Le 13-juil.-07, à 20:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>>> ...
Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interestin
Brent Meeker skrev:
> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>> That is exactly what I wanted to say. You don't need to have a complete
>> description of arithmetic. Our universe can be described by doing a
>> number of computations from a finite set of rules. (To get to the
>> current view of our universe
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>> ...
>>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span
Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Brent Meeker skrev:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>>>
>> ...
>>
>>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>
Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
> ...
>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
Brent Meeker skrev:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
...
Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
Assuming comp, I don't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
...
> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>
>
>
>
> Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" c
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>> I claim that "our universe" is the result of a finite set of rules. Just
>> as a GoL-universe is the result of a finite set of rules, so is our universe
>> the result of a set of rules. But these rules are more complicated than the
>> GoL-rules...
>>
> What are yo
> I claim that "our universe" is the result of a finite set of rules. Just
> as a GoL-universe is the result of a finite set of rules, so is our universe
> the result of a set of rules. But these rules are more complicated than the
> GoL-rules...
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
What are your "proof
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
Bruno Marchal skrev:
I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is
not primitive in my
opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model
perhaps). As David sai
Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal skrev:Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>> David Nyman skrev:
>>>
You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting
and
important IMO. This concerns the necessary entailment o
On 10/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> But I am not bored
I'm glad to hear you're not a zombie after all :)
> If I look at our universe from the outside
I'd like to know how you perform this feat.
> I see that I will do something
> tomorrow
I don't doubt it. But this is
David Nyman skrev:
On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always
static.
Then you must get very bored ;)
David
But I am not bored, because I don't know what will happen tomorrow. If
I lo
On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always
> static.
Then you must get very bored ;)
David
>
>
>
> On Jul 9, 7:47 pm, "David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
(Reposted because of some techical problems...)
On Jul 7, 2:00 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>
>
> > David Nyman skrev:
> >> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
> >> important IMO. This concerns
On Jul 9, 7:47 pm, "David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Because
> > everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.
> > All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in
> > B-Universe
On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> One object in one universe can not affect any object in some other universe.
> But we can look at the objects in an other universe.
I would say that the conjunction of the above two sentences is a contradiction.
> Because
> everything th
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
David Nyman skrev:
You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
important IMO. This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
1. The relation 1
David Nyman skrev:
> Consequently we can't 'interview' B-Universe objects.
>
It is true that we can not interview objects in B-Universe. One object
in one universe can not affect any object in some other universe.
But we can look at the objects in an other universe. Just in the same
way th
On 05/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> For us humans are the universes that contain observers more
> interesting. But there is no qualitaive difference between universes
> with observers and universes without observers. They all exist in the
> same way.
I still disagree, but
Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> David Nyman skrev:
>> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
>> important IMO. This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
> 1. The relation 1+1=2 is always true. It is true in all universes.
> Even
On 05/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
TT: All mathmatically possible universes exists, and they all exist in
the same way. Our universe is one of those possible universes. Our
universe exists independant of any humans or any observers.
DN: But here at the heart of your argume
David Nyman skrev:
> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
> important IMO. This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
1. The relation 1+1=2 is always true. It is true in all universes.
Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observe
On 04/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
TT: You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the
"gliders" move. If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you
can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. This is
possible although
You're doing a giant step for considering current GoL as an
universe... but anyway you can, but it's not because you see one
glider in your tiny framed GoL that the interaction of billions of
cells does not generate a consciousness inside the GoL universe and
you as an "external" observer couldn't
David Nyman skrev:
On 04/07/07, Stathis
Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes
A
and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate
sleight of imagin
Your example suppose many things which are not granted to be possible:
1- The one who compare them is in neither of them... What is comparing
these universes ? a conscious being ?
2- The fact that they are identical implies that both have
consciousness. If one really lacked it then they would be n
Jason skrev:
> Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I
> think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection
> of a large number of simultaneous thoughts.
I had the intention to include "thoughts", but I was unsure about how to
spell that word (wher
On Jul 3, 10:07 am, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as
> the materialistic parts of our Universe. We may call this second
> Universe B-Universe. (Our Universe is A-Universe.)
>
> This B-Universe looks exactly the
On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
SP: We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
DN: Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of
imagination where the thought experim
On 04/07/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> TT: This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
>
> DN: IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here. No universe
> can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
> 'observer' who is an embedd
Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as
> the materialistic parts of our Universe. We may call this second
> Universe B-Universe. (Our Universe is A-Universe.)
>
> This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe. Where there is a
>
On 03/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
TT: This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
DN: IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here. No universe
can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
'observer' who is an embedded sub
QA: ' By the way, I'm sure dogs are conscious (have inner
> personal world).'
MP: And I am sure I agree with you and that I have a pretty good
idea what you mean when you say that.
And you will understand me when I say that from a 3P view the
'inner world' of the dog is not at all experienced a
On Thursday 28 June 2007 21:59:40 Brent Meeker wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal skrev:
> >>> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> >>> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
>>> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
>>> explain it completely.
>> That sentence is wrong.
>
> Don
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 19-juin-07, à 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote to Quentin:
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>>
On Thursday 28 June 2007 19:22:35 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive. Therefore
> human beings show that type of behaviour.
>
> I don't know what is consciouslike
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive. Therefore
human beings show that type of behaviour.
I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the
first
On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
> > But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> > (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
> > explain it completely.
>
> That sentence is wrong.
Don't think so...
> There is at
Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
> explain it completely.
That sentence is wrong. There is at least one person (me...) that
really doubts about my own consciousness. I am consciou
Le 19-juin-07, à 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote to Quentin:
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>> The "subjective experience" is
Le 19-juin-07, à 10:55, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote (to Torgny Tholerus)
> TT: The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You
> can make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers
> are enough complicated.
>
> But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view.
Hi Brent,
Brent: ' > You seem to imply that the advent of the scientific
method banished slavery and tyranny and racism. Would that it
were so. Perhaps the scientific method can be applied to
politics and perhaps it would have that effect, but historically
the scientific method has been use
QA: '... you can't
> assert "Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method. These are
> prerequisites for the survival of civilisation."... if you really believe
> that History has not finished yet.
MP: The fact of me making the assertion is logical; what I
assert is not a closed prescr
On Friday 22 June 2007 20:38:50 Mark Peaty wrote:
> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to
> ensure that it doesn't.
Agreed, but it was not what I meant to say... it is the opposite... you can't
assert "Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method. These are
pre
Mark Peaty wrote:
> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to
> ensure that it doesn't.
>
> If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a
> moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis
> of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence wher
History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to
ensure that it doesn't.
If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a
moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis
of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am
wrong. Without
On 22/06/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
MP:
Who is to say what mbranes really are, except that in this
interpretation of the idea, each IS its own existence; I assume
we can say nothing definite about how each such existence would
compare with others or anything much about 'where' they
MN: 'If an
>> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
>> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>
> Yes, this may be an attractive notion. I've wondered about myself.
> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> imply that different 'mbranes' ar
This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.
Quentin
2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
>
> These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
David Nyman wrote:
> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> I always
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'r
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'r
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'r
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'r
DN: '
> I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
> field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
> fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
> a 'modulated conti
On Jun 20, 8:56 am, "Mohsen Ravanbakhsh" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience."
>
> Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
> view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY be
What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the "other's mind". how
we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume
that to be true, that everyone has consciousness.
But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny
your possible(!) conscio
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 02:22:20AM +0800, Mark Peaty wrote:
>
> I heard someone on the radio the other day saying that Moore's
> Law [doubling every 2 years] predicts that computers in about
> 2050 will have gross processing power similar to that of the
> human brain. Well the architecture may
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can
> make computers show t
On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:21:10 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Our language is very primitive. You can not decribe the reality with it.
>
> If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
> robot express itself to descibe what it observes? Could the robot say: "I
> see a red br
On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> >>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can
> >>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior,
TT; ' You behave as if you have "the subjective
> experience of first person". And it is possible for an enough
> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour. But in the
> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
> experience", there are just a lot of electric
>
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
>> sort of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective
>> experience
>> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
>> beh
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make
>>> computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
>>> complicated.
>> But we're not
On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>>The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make
>>> computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
>>> complicated.
>
>> But we're not talking about 3rd person
Hello again,
I mean your point could be made about the universe like this:
Something which exists is contained/located somewhere.
The universe is not contained nor located anywhere, therefore the universe
does not exist.
This is a logical inconsistency and prove nothing, except that the logica
On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> >The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make
> > computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
> > complicated.
>
> But we're not talking about 3rd person
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>The "subjective experience" is
just some sort of behaviour. You can
make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are
enough complicated.
But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
you reduce the subjective experien
>The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can make
computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
complicated.
But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how you
reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavio
Yes that is the issue and I don't think I read all the postings
on that thread at the time.
SP [Feb 21]: 'It is a complicated issue'
MP: Yep!
SP: 'So how do I know I'm not that special kind of
zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am
not but then
I would think that, would
On Thursday 14 June 2007 15:08:15 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> > 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >> If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be
> >> able to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
> >> behavi
On Jun 14, 2:08 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If the rock does *not* know anything, *but* the rock behaves as if it
> knows it, then it is reasonable to say that "the rock knows it".
Ah, but of course it is *not* reasonable to say this. You account is
an 'action-only' account
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be able
>> to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
>> behaviour.
>>
> If the rock know something and it behaves like
On Jun 14, 12:19 pm, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> you' because then you'r
2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> 2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
consciou
2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
> term
> > > implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality. But you
> > > can't elimina
On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
> term
> > implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality. But you
> > can't eliminate something that does not exists. If you don't believe in
> > gho
2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>
> What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny the
> existence of the consciousness?
> An eliminativist.
> "Eliminativist" is not a good term
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that
totally deny
the existence of the consciousness?
An eliminativist.
"Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
term implies that
On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>
> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
> reflexivity power of the number's themsel
Le 11-juin-07, à 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the
non quoted part)
> Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis? My
> scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an
> emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the
> c
Le 11-juin-07, à 08:05, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> ...
>> After Godel, Lob, I do think that comp is the best we can hope to
>> "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia,
>> (first)-persons, and many
On Jun 1, 6:04 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I look at myself in the third person view. I then see a lot of protons
> reacting with eachother, and I see how they explain my behavior and the words
> I produce. I see how they cause me saying "I am conscious! I have a free
>
On 11/06/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Mark Peaty skrev:
> > * Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar
> > and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of
> > something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I
> > would not argue b
Mark Peaty skrev:
> MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps
> clarification is needed, yet again:
>
> * Or this could conceivably be construed as a 'state of grace'
> in that Torgny is operating with no mental capacity being wasted
> on self-talk or internal commentary: 'j
On Jun 10, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part,
> sure).
> I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not
> a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but
> probably n
The question was "what's in your head...?"
If you don't have subjective (inner) experiences... then yes, you are
a zombie, and you should go to a museum... You 'll be then the first
real zombie on earth !
Quentin
2007/6/11, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
What is the subjective experience then?
The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You can
make computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are
enough complicated.
--
Torgny Tholerus
On 6/8/07, Torgny
Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ...
> After Godel, Lob, I do think that comp is the best we can hope to
> "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia,
> (first)-persons, and many notions like that. Tthe "only" price: the
> notion of ma
Le 10-juin-07, à 01:49, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> On Jun 9, 2:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :
>
>> I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a
>> primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out th
On 10/06/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
* But I agree also that you are highly unlikely to come across
> someone who can truthfully say 'I am not conscious'. It seems
> totally self-contradictory: for example a person not just with
> 'hemi' neglect, but total neglect. How could su
I think it can be useful to look at the problem of consciousness from
a third person point of view, doing so you would conclude we are a
bunch of apes aware of our surroundings wondering why it is we are
aware of our surroundings. If you explored further you would see
plenty of reasons to explain
On Jun 9, 2:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :
> I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a
> primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out the third
> "universal soul" hypostasis (the first person,
Mark,
you put your finger usually on the 'not-so-obvious' (but relevant). I
confess to not having memorized all the posts concerning conscious(ness?) on
this list since 1996 or so, but looked up the topic prior to that.
I found a historically developing noumenon, unidentified and a loose cannon,
ev
SP:
'I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are
dead, but
> no-one who thinks they're unconscious...'
MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps
clarification is needed, yet again:
* It may well be that history is in the making, Torgny Tholerus
is brea
Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :
> While I would point out that physics cannot possibly explain
> everything, being a necessarily constrained subjective model of
> "reality", I would like to reinforce the point about "consciousness."
> Consciousness certainly exists, as a descript
What is the subjective experience then?
On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>
> On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> What is the problem?
>
> If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
> that? That t
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