For the love of God can someone please unsubscribe me from this gobshite list?

[chris peck]

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AM6PR07MB499300ED9D5D848106569F1EDEE30%40AM6PR07MB4993.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com.

RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[chris peck]

Bruno

>> And someone asked JC, before the duplication, what do you expect to live. JC 
>> remarked that "you" is ambiguous. Oh, but you agreed that you will survive, 
>> so you expect to live some experience, no? Let me ask you this how to you 
>> evaluate the chance to see 0 on the paper after opening the drawer.

'You' is ambiguous *because* we agree that 'you' will survive. If we agreed 
'you' wouldn't survive then its meaning is clear. 'You' denotes just JC at 
Helsinki.

>> Surely, you can't be serious, as this is not a first experience. It is a 
>> list of first person experiences. "

Don't call me Shirley, and 'I will see 0 or I will see 1' is a list just as 
really as 'I will see 0 and I will see 1'. Whats your point?

>> After pushing the button, you will live only one realization of the 
>> experience just listed above.

This explicitly violates the agreement that 'you' survives in both rooms when 
duplicated. Also, its when you phrase things this way that it becomes clear 
that you are violating 'comp' because it is equivolent to saying that 'you' 
survives in only one branch, that despite the copy being made at the right 
substitution level in both rooms, something else is carrying over to one or the 
other room that is not contained in the description. You're language makes it 
clear that you believe, implicitly if not explicitly, that the description is 
incomplete.

>> you really maintain that the result of JC opening the drawer will be "0 and 
>> 1"?

yes in the following sense. I survive in both rooms. In both rooms I open the 
drawer. So I will 'live' the experience of 0 and I will 'live' the experience 
of 1.

>> So JC predicts "0 and 1". Then I interview JC-0. Did you observe "0 and 1". 
>> Yes, JC told me. 
How come? JC -1 has not yet been reconstituted, may be ... 

Perhaps the question that needs to be asked of JC-H is whether he can expect to 
see 0 and 1 at precisely the same moment? Is that the question you are trying 
to formulate? 

Also, you have to be clear about how 'you' operates. It can track 'you' 
backwards in time from JC-0 to JC-H and from JC-1 to JC-H, but it doesn't work 
well tracking duplicates across space at a particular time. So JC-0 can't track 
to JC-1. So, for example whilst it is true that JC-0-'you' is not JC-1-'you', 
both are JC-H-'you'. In otherwords, because JC-0 and JC-1's experiences are 
exclusive relative to one another, they are not exclusive relative to JC-H. 
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2015 19:40:16 +0200


On 31 Aug 2015, at 23:58, John Clark wrote:On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 4:30 AM, 
Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>>​Bruno Marcha​l  was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience 
when you do an experience in physics​ ​where "you" has been duplicated and thus 
making that personal pronoun ambiguous.
​>​I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before the 
duplication.
​And the question is about what one and only one thing will happen to YOU after 
YOU ​has been duplicated and becomes TWO. In other words the question was about 
gibberish.  
​I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't prove 
it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do any 
better. ​
​> ​If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter.
​If we're dealing in philosophy and not everyday conversation and it my body is 
a machine then I don't know what "choice" ​ ​means. And if my body is not a 
machine I still don't know what "choice" means.​ ​> ​You beg the question with 
respect to step 3.
​There may be a question mark but there is no question. And I have no answer 
because gibberish has no answer.  ​​>> ​​When I don't know I'm not afraid to 
say I don't know. ​​> ​Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument 
that there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a 
simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't believe in.

​A computer can make a simulated hurricane but because it uses only numbers to 
build the ​storm​ and numbers (probably) have no physical properties the 
simulated hurricane would always lack something the real hurricane had, the 
physical ability to get the computer wet.

However if it turned out that you're right and math is more fundamental than 
physics and numbers have everything physics has and more then a clever enough 
programmer could write a program that would cause the computer to actually get 
wet. I'm very skeptical that such a program is possible but I can't prove it's 
impossible so maybe you're right.  

​>> ​​No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody​ has ever made one 
single calculation without the use of physical hardware
​> ​How do you know that?​ 
​Because every time a calculation ​is made something physical in ​a ​computer 
changes and if I change something physical in a 

RE: Idiot Test

[chris peck]

 Once there are experience, we can only have partial consensus. Now, I know 
 better salvia than DMT, and the resemblance of the experience is striking. 
 It goes like
-30% feel the feminine presence (called lady D, or virgin Maria, etc..).
-75% feel the rotation/vortex
-67% feel the alternate reality/realities
-10% feel the copy/reset effect 
-49% feel the home effect,
etc.



These are not the kind of 'metaphysical messages' I was referring to. These are 
just phenomena that similar physical systems perturbed by the same physical 
substance might be expected to experience. Take the rotation/vortex. Theres no 
question its an impressive sight and far from being ephemeral seems utterly 
immersive and made of physical stuff. On weaker psychedelics you get a hint of 
it, but with DMT or high doses of Psilocybin etc, you are thrown into the 
vortex as if it were as real as any perception of the real world. On the one 
hand you could imagine that you are genuinely travelling through an alien 
geometry and architecture, and many people who 'smoalk' do. On the other hand 
you might conclude that the neural apparatus of perception is just being 
tickled in the same way by the same chemical, and many people who 'smoalk' 
think that instead.

The fact that the imagery can be accounted for and predicted could be evidence 
for a brute identity theory.

https://plus.maths.org/content/uncoiling-spiral-maths-and-hallucinations

The point being that the brute phenomena itself doesn't lend itself easily to 
one conclusion or its opposite. Strassman thinks DMT allows the mind to escape 
'consensus reality' to another realm. Sand thinks the visions are just a 
psychedelic trick and that the real value of psychedelics is in unshackling 
people from decades of psychological baggage so that they can re-evaluate their 
moral and social worth.

The one feeling that seems to get repeated more than any other is a feeling of 
greater empathy towards and understanding of other people and a more profound 
love for oneself, and that feeling, I think, stems from a greater appreciation 
of ones own fallibilty...self doubt.

So, to cut to the chase, when a thread appears claiming the benefit of a 
psychedelic is to work out who the idiots are, when it is suggested that the 
substance be used in such a miserly way, I can't help but feel the people 
suggesting that are the ones who have missed the message

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Idiot Test
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 15:27:29 +0200


On 13 Aug 2015, at 13:15, Kim Jones wrote:
OK - so the inability to be sure if someone is an idiot is just as fraught as 
trying to be sure that they are intelligent, I hear you say. 
I was saying that idiocy is easy to judge, but you can also deduce impossible 
to assert (of oneself or some-else). But we can see, and see from time to time, 
person behaving like idiots, even children!
intelligence is often used for flattery or vanity.idiot is often use as an 
insult (usual with more vulgar synonyms).
But it is better to not encapsulate people with such terms. Sometimes people 
believe it, making them into idiot in my protagorean sense. That will not 
help them.
It refers to character, and I think it is related to some amount of attention 
from the parents, which get it from their parents, etc.



Sounds like the ideal situation doesn't it! Tends to suggest that people rise 
only to the heights of their incompetence at understanding whether they or 
others are intelligent or stupid! So we are all stupid and the sand on the 
beach is intelligent. This is becoming very Smullyan, this bit...
So if we adopt your simple criteria of the repetition of stupidities as idiocy 
and the silence of the pebble as intelligence, it seems the human race is 
suffering a terrible toll of redundancy. I hope yours is in fact the correct 
definition because it means we can do something about the problem of latency 
with respect to the evolution of human consciousness. I mean - the idiots (if 
there be such) really are holding us back. They are in all the top jobs. 

They are more dishonest than idiots, I think, a bit like we can suspect John 
Clark to be when reading some of its post (where we see he got the point, but 
still deny it or mock it).
We might put dishonesty in idiocy. I don't know if this would be useful. 
Robbing a bank does not really look like a mistake, even if it makes money 
mistakenly representing work. That's a whole debate.


They cannot not be idiots so where does that leave us? Flexibility and 
tolerance and reform are not  supported by the mental software idiots use 
throughout their lives. 
But that is normal, given our long evolution. At least we have a big cortex 
making us able to do reasoning and thought experiences ...  Insects are much 
more wired, but that does not make them necessarily idiots. It take a lot of 
neurons and reflexive ability to be an idiot, and the more we are intelligent, 
the 

RE: Idiot Test

[chris peck]

Here's a thread with all the list's alpha-male geniuses mocking someone. Here's 
me, the village idiot, convinced they all pass their own idiot test with flying 
colours. lol.

I mean if the test involves understanding the implications of psychedelic drugs 
then you all just failed to do that. A monumental fail to Kim and Bruno, 
particularly. There's absolutely bugger-all metaphysically that people who have 
taken these drugs can agree on. Sod Salvia, even DMT and the mighty 5meo-DMT 
fail to deliver a consistent metaphysical message to those who take it, and 
'psycho-nauts' effectively fall into two camps with Strassman-ites on the one 
hand claiming these drugs open the mind to real alien hyper-spaces (roll eyes), 
and the Sand-ites on the other believing they are just tools to explore one's 
own mind. But there's no consensus.

If there is any general consensus about psychedelics it is a 
psychological/moral one. That we should have a healthy sense of self-doubt 
about our own convictions.

You guys are half way there with a healthy sense of doubt about everyone elses 
convictions but none for your own. 

Are you sure you weren't just chewing mint?

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Idiot Test
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 17:21:19 +0200


On 12 Aug 2015, at 01:06, Kim Jones wrote:
On 11 Aug 2015, at 10:26 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:No doubt 
that it would be interesting to look at. Salvia has been called a cure of ... 
atheism (the non agnostic one 'course). Not that it makes you believe in 
anything new, it just shows reasons to doubt more, and to recognize we are more 
ignorant that we would have been able to conceive before.
Bruno
 
Well, that’s it, surely. The Idiot Test administered in this way has as a basic 
assumption that only what might be called The True Public Idiot is by nature 
incapable of changing or modifying his stated beliefs. A hallmark of idiocy is 
absolute certainty. In this light, Richard Dawkins for example, qualifies 
pretty much as a TPI.



Absolute public certainties is madness.





The other thing about this possible theological definition of ‘idiocy’ is: you 
will never meet an idiot who thinks the test was run fairly. This person has to 
accept that there is now an institution-backed sanction against them due to 
someone ticking a box marked ‘idiot’ next to their name. Still, they can 
justify themselves by saying how ‘in the past’ they changed their mind over 
certain matters when people whose opinions they could respect convinced them 
otherwise. You might like to check this assertion by interviewing his mother or 
sister instead.

Idiocy is only an unfortunate self-destructive type of mentality. Most idiot 
are actually just wounded people, but in this case, knowing that thus not 
necessarily help.
(Keep in mind that I distinguish intelligent from competent, and thus 
idiot from incompetent. Competence is domain dependent and can be evaluated 
by test or exams. Idiocy and Intelligence does not admit definition, and we can 
agree, or not, on some axiomatics. 
And I like to interpret Dt, that is ~Bf,  by intelligent and Bf by idiot. You 
can read Bf by I assert stupiditiesGödel's second theorem becomes: If I don't 
assert stupidities then I don't assert that I don't assert stupidities. 
Intelligence is the mother of all protagorean virtues, which cannot be tought 
by words but only with example, and typically when you assert them about 
yourself you kill them, and when you assert the negation, you aggravate your 
case.Modesty, or humity of scientific-mindness are important virtue which are 
not protogorean, although they can have protagorean interpretation.




You will never, therefore, catch a certified public idiot in the act of 
changing his beliefs.
I am not sure that there exists something or someone like a certified public 
idiot. 



 This is because he has never changed his beliefs in the past and will never in 
the future - not because you are unlucky in the matter of catching him at it. 
The ticking of the box marked ‘idiot’ is a truly serious business. True (ie 
incorrigible) Public Idiots are actually quite rare. 
I don't believe that exist, but emotions can make people behaving like idiot 
and indeed it typically last. It is the problem of the lies. The longer time a 
person lie, the harder it is to admit it, and the graver the consequence *can* 
be.


Even David Icke had to kind of admit that he probably wasn’t the reincarnation 
of JC…proving therefore that he was capable of recognising the lie he was 
telling himself.
I don't know David Icke. 




This leads to further refinements of the concept:
1. An idiot is one who lies about core matters - but only to himself. 
I will think about that. It is complex, and dangerous because it is both 
counter-intuitive, and probably in the G* minus G part.



Others long since realised he enjoys playing this game with himself and that 
any other setup would entail 

RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[chris peck]

@ Pierz

  If he refuses to  
 acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  
 fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  
 effect.

but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when duplicates 
end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? So, Im not sure he 
feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never seen Bruno respond 
adequately to that point. 

All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with step 
3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 person could 
experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I thought it was 
odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up what he had 
actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just lying. lying out of 
their lazy fat academic arses! lol. He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have 
to be careful to read what John says rather than rely what Bruno says John 
says. The two can be very different.

Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700
From: pier...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again



On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote:



 Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that  

 started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep  

 taking the troll bait Bruno?



Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the  

person who have a problem with this are troll.







 JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he  

 understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy.



See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this,  

but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the  

goal of answering) that he is a troll.











 He just loves tormenting you.



Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say I was wrong?



I try to understand such bad faith as this might make the difference  

between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next  

century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner  

we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans.







 You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves  

 deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI?  

 I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to  

 multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of  

 the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to  

 acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then  

 fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that  

 effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of  

 its error.



John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between  

accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it  

is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on  

the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the  

next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows  

prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of.



Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago,  

and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist.  

But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some  

(non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not  

exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40  

years) 
I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and 
you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. You're still trying to 
deal with your hurt. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's 
considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone 
sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, 
somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. 
John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm 
give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person 
who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut 
down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. so I still try 
to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot  

in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness,  

to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and  

verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is  

probably just unwillingness.

Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is  

just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms  

that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how  

obscurantist people can be on this subject.

Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, 

RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

[chris peck]

@ Bruno

  You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. 

 Im not sure thats true. True, there is a fair amount of uncritical support, 
but from what I see people kind of give you the benefit of the doubt at step 3 
agreeing that there is something wishy washy about it. People kind of accept 
there would be a continuity of consciousness from H to W and from H to M, and 
they believe that is the important thing, then they blindly succer into the 
idea that because W and M only see one city this has some baring on how H 
should calculate his 'expectancies'. They make a fundamental and understandable 
error, and you push them very hard to make that error.

 The truth is that if you knew you were going to be duplicated you would bet on 
W very differently than if you know you have been duplicated and havent opened 
the door yet. Knowing you have been duplicated is a very different situation 
from knowing you are going to be. 

I can imagine my subjective view evolving seamlessly from H to W, and also 
imagine my view evolving seamlessly from H to M. But to ask which one will be 
me asks me to suppose that one evolution over the other is THE valid evolution 
of the subjective view. But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the 
other. So to bet one which one I will be is a stupid thing to do. You try to 
get away from that fact by torturing semantics. You ask 'which one will you 
live to be' and what have you, but really, the question is just silly. BUT, 
They are both *A* valid evolution. So it is possible to talk sensibly about 
them both being valid evolutions of a 1P view and that H can expect both.

You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of M, and 
clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE 1p of M are THE 
1p of H. 

Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400
Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​​ ​For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John 
Clark humbly requests that ​Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in 
future correspondence with John Clark: 
1) Substitute John Clark for the personal pronoun you.
​ ​We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark 
and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.
​Since ​Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in 
complying to the request of substituting  John Clark for the personal pronoun 
you.
​​​ ​it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first 
person experience ​​ ​There are two ​first person experiences, which one is 
Bruno talking about? 
​ ​We have shown that P((W  ~M) v (M  ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason 
that P(coffee) = 1.​ ​So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the 
protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after 
pushing the button. The refers to that unique experience. unique from the 
1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* 
unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it 
makes sense to refer to it.
​Well now that's all very nice but ​John Clark still has one question, ​there 
are two ​first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about?
​ ​You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing 
the button. ​ ​Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said 
clear as a bell that  depends on who you is. John Clark would know that in 
the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see 
Washington.  [...] And I [John Clark]​ ​also knew which one would be which, I 
knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man 
would get his photons from Washington. [...]​ ​what Bruno Marchal  would expect 
John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or 
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the 
unique feeling of self.
 ​ ​You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I 
think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in 
Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live 
as first person experience?
​That depends on who you is. John Clark  would ​expect​ that in the future 
the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. 
And John Clark ​​would ​also know ​which one would be which, the Moscow Man 
would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from 
Washington. ​W​hat Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor 
cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do 
with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self.​​ ​You 
are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

@ Bruno

 Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal 
 identity is not a Leibnizian notion.

You need to focus on what these factors govern:

1) international tariffs.

2) the state of the Chinese economy.

3) international demand for tea grown in china.


btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were 
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the 
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly. 

look, I can supply you with arguments but I can't understand them for you. You 
have to do that bit. Personally, I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless 
you try a bit harder.


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200


On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno

[John]Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a flat 
out logical contradiction.


[Bruno]  Where? 

The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you 
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats 
just logic 101.

Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity 
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which 
is not Leibnizian. Let  Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational, 
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a 
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and 
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy. 
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The 
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure 
simple extensional relation between numbers.





But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:

{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.

{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according 
to Bruno.

No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to 
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the 
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person 
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.





Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept 
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the 
difference in truth value come from?  
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I 
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it 
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot 
use the Leibniz identity rule.



you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are 
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see 
only one city. 

You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective, 
first person, experience. 




This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions

It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's 
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person 
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in 
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in 
M (as both copies confirms after).



 but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.

Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding 
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to 
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is 
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they 
each got one bit of information.
Bruno




From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200


On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​​ ​Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber 
​is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal 
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical 
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened 
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it 
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

@ Bruno

 Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal 
 identity is not a Leibnizian notion.

You need to focus on what these factors govern:

1) international tariffs.

2) the state of the chinese economy.

3) international demand for tea grown in china.


btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were 
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the 
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.

I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to do 
that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200


On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno

[John]Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a flat 
out logical contradiction.


[Bruno]  Where? 

The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you 
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats 
just logic 101.

Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity 
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which 
is not Leibnizian. Let  Arthur believe p be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational, 
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a 
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and 
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy. 
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The 
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure 
simple extensional relation between numbers.





But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:

{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.

{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according 
to Bruno.

No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to 
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the 
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person 
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.





Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept 
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the 
difference in truth value come from?  
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I 
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it 
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot 
use the Leibniz identity rule.



you can not equal person who remembers Helsinki, otherwise you are 
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that you will see 
only one city. 

You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective, 
first person, experience. 




This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions

It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's 
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person 
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in 
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in 
M (as both copies confirms after).



 but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.

Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding 
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to 
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is 
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they 
each got one bit of information.
Bruno




From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200


On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​​ ​Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber 
​is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal 
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical 
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened 
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it 
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was 
opened the 2 bodies were

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

@ John

  ​In MWI You is the only thing that the laws of physics ​allow Quentin 
 Anciaux to observe that is organized in a Johnkclarkian way ... With 
 duplicating chamber stuff if the bet was you will see Moscow I don't know 
 how to resolve the bet because I don't know who you is.

MWI is decoherent where Bruno is incoherent?



From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 03:04:56 +




@ Bruno

 [John]Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a 
flat out logical contradiction.


[Bruno]  Where? 

The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you 
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats 
just logic 101.

But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:

{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.

{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according 
to Bruno.

Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept 
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the 
difference in truth value come from?  you can not equal person who remembers 
Helsinki, otherwise you are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true 
and false that you will see only one city. 

This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions but is a direct 
consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200


On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​​ ​Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber 
​is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal 
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical 
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened 
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it 
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was 
opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so 
that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.   
​ ​That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the 
Helsinki guy.
​After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 
bodies but still only one Helsinki guy​ ​because they are identical, ​when the 
door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the 
Helsinki guy​ because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in 
Helsinki, but they are no longer each other ​because they diverged as soon as 
the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, 
but please explain how it is contradictory.  

There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M 
refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge. 
For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for 
the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that 
they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is 
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is, 
well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an 
intellectual belief.



 ​ ​There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
​You is both guys. 
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the 
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in 
Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington 
having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity 
experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from 
the push+self-localization measurement.




One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see 
only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door, 
and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is 
satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W 
and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience 
of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience. 
Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and 
M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.



 ​ Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a flat out 
logical contradiction. 

Where? it is W  M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to 
the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None 
contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.



I said it 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

@ Bruno

 [John]Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a 
flat out logical contradiction.


[Bruno]  Where? 

The problem arises because if You = person who remembers Helsinki then you 
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats 
just logic 101.

But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:

{You} will see only one city --- true according to Bruno.

{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city. --- false according 
to Bruno.

Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept 
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the 
difference in truth value come from?  you can not equal person who remembers 
Helsinki, otherwise you are contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true 
and false that you will see only one city. 

This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions but is a direct 
consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200


On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​​ ​Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber 
​is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal 
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical 
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened 
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it 
can never be determined if he won the bet because as soon as the door was 
opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so 
that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.   
​ ​That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the 
Helsinki guy.
​After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2 
bodies but still only one Helsinki guy​ ​because they are identical, ​when the 
door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the 
Helsinki guy​ because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in 
Helsinki, but they are no longer each other ​because they diverged as soon as 
the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange, 
but please explain how it is contradictory.  

There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M 
refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge. 
For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for 
the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that 
they could not have predicted that result, except by betting W v M, which is 
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience W and M is, 
well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an 
intellectual belief.



 ​ ​There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
​You is both guys. 
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the 
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in 
Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington 
having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity 
experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from 
the push+self-localization measurement.




One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But you will see 
only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door, 
and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because coffee is 
satisfied in both place. But W or M is also satisfied in both place, and W 
and M is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience 
of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience. 
Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and 
M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.



 ​ Bruno Marchal​ is correct, that is not ambiguous, ​that is a flat out 
logical contradiction. 

Where? it is W  M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to 
the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None 
contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.



I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal​ wants the words you will 
only see one city to be true Bruno Marchal​ is going to have to change the 
meaning of the personal pronoun you ; 
I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question is about 
the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree that there is a 
divergence, so I guess you understood that one write in the diary W, and the 
other write M. Those are what makes the divergence to exist. I 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

Quentin

 Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? 

we've done this sketch before...and John Clarke just did the same sketch with 
you hours ago...Why do you need things repeated to you so much?

David Wallace, a proponent of MWI at Oxford University, puts it this way with 
regards to Schrodinger's Cat:

We're not really sure how probability makes any sense in Many Worlds Theory. 
So the theory seems to be a theory which involves deterministic branching: if I 
ask what should I expect in the future the answer is I should with 100% 
certainty expect to be a version of David who sees the cat alive and in 
addition I should expect with 100% certainty to be a version of David who sees 
the cat dead.

What Wallace does is tackle incoherence head on. Does he over come it? Im not 
brainy enough to say. But I am brainy enough to see that he doesn't take the 
Bruno-Quentin approach of praying the problem will go away by pretending it 
doesn't exist.


Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 08:48:51 +0200
Subject: RE: A riddle for John Clark
From: allco...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com



Le 23 juil. 2015 05:09, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com a écrit :



 Quentin





  Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so 
  probability should also be one



 Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability 
 coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were 
 difficult to marry... 

Then you're refuting MWI as not being able to correctly renders the 
probabilities,  right? 
Is measuring spin up under MWI has a probability of one or 0.5 under MWI? 
Quentin 



 

 Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark

 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 From: meeke...@verizon.net

 Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700





 On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:





 On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:



 On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



   So maybe one could see W AND W the same way I can see my computer 
 screen AND my dog - just by attending to one or the other.





 You will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in 
 Washington. You can use a tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but 
 unless you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains, and fuse 
 the limbic system, by comp, the two original persons have become two 
 persons, having each its unique experience. That follows from mechanism, 
 and so P(W xor M) = 1, and P(W  M) = 0, as no one can open door in 
 Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the first person 
 experience.





 It follows from physics. 





 We don't know that.





 Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You will 
 need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party in Washington.



 We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement locally 
 universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then we arrive at the 
 computationalist difficulties. Physics assume a brain/mind link which has to 
 be justified, and the UDA shows the change we have to introduce. 





 But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at different 
 locations do not experience both locations - their minds are separate because 
 their brains are.  If that is more than just an assumption it is because it 
 is relying on the physical basis of mind.  If you reject the physical basis 
 of mind then you might expect the duplicates to share one mind.



 Brent









 But does it follow from UD computations?





 It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it is testable. 

 Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need to dig deeper in 
 computer science.



 Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts, I think you were 
 OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I think Bruce Kellet has also 
 some problem there. That can only be more intersting than the nonsense about 
 step 3 that we can hear those days.



 Bruno











 Brent



 -- 

 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.

 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.





 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/







 -- 

 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.

 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

 For more

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

Quentin

 Then under MWI, same thing you're garanteed to see all results, so 
 probability should also be one

Deterministic branching leads to trouble rendering the idea of probability 
coherent. Go figure! Who would ever have guessed determinism and chance were 
difficult to marry... 

Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
From: meeke...@verizon.net
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2015 16:25:00 -0700


  

  
  
On 7/22/2015 12:08 AM, Bruno Marchal
  wrote:




  
On 21 Jul 2015, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:


  
  
On 7/21/2015 10:30 AM, Bruno
  Marchal wrote:



  
  So maybe
one could see W AND W the same way I can see my
computer screen AND my dog - just by attending to
one or the other.

  
  
  

  
  You will need a long neck to attend a conference in
Moscow, and a party in Washington. You can use a
tele-vision system, and communicate by SMS, but unless
you build a new corpus callosum between the two brains,
and fuse the limbic system, by comp, the two original
persons have become two persons, having each its unique
experience. That follows from mechanism, and so P(W xor
M) = 1, and P(W  M) = 0, as no one can open door in
Moscow, and see some other city in the direct way of the
first person experience.



It follows from
  physics.  




We don't know that. 
  



Then why did you assert the necessity of a physical connection: You
will need a long neck to attend a conference in Moscow, and a party
in Washington.




  
We just assume that the physics is rich enough to implement
  locally universal machine, so that comp make sense, but then
  we arrive at the computationalist difficulties. Physics assume
  a brain/mind link which has to be justified, and the UDA shows
  the change we have to introduce. 


  



But you have effectively asserted that the duplicate persons at
different locations do not experience both locations - their minds
are separate because their brains are.  If that is more than just an
assumption it is because it is relying on the physical basis of
mind.  If you reject the physical basis of mind then you might
expect the duplicates to share one mind.



Brent




  









  But does it follow from UD
  computations?






It should, (at step 7 and 8) and the point is only that it
  is testable. 
Up to now, it is working well. But to explain this, we need
  to dig deeper in computer science.



Are you OK with the steps 0-6? 0-7? From your other posts,
  I think you were OK. So we can perhaps come back on step 8. I
  think Bruce Kellet has also some problem there. That can only
  be more intersting than the nonsense about step 3 that we can
  hear those days.



Bruno












   

  Brent

 
  
  
  -- 

  You received this message because you are subscribed to the
  Google Groups Everything List group.

  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from
  it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

  Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

  For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


  
  

   
  
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  

  
  

  -- 

  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
  Groups Everything List group.

  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
  send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

  Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

  For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.




  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

 Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person 
 experience.

Obviously. if I could experience M and W simultaneously they would not be 
exclusive by definition . 

If anyone besides you thinks I would argue any different they should look 
again. I argued that in worlds with duplication machines I can expect my future 
to involve numerous mutually exclusive perspectives. That isn't the same.

The probability of me seeing Moscow from a first person perspective after 
duplication is governed by two things which have nothing to do with 1p or 3p 
perspectives: whether or not, prior to duplication, I am justified in thinking 
the person post duplication will be me ... and your set up insists upon 
this and whether at least one duplicate will be in Moscow and your set up 
also guarantees this. Neither of these statements are dependent on perspective. 
Tegmark's bird and frog would agree on both. But nevertheless, it follows 
directly from these two statements that the probability of me seeing Moscow 
would be 1. Its just guaranteed by your set up and the way you define your 
terms. 

The specter of chance in step 3 stems from the idea of there being 1 person and 
two cities. But that is an incomplete description of the set up. There is 1 
person and then that person in each city. You are not betting on a flicked coin 
you are placing bets on red and black and then spinning a roulette wheel.

Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 18:02:58 -0400
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On Tue, Jul 21, 2015  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​ ​Two mutually exclusive first person experiences cannot be a first person 
experience.

​They can if the first person experience has ​been duplicated ​because that's 
what the word duplicated means.But of course ICT1PWT3P,
 ​ ​So I guess this is just the traditional John Clark's confusion between the 
1-1 and 3-1 views.
​Yep, as you've pointed out many many MANY times, all the problems with your 
theory and all the mysteries​ of the universe can be solved by ICT3PWT1P. 
​ ​To explain the error here, sometimes I imagine a guy who win a price: going 
to Mars, but the law of his country forbid self-annihilation, and so he can 
only be copied and pasted on Mars.​
​Why is it that in all such thought ​experiments it's always the original's 
viewpoint that is followed and never the copies?   ​
​ ​--No problem he said, I expect to live both experiences
No problem​,​ I expect to live both experiences​ provided that I means 
whoever remembers being ​in Helsinki right now. And what else could I mean?
 
​ ​he go in the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. But the ​copy​ on 
​Mars​ is disappointed, because when he opened the door​ and sees only Mars.​ 
in front on me on Earth,  
​S​o he go​es​ in​to​ the copy machine, is read, and pasted on Mars. ​And​ the 
​copy​ on ​Mars​ is ​not ​disappointed when​  ​ ​​he​​ (somebody who 
remembers being in Helsinki) opened the door​ and he sees only Mars and no 
sign of Earth​ because that is exactly what heexpected to happen.  ​If ​Bruno 
Marchal​ does not like that fact then ​​Bruno Marchal​ is going to need to 
change the meaning of he.
​​ He asked: did the copy occur? We told him that yes his copy is on Mars.
He asked: did the ​original survive​? We told him that yes his ​original​ is 
on ​Earth.​
​ ​he realized that the one staying on Erath, will just not experience the 
adventure on Mars. 
​Not being a complete imbecile the copy realized that the original on Earth 
​​w​ill just not experience the adventure on Mars. 
​ ​He can intellectually conceive that he survived on ​Mars​ through that 
doppelganger, but that is a meagre consolation 
​Although that is what he expected to happen when he diverged because 
that's what diverged means.​ 
 ​ ​If he repeat that experience, the probability that he ​[...]​
 A example of personal pronoun addiction​.​ 
​​ ​S​ee above.

​Why? ​
​ ​Let us read the diary.

​Why?​  
​ ​In Helsinki he wrote I expect to have both experiences in the first person 
sense.
​And Mr.I did indeed have both experiences in the first person sense, for proof 
of that just ask the two people who call themselves Mr. I.   
​ ​In Moscow, well, he sees only Moscow

​Another example of personal pronoun addiction​.​ 
​ ​and so conclude that he was wrong​.​
​And John Clark concludes that he doesn't know what he means. ​  
​ ​(even if he sees a video showing that he has successfully been 
reconstituted in Washington; but he cannot feel the W experience
​Not true, for proof just ask a Mr. He.   A Mr. He who says I ​feel the W ​ 
​experience​​ can always be found. 
​ ​even Clark admits, there are two streams of consciousness,
​Well of course there are two streams of consciousness​ after the duplication 
​because HE​ ​has been duplicated and that's what duplicated ​means. 
But of course ICT1PWT3P,
​  John K Clark​
  






-- 

You received this message 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

 the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his 
 experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one 
 city among W and M, i.e. W or M.

nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of 
being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, 
all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If 
he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a 
duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double 
expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows 
from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. 
It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, 
particularly while he is in  Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to 
this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will 
be right. 

Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W  M) = 1.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200


On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote:On Sun, Jul 19, 2015  Bruno Marchal 
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​ T​he probability of he (or anyone, actually)  *experiencing* one and only 
one city is one.
​If you want that statement to be true then he can't mean somebody who 
remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what he 
means to something else. ​ But of course ICT1PWT3P, 

Not at all. he means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the 
question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, 
and thus his experience content, which can only be seeing one city among W and 
M, i.e. W or M.


​ ​Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been 
completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki 
before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door.
​OK, he will say one city, Moscow. ​And he will say one city, Washington. 
In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the 
content of each of those experience.



So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then he saw 2 cities. 
Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has 
to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that 
after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities 
at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are 
independent, so ...).



​If you want that statement to be false then he can't mean somebody who 
remembers being a man in Helsinki, 
On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must 
interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W 
v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W  M) = 0.
I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an 
imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism.




you're going to have to change what he means to something else. ​ But of 
course ICT1PWT3P, 

Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine.

 
​ ​From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate,
​If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to him after the 
people duplicator has been ​turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless 
it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course 
ICT1PWT3P, 
The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The 
question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W 
and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy.


 ​ 
 ​ ​The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, 
about their experience
​I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the 
expectation, two are required.
Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the W v M 
expectation, and both confirms W  M is never felt. The W  M does not even 
make sense for a first person content of self-localization. W  M is 
evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those 
first person experience.

 Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do 
with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. 

Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the 
duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when 
opening the door, and thus the W or M is confirmed, and the W  M is 
refuted. For both of them.
Bruno


But of course ICT1PWT3P, 

  John K Clark
   ​ 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post 

RE: A riddle for John Clark

[chris peck]

 Simple comp predicts that in W, the H-guy opens the door and sees only W and 
 ~M (as those letters refers to the first person experience, not the 
 intellectual belief), and that in M, the H-guy opens the door and sees only 
 M and ~W. Both concludes that P(W  M) was 0, and know better, now 
 (hopefully).



Nah. The Helsinki guy predicts that he will see both cities and that 
encompasses the prediction that both his duplicates will individually see only 
one. The fact neither duplicate will see two cities doesn't effect Helsinki 
guy's expectancies. They can not be in two places at once, but through the 
magic of duplication Helsinki guy will be. He expects to be both of his future 
selves even though they would not expect to be each other. There is no 
contradiction here as Clark has pointed out with excruciating and what must 
amount to inhuman patience over many many years. Neither duplicate would 
conclude that P(W  M) was 0 for their mutual ancestor and the fact they only 
see one city wouldn't be considered by either of them to be evidence that he 
was wrong. Its painfully obvious you have confused P(W||M)(WM) with P(H)(WM) 
and this is about P(H)(WM). 1p 3p 1p-3p 3p-1p or even no pee pee. 

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 19:34:18 +0200


On 15 Jul 2015, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Jul 15, 2015  Bruno Marchal 
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

​ ​ ​one place plus​ ​one place equals two places. ​
​​But a place is a 3p notion.
​I is 1p ​ ​and I have a notion of place.​
Actually this contradicts your statement that consciousness is not localized 
from its pov. But that might be not relevant here.I is 1p, well the 1-I is, 
OK, and that does not prevent it localise itself, sure. But the point is that 
adding another 1-I elsewhere will not make any 1-one feeling being two.


 ​ ​For the M-guy, the presence or absence of the W guy will not change 
anything in its immediate experience 
​Agreed. 
OK.

 ​ ​(on which the prediction was asked).
​No, the prediction was about what would happen to the H-guy and the M-guy's 
fate is only part of the story, the W-guy's tale is just as important.
That is why in all illustration I interview always both the M-guy and the 
W-guy. Did you see one or two city, in your direct sensula experience? Both 
told me; we have seen only one city behind the door. That confirms P(one-city) 
= 1. And thus P(W v M) = 1. Even with the exclusive OR.




​ ​that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism, and so believe that as a 
person he will survive,
​OK.​
OK.
 
 ​ ​and he knows that wherever he will feel to have survived,
 ​That guy in Helsinki​ knows that ​that guy in Helsinki​ will feel to have 
survived in TWO cities.
How could anyone FEEL to have survived in both city. Both will FEEL to survive 
in one city, and as far as they know, the doppelganger might not yet exist, nor 
ever exist. They both have to wait for a 3p confirmation, and both will wrote 
in the diary: I survived in M (resp W) and I am waiting the news that the 
doppelganger has been well reconstituted in W (resp M).





​
 ​​he will feel to be in one city,

​If ​that guy in Helsinki believes in computationalism​ then ​that guy in 
Helsinki​ knows that the personal pronoun he in the above is ambiguous 
It is not ambiguous. He refers to both guys, and they are those that we will 
interview to confirm or refute the prediction. he is the guy in helsinki and 
is the guy who will remember having been the guy in Helsinki. Once duplicated 
the 1p diverge, and that is why we ask what he (that guy) expects to FEEL after 
pushing on the button. 
You will claim that we change the definition, only when we remind that the 
prediction bear on the first person experience content. That is all the 
precision we need, and that changes the 3-1 and into the 1p or, as nobody 
can feel to be in both city simultaneously. You said yourself, there are two 
persons after the duplication. each has its own unique first person experience, 
despite being both a legitimate Helsinki-guy.

and that is why Bruno Marchal insists on using so many of them​, they paint 
over flaws in ​the logical edifice of Bruno Marchal​.
​ ​So if 2 cities is not the correct answer to the question how many cities 
will the guy in Helsinki see? you're going to need to change the meaning of 
the guy in Helsinki. ​ ​ ​I don't have to change the meaning of the guy in 
Helsinki (or better: the guy who remember being or having be the guy in 
Helsinki).
​So the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see TWO cities 
but ​the guy who remembers being the Helsinki Man yesterday will see​ only one 
city.  Mr. Marchal, it's going to take more than ICT3PWT1P ​to get out of that 
logical black hole.

You repeat yourself, see above. Once again, you dismiss the 1p and 3p 
difference to introduce an ambiguity which is not there.





 ​ ​I have only to interview them in W and 

RE: Why was nobody murdered because of this cartoon?

[chris peck]

 And a fair answer would be they turned psychotic because they believed in a 
 psychotic religion. 

No that would be a stupid answer because we know that it is hogwash. 

Firstly, we know that the overwhelmingly vast majority of muslims do not turn 
psychotic in the face of cartoons.

Secondly, we know that learning the Koran acts as a defense against violence. 
Being taught the koran at madrassa is negatively correlated with becoming 
radicalized.

thirdly, we know that Coulibaly, for example, came to Islam late. He had 
already accrued several convictions for violent and drug related crimes before 
he was 18. A psychologist reports he had an immature and psychotic personality. 
He was converted to radical Islam during a spell in prison for armed robbery, 
prior to that he had probably never even seen a Koran. In these respects he 
follows a fairly typical profile.

He was allegedly introduced to Islam by Djamel Begal. Begal, a 'french' 
Algerian ... and we all know why Algerians are fucked off don't we? ... and 
erstwhile family man who worked for a homeless charity in the UK, had been 
arrested and tortured in Dubai while traveling to Afgahnistan in 2000. There 
was no evidence he was involved in any criminal activities. Tortures included 
anal rape, urethral insertions, ripping out finger nails, mock executions, 
force feeding, sleep deprivation and so on. The torture went on and on under 
the influence of pain enhancing hallucinogenic drugs for months. He was later 
returned to france where he was convicted on terrorism charges without recourse 
to a lawyer and imprisoned for ten years. Wikileaks would later release 
communications from the french judge who convicted Begal admitting that the 
evidence against him was insufficient. Why was Begal radicalized? Well, it was 
probably the words in a silly book rather than the torture and imprisonment he 
was subjected to with impunity and Frances colonial history. I mean an idiot 
might think so anyway.

Fourthly, Coulibaly was actually recorded explaining his motivations: 

Every time, they try to make you think Muslims are terrorists. I was born in 
France. If they hadn't been attacked elsewhere I wouldn't be here. I'll tell 
them to stop attacking the Islamic State, stop unveiling our women, stop 
putting our brothers in prison for everything and anything. You're the ones who 
elected your governments, and the governments never hid their intentions to be 
at war in Mali or elsewhere.

So whats with Mali then? Like many African countries Mali's society was ripped 
apart by French brutality and was conquered in the 1800s. A series of coups and 
military interventions and Frances' thoroughly evil colonial taxation system 
has ensured it remains under French control directly or by proxy ever since. 
Last time the French bombed peasants in Mali was in 2013. What a bunch of 
wankers.

Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2015 12:50:25 -0500
Subject: Re: Why was nobody murdered because of this cartoon?
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 7:49 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Since 1961 muslims have been subjected to increasingly draconian 
restrictions on their freedome and a media that depicts them in as 
dehumanizing way as possible. 

Well, the media certainly didn't need to work very hard to do that! In recent 
days it has been remarkably easy to depict Islamic culture as dehumanizing. 

 The wankers at Charlie Hebdo are part of 
that. Of course they should be free to do it, but its no wonder this 
marginalized sector feels angry about it.

Feeling angry is the natural state for Muslims. In the thirteenth century 
Islamic culture was the most advanced and progressive on the planet, but it's 
been straight downhill ever since, and today finding something to be offended 
about at is the only thing Islamic culture is still really really good at.

  The media now presents the 
story as though white french people should be afraid of Algerians.

This has nothing to do with Algeria, the French or  Charlie Hebdo, this has to 
do with Islamic values. Charlie Hebdo isn't even the worst or most idiotic  
Islam vs cartoon war. Back in 2005 it was Danish cartoons not French cartoons 
that cause violent riots and set Muslim nitwits off on a murder spree that 
ended up killing more than 200 people. Let me know if you think the cartoons 
deserved such a violent reaction, they were originally in Dutch but you can 
view them here with their English translation: 

http://www.aina.org/releases/20060201143237.htm 

  John k Clark







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options

RE: Why was nobody murdered because of this cartoon?

[chris peck]

Maybe the Onion cartoon didn't set anyone off, but it just isn't true that 
these three Algerians are the only people who behave psychotically in the face 
of free speech. 

During the first salvos of the battle of Fallujah the allies ransacked and shut 
down the general hospital because it was releasing civilian casualty figures. 
That was a war crime. The allies bombed the offices of Al Jazeera in Bagdahd in 
2003, a fact widely denied until David Blunket boasted about it in his memoirs. 
Why? They were releasing civilian casualty figures alongside photographic 
proof. Freely reporting the truth is simply unacceptable. In the war against 
Serbia Nato bombed Serbian state tv head quarters killing scores of 
journalists. 

We shouldn't be fooled into thinking France has any regard for free speech 
either. Only days after the Hebdo attacks their national treasure Dieudonné was 
arrested for an offensive face book post. He aligned himself with the killers 
rather than the victims in an exasperated outburst. It was deeply insensitive 
and deeply offensive. But so what? It was just a joke.

Clarke's question isn't a fair one. A fair question would be to ask why these 
three men turned psychotic over a cartoon. Asking why muslims are the only 
group to turn psychotic implies muslims turn psychotic over jokes in general, 
which isnt true. It implies that the only people who have killed journalists 
have been muslims. Again not true.

Why did these three Algerians turn psychotic? Who can honestly say? But we can 
look at the history of Algeria and France, and as it turns out the conquest and 
subjugation of the Algerian people was exceptionally brutal. Here is a postcard 
French ex-pats in Algeria could send home to mom depicting the fate of Algerian 
nationals who disobeyed:

http://img811.imageshack.us/img811/1337/5sor.jpg

see, even beheading people and publishing it on public media has precedents in 
the west. The Algerians tried to get their country back triggering a bitter 
civil war that killed 1.5 million people and resulted in Algerian society being 
torn apart. Pro French Algericans escaped to france, where they have been 
treated like animals ever since. In 1961, in Paris, during a peaceful protest 
against the occupation of Algeria and against a curfew imposed by the state, 
the french police rounded up scores of Algerian men women and children, beat 
them unconscious and threw them into the Seine to drown. Thousands were rounded 
up into stadiums and beaten. There are reports that some were forced to drink 
bleach. Corpses washed up on the shores of the Seine for weeks. Upwards of 200 
people were killed. Some estimates are far higher. France. Its not all cheese, 
baguettes and ooh la la. 

Since 1961 muslims have been subjected to increasingly draconian restrictions 
on their freedome and a media that depicts them in as dehumanizing way as 
possible. The wankers at Charlie Hebdo are part of that. Of course they should 
be free to do it, but its no wonder this marginalized sector feels angry about 
it. The media now presents the story as though white french people should be 
afraid of Algerians. Historically, its clearly the other way around because the 
whites in France have been behaving like a brutal and murderous bunch of cunts. 
That said, these three Algerians probably did what they did without reference 
to any of that and because of some words in a book.

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why was nobody murdered because of this cartoon?
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2015 18:45:13 -0500


Brent, you are suffering from progressive derangement syndrome, where all 
non-complaint minds are evil Nazis. I will never be compliant with progressive 
thinking because, a) it works poorly, and b) its totalitarian in nature, and 
becomes increasingly so over time. Secondly, Chris is holding the spot for the 
most mentally-impaired judgment, on the mailing list, and I don't think he 
needs the competition. I used to be a progressive myself, so I am used to the 
diatribes, accusations, lies, and Sol Alinsky's rules for Radicals (if you have 
ever read the man's book?).  Now, as to yout OECD comment, I am ok with cradle 
to grave social services, as long as we find a good way to pay for it all. I am 
pretty much the kind of libertarian who would like to see small scale fixes 
tried first, before the hoary hand over national government is imposed, along 
with all its strings and corruption. However I will accept it intellectually as 
long as it is thoughtfully planned. It can be done, but in the US, its done, 
more or less as bribes by the democrat party to guarantee people are dependent 
on the dems, rather than independent and upward bound. This, Chris's party 
doesn't want because otherwise, why vote for them?  Question, how well do you 
feel the OECD countries, which you exult in, would be able to fund their 
national social services, if they had to rely on their 

RE: Films I think people on this forum might like

[chris peck]

yeah, The Grand Budapest Hotel was a blast. Cinema for cinema's sake.



Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 19:39:32 +0200
Subject: Re: Films I think people on this forum might like
From: multiplecit...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Recently had fun with this in cinema, now out on DVD/Blueray:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Fg5iWmQjwk


Not really for content, profound depths, ideological stance, substance, plot, 
and this kind of serious set of one dimensional attributes, but more for its 
general attitude to telling a story and how the film makes an audience feel 
after viewing. PGC











-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Films I think people on this forum might like

[chris peck]

 That is logically impossible from the first person point of view. You 
 describe the 3p view only.

Nice straw man! Whats practically impossible is for one point of view to 
simultaneously accomodate the experience of both surviving and dieing. No one 
questions that. However, that an individual could anticipate both surviving and 
drowning, and anticipate the certainty of both experiences in a duplication 
context doesn't even approach logical impossibilty. 

 In the 3p pictures, yes. Not in the 1p views. Given the protocol given, you 
 cannot from the first person view simultaneously drawn and not-drawn. There 
 is no telepathy between the copies.

The fact that copies have different experiences doesn't introduce doubt into 
the mind of the original about what he will experience. In this instance, he 
will anticipate both. he will have 1p nightmares about drowning and 1p dreams 
about the glory of the prestige.  Alternatively, he will reject the idea that 
they are actual copies of him at the requisite substitution level and never 
conduct the illusion (he'll say no to the doctor). 

You cant have it both ways.

In anycase, the movie is clear on the matter. It is the magician's macabre fate 
to know he will suffer drowning to ensure he can reap the glory. Its what makes 
him such a pitiful character.

Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 12:08:24 +1200
Subject: Re: Films I think people on this forum might like
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Seconded. One could I suppose put the posts in small faint letters to make them 
less noticeable, but I can't see any SPOILER tags on this forum!



On 18 June 2014 03:28, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

On behalf of the people who haven't actually seen the film, could people please 
put Spoiler Alert in the email before you give away crucial details to a 
movie?  Many of the films mentioned in this thread I haven't seen. If I had 
read Chris's post before watching The Prestige I would have been pissed off.


Thanks,Terren

On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 12:20 AM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:






  It makes even more mysterious your resistance to UDA

Well The Prestige is a film about obsession and the lengths people go to meet 
them. Its not about the UDA.


It does contain a teleport machine in it and the naughty magician keeps 
duplicating himself and killing off one of the duplicates.

At one point, when arguing about what sacrifices he has made for his art, he 
points out that every night he is in a state of horror because he doesn't know 
whether he will end up at the back of the stage or drowning in the vat. 
ofcourse, he is just in a state of denial because he ought to know precisely 
what he will experience: survival to the prestige AND drowning. Its not as if 
there could be any doubt about it. The set up makes both experiences certain. 
But its not really a flaw in script, because the audience sees it clearly. Its 
why its such a macabre ending. Here is man so obsessed with bettering his rival 
that he reduces his life to a living hell drowning himself every night. The 
goody magician's sacrifices are bad enough, losing a finger, losing a wife, 
losing a brother. But the naughty magicians sacrifices are deliberate and 
knowing self annihilation and its this that makes his story so horrifically 
tragic. 



Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 13:53:15 -0400
Subject: Re: Films I think people on this forum might like
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




 The Prestige may just be the best movie in the last 15 years. 

 So we agree on this. 

Yes.
 
 It makes even more mysterious your resistance to UDA 




I see absolutely no contradiction between thinking that The prestige is 
saying something profound that rings true and thinking that the things that the 
Universal Dance Association says that are profound are not true and the things 
that it's saying that are true are not profound.




  John K Clark






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.







-- 

You

RE: Films I think people on this forum might like

[chris peck]

  It makes even more mysterious your resistance to UDA

Well The Prestige is a film about obsession and the lengths people go to meet 
them. Its not about the UDA.

It does contain a teleport machine in it and the naughty magician keeps 
duplicating himself and killing off one of the duplicates.

At one point, when arguing about what sacrifices he has made for his art, he 
points out that every night he is in a state of horror because he doesn't know 
whether he will end up at the back of the stage or drowning in the vat. 
ofcourse, he is just in a state of denial because he ought to know precisely 
what he will experience: survival to the prestige AND drowning. Its not as if 
there could be any doubt about it. The set up makes both experiences certain. 
But its not really a flaw in script, because the audience sees it clearly. Its 
why its such a macabre ending. Here is man so obsessed with bettering his rival 
that he reduces his life to a living hell drowning himself every night. The 
goody magician's sacrifices are bad enough, losing a finger, losing a wife, 
losing a brother. But the naughty magicians sacrifices are deliberate and 
knowing self annihilation and its this that makes his story so horrifically 
tragic. 

Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 13:53:15 -0400
Subject: Re: Films I think people on this forum might like
From: johnkcl...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On Thu, May 29, 2014 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 The Prestige may just be the best movie in the last 15 years. 

 So we agree on this. 

Yes.
 
 It makes even more mysterious your resistance to UDA 


I see absolutely no contradiction between thinking that The prestige is 
saying something profound that rings true and thinking that the things that the 
Universal Dance Association says that are profound are not true and the things 
that it's saying that are true are not profound.


  John K Clark






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 Oh, when it suits your prejudice 
it's OK to just count votes.  You suddenly no longer need to read the 
papers and decide for yourself.

Eh? Why the sour face? I thought you'ld be cracking open the champagne.  
There's no consensus. I give you perhaps the best news in history, ever, and 
you're just sour about it! You're not suggesting we ought to read about the 
science and think for ourselves are you?! What a drag!

Seriously though, how come this 97% figure is presented by climate change 
acceptors as a consensus about the catastrophic effect global warming will have 
when it isn't one? Do they even know that the figure represents just those 
scientist who agree climate change is happening? Do they know it doesn't 
reflect the amount of scientists who think the change is caused by humans? They 
certainly don't know that less than 50% of scientists think the effect of 
warming would be catastrophic otherwise that figure would enter into their 
discourse, or would it? I suspect the temptation to keep a bit silent about 
what a shocking figure like 97% really represents is overwhelming. A little 
white lie and so on, an economy with the truth etc.

In actual fact I think all these figures are bullshit. Listening to what the 
scientists actually have to say is exactly what people should do, even 
congressmen, rather than close ones ears to everything except easily digestible 
and neatly misrepresentable figures.

The title of this thread is really ironic. It could as well have been, if the 
the science is in fact ambiguous, deflect attention to startling statistics.



Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 10:38:07 +0200
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
From: te...@telmomenezes.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 6:45 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:



  

  
  
On 4/5/2014 4:13 PM, Telmo Menezes
  wrote:



  



  

  On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 1:01 AM,
meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  

  On 4/5/2014 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:

  
  

  On 5 April 2014 23:30,
Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
wrote:


  

  
On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 11:47 AM,
  LizR lizj...@gmail.com
  wrote:

  
That doesn't narrow
  it down too much.
  
  

  

Je m'accuse. I was one of them.



My point was that conspiracy
  theories, in the sense of power elites
  secretly cooperating to further their
  own interests against the interests of
  the majority are not, unfortunately,
  unusual events in History. We know of
  countless examples of this happening
  in the past. I think it requires some
  magical thinking to assume that this
  type of behaviour is absent from our
  own times.



I further pointed out that broadly
  discrediting any hypothesis that some
  elites might be conspiring against the
  common good, in broad strokes, seems
  to benefit precisely the ones in
  power. Furthermore, thanks to Snowden,
  we now have strong evidence of a
  large-scale conspiracy by western
  governments that I would not believe
  one year ago. In this case I'm
  referring to the secret implementation
  of global and total surveillance, with
  our tax money, by the people we
  elected, to spy on us, infringing on
  constitutions.



I 

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

Not at all.  Have you read the peer reviewed papers that the IPCC cites?  
I've read a lot of them.

Why have you felt the need to read them? 

You were just arguing that congressmen, people who unlike yourself are in a 
position to take or prevent action, did not need to. 

Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 10:13:44 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing


  

  
  
On 4/8/2014 4:44 AM, chris peck wrote:



  
   Oh,
  when it suits your prejudice it's OK to just count votes.  You
  suddenly no longer need to read the papers and decide for
  yourself.

  

  Eh? Why the sour face? I thought you'ld be cracking open the
  champagne.  There's no consensus. I give you perhaps the best
  news in history, ever, and you're just sour about it! You're
  not suggesting we ought to read about the science and think
  for ourselves are you?! What a drag!





Not at all.  Have you read the peer reviewed papers that the IPCC
cites?  I've read a lot of them.




  

  Seriously though, how come this 97% figure is presented by
  climate change acceptors as a consensus about the catastrophic
  effect global warming will have when it isn't one? 



Show me a quote where is it presented that way.  The actual
statement is 97% of climate scientists believe that the Earth is
getting hotter and it's due to burning fossil fuel.








  Do they even
  know that the figure represents just those scientist who agree
  climate change is happening? Do they know it doesn't reflect
  the amount of scientists who think the change is caused by
  humans? They certainly don't know that less than 50% of
  scientists think the effect of warming would be catastrophic
  otherwise that figure would enter into their discourse, or
  would it? I suspect the temptation to keep a bit silent about
  what a shocking figure like 97% really represents is
  overwhelming. A little white lie and so on, an economy with
  the truth etc.





No one has said it would be catastrophic, as in threaten extinction
of humans.  They have said it will be very economically and socially
disruptive and produce major changes in agriculture and in natural
food and water sources.




  

  In actual fact I think all these figures are bullshit.
  Listening to what the scientists actually have to say is
  exactly what people should do, even congressmen, rather than
  close ones ears to everything except easily digestible and
  neatly misrepresentable figures.





So why don't you listen?



Brent

  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 I have known Brent for a long time, and think this rather unlikely. He
has a string grasp of Physics and other general scientific topics, as
well as a lifetime of professional research.

Then he is hoisting himself up with his own petard. Either he needs to be a 
climate scientist or he doesn't.

 but understanding what is written has a much lower bar.

It does. You are now in agreement with me rather than Brent.

 Absolutely. But people without any form of research training would find it
very difficult indeed. 

All attempts to write about science for general consumption are worthless are 
they, Russell? For example, you spent 5 years translating Bruno's book to what 
end? No end? I mean if what you say is true you should make absolutely clear to 
everyone you can that they should not buy the book unless they possess the 
requisite qualifications which few people are going to have. I don't think you 
really believe that. I think you believe that core issues about a science can 
be communicated to lay people sufficiently well for them to make rational 
decisions about them.

Besides which, its just the logic of the situation that even if it where 
impossible to understand anything about climate science without a PHd in it, 
statements about consensus would still be empty. It would still be a logical 
fallacy to proclaim something to be true because of who said it, rather than 
what was said.

 Sadly, there are very few politicians with that sort of training though.

Most politicians have training in Law. A far more subtle and far harder 
discipline than science. You should give them more credit.

 Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 09:24:08 +1000
 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
 
 On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 11:06:09PM +, chris peck wrote:
   To see if various denier criticisms were valid.
  
  So you accept the claims of climate change advocates as true by default and 
  only read those papers which have criticisms leveled at them by deniers? 
  That isn't very even handed.
  
   I argued that most congressmen wouldn't be able to read them (since very 
   few are scientists of any kind, much less climate scientists).
  
  If it is important to be a climate scientist to read a climate science 
  paper then, again, why do you bother reading them? You are not a climate 
  scientist. You do not, on your own account, possess the skills to 
  understand them. 
  
 
 I have known Brent for a long time, and think this rather unlikely. He
 has a string grasp of Physics and other general scientific topics, as
 well as a lifetime of professional research.
 
 What he probably doesn't have the skills for is to write a climate
 science paper and have it accepted in a peer reviewed journal, but
 understanding what is written has a much lower bar.
 
 
  In truth though, it doesn't follow from the fact that someone isn't
   a scientist that they can't read or understand a scientific
   paper. Thats just tawdry elitism. Since it is possible to teach
   children physics, biology, chemistry etc. it is also possible to
   explain the important aspects of climate science to congressmen. And
   thats what should happen rather than chucking around empty
   statements about consensuses or the lack of thereof.
 
 Absolutely. But people without any form of research training would find it
 very difficult indeed. Most people with a PhD in physics, or even a
 lesser degree such as a MSc by research or a BSc (hons) could
 probably manage, as the science itself is classical.
 
 Sadly, there are very few politicians with that sort of training though.
 
 -- 
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
  Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
  (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 Amoeba's Secret is not a peer reviewed research article, but rather
already written for mass consumption (-ish, as my son would say). My comments
applied to research articles only, as that was the context.

Russell, I determine the context because this current row was triggered when 
Brent quibbled with a comment I made. The context is not peer reviewed 
articles. The context is any material available to the general public. And the 
question is to what extent the general public should be fed actual scientific 
facts about climate change and to what extent they should rely on figures about 
consensus amongst scientists.

  It would still be a logical fallacy to proclaim something to be true 
  because of who said it, rather than what was said.
 
 I think Liz has clarified what is actually being claimed here.

Liz is under the misconception that I argue that climate change advocates only 
use this consensus figure. My argument is not that, it is that when they use 
this consensus figure they commit a logical fallacy.

It relates to my argument that climate change advocates are as prone to logical 
fallacy and conspiracy theory as climate change deniers. This relates to the 
study that was pulled from the journal which in my view is as politically 
orientated a study as there can be. It only investigates those conspiracies 
dreamt up by climate change deniers and has nothing to say about how conspiracy 
theories are used to deflect attention from science generally. Ofcourse, when 
climate change advocates portray a climate change denier who is challenging the 
actual science as being 'in the bed of oil barons', they are doing precisely 
the same thing. When they dismiss what the climate change denier argues because 
'97% of scientists agree' they commit a fallacy. This latest row was trigger by 
nothing more controversial than that.

 Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 10:18:34 +1000
 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
 
 On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 11:50:07PM +, chris peck wrote:
   Absolutely. But people without any form of research training would find 
   it
  very difficult indeed. 
  
  All attempts to write about science for general consumption are
  worthless are they, Russell? For example, you spent 5 years
  translating Bruno's book to what end? No end? I mean if what you say
  is true you should make absolutely clear to everyone you can that they
  should not buy the book unless they possess the requisite
  qualifications which few people are going to have. 
 
 Amoeba's Secret is not a peer reviewed research article, but rather
 already written for mass consumption (-ish, as my son would say). My comments
 applied to research articles only, as that was the context.
 
 Of course, I never implied that people without research training
 cannot apply themselves to understanding research articles - I believe
 our own Stephen P. King would be a suitable counterexample, IIUC, but
 just that it is very hard for someone to do so, and requires a lot of
 determination, so they are few and far between.
 
 
  I don't think you really believe that. I think you believe that core
  issues about a science can be communicated to lay people sufficiently
  well for them to make rational decisions about them.
 
 Of course. But then naturally those decision makers will need to take those
 expert opinions on trust, as they don't have the ability and/or
 inclination to read the primary literature.
 
  
  Besides which, its just the logic of the situation that even if it where 
  impossible to understand anything about climate science without a PHd in 
  it, statements about consensus would still be empty. It would still be a 
  logical fallacy to proclaim something to be true because of who said it, 
  rather than what was said.
 
 I think Liz has clarified what is actually being claimed here.
 
  
   Sadly, there are very few politicians with that sort of training though.
  
  Most politicians have training in Law. A far more subtle and far harder 
  discipline than science. You should give them more credit.
  
 
 I'm not sure about most, but certainly more than those with science
 training.
 
 I do not underestimate the intellectual capacity required to study
 law. I'm married to one. As for being more subtle and harder, I think
 that depends on the student. For me, studying law would be much more
 difficult than studying science, as there is far too much rote
 learning for me. I would say the converse is true in my wife's
 case. My son is somewhere in between, but I suspect that ultimately
 he might end up studying law though, as he;d have an easier job of it.
 
 -- 
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 If in some general discussion of climate change someone says (as a 
convenient shorthand) that 97% of climate scientists agree that AGW is a
 fact, what is the logical fallacy they are committing? I'd like to 
know so I can avoid it in future myself.

if you are just pointing out that a consensus exists and nothing more then it 
isn't a fallacy. This consensus exists.

If on the other hand you are pointing out that the consensus exists for some 
other end, ie as a means of convincing people of the truth of any statement 
other than '97% of scientist think climate change is occurring', then it is a 
fallacy. Things are not true because people believe them right?


Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 12:59:53 +1200
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 9 April 2014 12:51, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




  It would still be a logical fallacy to proclaim something to be true 
  because of who said it, rather than what was said.
 
 I think Liz has clarified what is actually being claimed here.


Liz is under the misconception that I argue that climate change advocates only 
use this consensus figure. My argument is not that, it is that when they use 
this consensus figure they commit a logical fallacy.


It relates to my argument that climate change advocates are as prone to logical 
fallacy and conspiracy theory as climate change deniers. This relates to the 
study that was pulled from the journal which in my view is as politically 
orientated a study as there can be. It only investigates those conspiracies 
dreamt up by climate change deniers and has nothing to say about how conspiracy 
theories are used to deflect attention from science generally. Ofcourse, when 
climate change advocates portray a climate change denier who is challenging the 
actual science as being 'in the bed of oil barons', they are doing precisely 
the same thing. When they dismiss what the climate change denier argues because 
'97% of scientists agree' they commit a fallacy. This latest row was trigger by 
nothing more controversial than that.


OK, I'm quite happy to accept that they may be committing a logical fallacies - 
but I can't work out what it is from what you say here.

So, to put it in simple terms (I hope) ...


If in some general discussion of climate change someone says (as a convenient 
shorthand) that 97% of climate scientists agree that AGW is a fact, what is 
the logical fallacy they are committing? I'd like to know so I can avoid it in 
future myself.







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

Brent

 If most scientists in a field agree on something, I count that as evidence 
 in favor of their position.

I don't see how it can be, the fact that scientists agree about relativity 
isn't a fact that has any information content about relativity. Its at best a 
dubious kind of 'evidence by proxy'.

 f course that's a chicken-and-egg problem.  Physicists accepted it because 
 it agreed with experiment.

Exactly, because it agreed with experiment. Theres nothing chicken and egg 
about it. Einstein dreamt up a theory. People treated it with general 
suspicion. It made predictions, which were confirmed by experiments. People 
began to accept the theory. At no point in this story did anyone accept things 
on consensus. And if they did, they were wrong to.


  No, of course not.  But I didn't repeat their calculations and measurements 
 and neither did the deniers.


Im not suggesting people should personally repeat experiments. There is a 
difference in accepting relativity provisionally because you've read about 
Eddington's observations of light bending around the sun and accepting 
relativity because you've read that a bunch of physicists accept relativity. In 
one you have a reason to accept that relates to the phenomenon itself, in the 
other you just have this information-less consensus.

Likewise, when climate science accepters make gambits on blogs like '97% of 
scientists agree!!!' its an empty statement and should be discarded as such.

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
From: spudboy...@aol.com
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 09:27:00 -0400


Let's agree its a real problem, but it's also an opportunity for more control. 
Or should we be good with handing control of the internet, as well, to the UN? 
What is the remediation for this problem and how long will it take to 
implement? 



-Original Message-

From: chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com

To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com

Sent: Sun, Apr 6, 2014 7:08 pm

Subject: RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing













The real story here is that a peer reviewed journal was intimidated into 
withdrawing a paper that had passed through the proper review channels.



That the internet is full of conspiracy theory isn't news. And to the extent 
that climate science denial is correlated with beliefs in conspiracy theories, 
so is climate science acceptance. You don't have to read blog rows for long to 
see that climate science acceptors are the lackeys of communist Illuminati hell 
bent on denying the world freedom and that climate science deniers are in bed 
with the oil barons attempting in a capitalist frenzy to do pretty much the 
same thing. What gets lost on both sides is the actual science. A fact that I 
think is illustrated perfectly when climate science acceptors demand 
capitulation on the basis that 97% of climate scientists agree there is human 
caused problem. That 97% of scientists agree is an empirical fact, presumably, 
but it is also an irrelevant one. Not a single fact about the climate is true 
on the basis of a 97% agreement between scientists. Its an argument from 
authority writ large. its the kind of fact which if persuasive would have kept 
us believing the earth was flat. Yet every time I see blog rows on climate 
change it gets trotted out as if it is informative.



I think what this paper really shows is just that part and parcel of debate is 
to weave a narrative about your opponent: 'Obviously', if you are not convinced 
by my water tight arguments then there must be something wrong with you. 
Unfortunately the paper shows it by doing it. Thats not to say that it 
shouldn't have been published, it should have. But the shame is that by not 
publishing it, it has somehow earnt respect and currency.




Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 12:15:26 -0700

From: meeke...@verizon.net

To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing




  

  
  

On 4/6/2014 11:36 AM, Telmo Menezes
  wrote:





  







  


  
On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 6:47 AM,
meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:



  



  
On 4/5/2014 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:


  

  




  







On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at
  1:04 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:


  


  


On 4/5/2014 3:54 PM, Telmo Menezes
  wrote:




Sure, I also
  find it quite likely

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 Hence, people who claim that scientists agree because of some reason other 
 than looking at the instruments and using their best theories to interpret 
 the readings - e.g. people who claim that they agree for some psychological 
 reason, e.g. because they all adhere to some paradigm - are talking 
 bollocks.

I still don't understand what you're getting at Liz. What 'psychological 
paradigm' is who claiming scientists agree because of?

I mean I don't particularly like the suggestion that scientists are in some 
sense superhuman and impervious to the flaws the rest of us mortals succumb to, 
but we'ld just fly off on another tangent if we discussed that.

my point is just that 'agree with this because lots of scientists say so' isn't 
a terribly convincing argument, yet its one I see lots of climate acceptors 
promote. Relativity isn't a good theory because Einstein said it was. Nor is it 
a good theory because a bunch of Einsteins say it is. How many science lessons 
start like:

'Right children, please shut your text books. Now lots of people agree with 
relativity so you should too. Now on evolution, lots of scientists think we 
evolved via natural selection, so you should too. Good. that about wraps it up 
for your science class this week. Lets move on to home economics...'

Im actually stunned this is under debate.
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 12:14:29 +1200
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Sorry when I said you I didn't mean you specifically, I meant generically - 
one would have been better.

I shall try to paraphrase myself in an attempt to better express what I was 
trying to say.


Hence, people who claim that scientists agree because of some reason other than 
looking at the instruments and using their best theories to interpret the 
readings - e.g. people who claim that they agree for some psychological reason, 
e.g. because they all adhere to some paradigm - are talking bollocks.





On 7 April 2014 14:56, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




 They agree because the equipment they used produced a signal they 
 interpreted using their best available theories as indicating the existence 
 of the Higgs.

Right I see. So the physicists at cern don't count the number of people who are 
in agreement, they actually do look at equipment now and again. Thats a relief 
because Brent had me worried that they didn't think they had to do much of that.


 Hence if you're interested in why they agree, you have to take into account 
 how the experiment works, how the confidence levels were assessed, and so 
 on. It's no good just saying I'm only interested in why they agree as 
 though you're privy to some extraordinary psychological insight, because 
 that's just wilfully ignoring the real facts of the matter.


eh? 

 Otherwise you're just like the postmodernists who used to claim that all 
 views are equivalent but still preferred to fly to conferences by jet 
 rather than broomstick for reasons they could never quite explain (well, not 
 without showing themselves up to be pompous idiots, which I guess - dipping 
 my toes into the world of extraordinary psychological insight myself for a 
 moment - they wanted to avoid).



Im sure you know what you're talking about but I haven't got a clue.






Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 14:47:42 +1200
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


On 7 April 2014 14:32, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




 So does the agreement of physicists at CERN tell you nothing about whether 
 the Higgs boson exists?  

It tells me absolutely nothing. Im interested in why they agree not that they 
agree.


They agree because the equipment they used produced a signal they interpreted 
using their best available theories as indicating the existence of the Higgs.


Hence if you're interested in why they agree, you have to take into account how 
the experiment works, how the confidence levels were assessed, and so on. It's 
no good just saying I'm only interested in why they agree as though you're 
privy to some extraordinary psychological insight, because that's just wilfully 
ignoring the real facts of the matter.



Otherwise you're just like the postmodernists who used to claim that all views 
are equivalent but still preferred to fly to conferences by jet rather than 
broomstick for reasons they could never quite explain (well, not without 
showing themselves up to be pompous idiots, which I guess - dipping my toes 
into the world of extraordinary psychological insight myself for a moment - 
they wanted to avoid).








-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

The real story here is that a peer reviewed journal was intimidated into 
withdrawing a paper that had passed through the proper review channels.

That the internet is full of conspiracy theory isn't news. And to the extent 
that climate science denial is correlated with beliefs in conspiracy theories, 
so is climate science acceptance. You don't have to read blog rows for long to 
see that climate science acceptors are the lackeys of communist Illuminati hell 
bent on denying the world freedom and that climate science deniers are in bed 
with the oil barons attempting in a capitalist frenzy to do pretty much the 
same thing. What gets lost on both sides is the actual science. A fact that I 
think is illustrated perfectly when climate science acceptors demand 
capitulation on the basis that 97% of climate scientists agree there is human 
caused problem. That 97% of scientists agree is an empirical fact, presumably, 
but it is also an irrelevant one. Not a single fact about the climate is true 
on the basis of a 97% agreement between scientists. Its an argument from 
authority writ large. its the kind of fact which if persuasive would have kept 
us believing the earth was flat. Yet every time I see blog rows on climate 
change it gets trotted out as if it is informative.

I think what this paper really shows is just that part and parcel of debate is 
to weave a narrative about your opponent: 'Obviously', if you are not convinced 
by my water tight arguments then there must be something wrong with you. 
Unfortunately the paper shows it by doing it. Thats not to say that it 
shouldn't have been published, it should have. But the shame is that by not 
publishing it, it has somehow earnt respect and currency.

Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 12:15:26 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing


  

  
  
On 4/6/2014 11:36 AM, Telmo Menezes
  wrote:



  



  

  On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at 6:47 AM,
meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  

  On 4/5/2014 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

  
  


  



On Sun, Apr 6, 2014 at
  1:04 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:

  

  
On 4/5/2014 3:54 PM, Telmo Menezes
  wrote:


Sure, I also
  find it quite likely that powerful
  fossil fuel companies are lobbying or
  using even dirtier tricks to discredit
  AGW theory. On the other hand, this
  says nothing about the truth status of
  AGW theory.


  
  Doesn't it?  If it weren't
true, then dirty tricks wouldn't be
needed to discredit it, would they?  It
could be discredited like the flat
earth, creationism, and
cigarettes-are-good-for-you theories.

  
  
  

  
  If that was true, the world would be free
from religious superstition 

  

  
  


So do you classify religion as a conspiracy?  Do you
think clergy are really all atheists and are just
conspiring to fool others?

  




I subscribe Bruno's and Kim's replies.



But this is besides the point here. You claimed that,
  if AGW was false, then oil companies would only need to
  falsify the models to affect political change. If that
  were true, then it wouldn't be the case that the majority
  of the world population is religious, because most
  religious claims are trivially and publicly falsified by
  the many fields of modern science, from cosmology to
  archeology.


  

  



Religions make vague claims which are 'interpreted' and so cannot be
falsified - notice that even Bruno believes in a God and refers to

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

Brent

If 100% of scientists were in agreement about climate change, that fact alone, 
tells me nothing about the truth of the claims they actually make.

You probably didn't test the germ theory of disease or conservation of energy 
either.

Yes, and my great great great great great grand parents didn't test the theory 
that disease was caused by sin. They knew it was sin because so many experts 
told them it was. 

The superiority of my view over theirs can not be established by an appeal to a 
consensus because in this regard me and my ancestors are equivalent. They have 
their consensus and I have mine. If I am to convince them I will have an easier 
time drawing their attention to the actual science.

Whenever we're on the verge of a scientific revolution we're usually in a 
situation where 99.999% of scientists disagree with what happens to be more 
accurate. Those 99% have as much responsibility to show why the 1% are wrong as 
vica versa.



Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 16:51:34 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing


  

  
  
On 4/6/2014 4:08 PM, chris peck wrote:



  
  The real story here is that a peer reviewed journal
was intimidated into withdrawing a paper that had passed through
the proper review channels.



That the internet is full of conspiracy theory isn't news. And
to the extent that climate science denial is correlated with
beliefs in conspiracy theories, so is climate science
acceptance. You don't have to read blog rows for long to see
that climate science acceptors are the lackeys of communist
Illuminati hell bent on denying the world freedom and that
climate science deniers are in bed with the oil barons
attempting in a capitalist frenzy to do pretty much the same
thing. What gets lost on both sides is the actual science. A
fact that I think is illustrated perfectly when climate science
acceptors demand capitulation on the basis that 97% of climate
scientists agree there is human caused problem. That 97% of
scientists agree is an empirical fact, presumably, but it is
also an irrelevant one. Not a single fact about the climate is
true on the basis of a 97% agreement between scientists. Its an
argument from authority writ large. its the kind of fact which
if persuasive would have kept us believing the earth was flat.
Yet every time I see blog rows on climate change it gets trotted
out as if it is informative.

  



But it is informative.  It means that if you disagree, you need to
show why the published papers of these people who have spent a lot
of time and energy studying and measuring are wrong.  



After all you probably never did an experiment to prove the Earth is
spherical.  You accepted it because you were told it (If you dont'
already know it, you might find it instructive to read the story of
Alfred Wallace and John Hampden's bet
http://drvitelli.typepad.com/providentia/2010/08/the-flat-earth-fiasco.html
). You probably didn't test the germ theory of disease or
conservation of energy either.



Brent

  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 So does the agreement of physicists at CERN tell you nothing about whether 
 the Higgs boson exists?  

It tells me absolutely nothing. Im interested in why they agree not that they 
agree.

 How do you know that - did you take someone's word for it?  Was it a 
 scientist?

Assuming you are asking how do I know the germ theory is a superior theory. My 
point is that whether it is superior or not can not be decided by appeals to 
consensus. Maybe its sin. Maybe its not. 


 That's not really true.  

It often is true.

 Of course scientific revolutions start with one or two scientists

not a consensus then. You appear to agree then, are you just being 
argumentative? Or are you really persuaded by consensus?

 - but it's not that case that all the others disagree with the better 
 theory; they just haven't heard it yet.  Look how quickly special 
 relativity, matrix mechanics, Schodinger's equation, and Dirac's theory of 
 the electron were accepted.  Resistance to a new and better theory arises 
 when there is a lot of investment in old theories.

The speed with which people came to accept relativity is irrelevant. There was 
a consensus against relativity initially because it was not derived from 
experiment. Relativity was eventually convincing because it was confirmed by 
experiment, not because lots of physicists accepted it. 

Perhaps you accept relativity because you've been told about a consensus. I 
accept it because I've read about the experimental confirmations. 

 Indeed, and they have.  Every objection: heat island, cosmic rays, increased 
 insolation, measurement error, miscalibration of proxies,...has been studied 
 and answered.

And did they answer those objections by appealing to a consensus? Did they go 
'Its not cosmic rays because 76% of scientists believe otherwise'?

You apparently didn't
read about Alfred Russell's experience with John Hampden.

No I didn't.



Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 18:09:41 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing


  

  
  
On 4/6/2014 5:35 PM, chris peck wrote:



  
  Brent



If 100% of scientists were in agreement about climate change,
that fact alone, tells me nothing about the truth of the claims
they actually make.

  



So does the agreement of physicists at CERN tell you nothing about
whether the Higgs boson exists?  




  

You probably didn't test the germ theory of disease or
conservation of energy either.



Yes, and my great great great great great grand parents didn't
test the theory that disease was caused by sin. They knew it was
sin because so many experts told them it was. 



The superiority of my view over theirs can not be established by
an appeal to a consensus because in this regard me and my
ancestors are equivalent. They have their consensus and I have
mine. If I am to convince them I will have an easier time
drawing their attention to the actual science.

  



How do you know that - did you take someone's word for it?  Was it a
scientist?




  

Whenever we're on the verge of a scientific revolution we're
usually in a situation where 99.999% of scientists disagree with
what happens to be more accurate. 



That's not really true.  Of course scientific revolutions start with
one or two scientists - but it's not that case that all the others
disagree with the better theory; they just haven't heard it yet. 
Look how quickly special relativity, matrix mechanics, Schodinger's
equation, and Dirac's theory of the electron were accepted. 
Resistance to a new and better theory arises when there is a lot of
investment in old theories.



But to get back to AGW, there was no old theory.  The increase of
temperatures due to CO2 from fossil fuel was predicted over a
hundred years ago and everybody who knew anything about it agreed -
UNTIL it appeared to be something we needed to act on.  THEN there
were all kinds of wacky alternate 'explanations' proposed.




  Those 99% have as much responsibility to show why
the 1% are wrong as vica versa.

  



Indeed, and they have.  Every objection: heat island, cosmic rays,
increased insolation, measurement error, miscalibration of
proxies,...has been studied and answered.  You apparently didn't
read about Alfred Russell's experience with John Hampden.



Brent

  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything

RE: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing

[chris peck]

 They agree because the equipment they used produced a signal they 
 interpreted using their best available theories as indicating the existence 
 of the Higgs.

Right I see. So the physicists at cern don't count the number of people who are 
in agreement, they actually do look at equipment now and again. Thats a relief 
because Brent had me worried that they didn't think they had to do much of that.

 Hence if you're interested in why they agree, you have to take into account 
 how the experiment works, how the confidence levels were assessed, and so 
 on. It's no good just saying I'm only interested in why they agree as 
 though you're privy to some extraordinary psychological insight, because 
 that's just wilfully ignoring the real facts of the matter.

eh? 

 Otherwise you're just like the postmodernists who used to claim that all 
 views are equivalent but still preferred to fly to conferences by jet 
 rather than broomstick for reasons they could never quite explain (well, not 
 without showing themselves up to be pompous idiots, which I guess - dipping 
 my toes into the world of extraordinary psychological insight myself for a 
 moment - they wanted to avoid).


Im sure you know what you're talking about but I haven't got a clue.






Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 14:47:42 +1200
Subject: Re: If you can't disprove the science, you can always try suing
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 7 April 2014 14:32, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




 So does the agreement of physicists at CERN tell you nothing about whether 
 the Higgs boson exists?  

It tells me absolutely nothing. Im interested in why they agree not that they 
agree.

They agree because the equipment they used produced a signal they interpreted 
using their best available theories as indicating the existence of the Higgs.


Hence if you're interested in why they agree, you have to take into account how 
the experiment works, how the confidence levels were assessed, and so on. It's 
no good just saying I'm only interested in why they agree as though you're 
privy to some extraordinary psychological insight, because that's just wilfully 
ignoring the real facts of the matter.


Otherwise you're just like the postmodernists who used to claim that all views 
are equivalent but still preferred to fly to conferences by jet rather than 
broomstick for reasons they could never quite explain (well, not without 
showing themselves up to be pompous idiots, which I guess - dipping my toes 
into the world of extraordinary psychological insight myself for a moment - 
they wanted to avoid).







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[chris peck]

 An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits 
 about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are 
 immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication 
 between its distant parts.

I don't think it implies that at all. We don't know what consciousness really 
is but if it turns out to emerge from or supervene on some localized lump of 
stuff then there would be lots of independent consciousnesses that experienced 
similar things to me, rather than one consciousness per person-set that flits 
about faster than light over the set of infinite universes; somehow making time 
to get back to me per time iteration. But even if your implication stood, it 
would open up a huge can of philosophical worms. What exactly constitutes a 
'me' 10^10^29 meters away from here? In the infinite space there are a fair few 
mes, all of whom have some differences, differences in history, differences in 
location, differences in body, differences in vocations, beliefs even wives 
etc. An infinite spectrum of me. A happy thought for women everywhere but at 
what point does it become ridiculous to say this or that copy is still me? This 
is the problem Lewis faces with modal realism and why he gets wishy washy about 
whether these copies are me or are not me but are just similar to me in so many 
regards. 

More importantly, when we are talking about cause and effect we are talking 
about something other than dodgy metaphysical consequences such as 
'immortality'. We're want something that can be measured.


From: stath...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 10:12:09 +1100
Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:





I think you're missing Scott's point.  The universe is obviously
isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many
different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges
Library of Babel.  Almost all of them are just lists of what
happens.  Scott's point is that this is not very interesting,
important, or impressive.  It's only some small elegant compression
of those lists that's interesting - if it exists.   Scott seems to
think that it does.  I think it does *only* because we're willing to
call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary
conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness...  

Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense 
that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word 
significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH 
predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable 
regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look 
like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe 
evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes 
Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to 
have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly 
described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical 
ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the 
anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one 
universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that 
supported life.



I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky 
enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time.


I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the 
physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon.



I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 
light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit 
further away.

On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away 
to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable 
definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There 
doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and 
one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us.



An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits 
about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, 
so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its 
distant parts.

 
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout

RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[chris peck]

It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live 
forever.

Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it 
isn't is significant.

The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history 
common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this 
earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be.

Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 19:56:21 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark


  

  
  
On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis
  Papaioannou wrote:



  



  

  On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com
wrote:


  

  

  On 26 March 2014 14:50,
Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:


  

  
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb 
meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:

  

  

  On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  


  
On
  26 March 2014 12:15,
  meekerdb 
meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:
  

  

  
  
  
  
  
  
  An
  infinite
  universe
  (Tegmark type
  1) implies
  that our
  consciousness
  flits about
  from one copy
  of us to
  another and
  that as a
  consequence we
  are immortal,
  so it does
  affect us even
  if there is no
  physical
  communication
  between its
  distant parts.

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  


  
  That seems to
  imply that one's
  consciousness is
  unique and moves
  around like a
  soul.  
  
  

RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[chris peck]

 But that's assuming you don't live forever, so you aren't answering the 
 other poster's comment.

Sure it does and I'm  not assuming that. It makes no difference whether I live 
forever or not.

Personally, lets say whilst my widow, mistresses and admirers are all deep in 
mourning here, my history continues somewhere else beyond the reach of light. 
What tangible effect can be measured by the scientists at my wake? What effect 
does this continuation have here? All you end up with are two identifiably 
distinct worlds that are unable to causally influence one another. From an 
operational stand point they simply do not exist relative to one another.




Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:25:11 +1300
Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 26 March 2014 16:22, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live 
forever.

Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it 
isn't is significant.


The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history 
common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this 
earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be.


But that's assuming you don't live forever, so you aren't answering the other 
poster's comment.






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark

[chris peck]

I think you're missing Scott's point.  The universe is obviously
isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many
different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges
Library of Babel.  Almost all of them are just lists of what
happens.  Scott's point is that this is not very interesting,
important, or impressive.  It's only some small elegant compression
of those lists that's interesting - if it exists.   Scott seems to
think that it does.  I think it does *only* because we're willing to
call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary
conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness...  

Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense 
that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word 
significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH 
predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable 
regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look 
like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe 
evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes 
Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to 
have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly 
described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical 
ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the 
anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one 
universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that 
supported life.

I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky 
enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time.


I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the 
physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon.

I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 
light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit 
further away.

On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away 
to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable 
definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There 
doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and 
one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us.

Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 16:57:05 +1300
Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  

  
  
On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote:



  

  But Tegmark goes further.  He doesn't say that the
universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he
says that it is that structure, that its physical
and mathematical existence are the same thing.



  
  I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove
  to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure
  that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) -
  by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described
  by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely
  describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's
  MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate
  there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two
  things that are exactly isomosphic.


  



I think you're missing Scott's point.  The universe is obviously
isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many
different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges
Library of Babel.  Almost all of them are just lists of what
happens.  Scott's point is that this is not very interesting,
important, or impressive.  It's only some small elegant compression
of those lists that's interesting - if it exists.   Scott seems to
think that it does.  I think it does *only* because we're willing to
call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary
conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness...  

Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it 
isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large 
assumption that I've understood it correctly).


The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there is some 
minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of 
physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to 
differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical 
constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at 
least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a 
starting 

RE: Max and FPI

[chris peck]

The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly apologetic 
about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact other 
interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is ill would 
make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM interpretations, with 
bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing 
field in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite 
set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one +  a few hidden 
variables, or one + a spooky wave function collapse, depends very much on what 
definition of parsimonious you find most fitting.

We got the classic intuition buster argument. You know, screw intuition because 
it evolved in the sub Saharan savannah to help us lob spears. God forbid that 
it evolved in sub Saharan society to help spot hogwash. Apart from the fact 
that he confuses Tau for intuition, even before QM and Relativity came along, 
intuition has never been the arbiter of right and wrong. There have always been 
counter intuitive facts, there is nothing new about the current situation. 
Theres no more reason to distrust intuition now that there has been before. Its 
only ever been a guide and as such should be trusted as much now as it ever 
was. And that was never entirely.

Worst of all though was that I wanted to hear about his level 4 multiverse but 
he didn't address it except to comment that it was a little nutty. But really, 
in the world of QM interpretation barking mad is where things start. 

Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2014 21:05:53 +1300
Subject: Re: Max and FPI
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

He's talking about the fact that you get about 50% 0s and 50% 1s ... as we were 
discussing recently. I trust this clears up any lingering doubts about what he 
meant by this.


On 23 March 2014 18:50, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 11:27:13PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

 Here's Max! http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PC0zHIf2Gkw



 Brent





Thanks for that. One thing that struck me was how ordinary the FPI

argument (UDA step 3) seems when Max talks about it. But also how it

generalises to unequal probabilities - which was the thrust of that

paper we discussed here a couple of years ago - in generating the Born

rule from counting arguments.



Cheers





--





Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)

Principal, High Performance Coders

Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au

University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au





--

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

  But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a 
  maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent 
  with the FPI, without naming it.


 Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept 
 that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is 
 identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your 
 probability distribution from the first person perspective.


I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent 
as justifying the probability talk, even the usual boolean one.

There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others 
mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by positing 
some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the place of 
probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are actual classical 
probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't appear to recognize 
that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you present the alleged 
existence of classical probability from the first person as some kind of 
surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a virtue.

Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only one 
gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are experienced in 
one observation or another, must have an account in which probabilities are 
derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because classically 
probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between objective 
outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. Alternatively, one can 
live with classical probability of 1 that all outcomes will be observed, and 
discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' the usual probabilities obtained. 
Either approach is just the first step in making a coherent account of 
probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. But you don't do either. 
Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, surely? It seems to leave 
your account incomplete or perhaps even just incoherent.

It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on the 
train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the platform 
going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if you say Alice 
predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she would predict 
spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets her 0.5 
elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences between your 
accounts. Its not just vocab.



Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700
From: gabebod...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:OK. Me too. 
But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems 
more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, 
so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some 
merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism.
That's an interesting topic, to be sure.  Does comp actually help at all to 
solve the hard problem?  When I think about it qualia, I have five main 
questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for.
1. What are qualia made of?
2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in 
certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia?
3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances?  
What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, 
hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc?
4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their 
information and talk and write about them?
5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified?  How could our 
instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain 
processes?

Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but 
they stumble badly on 4-5.  Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to 
me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5.

-Gabe





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to 

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

  and prefer my songs interesting and quirky and catchy and fun (or in the 
 case of the Smiths, the opposite of fun)

(OK, except for Poker face :-)


Yeah I used to furrow my brow a lot and listen to thought provoking gloom but 
these days fun is where its at.  Lady G gets a lot of air time at home and Im 
enjoying Kitty, Daisy and Lewis at the moment with their yummy analogue 
production and retro sensibility. I  give them a plug whenever I can. 

Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 07:48:35 -0700
From: ghib...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The way the future was


On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 1:21:52 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, March 10, 2014 1:49:01 PM UTC, chris peck wrote:


 you are saying that something musically significant happened here

Something significant happened to pop music for sure.

In 1977 the charts were dominated by David Soul, Rod Stewart, Brotherhood of 
Man, Leo Sayer, Hot Chocolate, Boney M, Shawaddywaddy and Billy Ocean. Daddy 
Cool. Rockin' All Over the World and Yes Sir, I can Boogie.

And then:

Dragged on a table in factory

Illegitimate place to be

In a packet in a lavatory

Die little baby screaming

Body screaming fucking bloody mess

Not an animal

It's an abortion



Body! I'm not animal

Mummy! I'm not an abortion


It kind of hits you in the face with the reality as experienced by the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised, but in a very immediate and visceral way. Its 
far more gut wrenching and confrontational than iggy pop, or the clash or any 
other punk band I know of. Most people are so offended someone is singing about 
abortion that they miss the fact that the song is an argument between the 
unborn child and the mother. For a spotty teenager that's pretty brainy 
lyrically and very surreal. 

 I don't think it was ever matched until the Pixies really.

I stand by the Pistols. True, Rotten is a twat now. He wasn't then though.
  I think they were shit, but then it was all just a little before my time. I 
ran away from care homes about 1980 to fine my estranged mum shacked up with 
the ex Crass guitarist Steve Herman in some shitty squat called trentishoe 
mansions. From there I moved out to live with the punks and skins of the west 
end 1980 generation. Better than a care home hee hee. It were great funny 
actually. But...all the biggest idiots always had sex pistols tattoos and sid 
vicious jackets. The music they made was rubbish. An d tends to be remembered 
as punk. Which even I buy into, hence surprise at that clash sound up the top 
of the thread. All the others liz mentioned were much better, though I couldn't 
have named them myself. Much more a case of, I lived it  but I couldn't paint 
it.

 From: kimj...@ozemail.com.au
 Subject: Re: The way the future was
 Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 21:03:43 +1100
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 
 
 
 
 
  On 10 Mar 2014, at 4:30 am, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
  
  Although I have very little good to say about Malcolm McLaren he did 
  arguably launch a whole new musical experience with the Sex Pistols, a type 
  of music which had until then only been underground (Rezillos? B52s ?) but 
  bubbled to the surface when Rotten et al appeared on prime time TV swearing 
  away. The world was never the same.
 
 I lived through it and was even more the same after it. With all due respect, 
 you are saying that something musically significant happened here but I only 
 ever heard racket and rubbish from Johnny Rotten. I mean, he called himself 
 rotten for a reason. He was. He was musically as rotten as festering shit. 
 What was musically significant about the Sex Pistols? I mean, concerning the 
 actual elements of music. Things like pitch, rhythm, harmony, melody - all 
 that core stuff. His music shows no skill whatsoever at those things. But 
 then he didn't even write his own music because he was too off his dial most 
 of the time. None of this precludes the distinct possibility that you, as I 
 myself still do, find vastly entertaining, listening to the Sex Pistols very 
 occasionally. I often do listen to music I really hate if only to realise why 
 in ever more glory that I love the music I really do love...
 
 Feel free to hate this post creatively in some way. McClaren would have.
 
 Kim
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  I just thought of a great way to end this thread  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUwW108ITzw 




-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

 It depends, sometimes yes... But at other times thought provoking gloom can 
 be fun, while light, non-gloom fun can seem cheap and pandering. Just 
 depends on situation. Right now, I don't know if what I'm listening to is 
 light or gloomy and thought provoking. It has a minimal sort of machine 
 line, which negates the deep gloom, with small peculiar things happening 
 punctually. I don't know if its fun, it seems more curious. Thought 
 provoking? Depends...

It's Robert Henke's ''Ritual'' track on top of his homepage:

That kind of stuff tickles me pink, and is fun from my perspective.

These guys began their careers writing tracks in a similar vein to Henke's but 
have a warm analogue-like production which is like being in bed half asleep 
half awake on lovely sunny morning. 

http://warp.net/records/boards-of-canada

Dayvan Cowboy is just yum.


Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 14:26:24 +1300
Subject: Re: The way the future was
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 12 March 2014 14:10, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com 
wrote:

But at other times thought provoking gloom can be fun

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-cD4oLk_D0 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

 you are saying that something musically significant happened here

Something significant happened to pop music for sure.

In 1977 the charts were dominated by David Soul, Rod Stewart, Brotherhood of 
Man, Leo Sayer, Hot Chocolate, Boney M, Shawaddywaddy and Billy Ocean. Daddy 
Cool. Rockin' All Over the World and Yes Sir, I can Boogie.

And then:

Dragged on a table in factory

Illegitimate place to be

In a packet in a lavatory

Die little baby screaming

Body screaming fucking bloody mess

Not an animal

It's an abortion



Body! I'm not animal

Mummy! I'm not an abortion


It kind of hits you in the face with the reality as experienced by the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised, but in a very immediate and visceral way. Its 
far more gut wrenching and confrontational than iggy pop, or the clash or any 
other punk band I know of. Most people are so offended someone is singing about 
abortion that they miss the fact that the song is an argument between the 
unborn child and the mother. For a spotty teenager that's pretty brainy 
lyrically and very surreal. 

 I don't think it was ever matched until the Pixies really.

I stand by the Pistols. True, Rotten is a twat now. He wasn't then though.


 From: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
 Subject: Re: The way the future was
 Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 21:03:43 +1100
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 
 
 
 
  On 10 Mar 2014, at 4:30 am, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
  
  Although I have very little good to say about Malcolm McLaren he did 
  arguably launch a whole new musical experience with the Sex Pistols, a type 
  of music which had until then only been underground (Rezillos? B52s ?) but 
  bubbled to the surface when Rotten et al appeared on prime time TV swearing 
  away. The world was never the same.
 
 I lived through it and was even more the same after it. With all due respect, 
 you are saying that something musically significant happened here but I only 
 ever heard racket and rubbish from Johnny Rotten. I mean, he called himself 
 rotten for a reason. He was. He was musically as rotten as festering shit. 
 What was musically significant about the Sex Pistols? I mean, concerning the 
 actual elements of music. Things like pitch, rhythm, harmony, melody - all 
 that core stuff. His music shows no skill whatsoever at those things. But 
 then he didn't even write his own music because he was too off his dial most 
 of the time. None of this precludes the distinct possibility that you, as I 
 myself still do, find vastly entertaining, listening to the Sex Pistols very 
 occasionally. I often do listen to music I really hate if only to realise why 
 in ever more glory that I love the music I really do love...
 
 Feel free to hate this post creatively in some way. McClaren would have.
 
 Kim
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

 whoever put Hendrix as a proto punk should on the same basis add Cream and 
 even the Stones. (At this rate everyone will be in on it...)

Rick Astley ... post punk rocker...


Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 07:45:50 +1300
Subject: Re: The way the future was
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I have 4 pistols tracks in my very large and eclectic MP3 music collection, 
along with many others generally called punk.John Lydon also gave me my all 
time favourite headline, Sex pistol attacks New Zealand butter.

I even managed to turn it into a crossword clue - 
Enthusiastically attack butter (4)
...but anyway, yes, I like the Pistols some of the time, even if they were 
McLaren's boy band really.

PS whoever put Hendrix as a proto punk should on the same basis add Cream and 
even the Stones. (At this rate everyone will be in on it...)




On 11 March 2014 02:49, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




 you are saying that something musically significant happened here

Something significant happened to pop music for sure.

In 1977 the charts were dominated by David Soul, Rod Stewart, Brotherhood of 
Man, Leo Sayer, Hot Chocolate, Boney M, Shawaddywaddy and Billy Ocean. Daddy 
Cool. Rockin' All Over the World and Yes Sir, I can Boogie.


And then:

Dragged on a table in factory

Illegitimate place to be

In a packet in a lavatory

Die little baby screaming

Body screaming fucking bloody mess

Not an animal

It's an abortion



Body! I'm not animal

Mummy! I'm not an abortion


It kind of hits you in the face with the reality as experienced by the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised, but in a very immediate and visceral way. Its 
far more gut wrenching and confrontational than iggy pop, or the clash or any 
other punk band I know of. Most people are so offended someone is singing about 
abortion that they miss the fact that the song is an argument between the 
unborn child and the mother. For a spotty teenager that's pretty brainy 
lyrically and very surreal. 


 I don't think it was ever matched until the Pixies really.

I stand by the Pistols. True, Rotten is a twat now. He wasn't then though.


 From: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au

 Subject: Re: The way the future was
 Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 21:03:43 +1100
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 
 
 
 
 
  On 10 Mar 2014, at 4:30 am, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
  
  Although I have very little good to say about Malcolm McLaren he did 
  arguably launch a whole new musical experience with the Sex Pistols, a type 
  of music which had until then only been underground (Rezillos? B52s ?) but 
  bubbled to the surface when Rotten et al appeared on prime time TV swearing 
  away. The world was never the same.

 
 I lived through it and was even more the same after it. With all due respect, 
 you are saying that something musically significant happened here but I only 
 ever heard racket and rubbish from Johnny Rotten. I mean, he called himself 
 rotten for a reason. He was. He was musically as rotten as festering shit. 
 What was musically significant about the Sex Pistols? I mean, concerning the 
 actual elements of music. Things like pitch, rhythm, harmony, melody - all 
 that core stuff. His music shows no skill whatsoever at those things. But 
 then he didn't even write his own music because he was too off his dial most 
 of the time. None of this precludes the distinct possibility that you, as I 
 myself still do, find vastly entertaining, listening to the Sex Pistols very 
 occasionally. I often do listen to music I really hate if only to realise why 
 in ever more glory that I love the music I really do love...

 
 Feel free to hate this post creatively in some way. McClaren would have.
 
 Kim
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.

 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 00:26:56 +0100
Subject: Re: The way the future was
From: multiplecit...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Electric instruments just amplified what was already here.

Beethoven istm was first in rock, metal, punk etc. all the way to dubstep 
department;crystallizing sound's relations with explosive power, defiance, 
melancholy or magnificence.


Bach was more goth than punk, I'd guess, especially with the organ. 

Or you could see the origins of jagged, animalistic, primal fifth-based harmony 
in medieval music of ars antiqua and ars nova as the seed of power etc. All of 
heavy metal, rock, punk etc. is slave to what we call the power chord; albeit 
today's punk rockers are quite dogmatic regarding the harmony be expressed with 
distorted guitars.



Then maybe the old Greeks rocked like nobody had ever rocked before, but we 
lack patches of history to know what they really sounded like.

Or the stoners 60 thousand years ago with flutes, bones, rocks, and sticks 
might have already been 'rocking', as they certainly had the 'homeless nomadic 
take no prisoners perpetually alienated in hostile environment' thing of punk 
going. Yes, even the funky hairstyles and ritual clothing would be plausible 
;-) PGC



On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 7:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

I have 4 pistols tracks in my very large and eclectic MP3 music collection, 
along with many others generally called punk.John Lydon also gave me my all 
time favourite headline, Sex pistol attacks New Zealand butter.


I even managed to turn it into a crossword clue - 
Enthusiastically attack butter (4)
...but anyway, yes, I like the Pistols some of the time, even if they were 
McLaren's boy band really.


PS whoever put Hendrix as a proto punk should on the same basis add Cream and 
even the Stones. (At this rate everyone will be in on it...)





On 11 March 2014 02:49, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:





 you are saying that something musically significant happened here

Something significant happened to pop music for sure.

In 1977 the charts were dominated by David Soul, Rod Stewart, Brotherhood of 
Man, Leo Sayer, Hot Chocolate, Boney M, Shawaddywaddy and Billy Ocean. Daddy 
Cool. Rockin' All Over the World and Yes Sir, I can Boogie.



And then:

Dragged on a table in factory

Illegitimate place to be

In a packet in a lavatory

Die little baby screaming

Body screaming fucking bloody mess

Not an animal

It's an abortion



Body! I'm not animal

Mummy! I'm not an abortion


It kind of hits you in the face with the reality as experienced by the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised, but in a very immediate and visceral way. Its 
far more gut wrenching and confrontational than iggy pop, or the clash or any 
other punk band I know of. Most people are so offended someone is singing about 
abortion that they miss the fact that the song is an argument between the 
unborn child and the mother. For a spotty teenager that's pretty brainy 
lyrically and very surreal. 



 I don't think it was ever matched until the Pixies really.

I stand by the Pistols. True, Rotten is a twat now. He wasn't then though.


 From: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au


 Subject: Re: The way the future was
 Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 21:03:43 +1100
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


 
 
 
 
 
  On 10 Mar 2014, at 4:30 am, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
  
  Although I have very little good to say about Malcolm McLaren he did 
  arguably launch a whole new musical experience with the Sex Pistols, a type 
  of music which had until then only been underground (Rezillos? B52s ?) but 
  bubbled to the surface when Rotten et al appeared on prime time TV swearing 
  away. The world was never the same.


 
 I lived through it and was even more the same after it. With all due respect, 
 you are saying that something musically significant happened here but I only 
 ever heard racket and rubbish from Johnny Rotten. I mean, he called himself 
 rotten for a reason. He was. He was musically as rotten as festering shit. 
 What was musically significant about the Sex Pistols? I mean, concerning the 
 actual elements of music. Things like pitch, rhythm, harmony, melody - all 
 that core stuff. His music shows no skill whatsoever at those things. But 
 then he didn't even write his own music because he was too off his dial most 
 of the time. None of this precludes the distinct possibility that you, as I 
 myself still do, find vastly entertaining, listening to the Sex Pistols very 
 occasionally. I often do listen to music I really hate if only to realise why 
 in ever more glory that I love the music I really do love...


 
 Feel free to hate this post creatively in some way. McClaren would have.
 
 Kim
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.


 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com

RE: The way the future was

[chris peck]

Hi PGC

yep. All art, like language, has an etymology. 

The Pistols weren't special because they did anything 'new', but because they 
did something that challenged the status quo of the time. When it comes to 
shocking people The Rite of Spring had the audience rioting at its premier, so 
suck on that Johnny Rotten!


All of heavy metal, rock, punk etc. is slave to what we call the power chord; 
albeit today's punk rockers are quite dogmatic regarding the harmony be 
expressed with distorted guitars.


Yes, thats true, but I don't think punk rock is really about musical innovation 
is it? 

These guys make a good argument that all pop of the past 40 years is 
essentially the same single song, you might like it.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pidokakU4I

Or the stoners 60 thousand years ago with flutes, bones, rocks, and sticks 
might have already been 'rocking', as they certainly had the 'homeless 
nomadic take no prisoners perpetually alienated in hostile environment' thing 
of punk going. Yes, even the funky hairstyles and ritual clothing would be 
plausible ;-) PGC

Im sure you're right.


From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: The way the future was
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 23:58:50 +






Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 00:26:56 +0100
Subject: Re: The way the future was
From: multiplecit...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Electric instruments just amplified what was already here.

Beethoven istm was first in rock, metal, punk etc. all the way to dubstep 
department;crystallizing sound's relations with explosive power, defiance, 
melancholy or magnificence.


Bach was more goth than punk, I'd guess, especially with the organ. 

Or you could see the origins of jagged, animalistic, primal fifth-based harmony 
in medieval music of ars antiqua and ars nova as the seed of power etc. All of 
heavy metal, rock, punk etc. is slave to what we call the power chord; albeit 
today's punk rockers are quite dogmatic regarding the harmony be expressed with 
distorted guitars.



Then maybe the old Greeks rocked like nobody had ever rocked before, but we 
lack patches of history to know what they really sounded like.

Or the stoners 60 thousand years ago with flutes, bones, rocks, and sticks 
might have already been 'rocking', as they certainly had the 'homeless nomadic 
take no prisoners perpetually alienated in hostile environment' thing of punk 
going. Yes, even the funky hairstyles and ritual clothing would be plausible 
;-) PGC



On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 7:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

I have 4 pistols tracks in my very large and eclectic MP3 music collection, 
along with many others generally called punk.John Lydon also gave me my all 
time favourite headline, Sex pistol attacks New Zealand butter.


I even managed to turn it into a crossword clue - 
Enthusiastically attack butter (4)
...but anyway, yes, I like the Pistols some of the time, even if they were 
McLaren's boy band really.


PS whoever put Hendrix as a proto punk should on the same basis add Cream and 
even the Stones. (At this rate everyone will be in on it...)





On 11 March 2014 02:49, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:





 you are saying that something musically significant happened here

Something significant happened to pop music for sure.

In 1977 the charts were dominated by David Soul, Rod Stewart, Brotherhood of 
Man, Leo Sayer, Hot Chocolate, Boney M, Shawaddywaddy and Billy Ocean. Daddy 
Cool. Rockin' All Over the World and Yes Sir, I can Boogie.



And then:

Dragged on a table in factory

Illegitimate place to be

In a packet in a lavatory

Die little baby screaming

Body screaming fucking bloody mess

Not an animal

It's an abortion



Body! I'm not animal

Mummy! I'm not an abortion


It kind of hits you in the face with the reality as experienced by the 
dispossessed and disenfranchised, but in a very immediate and visceral way. Its 
far more gut wrenching and confrontational than iggy pop, or the clash or any 
other punk band I know of. Most people are so offended someone is singing about 
abortion that they miss the fact that the song is an argument between the 
unborn child and the mother. For a spotty teenager that's pretty brainy 
lyrically and very surreal. 



 I don't think it was ever matched until the Pixies really.

I stand by the Pistols. True, Rotten is a twat now. He wasn't then though.


 From: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au


 Subject: Re: The way the future was
 Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2014 21:03:43 +1100
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com


 
 
 
 
 
  On 10 Mar 2014, at 4:30 am, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
  
  Although I have very little good to say about Malcolm McLaren he did 
  arguably launch a whole new musical experience with the Sex Pistols, a type 
  of music which had until then only been underground (Rezillos? B52s ?) but 
  bubbled to the surface when Rotten et al appeared on prime time TV swearing 
  away. The world was never the same

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different 
vocabulary. 

Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.


But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of 
the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without 
naming it.


Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I 
mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between 
you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from 
the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I 
put that to one side.

if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and 
Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare 
quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference 
in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After 
all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just 
relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that 
all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger 
all to choose between them. 

In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not 
improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian 
physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. 
Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties 
but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your 
theories are scientifically irrelevant. 

Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


  

  
  
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal
  wrote:




  
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:


  
  
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR
  wrote:



  

  On 8 March 2014 08:14,
meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  

  On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

  
  

  
On 7 March 2014
  18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:

  

  
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason
  Resch wrote:


A
  related question is, is there
  any such thing as true
  randomness at all? Or is every
  case of true randomness an
  instance of FPI?
  
  Or is FPI
  just a convoluted way to
  pretend there isn't true
  randomness?

  
  
  If one assumes QM and the MWI
are correct then it isn't
pretending, 

  

  

True; but I don't assume that.



Since your original statement above only makes
  sense in some context - which you haven't
  revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could
  tell us what you are assuming?


  

  



I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one
could assume something different than QM and MWI.  For
instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each
branching only one instance of you continues.  Doesn't
that accord with all 

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. 

Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.

Quentin said:

That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.

And you agreed with Quentin:


Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. 

Are you saying you now actually agree with Greaves and that assigning 
probability 1 to both outcomes is in fact correct?


Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:40:53 -0800
From: ghib...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote:I'm not sure I follow. 
Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times 
and 
wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find 
that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with 
zeros occurring about 50% of the time.
 Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us 
the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they are hexadecimal 
translations. or very different bases anyway. Of course the bloody average 1's 
about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's binary. Which works by flipping.
That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get the 
sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally doubled up! 
The correct sequences should read:


  0001  0010  0011  0100  0101  0110  0111  1000  1001  1010  1011  1100  
1101  1110  

Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of 
those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure.


binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 2^n, 
and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to hexadecimal 
without a calculator, in two steps only.  1101101100111111  
it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor 
break the copy up into sets of four.  1101      1010  0001  0011   1100 
 0011  the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it 
round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1.  So if you have 1101 and 
you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 
1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 
1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing 
everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh I just 
taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there was ONE 
person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o)   I guess the sloppy 
phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences? I don't know 
if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above) or if it becomes 
more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can 
enlighten me?
 Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an 
archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most 
implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the bases, 
allowing for translation.  

I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters 
I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter 
seem more accessible.
 ...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large infinity 
of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I read that, 
it put me on the floor. 




-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone.

pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective 
uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. They are 
mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction 
of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells 
us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is 
extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still 
the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of 
everyone? 

You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has 
been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with 
his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he 
never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary 
value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of 
everyone'.

This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own 
satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. On the other hand, just because 
a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me 
to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in 
step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely 
that will make you happy?

Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal 
in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the 
impossibility of ever refuting any theory. You're talking to someone who hasn't 
placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years.

All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100


On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:On Thursday, March 6, 2014 
1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's 
happening.  The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at 
cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%.  

binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375
binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125
binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374
binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964
binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178
binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006

Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%.

binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922
binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677
binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939
binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427
binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747

Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of 
distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact 
proportion becomes less likely.  But at the same time, as you flip the coin 
more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and 
more tightly around the expected value.  So for tests when you do two million 
flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads 
and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%.


Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know.
the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in 
french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions 
given of 1p and 3p.
Bruno
(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? 

I don't object to any step in UDA.  It seems internally consistent and 
plausible to me.  I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it 
being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%.  
A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the 
premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist 
consequences in the vicinity of 25% ?
I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the 
unbelievable.


I have much formal logic to learn before I have any meaningful opinion about 
AUDA.

OK. Fair enough to say. I often come back to zero, so you might enjoy a ride 
eventually :)
Bruno


-Gabe
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop 

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 ou cannot say something like this. It is unscientific in the extreme. You 
 must say at which step rigor is lacking. 

I think you're missing the fact that I was poking fun at a comment you made to 
Liz. Don't worry about it.

 You make vague negative proposition containing precise error in elementary 
 statistics.


It wouldn't be at all unusual for me to make mistakes in sums, but that 'error 
in elementary statistics' is not seen as one by prof's at Oxford, which gives 
me great confidence that Im on to something and that the error is yours .


 Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in H you 
 predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that the prediction 
 was wrong. 

The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the 
probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea 
that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is 
really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the probability that 
either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to keep the questions 
phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: what is the probability 
that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that 
*is* simple and obvious. It is 1.

It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question 
you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of 
self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no 
recognition of duplication in the question, and so pronouns become altogether 
confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who.

 ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever listening to 
 what the duplicated persons say.

Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't make any 
difference whether you look at it from the objective or subjective view. The 
probabilities work out the same either way.

And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons say' by 
adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly out of his body into 
a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on both W and M guys, dream their 
1p views, fly back and integrate their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 
1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a 
hugely contorted confusion of the lot. 

 So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to provide it.

On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet understood it, 
less still rebutted it.

All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 23:33:15 +




Hi Bruno

Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone.

pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective 
uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. They are 
mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction 
of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells 
us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is 
extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still 
the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of 
everyone? 

You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has 
been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with 
his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he 
never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary 
value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of 
everyone'.

This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own 
satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. On the other hand, just because 
a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me 
to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in 
step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely 
that will make you happy?

Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal 
in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the 
impossibility of ever refuting any theory. You're talking to someone who hasn't 
placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years.

All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100


On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:On Thursday, March 6, 2014 
1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:
Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's 
happening.  The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at 
cases where 

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Jason/Gabriel

Thanks for the posts. They were both really clear. I can see that it was a 
mistake to hedge my bets on exact figures and also, given Jason's comments, to 
think that seemingly regular sequences were quite common.

I do maintain that proportions of roughly 50/50 splits are a spurious measure 
of 'seemingly random' though and that irregularity of change is a better one.

There also seems to me to be a big difference between Tegmark's game as 
described in the quote below, and flicking coins. Tegmark's game is a process 
guaranteed to generate (over 4 iterations)  16 unique and exhaustive 
combinations of 0s and 1s (heads or tails). If 16 people were to flick a coin 4 
times and write down the results there is only a low probability that the 
resulting set would map on to that generated by Tegmarks game. There is fair 
chance there would be some repetition.

Jason, you say:

 Even if your pattern were: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1, you still have no better 
 than a 50% chance of predicting the next bit, so despite the coincidental 
 pattern the sequence is still random.

I disagree here. In Tegmarks game you know a particular outcome is not 
exclusive and that you'll have two successors who get one and the other.  The 
next outcome is (01010101010 AND 01010101011) not (01010101010 XOR 
01010101011). Now this might influence how you bet. If you care about your 
successors you might refuse to make a bet because you know one successor will 
lose. If we rolled dice rather than flicked coins and were to bet on getting 
anything but a 6, in a modified Tegmark game we might still refuse to bet 
knowing that one successor would certainly lose. Its a bet we almost certainly 
would take if we were rolling die in a classical world without clones.

More dramatically, if you play Russian roulette in Everettian Multiverse you 
always shoot someone in the head. Crossing the road becomes deeply immoral 
because vast numbers of successors trip and get run down by trucks.

A final confusion: Does anything ever seem 'apparently random' in a 
Marchalian/Tegmarkian game? Given that you know outcomes are generated by a 
mechanical process and given you know exactly what the following set of 
outcomes will be, how can they seem random? Even 100010110011 isn't looking 
very random anymore.

:(


Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 10:21:47 +1300
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 6 March 2014 06:45, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote:

Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's 
happening.  The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at 
cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%.  


binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375
binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125
binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374
binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964
binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178
binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006

Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%.


binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922
binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677
binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939
binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427
binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747


Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of 
distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact 
proportion becomes less likely.  But at the same time, as you flip the coin 
more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and 
more tightly around the expected value.  So for tests when you do two million 
flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads 
and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%.


Thank you, that's exactly what I was attempting to say in my cack-handed way. 
(And it is almost certainly what Max intended to say.)






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 The question is: can you refute this.

To my own satisfaction? Yes. To your satisfaction? Apparantly not. Though 
perhaps you have an ideological agenda and are just trying very hard not to be 
refuted?

 And for the UDA, you don't need the 50%. You need only to assess the 
 indeterminacy, and its invariance for the changes described in the next 
 steps.

By your own admission your steps are dumbed down for morons like me and display 
a lack of rigour. Perhaps your book might help?

If I don't buy my little 2 year old a treat this month maybe I can afford it. 
Are there an awful lot of sums?  I hate sums.

Well its your call Bruno, should I treat my son or buy your book?

 What is you talk about the step 4?  It asks if the way to evaluate the P(W) 
 and the P(M) changes if some delay of reconstitution is introduced in W, or 
 in M.

It doesn't change as far as I can see. Its still P(1) for both.

I'll tell you what, I'll have another look at step 7. see if I can make head or 
tails of it the fifth or sixth time aroundLast time I got stuck at the 
floating pen.

Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 14:05:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Brent, could you please reply to Edgar? He is, I'm sure, eagerly 
awaiting your response so he can unleash a torrent of carefully thought 
out arguments which will cover every point you've made. (As indeed am 
I.)
 On 1 March 2014 13:46, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:

Brent,
Are you addressing that question to me? You are responding to a post by Liz 
talking about your theory. If so I'll be glad to answer.

On Friday, February 28, 2014 6:14:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  

  
  
On 2/28/2014 2:43 PM, LizR wrote:



  

  If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness
I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as
fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and
then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no
deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime
fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments
randomly.

  
  

  
  OK, I'll bite. Show us the maths and the experts can see how
it stacks up against Everett et al.
  

  

  
  But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum
theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as
'comp'.

  



On the contrary, I am
  interested in your theory of quantum randomness IF you can flesh
  it out.  For example how do you describe a Stern-Gerlach
  experiment, a Vaidman no-interaction measurment, an EPR
  experiment, Bose-Einstein condensate,...?






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

  0001 0010 0011 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1010 
 1011 1100 1101 1110 

Of which I'm fairly sure half the digits are 0 and half 1!

What am I missing here?


If you concatenate all those strings together you'll get a bigger string in 
which the proportion of 1s to 0s is exactly 50/50. And that will always be the 
case no matter how long the individual bit strings are. If they are 8 bits long 
then you'll have 256 individual strings. When concatenated together the 
proportion will be exactly 50/50.

But it looks to me like you're misconstruing Tegmark's method here. Its each 
individual string that matters. What is the proportion of 1s to 0s in , or 
in 1011, or 1100 etc. Because each string represents a sequence of room - wake 
ups. In your example, 16 people live through room-wake ups over 4 nights. Each 
person's experience represented by an individual string.

Even over 4 nights you'll see, just by counting, that the number of occasions 
where the proportion of 1s to 0s is 50% is 6. Not 8. Not half. How does that 
square with his claim that almost all people will experience a 50/50 
distribution of 0s to 1s? not even half will. Now as the individual strings get 
longer, as more nights are encountered, that proportion goes down. Not up. When 
individual strings are 16 bits long, there are 65,536 combinations (people). Of 
whom less than 20% experience a 50/50 split of 1s and 0s over those 16 nights.

Now Brent, and Bruno with customary obtuseness, correctly point out that:

1) Tegmark talks about 'roughly half', so not an exact 50/50 split.

2) if you take that into account, then you can get a figure approaching 'almost 
all'.

in the 16 bit example, if you include strings where there are 7 ones (or zeros) 
and you take strings where there are 6 ones (or zeros)  then about 78% of 
people will experience 'roughly' 50% ones or zeros. Ofcourse now we're in a 
situation where personal opinion rears its head. Is 78% 'almost all'? Is 37% 
(6/16) 'roughly half'? Right and wrong don't really preside over these kinds of 
opinions, but 37% doesn't look like 50% to me.

In any case both Bruno and Brent miss the bigger picture:

Consider the following 16 bit strings:

1010101010101010 - does that look random? 

how about 

0101010101010101

how about this:

1100110011001100

Seems to me Tegmark is confusing a roughly equal distribution of 1s and 0s with 
apparent unpredictability. A better approach considers irregularity of change 
in 1s and 0s. So where there is irregular change : 010001010011 it looks 
unpredictable, but where change is regular :  it doesn't. The 
proportion of 1s and 0s is irrelevant.

So has Tegmark convinced me that in his thought experiment I would assign 50/50 
probability of seeing one or the other room each iteration? Not really.

I'm sure Tegmark's world won't be shaken too much by any of this, I'm even more 
certain that I have something wrong. Though it does seem to have sent Bruno 
running for cover behind his little sums. So perhaps I am on to something

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 11:59:05 +1300
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I should also mention that in the quote, Max says that you wake up in room 0 or 
room 1, so if we WERE omitting leading zeroes, we'd write 11... !

Shurely shome mishtake!







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 I'm not sure I follow.

Me neither.

  wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that 
 the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros 
 occurring about 50% of the time.

there would be no 'about' it were your interpretation right, Liz. 

It would be all the time, exactly 50%. 

Hes saying that zeros occur about 50%of the time in the zeros and ones you have 
written down. 

That corresponds to the individual bit strings. Not the entire collection of 
them.

 I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most 
 sequences?

I suspect its sloppy interpretation rather than sloppy phrasing that implies 
that. 

 I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above)

6/16 isn't half is it? I measured 1 divided by 2 just now and it still seems to 
come out as 0.5 here.

 or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a 
 mathematician can enlighten me?

I wrote a little program Liz that collects together all the bit strings that 
can be made from 16 bits. Then it counts the number of 1s and 0s in each one. 
It has a little counter that goes up by one every time there are 8 zeros.

there are 65536 combinations. 12870 of them have 8 zeros. 12870 / 65536 * 100 = 
19%.

6/16*100 = 37%

I don't know about you but 19, being less than 37, suggests to me that the 
percentage is going down. But ofcourse ask a mathematician if you're not 
certain of that yourself.

 I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters 
 I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter 
 seem more accessible.

Yeah, which is preferable to people with similar ideas being slap dash in order 
to make them less accessible.

Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 22:13:28 -0600
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: jasonre...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




On Thu, Feb 27, 2014 at 9:09 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 2:49 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


I came upon an interesting passage in Our Mathematical Universe, starting on 
page 194, which I think members of this list might appreciate:


It gradually hit me that this illusion of randomness business really wasn't 
specific to quantum mechanics at all. Suppose that some future technology 
allows you to be cloned while you're sleeping, and that your two copies are 
placed in rooms numbered 0 and 1 (Figure 8.3). When they wake up, they'll both 
feel that the room number they read is completely unpredictable and random. If 
in the future, it becomes possible for you to upload your mind to a computer, 
then what I'm saying here will feel totally obvious and intuitive to you, since 
cloning yourself will be as easy as making a copy of your software. If you 
repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your 
room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of 
zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of 
the time. In other words, causal physics will produce the illusion of 
randomness from your subjective viewpoint in any circumstance where you're 
being cloned. The fundamental reason that quantum mechanics appears random even 
though the wave function evolves deterministically is that the Schrodinger 
equation can evolve a wavefunction with a single you into one with clones of 
you in parallel universes. So how does it feel when you get cloned? It feels 
random! And every time something fundamentally random appears to happen to you, 
which couldn't have been predicted even in principle, it's a sign that you've 
been cloned.


While reading, do you get a sense that he points towards how this might 
potentially weaken digital physics/functionalism in their strong sense?

I haven't gotten that sense yet, but I am only about half way through.
 
 That digital physics implies comp, which implies vast non computable parts of 
reality, which rules out stronger forms of interpreting digital 
physics/functionalism? Because in this quoted passage he just references the 
teleportation ambiguity, as many have. I'd want to know if he dug a bit deeper. 
PGC


 
 There are some leaps he seems unwilling to make, like QTI. Yet, if he thinks 
all mathematical structures exist, and if he believes in the CTM, then 
shouldn't he also believe every conscious state has at least some computational 
continuation somewhere in this infinite reality that contains everything?


Jason





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit 

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

 I'm not reading Max's book, so I don't know exactly what he said,

Im reading the quote Jason kindly provided and responding to exactly what 
Tegmark said.

but using FPI as in Everett QM and writing down which of two equally likely 
events you actually experience is an example of bernoulli trials.  

and the figures I've been stating reflect bernoulli trials precisely.

 The proportion of 1s and 0s both converge to 1/2 in probability. 

but in doing so call in to question definitions of 'about' 'roughly' and 
'almost all'. But then you haven't read the Tegmark quote so you won't be able 
to add anything substantive about that.

 It is irrelevant that the proportion of subsequences that have exactly 
 equally 1s and 0s goes down.

Whats irrelevant is the use of proportion of 1s and 0s in determining 'apparent 
randomness'. It doesn't. Which is my point. The figures for exact proportions 
were just my arse about tit way of getting there.

But still, even though I seemed to get there on my tod, at least I know what a 
Bernoulli trial is now. Thanks for that.

Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 21:43:29 -0800
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


  

  
  
I'm not reading Max's book, so I don't
  know exactly what he said, but using FPI as in Everett QM and
  writing down which of two equally likely events you actually
  experience is an example of bernoulli trials.  The proportion of
  1s and 0s both converge to 1/2 in probability.  This is exactly
  the way prediction of probabilities are evaluated experimentally. 
  It is irrelevant that the proportion of subsequences that have
  exactly equally 1s and 0s goes down.

  

  Brent

  

  On 3/3/2014 8:32 PM, chris peck wrote:


Hi Liz

  

   I'm not sure I follow.

  

  Me neither.

  

wrote down your room number each time, you'd in
almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd
written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the
time.

  

  there would be no 'about' it were your interpretation right, Liz.
  

  

  It would be all the time, exactly 50%. 

  

  Hes saying that zeros occur about 50%of the time in the zeros and
  ones you have written down. 

  

  That corresponds to the individual bit strings. Not the entire
  collection of them.

  

   I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen
half the time in most sequences?

  

  I suspect its sloppy interpretation rather than sloppy phrasing
  that implies that. 

  

   I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the
16 sequences above)

  

  6/16 isn't half is it? I measured 1 divided by 2 just now and it
  still seems to come out as 0.5 here.

  

   or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with
longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me?

  

  I wrote a little program Liz that collects together all the bit
  strings that can be made from 16 bits. Then it counts the number
  of 1s and 0s in each one. It has a little counter that goes up by
  one every time there are 8 zeros.

  

  there are 65536 combinations. 12870 of them have 8 zeros. 12870 /
  65536 * 100 = 19%.

  

  6/16*100 = 37%

  

  I don't know about you but 19, being less than 37, suggests to me
  that the percentage is going down. But ofcourse ask a
  mathematician if you're not certain of that yourself.

  

 I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases
things in the chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's
trying to make his subject matter seem more accessible.

  

  Yeah, which is preferable to people with similar ideas being slap
  dash in order to make them less accessible.


  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

  If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote 
 down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the 
 sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring 
 about 50% of the time.


There's something strikes me as very strange about this idea.

Tegmark's method is just a means of writing down binary sequences.

Being strict, already with binary sequences just 4 digits long, only 37.5% of 
those contain half zeros. This drops the longer the sequences get. So, with 
sequences 6 digits long, only 31.25% contain half zeros. With sequences 8 
digits long only 27% and with 16 digits only about 19%. 

If his experiment continued for a year, (365 digits) many people would find 
that either room 1 or room 0 was dominating strongly. For these people a change 
in room would seem very odd, a glitch in the matrix that wouldn't be of any 
great concern vis a vis prediction once 'normality' kicked back in the 
following night. For others, a change in room would occur at regular intervals 
and would seem very predictable. There would be the guy who changed room every 
night. There would be all the guys whose room changed every night except for 
the one time when it stayed the same. A little glitch is all.

In truth, the longer you continued the game and the more people got involved 
the less chance a person would have of finding room assignment random at all. 
There would be increasingly few people willing to bet 50/50 on a particular 
room assignment.

Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 17:13:23 +1300
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Hello, dear, looking for a bit of multi-sense realism?
On 2 March 2014 16:35,  ghib...@gmail.com wrote:


heh heh heh I love this place. It's like walking through an eccentric street 
market where traders call out their wares 
 GETCHYOUR P-TIME  2 for 1 logico-computational really real structure today 
only Assuming comp only, that's right comp only. Theology but done like 
science. Madam you are ugly but I will be sober in the morning. You there, you 
reek of not-comp, get lost. Ah sir, did you like the dreams? Same again?
 GETCHOR P-TIME..,.

 




-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

 Naah.  The *fractional* deviation from 50/50 keeps going down as 1/sqrt(n).

You'll have to explain further because it keeps going down. And at 4 digits its 
already well below 50% And at 16 digits its already below 20%. If you're 
generous and say at 16 steps half the people will experience 'roughly' 50% ones 
or zeros, already 50% will have one or the other dominating.

That seems to me to be a far cry from what Tegmark describes.



Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 23:43:09 -0800
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


  

  
  
On 3/2/2014 11:36 PM, chris peck wrote:



  
If you repeated the cloning experiment
  from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number
  each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of
  zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros
  occurring about 50% of the time.





There's something strikes me as very strange about this idea.



Tegmark's method is just a means of writing down binary
sequences.



Being strict, already with binary sequences just 4 digits long,
only 37.5% of those contain half zeros. This drops the longer
the sequences get. So, with sequences 6 digits long, only 31.25%
contain half zeros. With sequences 8 digits long only 27% and
with 16 digits only about 19%. 



If his experiment continued for a year, (365 digits) many people
would find that either room 1 or room 0 was dominating strongly.
For these people a change in room would seem very odd, a glitch
in the matrix that wouldn't be of any great concern vis a vis
prediction once 'normality' kicked back in the following night.
For others, a change in room would occur at regular intervals
and would seem very predictable. There would be the guy who
changed room every night. There would be all the guys whose room
changed every night except for the one time when it stayed the
same. A little glitch is all.



In truth, the longer you continued the game and the more people
got involved the less chance a person would have of finding room
assignment random at all. There would be increasingly few people
willing to bet 50/50 on a particular room assignment.

  



Naah.  The *fractional* deviation from 50/50 keeps going down as
1/sqrt(n).



Brent

  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Edgar

It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by 
quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be 
no deterministic rules for aligning
separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those 
alignments randomly.

Far out, man!


Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 10:33:25 +1300
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 27 February 2014 02:49, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


I came upon an interesting passage in Our Mathematical Universe, starting on 
page 194, which I think members of this list might appreciate:


Yes, a subset of me certainly does. Thanks.

 




-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

 I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to 
 read it, I will this week.

Ah so you dismiss things that you havent read then? Impressive!


 The abstract though did not reject probability calculus, only the 
 interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI setting probability 
 is not about what happen and what does not,

If I say that x will happen with 50% probability I certainly am talking about 
things happening or not happening and if it is clear that probability is not 
about that in MWI, then it is clear that probability in MWI is not about 
probability. 

 but about frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability 
 meaningless... proof is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will 
 follow the predicted distribution.


So you're strategy is to try and semantically wriggle out of the claims you 
make? Pretend the words you use have a different meaning than they really do?


 f you want to assert thing and not back them up, well...

But I did back up what I said. You couldn't be arsed to read the paper about 
Deutsch I offered, remember? You're the only one here refusing to back up 
claims. Perhaps you should give up on yourself?


Here's Deutsh from the abstract of his paper: Quantum Theory of Probability 
and Decisions

The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained
from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the
practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non-
probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic
part of classical decision theory

Read it carefully. It makes clear that he believes that all relevent 
predictions can be made from non probabilistic axioms. You're not going to 
turn around and argue that he meant 'probabilistic axioms' are you?


And from the conclusion:

No probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory. A decision maker who
believes only the non-probabilistic part of the theory, and is 'rational' in 
the sense
defined by a strictly non-probabilistic restriction of classical decision 
theory, will
make all decisions that depend on predicting the outcomes of measurements as if
those outcomes were determined by stochastic processes, with probabilities 
given by
axiom (1). (However, in other respects he will not behave as if he believed that
stochastic processes occur. For instance if asked whether they occur he will 
certainly
reply 'no', because the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory require the 
state
to evolve in a continuous and deterministic way.)

Now if you want to make the case that Deutsch 'does not reject probability' 
whilst he is insisting, indeed founding his reputation on the claim that 'no 
probabilistic axiom is required in quantum theory' be my guest. Im always up 
for a laugh.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 10:43:33 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-25 8:43 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Quentin

That's nonsense, 

The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less 
about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the 
same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just 
discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in 
respected and peer reviewed journals.



Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of 
subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.

 and contrary to observed fact. 



I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the 
angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?


 David Deutsch does not reject probability... 



Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ 
amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we 
should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.


o_O... he doesn't reject probability usage. 




or could you please show a quote where he does.

Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey.
Ok, I give up talking to you, if you want to assert thing and not back them up, 
well...


  I've kindly described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace 
argue, I've supplied papers which you've refused to read. 


I don't refuse to read them. You've cited *one* paper, I didn't have time to 
read it, I will this week. The abstract though did not reject probability 
calculus, only the interpretation of what it means. It is clear that in MWI 
setting probability is not about what happen and what does not, but about 
frequency and measure... that doesn't render probability meaningless... proof 
is, as you always are in *one* world, your measure will follow the predicted 
distribution... so what's your point

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
 been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. 

Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for 
identity over time?

With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a 
criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other 
words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that 
whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the 
reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the 
doctor.

This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoisted by his own petard because its his 
yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'.

All the best

Chris.


 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 19:21:00 +0100
 
 
 On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote:
 
 
 
   provide the algorithm of prediction.
 
  Why? What does that have to do with the price of eggs? FPI is about  
  the feeling of self and prediction has nothing to do with it.
 
 FPI = first person indeterminacy of result of experience having two  
 outcome due to digital self-duplication.
 
 
 
 
   W  M has been refuted.
 
  You said that we have to interview all copies and I agree. After  
  the interviews this is what we find:
 
  W has not refuted it.
  M has not refuted it.
  W  M have confirmed it.
 
 In the 3-1 views.
 
 
 
 
 
   You miss this only by confusing the 3-1 view and the 1-view,
 
  Who's the 1-view?
 
 Each of them.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could 
follow on from your current brain state via whatever transitions rules 
are allowed by - I assume - logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can 
explain.

let me ask a more round about question:

you say that we see spin up every time 'if the definition of you has been 
changed to accommodate the fact that you've split'

Changed from which definition?

All the best

Chris.

Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 15:31:01 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 26 February 2014 15:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




Hi Liz
 In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
 been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. 


Well what definition of 'you' do you suggest we use? What is your criterion for 
identity over time?

Assuming comp it appears to be the state(s) that could follow on from your 
current brain state via whatever transitions rules are allowed by - I assume - 
logical necessity. Perhaps Bruno can explain.


With regards to Bruno's steps, at this point I actually don't feel I need a 
criterion myself. What I have instead is the yes-doctor assumption. In other 
words, whatever criterion is adopted it must satisfy the condition that 
whenever I am copied, destroyed and reconstructed somewhere else, the 
reconstruction IS me. Otherwise, unless suicidal, I would never say yes to the 
doctor.


This is why I used to argue Bruno was hoist by his own petard because its his 
yes-doctor assumption that forces me to 'accommodate the fact that Ive split'.

Indeed. I have mentioned at times that if you accept Yes Doctor the rest of 
comp follows. Which I realise isn't quite true, but that's the big leap.






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 

But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?

All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100


On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:Greaves rejects subjective 
uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down pay special attention to the 
point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a thought experiment formally 
identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.
That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. 

Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said:

 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see 
SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both 
outcome.
Bruno
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume 
 there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your 
 physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.

We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its 
not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will 
always see 'spin up'. 

MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal 
identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in 
which 'we' appear.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 



But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?



She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the 
one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what 
is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the 
prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet 
with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)


Quentin
All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be


To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100




On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down 
pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a 
thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:



What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.


That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. 

Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. She should have said:



 whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see 
SOMETHING definite. And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both 
outcome.


Bruno
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger 
Hauer)






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Of course, and my point is that comp aggravates that problem, as only 
 extends the indterminacy from a wave to arithmetic.

Personally, I don't think it makes a difference what the underlying substrata 
of reality consists of, be it sums or some fundamental 'matter-esq' substance. 
What causes the problem is just the fact that in any TofE all outcomes are 
catered for. In such a theory genuine probabilities just vanish and subjective 
uncertainty can only exist as an epistemic measure.

In versions of MWI it can exist when a person is unable to locate himself in a 
particular branch. ie. in earlier versions of Deutsch where infinite numbers of 
universes run in parallel one might not know whether one is in a spin up or 
spin down universe. Or in your step 3, subjective uncertainty can exist after 
duplication but before opening the door. These people are unable to locate and 
that lack of knowledge translates into subjective uncertainty. They can assign 
a probability value between 0 and 1 to possible outcomes.

But crucially, where all relevant facts are known, the only values available 
must be 1 or 0. That just follows from the fact that all outcomes are catered 
for. And it seems to me that H guy in step 3 has all these relevent facts.

So, whilst the duplicates before opening the door would assign 0.5 to M or W, 
prior to duplication H guy would assign 1. 

This is why I have accused you in the past of smuggling probabilities in from 
the future which strikes me as very fishy.


 OK, I appreciate the work, but they don't address the mind-body problem. 
 Still less the computationalist form of that problem. But they get the 
 closer view of the physical possible with respect to both comp, and the 
 mathematical theory (comp+Theaetetus).

Im not arguing that these people have a complete or even coherent theory. My 
guess is that they don't, I mean who does? It seems like everyone but me thinks 
they are in direct contact with the one and only truth, but its all just 
hubris. It might well be the case that your theory fairs better than theirs on 
the mind-body problem and much else besides but so what? They do far better 
when it comes to probability assignment and subjective uncertainty, imho.

All the best

Chris

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:33:21 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:31 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:





Hi Liz

 I meant changed from our everyday definition, in which we normally assume 
 there is only one you, which is (or is at least associated with) your 
 physical structure. Which we generally assume exists in one universe.



We lose that definition just by stepping into the realm of MWI don't we? Its 
not as if we can have use of it in MWI until we want to argue that we will 
always see 'spin up'. 

MWI forces upon us either the complete abandonment of any notion of personal 
identity over time, or the equal distribution of it through all the branches in 
which 'we' appear.



That's where your wrong... that would mean all branches have equal measure, 
where it must not, if MWI must be in accordance with QM.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#PRPO


 
All the best



Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 07:28:53 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)


To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-26 7:21 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com:







Hi Bruno

 Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views.

There is no such confusion. I haven't seen anyone confusing these.

She should have said: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect 
(with certainty!) to see SOMETHING definite. 





But, If she had of said that you'd both be wrong! 

 And in the 1p it is obvious she will never see both outcome.

You need to stop confusing what is seen with what can be expected to be seen. I 
think that's the source of many of your mistakes. She can expect to see each 
outcome without being committed to the view that either future self sees both. 
All that 1p,3p,3-1p,1-3p stuff is a rubbishy smoke screen to divert attention 
from the simple error you make here, isn't it?





She can make a probabilistic prediction as you can make in MWI... you're the 
one wanting to say probability are wrong, but only the interpretation of what 
is probability change in MWI (and duplication settings)... not the 
prediction... if you say it is totally useless, then you're ready to make a bet 
with me (as everything for your has equal probability of happening...)




Quentin
All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be




To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2014 05:26:02 +0100






On 25 Feb 2014, at 07:31, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin


As I see from the abstract, he doesn't reject probability calculus, only the 
interpretation of it... I'll read the article later. 

Greaves rejects subjective uncertainty. With respect to spin up and spin down 
pay special attention to the point in section 4.1 where, in discussion of a 
thought experiment formally identical to Bruno's step 3, he argues:

What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.

 One reason for MWI, is to explain the observed QM probabilities... 

No, MWI was devised in response to the measurement problem but in abandoning 
wave function collapse Everett ends up with a theory which is very parsimonious 
but entirely deterministic. How to then account for probability in a 
determinist framework has become the Achilles heel of MWI not its raison 
d'être. 

Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.

The point is that how probability fits into MWI's determinist framework, or any 
TofE really, is still an open question. And to argue that must reject MWI if 
they reject Brunos probability sums is plain wrong. Im happy to find myself in 
the company of Oxford Dons like Deutsch and Greaves.

 your theory is disproven by fact... you never see constant spin up... which 
 should be the case if the probability to measure spin up was one.

See above.

All the best

Chris.

From: da...@davidnyman.com
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:32:01 +
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 
This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.


 
Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

 
Correct me if I'm misremembering Chris, but I seem to recall proposing to you 
on a previous occasion that Hoyle's pigeon hole analogy can be a useful way of 
tuning intuitions about puzzles of this sort, although I appear to be the sole 
fan of the idea around here. Hoyle's idea is essentially a heuristic for 
collapsing the notions of identity, history and continuation onto the 
perspective of a single, universal observer. From this perspective, the 
situation of being faced with duplication is just a random selection from the 
class of all possible observer moments.

Well, the just might be not that easy to define.
If the universal observer is the universal machine, the probability to get a 
computational history involving windows or MacOS might be more probable than 
being me or you.


But how would you remember that? 


I am not sure that the notion of observer moment makes sense, without a 
notion of scenario involving a net of computational relative states.
I think the hypostases describe a universal person, composed from a universal 
(self) scientist ([]p), a universal knower ([]p  p), an observer ([]p  p), 
and a feeler ([]p  p  p)).


But I would not say that this universal person (which exist in arithmetic and 
is associated with all relatively self-referential correct löbian number) will 
select among all observer moment.


Well, perhaps eventually it will select all of them, if we can give some 
relevant sense to eventually in this context. And I suppose Hoyle's point is 
that if one imagines a logical serialisation of all such moments, its order 
must be inconsequential because of the intrinsic self-ordering

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
 anything added.

I can't see that MWI has an explanation of probability.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out 
one way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they 
assume an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a 
measure of the proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up 
branch.

Is there something wrong with that?

It doesn't really address the issue. It doesn't address the question 'what can 
I expect to see'. Of course, I can say this set of future mes will inhabit a 
spin up branch and this set of future mes will inhabit a spin down branch. So, 
this proportion of future mes will see spin up and this portion will see spin 
down.

Asked what I (present me) can expect to see: well I can expect to see spin up 
and spin down Asked to assign a probability to seeing either result I 
assign 1 to both.

Theirs is a method of calculating frequencies of me seeing ups and downs but 
not probabilities of seeing up or down.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 13:30:48 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 25 February 2014 13:05, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




Since Everett there have been numerous attempts to smuggle an account of 
probability back into the theory, and more recent attempts: Deutsch, Wallace, 
Greaves etc., do that by abandoning the concept of subjective uncertainty 
altogether and replacing it with some kind of rational action principle. In 
otherwords, you can expect to see spin up and spin down, but you should act as 
if there was some objective bias towards one or the other. The approach comes 
complete with its own set of philosophical problems.


I can't see why the MWI's existing explanation of probability needs to have 
anything added.

Probability in the MWI is deduced from the results of measurements by an 
experimenter. Effectively, if they assume that they inhabit a non-branching 
universe, they will regard the proportion of times a measurement comes out one 
way (spin up say) as the probability of that result occurring. If they assume 
an MWI perspective, however, the probabilty of that outcome is a measure of the 
proportion of experimenters who will be found in the spin-up branch.


Is there something wrong with that?






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

That's nonsense, 

The point wasn't whether you think its nonsense or not. I couldn't care less 
about that. we were arguing about whether there are Oxford Dons who adopt the 
same standpoint as me, and given your little outburst above I think you've just 
discovered that there are. And that they are publishing these ideas in 
respected and peer reviewed journals.

Just to recap then: It is perfectly respectable to reject the notion of 
subjective uncertainty without abandoning MWI. Just as I said.

 and contrary to observed fact. 

I always wince when you throw that one out. How does one break it to the 
angriest member of a list that they are continually begging the question?


 David Deutsch does not reject probability... 

Sure he does, he swaps out the Born rule for rational decision theory (+ 
amendments to make it compatible with MWI). There isn't probability, but we 
should act 'as if' there was. Its what he's famous for, Quentin.

or could you please show a quote where he does.

Do your own homework, mate. I'm not your little quote monkey. I've kindly 
described to you what I think people like Deutsch and Wallace argue, I've 
supplied papers which you've refused to read. if you disagree you need display 
the same generosity and explain to me what you think they are arguing and how 
that is different. Waving your hands in the air demanding more and more to 
unceremoniously and uncritically ditch is no-ones idea of fun.

All the best

Chris.

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2014 20:26:52 +1300
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

In the MWI you do see spin up every time! ,,, if the definition of you has 
been changed to accommodate the fact that you've split. Or to put it another 
way, you (now) will become you (who sees spin up) and you (who sees spin down), 
which by then will be two different people.






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, 
 and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B 
 with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident it 
 duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp 
 and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought 
 experiment.

An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined 
result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the 
big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p 
uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin 
flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you 
shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.

This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.

Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

All the best

Chris.

 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
 
 
 On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =  
 the FPI of step 3):
 
  The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only  
  reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
 
 
 OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
 
 The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC  
 indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic  
 framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to  
 Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of  
 computationalism.
 
 That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is  
 basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my  
 papers, 'course.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

  then I can't see how you could still agree with many world interpretation 
 and reject probability, that's not consistent... unless of course, you 
 reject MWI.

I definitely wouldn't say I accept MWI. But even so, not everyone who does 
accept it agrees that there is subjective uncertainty. So, I can accept MWI and 
reject the probability sums Bruno derives and be in good company.

See here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 01:04:53 +




Hi Liz

  Let's also suppose you don't know which solar system you will be sent to, 
 and that in fact the matter transmitter is supposed to send you to A or B 
 with equal probability based on some quantum coin flip. But by accident it 
 duplicates you, and sends you to both. This effectively conflates the comp 
 and MWI versions IMHO, so you can't easily disentangle them in this thought 
 experiment.

An important aspect of step 3's experiment is that it depicts a determined 
result from 3p which is, allegedly, subject to uncertainty from 1p. Thats the 
big result right? That seems to get lost in your revision. You get 1p 
uncertainty but at the expense of 3p certainty. By introducing a 'quantum coin 
flip' you're loading the dice towards uncertainty. So I can't really say you 
shown an equivalence between step 3 and MWI.

This is the same as saying that I will experience all possible futures in the 
MWI - but by the time I experience them, of course, the version of me in each 
branch will be different, and it always seems to me, retrospectively, as 
though I only experienced one outcome.

Each duplicate will only experience one outcome. I don't think there is any 
disagreement about that. The problems occur when considering what the person 
duplicated will experience and then what probability he should assign to each 
outcome and that seems to me to depend on what identity criterion gets imposed. 
Its a consideration I've gone into at length and won't bore you with again. But 
I will say that where you think that what Bruno wants is just recognition that 
each duplicate sees one outcome, I think that he actually wants to show that 3p 
and 1p probability assignments would be asymmetric from the stand point of the 
person duplicated. Certainly for me he doesn't manage that.

All the best

Chris.

 From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 07:56:14 +0100
 
 
 On 22 Feb 2014, at 21:09, LizR wrote to Clark (with the above pap =  
 the FPI of step 3):
 
  The above pap is only a small step in an argument (and it only  
  reproduces a result obtained in the MWI, anyway).
 
 
 OK, but the MWI is a big thing, relying on another big thing: QM.
 
 The FPI assumes only the comp theory of mind, and extracts, as PGC  
 indicates, a strong form of indeterminacy in a purely deterministic  
 framework. That makes QM confirming a simple, (even according to  
 Clark) but startling and counter-intuitive consequence of  
 computationalism.
 
 That was new, and broke the common brain-mind identity thesis, and is  
 basically still ignored by everyone, except on this list and my  
 papers, 'course.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter 
transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out 
the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is 
the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you
to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet 
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists.
 





Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't 
know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the 
probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : small chance.

Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
chance) as far as I am concerned.

Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their 
own, the probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : 1.

So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular 
view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI 
scenarios. 

All the best

Chris.





From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100


On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
 
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say 
exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.

Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we 
have to interview all the copies.


  
  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees 
  neither Washington nor Moscow.
 
 So, this is my first post to you,
 
Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating 
chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.

On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p 
we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent 
atomic memories like WWMWMM. Say.



  
 despite I remember having sent other post?
 
The question is ambiguous because lots and lots of people in addition to Mr. I 
remember the exact same thing.

Obviously. We agree. But there is no ambiguity. By definition of 1p and comp, 
we have to take all the copies 1p view into account. That is why if the H-guy 
predicted W v M, all its copies win the bet, and if he predicted W  M, all 
the copies admits this was wrong (even if correct for the 3-1 view, but clearly 
false from their 1-views).


  
 If Mr he sees neither W or M, then he died,
 
If  Bruno Marchal wants to invent a new language and that's what the words  
death and he  are decreed to mean then fine, but to be consistent John 
Clark and Bruno Marchal of yesterday would have to be dead too. And it should 
be noted that invented languages make communication with others difficult, just 
look at Esperanto, and John Clark thinks that deep philosophical discussions 
are difficult enough as they are even if conducted in a mutually agreed upon 
language, so more obstacles to understanding are not needed.

You quote and comment yourself!



  
  and then comp is false.
 
That's fine, I don't give a hoot in hell if the incoherent grab bag of ideas 
you call comp is false or not. The word is your invention not mine and you're 
the only one who seems to know exactly what it means.

You have repeated that sentence an infinity of times. Comp is the quite 
standard hypothesis that the brain, or whatever responsible for my 
consciousness manifestation here and now, is Turing emulable.It is not my 
invention. comp abbreviates computationalism. I show the consequence, and you 
stop at step 3 for reason that you do not succeed to communicate.

  
  We also died each time we measure a spin, or anything.
 
Then the word died doesn't mean much.

That was a consequence of your saying.


  
 In AUDA this is a confusion
 
You have forgotten IHA.

I told you more than five times what AUDA means. Stop joking, and try to be 
serious. AUDA is the Arithmetical UDA, also called interview of the universal 
machine in sane04. It is the main part of the thesis in computer science.If 
you doubt that it means that you do repeat hearsay. 

 
  between []p and []p  t.
 
How in the world could anybody be confused between []p and []p  t especially 
if they had a nice low mileage AUDA convertible to help them get around town?

Mocking does not help you.

  
 you believe we have refuted comp. That would be a gigantic discovery
 
 Not to me it wouldn't! I don't care if comp is true or false because I don't 
believe comp is worth a 

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

By and large you didn't get my response to Quentin and largely the comments you 
made didn't actually address the comments I was making, or the questions I was 
asking Quentin. It seems more as if you were addressing comments you hoped I 
was making but didn't. With respect then I've just passed all that stuff by.

I thought this was worth commenting on though:

 So from the FPI, you can infer which you notion was involved. It is asked 
 to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in Helsinki. And the 
 question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel to be, or equivalently, 
 which city you will feel to be reconstituted in. The 3-you == 1-you in 
 Helsinki knows that there will be only one, from his future pov.

No, (3-you == 1-you) knows he has 2 future povs. He knows he will feel to be in 
both Washington and Moscow.

How can I make this clear for you that this is a 1-p expectancy? Because I 
think you have things completely the wrong way around. You say that it takes an 
act of intellectual and 3-p reasoning to draw the conclusion that I will be in 
both W and M, and that more naturally from the 1-p perspective I will only 
expect to see 1 city.

I say, no. Before the trip to both M and W I will day dream about walking 
through the corridors of the white house in Washington AND day dream about 
walking through the corridors of the Kremlin in moscow. I will imagine meeting 
and talking to Obama but also dream of meeting and talking to Putin. I'll sit 
at my work desk planning what I would say to each of them if we actually did 
meet. At night I wil dream of doing these things and wake up surprised that I 
am not actually in Moscow and not actually in Washington yet. And these dreams 
will be as 1-p as any common-all-garden dream. If I stop and think about 
things, if I intellectualize the matter from a 3-p perspective, then I will 
realize that my two future selves will be unique and separate and therefore 
will only see one or the other, but from my current non-duplicated perspective 
this will seem odd and hard to imagine. when I relax and let my mind wander I 
will expect to see both and dream of seeing both.

So, when you ask me where I will expect to be, of course I will answer that i 
expect to be in Moscow and Washington. And if you tell me that I will in fact 
only experience one or the other, I will demand my money back or at least half 
of it.

All the best

Chris.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 03:48:43 +




Hi Liz

Suppose for the sake of argument that the matter 
transmitter sends you to another solar system where you will live out 
the reminder of your life. Maybe you committed some crime and this is 
the consequence, to be transported :) A malfunction causes you
to be duplicated and sent to both destinations, but you will never meet 
your doppelganger in the other solar system, or find out that he exists.
 





Does this make any difference to how you assign probabilities? If so, why?

My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I don't 
know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then the 
probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : small chance.

Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
chance) as far as I am concerned.

Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of their 
own, the probabilities end up:

Solar System A : 1
Solar System B : 1.

So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an unpopular 
view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get rounded up to 1 in MWI 
scenarios. 

All the best

Chris.





From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 20:45:39 +0100


On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:59, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 2:47 AM, 
Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

   I can say today that I am the guy having answered your post of last week.
 
But if duplicating chambers exist then there are lots of people who could say 
exactly the same thing, so more specificity is needed.

Well, if it is about a prediction on 1p events, the specificity is simple: we 
have to interview all the copies.


  
  and neither is experiencing Helsinki right now, therefore Mr. he sees 
  neither Washington nor Moscow.
 
 So, this is my first post to you,
 
Bruno Marchal has certainly sent other posts to John Clark, but if duplicating 
chambers exist it's not at all clear who Mr. my is.

On the contrary. It is always clear. In the 3p we are all copies, and in the 1p 
we are one of them.That is what they all say. They have they own permanent 
atomic memories like 

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Russel

 This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the
probability of the certain event = 1.

Yes it does doesnt it. 

But thats ok. Im not convinced Kolmogorov had MWI in view when he dreamt up his 
axioms and Im too green behind the ears vis a vis probability axioms to know 
whether it matters much. But that 4th axiom does look like it might need 
revising.

So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability
as we known it.

sure and thats fine by me. Particularly if these thought experiments are 
intended as analogies for MWI then I think probability loses meaning from both 
frog and bird's eye views. In fact, for any TofE where all possibilities are 
catered for probability is the first casualty. Its the logic of the situation 
that does violence to the concept of probability not the manner in which the 
plenitude is realized. What i think is unusual about my position is that I 
stand fast against uncertainty in frogs as well as birds. Thank goodness there 
are academics out there like Hilary Graves who think in tune with me, its an 
unusual position but not a unique one.

All the best

Chris.

 Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:19:47 +1100
 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
 
 On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:48:43AM +, chris peck wrote:
  
  My probabilities get assigned in the same way. ie: chance of seeing solar 
  system A is 1. I can't assign a probability of seeing Solar System B if I 
  don't know about the possibility of accidents. But, 
  If I know that there is a small chance of the accident you describe then 
  the probabilities end up:
  
  Solar System A : 1
  Solar System B : small chance.
  
  Note that the probability of seeing Solar System A doesn't end up (1-small 
  chance) as far as I am concerned.
  
  Also note that in the MWI example, where small chances require a world of 
  their own, the probabilities end up:
  
  Solar System A : 1
  Solar System B : 1.
  
  So the probabilities work out slightly differently. I'm sure its an
 unpopular view but as I see it probabilities, however small, get
 rounded up to 1 in MWI scenarios. 
 
 This contradicts Kolmogorov's 4th axiom of probability, namely that the
 probability of the certain event = 1.
 
 In your probabilities, the probability of the certain event of seeing
 either solar system A or seeing solar system B, or something else
 entirely different again ends up being greater than or equal to 2.
 
 So maybe you can give meaning to your measure, but it aint probability
 as we known it.
 
 
 -- 
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll 
try one last time,  and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and 
explanation from your part.

So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what 
we will do (duplicating you) is possible.

Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is clearly 
illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and '*you*'.

 So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, 
 so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two 
 doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by 
 destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly 
 identical room),

Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is destroyed 
and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets destroyed and recreated 
'*you*' who presses the button? or someone different? Afterall, you explicitly 
introduced the distinction to make things clear, so Im not sure if you just 
made a typo. if not where did 'you' come from? I feel like huge violence is 
being done to the pronoun you here. I say you so that you can distinguish 
between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play. when I say you rather 
than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you.


 the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one 
 has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the 
 button ?

I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when you'll press 
the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie. did you mean 'when 
*you*'ll press the button'?


look at this bit:

1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No

If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to 
see both event simultaneously ?

In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to see, but 
then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*' expect to see. Are 
you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all three? It seems to me that 
'you' can expect to see one room or the other, and 'you' (the other 'you', 
there being two 'you' and one '*you*') can expect to see one room or the other, 
and '*you*' can expect to see both if 'you','you' and '*you*' bear the identity 
relation that is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption, you see? 

Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you' or 'you' 
will see both. The result of the probability calculus ... actually, lets not 
call it calculus because its just a way of bigging up what infact is very 
little ... the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts is different 
from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because '*you*' is going to 
be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are. '*you*' has to bear in mind that 
both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense. 'you' and 'you' don't need to 
worry about that. And infact to get any other result than zero from the sum, 
this identity relation between '*you*', 'you' and 'you' must stand, which 
brings us to another point: as Clark points out, preservation of identity is 
central to this thought experiment.

The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless, and if the 
intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated people would only ever 
have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed worthless. Does Bruno really need to 
advertise an inability to conduct simple probability sums to convince you that 
individuals only have a single pov? 

But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about. Its also about trying to 
maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken belief that it has a legitimate place 
in Everettian MWI.

All the best

Chris.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com:


On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:




 Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the 
 argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, 



So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic in 
doing so. No can do. 

That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet 
doppelganger argument, == read the next quote.





 or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability 
 calculus meaningless.



If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with both 
experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be meaningless 
because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum Mechanics works 
as well as it does.


The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you 

RE: What are numbers? What is math?

[chris peck]

how can facts exist that are not grounded in observation at some point?

Russell and Liz are wandering around the countryside and Liz points at the 
ground and says:

there's a gold coin buried right there.

Russell says:

no there isn't

They both walk on without looking. And in the subsequent march of history no - 
one ever looks.

Surely, at least one unobserved fact was stated? Maybe even 2 if you are an 
MWIer.

 Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 14:10:34 +1100
 From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: What are numbers? What is math?
 
 On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote:
  On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
  
   Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist?
  
  You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g.
  millions of people have observed that the sun shines without
  understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion.
  
 
 Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in
 the Multiverse).
 
  But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in
  observation at some point?
  
 
 Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so
 we'd better let him elaborate what he means.
 
 -- 
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Quentin

 I do not, valid critics are valid, 

By definition mate.

 but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he 
 maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does 
 not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. 

This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things 
that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing 
out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make 
Bruno evil??? 

In a later post you try to rebut Clark :

In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is 
 because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they 
 will never meet. 


That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 
200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy 
skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can 
not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its 
dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.

In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that 
Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he 
was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.

all the best

Chris.


Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  

  
  

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.

If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. 




Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of 
comp).
 






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him

That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality you 
who has failed to convince him.

All the best

Chris

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 +




Hi Quentin

 I do not, valid critics are valid, 

By definition mate.

 but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he 
 maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does 
 not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. 

This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things 
that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing 
out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make 
Bruno evil??? 

In a later post you try to rebut Clark :

In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is 
 because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they 
 will never meet. 


That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 
200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet...

But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy 
skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can 
not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its 
dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly.

In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that 
Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he 
was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics.

all the best

Chris.


Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  

  
  

So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is
true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to
refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level.

If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. 




Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe
then it cannot confirm comp.


This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of 
comp).
 






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and 
can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps 
simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that 
duplication is possible. 

my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a 
universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern 
technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score have 
they?

All the best

Chris.

Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and 
can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps 
simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that 
duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above 
the quantum level has accepted Yes Doctor.)


If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than oh 
but we can't do that (yet) !






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas

[chris peck]

Hi Chris dM and Bruno etc

 Once, Chris Peck said that he was convinced by Clark's argument) and I 
 invited him to elaborate, as that might give possible lightening. He did not 
 comply, and I was beginning that UDA was problematical for people named 
 Chris.

I think Clark should elaborate on his arguments rather than me, firstly because 
he'll do it better than I ever could and secondly it will save me the 
embarrassment if I have him wrong. I've elaborated at length on my own 
criticisms of step 3 and stand by them. 

I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way through 
Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that Clark's 
erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or difficult to 
follow. That the person who actually devised the steps themselves remains 
confused about Clark's comments almost beggars belief. There;s something very 
odd about that.

There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to MWI. Like 
some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he defends the 
notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context. I can see though that in 
Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas in MWI they are duplicated 
between worlds, and there possibly are some repercussions vis a vis the proper 
use of pro-nouns because of that. Im not sure it matters much, because Clark 
could be right about Comp and just inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, 
loudly pursued by Quentin, has always seemed impotent to me and not worth 
bothering about.

Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because, mentioning no 
names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm wavey about people 
criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. So for now at least, I'll limit myself to 
recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread. The Quiet Earth (1985) is 
a little known gem, btw.

All the best
Chris.

Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300
Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:


On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:




On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:





On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:






On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:














String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of the 
quark-gluon plasma before it was measured

Correctly, I assume.
 





 and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen 
bridges, which is more like a retrodiction. 


That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have a 
nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably have to 
be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you can do it very 
simply anyway?






And how can it be done very simply?
By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for the 
particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons).




Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR. 





It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask a physicist for the details, 
but it is a mechanism whereby the state of the measuring apparatus can 
influence the state of the entire system. If we assume the emitter creates a 
pair of entangled photons and their polarisation is measured at two 
spacelike-separated locations, then the polarisers can act as a constraint on 
the state of the photons and hence of the system, and that the setting of one 
polariser can therefore influence the polarisation measured in the other branch 
of the experiment (without any FTL signals / non-locality).




This preserves realism and locality at the expense of dropping an assumption 
that most physicists think is untrue anyway (though the idea of time being 
asymmetric is so deeply ingrained that we automatically assume it must be true 
of systems it doesn't apply to, like single photons).


Your explanation is hardly satisfactory for this physicist 
That's because I'm not a physicist. I'm merely showing that an explanation is 
possible, and hence should be investigated (although it isn't me showing this - 
it's been looked into by various people, from Wheeler-Feynman absorber theory 
onwards).


It has been considered a satisfactory basis for an explanation of Bell's 
Inequality by some physicists, including John Bell.






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com

RE: Films I think people on this forum might like

[chris peck]

you guys should check out

Dark City (has a platonic reality isn't really real thing going on)
Moon   (has a memory/identity/AI thing going on)
Source Code (has a 'its just numbers being computed' thing going on)

Tarkovsky's Solaris and Stalker are also pretty stunning if you can handle 10 
minute shots of dripping water and general Russian misery etc.

happy viewing!

:)




From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Films I think people on this forum might like
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 12:25:00 +0100


On 04 Feb 2014, at 08:33, LizR wrote:My son (15) has been trying to get us to 
watch Incaption for a while. Once we get time...

After the prestige, that was rather disappointing, for me.
My favorite movie is the thirteenth  floor, or the corresponding novel 
SIMULACRON III (Daniel Galouze).
According to some people, MATRIX is full of allusion to conscience  
mécanisme but I can't see it without falling asleep. I still don't know if it 
is comp-correct, like simulacron III is. Boring and not quite sexy, but I would 
have love it, I guess, if I was 12 years old. 
Bruno



On 4 February 2014 20:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
 Some more I can add that I enjoyed:
 
 Adjustment Bureau
 Inception
 Open Your Eyes (Spanish language, with subtitles).
 
 These are mainly virtual reality type movies.
 
 I'm going to add some of the others mentioned to my DVD service queue.
 
 Cheers
 
 On Mon, Feb 03, 2014 at 03:45:47PM -0600, Jason Resch wrote:
  Liz,
 
  Great recommendations, and excellent topic idea.
 
  The Prestige is the movie that got me interested in these topics and led me
  to this list.  Also, for US viewers, Chronochrimes goes by Timecrimes and
  is available under netflix under that title. I found it to be the first
  realistic portrayal of single-universe time travel in any movie I have seen.
 
  Somewhat off-topic being a TV series, but the recently reimagined
  Battlestar Galactica probes many of the questions of machine vs. human
  consciousness. I recommend it to Craig.
 
  Jason
 
 
  On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 12:14 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
 
   One I've mentioned ad nauseum - Memento.
  
   There is also The Prestige, which I would definitely recommend.
  
   To avoid spoilers, I won't go into detail about why these films might
   appeal, but they both address issues mentioned on this list (at least
   tangentially, and in a fictional manner).
  
   I might also mention Chronocrimes for its portrayal of a block univese.
  
   Sadly no one seems to have filmed October the First is Too Late although
   the 10-episode epic Doctor Who story The War Games comes close in some
   respects. In fact I wouldn't be at all surprised if the Who story was
   inspired by Hoyle's novel, which I think appeared about 3 years beforehand
   if I remember correctly. I would semi-recommend this (but you have to
   remember that it was made in black and white, for viewing as a weekly
   serial in 1969...)
  
--
   You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
   Everything List group.
   To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
   email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
   To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
   Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
   For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  
 
  --
  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
  Everything List group.
  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
  email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
  Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
  For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 --
 
 
 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Principal, High Performance Coders
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
 
 
 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to 

RE: Global warming silliness

[chris peck]

I'm not an expert on climate change. I know a couple of things though.

I know that according to a fairly large scientific consensus the planet might 
be getting hotter. I know that these predictions are based on flawed models of 
the weather system and how it operates. I also know that whilst flawed and not 
being the best possible models, there is a consensus amongst scientists that 
they are the best available models. They may not actually be the best 
available, there might be a largely ignored model that is bang on target, but 
there is a consensus that they are. This consensus exists within a bunch of 
people who are fairly intelligent and have spent a long time thinking about the 
models. This consensus has largely be reached independently.

I'm far too busy feeding my family and arguing about angels on pin heads to 
make it my life's goal to become an expert on climate change. Given that, it 
would be irrational of me not to act in accordance with the consensus. I know I 
must not fall into the 'Top Gear syndrome' and deride the consensus because I 
love cars. Or fall into the 'free love syndrome' and support the consensus 
because I love hugging trees. That would be silly. I act in accordance with the 
consensus because there is one, because it is a scientific one, and because it 
is born of minds that are fairly brainy.

The climate change scientists who do not support the consensus academically are 
being irrational if they do not support it politically. Again, this is because 
there is amongst brainy people like themselves a consensus which disagrees with 
their academic work. They should recognize their own personal fallibility. 
Equally though, the larger community should recognize the fallibility of the 
consensus and ensure that the attempt to refute the consensus continues with 
full financial support. But their studies should not be acted upon politically 
until it becomes a consensus. This oils the gears of progress.

There was a time when the consensus was that the earth was flat and only a few 
years old. That demons were the cause of illness and an apocalypse was 
imminent, and that sinners were destined to hell fire. If that was the 
consensus amongst brainy people who had spent time thinking about it, it would 
have been irrational to act in contradiction to it.

Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2013 09:48:37 -0800
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Global warming silliness


  

  
  
On 11/14/2013 3:34 AM, Bruno Marchal
  wrote:


The use of science by government of science is of the
  type of pseudo-religion abuse.


?? Does not parse.

  

  Brent


  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Global warming silliness

[chris peck]

http://adaptationresourcekit.squarespace.com/storage/climate%20change%20cartoons_better%20world.jpg?__SQUARESPACE_CACHEVERSION=1302730968594





Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 14:48:50 -0800
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Global warming silliness


  

  
  
On 11/13/2013 1:19 PM, John Mikes
  wrote:


More than ~2 million peer-reviewed articles approved
  the Bible stories beween 1599 and 2010.


But did they provide
  any data?

  

  Brent


  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Step 3

[chris peck]

Hi Jason (again)

in your response to Brent:

Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one 
psychological or physiological continuity can be successful.

ok, but in Bruno's step 3 it is taken as axiomatic that you survive in both 
branches because there is a continuity of psychological phenomena like memory. 
this is the 'yes doctor' axiom. Being an axiom Bruno doesn't need to defend it. 
We are obliged to assume it.

That said, taking issue with it is tantamount to admitting that we do not 
survive the teleportation, in which case the probability of me seeing Moscow or 
Washington is 0.

There is a concept of the observer moment. A discrete snippet of experience and 
the UD is churning these out willy nilly in a digital form. Or maybe they're 
all just there in an infinite plenitude of blah. Now the observer moments can 
be in any old order. A moment from tomorrow can be churned out before a moment 
from yesterday. Identity emerges as a trace of coherent memory. There is no 
need for an inherent order between the elements so long as there is some means 
of coherently connecting the observer moments. In this scheme the order is 
implicit in the notion of coherent memory.To use an analogy from IT , I suspect 
its the difference between sorting an array of shuffled digital cards or just 
keeping track of pointers to cards in an array when shuffling. Like wise 
physics emerges in this coherent trace. For example, in one observer moment a 
pen is dropped. Whats next? An observer moment where the pen goes down? One 
where it goes up? One where it goes right or left? All these moments are 
catered for in the infinite plenitude. So physics, here the law of gravity, 
becomes an investigation into a psychologically consistent trace of pen 
moments. All those where the pen keeps going down in my trace. Its going to be 
tricky to keep track of traces because they criss-cross. That is, all moments 
in some sense are coherent with one another. The pen down one vertical voxel is 
a consistent with moments where the pen is at any of the voxel neighbors, up 
down, left right, back forward. Taking different velocities into account it 
doesn't even have to be a neighboring voxel. Where is velocity anyway? Is it 
between the moments? Within the moments. A problem here I think.

Anyway, the point is that continuity between moments seems to me to be a big, 
big deal in this scenario. So, if you are of the view that continuity isn't 
even sufficient to maintain identity then I wonder to what degree you really 
are on the same page as Bruno.

best regards.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Step 3
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 02:18:43 +




Hi Jason

You're presenting the exact same situation in a different context in the hope 
that it will clarify the issues for me, I suppose. My response is exactly the 
same for your new version as it is for the original. The same as it is for 
Bruno's example in which the duplications involved explode to cover every 
possible permutation of pixel combinations that could occur over a 90 minute 
period on a telly. 

Perhaps a better tack might be to accept that I understand the issues under 
debate, and address the arguments that I offer directly rather than claim 
'misunderstanding' etc. 

How can uncertainty arise in a subject who believes he knows all the relevent 
facts?

How does a prediction of 50/50 not contravene the axiom that I survive 
anihilation and duplication into two (any number of) branches?

regards.


Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:12:55 +1300
Subject: Re: Step 3
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it 
easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an 
AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI 
could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI 
style splitting.


What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and 
remain red. There are copies of it which see the ball go blue at various 
points...

However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know what 
it will see, or to be more exact it knows that it will see all 
combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an it but a them. 
Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones 
aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with 
varied experiences.


In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, 
because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into 
different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being 
copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that 
its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours.


So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything?



On 

RE: For John Clark

[chris peck]

Hi Jason

 Right but when you refer to the experience or chris peck's experiences, 
 that is speaking in the third person.

It should make no difference to your argument at all. In fact Bruno's step 3 is 
written in the third person too.  You're confusing how the set up is described 
with what is actually thought by the protagonists. In fact let me use a 
paragraph from Bruno's step 3 replacing the issues under debate, that way there 
can be no confusion about the fact that I not mistaking a 1-p view for a 3-p 
view any more than he is.

Bruno's version (and take special note of the use of third person descriptions):

Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment 
about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot 
predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted 
to an unavoidable uncertainty. This is remarkable because from a third person 
point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the 
mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. 
But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, 
entails a strong form of indeterminacy[10], bearing on the possible consistent 
extensions, when they are observed by the first person, as both diaries can 
witness. This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 
1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any 
noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a 
probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” Before 
proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal ignorance.

Corrected version:

[Given] the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the 
experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he 
[can] predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is 
confronted to an unavoidable [certainty]. This is [unremarkable] because from a 
third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and 
indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of 
determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 
3-deterministic, entails a strong form of [determinacy], bearing on the 
[certain] consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, 
[regardless of what] both diaries can witness. This is what I [shouldn't] call 
the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. [Regardless] that 
Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the 
experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of 100% to the event “I 
will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” [because] Before proceeding the 
experiencer is in a state of maximal [knowledge].


 According to your usage, how is the meaning of subjective certainty 
 different from just certainty?

They are identical. Bruno argues that if everyone is certain or uncertain of 
something then this certainty become 'objective' in some sense. Its an 
irrelevant point he makes but nevertheless it is wrong. Its a confusion between 
solipsism and subjectivism. certainty and uncertainty are predicates applicable 
only to subjects. 'I's. And no matter how many people hold a belief or are 
certain or uncertain of something those certainties / uncertainties are only 
ever subjective.

 After the duplication there are two experiencers. --[notice the third 
 person description you're employing here!] Each is confronted with the 
 impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would 
 next have following the duplication.  The knowledge that all experiences 
 will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty.

I keep pointing out that the question is asked prior to duplication and you 
keep ignoring that.

 According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know 
 future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all 
 possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the 
 original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing himself 
 becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not subjective in the 
 sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should literally imagine 
 what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber and be duplicated.


Imagining what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber from a first 
person perspective is precisely what I am doing. And you can not ignore the 
fact that the experiencer will have a certain set of beliefs as he goes in. 
Infact, it is axiomatic to Bruno's reasoning that we assume the experiencer is 
a 'comp practitioner' who would 'say yes' to the doctor. ie. it is axiomatic 
that the experiencer has a very specific set of beliefs. If you don't take 
these beliefs into account then *you* are not imagining what it would be like 
to be the experiencer. So, when

RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article

[chris peck]

yep. organity is emergent.

Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 14:46:54 +1300
Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 25 October 2013 14:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their 
persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit of 
the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by anything 
other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms are made 
from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living organism that we 
have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure mathematics, or can 
survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or mathematics.


What are inorganic atoms? Or rather (since I suspect all atoms are inorganic), 
what are organic atoms?






-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article

[chris peck]

 The alien might be completely confident in his judgement, having a
brain made of exotic matter. He would argue that however complex its
behaviour, a being made of ordinary matter that evolved naturally
could not possibly have an understanding of what it is doing.

Aliens don't matter. They can be wrong about us being thoughtless and we can be 
right that computers are thoughtless.

There seem to be two points of view here:

1) Whether a machine is thinking is determined by the goals it achieves 
(beating people at chess, translating bulgarian)

2) Whether a machine is thinking is determined by how it trys to achieve a 
goal. How does it cognate?

I find myself rooting for the second point of view. A machine wouldn't need to 
beat kasperov to convince me it was thinking, but it would have to make 
mistakes and successes in the same way that I would against kasperov. 

In developmental psychology there is the question of how children learn 
grammar. I forget the details; but some bunch of geeks at a brainy university 
had developed a neural net system that given enough input and training began to 
apply grammatical rules correctly. What was really interesting though was that 
despite arriving at a similar competence to a young child, the journey there 
was very different. The system outperformed children (on average) and crucially 
didn't make the same kind of mistakes that are ubiquitous as children learn 
grammar. The ubiquity is important because it shows that in children the same 
inherent system is at play; the absence of mistakes between computer and child 
is important because it shows that theses systems are different. 

At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is learning or 
thinking about grammar. It is a matter of philosophical taste. It certainly 
isn't learning or thinking as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The 
way we cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we know is 
genuine. Do AI systems do that? The answer is obviously : No they don't. Are 
computers brainy in the way we are? No they are not. You can broaden the 
definition of thought and braininess to encompass it if you like, but that is 
just philosophical bias. They do not do what we do.

Regards

 From: stath...@gmail.com
 Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 13:11:47 +1100
 Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 On 25 October 2013 12:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  You could say that human chess players just take in visual data,
  process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical
  signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien
  scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not
  understanding!
 
 
  Right, but since we understand that such an alien observation would be in
  error, we must give our own experience the benefit of the doubt.
 
 The alien might be completely confident in his judgement, having a
 brain made of exotic matter. He would argue that however complex its
 behaviour, a being made of ordinary matter that evolved naturally
 could not possibly have an understanding of what it is doing.
 
  The
  computer does not deserve any such benefit of the doubt, since there is no
  question that it has been assembled intentionally from controllable parts.
  When we see a ventriloquist with a dummy, we do not entertain seriously that
  we could be mistaken about which one is really the ventriloquist, or whether
  they are equivalent to each other.
 
 But if the dummy is autonomous and apparently just as smart as the
 ventriloquist many of us would reconsider.
 
  Looking at natural presences, like atoms or galaxies, the scope of their
  persistence is well beyond any human relation so they do deserve the benefit
  of the doubt. We have no reason to believe that they were assembled by
  anything other than themselves. The fact that we are made of atoms and atoms
  are made from stars is another point in their favor, whereas no living
  organism that we have encountered is made of inorganic atoms, or of pure
  mathematics, or can survive by consuming only inorganic atoms or
  mathematics.
 
 There is no logical reason why something that is inorganic or did not
 arise spontaneously or eats inoragnic matter cannot be conscious. It's
 just something you have made up.
 
 
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe 

RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article

[chris peck]

 Unfortunately we don't even have that example, because we don't know how we 
 think.

We know that a certain set of mistakes are ubiquitous when learning grammer. 
(overgeneralising for example). Cats. dogs. hamsters. ... Sheeps. deers. etc.

And we know the computer system didn't make these mistakes.

Thats all we need to know to say that the two systems are not the same. All we 
need to know to say the computer was not doing what children do.

Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:35:05 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article


  

  
  
On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris peck
  wrote:


At this juncture then it becomes moot whether the
  computer is learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of
  philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking as we
  learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we cognate is the
  only example we have of cognition that we know is genuine.


Unfortunately we don't
  even have that example, because we don't know how we think.

  

  Brent


  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article

[chris peck]

 But you're back to judging internal processes by external behavior.

I have nothing against doing that. Its exactly what I in fact did.

Where there are no behavioral differences from which we can identify internal 
differences, we would not know whether they were cognitively different or the 
same.  Maybe they are, maybe they are not. And that certainly leads to the 
problem of other minds, say between children learning grammar.

But where we can do that, say between this grammar system and children or Deep 
Blue and Kasperov, it follows that they are definitely not cognitively similar 
regardless of how they perform because we can discern internal differences from 
external behavior.

We can only say Deep Blue is thinking if we broaden the definition of thinking. 
Well, I can show that Im gorgeous if I broaden the definition of gorgeous. We 
don't learn anything about thought by changing its definition.

Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:52:39 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article


  

  
  
On 10/24/2013 8:41 PM, chris peck
  wrote:



  
   Unfortunately we don't even have that
  example, because we don't know how we think.



We know that a certain set of mistakes are ubiquitous when
learning grammer. (overgeneralising for example). Cats. dogs.
hamsters. ... Sheeps. deers. etc.



And we know the computer system didn't make these mistakes.

  



Whether a computer made those mistakes would obviously depend on
it's software and one could obviously write software that would over
generalize and in fact neural network classifiers often over
generalize.



But you're back to judging internal processes by external behavior.



Brent






  

Thats all we need to know to say that the two systems are not
the same. All we need to know to say the computer was not doing
what children do.




  Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2013 20:35:05 -0700

  From: meeke...@verizon.net

  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

  Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article

  

  On 10/24/2013 8:09 PM, chris
peck wrote:

  
  At
this juncture then it becomes moot whether the computer is
learning or thinking about grammar. It is a matter of
philosophical taste. It certainly isn't learning or thinking
as we learnt or thought when learning grammar. The way we
cognate is the only example we have of cognition that we
know is genuine.
  

  Unfortunately we
don't even have that example, because we don't know how we
think.



Brent


  



  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my journey?

[chris peck]

Stephen Lin.
A new bike?

Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 19:43:32 -0400
Subject: Re: What's my name and what do you think I need to help me along my 
journey?
From: yann...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Are you the famous basketball player from Harvard, then the Knicks and now 
elsewhere.?Sorry I lost track of you.Richard

On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Stephen Lin sw...@post.harvard.edu wrote:







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: For John Clark

[chris peck]

Hi jason

I think in that last sentence you misuse the term subjective.  

In what way? 

Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? Have you 
ever seen an rock quivering in doubt? Certainty/uncertainty are properties of 
1-p experiences and can't be anything but. 


I refer you to the Everett quote above where he says the usual QM 
probabilities arise in the subjective views, not expectations of 100%.

Are you going to show an error of reasoning or are you going to point to a dead 
physicist?

I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of

http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136

 There are multiple experiencers, each having possibly different experiences. 
 For some class of those experiencers you can attach the label chris peck. 
 This allows you to say: chris peck experiences all outcomes but that does 
 not imply each experiencer experiences all experiences, each experiencer has 
 only one experience. The subjective first person view, of what any 
 experiencer can claim to experience, is a single outcome.  The experiences 
 are fractured and distinct because there is no communication between the 
 decohered worlds. 

ISTM that you're missing the point of my argument. You don't seem to get that 
it is very well understood that there is only one stream of experience per 'I'. 
The trouble is that in step 3 these 'I's get duplicated from one 'I' to two 
'I's AND I am obliged axiomatically to assume my 'I'ness survives in both 
duplicates.

So, when asked what will I experience ... and remember, there is only one 'I' 
at this point ... how can I answer 'either or' without violating this axiom I 
am obliged to accept? Alternatively, perhaps neither of the future 'I's are 
this earlier 'I'. In which case, I am forced to predict I will experience 
nothing and again that violates the axiom. The only choice I can make here is 
to predict this single 'I' will experience each outcome once duplicated. This 
is the only prediction I can make which doesn't violate the survival axiom I am 
bound to.

 In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective 
 randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which  is 
 enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA.

On the contrary, Jason, I find the concept of subjective uncertainty extremely 
unlikely in both MWI and COMP and find the 50/50 prediction particularly a 
little bit silly.

Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself 
tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream 
argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im 
not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy to have you on 
board.

regards.



Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 11:36:06 +1300
Subject: Re: For John Clark
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 

And I don't understand the difference between first person uncertainty and 
plain old fashioned uncertainty.  

The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving 
probablistically. Presumably a sentient dice (or die*) would feel the same way.


* Take the dice or die! as my son once said while playing Monopoly. He was 
just being pedantic but it got my attention. 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: For John Clark

[chris peck]

Hi Jason

 Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. 

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't 
indexical, its just me.

  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). 

Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not 
imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in 
my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I 
am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty.

 Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or 
 prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what 
 city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty 
 only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint 
 of some external impartial observer.

 You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion 
about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I 
agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.

 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of 
the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside 
the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of 
subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.

  I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by 
  someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. 

 Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the 
one I have used? It seems identical to me.

   The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI 
and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in 
similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied.

  yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects.

  All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one 
outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, 
then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I 
was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but 
instead I am experiencing this one).  


I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is 
that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can 
not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference 
though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after 
teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your 
location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or 
the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for 
doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the 
future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and 
teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, 
If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I 
end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss 
will be either heads or tails I win the bet.

 So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one 
 of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? 

I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to 
both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations.

 Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be?

Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. 

regards.

Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300
Subject: Re: For John Clark
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

The basis problem is no different from the present problem under special 
relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find 
ourselves in this particular now?



I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - 
we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. 


Unless you mean why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now? - which 
kind of answers itself, when you think about it!





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you 

RE: For John Clark

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

Hi Bruno

The uncertainty is objective

How can uncertainty be objective Bruno?

Uncertainty is a predicate applicable to experiences only.

 To insist, I use first person indeterminacy instead of subjective 
 indeterminacy

In step 3 you ask the reader to assess what he would 'feel' about the chances 
of turning up in either location. When I use the term 'subjective certainty' by 
'subjective' I mean to refer the to feelings I would have, and by 'certainty' I 
mean that I would bet 100% on both outcomes. 



 Chris, you have not answered the question where you are duplicated into 
 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24...The question is what do you expect to 
 live as an experience, that you will certainly have (as we assume comp).


My answer is that it would violate axioms you stipulate in COMP to suggest that 
we should expect anything other than to see each film. Following Greaves I 
would add that my decision whether to let you do this to me should be governed 
by my concern for all future mes. And since a vast amount of them are going to 
sit infront of 90 minutes of static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the 
ending just static, I wouldn't let you do it to me.

I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I would 
experience that exact fate. 

Regards.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: For John Clark
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:04:27 +




Hi Jason

 Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. 

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't 
indexical, its just me.

  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). 

Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not 
imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in 
my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I 
am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty.

 Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or 
 prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what 
 city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty 
 only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint 
 of some external impartial observer.

 You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion 
about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I 
agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.

 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of 
the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside 
the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of 
subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.

  I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by 
  someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. 

 Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the 
one I have used? It seems identical to me.

   The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI 
and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in 
similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied.

  yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects.

  All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one 
outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, 
then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I 
was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but 
instead I am experiencing this one).  


I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is 
that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can 
not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference 
though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after 
teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your 
location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or 
the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for 
doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the 
future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and 
teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, 
If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I 
end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss 
will be either heads or tails I win the bet.

 So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one 
 of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? 

I think we're going around in circles here. The 

RE: For John Clark

[chris peck]

 But that feeling only arises from the assumption (or gut feeling) that there 
 is only one observer, both before and after the measurement.

Quite, it arises from a mistake which would vanish in a true 'comp 
practitioner'.

The feeling that although I would become each observer and therefore experience 
each outcome, an erronious 'real me' would only follow one or the other path. 
And the fake comp practitioner would therefore not be certain of which outcome 
this 'real me' would experience.

A genuine 'comp practitioner' would be immune to this fallacy and within 
him/her no such subjective uncertainty would arise. Being subjectively certain 
about the future, she would assign a probability of one to both outcomes. She 
would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she would 
become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else to know. 
That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: For John Clark
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200


On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote:On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch 
jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, 
since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the 
subjective level...it is probabilistic in the strong sense that there is no way 
for observers to make any predictions better than the limitations imposed by 
the uncertainty principle. 
So he explicitly says the fully deterministic theory (fully deterministic from 
the God's eye, third person view) leads to probabilistic (random/unpredictable) 
outcomes from the subjective observer's first person view.  Even an observer 
who had complete knowledge of the deterministic wave function and could predict 
its entire evolution could not predict their next experience.  
Technically they can. They can correctly predict that they will have all the 
available experiences. It's only after the measurement has been made that there 
is an appearance of probability, with each duplicate feeling that he has 
experienced a probablistic event. But that feeling only arises from the 
assumption (or gut feeling) that there is only one observer, both before and 
after the measurement.

It comes from the fact that each multiplied observers has only one first person 
view on herself. (And that comes rom the fact that the personal diary is 
multiplied along with the body of the observer).She will not feel the split, 
nor even notice any split.
Bruno

 
(However, I imagine everyone here understands this...???)
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 I don't see why. There is a chance of 1/2 to feel oneself in M, and of 1/2 
 to feel oneself in W, but the probability is 1 (assuming comp, the protocol, 
 etc.) to find oneself alive. 

This begs the question. And the probability of finding oneself alive is 1 in 
both your view and mine.

 P(W v M) = P(W) + P(M) as W and M are disjoint incompatible (first person) 
 events. 

That they are disjoint is fine. And they are incompatible only insofar as no 
person, Bruno-Helsinki, Bruno-Washington or Bruno-Moscow, in the experiment 
will experience both simultaneously. But Bruno-Helsinki will experience each 
outcome.

Whats missing here is a discussion about what conditions are required in order 
to induce a feeling of subjective uncertainty in Bruno-Helsinki. I think what 
is required is some ignorance over the details of the situation, but there are 
none. Bruno-Helsinki knows all there is to know about the situation that is 
relevant.

He knows that in his future there will be two 'copies' of him; one in Moscow, 
one in Washington. By 'yes doctor' he knows that both these 'copies' are 
related to him in a manner that preserves identity in exactly the same way. 
There will be no sense in which Bruno-Washington is more Bruno-Helsinki than 
Bruno-Moscow. That is the essence of 'yes doctor'. So, at the point in time 
when Bruno-Helsinki is asked what he expects to see, there are no other 
relevant facts. Consequently there is no room for subjective uncertainty.

It would therefore be absurd of Bruno-Helsinki to assign a probability of 50% 
to either outcome. It would be like saying only one of the future Bruno's 
shares a relationship of identity with him. This is why I say your analysis 
violates the yes doctor axiom.

This can be contrasted with a response from either of the copies when asked the 
same question. If asked before opening their eyes, both Bruno-Washington and 
Bruno-Moscow are ignorant of their location. Ofcourse, apart from the fact that 
asking the question at this point is far too late for Bruno-Helsinki, this is 
not a relevent fact for him. Because he has no doubt that an identity 
maintaining version of him will be in each location.

I have to admit, what with you being a professor and all that, I did begin to 
feel like I was going mad. Luckily, the other day I found a paper by Hillary 
Greaves Understanding Deutcsh's Probability in a Deterministic Multiverse. 
Section 4.1 discusses subjective uncertainty in a generalized setting and 
argues for the exact same conclusions I have been reaching just intuitively. 
This doesn't make either of us right or wrong, but it gives me confidence to 
know that subjective uncertainty is not a foregone conclusion as I sometimes 
have felt it has been presented on this list. It is an analysis that has been 
peer reviewed and deemed worthy of publishing and warrants more than the hand 
waving scoffs some academics here have been offering.

All the best

Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 15:36:12 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/9/2013 10:35 AM, John Clark
  wrote:



  On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  


 How do you explain quantum
  mechanical probabilities in the Many Worlds
  interpretation?





Not very well, assigning probabilities is
  unquestionably the weakest part of the Many Worlds theory.
  True, Everett derived the Born Rule from his ideas, but
  not in a way that feels entirely satisfactory, not that
  its competitors can do better. The Many Worlds
  interpretation is the best bad explanation of why Quantum
  Mechanics works.


  

  



So you recognize that it has the same difficulties with probability
and personal identity as Bruno's teleportation.



Brent

  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit 

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling about the fact that our everyday attitude 
often doesn't cover the realities of how the universe works.





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Brent

But one of the essential things about quantum mechanics is futures are 
uncertain even give complete knowldge. 

I disagree. This is still 'up for grabs' and dependent on whether the 
interpretation is indeterminsitic (copenhagen,etc) or deterministic (MWI). Its 
a feature of MWI that all outcomes get their branch, there isn't uncertainty 
about that.

If you use MWI then you expect that after observing a quantum random outcome 
that there will be two (or more) copies of you that share the same memories up 
to the observation, but are different after.  So Bruno is just trying to show 
that the uncertainty can be in which copy is observing instead of which 
value was observed.

I think which copy is observing and which value was observed are 
functionally equivolent vis a vis the step 3 experiment. Nevertheless, the 
question asked is definately 'what value will you see?'

Whether this uncertainty can be represented as a probability is, I think, a 
problem in both Bruno's thought experiment and in MWI of QM.

There are two problems I think. firstly, is there room for subjective 
uncertainty? and secondly, how does the proportionality of a 'copenhagen' 
random event get represented. MWI has the problem that if the outcome depends 
on say 1/3 vs 2/3 the world will still split into just 2 outcomes, with nothing 
to represent proportionality. Im not sure Bruno's UD suffers from that issue, 
though being 'comp' and presumably therefore dealing with things discretely, 
there maybe issues whenever irrational numbers appear in denominators. 1/PI vs. 
1-1/PI as you have said before.

All the best.

From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 02:21:01 +




Hi Liz

 This is not, however, how people normally view these matters. The physicist 
 feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing spin-up despite his 
 knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the same way about 
 arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to think in terms 
 of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is acceptable in 
 terms of how we think about things in everyday life.

But Bruno is not talking about everyday people or everyday life. He is talking 
about people who are 'comp practitioners', and people who say 'yes doctor'.

If someone genuinely believed in MWI and was aware of all possible outcomes 
under MWI, then he would not actually experience any uncertainty.

 Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
 chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being 
 the single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the 
 chance beforehand. 

I explicitly dealt with that situation, Liz. And Moscow man might feel 
uncertainty. He might feel all manner of things. But it is not Moscow man who 
is asked the question, is it? Its Helsinki man. 

So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his chances of 
arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto for the 
physicist).

How exactly do Moscow/Washington men's uncertainty effect Helsinki man, given 
Helsinki man is no longer around to be effected?

Moreover, Bruno can not on the one hand stipulate that the people in the 
experiment are 'comp practitioners' who willingly say 'yes doctor' and then on 
the other hand stipulate their attitudes would actually conform to our 'folk 
psychology'. Either I am a 'comp practitioner' and my attitudes reflect that, 
or I am not a 'comp practitioner' would not say 'yes doctor' and my attitudes 
reflect 'folk psychology'.

All the best

Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 14:37:12 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

If Helsinki man understands the situation, he will assign a 100% probability to 
him being duplicated and ending in both places. Similarly a physicist who 
believes in MWI will assign a 100% probability to him splitting and observing 
all possible outcomes. This is not, however, how people normally view these 
matters. The physicist feels that he had a (say) 50% chance of him observing 
spin-up despite his knowledge of the MWI, and I guess Helsinki man feels the 
same way about arriving in Moscow, if only because our brains are wired to 
think in terms of the single universe view. I think Bruno's take on this is 
acceptable in terms of how we think about things in everyday life.


Once the duplication has been performed, one copy of the man then has a 50% 
chance of being Moscow man, and his (spurious) sense of always only being the 
single unique copy of himself would lead him to feel that this was the chance 
beforehand. So it's fair for Bruno to ask Helsinki man how he estimates his 
chances of arriving in Moscow, assuming folk psychology is involved (ditto 
for the physicist).


However this is only really quibbling 

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Liz


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.






(Or then again, I won't...)

Precisely. Being a true MWI believer you can be certain of both. :)



Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 16:35:56 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

I still think this is quibbling. I at least believe I know what Bruno means 
when he asks H-man to assign a probability to his chances of appearing in 
Moscow. Perhaps Bruno is being sloppy in talking about probabilities, because 
the whole situation is deterministic, but it does at least give a post-facto 
indeterminism like a quantum measurement does, so it's valid to the extent 
that we talk about probabilities at all (assuming the MWI). (Which is to say, 
it isn't really valid at all, but I still think I know what is intended!)


Oh dear, I think I will go and lie down now.

(Or then again, I won't...)





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.

regards

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200


On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark 
johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
  The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 
Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 
Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 

and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)
 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:G* proves (Bp  
p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.

a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.Except that even this is not 
clear, as he agrees that this is phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of 
a coin, but then he is unclear why he does not proceed to step 4. He 
contradicts himself from post to post, like saying that such an indeterminacy 
is so trivial and not deep enough to proceed (like if understanding a step of a 
reasoning was a reason to stop), or that it is nonsense. So is it trivial or is 
it nonsense? We still don't know what John Clark is thinking.

(I can accept it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is 
apparently doing it constantly.)

Yes, without Everett, I would not have dared to explain that the physical 
reality emerges from the many dreams by (relative) numbers.People accepting the 
consistency of Everett and stopping at step 3 are very rare. I know only one: 
Clark.
Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Quentin

 Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you 
 accept them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
 duplication experience.

But MWI does have a problem when it comes to probabilities and it is taken very 
seriously by Everetians and their critics.

In MWI any probabilities are a measure of ignorance rather than genuine chance, 
because all outcomes are realised. Any theory of everything will, I suspect, be 
similar in that regard.

So what sense does it make in MWI to ask of the probabilities associated with 
one of two outcomes, if both are certain? It doesn't really make sense at all.

It seems particularly acute to me for Bruno's experiment because at least in 
MWI worlds split on the basis of things we can not predict. There is no 
equivalent 'roll of the die' in Bruno's step 3. I know I am going to be 
duplicated. I know where I am going to be sent. I know by 'yes doctor' I will 
survive. Why shouldn't I expect to see both outcomes? After all, there is not 
two of me yet ...

But I think you are right. In general it would be inconsistent to regard 
Bruno's theory, but not MWI, of having issues here.

From: allco...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:03:53 +0200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




2013/10/7 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com






Hi Bruno

 Are you saying that the step 3 would provide a logical reason to say no to 
 the doctor, and thus abandoning comp?

I'm saying only the suicidal would expect a 50/50 chance of experiencing Moscow 
(or Washington) after teleportation and then say yes to the doctor.




regards


It makes no sense, in the comp settings it is 100% sure you'll experience a 
next moment... the thing is, it's that there is two of you after duplication, 
both experience something M o W, the 50/50 is a probability expectation before 
duplication... it has the *exact same sense* as probability in MWI setting... 
it's the same.




Either you should say probability are non sensical in the MWI or if you accept 
them with the MWI, you should accept them the same way with the comp 
duplication experience.

Quentin



 


From: marc...@ulb.ac.be



To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:34:19 +0200



On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:48, LizR wrote:
On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 
  The M-guy is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been the H-guy)
 


 The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are not identical just as you are 
not identical with the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. 



Thanks for noticing.

If comp is correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) 
then this is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same 
person even from one second to the next. I thought that was partly the point 
that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp, then we exist as steps in a 
computation, 



Well we exists at each step, but we are not step. Also, mind is not a 
computation, but a mind can be attached to a computation. I know it is simpler 
sometimes to abuse a little bit of the language, to be shorter and get to the 
point, but those simple nuance have to be taken into account at some points so 
it is important to be careful (even more so with pick-nickers) 




and hence, at least in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence 
constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital states can be 
duplicated, at least in principle, and could also be duplicated inside a 
computer (again in theory. The computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or 
it may not - however the point is only to show what is possible in principle. 
Or is in principle itself objectionable?)



 
Arguing about which man is which or who thinks what seems a bit pointless. The 
question is, do you agree that if consciousness is computation, 
In fact when you say that consciousness is computation, you identify a 1p 
notion with a 3p notion, and this is ... possible only for God:


G* proves (Bp  p) - Bp, but no machine can proves this correctly about 
herself. 
That is why it is preferable to say that comp postulates only that my 
consciousness is invariant for a digital physical susbtitution.




a duplicator of this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? 
I think John Clark made clear that he agrees with the theoretical possibility. 
he seems only to disagree with the indeterminacy.


Except that even this is not clear, as he agrees that this is 
phenomenologically equivalent with a throw of a coin, but then he is unclear 
why he does not proceed to step 4. He contradicts himself from post to post, 
like saying that such an indeterminacy is so trivial and not deep enough to 
proceed (like

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Brent

 This is true, but it's also something Bruno has said many times. If comp is 
 correct (to the extent that the mind is a computation, at least) then this 
 is happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the same person 
 even from one second to the next.

I think Heraclitus meant that it is through change that some things remain the 
same. Thus the river stops being the river if it doesn't flow. Or the human 
body has an underlying form and structure that gets maintained as the 
constituent matter comes and goes. It is the abstract relationship between 
elements that constitutes identity rather than the elements themselves. I would 
think this reading of Heraclitus is more palatable to Bruno given he is a 
neo-patonist. I would have thought Bruno would want identity between successive 
steps of 'the program' to be maintained, otherwise, as you do, he would really 
be denying a role to an underlying form in the natural numbers from which 
'shadows of us' are derived.

In any case Bruno really asserts that identity is maintained in comp. This is 
the essence of the 'yes doctor' axiom which he violates in step 3.


 I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning a 
 probability.

Well he would be right to. This is from Bruno's step 3 where he explicitly 
assigns probability:

This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 
1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any 
noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a 
probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).”

All the best

Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2013 17:45:48 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


  

  
  
On 10/6/2013 1:48 PM, LizR wrote:



  

  On 7 October 2013 06:48, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:


  
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:43 AM, Bruno
  Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
  wrote:



  

  

  
 The M-guy
  is the H-guy  (the M-guy remembers having been
  the H-guy)


  
   

The  H-guy turns into the M-guy, but they are
  not identical just as you are not identical with
  the Bruno Marchal of yesterday.


  

  

  
  


This is true, but it's also something
  Bruno has said many times. If comp is correct (to the extent
  that the mind is a computation, at least) then this is
  happening all the time. Heraclitus was right, you aren't the
  same person even from one second to the next. I thought that
  was partly the point that Bruno's step 3 was making. If comp,
  then we exist as steps in a computation, and hence, at least
  in a sense, cease to exist and come back into existence
  constantly. Hence (if comp) we are at any given moment digital
  states can be duplicated, at least in principle, and could
  also be duplicated inside a computer (again in theory. The
  computer MAY have to be the size of a galaxy, or it may not -
  however the point is only to show what is possible in
  principle. Or is in principle itself objectionable?)


  





JC should read this:
http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret



I think he's resisting Bruno's point because he sees it as assigning
a probability.



Brent


  

  


Arguing about which man is which or who
  thinks what seems a bit pointless. The question is, do you
  agree that if consciousness is computation, a duplicator of
  this sort is at least a theoretical possibility? (I can accept
  it, despite no-cloning, because the multiverse itself is
  apparently doing it constantly.)

  


  
  -- 




  





-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received 

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Liz / pgc

If I have been abusive to you or Bruno then I apologize without hesitation. If 
you would show where I have been abusive though I would appreciate that, 
because at the moment I regard the suggestion as low and mean spirited.

I have made my points and been misrepresented, misunderstood and disagreed 
with. I have clarified as far as I could. No doubt I have misrepresented and 
misunderstood people in return. In what way is that out of the ordinary in 
debate? In what way is that a disservice to anyone? The points under debate may 
seem obvious to you, well I apologise for my stupidity but they are not obvious 
to me. I find it stunning that people find anything in the realm of theoretical 
physics remotely obvious.

Bruno should be happy that people are still reading his papers. What more 
respect can anyone give him?

I do not follow his argument. I do not follow his or your attempts to clarify 
them. I see flaws in what you say. Does that really insult you?


--- Original Message ---

From: LizR lizj...@gmail.com
Sent: 4 October 2013 7:20 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com, Charles Goodwin 
charlesrobertgood...@gmail.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 4 October 2013 06:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
multiplecit...@gmail.comwrote:


 You were kind enough to let the list know, along with Chris Peck, that the
 flaw in the reasoning concerning step 3 of the UDA is it sucks.

 Unless you guys backtrack and quit abusing the fact that Bruno's
 politeness and dedication to critical debate puts him in default mode of
 taking your points seriously and granting you the benefit of the doubt that
 you would not in the faintest be inclined to grant in return, these
 discussions are a one way street into brick walls with you suck infantile
 graffiti sprayed on them at the end.

 So unless you can state something more substantial than teenage insults
 and ruses á la I don't understand THIS AND THAT!!! or the more passive
 but nonetheless authoritative you're confusing first/third person,
 everything is first person etc. , I submit you guys are trolling and
 wasting time on this.

 Either be open for genuine discussion and finding of flaws or this is
 pointless as it does a disservice to the readers of this list. It is not
 difficult to see that refuting computationalism in this form, would be a
 major result.

 Your aspirations are lofty gentlemen, but they don't jibe with the
 infantilization and the mockery masking itself as poised discourse and
 clear debate. PGC


I would like to frame this post and bring it whenever necessary :)

In fact I will keep a copy, just in case it's ever needed again. Thank you,
PGC.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Bruno

[JC] Because step 3 sucks. 











[Bruno] Why? You have not yet make a convincing point on this. 

His point is convincing me.

regards.


 Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 23:18:07 +0200
 Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
 From: te...@telmomenezes.com
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  On 10/2/2013 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 
  On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 
  On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote:
 
  On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
 
  However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
  logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
  defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
  (an assumption that seems consistent with our understanding of brain
  function, for example).
 
 
  But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the subconscious.
  If
  one conceives a subjective moment as just what one is conscious of in
  a
  moment it doesn't encode very much of the past.  And in the digital
  simulation paradigm the computational state doesn't encode any of it.  So
  I
  think each conscious moment must have considerable extent in (physical)
  time so as to overlap and provide continuity.
 
 
  But then comp is false, OK? As with comp the present first person moment
  can
  be encoded, and indeed sent on Mars, etc.
 
 
 
 Of course physical time need not correspond in any simple way to
  computational steps.
 
 
  OK. With this remark, comp remains consistent, indeed. That last remark
  is
  quite interesting, and a key to grasp comp and its relation to physics. I
  think.
 
  Could time arise from recursivity? A very caricatural example:
 
  f(x) = x :: f(x + 1)
 
  So f(0) would go through the steps:
  (0)
  (0 1)
  (0 1 2)
  ...
 
  If (in a caricatural way) we associated each step with a moment, each
  step would contain a memory of the past, although the function I wrote
  is just some static mathematical object I dug up from Platonia.
  Furthermore, these moments would appear to be relates in a causality
  sequence: (0) - (0 1) - (0 1 2) and so on. What do you think?
 
 
  They form a sequence of states which overlap and so have an inherent order.
  But that can't be the right model for conscious states because they don't
  contain all past conscious states; in general their content is very sparse
  relative memory.
 
 Sure but it would be trivial to define some recursive function that
 generates a sequence of states with sparse or even distorted memories
 of previous states. The recursive function could be as complex as you
 like.
 
 Telmo.
 
  Brent
 
 
  --
  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
  Everything List group.
  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
  email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
  To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
  Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
  For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
 For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 Is there something wrong with quantum indeterminacy?

Apart from the fact the MWI removes it? And that that is the point of MWI? And 
that probability questions in MWI are notoriously thorny?

This is why I resort to the Quantum Suicide experiment or better still to 
Quantum Russian Roulette. The experimenter is 1-p certain of his own survival, 
not unsure about it. Otherwise, he'ld never take part. And this certainty has 
nothing to do with the fact that in the other outcome he dies. It doesn't 
matter what happens in that branch. His certainty is consequent on the fact 
that all outcomes obtain and being a MWI believer he believes just that.

The Stanford Encyclopedia puts it:

 The quantum state of the Universe at one time specifies the quantum state at 
all times. If I am going to perform a quantum experiment with two possible 
outcomes such that standard quantum mechanics predicts probability 1/3 for 
outcome A and 2/3 for outcome B, then, according to the MWI, both the world 
with outcome A and the world with outcome B will exist. It is senseless to ask: 
What is the probability that I will get A instead of B? because I will 
correspond to both Levs: the one who observes A and the other one who 
observes B.

I agree with that analysis, and disagree with subsequent attempts to smuggle 
some notion of probability back in. I'll read them again shortly just to see if 
they are any more convincing but on the face of it MWI has an issue with 1-p 
indeterminacy. It shouldn't really be there.

Regards.


Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 13:19:50 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 3 October 2013 13:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  

  
  Interestingly it appears that most coin tosses may be quantum
random, arXiv:1212.0953v1 [gr-qc]


(snip) 



I say most because I know that magicians train themselves to be
able to flip a coin and catch it consistently.


Interesting. I think there's a slight bias (in non-magicians) towards the coin 
coming down one way or the other - either the same as it started or the 
opposite, I can't remember which (There could be an ig-nobel in finding out for 
sure...)







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

[chris peck]

Hi Liz

 The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome, even though he 
 knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and that in reality he will 
 see both   But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version 
 for some reason.

Bruno has a meeting in washington but has double booked it with one in moscow. 
So, he goes to the teleporter/duplicator and travels off to both cities and 
both meetings. On the way back both Brunos take the Re-assembler, which,  when 
both scans are available, runs a quick 'diff' over them and merges the result 
back into one. Bruno is reassembled replete with memories of both trips. 

We ask this Bruno what the probability was of experiencing Moscow before the 
trip. Well he has a 1-p memory of both cities, so he knows, from a 1-p view 
that the chance was 1. 

I imagine there will be some sort of ad hoc 'no cul-de-sac' strap ons to 
Bruno's theory as to why this kind of experiment is barred. But it seems 
perfectly in tune with 'comp' to me. What I think it shows is that the 
probabilities depend on how many Bruno's there are when the question is asked. 
And if you ask before teleportation the probability is 1 as it is after the 
merge.

The probabilities are governed by conjunction when you ask one man about to be 
duplicated: he will be in moscow AND washington. When you ask a duplicate, he  
IS in moscow OR washington. 1-p ness, 3-pness, 10p-ness, its all philosophical 
sleight of hand as far as I can tell.

And if I am pre-duplicate, being asked what I expect, if I believe in comp then 
I will expect to be in moscow and washington. Afterall, believing in comp I 
would not believe that there would be some other thing that chased my 
description to either city. Beliefs and expectancies are 1-p phenomena. What 
else is there? There is only me trying to imagine being either washington-me or 
Moscow-me in the future. But this is a 3-p perspective. As soon as I imagine me 
being somewhere else, I am objectifying me. Im 3-peeing me.

regards

Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 12:32:06 +1300
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

On 1 October 2013 09:40, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a 100% 
probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember being the 
Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that the Helsinki man had 
more than one future.  



Nicely and succinctly put. In comp the duplicated man indeed has more than 
one future.

Bruno is distinguishing between our overview and the man's personal point of 
view, and ISTM that this is analogous to a scientist performing a schrodinger's 
cat type experiment. The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each 
outcome, even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and 
that in reality he will see both (i.e. he has more than one future). 
Similarly the guy in Helsinki assigns a 50% chance to himself arriving in 
Washington, and ditto for Moscow. But from our third person perspective, he 
arrives in both places. I can't see that this is problematic, if we accept the 
MWI then the comp thought experiment is very similar. But there seems to be a 
lot of trouble with the comp version for some reason.







-- 

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.

To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.

For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.