Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote:

>
> And how much is that "2 kg" in that 'other' universe?

Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the  
reasoning.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[John Mikes]

And how much is that "2 kg" in that 'other' universe?
JM

On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
>>> MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
>>> - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT  (mechanism
>>> refutes materialism).
>>> - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism
>>> refutes mechanism)
>>>
>>> Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means
>>> MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks
>>> like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist
>>> theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest
>>> more general sense of "number").
>>>
>>> Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the
>>> "arithmetical" electron weights two kg. Then we will know that
>>> mechanism is false.
>>
>> But only in our universe, right. In some other universe couldn't
>> electrons actually weigh 2kg?
>
>
> Not really. If we prove that electrons (assuming we can defined them
> in the physics extracted from comp) weigh 2 kg, then they have 2 kg in
> all possible universes. If there is an 1,9 kg electron in some
> universe, that could be used as a counter-example showing that the
> proof was not valid, or that comp is false.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +  
>> MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
>> - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT  (mechanism  
>> refutes materialism).
>> - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism  
>> refutes mechanism)
>>
>> Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means  
>> MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks  
>> like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist  
>> theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest  
>> more general sense of "number").
>>
>> Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the  
>> "arithmetical" electron weights two kg. Then we will know that  
>> mechanism is false.
>
> But only in our universe, right. In some other universe couldn't  
> electrons actually weigh 2kg?


Not really. If we prove that electrons (assuming we can defined them  
in the physics extracted from comp) weigh 2 kg, then they have 2 kg in  
all possible universes. If there is an 1,9 kg electron in some  
universe, that could be used as a counter-example showing that the  
proof was not valid, or that comp is false.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + 
> MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
> - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT  (mechanism refutes 
> materialism).
> - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism 
> refutes mechanism)
>
> Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means MECH 
> provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like 
> and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory 
> of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general 
> sense of "number").
>
> Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the "arithmetical" 
> electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false.

*But only in /our/ universe, right. In some other universe couldn't 
electrons actually weigh 2kg?*
>
>
>
> >

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote:

> Bruno,
> I was just quoting you: "And if you do the math, you get  
> a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm  
> mechanism or to refute it."  Did you mean "refutes materialism"?


Thanks for quoting the entire sentence, before I was misunderstanding  
myself!


Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +  
MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
- the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT  (mechanism refutes  
materialism).
- the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism  
refutes mechanism)

Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means MECH  
provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like  
and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory  
of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general  
sense of "number").

Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the "arithmetical"  
electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false.

Now assuming comp we discover the physics in the inverse way of the  
empiricists, we discover the multiverse before the universe, the  
interference of sub-level histories, before the histories, the logic  
of the observable before the observation, etc.

The point, (of course I am thinking to Kory) is that I try to explain  
a reasoning which shows that the (DIGITAL) MECH hypothesis, can,  
thanks to "digital" be transformed into a scientific (meaning Popper- 
refutable) inquiry. A bit like John Bell succeed to show that the  
Einstein Podolski Rosen was not the product of a senile physician  
doing philosophy in its old days). It is science. At least this is  
what the construction is supposed to explain (and its translation in  
arithmetic is supposed to pave the way of a concretization of the idea).


The MECH is a venerable old philosophical idea. The reason and tools  
making it a science is due to Babbage, Post Turing Kleene Church  
Markov and Co. extraordinary discovery of the universal machine.  
"Nature" discovered it before us, for example we are such machine, but  
enlightening comes when a universal machine begin to suspect its own  
universality, and discovers the "everything" and its many (related)  
sub-structure "inside herself".




>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
>>
>>> So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which  
>>> (let's assume) refutes mechanism,
>>
>>
>> If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then  
>> mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).
>>
>> I guess you meant "refutes materialism". One main point is that  
>> physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the  
>> experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental  
>> refutation of comp.
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Hi m.a.


  if mechanism is true, then the "physical universe" appears to be  
 the border of the universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is  
 the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really  
 something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a  
 logical space gluing the possible machine "dreams". I am not  
 saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the  
 seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis.

  It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and  
 this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc)  
 assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you  
 get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to  
 confirm mechanism or to refute it.

 You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing.  
 Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some  
 notion of digital machine.

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote:
> nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
> quite accurately :-)

Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree  
as the MGA thread progresses. :)

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

Bruno,
I was just quoting you: "And if you do the math, you get a 
physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm 
mechanism or to refute it."  Did you mean "refutes materialism"?

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
>
>> *So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which 
>> (let's assume) refutes mechanism, *
>
>
> If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then 
> mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).
>
> I guess you meant "refutes materialism". One main point is that 
> physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the 
> experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental refutation 
> of comp.
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Hi m.a.
>>>
>>>
>>>  if mechanism is true, then the "physical universe" appears to be 
>>> the border of the universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is the 
>>> tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something 
>>> which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space 
>>> gluing the possible machine "dreams". I am not saying this is true, 
>>> only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some 
>>> naturalist) mechanist hypothesis.
>>>
>>>  It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and 
>>> this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption 
>>> of a physical universe. _*And if you do the math, you get a physics 
>>> extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or 
>>> to refute it.*_
>>>
>>> You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly 
>>> the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of 
>>> digital machine.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>
> >

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:

> So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which  
> (let's assume) refutes mechanism,


If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then  
mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).

I guess you meant "refutes materialism". One main point is that  
physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the  
experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental refutation  
of comp.



> leads inescapably to a mathematical structure in logic-space which  
> actually  constitutes the "physical" universe.


Yes. (for "technical reasons" on which I should perhaps not insist, I  
am far from sure it makes sense to say it is a mathematical structure,  
but mathematical structures can approximate "it".)





> And thus we can justify and explain the physical laws without any  
> reference to matter.

My point is modest (although perhaps radical). It is that IF we assume  
mechanism, THEN we HAVE TO explain the physical laws without any  
reference to matter, energy, time, space. Those things are of second  
order, emerging eventually in "normal" dreams by numbers' dream".
But the math is there and we can already begin the comparison. (This  
is the more difficult "arithmetical UDA). With comp we can only refer  
to numbers, and what numbers "says" about numbers, etc.



> Is that it or are their other implications?

The physics we get is multiplied by two. It explains why the apple  
falls of the tree, and why it hurts (in case *you* are below the  
tree ...).
It explains both the origin of the sharable and doubtable quanta, and  
the private,  non doubtable and non sharable qualia, and how they are  
related. It gives a pretty coherent picture which is more akin to  
Plato than to Aristotle.

But the key point is that it makes mechanism a testable theory. That  
picture is testable. Somehow QM already confirms some "weird"  
consequences of comp, like its many realties/histories interfering  
statistically. This relation can be made more precise, but the thought  
experiment show "only" the *necessity* of explaining physics through  
number relations and the way (universal) numbers reflect those  
relations.


Bruno


>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi m.a.
>>
>>
>>  if mechanism is true, then the "physical universe" appears to be  
>> the border of the universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is the  
>> tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something  
>> which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space  
>> gluing the possible machine "dreams". I am not saying this is true,  
>> only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some  
>> naturalist) mechanist hypothesis.
>>
>>  It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and  
>> this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc)  
>> assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you get  
>> a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm  
>> mechanism or to refute it.
>>
>> You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly  
>> the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of  
>> digital machine.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

*So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which (let's 
assume) refutes mechanism, leads inescapably to a mathematical structure 
in logic-space which actually  constitutes the "physical" universe.  And 
thus we can justify and explain the physical laws without any reference 
to matter. Is that it or are their other implications?


*
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi m.a.
>
>
>  if mechanism is true, then the "physical universe" appears to be the 
> border of the universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is the tip of 
> the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which 
> evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the 
> possible machine "dreams". I am not saying this is true, only that it 
> is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) 
> mechanist hypothesis.
>
>  It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this 
> from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a 
> physical universe. And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted 
> from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it.
>
> You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly 
> the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of 
> digital machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>
> >

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi m.a.


On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote:

> Dear Bruno,
> Needless to say I feel honored that you've  
> taken the time to answer my naive questions.


Naive questions I love.



> But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the  
> phrase highlighted below. Exactly what feature of the "fundamental  
> status of physics" is questioned by comp?


Its fundamentality. Since Aristotle's success it seems some scientists  
believe in a fundamental physical universe. The laws of physics who be  
the fundamental base from which all laws and patterns should be  
derived. The idea is: physics explains chemistry which explains
biology which explains psychology which explains consciousness. I am  
just saying that if the brain functions like a computer, then this  
Aristotelian picture is just wrong. If I tell you what is true, you  
will (if your are sane) believe it is crackpot, that is why I prefer  
to insist on the reasoning. But roughly speaking, if mechanism is  
true, then the "physical universe" appears to be the border of the  
universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg.  
And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in  
a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine  
"dreams". I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence  
of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis.


> Is it just the insistence on a substrate of matter? If all the  laws  
> of physics (in the real TOE) can be generated (duplicated) by pure  
> mathematics, isn't the distinction a trivial semantic one solved by  
> one sweep of Occam's razor? Do you view the idea of "matter" as  
> somehow inhibiting the pace of scientific discovery or as the basis  
> of a dangerous, quasi-mystical, pseudo-religious cult? Just curious.


It is not like that. It is far deeper. It gives a way to justify the  
why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this  
without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. And if  
you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you  
can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it.

You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly  
the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of  
digital machine.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

Dear Bruno,
Needless to say I feel honored that you've taken 
the time to answer my naive questions. But since you invite such 
questions, I do have a problem with the phrase highlighted below. 
Exactly what feature of the "fundamental status of physics" is 
questioned by comp? Is it just the insistence on a substrate of matter? 
If *all *the  laws of physics (in the real TOE) can be generated 
(duplicated) by pure mathematics, isn't the distinction a trivial 
semantic one solved by one sweep of Occam's razor? Do you view the idea 
of "matter" as somehow inhibiting the pace of scientific discovery or as 
the basis of a dangerous, quasi-mystical, pseudo-religious cult? Just 
curious. Best,
 

 
marty a.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Yes. If you mean matter by "fundamental matter".
>
>  It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC 
> shows it). It means that the idea that there are fundamental stuffy 
> material things constituting the observable reality is an illusion. 
> The content of physics is not necessarily wrong, *it is the 
> fundamental status of physics (in the real TOE) which is questioned by 
> the comp hypothesis.*  (By *real* TOE, I mean a TOE which does not 
> eliminate consciousness).
>
>
>
>
> >

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote:

> So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the  
> luminiferous aether

Yes. If you mean matter by "fundamental matter".

  It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC  
shows it). It means that the idea that there are fundamental stuffy  
material things constituting the observable reality is an illusion.  
The content of physics is not necessarily wrong, it is the fundamental  
status of physics (in the real TOE) which is questioned by the comp  
hypothesis.  (By *real* TOE, I mean a TOE which does not eliminate  
consciousness).



> and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions of  
> space and time?


I think so indeed, but my translations of Kant contradict each other.  
So I am not 100% sure.
Note also tat in the comp frame: "subjective" will admit good  
mathematical approximations, from personal memory to godel-lob  
provability logics. I mean we can have objective talk on the subjective.



> And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of equations?


Frankly you are a big quick here. The point is to make this precise  
enough so we can test comp experimentally.



> Gosh.


I agree. But feel free to put your finger on what could be wrong in  
the argument, and keep in mind the premisses can be eventually shown  
to be false. It is not philosophy, it is applied logic (and arithmetic/ 
computer science + a minimal amount of cognitive science). I am not  
defending a position, just showing it follows from "a position" (the  
digital mechanist  or comp position).


Bruno M.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous 
aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions 
of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of 
equations? Gosh.
 
m.a.

*
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
>>> *Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, 
>>> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that 
>>> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical 
>>> existence? 
>>> *
>>
>> That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that 
>> intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the 
>> (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of "life 
>> force", sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary 
>> for life.
>>
>> I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves 
>> fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed 
>> to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them 
>> to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and 
>> why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never 
>> heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is, 
>> "Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things 
>> that can count as a physical substrate." But that's just a 
>> restatement of the position that needs to be defended.
>>
>> When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit 
>> the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's 
>> descriptions of the life-force.
>
>
> I agree 99% with you, and I have myself in my papers and in this list 
> compared very often "materialism" with "vitalism". In generally I do 
> that after the seventh step of the UDA. At that step people should 
> understand that, in case a concrete UD is executed integrally 
> (infinite task) in our material universe, then,  to predict what a pen 
> will do if we drop it, we have to look at the entire set of possible 
> computations going through our current state (when in from of that 
> pen) OK?
>
> Now, are you aware that the MGA is just an argument to logically show 
> that the material invocation, cannot indeed be used to contradict of 
> weaken the consequence of those 7 steps?
>
> No need (for you!) of MGA, if you have already the (correct) intuition 
> that using materialism just cannot work. The use of matter is indeed 
> akin to the (fraudulous) use of God for explaining the existence of 
> the universe. That explain nothing. But we do have a very strong 
> intuition that matter does exist, and it is not so simple (and indeed 
> quite subtle) to precisely show that primitive or fundamental matter 
> is a red herring both for the mind and the body part of the mind-body 
> problem. OK?
>
> I will begin by a step 0, for the MGA, where I sum up what should be 
> completely clear before beginning the MGA itself. I have also to 
> explain what the MGA does not. For example the MGA does not prove the 
> inexistence of matter, it proves only to irrelevance of the notion of 
> matter concerning again both mind and body, consciousness and physics.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>
> >

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
>
>> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
>> Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious
>> like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic,
>> or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in
>> arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the  
>> same
>> than mine: we don't need a material bottom.
>
> Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two
> philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position.


I have no position (just an argument). Years ago, in a moment of  
weakness I have mentionned my perpetually oscillating positions, from  
hoping comp true (false) and believing it is false (true), the bad  
days, and the goods days hoping it true (false) and wanting it true  
(false). I mean even my taste is oscillating. But I think nobody  
should really care about things like that. as a professional, if you  
want, I care only on the sharable deductive results which is mainly  
that you can't have both mind and matter both computable. And the  
related: If MECH is true, then MAT is false. NOT MAT or NOT MEC.
Read my post to John Mikes, which has been sent probably when you  
wrote your's. I am not a philosopher. If you really want to classify  
me, just say that I am a (neoneoplatonist) theologian (with or without  
grain of salt). I just take the opportunity of comp to transform  
philosophical problems into mathematical problems (nobody has to  
believe in the assumption, nor believe I believe them).

>
>
>> The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe
>> (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one.
>
> I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your
> previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or
> not "a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when
> directly implemented in arithmetic", or do you mean something
> different when you say "the existence of mathematical physical
> universe"? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement
> - I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's  
> correct.


I guess you mean, ASSUMING COMP, and after the UDA-MGA proof. Then,  
the use of word is delicate, and can be understood only through the  
understanding of the argument, really. I can make a cautious try.

You cannot implement a person in arithmetic, because they are all  
already implemented in arithmetic. You can' do that for the same  
reason you cannot make, by yourself, 17 a prime number. 17 is already  
prime, and persons are already implemented.

Now, you can apparently implement arithmetic in our most probable  
computational histories, note the "s". I say "apparently" because it  
is an empirical fact. It is enough to implement a computer like the  
one in front of you right now. And you can implement a person, by  
yourself in a computer, except you have to solve the AI problem or to  
implement the universal dovetalier (and then be patient, and not to  
demanding because you will not been able to extract the people from  
the universal computation).

Now, even in the lucky case you implement a person on a computer, the  
consciousness of that person will noy been exclusively related to the  
computer in front of view which executes the person. from the person  
point of view, she will feel executed by an infinity of programs,  
inddeed all those already implemented in arithmetic. Give me a bit of  
time, and I will try to make this clear in MGA 0. This should be  
understandbale if yopu really 1) grasp the seven steps, and 2) abandon  
materialism (through MGA or not). The UDA says something about  
physics, that simple mathematicalism does not say, and it is related  
to the fact that the UD existence relies on Church thesis, like  
physics (and more) will be related to incompleteness and the  
mathematical structure of universal machine ignorance.

You seem to forget or to be unaware that, a priori, nowhere  in the  
deployment, does a physical structure arise. Physical structures arise  
in the "memories" of universal machine, and emerge, in a relative or  
conditional way, from a non computable (a priori) set of computable  
functions executions. Mathematical physicalism seems to invoke a  
program which would emulate somehow that sum on all computations; this  
seems impossible. But I agree that some facts are with you, it is a  
mystery (still too much non computable rabbits with comp). Yet if you  
are correct, then it means that your consciousness is defined by that  
the whole execution of that little programs. Comp is false, or is true  
but makes the whole universe my brain. Comp would be true in the  
weaker sense. Now, even if you are correct, it has to be justified  
comple

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea
> interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble
> contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a
> sculptor to allow the statue to interact with the outside world.
> Similarly, if we claim that the vibrating atoms in the block of marble
> implement a computation, say calculating the product of two numbers,
> we need to build a computer to do the computation in a conventional
> way in order to work out what the mapping is. This would also apply if
> the putative computation were conscious and we wanted to interact with
> it. But what if we *don't* require that we interact with the
> computation: that is, what if the computation is of a self-contained
> virtual world with conscious beings? In that case, working out the
> mapping explicitly would allow us to observe what's going on in this
> world, but there's no reason why the consciousness of its inhabitants
> should be contingent on this occurring.



You are right. It is an important point which works well for the DU  
computations. We don't have to be able to interact with the conscious  
entity, for them to be conscious.
Now I would not use that for a "material stone" because there is no  
evidence that a stone computes, except very little programs for a few  
seconds.
Strictly speaking, a mechanist has to admit that he does not know what  
a stone is, nor if that really exist. A stone can only be a stable  
pattern of his computational histories.

Here the arguments could be unclear due to the fact that they are  
interpreted differently according to where we are in the reasoning.
Let me sum up by saying that I agree with your logical point, but I  
think that to take a stone as an illustration for a computing entity  
could be problematical, at some point,  for those who believe  
"religiously" in ... fundamental primitive stones.

I let you know that I am working on MGA 0.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:

> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
>> Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,  
>> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that  
>> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called  
>> physical existence?
>
> That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that  
> intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the  
> (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of "life  
> force", sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary  
> for life.
>
> I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves  
> fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is  
> supposed to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden  
> is on them to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to  
> have, and why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill.  
> I've never heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a  
> lot of is, "Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds  
> of things that can count as a physical substrate." But that's just a  
> restatement of the position that needs to be defended.
>
> When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit  
> the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's  
> descriptions of the life-force.


I agree 99% with you, and I have myself in my papers and in this list  
compared very often "materialism" with "vitalism". In generally I do  
that after the seventh step of the UDA. At that step people should  
understand that, in case a concrete UD is executed integrally  
(infinite task) in our material universe, then,  to predict what a pen  
will do if we drop it, we have to look at the entire set of possible  
computations going through our current state (when in from of that  
pen) OK?

Now, are you aware that the MGA is just an argument to logically show  
that the material invocation, cannot indeed be used to contradict of  
weaken the consequence of those 7 steps?

No need (for you!) of MGA, if you have already the (correct) intuition  
that using materialism just cannot work. The use of matter is indeed  
akin to the (fraudulous) use of God for explaining the existence of  
the universe. That explain nothing. But we do have a very strong  
intuition that matter does exist, and it is not so simple (and indeed  
quite subtle) to precisely show that primitive or fundamental matter  
is a red herring both for the mind and the body part of the mind-body  
problem. OK?

I will begin by a step 0, for the MGA, where I sum up what should be  
completely clear before beginning the MGA itself. I have also to  
explain what the MGA does not. For example the MGA does not prove the  
inexistence of matter, it proves only to irrelevance of the notion of  
matter concerning again both mind and body, consciousness and physics.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to

> implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
> Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious
> like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic,
> or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in
> arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same
> than mine: we don't need a material bottom.

Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two  
philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position.

> The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe
> (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one.

I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your  
previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or  
not "a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when  
directly implemented in arithmetic", or do you mean something  
different when you say "the existence of mathematical physical  
universe"? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement  
- I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's correct.

> If it exists, we have
> to explain how it wins the "measure of uncertainty" battle on all
> other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the
> universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven).

Do you mean that if "mathematical physicalism" is true, we need to  
offer a mathematical-physicalist solution to the "white rabbit  
problem"? I agree with that. And in fact, I don't claim to have a full  
solution to the white rabbit problem. However, I think the logical /  
philosophical arguments against the materialist's conception of  
"matter" are so strong, and the replacement of that conception with  
the concept of "mathematical facts-of-the-matter" is so fruitful, that  
the acceptance of mathematical physicalism is justified, even without  
a full solution to the white rabbit problem.

>> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed
>> to play for materialists."
>
> I would say "some mathematical facts".

I see your point, although someday later I might want to defend the  
position that I don't really need the word "some".

> For that reason I am
> not sure you will appreciate the MGA, because you clearly seem to be
> aware we don't need material stuff.

I'm interested to learn how similar the MGA is to my own reasons for  
accepting what I'm calling "mathematical physicalism". It may turn out  
to be functionally identical to one of the arguments I've been using  
(in my head). Or it may be a complementary argument that I've never  
thought of. Or it may turn out that I don't find the argument  
persuasive, which may in turn indicate that what I'm calling  
mathematical physicalism isn't actually identical to your position. Or  
I might just think there's an easier or better way to get the same  
conclusion. In any case, I think it would be fruitful.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Nov 2008, at 15:57, John Mikes wrote:

>
> Dear Gordon Tsai, you wrote:
>
> "...How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are
> inside or we are the system?..."
>
> I am the 'heretic' who denies that we 'can'. Whatever "we" think as
> 'outside', is within our own thinking, no matter how we imagine to
> transcend our limitations.
> Bruno writes very smart things, I enjoy reading them, but 'with a
> grain of salt' that it is Brunoism, not binding in the limits to my
> imagination.


I am not brunoîst, whatver that means.


Please be careful with term like that, because some could believe  
there is a religion or worst, a philosophy, proposed by a certain bruno.

Keep in mind I am just a studborn reasoner, trying to share a proof  
that IF you can survive with an artifial digital brain, even just in  
principle, whatever you decide the brain or the universe is, then  
Plato is right, and Aristotle is wrong: meaning "the physical world  
emerge from elementary arithmetic. The physical world is not the  
fundamental background reality. The fundamental theory is number  
theory/computer science/mathematical logic.

IIf you want, all what I have done, is to take one half of atheism  
(mechanism) and show it incompatible with one other half of atheism  
(materialism). That's all. I have no position, no theories, no ideas,  
really. Just an argument. There is no brunoism. There is a proof which  
is either correct, or wrong. And up to today, all the many (serious)  
scientists who have study the proof have not find any error, and it is  
academically received, except by some philosopher and other pseudo- 
religious people from literature and media.

It is a proof, like the proof that the square root of 2 cannot be  
equal to the ratio of two integers. Once you understand it, you  
understand we have to live with that for ever, or to change the  
meaning of our words (like the square root of two is the ratio of two  
"generalized integers", why not, if you can make sense of it?).


Bruno Marchal



> Sometimes I get startled by his strong arguments,
> sometimes I have the "OK, but..." response.
> I started on the list more than 10 years ago.
> Welcome to the place of free spirits
>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
> On 11/13/08, Gordon Tsai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Bruno:
>>
>>   I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I  
>> tried to
>> find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new  
>> and still
>> sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this  
>> hypothesis. I
>> think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity,
>> dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled
>> subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain  
>> 'the outside
>> view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system?  
>> It's like
>> chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for  
>> underneath
>> rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as 'self- 
>> observing 'ideal'
>> machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon  
>> my poetic
>> distortion).  How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's  
>> home?
>>
>> Gordon
>>
>>
>>
>> --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
>>
>>
>> On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
>>>> argument
>>>> with people interested in the matter.
>>>
>>> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
>>>
>>>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>>>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>>>
>>> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
>>> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe.
>> What's
>>> problematic about that?"
>>
>>
>> I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian
>> brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain- 
>> building.
>> Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from
>> that, and 

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Kory,

nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position 
quite accurately :-)

Cheers,
Günther


> Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to  
> the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may  
> be descriptions of beings who have built their own computers (which  
> would ultimately be made out of "gliders" and so on). In that mundane  
> sense, those beings "perform computations" and "implement programs"  
> within that world. Even if those beings accepted what I'm calling  
> Mathematical Physicalism, they could still talk about un-implemented  
> programs, but they'd just mean "unimplemented by us in this particular  
> world".
> 
> The same goes for "existence" and "non-existence". As a Mathematical  
> Physicalist, I believe that "everything exists" (at least, everything  
> that's mathematically describable). But it's still convenient to say  
> things like "Unicorns don't exist", by which I just mean that they  
> (probably) don't exist in my particular world. (And by "my particular  
> world", I really mean the cloud of worlds represented by all my  
> possible future states and all my possible past states. And so on.)
> 
> -- Kory
> 

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote:

> Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness,  
> racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a  
> certain direction on the character's part.
>
> For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible  
> computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing  
> whether you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it -  
> you start off with physicalism and end up with some kind of  
> neoplatonism. Of course, you could still argue that you need some  
> kind of physical seed, but again what I take from this is that since  
> you can perform as much abstraction on the substrate as you like, it  
> doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be completely nothing.  
> My simplistic version works like this:
>
> 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'


Hmmm... You go to far. Since the failure of logicism, we know that yoy  
will be unable to recover even the natural number from nothing, or  
even from logic. To have the number, and thus the programs and the  
computations, you need at least ... the numbers.

That is why elementary arithmetic is a good starting ontology. Without  
the (natural) numbers, you don't get them, and with them, you can get  
everything. And if comp is true, you get them with the right measure,  
meaning it is just a mathematical problem to derive the SWE, from  
which you can derive F= MA, and all the physical laws.
===

Stathis wrote also:

>> 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'
>
> Just what I was saying!



OK, I guess you were meaning by nothing: "nothing physical". Of course  
this is not "nothing at all". We have to postulate the numbers without  
which there is no notion of computations.

Even the UD, seen extensionally as a function, is the empty  function  
from nothing to nothing, given that it has no inputs and no outputs.  
Set theoretically it belongs to nothing^nothing, which gives the set  
{nothing}, which is a singleton, not an empty set. Of course, the  
deployment is not particularly interesting when viewed extensionnaly.  
It is then equivalent with the program BEGIN DO NOTHING REPEAT END.  
The interest of the UD appears when viewed intensionnaly: it creates  
and executes all programs, in all programming language.



Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:

> My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the
> consequences of that conclusion after you accept it.

Not at all. I am just a logician showing that any consistent being  
(human, machine, extraterrestrial, angels, gods, etc.) cannot believe  
both in digital mechanism and materialism. It *is* the only  
consequence I have ever been interested in. My primary goal is to show  
that mechanism does not solve the mind body problem per se, as  
Descartes understood quite well already. Indeed with mechanism, you  
have to justify the appearance of matter without postulating a  
universe. The math part just makes the same reasoning a bit more  
constructive, to please some local mathematicians who found my work  
too much easy as to give a PhD thesis (sic). It is a bit ironical  
because I found the math part before the non math part. But both  
amounts to the same thing. If I am a machine, physical laws are  
emerging from the logic of numbers.


> Obviously,
> there's nothing wrong with focusing on the issues that interest you
> most. But for the world-at-large, the primary issue is *why* we should
> accept in the first place that persons represented by unimplemented
> computations are conscious.

I interpret your "unimplemented computation" by "not implemented in  
the *physical* world" because a computation is always implemented in  
some universal machine language, be it Conway game of life, Fortran,  
Combinators or or Elementary Arithmetic.
All my work (theses, papers, and my talk on this and other lists)  is  
just that: the notion of matter does not even make sense for a  
mechanist. Many got the point with the first seven steps of the UDA,  
and the MGA is intended for people, like Peter Jones, who insists that  
consciousness can appear only when the computation is implemented in a  
"real primary material word". For many this is just an ad hoc moves to  
save physics as the fundamental science. The MGA is intended to show  
that even that magical move does not work. Indeed, from a purely  
logical point of view, you can still believe that the seven first  
steps of the UDA proves only that our physical universe is too much  
"little" to run any significant part of a real UD. After the MGA, as I  
suspect you already understand, we just don't need to run the UD. Its  
"natural" atemporal running is already contained in the set of  
elementary arithmetical truth.


In a next post Kory wrote:

> On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
>> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
>> computations have to be implemented".
>
> Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
> computers or whatever) perform in our world.

Why in our world? In (or relatively to) any universal machine,  
material or immaterial. Sorry for not having been clear of that. I use  
the term "implementation" in the sense of theoretical computer  
science. By using Godel's trick I could define implementation purely  
with numbers and addition + multiplication.



> So it's still not quite
> right to refer to "persons represented by unperformed computations".
> But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying
> to say.


Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to  
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what  
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious  
like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic,  
or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in  
arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same  
than mine: we don't need a material bottom.
The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe   
(your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. If it exists, we have  
to explain how it wins the "measure of uncertainty" battle on all  
other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the  
universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven).


> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed
> to play for materialists."

I would say "some mathematical facts". But I agree with that. And  
those mathematical facts, after Godel Turing and Co., can even explain  
consciousness, where pure physicalism fails (and the UDA-MGA) explains  
in detail why physicalism has to fail there.
===


Kory wrote also to Brent:

> On Nov 14, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented
>> idea or program is an incoherent concept.  So for the non-materialist
>> there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not
>> implemented".
>
> I can't answer for Bruno, but in my formulation, I would say that we
> can talk about "un-implemented" programs as long as we underst

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
> Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,  
> whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that  
> substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical  
> existence?

That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that  
intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the  
(once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of "life force",  
sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary for life.

I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves  
fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed  
to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them  
to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and  
why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never  
heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is,  
"Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things that  
can count as a physical substrate." But that's just a restatement of  
the position that needs to be defended.

When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit  
the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's  
descriptions of the life-force.

-- Kory








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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/16 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>>
> I'm not sure that works.  In the original idea the mapping was to be
> one-to-one (which is possible since a stone or other physical object has
> many microscopic states).

I don't see why the mapping can't be
one(physical-state)-to-many(computation-states). This wouldn't work if
you actually tried to keep track of the computation - in that case you
would need some sort of index variable - but that isn't a problem if
you don't require that the computation interact with the world at the
level of substrate of its implementation.

> If the mapping is something like:
>
> computation-state1---map1>physical-state0
> computation-state2---map2>physical-state0
> computation-state3---map3>physical-state0
> ...
>
> then the inverse mapping,
>
> physical-state0---1map--->computation-state1
> physical-state0---2map--->computation-state2
> physical-state0---3map--->computation-state3
> ...
>
> has to implicitly provide it's own order.  So for the physical-state0 to
> implement the computation there would have to be another index variable,
> like time, to order the inverse mapping.  Then it would really be
>
> physical-state0@ t=1---1map--->computation-state1
> physical-state0@ t=2---2map--->computation-state2
> physical-state0@ t=3---3map--->computation-state3
> ...
>
> Right?
>
> Brent.




-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/16 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>
> I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
> computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the
> belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm
> not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all
> computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are
> functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of
> the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play
> for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation,
> because that's the one I actually understand.

It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea
interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble
contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a
sculptor to allow the statue to interact with the outside world.
Similarly, if we claim that the vibrating atoms in the block of marble
implement a computation, say calculating the product of two numbers,
we need to build a computer to do the computation in a conventional
way in order to work out what the mapping is. This would also apply if
the putative computation were conscious and we wanted to interact with
it. But what if we *don't* require that we interact with the
computation: that is, what if the computation is of a self-contained
virtual world with conscious beings? In that case, working out the
mapping explicitly would allow us to observe what's going on in this
world, but there's no reason why the consciousness of its inhabitants
should be contingent on this occurring.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>   
>> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
>> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
>> the null state?
>> 
I'm not sure that works.  In the original idea the mapping was to be 
one-to-one (which is possible since a stone or other physical object has 
many microscopic states).  If the mapping is something like:

computation-state1---map1>physical-state0
computation-state2---map2>physical-state0
computation-state3---map3>physical-state0
...

then the inverse mapping,

physical-state0---1map--->computation-state1
physical-state0---2map--->computation-state2
physical-state0---3map--->computation-state3
...

has to implicitly provide it's own order.  So for the physical-state0 to 
implement the computation there would have to be another index variable, 
like time, to order the inverse mapping.  Then it would really be

physical-state0@ t=1---1map--->computation-state1
physical-state0@ t=2---2map--->computation-state2
physical-state0@ t=3---3map--->computation-state3
...

Right?

Brent.

>
> I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any  
> computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the  
> belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm  
> not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all  
> computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are  
> functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of  
> the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play  
> for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation,  
> because that's the one I actually understand.
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>
>   


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an
incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if
you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any
physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other
physical systems, or to other mathematical objects, and eventually to any
physicality you want. Just consider that it's completely irrelevant whether
you start off with the platonic maths world or the physical world.

If this seems unclear or silly, well, I am very drunk

--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.


2008/11/16 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
>
> On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
> > every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
> > the null state?
>
> I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
> computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the
> belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm
> not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all
> computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are
> functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of
> the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play
> for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation,
> because that's the one I actually understand.
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
> every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
> the null state?

I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any  
computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the  
belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm  
not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all  
computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are  
functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of  
the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play  
for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation,  
because that's the one I actually understand.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[m.a.]

*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of 
substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or 
a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different 
from the math to be called physical existence? 

m.a.  
*
Kory Heath wrote
> Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary  
> digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an  
> outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's  
> Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, "At  
> time T, is this cell on or off?" For any cell at any time T, there's a  
> mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on  
> or off.
>
> My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter  
> play the role that "physical existence" is supposed to play for  
> materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's  
> Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits  
> (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons,  
> I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so),  
> because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're  
> "all you need" for consciousness, and they're "all you need" for what  
> materialists call "physical reality". We can perform acts of  
> computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical  
> facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness.
>
>
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>
>   

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon

[John Mikes]

Dear Gordon Tsai, you wrote:

"...How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are
inside or we are the system?..."

I am the 'heretic' who denies that we 'can'. Whatever "we" think as
'outside', is within our own thinking, no matter how we imagine to
transcend our limitations.
Bruno writes very smart things, I enjoy reading them, but 'with a
grain of salt' that it is Brunoism, not binding in the limits to my
imagination. Sometimes I get startled by his strong arguments,
sometimes I have the "OK, but..." response.
I started on the list more than 10 years ago.
Welcome to the place of free spirits

John Mikes



On 11/13/08, Gordon Tsai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno:
>
>I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to
> find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still
> sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I
> think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity,
> dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled
> subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain 'the outside
> view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It's like
> chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath
> rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as 'self-observing 'ideal'
> machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic
> distortion).  How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home?
>
> Gordon
>
>
>
> --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
>
>
> On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
>>> argument
>>> with people interested in the matter.
>>
>> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
>>
>>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>>
>> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
>> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe.
> What's
>> problematic about that?"
>
>
> I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian
> brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building.
> Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from
> that, and by this move created modern science including theology as
> the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature
> enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic,
> both scientist and theologian get back to it.
> Of course poets and mystics know better 
>
>
>
>> And then the burden is back on us to explain
>> why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than
> it
>> seems. Burden Tennis.
>
>
> This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument
> (hereafter MGA).
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use
>>> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
>>> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).
>>
>> I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to
>> some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by
>> anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that
>> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious.
>
>
> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
> it soft or hard wired).
>
>
>
>> I
>> believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian
>> machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought-
>> experiments.
>
>
> MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like
> UDA, but it is deeply different.
>
>
>>
>>
>> I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying.
>
>
> Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does
> not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explainin

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
> 2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'
>
> Just what I was saying!
>

I was about to say that...

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
> just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
> character's part.
>
> For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
> computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether
> you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off
> with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you
> could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I
> take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the
> substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be
> completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this:
>
> 'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'

Just what I was saying!



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
> outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that
> reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root
> there still is material stuff which is different than bare
> mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a
> physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as
> there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that
> stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the
> computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust
> throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to
> say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of
> my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough
> like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally
> disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through
> space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist.
>
> One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my
> opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One
> can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in
> order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to
> suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the
> role that "physical existence" is supposed to play.

But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state? The computation is "realised" in the mapping, a
Platonic object, with the nature or even existence of the physical
state being irrelevant.

> Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard
> to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For
> instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt
> the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the
> initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be
> jump-started.

Yes, I guess he just added that part because it fit better with the story.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.

For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether
you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off
with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you
could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I
take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the
substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be
completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this:

'Nothing' := 'Something' -> 'Everything'

2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
>
> On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote:
> > Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have
> > essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
>
> Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
> outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that
> reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root
> there still is material stuff which is different than bare
> mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a
> physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as
> there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that
> stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the
> computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust
> throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to
> say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of
> my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough
> like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally
> disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through
> space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist.
>
> One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my
> opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One
> can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in
> order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to
> suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the
> role that "physical existence" is supposed to play.
>
> Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard
> to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For
> instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt
> the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the
> initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be
> jump-started.
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote:
> Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have  
> essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.

Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory  
outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that  
reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root  
there still is material stuff which is different than bare  
mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a  
physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as  
there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that  
stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the  
computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust  
throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to  
say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of  
my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough  
like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally  
disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through  
space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist.

One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my  
opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One  
can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in  
order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to  
suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the  
role that "physical existence" is supposed to play.

Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard  
to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For  
instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt  
the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the  
initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be  
jump-started.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 14, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented
> idea or program is an incoherent concept.  So for the non-materialist
> there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not  
> implemented".

I can't answer for Bruno, but in my formulation, I would say that we  
can talk about "un-implemented" programs as long as we understand that  
we just mean "un-implemented in our particular world".

Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to  
the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may  
be descriptions of beings who have built their own computers (which  
would ultimately be made out of "gliders" and so on). In that mundane  
sense, those beings "perform computations" and "implement programs"  
within that world. Even if those beings accepted what I'm calling  
Mathematical Physicalism, they could still talk about un-implemented  
programs, but they'd just mean "unimplemented by us in this particular  
world".

The same goes for "existence" and "non-existence". As a Mathematical  
Physicalist, I believe that "everything exists" (at least, everything  
that's mathematically describable). But it's still convenient to say  
things like "Unicorns don't exist", by which I just mean that they  
(probably) don't exist in my particular world. (And by "my particular  
world", I really mean the cloud of worlds represented by all my  
possible future states and all my possible past states. And so on.)

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is
the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.


2008/11/15 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
>
> On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
> > by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
> > computations have to be implemented".
>
> Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
> computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite
> right to refer to "persons represented by unperformed computations".
> But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying
> to say.
>
> Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary
> digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an
> outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's
> Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, "At
> time T, is this cell on or off?" For any cell at any time T, there's a
> mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on
> or off.
>
> My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter
> play the role that "physical existence" is supposed to play for
> materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's
> Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits
> (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons,
> I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so),
> because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're
> "all you need" for consciousness, and they're "all you need" for what
> materialists call "physical reality". We can perform acts of
> computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical
> facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness.
>
> That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm
> looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this
> position. For instance:
>
> "Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed
> to play for materialists."
>
> Or
>
> "All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious."
>
> Or even just
>
> "Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious."
>
> Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is
> "Mathematical Physicalism".
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
> computations have to be implemented".

Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or  
computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite  
right to refer to "persons represented by unperformed computations".  
But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying  
to say.

Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary  
digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an  
outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's  
Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, "At  
time T, is this cell on or off?" For any cell at any time T, there's a  
mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on  
or off.

My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter  
play the role that "physical existence" is supposed to play for  
materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's  
Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits  
(i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons,  
I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so),  
because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're  
"all you need" for consciousness, and they're "all you need" for what  
materialists call "physical reality". We can perform acts of  
computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical  
facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness.

That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm  
looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this  
position. For instance:

"Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed  
to play for materialists."

Or

"All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious."

Or even just

"Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious."

Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is  
"Mathematical Physicalism".

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and  
>> me,
>> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
>> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material.  
>> Now a
>> materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the
>> sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a  
>> non
>> materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is
>> implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion  
>> of
>> zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist  
>> belief. A
>> zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the
>> appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a
>> materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).
>>
>
> If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of  
> me.  I
> am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no
> consciousness...


You are very *clever* ! (And I say this against my religion which  
forbids me to judge things like that).

And you may be a zombie, that would perhaps explain how you can be an  
ultrafinitist.  (joke?).

I hope you will follow the MGA thread. The opinion of a zombie could  
be appreciate (joke?).

Your last two posts were lovely. See if it is sufficiently new and if  
not collect and try to publish maybe.
(At least collect the ideas. Such logic are useful for the study of  
the perceptible field. With comp we have to retrieve them or similar   
from the Z and X logic/hypostasis. The diameter of the thick bord is  
related to the "ignorance hole" from which emerge the "parallel"  
computations/realities, as "seen" from inside. Sure it has to be not  
too sick for eliminating the rabbits. it could  also be related to the  
quantum h)

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>   
>> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
>>> it soft or hard wired).
>>>   
>> Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that
>> persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"?
>> 
>
>
>
>
> Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to  
> realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same  
> impression with the discussion about zombie.
>
> For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all  
> your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad  
> absurdo which will follow). But now we can "redefined", or even just  
> *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation)  
> without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background.
>
> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,  
> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.   
> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a  
> materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the  
> sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non  
> materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is  
> implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of  
> zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A  
> zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the  
> appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a  
> materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).
>
> The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a  
> program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term  
> as "material implementation", but a non materialist can still believe  
> in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of  
> sort of quasi-"material" implementation: this would mean for him/her  
> "implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations".
>   

I don't see this.  For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented 
idea or program is an incoherent concept.  So for the non-materialist 
there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not implemented".  
But then what can it mean to refer to an "implementation relative to the 
most probable computations"?

Brent

> So we agree that a computation is not conscious.
> That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have  
> to make the notion of person a bit more precise)
>
> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented  
> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all  
> computations have to be implemented". Indeed, most computer programmer  
> used the term "implementation" followed by "in Fortran" (or java,  
> lisp, etc.).
>
> A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program)  
> x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are  
> machine capable of implementing all machines.
>
> (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like  "arithmetic  
> implement all universal machines whose "dreams" (sharable first person  
> stories) cohere into "physical histories" which then locally implement  
> these universal machine into person.
>
> To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large  
> interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine  
> difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone  
> who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only  
> if you take matter fro granted.
>
> I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here.  Except for:
>
>
>   
>> 
>>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>>> conclusion. So ...
>>>   
>> No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested.
>> 
>
>
> With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice  
> apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1,  asap.
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>   


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:
> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,  
> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.   
> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a  
> materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the  
> sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non  
> materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is  
> implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of  
> zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A  
> zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the  
> appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a  
> materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).
>   

If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of me.  I 
am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no 
consciousness...

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
>> it soft or hard wired).
>
> Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that
> persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"?




Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to  
realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same  
impression with the discussion about zombie.

For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all  
your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad  
absurdo which will follow). But now we can "redefined", or even just  
*use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation)  
without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background.

For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,  
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.   
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a  
materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the  
sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non  
materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is  
implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of  
zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A  
zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the  
appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a  
materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).

The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a  
program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term  
as "material implementation", but a non materialist can still believe  
in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of  
sort of quasi-"material" implementation: this would mean for him/her  
"implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations".

So we agree that a computation is not conscious.
That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have  
to make the notion of person a bit more precise)

Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented  
by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all  
computations have to be implemented". Indeed, most computer programmer  
used the term "implementation" followed by "in Fortran" (or java,  
lisp, etc.).

A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program)  
x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are  
machine capable of implementing all machines.

(and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like  "arithmetic  
implement all universal machines whose "dreams" (sharable first person  
stories) cohere into "physical histories" which then locally implement  
these universal machine into person.

To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large  
interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine  
difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone  
who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only  
if you take matter fro granted.

I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here.  Except for:


>
>
>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>> conclusion. So ...
>
> No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested.


With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice  
apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1,  asap.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>> conclusion. So ...
>
> Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read
> French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also
> the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could
> also post it on your homepage, for easier reference.


Nice to tell me. Sometimes I got the feeling I have no more things to  
explain to you.
And thanks for the suggestion, I will, I certainly should,  do that.
(I am very lazy when it comes to make change on my webpage I must say)

Best,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Gordon,


On 13 Nov 2008, at 19:36, Gordon Tsai wrote:

> Bruno:
>
>I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind.


OK.




> I tried to find the detailed description with no avail.
> Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I  
> feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard  
> problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are  
> basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps  
> neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside view’ of a  
> closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess  
> pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath  
> rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing  
> ‘ideal’ machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking  
> inside’ (pardon my poetic distortion).  How close can we look? The  
> light is on but nobody’s home?


If you know french, I can give you links to the places where I give  
detailed account. If not, just be patient. I will make a try on this  
list.
Thanks for letting know your interest.

Bruno Marchal



>
> Gordon
>
>
> --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
>
> On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
> >> argument
> >> with people interested in the matter.
> >
> > True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
> >
> >> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
> >> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
> >
> > I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
> > "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe.
> What's
> > problematic about that?"
>
>
> I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian
> brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building.
> Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from
> that, and by this move created modern science including theology as
> the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature
> enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic,
> both scientist and theologian get back to it.
> Of course poets and mystics know better 
>
>
>
> > And then the burden is back on us to explain
> > why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than
> it
> > seems. Burden Tennis.
>
>
> This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument
> (hereafter MGA).
>
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging  
> use
> >> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
> >> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).
> >
> > I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to
> > some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay  
> (by
> > anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that
> > computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious.
>
>
> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
> it soft or hard wired).
>
>
>
> > I
> > believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian
> > machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought-
> > experiments.
>
>
> MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like
> UDA, but it is deeply different.
>
>
> >
> >
> > I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying.
>
>
> Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does
> not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA
> was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that
> computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me
> too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit
> frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they
> already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me
> that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses
> it with other type of criticis

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
> conclusion. So ...

Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read
French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also
the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could
also post it on your homepage, for easier reference.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
> it soft or hard wired).

Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that  
persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"?

> Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does
> not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA
> was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that
> computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me
> too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit
> frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they
> already agree with the conclusion.

You're right. I do already accept the conclusion. But it's my  
impression that almost no one else in the world does. I suspect that  
there are others on this list who do, but even then, I'm not sure they  
represent a majority. (Should I start an informal poll? How many  
people on this list believe that persons represented by unimplemented  
computations are conscious?)

My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the  
consequences of that conclusion after you accept it. Obviously,  
there's nothing wrong with focusing on the issues that interest you  
most. But for the world-at-large, the primary issue is *why* we should  
accept in the first place that persons represented by unimplemented  
computations are conscious. As I said earlier, I've never seen it laid  
out convincingly. (At least, not in the one language I can read. :)

I'm aware that exploring the consequences of the conclusion can lend  
support to the conclusion itself. For instance, if you can show that  
something like quantum physics emerges from the idea that persons  
represented by unimplemented computations are conscious, that counts  
as evidence. But that's a hard road to go. Arguments involving Godel,  
Loebian machines, etc., go over my head, and will go over most other  
people's heads as well.

> Dennett, like many "naturalist" is not aware that the notion of matter
> is not obvious at all.

For what it's worth, Dennett made some interesting comments about this  
somewhere. (Maybe in "Dennett and His Critics", but I can't remember  
for sure.) He basically said that, in his capacity as a professional  
philosopher, he's chosen to focus on the issue of how persons  
represented by implemented computations can be conscious. (He didn't  
put it that way, but I think that's a good way of saying it.) When it  
comes to ontology, he's essentially a layperson. He's willing to  
accept the standard naturalist ontology (and the standard view of  
"impelmentation") so that he can focus on his philosophical specialty.  
He even indicated that he has some private opinions about ontology,  
but he doesn't feel qualified enough to air those opinions in public.  
For all we know, he *is* aware that the notion of matter is not  
obvious at all. It's just not the issue he's chosen to focus on.

My point is that one can read Dennett as if he were entirely agnostic  
about the question of whether persons represented by unimplemented  
computations are conscious. Almost everything he says about  
consciousness still makes sense without the assumption of "matter",  
even if he himself does assume it.

> Now I feel guilty. There is just no presentations of the MGA in
> English. The MGA appears the first time in my 1988 paper, written in
> french.
[snip]
> In this list, I have always suggest people to read the Maudlin"s paper
> 1989, which develops a similar argument.

I don't know French, and I've never tracked down Maudlin's paper. I've  
only read previous threads on this list, like this one:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/567c5ffde76c70a/780e5a48fb33724e?hl=en&lnk=gst&q=olympia#780e5a48fb33724e

I don't really grasp the argument presented in that thread, so  
(therefore) I don't find it very convincing.

> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
> conclusion. So ...

No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Gordon Tsai]

Bruno:
 
   I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to 
find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still 
sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I 
think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, 
dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled 
subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside 
view’ of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess 
pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by 
observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing ‘ideal’ machine 
discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside’ (pardon my poetic 
distortion).  How close can we look? The light is on but nobody’s home?  
 
Gordon

 

--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM


On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the  
>> argument
>> with people interested in the matter.
>
> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
>
>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>
> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe.
What's
> problematic about that?"


I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian  
brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building.
Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from  
that, and by this move created modern science including theology as  
the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature  
enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic,  
both scientist and theologian get back to it.
Of course poets and mystics know better 



> And then the burden is back on us to explain
> why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than
it
> seems. Burden Tennis.


This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument  
(hereafter MGA).




>
>
>> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use
>> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
>> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).
>
> I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to
> some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by
> anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that
> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious.


Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will  
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember  
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be  
it soft or hard wired).



> I
> believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian
> machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought-
> experiments.


MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like  
UDA, but it is deeply different.


>
>
> I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying.


Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does  
not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA  
was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that  
computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me  
too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit  
frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they  
already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me  
that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses  
it with other type of criticism of comp.



> It's easy for me to
> sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of
> actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that
> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so
> you're usually preaching to the choir with me.


You see!



> My point is that, I can
> imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying "Ok, that makes sense
> *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order
> to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe
that."


Dennett, like many "naturalist" is not aware that the notion of
matter  
is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those  
who followed, of

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the  
>> argument
>> with people interested in the matter.
>
> True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
>
>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>
> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's
> problematic about that?"


I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian  
brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building.
Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from  
that, and by this move created modern science including theology as  
the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature  
enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic,  
both scientist and theologian get back to it.
Of course poets and mystics know better 



> And then the burden is back on us to explain
> why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than it
> seems. Burden Tennis.


This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument  
(hereafter MGA).




>
>
>> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use
>> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
>> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).
>
> I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to
> some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by
> anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that
> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious.


Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will  
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember  
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be  
it soft or hard wired).



> I
> believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian
> machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought-
> experiments.


MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like  
UDA, but it is deeply different.


>
>
> I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying.


Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does  
not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA  
was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that  
computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me  
too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit  
frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they  
already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me  
that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses  
it with other type of criticism of comp.



> It's easy for me to
> sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of
> actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that
> computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so
> you're usually preaching to the choir with me.


You see!



> My point is that, I can
> imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying "Ok, that makes sense
> *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order
> to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that."


Dennett, like many "naturalist" is not aware that the notion of matter  
is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those  
who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and  
Malebranche). Today people thought about the "consciousness" problem,  
when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating  
them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not  
progressed at all in the "hard problem of matter", on the contrary,  
modern physics (quantum physics) makes the problem of matter even  
harder (which in a sense *constitutes* a progress of course). The QM  
many worlds saves the idea that matter is something objective, but  
even the many worlds does not explain what matter is, and if it is, at  
all.

Dennett gives a good criteria of what could be an explanation of  
intelligence or consciousness. It has to be something relating NON- 
INTELLIGENT (or non-conscious) entity in such a way it explains  
intelligence or consciousness. This is the basic idea behind Putnam's  
functionalism, or even computationalism (which is the belief that  
functionalism is true at least at some level of description of oneself).

So, why does Dennett not ask the same for an explanation of matter.  
Matter should be explained without any use of the word matter, and so  
it should be explained by relating only ... non material entities. But  
nobody asks for that. Why? Because we are hardwired for not doubting  
matter. We take for granted that ma

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/13 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

>> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
>> tell us what he means by a physical universe.
>
> I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
> "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's
> problematic about that?" And then the burden is back on us to explain
> why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than it
> seems. Burden Tennis.

Yes indeed, that's the problem. I can discuss almost any of these
strange ideas (comp, many worlds, duplication thought experiments) and
most people are willing to at least consider them. But tell them the
world is just a dream, running on no hardware at all, and they say
that's crazy.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument
> with people interested in the matter.

True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)

> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
> tell us what he means by a physical universe.

I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,  
"What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's  
problematic about that?" And then the burden is back on us to explain  
why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than it  
seems. Burden Tennis.

> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use
> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).

I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to  
some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by  
anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that  
computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. I  
believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian  
machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- 
experiments.

I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. It's easy for me to  
sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of  
actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that  
computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so  
you're usually preaching to the choir with me. My point is that, I can  
imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying "Ok, that makes sense  
*if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order  
to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that."

I guess what it comes down to is that the Movie Graph Argument on its  
own doesn't seem fully convincing to me. But it's quite possible that  
I don't fully understand that argument. (I have my own reasons for  
believing that computations don't need to be implemented in order to  
be conscious, and sometimes I think some of them are functionally  
equivalent to the MGA, but I'm not sure.) Where is the clearest  
statement of the MGA?

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
>> granted.
>
> I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
> we can't take physical reality for granted.


First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument  
with people interested in the matter.
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to  
tell us what he means by a physical universe. This is what I try to  
clarify too.



> I've never seen the
> arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes.

It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use  
of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or  
imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).



> (And I'll
> admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.)

Which gives you perhaps a bit of time to study other's proposal. Of  
course if it is just a question of taste, I can' help you.
Kory, I give you on plate a complete detailed, obviously a bit long  
and not "so" simple, argument which shows, or is supposed to show,  
that if mechanism is true there is no primary material universe, and  
you ask for a more tasty argument?
I give you the blue pill, and you ask for ... what, marmelade,  
chocolate?

(Sorry Kim Jones, I fall into simple sarcasm (again))

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality
go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away
from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective.

--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.


2008/11/12 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
>
> On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
> > granted.
>
> I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
> we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the
> arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll
> admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.)
>
> -- Kory
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
> granted.

I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why  
we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the  
arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll  
admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.)

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Nov 2008, at 23:38, Kory Heath wrote:

> Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand.
> But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I
> think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand,
> they wouldn't convince a philosopher like Dennett. But they should be
> able to. (In principle. In practice, philosophers are rarely convinced
> by anyone else's arguments on any issue.)
>
> Maybe I still don't fully understand Bruno's position. If I were
> making the argument, his step 8 would be my step 1.



As I said earlier. Step #8 *is* step #1 in my long "Conscience et  
Mecanisme" (1994), and in my shorter "Calculabilité, Physique et  
Cognition" which I have defended as a PhD thesis in Computer Science  
(1998).

I have put Step #8 at the last place because it is much more subtle,  
and UDA(1...7) makes it already possible to understand the nature of  
the reversal physics/computer science.

The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for  
granted. Note that Dennett and Hofstadter did come very close to the 1- 
person indeterminacy in their book "Mind's I", but, miss it clearly,  
as can be deduced from Hofstadter's critics of Everett, for example.

Bruno Marchal


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of  
> "logical
> possibility".

Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to  
state my position would be that I think the standard conception of  
"philosophical zombie" is incoherent. I tend to use the terms  
"logically impossible" and "incoherent" interchangeably, but that's  
probably sloppy philosophizing.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Kory Heath wrote:
> 
> On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,  
>> like your
>> Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number  
>> generator but just
>> happened to behave as if it were conscious.
> 
> Ok. That works just as well for me.
> 
>> I'm not sure where you would draw
>> the line between the accidentally convincing conversation and the  
>> accidentally
>> behaving robot to say one was a philosophical zombie and the other  
>> wasn't.
> 
> I wouldn't. I would say that neither of them are philosophical zombies  
> at all. And I'm pretty sure that that would be Dennett's position.
> 
>> Since the concept is just a hypothetical it's a question of semantics.
> 
> I agree. But the semantics are important when it comes to  
> communicating with other philosophers. My only point at the beginning  
> of this thread was that Bruno would be getting himself into hot water  
> with other philosophers by claiming that unimplemented computations  
> describing conscious beings should count as zombies, because that's a  
> misuse of the established term.
> 
>> OK.  It's just that the usual definition in strictly in terms of  
>> behavior and
>> doesn't consider inner workings.
> 
> But the inner workings are part of the behavior, and I'm pretty sure  
> that the usual definition of "philosophical zombie" includes these  
> inner workings.
> 
>> My own view is that someday we will understand a lot about the inner  
>> workings of
>> brains; enough that we can tell what someone is thinking by  
>> monitoring the
>> firing of neurons and that we will be able to build robots that  
>> really do
>> exhibit conscious behavior (although see John McCarthy's website for  
>> why we
>> shouldn't do this).  When we've reached this state of knowledge,  
>> questions about
>> qualia and what is consciousness will be seen to be the wrong  
>> questions.  They
>> will be like asking where is life located in an animal.
> 
> As far as I understand it, this is exactly Dennett's position.
> 
> Let's imagine we know enough about the inner working of brains to  
> examine a brain and tell what that person is thinking, feeling, etc.  
> Imagine that we certainly know enough to examine a brain and confirm  
> that it is *not* just a random-number generator that's accidentally  
> seeming to be conscious. We can look at a brain and tell that it  
> really is responding to the words that are being spoken to it, etc.  
> Let's say that we actually do examine some particular brain, and  
> confirm that it's meeting all of our physical criteria of  
> consciousness. Do you think it's logically possible for that brain to  
> *not* be conscious? If you don't believe that, then you, like Dennett  
> (and me), don't believe in the logical possibility of zombies.

I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of "logical 
possibility".  I don't think logic makes anything impossible except "A and ~A"; 
which is a failure of expression.  So I tend to just say "impossible" or 
sometimes "nomologically impossible".

Brent

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,  
> like your
> Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number  
> generator but just
> happened to behave as if it were conscious.

Ok. That works just as well for me.

> I'm not sure where you would draw
> the line between the accidentally convincing conversation and the  
> accidentally
> behaving robot to say one was a philosophical zombie and the other  
> wasn't.

I wouldn't. I would say that neither of them are philosophical zombies  
at all. And I'm pretty sure that that would be Dennett's position.

> Since the concept is just a hypothetical it's a question of semantics.

I agree. But the semantics are important when it comes to  
communicating with other philosophers. My only point at the beginning  
of this thread was that Bruno would be getting himself into hot water  
with other philosophers by claiming that unimplemented computations  
describing conscious beings should count as zombies, because that's a  
misuse of the established term.

> OK.  It's just that the usual definition in strictly in terms of  
> behavior and
> doesn't consider inner workings.

But the inner workings are part of the behavior, and I'm pretty sure  
that the usual definition of "philosophical zombie" includes these  
inner workings.

> My own view is that someday we will understand a lot about the inner  
> workings of
> brains; enough that we can tell what someone is thinking by  
> monitoring the
> firing of neurons and that we will be able to build robots that  
> really do
> exhibit conscious behavior (although see John McCarthy's website for  
> why we
> shouldn't do this).  When we've reached this state of knowledge,  
> questions about
> qualia and what is consciousness will be seen to be the wrong  
> questions.  They
> will be like asking where is life located in an animal.

As far as I understand it, this is exactly Dennett's position.

Let's imagine we know enough about the inner working of brains to  
examine a brain and tell what that person is thinking, feeling, etc.  
Imagine that we certainly know enough to examine a brain and confirm  
that it is *not* just a random-number generator that's accidentally  
seeming to be conscious. We can look at a brain and tell that it  
really is responding to the words that are being spoken to it, etc.  
Let's say that we actually do examine some particular brain, and  
confirm that it's meeting all of our physical criteria of  
consciousness. Do you think it's logically possible for that brain to  
*not* be conscious? If you don't believe that, then you, like Dennett  
(and me), don't believe in the logical possibility of zombies.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic
> physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the
> computation that gives rise to the physical world.

That's also how I understand him. And, in fact, I believe something  
similar (if not identical). My point is that a staunchly anti-zombie  
philosopher like Dennett would still need convincing, and appealing to  
his (Dennett's) own anti-zombie leanings wouldn't be enough to  
convince him.

> This is in step 8
> of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to
> grasp part of the argument.

Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand.  
But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I  
think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand,  
they wouldn't convince a philosopher like Dennett. But they should be  
able to. (In principle. In practice, philosophers are rarely convinced  
by anyone else's arguments on any issue.)

Maybe I still don't fully understand Bruno's position. If I were  
making the argument, his step 8 would be my step 1.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something
>> the same as creating it?  
> 
> Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or 
> finite pieces of computations).
> 
> 
>> How can we decide these entities (what makes
>> them entities?) are or are not conscious?
> 
> 
> We just cannot decide. 
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical
>> things"  How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail
>> phyisical things?
> 
> 
> Well, this is really the point of the whole reasoning. UDA(1...7) + UDA.8
> 
> I think now that if you have grasped up to step 6. It is really step 7 
> which explain why the laws of physics have to emerge from computer 
> science or number theory. 
> 
> Imagine that in our physical universe (assumed, if only to get the 
> contradiction) a real concrete UD is running. This makes intuitive 
> sense. I have implemented in 1991 a UD, and it has run for two weeks. 
> The UD has no inputs and no outputs. It just runs, and simulate all 
> possible programs on all possible inputs with all possible (piece of) 
> oracles. The existence of this UD is not something obvious, but it does 
> exist, and is even constructible, if we accept Church Thesis. With 
> Church thesis, even a DU written in FORTRAN, and dovetailing only on the 
> fortran programs will generates all the program in LISP, but also in all 
> not yet invented languages, and runs them. OK?
> 
> I assume here also (in step 7) that our physical universe is robust 
> enough to let the UD run forever. If you grasp up to step 6, then you 
> should understand that if you decide here and now to do any "physical 
> experiment", like sending a photon on a mirror, or like observing an 
> apple in a tree", the only real and correct way to predict or evaluate 
> what will happen, is NO MORE to use the physical laws of your universe, 
> but to look at all the computational histories generated through by the 
> UD up to your actual state of mind (this exists because we assume comp). 
> And what will happen is what happen in most of those stories. OK?

No.  That seems to me to be assuming what you want to prove.  It's assuming 
that 
computations instantiate universes and there is a probability measure 
proportional to their number in the UD.  I look at it the other way around. IF 
I 
look at the computational histories generated by the UD and measure 
probabilities by their number and that accurately predicts what I observe - 
then 
that will be evidence that computations instantiate this universe (and all 
others).

> 
> So, even, without the Movie Graph Argument, if such a concrete UD 
> exists, if no white rabbits appears and if the photon bounce, or the 
> apple falls on the ground, you can deduce that the "physical laws' 
> describe those more common histories.

Right - but that's three conditionals.


> 
> At this point a mechanist who want to stay naturalist and keep "a 
> physical lawful universe" can decide that such a universe just cannot 
> run the UD, nor a too big portion of it. This would indeed evacuate the 
> comp white rabbits, and reinstate a sense to "physical law".
> 
> But then MGA, UDA step 8, shows that such a move don't work.

Yes, I think I understand that part.

Brent

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Jason,


On 07 Nov 2008, at 22:39, Jason Resch wrote:

> Bruno,
>
> Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the  
> same page with the UDA.  I accept mathematical realism and therefore  
> the existence of abstract Turing machines defining the computational  
> histories of all programs, or the equations of string theory  
> defining all true solutions, etc.  Therefore I would say the  
> apparent "physical" universe is a timeless object that exists purely  
> within math, and that our consciousness is formed by computations of  
> processes that take place through one of the dimensions of the  
> universe (time).  I also believe there is no single mathematical  
> object to which we can say we exist in, our certainty of which  
> universe we can exist in changes all the time depending on the  
> content of our OM.



OK.



>
> For example, when not thinking about the color of my tooth brush,  
> and when not directly perceiving it, I exist in all universes where  
> it is possible for my OM to exist, some of which my toothbrush is  
> green, others red, or blue.  Only when I stop and recall what color  
> it is do I limit which universes I can belong to.


... hmmm  OK.  (interpreting favorably possible ambiguities).




>  Does your opinion differ in this regard?  I am not sure if you  
> believe in the actual existence of shareable physical (mathematical)  
> universes or only in the dreams, which only occasionally give the  
> appearance of shared histories.  This to me sounds like the comp  
> equivalent of Boltzmann brains, which I think would be less frequent  
> than brains evolving through the full history of mathematical  
> objects or computational universes.


Hmmm You have not push the UDA logic far enough yet, because it  
contains the answer to your question.
The shareable "physical" mathematical universe HAS TO be defined from  
all the dreams/computations.
This change your question into: is there a special program P,  
different of the UD itself, which when executed by the UD will the  
"measure battle", so that other programs, even those which generates  
multiple version "you" will never adds measure compare to the  
supermultiplication of that program P?
I don't know. If P exists, it has to be a special UD. And Feynman's  
work can be adapted for showing that, well to be short, a sort of  
e^iUD, that is a quantized version of the UD, will evacuate  
efficiently its own "white rabbits", it is not yet clear how it could  
evacuate all the other white rabbits. yet I do believe somehow that  
the everything object is akin to e^iUD. But to solve the mind-body  
problem, we have to justify this from the "classical UD".



>
> Regarding zombies, I think there can be outwardly appearing  
> accidental zombies (from a third person view) that can appear  
> conscious in certain circumstances but I don't think its possible to  
> have two identical computational histories and only ascribe  
> consciousness to one of them.
>
> Jason
>
> P.S.
>
> I apologize for the difficult to understand and half completed  
> sentences that appeared in my previous post, I was writing notes of  
> thoughts as they were coming to me and forgot to clean them up  
> before sending out the message.


And I apologize for my numerous misspellings (especially the "s"), but  
also for the words lacking in my sentences, or words appearing from  
nowhere. As an example I just send to Brent the following sentence:

"I think now that IF  you have grasped  
up  to step 6. It is really step  
7 which explain < explains > why the laws of physics have to  
emerge from computer science or number theory. "

I see the errors only after sending the message, in general.

Sorry sorry sorry.   Feel free to ask me to rewrite sentences ...

Bruno
- In this sentence, no word is lacking.
- In sentence, one word is lacking.
- In sentence, two are lacking.
- In sentence, three lacking.
- In, four lacking.
- In, five.
- six
-

;-)



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Kory Heath wrote:
> 
> On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
>> accidental zombies.  It's just not nomologically possible.
> 
> I'm not sure what counts as an "accidental zombie". Do you mean  
> something like the following:
> 
> I can write a very short computer program that accepts ascii  
> characters as input, and then spews out a random series of characters  
> as output, and then accepts more input, etc. It's logically possible  
> for me to have a "conversation" with this program in which the program  
> just happens (by accident) to pass the Turing Test with flying colors.
> 
> Is this what you mean by an "accidental" zombie? If so, it's important  
> to understand that this is not a zombie at all by Dennett's definition  
> (unless I've really misunderstood Dennett). A zombie is something  
> that's physically indistinguishable from a physical conscious entity  
> and yet isn't conscious. 

It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that, like your 
Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number generator but 
just 
happened to behave as if it were conscious.  I'm not sure where you would draw 
the line between the accidentally convincing conversation and the accidentally 
behaving robot to say one was a philosophical zombie and the other wasn't. 
Since the concept is just a hypothetical it's a question of semantics.

>That program might be accidentally behaving  
> as if it were conscious, but if you had the proper instruments to  
> examine it physically, you would be able to conclude exactly that:  
> it's a random number generator that's accidentally behaving as though  
> it were conscious. Dennett would claim that a random number generator  
> that passes a Turing Test is logically possible (but extraordinarily  
> unlikely), and he'd happily claim that it's not conscious. He'd claim  
> that zombies are something different, and that they're logically  
> impossible. (He's also used words like "unimaginable" and "incoherent".)

OK.  It's just that the usual definition in strictly in terms of behavior and 
doesn't consider inner workings.

My own view is that someday we will understand a lot about the inner workings 
of 
brains; enough that we can tell what someone is thinking by monitoring the 
firing of neurons and that we will be able to build robots that really do 
exhibit conscious behavior (although see John McCarthy's website for why we 
shouldn't do this).  When we've reached this state of knowledge, questions 
about 
qualia and what is consciousness will be seen to be the wrong questions.  They 
will be like asking where is life located in an animal.

Brent Meeker

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing  
> something
> the same as creating it?

Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or  
finite pieces of computations).


> How can we decide these entities (what makes
> them entities?) are or are not conscious?


We just cannot decide.


>
>
> I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" =  
> "physical
> things"  How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail
> phyisical things?


Well, this is really the point of the whole reasoning. UDA(1...7) +  
UDA.8

I think now that if you have grasped up to step 6. It is really step 7  
which explain why the laws of physics have to emerge from computer  
science or number theory.

Imagine that in our physical universe (assumed, if only to get the  
contradiction) a real concrete UD is running. This makes intuitive  
sense. I have implemented in 1991 a UD, and it has run for two weeks.  
The UD has no inputs and no outputs. It just runs, and simulate all  
possible programs on all possible inputs with all possible (piece of)  
oracles. The existence of this UD is not something obvious, but it  
does exist, and is even constructible, if we accept Church Thesis.  
With Church thesis, even a DU written in FORTRAN, and dovetailing only  
on the fortran programs will generates all the program in LISP, but  
also in all not yet invented languages, and runs them. OK?

I assume here also (in step 7) that our physical universe is robust  
enough to let the UD run forever. If you grasp up to step 6, then you  
should understand that if you decide here and now to do any "physical  
experiment", like sending a photon on a mirror, or like observing an  
apple in a tree", the only real and correct way to predict or evaluate  
what will happen, is NO MORE to use the physical laws of your  
universe, but to look at all the computational histories generated  
through by the UD up to your actual state of mind (this exists because  
we assume comp). And what will happen is what happen in most of those  
stories. OK?

So, even, without the Movie Graph Argument, if such a concrete UD  
exists, if no white rabbits appears and if the photon bounce, or the  
apple falls on the ground, you can deduce that the "physical laws'  
describe those more common histories.

At this point a mechanist who want to stay naturalist and keep "a  
physical lawful universe" can decide that such a universe just cannot  
run the UD, nor a too big portion of it. This would indeed evacuate  
the comp white rabbits, and reinstate a sense to "physical law".

But then MGA, UDA step 8, shows that such a move don't work.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/11/9 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I
> was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett
> who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that
> (for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in
> order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue
> that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they
> would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about
> zombies. And in fact, they're correct - "zombie" is a technical term
> that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to
> *physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave
> identically to conscious things but aren't conscious.

Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic
physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the
computation that gives rise to the physical world. This is in step 8
of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to
grasp part of the argument.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
> accidental zombies.  It's just not nomologically possible.

I'm not sure what counts as an "accidental zombie". Do you mean  
something like the following:

I can write a very short computer program that accepts ascii  
characters as input, and then spews out a random series of characters  
as output, and then accepts more input, etc. It's logically possible  
for me to have a "conversation" with this program in which the program  
just happens (by accident) to pass the Turing Test with flying colors.

Is this what you mean by an "accidental" zombie? If so, it's important  
to understand that this is not a zombie at all by Dennett's definition  
(unless I've really misunderstood Dennett). A zombie is something  
that's physically indistinguishable from a physical conscious entity  
and yet isn't conscious. That program might be accidentally behaving  
as if it were conscious, but if you had the proper instruments to  
examine it physically, you would be able to conclude exactly that:  
it's a random number generator that's accidentally behaving as though  
it were conscious. Dennett would claim that a random number generator  
that passes a Turing Test is logically possible (but extraordinarily  
unlikely), and he'd happily claim that it's not conscious. He'd claim  
that zombies are something different, and that they're logically  
impossible. (He's also used words like "unimaginable" and "incoherent".)

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
> contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
> relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
> and variant, if only that for example ...)?
> It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the
> level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do
> you see what I mean?

Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I  
was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett  
who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that  
(for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in  
order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue  
that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they  
would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about  
zombies. And in fact, they're correct - "zombie" is a technical term  
that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to  
*physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave  
identically to conscious things but aren't conscious.

So the technical term "zombie" carries along with it the baggage of  
"physical existence". That baggage could be eliminated - maybe you  
could convince Dennett that computations don't have to be implemented  
in order to be conscious - but you couldn't do it simply by suggesting  
that unimplemented computations should count as zombies.

In actual fact, I think the real burden is on the people who believe  
that a computation needs to be implemented in order to be conscious.  
But now we're just playing what Dennett calls "burden tennis".  They  
can just say that the burden lies on us to show why the burden lies on  
them.

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Jason Resch]

Bruno,
Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page
with the UDA.  I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of
abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all
programs, or the equations of string theory defining all true solutions,
etc.  Therefore I would say the apparent "physical" universe is a timeless
object that exists purely within math, and that our consciousness is formed
by computations of processes that take place through one of the dimensions
of the universe (time).  I also believe there is no single mathematical
object to which we can say we exist in, our certainty of which universe we
can exist in changes all the time depending on the content of our OM.

For example, when not thinking about the color of my tooth brush, and when
not directly perceiving it, I exist in all universes where it is possible
for my OM to exist, some of which my toothbrush is green, others red, or
blue.  Only when I stop and recall what color it is do I limit which
universes I can belong to.  Does your opinion differ in this regard?  I am
not sure if you believe in the actual existence of shareable physical
(mathematical) universes or only in the dreams, which only occasionally give
the appearance of shared histories.  This to me sounds like the comp
equivalent of Boltzmann brains, which I think would be less frequent than
brains evolving through the full history of mathematical objects or
computational universes.

Regarding zombies, I think there can be outwardly appearing accidental
zombies (from a third person view) that can appear conscious in certain
circumstances but I don't think its possible to have two identical
computational histories and only ascribe consciousness to one of them.

Jason

P.S.

I apologize for the difficult to understand and half completed sentences
that appeared in my previous post, I was writing notes of thoughts as they
were coming to me and forgot to clean them up before sending out the
message.

On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>>
>> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
>> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is
>> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
>> > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new
>> > world/reality.
>>
>> I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6,
>> is that you do survive there  like if it was teleportation. And in that
>> context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five
>> preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that
>> if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that
>> copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the
>> virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you
>> will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is
>> 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's
>> closer continuer identity theory fails with comp.
>
>
> My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in
> expecting your next observer moment work this way.  From a third person
> perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as
> you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not
> experience all 3 locations at once.  I think this is where I disagree, you
> _do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations
> and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to
> merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations.
>
>
>
>
> I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We come
> from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but it does not
> seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics *has to* be extracted
> from probability/credibility measure on computations.
>
>
>
>
>
> This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a
> 4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being
> in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from
> past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future
> states to the present.  The vast majority of information within our brain
> state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent
> past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our
> true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of
> birth to death.
>
> This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into
> believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing
> to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current conte

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>   
>> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in  
>>> the
>>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>>>   
>> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to
>> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel
>> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't
>> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular-
>> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is
>> implemented in some physical way.
>> 
>
>
> Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem  
> in physics, he says).
>
>
>
>
>   
>> In the standard view, believing in
>> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
>> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
>> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
>> that's logically impossible.)
>> 
>
>
>   It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of  
> what you have already understand.
> I should do exams or things like that :)
>
> Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny,   
> part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the  
> running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind  
> states, through all possible computations, containing notably  
> relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of  
> histories.
> It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains  
> description of our third person current conversation, including  
> everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So  
> you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they  
> are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many  
> stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc.
>   

It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something 
the same as creating it?  How can we decide these entities (what makes 
them entities?) are or are not conscious?
> In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by  
> physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This  
> is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the  
> physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA  
> is really a logical argument justifying that:  IF you buy the  
> mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- 
> materialist or substantialist explanation of matter.
> Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation  
> for QM.
> I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a  
> singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a  
> vast hierarchy of weakening of comp.
>
> To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a  
> physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming  
> comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another  
> reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp,  I don't believe  
> in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I  
> don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing,  
> with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal  
> ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is  
> a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron  
> relatively to your measurements).
>   

I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical 
things"  How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail 
phyisical things?

Brent
>
> Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth  
> contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the  
> relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations  
> and variant, if only that for example ...)?
> It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the  
> level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do  
> you see what I mean?
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>   


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in  
>> the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>
> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to
> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel
> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't
> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular-
> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is
> implemented in some physical way.


Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem  
in physics, he says).




> In the standard view, believing in
> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
> that's logically impossible.)


  It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of  
what you have already understand.
I should do exams or things like that :)

Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny,   
part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the  
running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind  
states, through all possible computations, containing notably  
relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of  
histories.
It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains  
description of our third person current conversation, including  
everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So  
you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they  
are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many  
stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc.

In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by  
physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This  
is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the  
physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA  
is really a logical argument justifying that:  IF you buy the  
mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- 
materialist or substantialist explanation of matter.
Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation  
for QM.
I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a  
singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a  
vast hierarchy of weakening of comp.

To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a  
physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming  
comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another  
reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp,  I don't believe  
in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I  
don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing,  
with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal  
ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is  
a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron  
relatively to your measurements).


Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth  
contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the  
relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations  
and variant, if only that for example ...)?
It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the  
level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do  
you see what I mean?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Brent Meeker]

Kory Heath wrote:
> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>   
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>> 
>
> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to  
> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel  
> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't  
> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- 
> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is  
> implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in  
> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for  
> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every  
> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think  
> that's logically impossible.)
>
> -- Kory
>   
I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. 
accidental zombies.  It's just not nomologically possible.  But I don't 
know that Bruno allows that there is such a category as nomological, 
distinct from logical.

Brent

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  
> wrote:
>
> Hi Jason,
>
>
> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
>
> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the  
> computer is
> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
> > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new
> > world/reality.
>
> I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6,
> is that you do survive there  like if it was teleportation. And in  
> that
> context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five
> preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that
> if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that
> copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the
> virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you
> will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is
> 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's
> closer continuer identity theory fails with comp.
>
> My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in  
> expecting your next observer moment work this way.  From a third  
> person perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3  
> extensions, and as you say, this is interesting because from a first  
> person POV you do not experience all 3 locations at once.  I think  
> this is where I disagree, you _do_ experience all 3 locations at  
> once, but due to the isolated locations and lack of communication  
> between the 3 different brains, they are unable to merge the  
> experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations.



I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We  
come from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but  
it does not seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics  
*has to* be extracted from probability/credibility measure on  
computations.




>
> This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a 4- 
> dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience  
> being in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth,  
> communication from past memories to the present, and complete lack  
> of communication from future states to the present.  The vast  
> majority of information within our brain state at any one time is  
> chiefly information of the present and very recent past, giving us  
> the feeling of living in the present, when of course our true nature  
> is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of birth  
> to death.
>
> This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools  
> us into believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly  
> there is nothing to differentiate one observer from any other,  
> except for the current content of their experience.


You are right. But when you look for the true reason why apples appear  
to fall on the ground. UDA(+AGF, that is 1...8) explains why the comp  
correct way to predict the behavior of the apple consists in looking  
in the universal deployment, and then looking at all computations  
going through your actual states (the one you have (by comp) once you  
observet the apple before dropping it), and, looking at the normal  
most probable stories/computations going through that state.
  Hmm... perhaps you have a problem with the UD? It does not just  
generate OM (Observer Moment). The DU generates all third person  
"observer moments"  (as instantaneous state of universal self- 
observing machine) by generating all the stories (singular  
computations) going through that state. There is a continuum (from a  
first person pov) of such stories. The first person moment are  
different modalities.




>  I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has access to as a  
> means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones memories  
> are not in the content of ones OM at any one time.


You are right, but not at the level needed to understand why and how,  
assuming comp, we *have* to explain why apples falls from "pure  
(mathematical) computer science".  (or perhaps you are and there is a  
misunderstanding, to be sure). The reasoning should show comp  
testable.  So we have to take into account all computations going  
through each observer moment to have normal relative "expected  
values". A bit like already with QM and Everett.




>  I think the importance of a particular computational history in  
> defining an "observer moment" is not as important as memory/ 
> communication isolation.


You are right if your goal is to discover who you really are. But not  
if your goal is to understand why we have to derive Schoedinger  
Equation from computer science and number theory. It makes comp  
testable, and it provide a fundamental theory which does not eliminate  
the person. On the contrary it expl

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Günther Greindl]

Hi Bruno,

> I can agree for "all computational states" of some (universal) machine.
> If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much 
> general. Imo.

I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states -> 
depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the difference would 
then only be that with phys the states where not turing emulable.

> that "17 is not a prime number". Those are false statements, but 
> assuming comp, your consciousness of the statement "17 is not a prime 
> number" will supervene on the TRUE statement that some machine have 
> access the state corresponding to your belief that 17 is not prime. The 
> true arithmetical statement on which consciousness will have to 
> supervene are just description of computation under the form : "the 
> machine XXX has got the state YYY from the input RRR".

Ok thanks - this is clear now.

> Maudlin assume PHYS and thus concludes there is a problem with MECH.
> I assume MECH and thus conclude there is a problem with PHYS.
> But the reasoning are equivalent.

Yes, that is how I understood it.

> All right? It seems to me you have everything to understand the seven 
> steps of the UDA. You are OK with 1...7.  My point was that if you 
> don't believe in arithmetical (as a particular case of philosophical) 
> zombie, the the Movie Graph Argument is not needed. If you don't 
> believe in what I would call physical zombie, and yet believe in 
> primary physical things, then the MGA is needed (step 8). All right?

I understand Step 8 as showing that if one accepts COMP, one has to 
associate conscious experience with abstract computations, not with 
physical implementations - by appeal to a thought experiment, which 
leaves me a bit queasy; but I tend to agree.

I still do not understand what an "arithmetical zombie" should be - do 
you mean a computational state which would not be conscious?

Now if I don't believe in arithmetical zombies, why would I not need 
step 8 to exclude the physical universe? I could dispute that 
arithemetics by itself without physical implementation has no 
consequence whatever, for instance.

Cheers,
Günther







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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hello  Günther,

>
> Hello Bruno,
>
>> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not 
>> conscious,
>> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
>> Thus I can conceive zombies.
>
> Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think 
> philosophical
> zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not
> inconceivable.

I agree. But I would call "your" zombie "physical zombie". Of course 
this is because I know the result of the reasoning!


>
>> Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if
>> I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act
>> in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could
>> depend what we put exactly in the term zombie.
>
> Ok, I agree with that.
>
>>> and here you clarify:
>>>
 If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would
 not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of 
 philosophical
 zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.
>
> Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin*
> - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true 
> and
>   step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than
> program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious?
>
>> So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are 
>> encodable
>> (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing
>> between numbers.
>
> Ok, I'm with you.
>
>> So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not
>> need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical
>> truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this
>> very discussion we have here and now.
>
> Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all
> states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but
> mentality.

I can agree for "all computational states" of some (universal) machine.
If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much 
general. Imo.



>
>> For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non
>> existence of zombie.
>
> Ok.
>
> What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with
> _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in
> line with a plenitude-like theory?
>
> False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for
> instance or whatever...)


OK. This I have to answer if you want you to understand the argument.
"False state" does not makes sense. Only "false proposition" or "false 
statement" makes sense.
So, in case, for example, you dream that you are Napoleon, or you dream 
that "17 is not a prime number". Those are false statements, but 
assuming comp, your consciousness of the statement "17 is not a prime 
number" will supervene on the TRUE statement that some machine have 
access the state corresponding to your belief that 17 is not prime. The 
true arithmetical statement on which consciousness will have to 
supervene are just description of computation under the form : "the 
machine XXX has got the state YYY from the input RRR".
If consciouness did supervene on true beliefs only, then all white 
rabbits would be eliminated at the start. OK? This point is important 
to proceed from UDA to Arithmetical UDA.




>
>>> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number
>>> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie
>>> come
>>> about? Can you give an example?
>>
>>
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right?
>
> Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences 
> thrown in)



So I repeat the key point. Consciousness supervene on computation, and 
computation are described by proof of true statement of arithmetic, 
even in the case of dream or error, which occur at a higher level of 
description. It is really the difference between "17 is not a prime 
number" (false statement) and "the machine got the state "I believe 17 
is not prime", which can be a true statement if the machine indeed 
believe 17 is not prime.





>
>> such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and 
>> would
>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>
> Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ -
> maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as
> causing a problem for _comp_



Both Maudlin (1989) and me (1988) shows :

(MECHANISM WRONG   OR   PHYSICALISM WRONG)

But (NOT A or NOT B) is equivalent with (A -> NOT B). and is equiavlent 
with (B -> NOT A).

So (NOT MECH or NOT PHYS) is equivalent with
MECH implies NOT PHYS,
and is equivalent again with
PHYS implies N

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Kory Heath]

On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.

I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to  
count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel  
Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't  
think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- 
automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is  
implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in  
philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for  
there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every  
physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think  
that's logically impossible.)

-- Kory


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> Hi Jason,
>
>
> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is
> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
> > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new
> > world/reality.
>
> I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6,
> is that you do survive there  like if it was teleportation. And in that
> context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five
> preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that
> if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that
> copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the
> virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you
> will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is
> 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's
> closer continuer identity theory fails with comp.


My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in
expecting your next observer moment work this way.  From a third person
perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as
you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not
experience all 3 locations at once.  I think this is where I disagree, you
_do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations
and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to
merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations.

This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a
4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being
in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from
past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future
states to the present.  The vast majority of information within our brain
state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent
past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our
true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of
birth to death.

This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into
believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing
to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current content
of their experience.  I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has
access to as a means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones
memories are not in the content of ones OM at any one time.

Jason


 I think the importance of a particular computational history in defining an
"observer moment" is not as important as memory/communication isolation.

The Universal Dovetailer shares a single computational history as one
well-defined short program, and it implements all possible observer moments.
 Yet would not all OM's it generates be considered the same since they share
a single computational history?  I think it is better to track the flow of
information that goes

(Experiencingo ne moment because of no communication from the future tothe
past, and very low bandwidth rate from the past to the present)  Surely if I
was duplicated to 100 locations (only one of which was Moscow), I could
wager $1 that I will not appear in Moscow, and 99 of my copies will be
richer but

One OM that travels across all OM's, the UD?  ...Share computational
history, same program, it is jsut that the information doesn't get linked
between them.



>
> If you get this, I guess you are ready to understand step 7.
> I would be pleased to know if you get the step 7. If everyone agree
> with step 7, we can proceed to step 8, which is a bit more difficult.
> In my older presentations (like my PhD thesis), I always begin with
> step 8, and I call it "the Movie Graph Argument". The older UDA was
> only 1...7. Only 1...7 shows that comp transform physics into a
> computer science probability calculus. The Movie Graph Argument singles
> out the difficulty to attach mind to matter, or consciousness to
> physical activity, oncer we *assume* the comp hyp. It is the Movie
> Graph Argument which shows that we don't have to run the UD in a
> concrete way.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Michael Rosefield]

Isn't a zombie equivalent to, say, a spreadsheet that doesn't really perform
the proper calculations, but produces all the right answers for all the data
and functions you happen to put in?

It seems like such an elaborate con-job is far more inefficient and
intensive (and pointlessly so) once you put it in a rich enough environment.
As someone probably once said, the quickest way to simulate the universe
accurately is to be the universe.

For me, consciousness is all about the simplification and unification of
experience/assessment/action into higher and higher abstractions - to deal
with a complicated world we have to make stories about it, and to deal with
other people doing the same thing we have to make extremely complicated and
self-referential stories. Consciousness is just the top layer, and sometimes
done after-the-fact, simply because the machinery doesn't know not to.

--
- Did you ever hear of "The Seattle Seven"?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.


2008/11/6 Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
> Hello Bruno,
>
> > More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious,
> > and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
> > Thus I can conceive zombies.
>
> Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical
> zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not
> inconceivable.
>
> > Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if
> > I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act
> > in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could
> > depend what we put exactly in the term zombie.
>
> Ok, I agree with that.
>
> >> and here you clarify:
> >>
> >>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would
> >>> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical
> >>> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.
>
> Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin*
> - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and
>  step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than
> program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious?
>
> > So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable
> > (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing
> > between numbers.
>
> Ok, I'm with you.
>
> > So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not
> > need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical
> > truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this
> > very discussion we have here and now.
>
> Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all
> states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but
> mentality.
>
> > For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non
> > existence of zombie.
>
> Ok.
>
> What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with
> _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in
> line with a plenitude-like theory?
>
> False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for
> instance or whatever...)
>
> >> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number
> >> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie
> >> come
> >> about? Can you give an example?
> >
> >
> > Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
> > life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
> > Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
> > times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right?
>
> Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in)
>
> >such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and
> would
> > constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
>
> Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ -
> maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as
> causing a problem for _comp_
>
> > If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is
>
> I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does
> not have mental states, but X has mental states.
>
> Best Wishes,
> Günther
>
> >
>

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Günther Greindl]

Hello Bruno,

> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, 
> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
> Thus I can conceive zombies.

Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical 
zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not 
inconceivable.

> Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if 
> I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act 
> in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could 
> depend what we put exactly in the term zombie.

Ok, I agree with that.

>> and here you clarify:
>>
>>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would
>>> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical
>>> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.

Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin* 
- but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and 
  step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than 
program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious?

> So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable 
> (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing 
> between numbers.

Ok, I'm with you.

> So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not 
> need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical 
> truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this 
> very discussion we have here and now.

Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all 
states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but 
mentality.

> For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non 
> existence of zombie.

Ok.

What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with 
_true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in 
line with a plenitude-like theory?

False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for 
instance or whatever...)

>> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number
>> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie 
>> come
>> about? Can you give an example?
> 
> 
> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real 
> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the 
> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of 
> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? 

Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in)

>such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would 
> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.

Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ - 
maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as 
causing a problem for _comp_

> If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is 

I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does 
not have mental states, but X has mental states.

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Günther,


> unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite
> busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to 
> pose
> a question (to Bruno):
>
>>> Which is why I think philosophical zombies
>>> are impossible.
>
> I also think they are impossible, and you (Bruno) have already hinted
> once that you do not think them impossible,


I don't think them impossible because I have seen such zombies!
Indeed I have seen a false policeman on some road, they are for slowing 
down some cars.
I don't attribute consciousness to cartoon policeman, so that they are 
zombies, at least when I am a failed by them.
More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, 
and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
Thus I can conceive zombies.
Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if 
I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act 
in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could 
depend what we put exactly in the term zombie.
I criticize sometimes Bohm Quantum mechanics by invoking the fact that 
the "wave without particles" is full of zombies.




> and here you clarify:
>
>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would
>> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical
>> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.
>
> Which arithemetical truths would correspond to philosophical zombies? I
> don't get this.


This is different. If I am a digital machine, the complete description 
and even emulation of the computations leading to my mental state, at 
the right level (which exists once we assume the comp hyp of course) is 
entirely encoded into prove of statement like the machine described by 
the number 43554500901655 (say) on imput 4545665450098987 (say) go to 
the state 67567689043. Such a description constitute a provable 
arithmetical truth (it is a typical Sigma_1 truth, actually a Sigma_0 
truth, meaning just it decidable.
So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable 
(and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing 
between numbers.
So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not 
need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical 
truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this 
very discussion we have here and now.
For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non 
existence of zombie.



>
> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number
> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie 
> come
> about? Can you give an example?


Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real 
life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the 
Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of 
times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a 
computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would 
constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is 
different (again we should then better define zombie). But this move is 
irrelevant *after* the MGA.

Best regards,

Bruno Marchal



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Jason,


Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :

> Bruno,
>
> Thanks I understand now.  I must have misread previous posts of yours 
> because I had thought you had said "if I = the world, then the world 
> is not turing-emulable", but what you are saying is that "if I = the 
> world and the world is not turing emulable then comp is false".  


Exactly. Thanks for acknowledging.


> Regarding step 6 I believe one's consciousness continues if they were 
> to "upload" their brain into a computer even if it necessitated the 
> destruction of their biological brain.  To me this is no different 
> logically from teleportation,

And that is all you need for going to the next step.


> although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is 
> entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the 
> computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new 
> world/reality.

I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, 
is that you do survive there  like if it was teleportation. And in that 
context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five 
preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that 
if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that 
copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the 
virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you 
will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is 
1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's 
closer continuer identity theory fails with comp.
If you get this, I guess you are ready to understand step 7.
I would be pleased to know if you get the step 7. If everyone agree 
with step 7, we can proceed to step 8, which is a bit more difficult. 
In my older presentations (like my PhD thesis), I always begin with 
step 8, and I call it "the Movie Graph Argument". The older UDA was 
only 1...7. Only 1...7 shows that comp transform physics into a 
computer science probability calculus. The Movie Graph Argument singles 
out the difficulty to attach mind to matter, or consciousness to 
physical activity, oncer we *assume* the comp hyp. It is the Movie 
Graph Argument which shows that we don't have to run the UD in a 
concrete way.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Jason Resch]

Bruno,
Thanks I understand now.  I must have misread previous posts of yours
because I had thought you had said "if I = the world, then the world is not
turing-emulable", but what you are saying is that "if I = the world and the
world is not turing emulable then comp is false".  Regarding step 6 I
believe one's consciousness continues if they were to "upload" their brain
into a computer even if it necessitated the destruction of their biological
brain.  To me this is no different logically from teleportation, although I
agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is entirely cut off
from causal effects of the physical world where the computer is running,
then you have also created an entirely new world/reality.

Jason

On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
>> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>>
>>
>>
> Bruno,
>
> I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is
> so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining "I" or "world", but I was
> hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain
> this.  In particular I do not follow how only one of "I" or "the world" can
> be computable, why not both?  Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds
> and all possible Is?
>
>
>
> Jason, People,
>
> Well I apologize because I have send the draft (brouillon) of my answer to
> Brent by error on the list. I intended to send it to my home computer so
> that I can make corrections before. But's ok.
>
>
> Here I was recalling the definition of "generalized brain": the portion of
> the universe that you have to emulate digitally for surviving in a comp
> teleportation.
> Some people indeed want to make consciousness supervening on the brain +
> some context (the world), and see that as an objection to the uda. but that
> is why I put such context in the "generalized brain", and the argument still
> go through, unless that generalized brainis supposed to be not turing
> emulable.
> The thought experiment per se is harder to perform (how to put the moon in
> the teleportation box for those who put the moon as part of their
> context-brain!), but when the DU is introduced we see that the "bigness of
> whatever is taken as a context" is  not relevant, as far as it is
> computable.
> COMP assumes that such a digital relatively relevant descriptive portion of
> universe exists (by definition), so if you put the moon or the entire cosmos
> in the definition of your brain, we are still under the comp assumption.
> Unless, of course, the moon or the context or world is assumed to be non
> turing emulable. In that case comp is false, because you are saying that
>
> -my real generalized brain (by definition the things on which your
> consciousness supervenes here and now) is equal to my organic brain in my
> skull + my body + the moon + the cat, and then you add
> - and my cat is non turing emulable,
>
> then of course comp is false, your generalized brain is not turing emulable
> (it works only the non turing emulable cat).
> This is simple logic (any difficulty here can only be explained by my poor
> english or something like that. Please tell me if you grasp what I try to
> say here. It is not particularly deep).
>
> The point of all this is that we can reason *despite* we cannot define "I"
> or "the world". Comp is just the bet that the I, the I that I feel, can be
> recovered by a third person "I" description, whatever it is, under the
> condition of belonging to the computable things locally. Brent seems to
> pretend that he is able to distinguish real and virtual reality.
>
> (Note that in a post to Brett Hall,  I explain tat we *can* do that in a
> relative way, but it takes a long time, and we have to survive through it
> before, and also it works only statistically.  Indeed quantum evidence
> gives, from a comp pov, such an evidence, I mean that we are in number
> matrix).
>
> What do you think of step six? Do you think you die, in step six?
> I use the generalized brain explicitly for preventing the move, for
> objecting the derivation, consciousness supervenes on brain + context.
>
> Brent, what if I send you regularly on mars  by teletransportation,
> assuming you are a fidel tourist of my Mars-teleportation company. yet
> during the year 2007 (but not 2008), due to budget restriction, I fail you,
> and send you to virtual mars. And then again on real mars after in 2008
> (better year!).
> You think this scenario is impossible in practice? If the comp level of
> substitution exist, I can fail you for any finite period of time, even
> without intervening directly on your brain memories (I need some high budget
> too for this of course).
>
> Sorry if I am unclear, but feel free all to ask for any clarifications,
>

Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Günther Greindl]

Hello,

unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite 
busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to pose 
a question (to Bruno):

>> Which is why I think philosophical zombies
>> are impossible.

I also think they are impossible, and you (Bruno) have already hinted 
once that you do not think them impossible, and here you clarify:

> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would 
> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical 
> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.

Which arithemetical truths would correspond to philosophical zombies? I 
don't get this.

I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number 
theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie come 
about? Can you give an example?

Cheers,
Gunther

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  
> wrote:
>
>
> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>
>
>
> Bruno,
>
> I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why  
> it is so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining "I" or "world",  
> but I was hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past  
> post which explain this.  In particular I do not follow how only one  
> of "I" or "the world" can be computable, why not both?  Does the UDA  
> not enumerate all possible worlds and all possible Is?


Jason, People,

Well I apologize because I have send the draft (brouillon) of my  
answer to Brent by error on the list. I intended to send it to my home  
computer so that I can make corrections before. But's ok.


Here I was recalling the definition of "generalized brain": the  
portion of the universe that you have to emulate digitally for  
surviving in a comp teleportation.
Some people indeed want to make consciousness supervening on the brain  
+ some context (the world), and see that as an objection to the uda.  
but that is why I put such context in the "generalized brain", and the  
argument still go through, unless that generalized brainis supposed to  
be not turing emulable.
The thought experiment per se is harder to perform (how to put the  
moon in the teleportation box for those who put the moon as part of  
their context-brain!), but when the DU is introduced we see that the  
"bigness of whatever is taken as a context" is  not relevant, as far  
as it is computable.
COMP assumes that such a digital relatively relevant descriptive  
portion of universe exists (by definition), so if you put the moon or  
the entire cosmos in the definition of your brain, we are still under  
the comp assumption. Unless, of course, the moon or the context or  
world is assumed to be non turing emulable. In that case comp is  
false, because you are saying that

-my real generalized brain (by definition the things on which your  
consciousness supervenes here and now) is equal to my organic brain in  
my skull + my body + the moon + the cat, and then you add
- and my cat is non turing emulable,

then of course comp is false, your generalized brain is not turing  
emulable (it works only the non turing emulable cat).
This is simple logic (any difficulty here can only be explained by my  
poor english or something like that. Please tell me if you grasp what  
I try to say here. It is not particularly deep).

The point of all this is that we can reason *despite* we cannot define  
"I" or "the world". Comp is just the bet that the I, the I that I  
feel, can be recovered by a third person "I" description, whatever it  
is, under the condition of belonging to the computable things locally.  
Brent seems to pretend that he is able to distinguish real and virtual  
reality.

(Note that in a post to Brett Hall,  I explain tat we *can* do that in  
a relative way, but it takes a long time, and we have to survive  
through it before, and also it works only statistically.  Indeed  
quantum evidence gives, from a comp pov, such an evidence, I mean that  
we are in number matrix).

What do you think of step six? Do you think you die, in step six?
I use the generalized brain explicitly for preventing the move, for  
objecting the derivation, consciousness supervenes on brain + context.

Brent, what if I send you regularly on mars  by teletransportation,  
assuming you are a fidel tourist of my Mars-teleportation company. yet  
during the year 2007 (but not 2008), due to budget restriction, I fail  
you, and send you to virtual mars. And then again on real mars after  
in 2008 (better year!).
You think this scenario is impossible in practice? If the comp level  
of substitution exist, I can fail you for any finite period of time,  
even without intervening directly on your brain memories (I need some  
high budget too for this of course).

Sorry if I am unclear, but feel free all to ask for any clarifications,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 11:10 AM, Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
>> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>>
>>
>>
> Bruno,
>
> I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is
> so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining "I" or "world", but I was
> hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain
> this.  In particular I do not follow how only one of "I" or "the world" can
> be computable, why not both?  Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds
> and all possible Is?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jason
>

Minor correction:  I meant "Universal Dovetailer" not the UDA.
Jason

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
>
> To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not
> turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
>
>
>
Bruno,

I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is
so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining "I" or "world", but I was
hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain
this.  In particular I do not follow how only one of "I" or "the world" can
be computable, why not both?  Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds
and all possible Is?

Thanks,

Jason

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Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 03-nov.-08, à 08:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> I have reservations about #6:  Consciousness is a process, but  it
> depends on a context.

That is why I use the notion of generalized brain. I take into account 
the possible need of a context. The argument would break only if you 
stipulate that the context cannot be captured digitally, but this would 
make the generalized brain non turing emulable, and this would mean 
comp is false. Recall that my point is that comp implies something, not 
that comp is true.



>  In the argument as to whether a stone is a
> computer, even a universal computer, the error is in ignoring that the
> computation in a computer has an interpretation which the programmer
> provides.

I don't see the relevance of this concerning the step #6.
I have never written nor indeed believed that a stone can be a computer.


>  If he can provide this interpretation to the processes within
> a stone, then indeed it would be a computer; but in general he can't.

I agree with this, but I don't see the relevance.


>  I think consciousness is similar; it is a process but it only has an
> interpretation as a *conscious* process within a context of perception
> and action within a world.

In step six, the context is taken into account. Your argument  will go 
through only if you think that the context is both needed integrally 
and is not turing emulable, But then comp is false.
Also consciousness makes sense only, strictly speaking, for the 
subject. If some direct access to a world was needed throughout, then 
even the experience of dream becomes impossible.


> Which is why I think philosophical zombies
> are impossible.

If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would 
not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical 
zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.



> But then, when you imagine reproducing someone's
> consciousness, in a computer and simulating all the input/output, i.e.
> all the context, then you have created a separate world in which there
> is a consciousness in the context of *that* world.  But it doesn't
> follow that it is a consciousness in this world.

To accept this I have to assume "I = the world", and that world is not 
turing-emulable. But then comp is false.



> The identification of
> things that happen in the computer as "He experiences this." depend on
> our interpretation of the computer program.  There is no inherent,
> ding-an-sich consciousness.

Here I disagree. This would entail that if you beat a child in a way 
such that nobody knows, then the child does not suffer.


>
> Your step #6 can be saved by supposing that a robot is constructed so
> that the duplicated consciousness lives in the context of our world, 
> but
> this does not support the extension to the UD in step #7.  To identify
> some program the UD is generating as reproducing someone's 
> consciousness
> requires an interpretation.

With comp the universal machine is the interpreter. Again you are 
telling me that comp is false.


> But an interpretation is a mapping between
> the program states and the real world states - so it presumes a real 
> world.

Then dreaming cannot be a conscious experience. But since the work of 
Laberge and Hearne, all brain physiologist accept this.
I am afraid you put something magical (non Turing emulable) in the 
world and in consciousness. This makes us non digital machine or 
entity.

>
> I have several problems with step #8.  What are consistent 1-histories?

This is needed for the AUDA (arithmetical translation of the UDA). The 
movie graph just explain that comp makes it impossible to attach 
consciousness to the physical activity of the running UD. It explains 
why we don't have to run the UD. Digital machines cannot distinguish 
physical computations from arithmetical computations.


> Can they be characterized without reference to nomological consistency?
> The reduction to Platonia seems almost like a reduction argument 
> against
> comp.

This is certainly possible, but up to now, nobody has been able to get 
a contradiction. In the seventies, some people pretend that I have 
refute comp by showing it entails many-worlds. At least since 
Everett-Feynman-Deutsch, people have abandon this idea (that many 
worlds = contradiction).



>  Except that comp was the assumption that one physical process can
> be replaced by another that instantiates the same physical relations.


No, comp implicates the notion of "me" or of "my consciousness". Comp 
is just the assumption that my consciousness is unchanged when my 
(generalized) brain is substituted by digital devices at some level of 
description.


>  I
> don't see how it follows from that there need not be an instantiation 
> at
> all and we can just assume that the timeless existence in Platonia is
> equivalent.

Well, it comes from the impossibility to attach consciopusness to the 
exclusively physical: that is the point of the movie graph argument 
(also