I think what Saibal was referring to can be illustrated by a device used
quite often in science fiction, where a person's mind is "backed up" at time
t1, then restored from backup when the person dies at time t2. The effect
for the person is exactly the same as if he had not died at t2, but in
Johnathan Corgan writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> There are many ways to escape from this scenario. If you are Tookie, you
> will find yourself shunted into increasingly less likely situations: not
> being caught in the first place; being caught but not being found
> guilty; being sentence
Saibal Mitra wrote:
> To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at cases
> where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to the
> Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no objective
> reason why these Tookies should be excluded a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> There are many ways to escape from this scenario. If you are Tookie, you
> will find yourself shunted into increasingly less likely situations: not
> being caught in the first place; being caught but not being found
> guilty; being sentenced to death but getting off on
Le 16-déc.-05, à 16:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
It may be easy to find logical flaws in the above credo, but I maintain that it is so deeply ingrained in each of us that it would be very difficult to overcome, except perhaps on the intellectual level.
OK but that would not make sense.
Le Vendredi 16 Décembre 2005 02:18, vous avez écrit :
> This is true, but you can only experience being one person at a time.
In fact I'd say "I" can only experience being me ;) If "I" experienced being
another person "I" wouldn't be "I".
> When
> I contemplate what may happen to me tomorrow, I
Le 14-déc.-05, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends. Although
from a third person perspective every entity in the multiverse could
be said to exist only transiently because at every point of an
entity's history we can say that there sp
with the 1-3 distinction)?
"See" you tomorrow,
Bruno
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2005 01:25 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality an
Saibal Mitra writes:
To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at cases
where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to the
Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no
objective
reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''
tally.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2005 01:25 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
> Le 15-déc.-05, à 03:04, Saibal Mitra a
There are many ways to escape from this scenario. If you are Tookie, you
will find yourself shunted into increasingly less likely situations: not
being caught in the first place; being caught but not being found guilty;
being sentenced to death but getting off on appeal; being pardoned by the
Quentin Anciaux writes:
Hi Jesse,
> unless you are willing to say that white rabbit universes have a
> lower absolute measure than stable-laws-of-nature universes, you have no
> justification for expecting that you are unlikely to experience such
events
> in your future.
>
> Jesse
You have n
Le 15-déc.-05, à 03:04, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at
cases
where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to
the
Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no
objective
reason why these T
Le 14-déc.-05, à 01:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends. Although
from a third person perspective every entity in the multiverse could
be said to exist only transiently because at every point of an
entity's history we can say that there s
- Original Message -
From: "Johnathan Corgan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 10:39 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
&g
On Wed, Dec 14, 2005 at 03:18:16PM -0800, George Levy wrote:
>
> The only way to talk meaningfully about measure is when you can compare
> two situations from a third person point of view: for example, if you
> witness someone die from a freak event you could conclude that he
> continued living
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Also, I'm still confused about your original argument:
"Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, you
must accept that no matter how large or small a segment of the
continuum is considered, the number of histories is the same. Hence
measure is the sam
Le 13-déc.-05, à 18:37, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
In this context I'm talking about your comp multiverse. Yes, our
common sense experience sees history as one way. But this is the
problem. Your requirement for LASE is that the accessibility relation
is symmetrical.
I don't require
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends.
Kind of makes you wonder what Tookie is doing right now. To us, he died
as a result of lethal injection.
What sort of successor observer-moments can follow a thing like that?
Better question--what is the mo
Hi,
the only explanation that I see fit in this context is an anthropic like
argument.
To have this discussion about why we haven't seen/experienced weird things up
till now is that we must be conscious observer that haven't seen/experienced
weird things up till now ;)
And only our next exte
Hi Jesse,
> unless you are willing to say that white rabbit universes have a
> lower absolute measure than stable-laws-of-nature universes, you have no
> justification for expecting that you are unlikely to experience such events
> in your future.
>
> Jesse
You have no justification, but in (ever
George Levy wrote:
Jesse,
the infinite number of histories refer to the continuum of histories. The
first person observer can only perceive through his own experiments that
physics in his own world, provides a infinite number of histories as large
as the continuum. All he knows is that his o
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of
infinite never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says
about that: true and strictly unbeliev
George Levy wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about
that: true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since y
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about
that: true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the numbe
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite never
ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about that:
true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the number of histories is on
In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends. Although from a
third person perspective every entity in the multiverse could be said to
exist only transiently because at every point of an entity's history we can
say that there sprouts a dead end branch of zero extent, from a first p
Tom Caylor writes:
It seems to me that as soon as we talk about measure, it is equivalent to
talking about one (physical!) universe. This is similar to your George
Levy's taking the ratio of the lengths of two line segments. You don't
need a multiverse to do that. I think that talking of me
The white rabbit problem is a problem only for multiverse believers.
By the way, thanks for the reference to rabbits. It caused a
rabbit-repellent ad to appear in the margin of the archive. It is
lemon-scented (and another one is fox-scented!) and this will be more
pleasant for me than the
Jesse wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you
don't buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single
universe."
Tom Caylo
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you don't
buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe."
Tom Caylor
If you don't a
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you
don't buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe."
Tom Caylor
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about
that: true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, y
Bruno wrote:
Le 12-déc.-05, à 18:07, Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) a écrit :
...
In the Plenitude, everything washes out to zero. And Bruno, I would
even say that all consistent histories wash out to zero.
I am not sure why you say this.
See below.
It's interesting that symmetry (Bruno's re
Stathis wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment
being
"set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an "irrelevant"
subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse hypothesis is true.
In the
Plenitude, there are an additiona
Le 12-déc.-05, à 18:07, Tom ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) a écrit :
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment
being "set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an
"irrelevant" subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse
hypothesis is true. In the Plenitude, t
Le 12-déc.-05, à 19:37, George Levy a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the
point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are
created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his expe
Le 13-déc.-05, à 02:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
From the third person perspective, the annihilation of the 10^100
copies
could be seen as 10^100 dead ends. (In fact, when I originally
proposed this experiment, Hal Finney thought it represented the
ultimate in mass murder.) If I were one
Tom Caylor writes:
In response to Stathis' thought experiment, to speak of an experiment being
"set up" in a certain way is to base probabilities on an "irrelevant"
subset of the whole, at least if the multiverse hypothesis is true. In the
Plenitude, there are an additional 10^100 copies stil
From the third person perspective, the annihilation of the 10^100 copies
could be seen as 10^100 dead ends. (In fact, when I originally proposed this
experiment, Hal Finney thought it represented the ultimate in mass murder.)
If I were one of the 10^100, however, I wouldn't be worried in the sli
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem
from the point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person
are created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his experience? It seems to me that there is no test or
ex
Bruno wrote:
Le 11-déc.-05, à 11:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You find yourself alone in a room with a light that alternates
red/green with a period of one minute. A letter in the room informs
you that every other minute, 10^100 copies of you are created and run
in parallel for one minut
Le 11-déc.-05, à 11:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You find yourself alone in a room with a light that alternates
red/green with a period of one minute. A letter in the room informs
you that every other minute, 10^100 copies of you are created and run
in parallel for one minute, then shut
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 10-déc.-05, à 13:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the point of
view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are created and run in
parallel for a period, what difference does this make to his experi
Le 09-déc.-05, à 22:44, George Levy a écrit :
The crux of the matter is the concept of indistinguishability: whether you consider two identical persons (OMs) occupying two identical universes the same person (point on the road). It is clear that if you consider the problem from the information an
Le 10-déc.-05, à 13:24, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
In addition to the above arguments, consider the problem from the
point of view of the subject. If multiple copies of a person are
created and run in parallel for a period, what difference does this
make to his experience? It seems to me t
George Levy writes:
Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno
It all depends how you see the plenitude, OMs and the branching. Is
consciousness like a traveller in a network of roads traversing the
plenitude, some roads branching some roads merging?
If yes then you could have several independent conscious
Hi Quentin, Stathis, Bruno
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Georges,
if you start from OMs as basic, then a branch is a set of OMs (only
"consistent"/ordered set ?). Then it means a branch is unique. Some part of
different branches could overlap, but as I don't understand what could be an
abs
Le 08-déc.-05, à 22:21, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
So far we have been talking ab
Hi (again) Brent,
So Brent you were right, if I understood you correctly, in quantum
logic the negation can be interpreted as an orthogonality relations
classifying alternative results of an experiment. The vectors of the
base corresponds to the observables under scrutiny.
Le 09-déc.-05, à
Hi Brent,
This is perhaps a slightly more advanced answer relatively to the
current thread, so don't be astonished if you don't get the end, I
should recall the notion of "theory" before. My current conversation
with Stathis is based directly on the "multiverse (Kripke) semantics",
but I stil
George Levy writes:
So far we have been talking about splitting universes and people. Let's
consider the case where two branches of the universe merge. In other words,
two different paths eventually happen to become identical - Of course when
this happens all their branching futures also becom
Hi Georges,
if you start from OMs as basic, then a branch is a set of OMs (only
"consistent"/ordered set ?). Then it means a branch is unique. Some part of
different branches could overlap, but as I don't understand what could be an
absolute measure (meaning it never change and is fixed foreve
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything
and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
So far we have been talking about spli
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
What could this mean in a real world example?
Take W as the set of places in Brussels. Take R to be "accessible by
walking in a finite number of foot steps". Then each places at Brussels
is accessible from itself, giving that you can access it with zero
steps, or
Hi Stathis,
Hi Bruno,
I replied to the first part of your post earlier, but it took a bit
more time to digest the rest. For what it is worth, I have included my
"thinking out loud" below.
Thanks for replying, and thanks for authorizing me to comment online.
Mhh I know
Le 03-déc.-05, à 11:12, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to
other OMs making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. A
Le 05-déc.-05, à 02:46, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only
the
doubled person, the probability will be 1.
Actually I agree with this.
This is simply a consequence of
using the absolute measure.
Ah ? I am not sure this makes
Le 05-déc.-05, à 22:49, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Dec 05, 2005 at 03:58:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I still have
difficulty in understanding why Pp=Bp & -B-p should be translated
into
English as "to bet on p" (or for tha
On Mon, Dec 05, 2005 at 03:58:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I still have
> >difficulty in understanding why Pp=Bp & -B-p should be translated into
> >English as "to bet on p" (or for that matter pourquoi on devrait
> >le traduire par
Le 03-déc.-05, à 11:06, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Nov 21, 2005 at 03:39:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Observation is implicitly defined here by measurement capable of
selecting alternatives on which we are able to bet (or to gamble ?).
The french word is "parier".
Well at least
I'm perhaps missing something here. In a no-collapse interpretation of QM,
doesn't "everything double" every moment? So, if only one of the doubled
versions of a person is annihilated, doesn't this mean the probability of
survival is 1?
Although the plenitude is timeless, containing all poss
age -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:32 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
> There is, of course, a diff
have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject:
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 03:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Messag
have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject:
Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark QS
experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and magically an
identical, separate world comes into being this is fundamentally different
to what happens in quantum branch splitting? It seems to me that in both
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other OMs
making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. Are you saying, like Saibal Mitra, that OMs
(Observer-Mom
On Mon, Nov 21, 2005 at 03:39:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Observation is implicitly defined here by measurement capable of
> selecting alternatives on which we are able to bet (or to gamble ?).
> The french word is "parier".
>
Well at least this isn't a problem of translation. But I stil
Hi Saibal,
Le Samedi 3 Décembre 2005 02:15, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
> Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really
> create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
> probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
> branch sp
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really
create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
branch splitting.
To see this, consider first what would
AIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 02:25 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> The answer must be a) because (and
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Stathis Papaioannou"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 04:47 P
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 10:02 PM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
> Saibal wrote:
> > > > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
>
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Jonatha
Le 01-déc.-05, à 07:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other
OMs making up a person? [the complete message is below].
I am not sure I understand. Are you saying, like Saibal Mitra, that OMs
(Observer-Moments) are not related?
Why does an OM need to contain so much information to link it to other OMs
making up a person? I certainly don't spend every waking moment reminding
myself of who I am, let alone going over my entire past history, and I still
think all my thoughts are my thoughts. I don't think that the fact t
An observer a1 at time t1 undergoes destructive scanning, and two exact
copies, observers a2 and a3, are created. If we ask a2 and a3, they will
each claim to remember "being" a1. We could say that as a result of the
duplication we have two people, a1a2 and a1a3, each with equal claim to have
Saibal Mitra writes:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
see how some states can be more ''real'' than other st
Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:25, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all
that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the
past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It
don't
see how some states can
Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:18, Kim Jones a écrit :
The search for a "consistent meaning to life" is then the search for
certainty about that pattern one recognises as the 1st person
experience, or the self. I assume that this is not so much for
confirmation of solipsism but for the knowledge that ou
Le 27-nov.-05, à 00:07, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Why are we looking for a consistent meaning of our own life ?
What would be an inconsistent meaning? (i'm just trying to figure out
what you ask)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[quoting Saibal Mitra]
There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM representing you at N + 4 has the
memory
Brent Meeker writes:
[quoting Saibal Mitra]
There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM representing you at N + 4 has the
memory of being the OM at N.
This
I agree with everything Jesse says here.
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would
Saibal wrote:
> > > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > > Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> > > moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> > > they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> > > states can be more
Saibal Mitra wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Saibal wrote:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
Jesse), al
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> Saibal wrote:
> > The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> > Jesse), al
Jonathan Colvin writes:
Saibal wrote:
> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> states can be
Saibal Mitra writes:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
see how some states can be more ''real'' than other s
Please disregard previous post. The b and c cases were inverted.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there
are several possible ways this m
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there
are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st
person viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live
Saibal wrote:
> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
> Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
> moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
> they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
> states can be more ''real'' than o
aving done the experiment were wiped out form
your memory.
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
>
>
On 27/11/2005, at 10:07 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
While I agree it is quite of topic.. this is something that I got
lot of
interest into. Why are we looking for a consistent meaning of our
own life ?
Quentin
How can anything be off-topic on a list calling itself
"Everything"? ;
Le Samedi 26 Novembre 2005 18:47, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
>don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
>even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyon
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
help?
What do you think of my argument here?
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
(b) Pr(I
Le 25-nov.-05, à 01:10, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living,
there are several possible ways this might be interpreted from the
1st person view
Bruno Marchal writes:
If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
viewpoint:
(a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
I hope every
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