Moscow are accessible equally.

Equally accessible to the Helsinki man yes, the probability of the  
Helsinki man seeing Moscow is 100% and the probability of the  
Helsinki man seeing Washington is 100%.

That is immediately refute by one copy after the duplication.

> That is why P = 1/2 is the most plausible candidate in this  
situation.

John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as Bruno  
Marchal explains exactly what P is supposed to be a probability  
of. Until then is is neither correct nor incorrect, it's just  
gibberish  

The probability of seeing W. Or of seeing M, for the H-guy.

> Refutation: he knows perfectly well that after pushing the  
button, he will feel to be in either Moscow, or Washington, and  
never in both cities

"He" just walked into a "he" duplicating machine so there is  
absolutely no contradiction between:

1)  He will see either Moscow, or Washington and never in both cities

2) John Clark (aka The Helsinki Man) will see both Moscow AND  
Washington.

There is a contradiction if we identify the 3p and the 1p view, but  
indeed, there is no contradiction once we take the 1-3 difference into  
account. That is why "1)" leads to the indeterminacy.

> You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies

Are you sure you really want me to do that? If so I'd have to  
conclude that I will see both cities at the same time.

But that contradicts the "1)", or you just insist not taking the 1-1- 
view and the 3-1 view difference.

> No observer at all will have the 1p experience 

There is no such thing as "THE 1p" in a world with 1p  
duplicating machines.

That is contradicted by what copies says. In helsinki he imagined to  
get that 1p view, and both concur.

> of seeing both cities.

The Helsinki Man will see both cities. 

Yes, but you will not become a monster with two heads. You will become  
one of them, or you bring back again that telepathic ability of yours.

> The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link  
which would be mandatory for having an experience of both cities at  
once,

On no, now we're back with the idiotic telepathy crap! 

Exactly, but *you* are the one needing it to say that after the  
duplication you see the two cities, which is never the case assuming  
computationalism and non telepathy.

> indeed the probability that JKC see city X is 100%, from the  
3-1 view. But from this it does not follow that all copies will see  
both cities.

All the copies don't need to see both cities for JKC to see both  
cities if JKC means the person who remembers being in Helsinki.  
And what else on earth could JKC mean?

The question is about the 1p seeing a city, not on the intellectual  
belief about the 3-1 description.

> You forget to consult the diary of both copies, who both  
testify that they both see only one city.

I haven't forgotten that, but you seem to have forgotten that 1+1  
=2 

> You don't refute step 3, you just ignore it.

I've long long ago forgotten what step 3 is, but I do try to  
ignore gibberish.   

> What can the Helsinki guy write in his personal diary that  
the guy in Helsinki expect to live.

The diary says "I expect that after I walk into the I duplicating  
machine I, that is to say the person who remember writing these  
words, will see Washington and at the

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-18 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jul 17, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> The Helsinki guy now that he will survive,
>

Only if there is a person or if there are persons who remember being the
Helsinki guy. 

> > 
> and that he cannot have the simultaneous first person experience
>

That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured
logic under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.

>> > 
>> There is no such thing as *THE* first person experience, there is only A
>> first person experience.
>
>
> > 
> "The" refers to that experience of seeing only one city
>  
> and not the other
>

Two people not one have the experience of seeing only one city

and not the other. So which ONE is "THE"?  Bruno, to be meaningful language
in a world that has personal pronoun duplicating machines just can't be
used in the same way its used in our world that doesn't have such devices.

>> 
>> Both Moscow AND Washington
>>  are accessible
>> because there are people in BOTH Washington and Moscow who remember being
>> the Helsinki Man and neither city is
>> more 
>> favored because both memories are equally vivid.
>
>
> > 
> Excellent. Both Washington  AND Moscow are accessible equally.
>

Equally accessible to the Helsinki man yes, the probability of the
Helsinki man seeing Moscow is 100% and the probability of the Helsinki man
seeing Washington is 100%.

> > 
> That is why P = 1/2 is the most plausible candidate in this situation.
>

John Clark will say if P=1/2 is correct or not as soon as Bruno Marchal
explains exactly what P is supposed to be a probability of.

Until then is is neither correct nor incorrect, it's just gibberish  

> 
> Refutation: he knows perfectly well that after pushing the button, he will
> feel to be in either Moscow, or Washington, and never in both cities
>

"He" just walked into a "he" duplicating machine so there is absolutely no
contradiction between:

1)  He will see either Moscow, or Washington and never in both cities

2) John Clark (aka The Helsinki Man) will see both Moscow AND Washington.

> 
> You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies
>

Are you sure you really want me to do that? If so I'd have to conclude
that I will see both cities at the same time.

> > 
> No observer at all will have the 1p experience
>  
>

There is no such thing as "THE 1p" in a world with 1p duplicating
machines.

> > 
> of seeing both cities.
>

The Helsinki Man will see both cities. 

> > 
> The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link which would be
> mandatory for having an experience of both cities at once,
>

On no, now we're back with the idiotic telepathy crap! 

> 
> indeed the probability that JKC see city X is 100%, from the 3-1 view. But
> from this it does not follow that all copies will see both cities.
>

All the copies don't need to see both cities for JKC to see both cities if
JKC means the person who remembers being in Helsinki.

And what else on earth could JKC mean?

> > 
> You forget to consult the diary of both copies, who both testify that they
> both see only one city.
>

I haven't forgotten that, but you seem to have forgotten that 1+1 =2 

> 
> You don't refute step 3, you just ignore it.
>

I've long long ago forgotten what step 3 is, but I do try to ignore
gibberish.   

> 
> What can the Helsinki guy write in his personal diary that the guy in
> Helsinki expect to live.
>

The diary says "I expect that after I walk into the I duplicating machine
I, that is to say the person who remember writing these words, will see
Washington and at the same time I,
that is to say the person who remember writing these word
s
, will see
Moscow".

When we check later when its all over everybody involved agrees the
prediction turned out to be correct because everybody involved knows that
thanks to the person duplicating machine there is more than one person who
remembers writing those words.

> 
> When you say "John Clark will see 2 cities", you mean, taken together
>

Obviously, 2 beings have an equal right to call themselves John Clark and
a equal right to call themselves the Helsinki man. "What one and only one
city will you end up seeing after you step into the you duplicating
machine?" is not question, it's just a string of words with a question mark
at the end. If I'm wrong and it really is a question then answer it, after
it was all over what one and only one city did "you" end up seeing? Was it
Washington or Moscow?   

> > 
> You don't seem to try to refute an argument.
>

Because it's not a good argument, it's not even a bad argument, it's
personal pronoun laden gibberish. We're talking about a world with personal
pronoun duplicating machines in it and in such a world personal pronouns
can not be used in the same way as they are in a world like ours which
hasn't invented
personal pronoun duplicating machines
 yet. So stop talking about

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 14 Jul 2016, at 21:49, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>>> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue  
which one".

>> The better prediction about WHAT?
> About the first person experience

There is no such thing as THE first person experience, there is  
only A first person experience.

The Helsinki guy now that he will survive, and that he cannot have the  
simultaneous first person experience of being in the two cities at  
once, so he will have with P = 1 an experience of seeing one city and  
not the other. "The" refers to that experience of seeing only one city  
and not the other that the guy in Helsinki expect. It is a "a" in the  
3-1 view, but it is a "the" for both copies.

> that is accessible to the candidate in Helsinki.

Both Moscow AND Washington are accessible because there are  
people in BOTH Washington and Moscow who remember being the Helsinki  
Man and neither city is more favored because both memories are  
equally vivid.

Excellent. Both Washington  AND Moscow are accessible equally. That is  
why P = 1/2 is the most plausible candidate in this situation. Both  
statements made by the copies confirm one city, and not the others,  
and both deserve to be listened equally.

>With computationalism, the guy in Helsinki knows that he will  
survive,

The guy in Helsinki knows that the guy in Helsinki will  
survive, but the guy in Helsinki knows nothing about "he".

Refutation: he knows perfectly well that after pushing the button, he  
will feel to be in either Moscow, or Washington, and never in both  
cities, from the 1-p pov, with "the" explained as above.

> given that we know that both will live A 1p view. But  
we know that the two 1p view are logically incompatible.

No, it would be logically incompatible only if people  
duplicating machines did not exist.

You forget again to put yourself at the place of both copies, as this  
shows immediately that you are plain wrong here. Like often, you stop  
the reasoning in the middle. It is simply obvious, given the  
assumption and protocol that the W and M 1p views are logically  
incompatible. No observer at all will have the 1p experience of seeing  
both cities.

You keep doing the same obvious mistake again and again.

For heaven's sake making those two views logically compatible is  
the very thing that makes a people duplicating machine a people  
duplicating machine! It's what they do!

The duplicating machine cannot introduce a telepathic link which would  
be mandatory for having an experience of both cities at once, so that  
the candidate would write "I see W and M". That simply never happens,  
or computationalism is false.

 >> All the 1-views that saw all those cities have an  
equal right to call themselves John Clark, so the answer to the  
question "what is the probability John Clark will see city X?" is  
100%.

> Only in the 3p view.

What the hell does that mean?

It means that for the outsider who look at the experience, or for the  
experiencer when he is in Helsinki, there will be a duplicated body,  
with each an 1p experience, in both cities, so that indeed the  
probability that JKC see city X is 100%, from the 3-1 view. But from  
this it does not follow that all copies will see both cities. In fact  
each copy will see only one city, and the Helsinki guy knew that in  
advance, so the probability, for the 1-view, is P(seeing one city) =  
1. And, as you argue correctly on the equally valid statement made by  
both copy, we get the ¨=1/2. It is the perfect 3-1 symmetry which  
entails the perfect indeterminacy P = 1/2.

 > You agree that for the cities which are not X, the guy  
will not see X, and so refute already what you say here.

I neither agree nor disagree because I have no idea who "THE guy 
" is.

Because you stop the experience in the middle. You forget to consult  
the diary of both copies, who both testify that they both see only one  
city. You abtract away from that second part of the experience, for  
unknown reason (you did this mistake very often).

People duplicating machines make it logically impossible for just  
one guy to refute the prediction that John Clark the Helsinki Man  
will see 2 cities, otherwise it wouldn't be a people duplicating  
machine.

You keep forgetting that the question is on the 1-views, so trivially,  
just one guy can refute a prediction. If he wrote "W and M" in  
Helsinki, both guy will refute the prediction, as it is on the 1-View,  
with "the" in the sense above.

You don't refute step 3, you just ignore it.

> The answer is crystal clear: it is: " Washington or Moscow,  
and I can't be more precise than that".

The answer may be crystal clear but that's not the problem. To  
hell with the answer, John Clark want's to know what the question  
was.

What can

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-16 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 15 Jul 2016, at 10:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


 On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark 
>>> wrote:


 On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes
 
 wrote:


> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.




 What you just said was:

 "
 Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win
 this
 game is not to play it
 "


 And then I just said:

 "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
 Telmo Menezes
 is not sane."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
>>> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
>>> playing the game (sooner or later).
>>>
>>> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
>>> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
>>> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
>>> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>>>
>>> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
>>> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
>>> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
>>> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
>>> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
>>> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.
>>>
>>> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
>>> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
>>> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
>>> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.
>>>
>>> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:
>>>
>>> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
>>> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
>>>
>>> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
>>> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
>>> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
>>> of your interlocutor.
>>>
>>> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
>>> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
>>> you.
>>>
>> Rather accurate description I'm afraid.
>>
>> I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
>> Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some
>> primary
>> matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism
>> (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to
>> anything
>> else simpler).
>>
>> I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of
>> "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only
>> matter/force
>> exists, but only matter/force exists.
>>
>> Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot
>> and
>> the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to
>> some
>> point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I
>> think
>> Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he
>> needs
>> to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in
>> a
>> scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too
>> bad
>> he
>> never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he
>> dismissed
>> logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which
>> might
>> explain this.
>>
>> Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be
>> physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some
>> oracle).
>>
>> When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what
>> is
>> primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up
>> to
>> the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the
>> fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term
>> of
>> the
>>

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-16 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Jul 2016, at 10:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker   
wrote:



On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:



On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark 
wrote:


On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 

wrote:



Thanks for illustrating what I just said.




What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to  
win this

game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."



It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most  
sane

people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the  
game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from  
your

usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say  
modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made  
to this

mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That  
would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when  
discussing

Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I  
consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is  
precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your  
religion

has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here  
you go:


"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was  
12."


This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that  
religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion  
that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the  
ideas

of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice  
to

you.


Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some
primary
matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version:  
Physicalism

(physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to
anything
else simpler).

I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the  
use of
"materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only  
matter/force

exists, but only matter/force exists.

Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as  
Diderot

and
the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up  
to some
point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body  
problem. I

think
Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his  
meditation, he

needs
to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be  
assumed in a
scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though.  
Too bad

he
never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he
dismissed
logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies  
which

might
explain this.

Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and  
still be
physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number +  
some

oracle).

When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain  
what is
primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it  
is up

to
the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness,  
of the
fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in  
term of

the
(infinities of) computations (measure).



Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.


I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict
that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of
time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case.



Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as  
"good" those
that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the Moon  
is a

circle.


Right, but the problem with laughing at them is that our current
super-serious scientific theories might be the target of similar
laughter by our descendants 1K years from now -- if we manage to
survive that long, of course.



A more modern set of examples:

- Neural correlates are easy to find, explaining how the brain
actually works is super-hard;

- Epidemiological studies keep predicting all sorts of things about
nutritional habits,



Maybe I didn't express myself

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 15 Jul 2016, at 22:16, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


> I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave  
one to both John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The   
questionnaires each had 8 questions:
1. What city did you last recall being in? Helsinki2. How many  
cities do you see now? One

3. What is the name of the city you see before you? Washington
4. True/False: You see two cities right now: False
5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: True
6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: False
7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow  
was: False
8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was:  
True


And every single one of those 8 questions had the personal pronoun  
"you" in it, which in a world with people duplicating machines is an  
ambiguous word, and that means they aren't questions at all  
they're just a sequence of words with a question mark at the  
end. And it isn't a thought experiment, it's a thought  
muddle.


 So let me help you out by rewriting those questions so they  
make sense. The answers are in bold:


1. What city did John Clark last recall being in? Helsinki
2. How many cities does John Clark see now? Two



Wrong, no John Clark can ever see two cities.  No John Clark has ever  
become two person at once from the 1p view, which was the obvious  
intent. The duplication does not fuse the resulting 1p experience. You  
fake to misunderstand.


Bruno





3. What is the name of a city John Clark sees now ?   
Moscow
4. What is the name of another city John Clark sees  
now?  Washington
5. True/False: John Clark sees two cities right  
now: True
6. True/False: The prediction that John Clark will  
see Washington was: True
7. True/False: The prediction that John Clark will  
see Moscow was: True
8. True/False: The prediction that John Clark see  
Washington and Moscow was: True
9. True/False: The prediction that John Clark will see  
Washington or Moscow was: Dependents on if it's a exclusive  
"or". 


A person duplicating machine duplicates "you". That needs repeating,  
a person duplicating machine duplicates "you".  All of "you" is  
duplicated, there is no essential youness or soul that the machine  
can't duplicate. When "you" is duplicated that means there is more  
than one, so to then ask what one and only one city "you" will see  
is just dumb. Equally dumb is to talk about "THE 1p" as if there  
were only one when that has been duplicated too just like everything  
else about "you".


And neither the John Clark in Washington nor the John Clark in  
Moscow sees the slightest need to apologize for pointing out this  
imbecility.


 John K Clark









--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-15 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> 
>> I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave one to both
>> John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The
>>  
>> questionnaires each had 8 questions:
>
> 1. What city did you last recall being in? *Helsinki*2. How many cities
>> do you see now?
>> *One*3. What is the name of the city you see before you?
>> *Washington*4. True/False: You see two cities right now:
>> *False*5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was:
>> *True*6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was:
>> *False*7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow
>> was:
>> *False*8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow
>> was: *True*
>
>
And every single one of those 8 questions had the personal pronoun "you" in
it, which in a world with people duplicating machines is an ambiguous word,
and that means they aren't questions at
all

they're
just a sequence of words
 with a question mark at the end
.

And
 it isn't a thought experiment

, it's a thought muddle.

 So let me help you out by rewriting
those
 questions so they make sense
.

The
 answers are in *bold*:

1. What city did
John Clark
 last recall being in? *Helsinki*
2. How many cities do
es

John Clark
see now?
*Two*
3. What is the name of
a

city John Clark sees now ?
  *Moscow*
4. 
What is the
name of another city
 John Clark sees now?

*Washington*
5
. True/False:
John Clark
 see
s
two cities right now:
*True*
6
. True/False: The prediction that
John Clark

will 
see Washington was:
* True*
7
. True/False: The prediction that
John Clark

will 
see Moscow was: *True*
8
. True/False: The prediction that
John Clark 
see Washington and Moscow was:
*True*
9
. True/False: The prediction that
John Clark will
 see Washington or Moscow was:
*Dependents on if it's a exclusive "or". *

A person duplicating machine duplicates "you". That needs repeating, a
 person duplicating machine duplicates "you"
.  All of "you" is duplicated, there is no essential youness or soul that
the machine can't duplicate. When "you" is duplicated that means there is
more than one, so to then ask what one and only one city "you" will see is
just dumb. Equally dumb is to talk about "THE 1p" as if there were only one
when that has been duplicated too just like everything else about "you".

And neither the John Clark in Washington nor the John Clark in Moscow sees
the slightest need to apologize for pointing out this imbecility.

 John K Clark

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-15 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
>>
>>
>>
>> What you just said was:
>>
>> "
>> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
>> game is not to play it
>> "
>>
>>
>> And then I just said:
>>
>> "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
>> Telmo Menezes
>> is not sane."
>
>
> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
> playing the game (sooner or later).
>
> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>
> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.
>
> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.
>
> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:
>
> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
>
> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
> of your interlocutor.
>
> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
> you.
>
 Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

 I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
 Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some
 primary
 matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism
 (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to
 anything
 else simpler).

 I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of
 "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force
 exists, but only matter/force exists.

 Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot
 and
 the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some
 point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I
 think
 Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he
 needs
 to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a
 scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad
 he
 never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he
 dismissed
 logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which
 might
 explain this.

 Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be
 physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some
 oracle).

 When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is
 primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up
 to
 the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the
 fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of
 the
 (infinities of) computations (measure).
>>>
>>>
>>> Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.
>>
>> I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict
>> that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of
>> time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case.
>
>
> Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as "good" those
> that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the Moon is a
>

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Jason Resch

I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave one to both
John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The questionnaires each had 8 questions:

1. What city did you last recall being in?
2. How many cities do you see now?
3. What is the name of the city you see before you?
4. True/False: You see two cities right now:
5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was:
6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was:
7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was:
8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was:

When I gave the questionnaire to John-Washington, he filled out the
following answers (in bold):

1. What city did you last recall being in? *Helsinki*
2. How many cities do you see now? *One*
3. What is the name of the city you see before you? *Washington*
4. True/False: You see two cities right now: *False*
5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: *True*
6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: *False*
7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was:
*False*
8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was: *True*

When I gave the questionnaire to John-Moscow, he filled out the following
answers (in bold):

1. What city did you last recall being in? *Helsinki*
2. How many cities do you see now? *One*
3. What is the name of the city you see before you? *Moscow*
4. True/False: You see two cities right now: *False*
5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: *False*
6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: *True*
7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was:
*False*
8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was: *True*

Both Johns expressed deep regret over insulting people on the Everything
list, most especially Bruno. It turned out neither John-Washington's, nor
John-Moscow's prediction that they would see both cities was true from
their own first person points of view.

Jason

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 5:15 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
> 
>>> >> 
>>> 1) Each
>>> 
>>>  copy saw only one city.
>>
>>
>> > 
>> Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you just need to
>> interview each copy about the prediction made in Helsinki and written in
>> the diary to evaluate the better one.
>>
>
> How? Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or Washington?
> And was the prediction about John Clark or was it about some mysterious
> figure named "you"?
>
> 2) All the copies together saw 2 cities.
>>
>>
>> > 
>> Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That is the 3-1
>> view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the copies" is not a
>> person,
>>
>
> Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will *you* see?" or "how many
> cities will *you *see?" is a nonsense question because this is a world
> with people duplicating machines. 
>
>
> > 
>> that is why you correctly add "together"
>> 
>> (which is the 3-1 view, in which we are not interested).
>>
>
> I know, you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just pointed out
> in a world with people duplicating machine  "THE 1p view" is meaningless,
> there is only "A 1p view".
>
>
>> > 
>> we are asked about the 1-views.
>>
>
> You are asking about what one and only one city was seen by "
> the 1-views
> " and that is a incoherent question with no coherent answer. Garbage in
> garbage out.
>
> >> 
>>> 4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to be
>>> unambiguously true.
>>
>>
>> > 
>> In the 3-1 view, sure.
>>
>
> If they were logical it would be true from true from ANYBODIES view,
> Helsinki man Moscow Man Washington man you name it; John Clark will see two
> cities.
>
>
>> > 
>> But we asked about the 1-views.
>>
>
> There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know which *ONE* and
> only *ONE* *you* will see, and that demand is pure gibberish.
>
> >> 
>>> So which one was right?
>>
>>
>> > 
>> Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the diary was
>> "W v M",
>>
>
> But what exactly was the prediction about? If it was about how many
> cities John Clark will see there would be universal agreement that answer
> turned out to be 2, but if was about how many cities you will see there
> will never be universal agreement on what the answer turned out to be
> because in a world with people duplicating machines the personal pronoun
> used will be ambiguous.
>
>
> *> Holiday Exercise:  [...]*
>>
>
> Adding more cities and more duplicates of "you" will not clarify the
> situation about what one and only one thing will happen to "you".
>
> > 
>> So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ?
>>  
>> Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results?
>>
>
> Bruno, as long as the question has a personal pronoun in it any
> probability for getting

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >>> 
> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which one".

> >> 
> The better prediction about WHAT?
>
> > 
> About the first person experience
>

There is no such thing as *THE* first person experience, there is only A
first person experience.

> > 
> that is accessible to the candidate in Helsinki.
>

Both Moscow AND Washington
 are accessible
because there are people in BOTH Washington and Moscow who remember being
the Helsinki Man and neither city is
more 
favored because both memories are equally vivid.

>> 
>> Even after the experiment is over nobody knows what was the better
>> prediction because nobody knows who exactly the prediction was supposed to
>> be about. 
>
>
> > 
> Then you are already abandoning computationalism.
>

Bullshit. C
omputationalism
 can't make predictions about gibberish and neither can anything else. 

>
> With computationalism, the guy in Helsinki knows that he will survive,
>

The
 guy in Helsinki knows
 that
the guy in Helsinki
 will survive, but
the guy in Helsinki knows nothing about "he".

> > 
> and that he will feel being experiencing the direct seeing of only one
> city.
>

That's right Bruno, keep sweeping those foggy thoughts and fractured logic
under the "he" colored personal pronoun rug.

> 
> We don't ask which one will have THE 1p view,
>

Because there is no such thing as *THE* 1p view.

> > 
> given that we know that both will live A 1p view.
>  
> But we know that the two 1p view are logically incompatible.
>

No, it would be 
logically incompatible
 only if people 
duplicating machines

did not exist. For heaven's sake m
aking those two views logically compatible is the very thing that makes a
people duplicating machine a
people duplicating machine
! It's what they do!

>> >> 
>> The next state of what?I assume you mean the next state of something
>> that remembers being in Helsinki, if so then there is certainly no law of
>> physics that demands only one state can meet those specifications. If  you
>> means something else then I repeat my question, the next state of what?
>
>
> > 
> The next mental state of the guy in Helsinki, from his/her first point of
> view.
>

That should be "states" not "state" because people duplicating machines
are involved and ensuring that there are at least 2 such states is what
a people duplicating machine
 does. If it didn't then it wouldn't be 
a people duplicating machine
. There is nothing paradoxical or logically inconsistent in having 2
answers to that question, we just find it odd because up to now our
technology hasn't been good enough to build a people duplicating machine,
but there is no law of logic or physics that says it can't be done or that
odd things can't happen.  

>> >> 
>> All the 1-views that saw all those cities have an equal right to call
>> themselves John Clark, so the answer
>> to the question "what is the probability John Clark will see city X?" is
>> 100%.
>>
>
> > 
> Only in the 3p view.
> 
>

What the hell does that mean?

> 
> > 
> You agree that for the cities which are not X, the guy will not see X,
>  
> and so refute already what you say here.
>

I neither agree nor disagree because I have no idea who "*THE* guy" is.

>> 
>> if you ask just one John Clark how many cities he saw and he just says
>> only one that does NOT disprove the statement "John Clark will see 2
>> cities" because there is still another John Clark out there that you
>> haven't asked yet.
>
>
> > 
> That is why to get the prediction, the guy in Helsinki has to put itself
> in the place of all copies (mentally), and then just take into account the
> impossibility of the 1p-feeling of seeing the two cities at once.
>

There is no such thing as *THE* 1p-feeling. 

> 
> So just get the conclusion from this. If the two people remember having
> wondering about what city they will end up, by using computaionalism, they
> know that any specific city prediction will be refuted by one guy,
>

People duplicating machines make it logically impossible for just one guy
to refute the prediction that John Clark the Helsinki Man will see 2
cities, otherwise it wouldn't be a people duplicating machine.

> 
> The answer is crystal clear: it is: " Washington or Moscow, and I can't be
> more precise than that".
>

The answer may be crystal clear but that's not the problem. To hell with
the answer, John Clark want's to know what the question was.

> >
>>> >>
>>> as we have agree that all John Clark are John Clark, but after the
>>> duplication, each John Clark will see only one city. So if the question is
>>> "how many city will you see",
>>
>>
> 
>> >> 
>> Bruno Marchal uses "John Clark" 3 times and then sneaks in a "he" in the
>> most important place as if nobody would notice. Who the hell is "he"?  
>
> > 
> John Clark. That was

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:



Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.


Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary
matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism
(physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything
else simpler).

I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of
"materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force
exists, but only matter/force exists.

Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot and
the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some
point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I think
Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he needs
to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a
scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he
never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed
logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might
explain this.

Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be
physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some oracle).

When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is
primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up to
the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the
fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of the
(infinities of) computations (measure).


Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.

I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict
that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of
time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case.


Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as "good" 
those that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the 
Moon is a circle.




A more modern set of examples:

- Neural correlates are easy to find, explaining how the brain
actually works is super-hard;

- Epidemiological studies keep predicting all sorts of things about
nutritional habits,


Maybe I didn't express myself precisely enough.  Prediction that is 
accurate and goes beyond the data in scope is hard.  Just making a 
prediction is easy - Donald Trump predicts he'll be the greatest 
President every day.



while we seem quite far from having reasonable
explanations in most cases (too much complexity from metabolic
pathways, epigentic interactions etc etc)

This trend seems to only be more accentuated with certain machine
learning models, that are increasingly

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 14 Jul 2016, at 00:52, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or  
Washington? And was the prediction about John Clark or was it  
about some mysterious figure named "you"?

> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which  
one".

The better prediction about WHAT?

About the first person experience that is accessible to the candidate  
in Helsinki.

Even after the experiment is over nobody knows what was the better  
prediction because nobody knows who exactly the prediction was  
supposed to be about. 

Then you are already abandoning computationalism. With  
computationalism, the guy in Helsinki knows that he will survive, and  
that he will feel being experiencing the direct seeing of only one city.

>> Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will you see?"  
or "how many cities will you see?" is a nonsense question because  
this is a world with people duplicating machines. 

> Yes, but it should be obvious to anyone understand the  
difference between the 1p and the 3p views

Then answer the question! After the experiment was over what  
ONE city turned out to be the correct answer, Moscow or Washington?

In helsinki, the guy can predict "W v M". He can predict "(W & ~M) v  
(M & ~W). He can predict that (W & M) will be false.

If you can't answer that question then it's not a experiment or even  
a thought experiment and so it's not science and assigning a  
probability to anything concerning it is just ridiculous.

I can predict, as well as I can predict that if I throw a dice, and  
the usual default assumption, I will get with certainty 1 v 2 v 3 v 4  
v 5 v 6. In the step 3 protocol, I predict W v M, and I can prove  
(using computaionalism) that it is the best bet.

As for being obvious, if modern physics and mathematics has taught  
us anything it's that common sense is not always a reliable guide,  
and a lot of obvious things would not be true in a world with  
people duplicating machines. We didn't evolve in a environment  
where things move close to the speed of light so out intuition  
in that area is poor, common sense tells us that Einstein's  
relativity just can'r be true, but it is.

> When the H-guy pushes on the button in Helsinki, he knows  
with certainty (assuming computationalism and the protocol and the  
default hypotheses) that such a guy will find itself in a box, in  
front of a door, behind which only one city will be seen (in the 1p  
view).

If after it's all over you can't name what one city "he" ended  
up seeing then "the" 1p view does not exist, only "a" 1p view does.

Read cautiously what you just said above.

>> you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just  
pointed out in a world with people duplicating machine "THE 1p view 
" is meaningless, there is only "A 1p view".

> Exactly, that is the root of the 1p indeterminacy.

We agree, although not very profound it is certainly true that a  
meaningless question (like which ONE will have the THE 1p view) has  
no answer, and that is the root cause of "1p indeterminacy". 

We don't ask which one will have THE 1p view, given that we know that  
both will live A 1p view. But we know that the two 1p view are  
logically incompatible. We ask to one precise guy (the H-guy) what he  
can expect to live after pushing on the button.

> You are asking about what one and only one city was seen

> The question concerns the future, or the next state.

The next state of what? I assume you mean the next state of  
something that remembers being in Helsinki, if so then there is  
certainly no law of physics that demands only one state can meet  
those specifications. If  you means something else then I repeat my  
question, the next state of what?

The next mental state of the guy in Helsinki, from his/her first point  
of view. As he does not die, and is reconstituted only in W and in M,  
it can only be W, or M.

And please, no personal pronouns with no clear referent in the answer.

>> John Clark will see two cities.

> That is the 3-1-view.

All I know is that John Clark in his 1-view sees Moscow and  
John Clark in his 1-view sees Washington and I have no idea what Mr.  
3-1-view sees. 

It is "John Clark in his 1-view sees Moscow and John Clark in his 1- 
view sees Washington"

With only that you can get that the best Helsinki prediction is "W v M".

> As you are John Clark, you need to go out of your body to  
conceive it. But to complete the thought experience, you need to re- 
integrate your body after the duplication.

OK even better, after the re-integration I have vivid memories of  
BOTH Washington and Moscow
and so I John K Clark from John K Clark's 1p ended up seeing  
Washington and Moscow. 

Assuming telepathy, or another notion of "integration" with no

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 13 Jul 2016, at 00:23, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 7/12/2016 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Jul 2016, at 20:25, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  
 wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 

wrote:





Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to  
win this

game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the  
game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from  
your

usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to  
this

mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would  
be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when  
discussing

Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I  
consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is  
precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your  
religion

has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you  
go:


"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion  
that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the  
ideas

of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.



Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is  
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in  
some primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological  
version: Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics  
can't be reduced to anything else simpler).


I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the  
use of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not  
only matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists.


Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as  
Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think,  
but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on  
the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist)  
answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is  
good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific  
derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he  
never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he  
dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical  
contingencies which might explain this.


Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and  
still be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal  
number + some oracle).


When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain  
what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness,  
and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for  
consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they  
can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations  
(measure).


Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.  Physicalist can predict  
that cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of  
consciousness.


That is not 3p testable.


Sure it is, unless you deny that you have a reference for the word  
"conscious" which you used freely above.



Only in the 1p mode, which cannot be used in the 3p scientific  
discourse, unless we assume mechanism, in which case it is proven that  
the physicalist is wrong (and that is testable, although in an  
indirect way).








Anyway, I just show that Physicalism is incompatible with Mechanism  
+ Occam.


Materialism needs to add a magic thing which has never been  
obesrved by anyone (primary matter) or something even more magical  
making the physical "reality" able to make "real" what already  
exist from much less assumption.


There is no more "magic" than any other theory.  Every theory posits  
some ontology.  You posit the integers - an infinite set which has  
never been observed either and which

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tuesday, 12 July 2016, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
wrote:

> What if John does not want to engage with the argument?
>
> Shouldn't it be his right to say "no"?
>
> I'm arriving at the conclusion that his constant replies, negative +
> insulting as they are, are actually on par with the weird impatient
> expectation by you guys "that he should just answer in the fucking way we
> want him to" - a posture that is just as hostile, even in the politeness
> trappings you love to waltz around with linguistically.
>
> It takes two to tango and continue with the small, eternal bickering orgy
> that you've sucked this list into. Have your UDA threads by all means, but
> the automatic assumption that every list member "must go through UDA"
> before they've even consented to such a private theological exercise is
> plain rude.
>
> The arguments of what was debunked, referring to some huge audience of
> "we", who have all swallowed comp hook, line, and sinker is also curious.
> Why not address that audience with this burning ambition, or Bruno's peers,
> or publications on foundations of science, theology, modal logic etc.?
> People are here for ensemble TOE discussion and the platform seems to have
> developed into Bruno's advertising/propaganda corner.  And whoever says
> "no" is an enemy of science. Whoever does not want to engage with UDA the
> way we want is being strange/egoistic. Such assumptions make Bruno's side
> seem arrogant and guilty of blaspheme.
>
> Besides being incredibly rude socially, tearing people into "Helsinki,
> Moscow" without seeking explicit consent WITH the disclaimer that this
> thought experiment supports a worldview where science and theology loose
> the usual boundary, that physics reverses into machine psychology, that we
> are all assumed to be universal machines... not stating these things
> clearly at the start, but then exposing people's personal belief systems to
> this list "John is a fundamentalist" -via their replies- is perhaps beyond
> rude and already odious, depending on your psychological health. Because
> people's inner theological stances are a private matter which comp
> adherents (meaning Telmo and Bruno) feel they have a right to trample over
> by fast-tracking them into the future of science via the thought experiment
> too quickly.
>
> But no, we couldn't have the kind of politeness that respects personal
> boundaries; just the kind that uses all kinds of politeness markers to
> trample on the exact right that the argument proposes to champion: saying
> "no" to the comp doctor and any form of his marketing, including UDA.
>

Bruno does not argue for comp, his position is that assuming comp,  the UDA
leads to certain unexpected conclusions. So it is possible to claim that
the UDA is valid but not sound, if comp is false.


>  Your sense for manners and good argumentative form, posture, and patience
> is most weird, and it is understandable that some people would feel coerced
> by the rushed, selectively packaged aspect of presenting the argument.
>
> I prefer laughing and fart jokes in my discussions on ontology. They
> ensure absence of seriousness. Nirvana is already here but it is obviously
> your choice to split hairs, so consider being more measured in your
> responses for "opening the eyes of the world". Respect people's basic
> theological boundaries and control that tendency for the kind of discourse,
> where when people have a beer with you, you'l be the types obsessively
> returning to your subject even when group discussion moves on with "one
> more thing about comp though is that..."
>
> Because of this attitude, the absence of informal discussion (this place
> was also used to share jokes in non obsequious fashion), I won't even get
> into the theological problems I see with comp. Without the laughter and all
> the force you guys enforce via emails with you too, I have come to the
> conclusion that you're already at the point where you mistake comp for
> reality much too often. And that's further than any scientist should go,
> regardless of subject. Especially preaching ignorance and modesty the way
> you guys do. This leaves me with little interest to even bring up such
> problems here because you are forever decided on these issues. Indeed,
> these are the beginning trappings of false religions and no longer the kind
> of inquiring open science that interests me.
>
> I decline on the infinite bickering contest. Thank goodness for Brent's
> and John Mike's post. They are what hold this whole kindergarten together.
> PGC
>
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 2:03 PM, Telmo Menezes  > wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 11:25 PM, John Clark > > wrote:
>> > On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes > > wrote:

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-14 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  wrote:

 On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
 wrote:


>>
> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



 What you just said was:

 "
 Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
 game is not to play it
 "


 And then I just said:

 "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
 Telmo Menezes
 is not sane."
>>>
>>>
>>> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
>>> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
>>> playing the game (sooner or later).
>>>
>>> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
>>> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
>>> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
>>> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>>>
>>> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
>>> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
>>> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
>>> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
>>> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
>>> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.
>>>
>>> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
>>> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
>>> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
>>> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.
>>>
>>> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:
>>>
>>> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
>>> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
>>>
>>> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
>>> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
>>> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
>>> of your interlocutor.
>>>
>>> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
>>> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
>>> you.
>>>
>>
>> Rather accurate description I'm afraid.
>>
>> I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
>> Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary
>> matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism
>> (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything
>> else simpler).
>>
>> I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of
>> "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force
>> exists, but only matter/force exists.
>>
>> Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot and
>> the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some
>> point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I think
>> Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he needs
>> to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a
>> scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he
>> never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed
>> logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might
>> explain this.
>>
>> Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be
>> physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some oracle).
>>
>> When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is
>> primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up to
>> the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the
>> fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of the
>> (infinities of) computations (measure).
>
>
> Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.

I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict
that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of
time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case.

A more modern set of examples:

- Neural correlates are easy to find, explaining how the brain
actually works is super-hard;

- Epidemiological studies keep predicting all sorts of things about
nutritional habits, while we seem quite far from having reasonable
explanations in most cases (too much complexity from metabolic
pathways, epigentic interactions etc etc)

This trend seems to only be more accentuated with certain machine
learning models, that are increasingly good at predicting all sorts of
things while remaining black boxes for explanatory

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-13 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or Washington? And
>> was the prediction about John Clark or was it about some mysterious figure
>> named "you"?
>
>
> > 
> The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which one".
>

The better prediction about WHAT? Even after the experiment is over nobody
knows what was the better prediction because nobody knows who exactly the
prediction was supposed to be about. 

>> >> 
>> Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will *you* see?" or "how many
>> cities will *you *see?" is a nonsense question because this is a world
>> with people duplicating machines. 
>
>
> > 
> Yes, but it should be obvious to anyone understand the difference between
> the 1p and the 3p views
>

Then answer the question!

After the experiment was over what ONE city turned out to be the correct
answer, Moscow or Washington? If you can't answer that question then it's
not a experiment or even a thought experiment and so it's not science

and assigning a probability to anything concerning it is just ridiculous.

As for being obvious, if modern physics and mathematics has taught us
anything it's that common sense is not always a reliable guide,

and

a lot of obvious things would not be true in a world with people
duplicating machines.

We didn't evolve in a environment

where

things move close to the speed of light so out intuition in that area is
poor, common sense tells us that Einstein's relativity just can'r be true,
but it is.

> > 
> When the H-guy pushes on the button in Helsinki, he knows with certainty
> (assuming computationalism and the protocol and the default hypotheses)
> that such a guy will find itself in a box, in front of a door, behind which
> only one city will be seen (in the 1p view).
>

If after it's all over you can't name what one city "he" ended up seeing
then "*the*" 1p view does not exist, only "*a*" 1p view does.

>> >> 
>> you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just pointed out in a
>> world with people duplicating machine "THE 1p view" is meaningless, there
>> is only "A 1p view".
>
>
> > 
> Exactly, that is the root of the 1p indeterminacy.
>

We agree, although not very profound it is certainly true that a
meaningless question (like which ONE will have the THE 1p view)
has no answer, and that is the root cause of "1p indeterminacy". 

> 
>> > 
>> You are asking about what one and only one city was seen
>
>
> > 
> The question concerns the future, or the next state.
>

The next state of what?

I assume you mean the next state of something that remembers being in
Helsinki, if so then there is certainly no law of physics that demands only
one state can meet those specifications. If  you means something else then
I repeat my question, the next state of what? And please, no personal
pronouns with no clear referent in the answer.

>> 
>> John Clark will see two cities.
>
>
> > 
> That is the 3-1-view.
>

All I know is that
John Clark
in his 1-view sees Moscow and John Clark in his 1-view sees Washington and
I have no idea what Mr. 3-1-view sees. 

> 
> As you are John Clark, you need to go out of your body to conceive it. But
> to complete the thought experience, you need to re-integrate your body
> after the duplication.
>

OK even better, after the re-integration I have vivid memories of BOTH
Washington and Moscow and so I John K Clark from John K Clark's 1p ended up
seeing Washington *and* Moscow. 

>> >>
>> There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know which *ONE* and
>> only *ONE* *you* will see, and that demand is pure gibberish.
>
>
> > 
> You seem to be unable to understand that despite there are many 1-views
> obtained, all the 1-views feel to be one individual in a specific city.
>

So what? A
ll the 1-views that saw all those cities have an equal right to call
themselves John Clark, so the answer
to the question "what is the probability John Clark will see city X?" is
100%. And if you ask just one John Clark how many cities he saw and he just
says only one that does NOT disprove the statement "John Clark will see 2
cities" because there is still another John Clark out there that you
haven't asked yet.

> 
> By computationalism, you know that you will survive, and that you can only
> feel to survive as a unique individual in
>  
> only one city. You *know* that in advance. 
>

Ah, more

duplicate people and more duplicate personal pronouns

with no clear referent!

> > 
> remembering that the question was about that "future personal memory".
>

I'm not the one who has forgotten that in the future 2 people not just one
will have memories of being in Helsinki, and 2 people not just one will
remember wondering about what city they will end up in; I think you're the
one who has forgotten about that and that's why you call *both* of these
people

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 12 Jul 2016, at 00:15, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 1) Each  copy saw only one city.

> Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you  
just need to interview each copy about the prediction made in  
Helsinki and written in the diary to evaluate the better one.

How? Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or  
Washington? And was the prediction about John Clark or was it  
about some mysterious figure named "you"?

The better prediction was "W v M and I have no clue which one".

In that case, both copies agrees with each other and all subsequent  
similar experiences.

2) All the copies together saw 2 cities.

> Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That  
is the 3-1 view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the  
copies" is not a person,

Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will you see?" or "how  
many cities will you see?" is a nonsense question because this is a  
world with people duplicating machines. 

Yes, but it should be obvious to anyone understand the difference  
between the 1p and the 3p views, that the 1p views are not duplicated  
from the 1p view (the 1-1-view as opposed to the 3-1-views, and the  
3-1-1 views) etc.

When the H-guy pushes on the button in Helsinki, he knows with  
certainty (assuming computationalism and the protocol and the default  
hypotheses) that such a guy will find itself in a box, in front of a  
door, behind which only one city will be seen (in the 1p view).

> that is why you correctly add "together" (which is the 3-1  
view, in which we are not interested).

I know, you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just  
pointed out in a world with people duplicating machine  "THE 1p  
view" is meaningless, there is only "A 1p view".

Exactly, that is the root of the 1p indeterminacy. There will be at  
all moments only one 1p view, from the points of you of all copies.

> we are asked about the 1-views.

You are asking about what one and only one city was seen

The question concerns the future, or the next state. Then, the  
verification is asked to all copies, and those which are verified by  
all copies, when discussing together for example, are the correct one.

by "the 1-views" and that is a incoherent question with no  
coherent answer. Garbage in garbage out.

There is nothing incoherent, and indeed, those writing "W or M, and I  
have no clue which one" all win. and all other prediction fails.
In the finite case, just one fail refutes the prediction. In the  
infinite iteration of duplication, we can dismiss the negligible set  
(in the analytical or computer-science theoretical sense).

>> 4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities"  
turned out to be unambiguously true.

> In the 3-1 view, sure.

If they were logical it would be true from true from ANYBODIES  
view, Helsinki man Moscow Man Washington man you name it;

Yes, and only "W v M" is true from anybodies views when of course they  
keep in mind we are talking about the 1-views, and not the 3-1-views.  
All the copies agree that they expected and eventually verified to see  
only once city, and not knowing in advance which one.

John Clark will see two cities.

That is the 3-1-view.

As you are John Clark, you need to go out of your body to conceive it.  
But to complete the thought experience, you need to re-integrate your  
body after the duplication. As you have two bodies now, you have to do  
a choice, or more seriously, you need to develop just enough empathy  
toward BOTH copies, and listen to them: and both say that they see  
only one city, and could not have guessed that one city in advance,  
nor could they guess it again if we repeat the experience.

> But we asked about the 1-views.

There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know which ONE  
and only ONE *you* will see, and that demand is pure gibberish.

You seem to be unable to understand that despite there are many 1- 
views obtained, all the 1-views feel to be one individual in a  
specific city.

By computationalism, you know that you will survive, and that you can  
only feel to survive as a unique individual in only one city. You  
*know* that in advance. The gibberish is only apparent to you because  
you stop in the middle of the experience: you get first the correct  
3-1 view, but you don't complete the thought experience, by, notably  
looking at the personal memory of each copy, and remembering that the  
question was about that "future personal memory". If you do that, you  
can see easily that "W v M" win, and all others fail.

>> So which one was right?

> Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the  
diary was "W v M",

But what exactly was the prediction about?

Given that the guy knows he will survive, and that he will feel to be  
in one city, the

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-12 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jul 12, 2016Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> You say that Aristotle is a Nitwit,
>

Yes.



> > 
> you seem to defend its main fundamental axiom, made into a dogma by the
> Roman Christian (shared by the strong atheists (the non agnostic one) and
> the fundamentalist catholics.
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> 
> Anyone saying that science has currently decided between Plato and
> Aristotle is either a very naïve ignorant, or someone lied, or a liar.
>

I agree. Science has decided that BOTH Plato and Aristotle were nitwits,
and I have decided that anyone into 
ancestor worship is also a nitwit.


 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-12 Thread Brent Meeker




On 7/12/2016 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Jul 2016, at 20:25, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  
wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 


wrote:





Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win 
this

game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.



Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is 
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some 
primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: 
Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be 
reduced to anything else simpler).


I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use 
of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only 
matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists.


Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as 
Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but 
only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the 
mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) 
answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, 
which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. 
But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he never finished 
his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic 
and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which might 
explain this.


Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still 
be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + 
some oracle).


When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain 
what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, 
and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for 
consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they 
can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations 
(measure).


Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.  Physicalist can predict 
that cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of 
consciousness.


That is not 3p testable.


Sure it is, unless you deny that you have a reference for the word 
"conscious" which you used freely above.




Anyway, I just show that Physicalism is incompatible with Mechanism + 
Occam.


Materialism needs to add a magic thing which has never been obesrved 
by anyone (primary matter) or something even more magical making the 
physical "reality" able to make "real" what already exist from much 
less assumption.


There is no more "magic" than any other theory.  Every theory posits 
some ontology.  You posit the integers - an infinite set which has never 
been observed either and which ex hypothesi cannot be observed.  No 
physicist proposes "primary matter"  they just write descriptive 
equations which on the the basis of their predictive power they think 
capture some truths about reality.




But I decide nothing: I show that physicalism versus mechanism can be 
tested.




 Explanations in terms of infinities of

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Jul 2016, at 22:51, John Clark wrote:



On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


> I think John Clark's religion has a  
name,.[ (weak) Materialism]


Please quote at least the complete sentence.





Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never  
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.




Then stop fainting when some dare to doubt Aristotle's Theology (Weak  
Materialism).


Aristotle: Matter = Primitive truth
Plato:  Matter = possible symptom of something possibly true and  
invisible (like math, no need to invoke ghost).


You say that Aristotle is a Nitwit, but you seem to defend its main  
fundamental axiom, made into a dogma by the Roman Christian (shared by  
the strong atheists (the non agnostic one) and the fundamentalist  
catholics.


Anyone saying that science has currently decided between Plato and  
Aristotle is either a very naïve ignorant, or someone lied, or a liar.


Bruno



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Jul 2016, at 20:25, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark   
wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 

wrote:





Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win  
this

game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game  
of

arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to  
this

mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your  
religion

has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the  
ideas

of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.



Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is  
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some  
primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version:  
Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be  
reduced to anything else simpler).


I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use  
of "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only  
matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists.


Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as  
Diderot and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think,  
but only up to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on  
the mind/body problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist)  
answer, but in his meditation, he needs to assume that God is good,  
which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation.  
But I think he got the main point though. Too bad he never finished  
his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic  
and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which  
might explain this.


Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still  
be physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number +  
some oracle).


When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain  
what is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness,  
and it is up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for  
consciousness, of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they  
can't be explained in term of the (infinities of) computations  
(measure).


Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.  Physicalist can predict  
that cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of  
consciousness.


That is not 3p testable.

Anyway, I just show that Physicalism is incompatible with Mechanism +  
Occam.


Materialism needs to add a magic thing which has never been obesrved  
by anyone (primary matter) or something even more magical making the  
physical "reality" able to make "real" what already exist from much  
less assumption.


But I decide nothing: I show that physicalism versus mechanism can be  
tested.




 Explanations in terms of infinities of computations are like  
physics explaining things as "A consequence of the state of the  
universe and the laws of physics."


I don't submit an explanation. I submit a problem for the Mechanist.

Then I show that the machines have, in some sense, already solved a  
part of the problem (the propositional part) and this in a  
sufficiently precise way so as to be tested.


By QM, things fit more with mechanism than physicalism up to now. Of  
course in some Newtonian era we might have thought

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> >> 
>> 1) Each
>> 
>>  copy saw only one city.
>
>
> > 
> Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you just need to
> interview each copy about the prediction made in Helsinki and written in
> the diary to evaluate the better one.
>

How? Which turned out to be the better prediction, Moscow or Washington?
And was the prediction about John Clark or was it about some mysterious
figure named "you"?

2) All the copies together saw 2 cities.
>
>
> > 
> Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That is the 3-1
> view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the copies" is not a
> person,
>

Then asking the Helsinki Person "what city will *you* see?" or "how many
cities will *you *see?" is a nonsense question because this is a world with
people duplicating machines. 

> 
> that is why you correctly add "together"
> 
> (which is the 3-1 view, in which we are not interested).
>

I know, you're interested in "THE 1p view" but as you just pointed out in
a world with people duplicating machine  "THE 1p view" is meaningless,
there is only "A 1p view".

> > 
> we are asked about the 1-views.
>

You are asking about what one and only one city was seen by "
the 1-views
" and that is a incoherent question with no coherent answer. Garbage in
garbage out.

>> 
>> 4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to be
>> unambiguously true.
>
>
> > 
> In the 3-1 view, sure.
>

If they were logical it would be true from true from ANYBODIES view,
Helsinki man Moscow Man Washington man you name it; John Clark will see two
cities.

> > 
> But we asked about the 1-views.
>

There are 2 "1-views", and Bruno Marchal demands to know which *ONE* and
only *ONE* *you* will see, and that demand is pure gibberish.

>> 
>> So which one was right?
>
>
> > 
> Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the diary was "W
> v M",
>

But what exactly was the prediction about? If it was about how many
cities John Clark will see there would be universal agreement that answer
turned out to be 2, but if was about how many cities you will see there
will never be universal agreement on what the answer turned out to be
because in a world with people duplicating machines the personal pronoun
used will be ambiguous.

*> Holiday Exercise:  [...]*
>

Adding more cities and more duplicates of "you" will not clarify the
situation about what one and only one thing will happen to "you".

> 
> So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ?
>  
> Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results?
>

Bruno, as long as the question has a personal pronoun in it any
probability for getting the right answer can be cranked out, and they're
all meaningless.

 John K Clark 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> I think John Clark's religion has a name,


Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

John K Clark



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016  Telmo Menezes  wrote:

>
>> >
>> I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's
>>  
>> fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms
>> should
>>  
>> be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know what
>>  
>> the hell he's talking about.
>
>
> > 
> I think this gets to the root of the problem, and it's all in your
>  
> head.

Yes, I find that if it's not in my head it's not worth saying.

> > 
> You pride yourself in your scientific culture

Yes

> > 
> so you feel
>  
> personally insulted when someone uses some obscure acronym that you
>  
> don't know about. That is irrational.
>

It's not irrational if the acronym in question is obscure because the
person just made it up and when there is already a short word that every
English speaker in the world knows that means exactly the same thing.

And yes, when somebody uses pompous language instead of logic I feel
insulted  

> 
> People have been discussing Bruno's Universal Dovetailer Argument for
>  
> many years on this mailing list.

And nowhere else.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uda 

By now I know what a Universal Dovetailer is but I still don't know what
"UDA" means because  the "A" in it is not clear,  I've never found any
coherent "argument" in UDA.

> 
> This is not an exercise in
>  
> self-importance

I think it is. Nobody would say "3p"  instead of "your" unless they wanted
to sound deeper and more profound than they really are. And although I can
figure out what "*A *1p view" means I have no idea what "*THE* 1p view"
means, and that's the one Bruno talks about.

> > 
> it's just how acronyms are born anywhere.

Those acronyms are still in the womb and will never be born.

> > 
> Bruno's
>  
> argument has not reached the mainstream,

And why do you suppose that is?

> > 
> so it's fairly normal that
>  
> wikipedia does contain an entry about it.

Not only does Google not know what "UDA" is neither does Bing. They don't
know what "1p" is either , or "3p, much less "1-1p".

> 
> The Universal Dovetailer is a perfectly well defined (and quite
>  
> interesting) concept in computer science.
>  
> I do think this one is
>  
> mentioned in wikipedia, by the way.

No, Wikipedia doesn't know what a "Universal Dovetailer" is either
.

B
ut I have no problem with the fact that one type of
 P
HYSICAL

computer can always

simulate

another

type of computer or that a

PHYSICAL computer if properly programmed and if given sufficient energy and
time
. and
could compute everything that is
c
omputable and thus be able simulate reality, but Turing figured that out 85
years ago.

I also have no problem with something that can compute intelligent behavior
will 
also be conscious, Darwin proved that (or at least provided an astronomical
amount of evidence in favor of it) over 150 years ago. So what's new
thing does
 Bruno's "
Universal
 Dovetailer
" bring to the table?

Mathematics can't tell us what is, it can't tell us the truth or even the
approximate truth, mathematics can only tell us what will result from
certain assumptions. Physics can't tell us the truth either but at least it
can come close.

> 
> You can check the definition of "Bad Faith" on Wikipedia:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_faith

But you can't check
 Universal Dovetailer
 or UDA or 1p or 3p or 1-1p or 3-1p on Wikipedia. And speaking of bad
faith, do you think Bruno *really* believes I'm a dogmatic catholic
theologian who is even more hidebound than the Pope, or do you think maybe
he was being just a tad
duplicitous
?

> > 
> It is bullying if you even refuse to read what you propose to
>  
> criticize,

Proofs are built on foundation of the previous steps so only a fool would
keep reading a proof after a error was found, and I am not a fool.

John K Clark 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:





Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.



Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is 
Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some 
primary matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: 
Physicalism (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be 
reduced to anything else simpler).


I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of 
"materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only 
matter/force exists, but only matter/force exists.


Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot 
and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up 
to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body 
problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his 
meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, which, even if true, 
cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. But I think he got the 
main point though. Too bad he never finished his text "À la Recherche 
de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there 
are historical contingencies which might explain this.


Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be 
physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some 
oracle).


When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what 
is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is 
up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, 
of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in 
term of the (infinities of) computations (measure).


Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.  Physicalist can predict that 
cutting off oxygen from your brain will cause loss of consciousness.   
Explanations in terms of infinities of computations are like physics 
explaining things as "A consequence of the state of the universe and the 
laws of physics."


Brent



Some people, when they learn that you are open to the idea that (weak) 
materialism is wrong, will believe, for a time, that you are actually 
open to the fairy tales, superstition and magic, and so believe that 
you are mad. When they realize the error, and that immaterialism can 
also be only some mathematicalism, which usually assumes *less* than 
physicalism, it is too much embarrassing for them to admit.
Then they hate you cordially when they eventually understand that they 
were the one still using magic in their religion.


Bruno







Thanks for illustrating what I just said.


John K Clark




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups

"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, 
send an

email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark   
wrote:
On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes  


wrote:





Thanks for illustrating what I just said.



What you just said was:

"
Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win  
this

game is not to play it
"


And then I just said:

"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
Telmo Menezes
is not sane."


It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.



Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is Materialism 
which includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some primary matter and/ 
or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism (physics is  
the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to anything else  
simpler).


I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of  
"materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/ 
force exists, but only matter/force exists.


Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot  
and the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up  
to some point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body  
problem. I think Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his  
meditation, he needs to assume that God is good, which, even if true,  
cannot be assumed in a scientific derivation. But I think he got the  
main point though. Too bad he never finished his text "À la Recherche  
de la Vérité". Too bad he dismissed logic and neoplatonism, but there  
are historical contingencies which might explain this.


Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be  
physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some  
oracle).


When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what  
is primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is  
up to the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness,  
of the fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in  
term of the (infinities of) computations (measure).


Some people, when they learn that you are open to the idea that (weak)  
materialism is wrong, will believe, for a time, that you are actually  
open to the fairy tales, superstition and magic, and so believe that  
you are mad. When they realize the error, and that immaterialism can  
also be only some mathematicalism, which usually assumes *less* than  
physicalism, it is too much embarrassing for them to admit.
Then they hate you cordially when they eventually understand that they  
were the one still using magic in their religion.


Bruno







Thanks for illustrating what I just said.


John K Clark




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups

"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an

email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything- 
l...@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

What if John does not want to engage with the argument?

Shouldn't it be his right to say "no"?

I'm arriving at the conclusion that his constant replies, negative +
insulting as they are, are actually on par with the weird impatient
expectation by you guys "that he should just answer in the fucking way we
want him to" - a posture that is just as hostile, even in the politeness
trappings you love to waltz around with linguistically.

It takes two to tango and continue with the small, eternal bickering orgy
that you've sucked this list into. Have your UDA threads by all means, but
the automatic assumption that every list member "must go through UDA"
before they've even consented to such a private theological exercise is
plain rude.

The arguments of what was debunked, referring to some huge audience of
"we", who have all swallowed comp hook, line, and sinker is also curious.
Why not address that audience with this burning ambition, or Bruno's peers,
or publications on foundations of science, theology, modal logic etc.?
People are here for ensemble TOE discussion and the platform seems to have
developed into Bruno's advertising/propaganda corner.  And whoever says
"no" is an enemy of science. Whoever does not want to engage with UDA the
way we want is being strange/egoistic. Such assumptions make Bruno's side
seem arrogant and guilty of blaspheme.

Besides being incredibly rude socially, tearing people into "Helsinki,
Moscow" without seeking explicit consent WITH the disclaimer that this
thought experiment supports a worldview where science and theology loose
the usual boundary, that physics reverses into machine psychology, that we
are all assumed to be universal machines... not stating these things
clearly at the start, but then exposing people's personal belief systems to
this list "John is a fundamentalist" -via their replies- is perhaps beyond
rude and already odious, depending on your psychological health. Because
people's inner theological stances are a private matter which comp
adherents (meaning Telmo and Bruno) feel they have a right to trample over
by fast-tracking them into the future of science via the thought experiment
too quickly.

But no, we couldn't have the kind of politeness that respects personal
boundaries; just the kind that uses all kinds of politeness markers to
trample on the exact right that the argument proposes to champion: saying
"no" to the comp doctor and any form of his marketing, including UDA. Your
sense for manners and good argumentative form, posture, and patience is
most weird, and it is understandable that some people would feel coerced by
the rushed, selectively packaged aspect of presenting the argument.

I prefer laughing and fart jokes in my discussions on ontology. They ensure
absence of seriousness. Nirvana is already here but it is obviously your
choice to split hairs, so consider being more measured in your responses
for "opening the eyes of the world". Respect people's basic theological
boundaries and control that tendency for the kind of discourse, where when
people have a beer with you, you'l be the types obsessively returning to
your subject even when group discussion moves on with "one more thing about
comp though is that..."

Because of this attitude, the absence of informal discussion (this place
was also used to share jokes in non obsequious fashion), I won't even get
into the theological problems I see with comp. Without the laughter and all
the force you guys enforce via emails with you too, I have come to the
conclusion that you're already at the point where you mistake comp for
reality much too often. And that's further than any scientist should go,
regardless of subject. Especially preaching ignorance and modesty the way
you guys do. This leaves me with little interest to even bring up such
problems here because you are forever decided on these issues. Indeed,
these are the beginning trappings of false religions and no longer the kind
of inquiring open science that interests me.

I decline on the infinite bickering contest. Thank goodness for Brent's and
John Mike's post. They are what hold this whole kindergarten together. PGC

On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 2:03 PM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 11:25 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> > On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> >
> >> I am sick of
> >> playing the game
> >
> >
> > Yes I know you said that before, but then why do you continue to play it?
>
> Human nature.
>
> >
> >>
> >> what I mean by "this game" is the game of
> >>
> >> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
> >>
> >> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
> >>
> >> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
> >
> >
> > I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's
> > fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms
> should
> > be well known to

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 11:25 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>
>>
>> >
>> I am sick of
>> playing the game
>
>
> Yes I know you said that before, but then why do you continue to play it?

Human nature.

>
>>
>> what I mean by "this game" is the game of
>>
>> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
>>
>> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
>>
>> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>
>
> I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's
> fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms should
> be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know what
> the hell he's talking about.

I think this gets to the root of the problem, and it's all in your
head. You pride yourself in your scientific culture so you feel
personally insulted when someone uses some obscure acronym that you
don't know about. That is irrational.

I have never seen Bruno acting like anyone is uneducated or dumb for
not knowing something, much less is acronyms. It is all in your head.
What I have seen is you making fun of Bruno's ideas for years, even
though he was always available to clear up the meaning of his acronyms
to you. But you play the game of pretending you don't know what they
mean, because you just want to sabotage the debate.

People have been discussing Bruno's Universal Dovetailer Argument for
many years on this mailing list. It is normal that, at some point, we
start using abbreviations like UDA. This is not an exercise in
self-importance, it's just how acronyms are born anywhere. Bruno's
argument has not reached the mainstream, so it's fairly normal that
wikipedia does contain an entry about it. This is surely true of
millions of ambitious concepts that are being explored by niches of
humanity all over. Nothing special about it.

The Universal Dovetailer is a perfectly well defined (and quite
interesting) concept in computer science. I do think this one is
mentioned in wikipedia, by the way. The argument around the UD (see,
it's annoying to keep writing the same thing over and over) captures
the interest of a lot of people here, clearly including you -- you
have been discussing it for years. What you are saying is what? That
we should not give Bruno the satisfaction of creating acronyms for
things that he thought and that we debate over and over? Don't you
think that is terribly petty?

I have witnessed Bruno give a lecture having in mind a general
audience, and the did not assume people to know what a FUNCTION is.
much less some obscure acronym. It's all a matter of context, a
concept you seem to have a hard time grasping. Don't we have the right
to have a niche place to discuss less known ideas that we find
exciting? What the hell is the problem with that? How can you think
that this is a personal insult to you?

> I'm also sick of pretending that substituting
> "1p" for "me" and "3p" for "you" is a great scientific achievement.

Well that's not on Bruno, it's common in philosophical discussion
everywhere. The way you phrase it tells me that you don't fully grasp
the concepts, but that's not very surprising given the incorrect
arguments you use against the UDA. In any case, I don't think anyone
is under the impression that these are scientific advancements at all.
1p and 3p are just useful concepts to talk about certain things,
surely useful when we are dealing with the mind-body problem.

I don't get this "scientific advancement" obsession, where
hard-to-grasp ideas are glorified. Hard-to-grasp ideas are a necessary
evil at most. Science is about the search for truth, and if we could
express all the truth at a basic school level that would be great.

>> >
>> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it.
>
>
> You already said that more than once, and I already asked why you continue
> doing something you're sick of.

Because I think Bruno has something interesting to tell the world, and
not a lot of people know about it. So I am doing my small part to
leave it on the record that not everyone thinks like you.

>
>>
>> >
>> you argue in bad faith.
>
>
> I then to think all faith is bad

You can check the definition of "Bad Faith" on Wikipedia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bad_faith

Of course you know this, and you know that "faith" in this context has
no relation whatsoever with the notion of "religious faith". So this
turns out to be a good example of arguing in bad faith -- you ignore
what you know is meant and run for a dictionary definition that you
like. You do this a lot.

> but perhaps I could figure out that you're
> taking about if you gave a specific example rather than vague generalities.

I do above and I did before, but you removed them when answering to
me. You also do that a lot.

>>
>> >
>> it is precisely
>> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
>> has no name,

Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

Those tired of Clark's argument can skip up to the (more interesting)   
Holiday Exercise below.
My be this could help Clark to try to find a new argument, as again,  
he just brought his usual invalid trick, as I show one last times.

On 10 Jul 2016, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 10, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Pleasen replaced "all copies" by "each copy", and call them  
as you want.

OK.
1) Each copy saw only one city.

Excellent! That is the correct 1-view description. Now, you just need  
to interview each copy about the prediction made in Helsinki and  
written in the diary to evaluate the better one.

If you agree that "Each copy saw only one city", you have to agree  
that "each copy realize that "W & M" is refuted, that half of the  
copies refute all specific predictions, and that all verifies "W V M".

2) All the copies together saw 2 cities.

Correct 3p description of the experiences of all copies. That is the  
3-1 view. We need it to get the correct "1)", but "all the copies" is  
not a person, that is why you correctly add "together" (which is the  
3-1 view, in which we are not interested).

3) All the copies have an equal right to call themselves "John  
Clark".

Yes, but below you are using "3') All the copies has an equal right to  
call themselves "John Clark", like if the set of reconstituted people  
was a sort of super-entity. That is the 3-1 view. But we are asked  
about the 1-views. Again, better to use "each" than "all", you get  
back to what you were asked to avoid.

4) The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to  
be unambiguously true.

In the 3-1 view, sure. But we asked about the 1-views.

If you were talking about the 1-views, then that is directly refuted  
by each copy, or each 1-view (or all of them, well understood). Given  
the enunciation of the problem, you are just wrong, as the  
verification procedure has shown again above.

5) The statements "you will see one city" and "you will see 2  
cities" and "you will see no city" turned out to be neither true nor  
false because in a world of people duplicating machines the personal  
pronoun "you" is ambiguous.

> When interviewing each of them in the cities, each have no  
problem to understand to whom I am asking the question, whatever  
words are used for it.

But the interviewees do NOT agree among themselves to whom the  
question was asked.

Utter non sense, again made possible by the confusion you introduce by  
abstracting from the precision given.

If I don't give the precision, you say: vague, ambiguous. If I give  
you the precision (like in the papers, books), you say "pee-pee  
jargon", and refuse to use them. When eventually you use them, you say  
the result is not original, but fail to say why you don't move on the  
next step.

So which one was right?

Trivially both when in Helsinki the prediction written in the diary  
was "W v M", and none for any other. There is no ambiguity, and the  
prediction are simple and clear, and the criteria of verification  
(interviewing all copies) is very clear too.

You might try to use the exercise below to try to find another  
refutation. Your current attempt has been debunked many times, and as  
Telmo and other said, it is a bit boring.

==

Holiday Exercise:

A guy undergoes the Washington Moscow duplication, starting again from  
Helsinki.
Then in Moscow, but not in Washington,  he (the one in Moscow of  
course) undergoes a similar Sidney-Beijing duplication.

I write P(H->M) the probability in H to get M.

In Helsinki, he tries to evaluate his chance to get Sidney.

With one reasoning, he (the H-guy)  thinks that P(H-M) = 1/2, and that  
P(M-S) = 1/2, and so conclude (multiplication of independent  
probability) that P(H-S) = 1/2 * 1/2 = 1/4.

But with another reasoning, he thinks that the duplications give  
globally a triplication, leading eventually to a copy in W, a copy in  
S and a copy in B, and so, directly conclude P(H-S) = 1/3.

So, is it 1/4 or 1/3 ?

Can you modify a bit the protocol so that we get any of those results?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-10 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jul 10, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> you were confusing 1p and 3p.
>

What the hell is confusing about the difference between "I" and "you"? Off
the top of my head I can't think of anything  LESS confusing.

> > 
> You confuse 1p and 3p, and then 1-1-p and 3-1-p, etc.
>

What the hell is the difference between 1-p and 1-1-p? Peepee notation
sucks.

>

>> >> 
>> It most certainly is NOT confirmed if you call "
>> 
>> all 1p copies
>> " by the name they call themselves, John Clark. 
>>
>
> > 
> Utterly stupid semantic game.
>

John Clark admits it's not brilliant, but it's more than smart enough to
utterly debunk  Bruno Marchal's
"proof". That's why Bruno's halfhearted attempt to get rid of the personal
pronouns was abandoned almost immediately. It was obviously not working.

> > 
> Pleasen replaced "all copies" by "each copy", and call them as you want.
>

OK
.

1) Each
 copy saw only one city.
2) 
All the copies together saw 2 cities.
3) 
All the copies have an equal right to call themselves "John Clark".
4) 
The statement "John Clark will see two cities" turned out to be
unambiguously true.
5) 
The statements "you will see one city" and "you will see 2 cities" and "you
will see no city" turned out to be neither true nor false because in a
world of people duplicating machines the personal pronoun "you" is
ambiguous.

> > 
> When interviewing each of them in the cities, each have no problem to
> understand to whom I am asking the question, whatever words are used for it.
>

But the interviewees do *NOT* agree among themselves to whom the question
was asked. So which one was right? If after the experiment is over that
question can not be answered (and it can't be) then it's not a experiment
or even a thought experiment, it's just a muddle.  

>> 
>> If you put a gun to my head I couldn't tell you what step 7 is.
>
>
> > 
> Meaning: I don't read the papers,
>

Meaning life is too short to continue reading a "proof" after a colossal
blunder has been made and the author has no idea how to fix it. 

> 
> You love the idea of disliking religion, no doubt,
>

Yes, there is no doubt about that. 

> > 
> but that does not prevent you to behave like a fundamentalist defender of
> some catholic dogma.
>  
>  Even the Pope JP II took distance from them.
>

I
 have an idea, instead of going through all the trouble of calling me a
dogmatic catholic fundamentalist about every other day as you have for the
last several years let's just establish a new notation such that
"INSULT#41" means "John Clark is a
dogmatic catholic fundamentalist
" and "RESPONSE#42" means "
Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was
12

"
.

 I think I'll give it a try:

RESPONSE#42

John K Clark

>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 08 Jul 2016, at 20:13, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> You repeat your confusion between 3p and 3-1p.

Confusion? We're not talking about Tensor Calculus here! Is there  
anybody on the face of this planet that is confused by the  
difference between "I" and "you"? 

I know only one, and not all the times, only when confronted to the  
FPI, as it is utterly clear in the text your wrote, but don't not  
quote, but for which I said that you were confusing 1p and 3p.

I should have said more clearly: you again confuse 1p and 3p  
opportunistically. But as you never quote enough ...

remember? You confuse 1p and 3p, and then 1-1-p and 3-1-p, etc.

> We have debunked your strategies,

Bullshit.

?

> showing that the proof was fine

If the proof was fine you could replace all the personal pronouns  
in it with proper nouns; you tried to do that a few posts ago but  
gave up after my first challenge when it became obvious the "proof"  
was crumbling apart.  

No, I was a bit discouraged you came back with your oldest strategy  
already debunked by many people.

> It is plain obvious that WvM is confirmed by all 1p copies,

It most certainly is NOT confirmed if you call "all 1p copies 
" by the name they call themselves, John Clark. 

Utterly stupid semantic game. Pleasen replaced "all copies" by "each  
copy", and call them as you want. When interviewing each of them in  
the cities, each have no problem to understand to whom I am asking the  
question, whatever words are used for it.

> And by the way, you have took some times to criticize the  
step 7

If you put a gun to my head I couldn't tell you what step 7 is.

Meaning: I don't read the papers, but I will criticize anyway, because  
I dislike the result which hurt my dogmatic faith in primary matter  
and physicalism so much.

> your religious materialist belief

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never  
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

You love the idea of disliking religion, no doubt, but that does not  
prevent you to behave like a fundamentalist defender of some catholic  
dogma. Even the Pope JP II took distance from them.

Bruno

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-09 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 , Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> > 
> I am sick of
>  
> playing the game
>

Yes I know you said that before, but then why do you continue to play it?

> what I mean by "this game" is the game of
> 
> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
> 
> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
> 
> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>

I'll tell you what I'm sick of, I'm not sick of arguing with you, that's
fun, but I'm sick of Bruno's acting as if his silly homemade acronyms
should be well known to every educated person when even Google doesn't know
what the hell he's talking about. I'm also sick of pretending that
substituting "1p" for "me" and "3p" for "you" is a great scientific
achievement.

> 
> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it.

You already said that more than once, and I already asked why you
continue doing something you're sick of.

> > 
> you argue in bad faith.
>

I then to think all faith is bad but perhaps I could figure out that you're
taking about if you gave a specific example rather than vague generalities.

> > 
> it is precisely
>  
> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
>  
> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.I'll spare you the
> trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
>

Thank you that was thoughtful because between you and Bruno my rubber
stamp is getting a bit worn so I'll make you a deal, stop using your
rubber stamp insult stamp and I'll stop using my rubber stamp response
stamp.

> 
> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
>  
> people use.

Oh dear, I've got to use my rubber stamp yet again::

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never

heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

> > 
> You argue in bad faith

You already said that and I already requested a specific example.

> > 
> you destroy honest discussion to score
>  i
> nternet points you bully people that were nothing but nice to
> 
> you.

If somebody is talking nonsense it makes no difference if they are nice to
me or not, it's still nonsense. And pointing out logical inconsistencies is
not bullying, it's critical thinking.

 John K Clark

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-09 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>
>> >
>> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
>
>
> What you just said was:
>
> "
> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
> game is not to play it
> "
>
>
> And then I just said:
>
> "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
> Telmo Menezes
> is not sane."

It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
playing the game (sooner or later).

It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).

This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.

Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.

I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:

"Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."

This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
of your interlocutor.

You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
you.

Telmo.

>
> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
>
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-09 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

>
> 
> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
>

What you just said was:

"
*Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win
this **game
is not to play it*
**"


And then I just said:


*"If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that Telmo Menezes
is not sane."*

Thanks for illustrating what I just said.


 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-09 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 7:47 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Telmo Menezes 
> wrote:
>
>> John,
>> Let us be completely honest here. You have more or less destroyed this
>> mailing list.
>>  [ long long list of blather followed by]
>> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
>> game is not to play it.
>
>
> If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
> Telmo Menezes
> is not sane.

Thanks for illustrating what I just said.

Telmo.

>
>  John K Clark
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-08 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 4:01 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> 
> You repeat your confusion between 3p and 3-1p.
>

Confusion? We're not talking about Tensor Calculus here! Is there anybody
on the face of this planet that is confused by the difference between "I"
and "you"? 

> 
> We have debunked your strategies,
>

Bullshit.

> > 
> showing that the proof was fine
>

If the proof was fine you could replace all the personal pronouns in it
with proper nouns; you tried to do that a few posts ago but gave up after
my first challenge when it became obvious the "proof" was crumbling apart.

> > 
> It is plain obvious that WvM is confirmed by all 1p copies,
>

It most certainly is NOT confirmed if you call "
all 1p copies
" by the name they call themselves, John Clark. That's why Bruno Marchal
insists on calling them "you" or "he", personal pronouns are a great place
to hide fuzzy thinking.

> > 
> You deny
> t
> he simplest point of the UDA.
>

That's because "simple" can have 2 meanings, it can also mean stupid.

> 
> And by the way, you have took some times to criticize the step 7
>

If you put a gun to my head I couldn't tell you what step 7 is.

> 
> your religious materialist belief
>

 Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-08 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

John,
>  
> Let us be completely honest here. You have more or less destroyed this
>  
> mailing list.
>  [* long long list of blather followed b*y]
> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
>  
> game is not to play it.


If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that 
Telmo Menezes
 is not sane.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-08 Thread Telmo Menezes

John,

Let us be completely honest here. You have more or less destroyed this
mailing list.
It is not that you disagree with something, it is that you use
manipulative techniques to score points (the only thing you really
seem to care about):

- You take people's sentences out of context and reply to that;
- You overgeneralize what someone said and use it against the person
until the end of times;
- You insult people who never wrote an unkind word to you;
- You cut an paste jokes that weren't funny the first time around. You
do this again and again and again;
- When you lose and argument you immediately change the subject...
- ... and then months later you "forget" that you already lost the
argument and bring back the same drivel;
- (this happened not one, not two times, not three... you get the idea)
- You play the "no-bullshit scientist" role while constantly resorting
to arguments from authority.

Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
game is not to play it. You started debating dozens of people here,
now about three are left. Soon it will be only you, and then you will
be able to fully enjoy your victory, I guess.

Have fun!
Telmo.

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 7:05 PM, John Clark  wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 7, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>> >>
>>> I can stop here.
>>
>>
>>
>> >
>> That is probably wise.
>
>
> But deep down John Clark knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't stop here, John Clark
> knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't be wise.
>
>
>>
>> >
>> but apparently once you get that there is no problem with the pronouns and
>> name,
>
>
> Bullshit.
> When names are substituted for personal pronouns the
> vapidness of the "proof" becomes obvious and the entire argument falls to
> pieces. All Bruno Marchal has done in
> Bruno Marchal's "proof" is to sweep metaphysical puzzles under a rug made of
> nothing but personal pronouns.
>
>>
>> >
>> you just came back to your oldest strategy (faking a confusion between 1p
>> and 3p points of view
>
>
> On the contrary there is no confusion, Bruno Marchal's error is crystal
> clear.
>  Bruno Marchal
> thinks that by defining "1p" as "I" and "I" as "1p", and by defining "3p" as
> "he" and "he" as "3p" great philosophical progress has been made.
>
>>
>> >
>> That strategy has already been debunked more than one times by many people
>> on this list.
>
>
> Bullshit.
>
>>
>> >
>> It would be most boring to make another tour.
>
>
> And yet no doubt you (Mr. 3p) will.
>
>>
>> >
>> Of course if any one else has still a problem with the first person
>> indeterminacy
>> [...]
>>
>
> Nor does Mr. 1p have a problem with it.  I (or Mr. 1p) have no problem
> whatsoever with
> first person indeterminacy
> and never have
> , for as far back as I (or Mr. 1p) can remember I (or Mr. 1p) have been
> unable to always know what would happen next.
>
>>
>> >
>> at this point, without further motivation to do so, I will not add
>> anything
>
>
> You (or Mr. 3p) haven't added anything in a very long time.
>
>
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 07 Jul 2016, at 19:05, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> I can stop here.

> That is probably wise.

But deep down John Clark knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't stop here,  
John Clark knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't be wise. 

> but apparently once you get that there is no problem with the  
pronouns and name,

Bullshit. When names are substituted for personal pronouns  
the vapidness of the "proof" becomes obvious and the entire  
argument falls to pieces.

Sure.

All Bruno Marchal has done in Bruno Marchal's "proof" is to  
sweep metaphysical puzzles under a rug made of nothing but personal  
pronouns.

> you just came back to your oldest strategy (faking a  
confusion between 1p and 3p points of view

On the contrary there is no confusion, Bruno Marchal's error is  
crystal clear. Bruno Marchal thinks that by defining "1p" as "I"  
and "I" as "1p", and by defining "3p" as "he" and "he" as "3p" great  
philosophical progress has been made.

I never did that. You repeat your confusion between 3p and 3-1p.

> That strategy has already been debunked more than one times  
by many people on this list.

Bullshit.

Sure.

> It would be most boring to make another tour.

And yet no doubt you (Mr. 3p) will.

> Of course if any one else has still a problem with the first  
person indeterminacy [...]

Nor does Mr. 1p have a problem with it.  I (or Mr. 1p) have no  
problem whatsoever with first person indeterminacy and never  
have, for as far back as I (or Mr. 1p) can remember I (or  
Mr. 1p) have been unable to always know what would happen next.

> at this point, without further motivation to do so, I will  
not add anything

You (or Mr. 3p) haven't added anything in a very long time. 

We have debunked your strategies, showing that the proof was fine  
right, so why would we change it, and indeed, it is very easy. You are  
the only one (except for Delahaye)  having a problem with this... well  
faking having a problem with this.

It is plain obvious that WvM is confirmed by all 1p copies, and all  
other propositions are refuted by at least one copy, so, given the  
definition of 1p, it follows directly. You deny he simplest point of  
the UDA. And by the way, you have took some times to criticize the  
step 7 (without noticing it, and contradicting you fake non  
comprehension, but there you used the usual knock-down argument,  
refuted by the dream phenomenon.

The reason I keep pointing on your strategies is that you are the only  
opponent I can confront on this. The others are literary philosophers  
that have never said more than non-convincing, and never in myb  
presence. It probably reassure me that your strategy is really simple,  
and is not related with anything I could say. This last two post  
illustrates very well. I am also interested in your motivation, which  
is not your religious materialist belief (that I have already figure  
out), so what?

Bruno

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-07 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Jul 7, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> I can stop here.
>
>

> 
> That is probably wise.

But deep down John Clark knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't stop here, John Clark
knew Bruno Marchal wouldn't be wise. 

> > 
> but apparently once you get that there is no problem with the pronouns and
> name,
>

Bullshit.

When names are substituted for personal pronouns the

vapidness of the "proof" becomes obvious and the entire argument falls to
pieces. All Bruno Marchal has done in

Bruno Marchal's "proof" is to sweep metaphysical puzzles under a rug made
of nothing but personal pronouns.

> > 
> you just came back to your oldest strategy (faking a confusion between 1p
> and 3p points of view
>

On the contrary there is no confusion, Bruno Marchal's error is crystal
clear.
 Bruno Marchal
 thinks that by defining "1p" as "I" and "I" as "1p", and by defining "3p"
as "he" and "he" as "3p" great philosophical progress has been made.

> > 
> That strategy has already been debunked more than one times by many people
> on this list.
>

Bullshit.

> > 
> It would be most boring to make another tour.
>

And yet no doubt you (Mr. 3p) will.

> > 
> Of course if any one else has still a problem with the first person
> indeterminacy
>  [...]
>
>
Nor does Mr. 1p have a problem with it.  I (or Mr. 1p) have no problem
whatsoever with 
first person indeterminacy
 and never have
, for as far back as I (or Mr. 1p) can remember I (or Mr. 1p) have been
unable to always know what would happen next.

> > 
> at this point, without further motivation to do so, I will not add anything
>

You (or Mr. 3p) haven't added anything in a very long time.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 06 Jul 2016, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 6, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>> In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a  
prediction, not about where JC's two bodies will be reconstituted  
(everyone knows that the answer here is "in Washington and  in  
Moscow" as that is part of the protocol), but about how many cities  
all the JC's involved will see

>> And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's  
involved will together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see  
2 cities; not that predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have  
the slightest thing to do with the subjective sense of self.

> I can stop here.

That is probably wise.

Absolutely. I was hoping you would try to renew your argument, but  
apparently once you get that there is no problem with the pronouns and  
name, you just came back to your oldest strategy (faking a confusion  
between 1p and 3p points of view). That strategy has already been  
debunked more than one times by many people on this list. It would be  
most boring to make another tour.

Of course if any one else has still a problem with the first person  
indeterminacy, or other steps of the main argument, or want me to  
answer your post in detail, I will happily comply, and they can ask  
any question or precision. Yet, at this point, without further  
motivation to do so, I will not add anything, we have already gone  
through this too much time, and since long you have stopped renewing  
your (invalid) arguments.

Bruno

John K Clark
=

> personally 

How could John Clark see something but not see it personally?

> and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door  
of the reconstitution boxes.

Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see  
when the doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question  
is not well formed and makes no sense.

one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W.

True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is  
true. Of course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not  
see M" is also true but there is nothing paradoxical about that  
because plural object have properties that singular objects do not,  
and thanks to the people duplicating machine JC is no longer  
singular. Rain drops are not singular either so you can say this  
rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is not at point X.

> So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city.

False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities. Rain  
fell at point X even if some rain drops did not.

> But now the question was "which one?".

Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the  
question being addressed to and what is supposed to be the one  
unique correct answer?

> Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city

No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow  
and JC will see Washington.

> computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both  
respectable Helsinki-JC survivors,

Absolutely true .

> there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences  
is favored

Absolutely true.

>leading to the theory which can be sum up by:  which city is  
unknown

Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the doors of  
the reconstitution boxes are opened the light that enters one of  
the boxes will turn John K Clark into John Washington Clark and the  
light entering the other box will turn John K Clark into John  
Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly because we don't  
yet have people duplicating machines, but where is the paradox,  
where is the unknown?

> the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived  
in anyone of those city is P = 1/2.

In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in  
both cities John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you  
doubt that then go to both cities and ask if the person there is  
John Clark and then ask if that person feels alive.

The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment  
at all is that after its all over and somebody asked the simple  
question "well what ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing,  
Washington of Moscow?" there would be no answer, and therefore  
assigning a probabilities beforehand like 1/2 is meaningless.

> Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story: no  
machine can do that

And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of  
reality, only examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in  
establishing a language to communicate with other humans.  

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group,

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-06 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jul 6, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>> >>
>> 
>> In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a prediction, not about where
>> JC's two bodies will be reconstituted (everyone knows that the answer here
>> is "in Washington and  in Moscow" as that is part of the protocol), but
>> about how many cities all the JC's involved will see
>>
>
>
> >> 
>> And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's involved will
>> together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see 2 cities; not that
>> predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have the slightest thing to do
>> with the subjective sense of self.
>
>
> > 
> I can stop here.
>


That is probably wise.

John K Clark
=

>
>
>> > 
>> personally
>>  
>>
>
> How could John Clark see something but not see it personally?
>
>
>
>> > 
>> and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door of the
>> reconstitution boxes.
>>
>
> Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see when the
> doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question is not well
> formed and makes no sense.
>
>
>> one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W.
>>
>
> True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is true. Of
> course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not see M" is also
> true but there is nothing paradoxical about that because plural object have
> properties that singular objects do not, and thanks to the people
> duplicating machine JC is no longer singular. Rain drops are not singular
> either so you can say this rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is
> not at point X.
>
>
>> > 
>> So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city.
>>
>
> False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities.
>
> Rain fell at point X even if some rain drops did not.
>
> > 
>> But now the question was "which one?".
>>
>
> Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the question
> being addressed to and what is supposed to be the one unique correct answer?
>
> > 
>> Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city
>>
>
> No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow and JC
> will see Washington.
>
> > 
>> computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both respectable
>> Helsinki-JC survivors,
>>
>
> Absolutely true .
>
>
>
>> > 
>> there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences is favored
>>
>
> Absolutely true.
>
>
>
>> >
>> leading to the theory which can be sum up by:  which city is unknown
>>
>
> Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the
> doors of the reconstitution boxes
>  are opened the light that enters one of the boxes will turn John K Clark
> into John Washington Clark and the light entering the other box will turn
> John K Clark into John Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly
> because we don't yet have people duplicating machines, but where is the
> paradox, where is the unknown?
>
> > 
>> the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived in anyone of
>> those city is P = 1/2.
>>
>
> In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in both cities
> John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you doubt that then go to
> both cities and ask if the person there is John Clark and then ask if that
> person feels alive.
>
> The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment at all
> is that after its all over and somebody asked the simple question "well
> what ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing, Washington of Moscow?"
> there would be no answer, and therefore assigning a probabilities
> beforehand like 1/2 is meaningless.
>
> > 
>> Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story:
>>  n
>> o machine can do that
>>
>
> And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of reality,
> only examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in establishing a
> language to communicate with other humans.  
>
>  John K Clark
> 
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

-- 
You

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 06 Jul 2016, at 01:59, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jul 5, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a prediction, not  
about where JC's two bodies will be reconstituted (everyone knows  
that the answer here is "in Washington and  in Moscow" as that is  
part of the protocol), but about how many cities all the JC's  
involved will see

And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's involved  
will together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see 2  
cities; not that predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have  
the slightest thing to do with the subjective sense of self.

I can stop here.

Bruno

> personally 

How could John Clark see something but not see it personally?

> and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door  
of the reconstitution boxes.

Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see  
when the doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question  
is not well formed and makes no sense.

one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W.

True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is  
true. Of course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not  
see M" is also true but there is nothing paradoxical about that  
because plural object have properties that singular objects do not,  
and thanks to the people duplicating machine JC is no longer  
singular. Rain drops are not singular either so you can say this  
rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is not at point X.

> So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city.

False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities. Rain fell  
at point X even if some rain drops did not.

> But now the question was "which one?".

Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the  
question being addressed to and what is supposed to be the one  
unique correct answer?

> Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city

No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow  
and JC will see Washington.

> computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both  
respectable Helsinki-JC survivors,

Absolutely true .

> there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences  
is favored

Absolutely true.

>leading to the theory which can be sum up by:  which city is  
unknown

Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the doors of the  
reconstitution boxes are opened the light that enters one of the  
boxes will turn John K Clark into John Washington Clark and the  
light entering the other box will turn John K Clark into John  
Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly because we don't yet  
have people duplicating machines, but where is the paradox, where is  
the unknown?

> the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived  
in anyone of those city is P = 1/2.

In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in both  
cities John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you doubt that  
then go to both cities and ask if the person there is John Clark and  
then ask if that person feels alive.

The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment at  
all is that after its all over and somebody asked the simple  
question "well what ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing,  
Washington of Moscow?" there would be no answer, and therefore  
assigning a probabilities beforehand like 1/2 is meaningless.

> Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story: no  
machine can do that

And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of  
reality, only examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in  
establishing a language to communicate with other humans.  

 John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-05 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jul 5, 2016 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > 
> In Helsinki, we ask John Clark (JC) to make a prediction, not about where
> JC's two bodies will be reconstituted (everyone knows that the answer here
> is "in Washington and  in Moscow" as that is part of the protocol), but
> about how many cities all the JC's involved will see
>

And John Clark in Helsinki predicts that all the JC's involved will
together see 2 cities and therefor John Clark will see 2 cities; not that
predictions, correct ones or incorrect ones, have the slightest thing to do
with the subjective sense of self.

> > 
> personally
>  
>

How could John Clark see something but not see it personally?

> > 
> and then which one, when the John Clarks will open the door of the
> reconstitution boxes.
>

Which one (singular) city the John Clarks (plural) will see when the
doors of the reconstitution boxes are opened? The question is not well
formed and makes no sense.

> one JC will see W, and not M, and one JC will see M, and not W.
>

True, and therefore the statement "JC will see W and M" is true. Of
course the statement "JC will not see W" and "JC will not see M" is also
true but there is nothing paradoxical about that because plural object have
properties that singular objects do not, and thanks to the people
duplicating machine JC is no longer singular. Rain drops are not singular
either so you can say this rain drop is at point X but that rain drop is
not at point X.

> > 
> So JC find the correct answer: all JC will see only one city.
>

False. All the JCs taken together saw 2 cities.

Rain fell at point X even if some rain drops did not.

> 
> But now the question was "which one?".
>

Which one what? What exactly is the question and who is the question being
addressed to and what is supposed to be the one unique correct answer?

> 
> Well JC figures out that all JC will see only one city
>

No, JC figures all the JCs will see 2 cities; JC will see Moscow and JC
will see Washington.

> 
> computationalism guarantied to all JC that they are both respectable
> Helsinki-JC survivors,
>

Absolutely true .

> > 
> there is no reason that one of the two personal experiences is favored
>

Absolutely true.

> >
> leading to the theory which can be sum up by:  which city is unknown
>

Huh, what exactly is unknown about which city? When the
doors of the reconstitution boxes
 are opened the light that enters one of the boxes will turn John K Clark
into John Washington Clark and the light entering the other box will turn
John K Clark into John Moscow Clark. That is a odd situation certainly
because we don't yet have people duplicating machines, but where is the
paradox, where is the unknown?

> 
> the probability for the Helsinki guy to feel having survived in anyone of
> those city is P = 1/2.
>

In no city does John Clark feel that he has half survived, in both cities
John Clark feels that he has 100% survived. If you doubt that then go to
both cities and ask if the person there is John Clark and then ask if that
person feels alive.

The way to tell that this thought "experiment" isn't a experiment at all is
that after its all over and somebody asked the simple question "well what
ONE UNIQUE city did John Clark end up seeing, Washington of Moscow?" there
would be no answer, and therefore assigning a probabilities beforehand like
1/2 is meaningless.

> 
> Now, to define the 1-self is quite another story:
>  n
> o machine can do that
>

And a definition will teach you nothing about the nature of reality, only
examples can do that. Definitions are only useful in establishing a
language to communicate with other humans.  

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Jul 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jul 4, 2016 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> If it's really a well formed question then the personal  
pronoun "you" could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't  
be done without destroying the value of the thought experiment has  
to the theory.

> Nope. It works very well with "John Clark" instead of "you".

OK fine, then the statement "John Clark will see BOTH Washington  
AND Moscow" works very well.

>> In a world with people duplicating machines the question is  
far too vague to have an answer,

> Nope. The question is clear, and has a definite answer, once  
we distinguish the 1-self  and [blah blah]

OK fine, then distinguish it. Do you want a prediction about the  
Helsinki 1-self or the Moscow 1-self or the Washington 1-self?

> just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of  
string?" has no answer. And please, don't start going on and on  
about diaries again, two people remember writing that diary; which  
particular person and which particular piece of string are you  
talking about?   

> Both of them of course

OK fine, if that's what Bruno Marchal means by "you", the person  
who remembers writing the diary, then "you" will see BOTH cities.  
And of course if something else is meant by "you" then "you"  
will not see both cities, in that case what "you" will actually see  
depends on what the 3 letter word "you" means. In the our everyday  
world the meaning is obvious, but it wouldn't be in a world with  
people duplicating machines.

>> So after one precise person had been duplicated and become  
two precise people tell me which one of those two precise people  
you're interested in

> We are interested in both discourse. Both agree with "W v M",  
and both are wrong with "W & M".

That is just flat out wrong. If it was agreed before the  
duplication that "you" means somebody who remembers writing the  
diary, and assuming the ability to reason logically is retained by  
both after the duplication,  then both would agree that "You" saw  
both cities. It all depends on what the word "you" means, and  
that's why all personal pronouns should be banned from such thought  
experiments.

> Keep in mind that we ask for the prediction in Helsinki.

Yes but who precisely was the prediction requested in Helsinki  
supposed to be about? I assume it was about what further adventures  
the man (or in this case the men) who remember being in Helsinki  
would have in the future, but that is never made clear.

> By computationalism we know that we have to verify the  
prediction for all first person involved in the reconstitution.

Until it's nailed down exactly what the personal pronoun "you"  
means absolutely nothing can be verified or refuted, and thus it's  
not a experiment, it's not even a thought experiment.  So forget  
personal pronouns and use proper nouns!

>> If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a more precise  
question.

> What can John Clark predicts about its future first person  
experience in Helsinki?

If "its" means John Clark then John Clark would predict John Clark  
would see both cities; not that predictions correct ones or  
incorrect ones, have the slightest thing to do with the sense of self.

>> And if Everett is right then demanding a yes or  
no answer to the question "will Schrodinger's cat breathe the  
cyanide poison gas?" would be silly because it's a ill formed  
question that has no answer, the same as "how long is a piece of  
string?" or "what city will you see?".

> Or "what city will John Clark see".

John Clark will see both cities and Schrodinger's cat  
will breathe the cyanide poison gas and Schrodinger's  
cat will not breathe the cyanide poison gas. I plant an  
apple tree and predict it will produce red apples and I predict it  
will produce green apples and I predict it will not produce a apple  
that is both red and green; does Bruno Marchal also believe that  
prediction is ridiculous?

>> For the 42 time I DON'T CARE If MATTER IS PRIMARY! If  
your interest is consciousness it's irrelevant, primary or not  
primary matter is needed.

> Only because you stop at the third step of the reasoning,

Reasoning? The third step was the point where the blizzard of  
unattributed personal pronouns became too dense to endure.  

> It should be obvious, given the definition of 1p

The definition of the homemade term 1p is me, and the definition  
of me is 1p. And round and round we go.

> using pronouns or name does not change anything here.

Then why does Bruno Marchal continue to use wall to wall personal  
pronouns in thought experiments despite being begged for years not to?

OK. I will make a new attempt, and I am in a so good mood that I will  
do it without using any pronoun, then I will explain what I have seen  
that some other often still miss:

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-04 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jul 4, 2016 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> If it's really a well formed question then the personal pronoun "you"
>> could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't be done without
>> destroying the value of the thought experiment has to the theory.
>
>
> > 
> Nope. It works very well with "John Clark" instead of "you".
>

OK fine, then the statement "John Clark will see *BOTH* Washington *AND*
Moscow" works very well.

>> 
>> In a world with people duplicating machines the question is far too vague
>> to have an answer,
>
>

> 
> Nope. The question is clear, and has a definite answer, once we
> distinguish the 1-self
>   and [blah blah]
>

OK fine, then distinguish it. Do you want a prediction about the Helsinki
1-self or the Moscow 1-self or the Washington 1-self?

> 
>> just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of string?" has no
>> answer. And please, don't start going on and on about diaries again, two
>> people remember writing that diary; which particular person and which
>> particular piece of string are you talking about?   
>
>
> > 
> Both of them of course
>

OK fine, if that's what Bruno Marchal means by "you", the person who
remembers writing the diary, then "you" will see *BOTH* cities. And of
course if something else is meant by "you" then "you"

will not see both cities, in that case what "you" will actually see
depends on what the 3 letter word "you" means. In the our everyday world
the meaning is obvious, but it wouldn't be in a world with
people duplicating machines.

>> 
>> So after one precise person had been duplicated and become two precise
>> people tell me which one of those two precise people you're interested in
>
>
> > 
> We are interested in both discourse. Both agree with "W v M", and both are
> wrong with "W & M".
>

That is just flat out wrong. If it was agreed before the duplication that 
"you" means somebody who remembers writing the diary, and assuming the
ability to reason logically is retained by both after the duplication,
 then both would agree that "You" saw both cities. It all depends on what
the word "you" means, and that's why all personal pronouns should be banned
from such thought experiments.

> 
> Keep in mind that we ask for the prediction in Helsinki.
>

Yes but who precisely was the prediction requested in Helsinki supposed to
be about? I assume it was about what further adventures the man (or in this
case the men) who remember being in Helsinki would have in the future, but
that is never made clear.

> > 
> By computationalism we know that we have to verify the prediction for all
> first person involved in the reconstitution.
>

Until it's nailed down exactly what the personal pronoun "you" means
absolutely nothing can be verified or refuted, and thus it's not a
experiment, it's not even a thought experiment.  So forget personal
pronouns and use proper nouns!

>> 
>> If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a more precise question.
>
>
> > 
> What can John Clark predicts about its future first person experience in
> Helsinki?
>

If "its" means John Clark then John Clark would predict John Clark would
see both cities; not that predictions correct ones or incorrect ones, have
the slightest thing to do with the sense of self.

>> 
>> And if
>>  
>> Everett
>>  
>> is right then demanding a yes or no answer to the question "will
>> Schrodinger's cat breathe the cyanide poison gas?" would be silly because
>> it's a ill formed question that has no answer, the same as "how long is a
>> piece of string?" or "what city will you see?".
>
>
> > 
> Or "what city will John Clark see".
>

John Clark will see both cities and

Schrodinger's cat
will 
breathe the cyanide poison gas

and

Schrodinger's cat
will not 
breathe the cyanide poison gas
. I plant an apple tree and predict it will produce red apples and I
predict it will produce green apples and I predict it will not produce a
apple that is both red and green; does Bruno Marchal also believe that
prediction is ridiculous?

>> >> 
>> For the 42 time I DON'T CARE If MATTER IS PRIMARY! If your interest is
>> consciousness it's irrelevant, primary or not primary matter is needed.
>
>
> > 
> Only because you stop at the third step of the reasoning,
>

Reasoning? The third step was the point where the blizzard of unattributed
personal pronouns became too dense to endure.  

> 
> It should be obvious, given the definition of 1p
>

The definition of the homemade term 1p is me, and the definition of me is
1p. And round and round we go.

> > 
> using pronouns or name does not change anything here.
>

Then why does Bruno Marchal continue to use wall to wall personal pronouns
in thought experiments despite being begged for years not to?

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Jul 2016, at 00:03, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 3, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>Computationalism says intelligent behavior is  
caused by computations, and I'm saying the same thing.

> That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word  
"cause" is better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.

If there are no computations then there is no intelligent  
behavior, that's what computationalism is and it's about as unfuzzy  
as things get. After that we can use Darwin to form a corollary, if  
there is no consciousness then there is no intelligent behavior.

> Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing  
emulable physically.

So was I, and so is Computationalism.

> Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/ 
translation in elementary arithmetic.

Ah but you forgot IHA.

> The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki,  
you (whoever you are) [...]

If it's really a well formed question then the personal pronoun  
"you" could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't be done  
without destroying the value of the thought experiment has to the  
theory.

Nope. It works very well with "John Clark" instead of "you".

In a world with people duplicating machines the question is far too  
vague to have an answer,

Nope. The question is clear, and has a definite answer, once we  
distinguish the 1-self- and the 3-self, or the first person pov and  
the third person pov.

just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of string?"  
has no answer. And please, don't start going on and on about diaries  
again, two people remember writing that diary; which particular  
person and which particular piece of string are you talking  
about?   

Both of them of course, given the definition, the hypotheses and the  
protocol, that should be obvious.

> know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol) with  
probability one that you will feel yourself in a box, and that  
you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after opening  
the box.

Once more the wrong words are used, THEY (not you)  will  
find themselves (not yourself) in BOXES (not a box)

OK.

and see one precise city after opening THEIR (not the) box 
, but that one precise city won't be the same one precise city  
the other one saw.

OK.

So after one precise person had been duplicated and become two  
precise people tell me which one of those two precise people you're  
interested in

We are interested in both discourse. Both agree with "W v M", and both  
are wrong with "W & M".

and I'll tell you which one precise city was seen by that one  
precise person.

Keep in mind that we ask for the prediction in Helsinki. By  
computationalism we know that we have to verify the prediction for all  
first person involved in the reconstitution.

> What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be  
Moscow or if it will be Washington.

Precise?? The only thing precise I can say about the above is that  
both Moscow and Washington will be.

in the 3p view, that is correct, but we know that both will say "I see  
only one city, so the prediction that the guy in Helsinki made "W & M"  
is false, from all the 1p-view after the duplication.

If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a more precise question.

What can John Clark predicts about its future first person experience  
in Helsinki? Most people can see without problem that "W v M but I do  
not which one" win for both reconstitution, and "W & M" fails for  
both, and "W" , like "M", win on only 1/2 of the people reconstituted.  
Keep in mind that "W" and "M" denotes the first person experiences,  
not the 3p description of the localization of the reconstituted bodies.

>> unlike the case with the people duplicating machine stuff,  
with QM after the experiment is over everybody in the observable  
universe agrees about what the answer turned out to be. So although  
right now I don't know the answer to the question "will I see that  
atom decay in the next 30 seconds?" it is a perfectly well formed  
question and 30 seconds from now both I and everybody in the  
observable universe will agree on what the answer turned out to be.  
But with the duplicating machine stuff NOBODY will EVER agree on  
what the answer to the question "what city will YOU see in 30  
seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds the pronoun will  
have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a question, it's just  
gibberish.

> That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural*  
notion.

And if Everett is right then demanding a yes or no answer  
to the question "will Schrodinger's cat breathe the cyanide poison  
gas?" would be silly because it's a ill formed question that has no  
answer, the same as "how long is a piece of string?" or "what city  
will you see?".

Or "what city will John

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-03 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jul 3, 2016  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>
>> Computationalism
>>  says 
>> intelligent behavior is caused
>>  
>> by computations
>> , and I'm saying the same thing.
>>
>
> > 
> That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word "cause" is
> better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.
>

If there are no computations then there is no intelligent behavior, that's
what computationalism is and it's about as unfuzzy as things get. After
that we can use Darwin to form a corollary, if there is no consciousness
then there is no intelligent behavior.

> > 
> Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing emulable physically.
>

So was I,

and so is

Computationalism
.

> 
> Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/translation in
> elementary arithmetic.
>

Ah but you forgot IHA.

> 
> The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki, you (whoever
> you are)
>  [...]
>

If it's really a well formed question then the personal pronoun "you"
could be replaced with "John Clark" , but that can't be done without
destroying the value of the thought experiment has to the theory. In a
world with people duplicating machines the question is far too vague to
have an answer, just as in our world the question "how long is a piece of
string?" has no answer. And please, don't start going on and on about
diaries again, two people remember writing that diary; which particular
person and which particular piece of string are you talking about?   

> > 
> know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol) with probability one
> that you will feel yourself in a box,
>  
> and that you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after
> opening the box.
>

Once more the wrong words are used, THEY (not you) 
 will
find themselves (not yourself) in BOXES (not a box) and 
see one precise city after opening
THEIR (not the)
 box
,
 but that one precise city won't be the same one precise city the other
one saw. So after one precise person had been duplicated and become two
precise people tell me which one of those two precise people you're
interested in and I'll tell you which one precise city was seen by that one
precise person.

> > 
> What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be Moscow or if it
> will be Washington.
>

Precise?? The only thing precise I can say about the above is that both Moscow
and Washington will be. If that answer is unsatisfactory then give me a
more precise question.

> >> 
>> unlike the case with the people duplicating machine stuff, with QM after
>> the experiment is over everybody in the observable universe agrees about
>> what the answer turned out to be. So although right now I don't know the
>> answer to the question "will* I* see that atom decay in the next 30
>> seconds?" it is a perfectly well formed question and 30 seconds from now
>> both I and everybody in the observable universe will agree on what the
>> answer turned out to be. But with the duplicating machine stuff NOBODY will
>> EVER agree on what the answer to the question "what city will *YOU* see
>> in 30 seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds the pronoun will
>> have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a question, it's
>> just gibberish.
>
>
> > 
> That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural* notion.
>

And if 
Everett
 is right then demanding a yes or no answer to the question "will
Schrodinger's cat breathe the cyanide poison gas?" would be silly because
it's a ill formed question that has no answer, the same as "how long is a
piece of string?" or "what city will *you* see?".

> 
> The superposition of the cat (say) is contagious to the observer and then
> to those the observer will meet.
>

Some
 observer
s
in

Everett
's Multiverse will see a dead cat and some will see a live cat but none
will see a half alive half dead cat.

>> 
>> Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno Marchal
>> 's theory and would die a quick death without it.
>>
>
> > 
> That is correct.
>

I know.

> > 
> But that is why I am able to eliminate them, as eliminating pronouns is
> technically easy for mathematical logicians.
>

Well, I know of one 
mathematical logician
 who can't seem to do without personal pronouns even though this
particular mathematical logician has been asked many many many times to
frame his thought experiment without using them.

> Actually, Theaetetus got the main idea 2000 years ago, but Socrates
> refuted it, and incompleteness shows precisely where Socrates went wrong.
> Of course Socrates could
>  [blah blah]
>

To hell with the ancient Greeks! 
The ancient Greeks were nitwits.

> 
> There are many religions.
>

And there are many different types of crap, but they're all crap.

> > 
> Aristotle theology
>  [...]
>

What is the title of this thread? 

> > 
> the empirical evidences side on the absence of primary

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 01 Jul 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 10:28 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> An abstract universal Turing machine can  
compute exactly diddly squat. A physical universal Turing  
machine on the other hand can compute anything capable of  
being computed.

> In your theory. No problem

True.

> but it is incompatible with computationalism.

Bullshit.  Computationalism says intelligent behavior is  
caused by computations, and I'm saying the same thing.

That is a fuzzy version of computationalism, and the word "cause" is  
better to avoid because it is a term admitting many senses.

Here I was alluding to the consequence of being Turing emulable  
physically. We know where you stop in the argument, and nobody seemed  
to understand your point.

>>> Once you accept Yes-doctor,

>> But I don't accept it unless the Turing Machine  
simulating me is PHYSICAL.

>the whole point is that is enough for getting the non physical  
immaterialist consequences.

The whole point of what?

Of the UDA reasoning (notably), and its formalization/translation in  
elementary arithmetic.

>> If the person is duplicated then the question "what will YOU  
see next?"is not well formed and it is equivalent to "what will  
flobkneequicks see next?"; neither question has an answer.

> All your copies disagree.

All copies will disagree about what the answer turned out to be,  
and none of them would be right and none of them would be wrong  
because the question was not well formed.

The question is well formed, and easy to answer. In Helsinki, you  
(whoever you are) know (with the hypothesis given and the protocol)  
with probability one that you will feel yourself in a box, and that  
you (whoever you still are) will see one precise city after opening  
the box. What is unknown, but still precise, is if the city will be  
Moscow or if it will be Washington. By the numerical identity of the  
copies in the reconstruction boxes, it is arguably equivalent to  
throwing a coin.

It takes more than a question mark to turn gibberish into a  
question. 

> If it was ill-formed, then the question what spin will you  
get would be ill-formed too in QM, and in physics in general.

That is untrue because, unlike the case with the people  
duplicating machine stuff, with QM after the experiment is over  
everybody in the observable universe agrees about what the answer  
turned out to be. So although right now I don't know the answer to  
the question "will I see that atom decay in the next 30 seconds?" it  
is a perfectly well formed question and 30 seconds from now both I  
and everybody in the observable universe will agree on what the  
answer turned out to be. But with the duplicating machine stuff  
NOBODY will EVER agree on what the answer to the question "what city  
will YOU see in 30 seconds?" turned out to be because in 30 seconds  
the pronoun will have no unique agreed on referent, so it's not a  
question, it's just gibberish.

That just show that in QM we have a first person *plural* notion.

The superposition of the cat (say) is contagious to the observer and  
then to those the observer will meet.

To have that first person plural notion in the computationalist frame,  
you need to imagine a collection of persons going all together in the  
reading-annihilation box, In Helsinki. Then, after pushing the button,  
all persons "with you" will see the same city, and all observers will  
agree on which city is seen. The fact that they will also all find  
themselves in the other city change nothing for all first person view  
involved. You can make them interacting or not: it will not change  
that in Helsinki those betting on WvM won, those betting on W lose,  
and those betting on W (resp M) won and lose one halve the times in  
the average, when that experience is reiterated (say).

>> The question "what will John Clark see next?" has an answer  
but Bruno absolutely insists on using the personal pronoun, hasn't  
anyone wondered why Bruno is so adamant about doing so? It's because  
personal pronouns are a convenient place to hide the gaping holes in  
Bruno's argument.

> I gave you version without pronoun,

BULLSHIT. Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno  
Marchal's theory and would die a quick death without it.

That is correct. But that is why I am able to eliminate them, as  
eliminating pronouns is technically easy for mathematical logicians.  
The new thing is that I have shown how incompleteness makes impossible  
for a machine to avoid the distinstinction between the first person  
notions (including the selves and the related pronouns) from the third  
person selves. Actually, Theaetetus got the main idea 2000 years ago,  
but Socrates refuted it, and incompleteness shows precisely where  
Socrates went wrong. Of course Socrates could not have been aware of

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-01 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 10:28 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> 
>> An
>> abstract 
>> universal Turing machine can compute
>>  exactly
>> diddly squat
>> . A physical 
>> universal Turing machine
>> on the other hand 
>> can compute
>> anything capable of being computed.
>>
>
> > 
> In your theory. No
> problem
>

True.

> >
> but it is incompatible with computationalism.
>

Bullshit.  C
omputationalism
 says 
intelligent behavior is caused

by computations
, and I'm saying the same thing.

> >
>>> >>
>>> Once you accept Yes-doctor,
>>
>>
> >> 
>> But I don't accept it unless the Turing Machine simulating me is
>> PHYSICAL.
>
> >
> the whole point is that is enough for getting the non physical
> immaterialist consequences.
>

T
he whole point
 of what?

>> 
>> If the person is duplicated then the question "what will *YOU* see next?"is
>> not well formed and it is equivalent to "what will flobkneequicks see
>> next?"; neither question has an answer.
>
>
> > 
> All your copies disagree.
>

All copies will disagree about what the answer turned out to be, and none
of them would be right and none of them would be wrong because the question
was not well formed. It takes more than a question mark to turn gibberish
into a question. 

> 
> If it was ill-formed, then the question what spin will you get would be
> ill-formed too in QM, and in physics in general.
>

That is untrue because, unlike the case with the people duplicating
machine stuff, with QM after the experiment is over everybody in the
observable universe agrees about what the answer turned out to be. So
although right now I don't know the answer to the question "will* I* see
that atom decay in the next 30 seconds?" it is a perfectly well formed
question and 30 seconds from now both I and everybody in the observable
universe will agree on what the answer turned out to be. But with the
duplicating machine stuff NOBODY will EVER agree on what the answer to the
question "what city will *YOU* see in 30 seconds?" turned out to be because
in 30 seconds the pronoun will have no unique agreed on referent, so it's
not a question, it's just gibberish.

>> 
>> The question "what will John Clark see next?" has an answer but Bruno
>> absolutely insists on using the personal pronoun, hasn't anyone wondered
>> why Bruno is so adamant about doing so? It's because personal pronouns are
>> a convenient place to hide the gaping holes in Bruno's argument.
>
>
> > 
> I gave you version without pronoun,
>

BULLSHIT. 
Personal pronouns are the lifeblood of Bruno Marchal
's theory and would die a quick death without it.

> 
> You illustrate very well  that people who call themselves non-religious
> are more dogmatic on their beliefs than religious educated people
>

Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard that
one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.

 John K Clark

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

2016-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

A second answer, more precise.

On 25 Jun 2016, at 03:12, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

On 24 Jun 2016, at 03:25, Jason Resch wrote:

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 12:55 PM, John Clark
wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:34 AM, Jason Resch
wrote:

>> I would say it would have to have SOMETHING physical as
we know it or it wouldn't be another physical universe as we know
it.

> So according to you, does every physical universe has to
have hadrons, electrons and photons, and 3 spatial dimensions?

No, according to me every physical universe must have
something physical in it or it wouldn't be a physical universe.

> What in your mind delineates the physical from the
mathematical?

"Mathematics" is the best language minds have for thinking about
the physical universe.

And "physical" is anything that is NOT nothing.
And "nothing" is anything that is infinite, unbounded,
and homogeneous in both space and time.

So if a Game of Life computation qualifies as a physical universe,
I am guessing so would other cellular automata systems would. Some
linear cellular automata systems are even Turing universal: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/UniversalCellularAutomaton.html

When we envision (imagine) a GoL emulation, we interpret it as a
grid of cells with changing states, but an equally consistent view
would be to imagine the grid as a binary number, whose bits flip
from one step to another according to finite rules. For example,
the game tic-tac-toe (a.k.a. naughts and crosses) is often
envisioned as completing a line, or diagonal with X's or O's, but a
mathematically equivalent view of the game is the players complete
for selecting unique numbers from 1 to 9, such that the sum of
their selected numbers adds to 15 ( https://www.mathworks.com/moler/exm/chapters/tictactoe.pdf
).

All this is to say that a "physically existing GoL universe" is
from the inside of that world, no different (in any testable way)
from a recursive function operating on an integer. So can anyone
truly differentiate a "physically existing GoL universe" from a
"platonically existing recursive computation" when both are
equivalent and for all intents and purposes identical--sharing all
the same internal relations isomorphically?

If a GoL universe exists and contains a Turing machine executing
the universal dovetailer, no conscious entities within the programs
executed by the universal dovetailer could ever know their ultimate
substrate happens to be a GoL universe.

That would even have no sense, as here the GOL would only be a tool
for us to have some precise view of the UD. In fact we could not
distinguish the UD made by that GOL from the UD made by a GOL made
by a UD made by a Diophantine polynomial. Fortunately, the measure
is formalism independent. We need one, but anyone will do. Then it
happens that we all believe, in the relevant sense, in one of them,
when we decide to not take our kids at school when a teacher told
them that there are infinitely many primes.

Wouldn't different formalisms lead to different frequencies of
occurrences of different programs? It is not immediately clear to me
that it wouldn't.

Note that physics cannot been a priori Turing emulable, as it is
given by a first person limit on the FPI on the whole universal
deployment (entirely determined by a tiny part of the arithmetical
reality). The miracle here is that an infinite addition leads to
subtraction of probabilities, a bit like with Ramanujan sum. The
explanation of this is in the math of self-reference.

Is this without assuming imaginary measures? Or do imaginary numbers
somehow fall out of the infinities?

Normally, the imaginary numbers and the whole quantum linear stuff
should come from the semantics of the logic of the observable (Z1*,
etc.).

By incompleteness, you can't take []p as "p has probability one". You
might be in cul-de-sac world, where the probabilities make no sense,
and that is why we add the "<>t" conjunctive attachment ([]p & <>t) to
get the bettable. On p sigma_1, we get a quantum logic (Z1*), and if
it is correct, this should have a semantics such that we get the
equivalent of Gleason theorem, and the quantum formalism.
Now we get three quantum logics, even five, generalizing the notion of
quantum logic.

It seems the only way to avoid the white rabbits in the infinite
multiplication of computations consists in phasing them, going from
from sum of Ht to sum of e^iHt. For this you need a good proximity
space and a cosine. The universal machines got the proximity space,
and the quantization, but it is a hell of a difficulty to extract the
cosine, and the imaginary numbers. The quantum win by phasing out the
relatively aberrant computations. Intuititively.

If number theory