subject:"Another physicist in mental decline \(Sean Carroll\)"

> On 24 Sep 2019, at 03:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/19/2019 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 22:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/16/2019 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body obeys 
 laws which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing 
 mathematical definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that there 
 no magic happening in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is Digitally 
 emulable *at some description level* relevant for staying alive and well.
>>> But then you conclude that physical objects, like brains, are not Turing 
>>> computable...and thus arrive at contradiction to your starting hypothesis.
>> No. As the reasoning show only that the particular matter used in the 
>> digital substitution does not matter, which we knew at the start.
>> 
>> To get a contradiction you need to show that the matter that we observed is 
>> differ,t from the matter brought bay the infinitely many computations 
>> statistically interfering below our substitution level, but we do find there 
>> exactly what nature shows us there.
> 
> It's hard to parse what that means. 

Yes sorry. I type too much quickly. What I wanted to write is this:

< But I think it says that we have to infer the structure of matter entailed by 
> the UD using some statistics (not clear which)

Intuitively, it is the one brought by the first person indeterminacy on all 
computational consistent extension of you current relative state, as seen from 
the first person pont of view.

Mathematically it is the one given by, with p representing sigma_1 sentences,  
the logic of []p & p, []p & <>t, and []p & <>t & p (and graded variants). Just 
“[]p” cannot work, due to the presence of the cul-de-sac worlds, imposed by 
incompleteness (<>[]f is true only in cul-de-sac worlds).

> and compare this to the matter we observed (where?  in the brain? in the 
> digital substitute?). 

In the arithmetical reality (seen differently from the person view defined from 
inside).

> This reminds me of string theory. It's so complicated we can't figure out 
> what it implies, but we're sure that if we did there would be no 
> contradiction with observation.

If there is no contradiction which nature, then we have solved the mind body 
problem together with the explanation of the origin of the illusion of the 
physical universe, and in passing found the simplest physical theory ever. Kxy 
= x and Sxyz = xz(yz).

I doubt this, but who knows? It has to be if mechanism is correct, and the 
derivation of physics is valid.

We can only continue the testing. Contrary to what you say, it is shrewdly to 
imagine a theory which is more refutable than this universal machine’s theory. 

Ask is you doubt this, because your certainty that it fits with Nature is quite 
over-optimistic.

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-24 Thread Alan Grayson



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 6:38:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2019, at 13:11, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:48:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
 On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a 
>>> écrit :
>>>
 On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:

>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:

>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <
>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then 
 there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
 frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
 proven, or 
 even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*

>>>
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a 
>>> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
>>> OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
>>> infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of 
>>> them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go 
>>> to see such a thing. 
>>>
>>
>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
>> coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
>> number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated 
>> with a 
>> different universe. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>>
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave 
>> rather good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having 
>> non 
>> countable universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise 
>> to a 
>> continuum (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” 
>> brought by 
>> the measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to 
>> say the 
>> least.
>>
>
> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- 
> which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious 
> that 
> any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>
>
>
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat 
> exist, indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At 
> some 
> point the difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital 
> mechanist 
> truncate, which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non 
> countable 
> case.
>

 *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they 
 occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *

>>>
>>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  
>>> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and 
>>> more 
>>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level 
>>> at 
>>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation 
>>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and 
>>> there 
>>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an 
>>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). 
>>>
>>
>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive 
>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, 
>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. 
>> No 
>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no 
>> necessity 
>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 24 Sep 2019, at 00:05, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/23/2019 2:05 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 11:01:46 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/22/2019 11:36 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
 Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with 
 the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is not self 
 contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).
 
 Brent
 
 I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions have 
 100% destructive interference. AG 
>>> 
>>> They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies quantum 
>>> mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that satisfies Newtonian 
>>> mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or Aristotelian mechanics?
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> So now you're saying that everything conceivable is possible. But isn't 
>>> that what you criticized Jason for? AG
>> 
>> Yes, I did.  And above I'm criticizing you for not recognizing the 
>> difference between nomologically impossible in this universe under the 
>> physics as we understand it, and Tegmark's everything mathematically 
>> consistent happens in some universe.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> In fact I looked up "nomologically" and I'm not clear as to your meaning. 
>> Jason said "everything conceivable", so you pointed out what amounts to 
>> destructive interference and flying pigs as things that don't happen in our 
>> world. Why do that, and then turn around and mention universes where QM 
>> doesn't work. Let's just say that Jason didn't misuse the term, and leave it 
>> at that.  AG
> 
> Jason may well believe that everything conceivable happens.  After all he's 
> on the "everything" list.  But he's wrong to think that quantum mechanics 
> endorses that assumption.


It is part of the wave equation. Indeed, von Neumann saw this so clearly that 
he added the postulate of collapse, which contradicts the SWE, and introduce a 
dualism between observer and the thing observed. Bohr too insisted that quantum 
mechanics cannot apply to the macroscopic world.

The many world is just Dirac's principle of superposition, without adding a 
collapse postulate.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> 
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>  
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 13:11, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:48:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson > a écrit 
>> :
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
 
 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > 
 wrote:
  
 > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
 > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
 > claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
 > plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
 
 Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
 number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
 universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
 then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
 fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such 
 a thing. 
 
 What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
 UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
 coming into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
 number of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated 
 with a different universe. AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Tegmark missed this? 
>>> 
>>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the 
>>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the 
>>> least.
>>> 
>>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
>>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 
>> 
>> 
>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
>> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
>> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
>> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>> 
>> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
>> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
>> 
>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels then 
>> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", 
>> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your 
>> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones 
>> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity 
>> of them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at 
>> the correct level and below it). 
>> 
>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
>> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
>> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how 
>> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
>> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
>> 
>> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not 
>> uncountable.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> 
>> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the 
>> necessary existence of copies. AG 
>> 
>> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is 
>> finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> 
>> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable 
>> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 
> 
> It is a theorem, about *all* universal machinery  phi_i that all programs 
> repeat, with different codings.
> 
> For all i there is a j such that i ≠ j, and for all x phi_j(x) = phi_i(x). 
> That is obvious for a programmer, you can always add spurious instructions, 
> for example.
> 
> So, in the arithmetical reality (which is Turing universal)

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 12:50, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 4:14:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Sep 2019, at 05:24, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 7:39:50 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
>> 
>> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
>> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
>> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
>> 
>> 
>> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" becomes 
>> superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what Guth 
>> writes:
>> 
>>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of a 
>> fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
>> local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on distance 
>> scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect astronomers to see 
>> it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the fractal structure if one 
>> wants to understand the very large scale structure of the spacetime produced 
>> by inflation. Most important of all is the simple statement that once 
>> inflation happens, it produces not just one universe, but an infinite number 
>> of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally inflating universe, anything 
>> that can happen will happen; in fact, it will happen an infinite number of 
>> times.”
>> 
>> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf 
>>  )
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> Unless Guth can plausbily argue why eternal inflation must occur, the claim 
>> goes far behind mere speculation since it's already beyond our ability to 
>> observe. AG 
> 
> Whatever is observable is dream-able, and so “observation” is not a good 
> criterion for deciding the ontology.
> 
> You can't prove that arithmetic has a Platonic reality


I need you only to agree with x + 0 = x, and you do agree with this, as anyone 
reading books in physics.

The “platonic” part is proved at a letter stage. 




> and lies at the core of everything we perceive and call the external world.

It does not. That is the whole point. We get physics. You take it as a lie, 
because you have adopted Aristotle”s lmetaphysics: what I see in real.
Platonism is born from the doubt that what we see is real, and its basic 
motivation is the (antic) dream argument, which becomes a mathematical theorem 
once we accept the Church-Turing thesis.




> OTOH, it's child's play 
> to show that arithmetic arises immediately from observations of the 
> externally appearing world. AG 

Yes. The number are cool, they don’t lie, and reappear all the times at every 
level. That confirms more what the mechanist say, where for a physicist it is 
not entirely obvious why there is a physical world and why it obeys to 
mathematical laws.

We just don’t know the truth. My work shows only how to test between (weak) 
Mechanism and (weak) Materialism, and shows that up to now, nature confirms 
Mechanism, at a place where all people accepting the notion of consciousness 
are made dizzy by the physicalist position which makes the mind-body problem 
unsolvable.

Let us just pursue the research, and make the experience. 

Bruno




> 
> That is the older anti-physicalist argument, already in Plato, and well 
> before.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>> 
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 11:57 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/19/2019 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 16 Sep 2019, at 22:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 9/16/2019 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body
> obeys laws which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing
> mathematical definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that there
> no magic happening in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is Digitally
> emulable *at some description level* relevant for staying alive and well.
> >> But then you conclude that physical objects, like brains, are not
> Turing computable...and thus arrive at contradiction to your starting
> hypothesis.
> > No. As the reasoning show only that the particular matter used in the
> digital substitution does not matter, which we knew at the start.
> >
> > To get a contradiction you need to show that the matter that we observed
> is differ,t from the matter brought bay the infinitely many computations
> statistically interfering below our substitution level, but we do find
> there exactly what nature shows us there.
>
> It's hard to parse what that means.  But I think it says that we have to
> infer the structure of matter entailed by the UD using some statistics
> (not clear which) and compare this to the matter we observed (where?  in
> the brain? in the digital substitute?).  This reminds me of string
> theory. It's so complicated we can't figure out what it implies, but
> we're sure that if we did there would be no contradiction with observation.
>

No, that's not quite right Brent. What he means is that is he does the
statistics right, he will get agreement with the physics in some world or
another -- not exactly clear which.

Bruce

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/19/2019 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Sep 2019, at 22:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
wrote:

On 9/16/2019 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body obeys laws
which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing mathematical
definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that there no magic happening
in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is Digitally emulable *at some
description level* relevant for staying alive and well.

But then you conclude that physical objects, like brains, are not Turing
computable...and thus arrive at contradiction to your starting hypothesis.

No. As the reasoning show only that the particular matter used in the digital
substitution does not matter, which we knew at the start.

To get a contradiction you need to show that the matter that we observed is
differ,t from the matter brought bay the infinitely many computations
statistically interfering below our substitution level, but we do find there
exactly what nature shows us there.

It's hard to parse what that means. But I think it says that we have to
infer the structure of matter entailed by the UD using some statistics
(not clear which) and compare this to the matter we observed (where? in
the brain? in the digital substitute?). This reminds me of string
theory. It's so complicated we can't figure out what it implies, but
we're sure that if we did there would be no contradiction with observation.

Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 4:50:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 4:14:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
  On 23 Sep 2019, at 05:24, Alan Grayson  wrote:

> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 7:39:50 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen

 No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
 nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
 "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.


>>> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" 
>>> becomes superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what 
>>> Guth writes:
>>>
>>>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of 
>>> a fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
>>> local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on 
>>> distance scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect 
>>> astronomers to see it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the 
>>> fractal structure if one wants to understand the very large scale structure 
>>> of the spacetime produced by inflation. Most important of all is the simple 
>>> statement that once inflation happens, it produces not just one universe, 
>>> but an infinite number of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally 
>>> inflating universe, anything that can happen will happen; in fact, it will 
>>> happen an infinite number of times.”
>>>
>>> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
>>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf )
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>> Unless Guth can plausbily argue why eternal inflation must occur, the 
>> claim goes far behind mere speculation since it's already beyond our 
>> ability to observe. AG 
>>
>>
>> Whatever is observable is dream-able, and so “observation” is not a good 
>> criterion for deciding the ontology.
>>
>
> You can't prove that arithmetic has a Platonic reality and lies at the 
> core of everything we perceive and call the external world. OTOH, it's 
> child's play 
> to show that arithmetic arises immediately from observations of the 
> externally appearing world. AG 
>

You can't prove that arithmetic has a Platonic reality; the most you can do 
is assume it. You do so to solve the mind-body problem, and the key to your 
alleged solution is computability. I grant that if you wait long enough, a 
monkey typing at random can produce the complete works of William 
Shakespeare. But how could it produce Newton's law of gravitation? In your 
maze of computations, what could you identify as Newton's law of 
gravitation? Herein lies the rub; underneath the term "computability" is an 
undefined maze of unrelated computations, none of which, unlike 
Shakespeare, have a definable meaning. AG 

>
>> That is the older anti-physicalist argument, already in Plato, and well 
>> before.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
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>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
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>>  
>> 
>> .
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 4:05:16 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/23/2019 2:05 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 11:01:46 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/22/2019 11:36 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>> Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with 
 the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is not self 
 contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).

 Brent

>>>
>>> I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions 
>>> have 100% destructive interference. AG 
>>>
>>>
>>> They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies quantum 
>>> mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that satisfies Newtonian 
>>> mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or Aristotelian mechanics?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> So now you're saying that everything *conceivable* is possible. But 
>> isn't that what you criticized Jason for? AG
>>
>>
>> Yes, I did.  And above I'm criticizing you for not recognizing the 
>> difference between nomologically impossible in this universe under the 
>> physics as we understand it, and Tegmark's everything mathematically 
>> consistent happens in some universe.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> In fact I looked up "nomologically" and I'm not clear as to your meaning. 
> Jason said "everything conceivable", so you pointed out what amounts to 
> destructive interference and flying pigs as things that don't happen in our 
> world. Why do that, and then turn around and mention universes where QM 
> doesn't work. Let's just say that Jason didn't misuse the term, and leave 
> it at that.  AG
>
>
> Jason may well believe that everything conceivable happens.  After all 
> he's on the "everything" list.  But he's wrong to think that quantum 
> mechanics endorses that assumption.
>
> Brent
>

That's not what I think he meant. Rather he meant that for every 
conceivable outcome, there is some world in which it exists.  AG 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/23/2019 2:05 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 11:01:46 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/22/2019 11:36 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

Of course they are mathematically possible. You just
need to start with the right axioms. Everything
mathematically possible that is not self contradictory
(including a flat Earth and flying pigs).

Brent

I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since
these regions have 100% destructive interference. AG

They have destructive interference in a universe that
satisfies quantum mechanics. How do you know there isn't a
universe that satisfies Newtonian mechanics? or Harry Potter
mechanics? Or Aristotelian mechanics?

Brent

So now you're saying that everything *conceivable* is possible.
But isn't that what you criticized Jason for? AG

Yes, I did. And above I'm criticizing you for not recognizing the
difference between nomologically impossible in this universe under
the physics as we understand it, and Tegmark's everything
mathematically consistent happens in some universe.

Brent

In fact I looked up "nomologically" and I'm not clear as to your
meaning. Jason said "everything conceivable", so you pointed out what
amounts to destructive interference and flying pigs as things that
don't happen in our world. Why do that, and then turn around and
mention universes where QM doesn't work. Let's just say that Jason
didn't misuse the term, and leave it at that. AG

Jason may well believe that everything conceivable happens. After all
he's on the "everything" list. But he's wrong to think that quantum
mechanics endorses that assumption.

Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 11:01:46 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/22/2019 11:36 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with 
>>> the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is not self 
>>> contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions 
>> have 100% destructive interference. AG 
>>
>>
>> They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies quantum 
>> mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that satisfies Newtonian 
>> mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or Aristotelian mechanics?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> So now you're saying that everything *conceivable* is possible. But isn't 
> that what you criticized Jason for? AG
>
>
> Yes, I did.  And above I'm criticizing you for not recognizing the 
> difference between nomologically impossible in this universe under the 
> physics as we understand it, and Tegmark's everything mathematically 
> consistent happens in some universe.
>
> Brent
>

In fact I looked up "nomologically" and I'm not clear as to your meaning. 
Jason said "everything conceivable", so you pointed out what amounts to 
destructive interference and flying pigs as things that don't happen in our 
world. Why do that, and then turn around and mention universes where QM 
doesn't work. Let's just say that Jason didn't misuse the term, and leave 
it at that.  AG

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/22/2019 11:36 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:


Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to
start with the right axioms.  Everything mathematically
possible that is not self contradictory (including a flat
Earth and flying pigs).

Brent


I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these
regions have 100% destructive interference. AG


They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies
quantum mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that
satisfies Newtonian mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or
Aristotelian mechanics?

Brent


So now you're saying that everything *conceivable* is possible. But 
isn't that what you criticized Jason for? AG


Yes, I did.  And above I'm criticizing you for not recognizing the 
difference between nomologically impossible in this universe under the 
physics as we understand it, and Tegmark's everything mathematically 
consistent happens in some universe.


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Ha! We cannot mess with the circuitry? Right now its an aleph-null universe, 
and we have very little to do with that. My own pet theory is that those at the 
front of your class have their brains neurologically wired to perform math at a 
satisfactory level. That its the ability to do well with patterns and both 
short term and long term memory. Also the ability to associate one pattern with 
another. 


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 23, 2019 5:57 am
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On 20 Sep 2019, at 09:16, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Ha! Thanks Bruno. I am kind of a physicalist-materialist sort of dude,

No problem. Just say “no” to the doctor, and find some “magical” theory of mind 
if interested in the mind-body problem.



 and if these universes are forever untouchable, 

Truth is untouchable, unseeable, unmeasurable, but it explains (wrongly or 
correctly) why we see, touch, measure many things, in a stable and prolongated 
way. We get an indirect explanation including why we believe that there is a 
physical universe, when they are none.
All proposition like “0 universe”, “1 universe”, “2 universes”, … aleph_zero 
universes”, aleph_1 universes, etc.
Are not directly verifiable, but they do have different observable consequences.




it because all pedantic as they say. Unless for example, the Borisov comet is 
really an interstellar craft, it's only moderately interesting. On math, please 
place me at the back of the class ;-)


No problem if you can still hear me. It is a bit crowded there, also …
Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Sep 19, 2019 7:08 am
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On 16 Sep 2019, at 23:06, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Yes, Bruno, it's all axiomatic. Having said this, we can do away with MWI by 
simply calling it all, an infinite (my term is near-infinite, a non sequitur), 
and we still hypothetically receive the same results as chaotic inflation, or 
the happy Hugh Everett, dance of worlds. From trans-cosmic invaders from 
alternate Earths, I'd hope it would be from 3 different cosms where other human 
species were successful. Dance with Denisovans, battle with Neanderthals, do 
mathematics with Boskones (they gota be good at math with those big heads?). We 
leave one discussion out of our thoughts. Which is how many of these oblate 
spheroids that we split off to, are just empty vacuums, or false vacuums? Thus, 
it's the internal content of any given cosmos that matters. No minds (to me) 
equals non-consciousness, and that Swiss guy, Schrodinger seems to agree with 
me. I'll just jot off and submit this to the committee and await my Fields 
Prize. 


Not sure if we differ. It is a bit fuzzy to me to be honest. Good luck for the 
Fields Medal. If you are older than 40, it is no more possible (I let you know).
Bruno




-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 16, 2019 1:25 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
unconcerned. 


Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.
1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we said 
that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. We have 
believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the world, 
then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments made 
of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less mysterious as 
it implies a still bigger multiplication. 

2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without the 
axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your theory.The 
theory 
Mechanism + SWE 
is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 
SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave (without 
mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).
Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to re-prove 
constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising result (I dare to 
say) in that direction.
Yes, the less axioms you have, the more possibilities/models you get, and with 
mechanism, there is a simple explanation why the possibilities have to 
interfere at some point. 
The most plausible theory is Mechanism. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 & Co. 
The appearance of the many worlds and they laws is explain

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 3:48:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:

 On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:

> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>>
>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a 
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <
>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then 
>>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
>>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
>>> proven, or 
>>> even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a 
>> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
>> OBSERVABLE 
>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
>> infinite 
>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them 
>> in 
>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go 
>> to see such a thing. 
>>
>
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
> coming 
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
> number 
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated 
> with a 
> different universe. AG
>
>
>
> Tegmark missed this? 
>
> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave 
> rather good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having 
> non 
> countable universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise 
> to a 
> continuum (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” 
> brought by 
> the measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to 
> say the 
> least.
>

 *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- 
 which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious 
 that 
 any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *



 I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat 
 exist, indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At 
 some 
 point the difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital 
 mechanist 
 truncate, which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non 
 countable 
 case.

>>>
>>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they 
>>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>>>
>>
>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  
>> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and 
>> more 
>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level 
>> at 
>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation 
>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and 
>> there 
>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an 
>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). 
>>
>
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive 
> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, 
> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. 
> No 
> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity 
> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any 
> universe. AG
>

 If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are 
 not uncountable.

> -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of 
>>> the

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 4:14:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2019, at 05:24, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 7:39:50 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
>>>
>>> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
>>> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
>>> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
>>>
>>>
>> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" 
>> becomes superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what 
>> Guth writes:
>>
>>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of 
>> a fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
>> local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on 
>> distance scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect 
>> astronomers to see it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the 
>> fractal structure if one wants to understand the very large scale structure 
>> of the spacetime produced by inflation. Most important of all is the simple 
>> statement that once inflation happens, it produces not just one universe, 
>> but an infinite number of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally 
>> inflating universe, anything that can happen will happen; in fact, it will 
>> happen an infinite number of times.”
>>
>> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf )
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
> Unless Guth can plausbily argue why eternal inflation must occur, the 
> claim goes far behind mere speculation since it's already beyond our 
> ability to observe. AG 
>
>
> Whatever is observable is dream-able, and so “observation” is not a good 
> criterion for deciding the ontology.
>

You can't prove that arithmetic has a Platonic reality and lies at the core 
of everything we perceive and call the external world. OTOH, it's child's 
play 
to show that arithmetic arises immediately from observations of the 
externally appearing world. AG 

>
> That is the older anti-physicalist argument, already in Plato, and well 
> before.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 09:05, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:27:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> There is no repeat of universe, only of computations. The universe (the 
> physical universe) is a statistical illusion/appearance from within 
> arithmetic (assuming mechanism, and doing the reasoning: it is NOT obvious, 
> the math relies on Gödel and many others).
> 
> Once you understand that elementary arithmetic RUN all computations, already 
> the idea of a physical ontological universe seems quite speculative. Now some 
> still believe that the physical universe is brought by one computation, but 
> that too does not make sense, unless your brain. Is really the entire 
> physical universe. If not, the physical reality is brought by a relative 
> measure on all computations (a concept making sense with the Church-Turing 
> thesis).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> 
> A Sum over Computations (in one world).
> 
> Sum Over Histories
> [ http://muchomas.lassp.cornell.edu/8.04/Lecs/lec_FeynmanDiagrams/node3.html 
>  ]
> 
> Sum over Spacetimes
> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.3947  ]
> 
> and
> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0501135.pdf
> 
> A theory of quantum gravity based on quantum computation
> Seth Lloyd
> 
> An appealing choice of quantum computation is one which consists of a 
> coherent superposition of all possible quantum computations, as in the case 
> of a quantum Turing machine whose input tape is in a uniform superposition of 
> all possible programs . Such a ‘sum over computations’ encompasses both 
> regular and random architectures within its superposition, and weighs 
> computations according to the length of the program to which they correspond: 
> algorithmically simple computations that arise from short programs have 
> higher weight. The observational consequences of this and other candidate 
> computations will be the subject of future work.


Very good work, but incomplete, the quantum Turing machineries must be deduced 
for this sum over computations to work properly. But it go in the right 
direction (right with respect to mechanism).

Bruno 


> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> -- 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 05:24, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 7:39:50 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
> 
> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
> 
> 
> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" becomes 
> superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what Guth writes:
> 
>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of a 
> fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
> local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on distance 
> scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect astronomers to see 
> it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the fractal structure if one 
> wants to understand the very large scale structure of the spacetime produced 
> by inflation. Most important of all is the simple statement that once 
> inflation happens, it produces not just one universe, but an infinite number 
> of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally inflating universe, anything 
> that can happen will happen; in fact, it will happen an infinite number of 
> times.”
> 
> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf 
>  )
> 
> Jason
> 
> Unless Guth can plausbily argue why eternal inflation must occur, the claim 
> goes far behind mere speculation since it's already beyond our ability to 
> observe. AG 

Whatever is observable is dream-able, and so “observation” is not a good 
criterion for deciding the ontology.

That is the older anti-physicalist argument, already in Plato, and well before.

Bruno



> 
> -- 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 05:20, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 5:43:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/22/2019 8:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 
> > 
> > This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
> > identical language saying everything that can happen happens an 
> > infinite number of times. 
> 
> 
> The problem is to figure out what CAN happen.  There tends to be a 
> casual assumption that it's anything that can be imagined or anything 
> that is not a logical contradiction.  The former is vague (can you 
> imagine that Puerto Rico exists?).  The second can't be applied because 
> the world is not a set of propositions. "Everything" is ill defined.  
> Quantum mechanics is often cited as proving that everything happens, but 
> this is a misunderstanding.  QM also predicts that some things have zero 
> probability...that's why there are dark bands in a Young's slits experiment. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> Tegmark claimed that everything that's mathematically possible, must occur.
> Since the dark bands are NOT mathematically possible,

?

The dark bands are mathematically possible, and even mathematically necessary 
when arithmetic is seen “from inside”.



> Tegmark's general
> claim cannot apply. So we must address ourselves to what IS mathematically
> possible, which could include flying pigs with properly modified DNA.

Yes, in dreams, but perhaps rare in physics, which is not dreams, but a sum on 
all (relative) dreams.




> I don't
> subscribe to the claim of many or infinite copies of anything. I've never seen
> a proof of that; only assertions. And Jason mistakes the claim if it comes 
> from
> Tegmark. He did NOT claim that anything CONCEIVABLE must occur. AG


“Conceivable” is a fuzzy term. Flying pigs are conceivable, dream-able, but 
square circles are not, like 2+2=5 in arithmetic. (As opposed to other 
mathematical structure where numbers have another interpretation).

Bruno 



>  
> 
> -- 
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>  
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 03:39, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
> 
> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
> 
> 
> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" becomes 
> superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what Guth writes:
> 
>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of a 
> fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
> local universes […]

Guth converges toward a universal physical dovetailing, and that is possible, 
and very plausible with Mechanism, almost proved, I would say, except for the 
devils in the details. Of course that infinite repetition is guarantied in the 
arithmetical reality.

Bruno 




> Of course this fractal structure is entirely on distance scales much too 
> large to be observed, so we cannot expect astronomers to see it. Nonetheless, 
> one does have to think about the fractal structure if one wants to understand 
> the very large scale structure of the spacetime produced by inflation. Most 
> important of all is the simple statement that once inflation happens, it 
> produces not just one universe, but an infinite number of universes.” He 
> concludes, “In an eternally inflating universe, anything that can happen will 
> happen; in fact, it will happen an infinite number of times.”
> 
> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf 
>  )
> 
> Jason
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 00:46, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 5:36 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:39 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable 
> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 
> 
> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces 
> within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic 
> principle.
> 
> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The 
> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite 
> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The 
> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
> 
> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite 
> volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in 
> physics?
> 
> Holography is highly speculative. The Bekenstein bound does not apply to 
> non-static universes, such as our expanding universe.
> 
> The Bekenstein bound doesn't apply to universe, it applies to volumes.  Are 
> you aware of a way to physically store infinite information in a finite space 
> using finite energy?

Which is indeed the main task to do for a non-mechanist.

Now, that might not be entirely true. Gödel did try to get a notion of non 
computable finite object, and recently I find a way to build a model of ZF(or 
even PA) in which such finite object are not computable, but those models are 
highly non standard, and such finite things are “truly” infinite, so I don’t 
believe Gödel’s idea could succeed, nor that he ever took this seriously, as 
other writing of him put doubt on this. So I agree with you, a non mechanist 
must conceive actual infinite brain capable of doing an infinity of task in a 
finite time. Only that can make him hoping to escape the UD statistics in 
arithmetic.

Bruno



>  
>  
> If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite 
> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
> 
> You overlook the possibility that the infinite repeats are of uninteresting 
> volumes, and that the initial conditions for some volumes may never repeat.
> 
> But that would contradict standard cosmological models, where all variation 
> was seeded by quantum fluctuations occurring at all scales of expansion, such 
> that every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen 
> (and infinitely often in either a spatially infinite universe, or an 
> eternally inflating universe).
>  
>  
> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite 
> number of times.
> 
> Guth was wrong about a lot of things. Eternal inflation is an unproven 
> speculative idea. Not even inflation itself is entirely secure -- it is 
> increasingly becoming to look like a solution in search of a problem. All of 
> Guth's original motivations for inflation have come to very little.
> 
> 
> Wasn't it strongly confirmed by the Planck CMB measurements?  Guth and Linde 
> were awarded the Break Through Prize, which is even bigger than the Nobel 
> prize.  Wouldn't that suggest there had been some support or confirmation of 
> the theory?
> 
> https://s22380.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015_TT_power_spectrum_Planck_600px.jpg
>  
> 
> 
> This endeavor is a challenging one, explains Planck team member Charles 
> Lawrence (JPL). Cosmologists start with the splotchy CMB pattern. From that 
> they calculate what’s called the power spectrum, which reveals the strength 
> of the CMB’s fluctuations at different angular scales. (The power spectrum is 
> the wiggly graph at right.) The power spectrum is the cornerstone of the 
> whole effort: it’s this statistical map that cosmologists base their CMB 
> analysis on.
> 
> The cosmologists then make some assumptions about what kind of universe 
> they’re dealing with — in astrospeak, they assume the standard lambda-CDM 
> model, which includes (1) a particular solution to the general relativistic 
> equations of gravity, (2) a universe that looks basically the same on large 
> scales and is expanding, (3) an early period of stupendous expansion called 
> inflation, and (4) quantum fluctuations that seeded today’s large-scale 
> matter distribution.
> 
> 
> Jason 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 22 Sep 2019, at 17:39, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
> 
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels then 
> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", 
> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your 
> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones 
> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of 
> them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the 
> correct level and below it). 
> 
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how 
> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
> 
> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not 
> uncountable.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the 
> necessary existence of copies. AG 
> 
> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is finite, 
> countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
> 
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable 
> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 
> 
> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces 
> within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic 
> principle.
> 
> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The 
> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite 
> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The 
> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
> 
> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite 
> volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in 
> physics?
> 
> If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite 
> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
> 
> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite 
> number of times.

Which is a theorem in arithmetic. Assuming a physical universe is not just 
needed, it cannot work at all, unless Mechanism is false.

Bruno 



> 
> Jason
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 20 Sep 2019, at 09:16, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Ha! Thanks Bruno. I am kind of a physicalist-materialist sort of dude,

No problem. Just say “no” to the doctor, and find some “magical” theory of mind 
if interested in the mind-body problem.



> and if these universes are forever untouchable,

Truth is untouchable, unseeable, unmeasurable, but it explains (wrongly or 
correctly) why we see, touch, measure many things, in a stable and prolongated 
way. We get an indirect explanation including why we believe that there is a 
physical universe, when they are none.

All proposition like “0 universe”, “1 universe”, “2 universes”, … aleph_zero 
universes”, aleph_1 universes, etc.

Are not directly verifiable, but they do have different observable consequences.




> it because all pedantic as they say. Unless for example, the Borisov comet is 
> really an interstellar craft, it's only moderately interesting. On math, 
> please place me at the back of the class ;-)

No problem if you can still hear me. It is a bit crowded there, also …

Bruno




> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Thu, Sep 19, 2019 7:08 am
> Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
> 
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 23:06, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Yes, Bruno, it's all axiomatic. Having said this, we can do away with MWI by 
>> simply calling it all, an infinite (my term is near-infinite, a non 
>> sequitur), and we still hypothetically receive the same results as chaotic 
>> inflation, or the happy Hugh Everett, dance of worlds. From trans-cosmic 
>> invaders from alternate Earths, I'd hope it would be from 3 different cosms 
>> where other human species were successful. Dance with Denisovans, battle 
>> with Neanderthals, do mathematics with Boskones (they gota be good at math 
>> with those big heads?). We leave one discussion out of our thoughts. Which 
>> is how many of these oblate spheroids that we split off to, are just empty 
>> vacuums, or false vacuums? Thus, it's the internal content of any given 
>> cosmos that matters. No minds (to me) equals non-consciousness, and that 
>> Swiss guy, Schrodinger seems to agree with me. I'll just jot off and submit 
>> this to the committee and await my Fields Prize. 
> 
> Not sure if we differ. It is a bit fuzzy to me to be honest. Good luck for 
> the Fields Medal. If you are older than 40, it is no more possible (I let you 
> know).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> To: everything-list > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>>
>> Sent: Mon, Sep 16, 2019 1:25 pm
>> Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
>> 
>> 
>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>>> >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical 
>>> of MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
>>> unconcerned.
>> 
>> 
>> Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.
>> 
>> 1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we 
>> said that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. 
>> We have believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the 
>> world, then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
>> eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
>> multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments 
>> made of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less 
>> mysterious as it implies a still bigger multiplication. 
>> 
>> 
>> 2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without 
>> the axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your 
>> theory.
>> The theory 
>> 
>> Mechanism + SWE 
>> 
>> is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 
>> 
>> SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave 
>> (without mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).
>> 
>> Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
>> extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to 
>> re-prove constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising 
>> result (I dare to say) in

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:46, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson > a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > 
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>>> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
>>> 
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such 
>>> a thing. 
>>> 
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
>>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
>>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
>>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG
>> 
>> 
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>> 
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure 
>> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.
>> 
>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 
> 
> 
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
> 
> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
> 
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels then 
> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", 
> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your 
> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones 
> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of 
> them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the 
> correct level and below it). 
> 
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how 
> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
> 
> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not 
> uncountable.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the 
> necessary existence of copies. AG 
> 
> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is finite, 
> countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
> 
> 
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable 
> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 
> 
> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces 
> within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic 
> principle.

It would even violate the assumption that the physical reality is Turing 
universal. To negate mechanism, we need a small finite non Turing universal 
universe, but that leads to big difficulties by itself. You need some magic.

Bruno 


> 
> Jason
> 
> 
>  
> 
>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 20 Sep 2019, at 03:17, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson > a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > 
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>>> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
>>> 
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such 
>>> a thing. 
>>> 
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
>>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
>>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
>>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG
>> 
>> 
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>> 
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure 
>> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.
>> 
>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 
> 
> 
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
> 
> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
> 
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels then 
> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", 
> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your 
> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones 
> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of 
> them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the 
> correct level and below it). 
> 
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how 
> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
> 
> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not 
> uncountable.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the 
> necessary existence of copies. AG 
> 
> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is finite, 
> countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
> 
> 
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable 
> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 

It is a theorem, about *all* universal machinery  phi_i that all programs 
repeat, with different codings.

For all i there is a j such that i ≠ j, and for all x phi_j(x) = phi_i(x). That 
is obvious for a programmer, you can always add spurious instructions, for 
example.

So, in the arithmetical reality (which is Turing universal) then if you can 
survive with a digital brain, you survive in all infinitely many computations 
which extends your current experiences.
There is arguably a non countable set of (infinite!)

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-23 Thread Philip Thrift

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:27:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> There is no repeat of universe, only of computations. The universe (the 
> physical universe) is a statistical illusion/appearance from within 
> arithmetic (assuming mechanism, and doing the reasoning: it is NOT obvious, 
> the math relies on Gödel and many others).
>
> Once you understand that elementary arithmetic RUN all computations, 
> already the idea of a physical ontological universe seems quite 
> speculative. Now some still believe that the physical universe is brought 
> by one computation, but that too does not make sense, unless your brain. Is 
> really the entire physical universe. If not, the physical reality is 
> brought by a relative measure on all computations (a concept making sense 
> with the Church-Turing thesis).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  

A Sum over Computations (in one world).

Sum Over Histories
[ http://muchomas.lassp.cornell.edu/8.04/Lecs/lec_FeynmanDiagrams/node3.html
 ]

Sum over Spacetimes
[ https://arxiv.org/abs/0906.3947 ]

and

https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0501135.pdf

*A theory of quantum gravity based on quantum computation*
Seth Lloyd

An appealing choice of quantum computation is one which consists of a 
coherent superposition of all possible quantum computations, as in the case 
of a quantum Turing machine whose input tape is in a uniform superposition 
of all possible programs . Such a *‘sum over computations’ *encompasses 
both regular and random architectures within its superposition, and weighs 
computations according to the length of the program to which they 
correspond: algorithmically simple computations that arise from short 
programs have higher weight. The observational consequences of this and 
other candidate computations will be the subject of future work.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:55:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with 
>> the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is not self 
>> contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions have 
> 100% destructive interference. AG 
>
>
> They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies quantum 
> mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that satisfies Newtonian 
> mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or Aristotelian mechanics?
>
> Brent
>

So now you're saying that everything *conceivable* is possible. But isn't 
that what you criticized Jason for? AG 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/22/2019 8:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:


Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start
with the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is
not self contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).

Brent


I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions 
have 100% destructive interference. AG


They have destructive interference in a universe that satisfies quantum 
mechanics.  How do you know there isn't a universe that satisfies 
Newtonian mechanics?  or Harry Potter mechanics?  Or Aristotelian mechanics?


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:28:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/22/2019 8:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 5:43:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/22/2019 8:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 
>> > 
>> > This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
>> > identical language saying everything that can happen happens an 
>> > infinite number of times. 
>>
>>
>> The problem is to figure out what CAN happen.  There tends to be a 
>> casual assumption that it's anything that can be imagined or anything 
>> that is not a logical contradiction.  The former is vague (can you 
>> imagine that Puerto Rico exists?).  The second can't be applied because 
>> the world is not a set of propositions. "Everything" is ill defined.  
>> Quantum mechanics is often cited as proving that everything happens, but 
>> this is a misunderstanding.  QM also predicts that some things have zero 
>> probability...that's why there are dark bands in a Young's slits 
>> experiment. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> Tegmark claimed that everything that's mathematically possible, must occur.
> Since the dark bands are NOT mathematically possible, 
>
>
> Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with 
> the right axioms.  Everything mathematically possible that is not self 
> contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).
>
> Brent
>

I don't see dark bands as mathematically possible since these regions have 
100% destructive interference. AG 

>
> Tegmark's general
> claim cannot apply. So we must address ourselves to what IS mathematically
> possible, which could include flying pigs with properly modified DNA. I 
> don't
> subscribe to the claim of many or infinite copies of anything. I've never 
> seen
> a proof of that; only assertions. And Jason mistakes the claim if it comes 
> from
> Tegmark. He did NOT claim that anything CONCEIVABLE must occur. AG
>  
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com .
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c8315daf-c474-4601-9969-0f7724e65ffb%40googlegroups.com
>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/22/2019 8:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 5:43:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/22/2019 8:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used
almost
> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an
> infinite number of times.

The problem is to figure out what CAN happen. There tends to be a
casual assumption that it's anything that can be imagined or anything
that is not a logical contradiction. The former is vague (can you
imagine that Puerto Rico exists?). The second can't be applied
because
the world is not a set of propositions. "Everything" is ill defined.
Quantum mechanics is often cited as proving that everything
happens, but
this is a misunderstanding. QM also predicts that some things
have zero
probability...that's why there are dark bands in a Young's slits
experiment.

Brent

Tegmark claimed that everything that's mathematically possible, must
occur.

Since the dark bands are NOT mathematically possible,

Of course they are mathematically possible. You just need to start with
the right axioms. Everything mathematically possible that is not self
contradictory (including a flat Earth and flying pigs).

Brent

Tegmark's general
claim cannot apply. So we must address ourselves to what IS mathematically
possible, which could include flying pigs with properly modified DNA.
I don't
subscribe to the claim of many or infinite copies of anything. I've
never seen
a proof of that; only assertions. And Jason mistakes the claim if it
comes from

Tegmark. He did NOT claim that anything CONCEIVABLE must occur. AG
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 7:39:50 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
>>
>> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
>> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
>> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
>>
>>
> I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" becomes 
> superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what Guth 
> writes:
>
>  “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of a 
> fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the 
> local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on 
> distance scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect 
> astronomers to see it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the 
> fractal structure if one wants to understand the very large scale structure 
> of the spacetime produced by inflation. Most important of all is the simple 
> statement that once inflation happens, it produces not just one universe, 
> but an infinite number of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally 
> inflating universe, anything that can happen will happen; in fact, it will 
> happen an infinite number of times.”
>
> -- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" ( 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf )
>
> Jason
>

Unless Guth can plausbily argue why eternal inflation must occur, the claim 
goes far behind mere speculation since it's already beyond our ability to 
observe. AG 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 5:43:13 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/22/2019 8:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 
> > 
> > This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
> > identical language saying everything that can happen happens an 
> > infinite number of times. 
>
>
> The problem is to figure out what CAN happen.  There tends to be a 
> casual assumption that it's anything that can be imagined or anything 
> that is not a logical contradiction.  The former is vague (can you 
> imagine that Puerto Rico exists?).  The second can't be applied because 
> the world is not a set of propositions. "Everything" is ill defined.  
> Quantum mechanics is often cited as proving that everything happens, but 
> this is a misunderstanding.  QM also predicts that some things have zero 
> probability...that's why there are dark bands in a Young's slits 
> experiment. 
>
> Brent 
>

Tegmark claimed that everything that's mathematically possible, must occur.
Since the dark bands are NOT mathematically possible, Tegmark's general
claim cannot apply. So we must address ourselves to what IS mathematically
possible, which could include flying pigs with properly modified DNA. I 
don't
subscribe to the claim of many or infinite copies of anything. I've never 
seen
a proof of that; only assertions. And Jason mistakes the claim if it comes 
from
Tegmark. He did NOT claim that anything CONCEIVABLE must occur. AG
 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 8:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen
>
> No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything
> nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen.
> "Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.
>
>
I qualified it with "that is possible", I grant that "conceivable" becomes
superfluous with the "possible" constraint.  Anyway, here is what Guth
writes:

 “This process will repeat itself literally forever, producing a kind of a
fractal structure to the universe, resulting in an infinite number of the
local universes […] Of course this fractal structure is entirely on
distance scales much too large to be observed, so we cannot expect
astronomers to see it. Nonetheless, one does have to think about the
fractal structure if one wants to understand the very large scale structure
of the spacetime produced by inflation. Most important of all is the simple
statement that once inflation happens, it produces not just one universe,
but an infinite number of universes.” He concludes, “In an eternally
inflating universe, anything that can happen will happen; in fact, it will
happen an infinite number of times.”

-- Alan Gutth, "Eternal inflation and its implications" (
https://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0702178.pdf )

Jason

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 4:36:11 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:39 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>>
 On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson >>> > wrote:
>
>
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have 
> countable universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG 
>

 It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite 
 spaces within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and 
 holographic principle.

>>>
>>> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The 
>>> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite 
>>> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The 
>>> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
>>>
>>
>> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite 
>> volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in 
>> physics?
>>
>
> Holography is highly speculative. The Bekenstein bound does not apply to 
> non-static universes, such as our expanding universe.
>  
>
>> If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite 
>> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
>>
>
> You overlook the possibility that the infinite repeats are of 
> uninteresting volumes, and that the initial conditions for some volumes may 
> never repeat.
>  
>
>> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
>> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite 
>> number of times.
>>
>
> Guth was wrong about a lot of things. Eternal inflation is an unproven 
> speculative idea. Not even inflation itself is entirely secure -- it is 
> increasingly becoming to look like a solution in search of a problem. All 
> of Guth's original motivations for inflation have come to very little.
>

*Doesn't inflation account for the homogeneity of our present observable 
universe that is causally UN-connected? Was it one of problems that 
inspired Guth to posit inflation? AG *

>
> Bruce 
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/22/2019 3:56 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The Bekenstein bound does not apply to our Hubble volume. If you take 
the mean density over this volume, and the Hubble radius, you find 
that the amount of enclosed matter saturates the Bekenstein bound. But 
we are not inside a black hole So the bound does not apply to 
every volume


You would have to calculate the amount of information, not the matter 
density.  The information maybe reduced by correlations within the 
matter fields.


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/22/2019 3:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would happen


No.  That is NOT the theory.  The theory is that everything 
nomologically consistent with the initial conditions may happen. 
"Conceviable" is having a flat Earth and flying pigs.


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/22/2019 8:39 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost 
identical language saying everything that can happen happens an 
infinite number of times.



The problem is to figure out what CAN happen.  There tends to be a 
casual assumption that it's anything that can be imagined or anything 
that is not a logical contradiction.  The former is vague (can you 
imagine that Puerto Rico exists?).  The second can't be applied because 
the world is not a set of propositions. "Everything" is ill defined.  
Quantum mechanics is often cited as proving that everything happens, but 
this is a misunderstanding.  QM also predicts that some things have zero 
probability...that's why there are dark bands in a Young's slits experiment.


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 8:46 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 5:36 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:39 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch 
 wrote:

> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have
>> countable universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG
>>
>
> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite
> spaces within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and
> holographic principle.
>

 That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The
 Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite
 space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The
 holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.

>>>
>>> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a
>>> finite volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory
>>> in physics?
>>>
>>
>> Holography is highly speculative. The Bekenstein bound does not apply to
>> non-static universes, such as our expanding universe.
>>
>
> The Bekenstein bound doesn't apply to universe, it applies to volumes.
> Are you aware of a way to physically store infinite information in a finite
> space using finite energy?
>

The Bekenstein bound does not apply to our Hubble volume. If you take the
mean density over this volume, and the Hubble radius, you find that the
amount of enclosed matter saturates the Bekenstein bound. But we are not
inside a black hole So the bound does not apply to every volume


If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite
>>> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
>>>
>>
>> You overlook the possibility that the infinite repeats are of
>> uninteresting volumes, and that the initial conditions for some volumes may
>> never repeat.
>>
>
> But that would contradict standard cosmological models, where all
> variation was seeded by quantum fluctuations occurring at all scales of
> expansion, such that every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen
> and would happen (and infinitely often in either a spatially infinite
> universe, or an eternally inflating universe).
>

What are quantum fluctuations? This is another of the very dubious
assumptions/misconceptions built into the very foundations of inflation
theory.



> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost
>>> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite
>>> number of times.
>>>
>>
>> Guth was wrong about a lot of things. Eternal inflation is an unproven
>> speculative idea. Not even inflation itself is entirely secure -- it is
>> increasingly becoming to look like a solution in search of a problem. All
>> of Guth's original motivations for inflation have come to very little.
>>
>
> Wasn't it strongly confirmed by the Planck CMB measurements?
>

No, eternal inflation was not thereby confirmed. Some inflation models
received support, and many were ruled out by the CMB data. But nothing is
clearly settled.


>   Guth and Linde were awarded the Break Through Prize, which is even
> bigger than the Nobel prize.  Wouldn't that suggest there had been some
> support or confirmation of the theory?
>

Prizes are awarded for all sorts of things. Particularly the recent prizes
for speculative ideas in string theory


>
>
> https://s22380.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015_TT_power_spectrum_Planck_600px.jpg
>
> This endeavor is a challenging one, explains Planck team member Charles
> Lawrence (JPL). Cosmologists start with the splotchy CMB pattern. From that
> they calculate what’s called the power spectrum, which reveals the strength
> of the CMB’s fluctuations at different angular scales. (The power spectrum
> is the wiggly graph at right.) The power spectrum is the cornerstone of the
> whole effort: it’s this statistical map that cosmologists base their CMB
> analysis on.
>
> The cosmologists then make some assumptions about what kind of universe
> they’re dealing with — in astrospeak, they assume the standard lambda-CDM
> model, which includes (1) a particular solution to the general relativistic
> equations of gravity, (2) a universe that looks basically the same on large
> scales and is expanding, (3) an early period of stupendous expansion called
> inflation, and (4) quantum fluctuations that seeded today’s large-scale
> matter distribution.
>
>

I ask again, what are quantum fluctuations?

Bruce

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Sep 22, 2019 at 5:36 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:39 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:
>
>
> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have
> countable universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG
>

 It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite
 spaces within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and
 holographic principle.

>>>
>>> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The
>>> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite
>>> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The
>>> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
>>>
>>
>> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite
>> volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in
>> physics?
>>
>
> Holography is highly speculative. The Bekenstein bound does not apply to
> non-static universes, such as our expanding universe.
>

The Bekenstein bound doesn't apply to universe, it applies to volumes.  Are
you aware of a way to physically store infinite information in a finite
space using finite energy?

>
>
>> If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite
>> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
>>
>
> You overlook the possibility that the infinite repeats are of
> uninteresting volumes, and that the initial conditions for some volumes may
> never repeat.
>

But that would contradict standard cosmological models, where all variation
was seeded by quantum fluctuations occurring at all scales of expansion,
such that every conceivable pattern that is possible can happen and would
happen (and infinitely often in either a spatially infinite universe, or an
eternally inflating universe).

>
>
>> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost
>> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite
>> number of times.
>>
>
> Guth was wrong about a lot of things. Eternal inflation is an unproven
> speculative idea. Not even inflation itself is entirely secure -- it is
> increasingly becoming to look like a solution in search of a problem. All
> of Guth's original motivations for inflation have come to very little.
>
>
Wasn't it strongly confirmed by the Planck CMB measurements?  Guth and
Linde were awarded the Break Through Prize, which is even bigger than the
Nobel prize.  Wouldn't that suggest there had been some support or
confirmation of the theory?

https://s22380.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015_TT_power_spectrum_Planck_600px.jpg

This endeavor is a challenging one, explains Planck team member Charles
Lawrence (JPL). Cosmologists start with the splotchy CMB pattern. From that
they calculate what’s called the power spectrum, which reveals the strength
of the CMB’s fluctuations at different angular scales. (The power spectrum
is the wiggly graph at right.) The power spectrum is the cornerstone of the
whole effort: it’s this statistical map that cosmologists base their CMB
analysis on.

The cosmologists then make some assumptions about what kind of universe
they’re dealing with — in astrospeak, they assume the standard lambda-CDM
model, which includes (1) a particular solution to the general relativistic
equations of gravity, (2) a universe that looks basically the same on large
scales and is expanding, (3) an early period of stupendous expansion called
inflation, and (4) quantum fluctuations that seeded today’s large-scale
matter distribution.

Jason

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:39 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:

 What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have
 countable universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG

>>>
>>> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite
>>> spaces within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and
>>> holographic principle.
>>>
>>
>> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The
>> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite
>> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The
>> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
>>
>
> Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite
> volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in
> physics?
>

Holography is highly speculative. The Bekenstein bound does not apply to
non-static universes, such as our expanding universe.

> If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite
> (homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.
>

You overlook the possibility that the infinite repeats are of uninteresting
volumes, and that the initial conditions for some volumes may never repeat.

> This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost
> identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite
> number of times.
>

Guth was wrong about a lot of things. Eternal inflation is an unproven
speculative idea. Not even inflation itself is entirely secure -- it is
increasingly becoming to look like a solution in search of a problem. All
of Guth's original motivations for inflation have come to very little.

Bruce

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019, 9:34 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>
> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that
> they occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>

 Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080
 pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and 
 more
 "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level 
 at
 which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
 thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and 
 there
 are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
 infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).

>>>
>>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive
>>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes,
>>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your 
>>> choice. No
>>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no 
>>> necessity
>>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any
>>> universe. AG
>>>
>>
>> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes
>> are not uncountable.
>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of
> the necessary existence of copies. AG
>

 Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is
 finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite?

>>>
>>> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable
>>> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG
>>>
>>
>> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces
>> within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic
>> principle.
>>
>
> That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The
> Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite
> space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The
> holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.
>

Both places absolute finite limits on the information content of a finite
volume containing finite energy. Is this no longer a favored theory in
physics?

If a finite region does contain finite information, then in an infinite
(homogeneous) space, that same finite pattern will reappear infinitely.

This is a consequence also of eternal inflation, and Guth used almost
identical language saying everything that can happen happens an infinite
number of times.

Jason

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  > a écrit :
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > 
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>>> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
>>> 
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such 
>>> a thing. 
>>> 
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
>>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
>>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
>>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG
>> 
>> 
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>> 
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure 
>> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.
>> 
>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 
> 
> 
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
> 
> I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
> 
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels then 
> in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more "precision", 
> once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at which your 
> consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation thant the ones 
> at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there are an infinity of 
> them) does not make any difference, but there are an infinity of them (at the 
> correct level and below it). 
> 
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter how 
> many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG 

There is no repeat of universe, only of computations. The universe (the 
physical universe) is a statistical illusion/appearance from within arithmetic 
(assuming mechanism, and doing the reasoning: it is NOT obvious, the math 
relies on Gödel and many others).

Once you understand that elementary arithmetic RUN all computations, already 
the idea of a physical ontological universe seems quite speculative. Now some 
still believe that the physical universe is brought by one computation, but 
that too does not make sense, unless your brain. Is really the entire physical 
universe. If not, the physical reality is brought by a relative measure on all 
computations (a concept making sense with the Church-Turing thesis).

Bruno




> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
>> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
>> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is 
>> your theory, isn't it?
> 
> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually 
> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. 
> 
> 
>> If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG
> 
> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much 
> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 19 Sep 2019, at 15:37, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > 
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>>> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
>>> 
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such 
>>> a thing. 
>>> 
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
>>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
>>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
>>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>>> different universe. AG
>> 
>> 
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>> 
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure 
>> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.
>> 
>> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 
> 
> 
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
> 
> I don't believe in repeats

That can be shown to be non accessible from the first person view.



> and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur,


That follows easily from the fact that the elementary arithmetical reality 
emulates all computations, and this infinity many often.

You need to study Gödel 1931, or some books, to get this right. The 
arithmetical reality is Turing universal, and no universal machine can 
distinguish the arithmetical reality from any other type of reality, from its 
first person perspective, but that still can test the plausibility of 
mechanism, by comparing the physics in the head of the (immaterial, 
arithmetical) machine and what we see. Thanks to QM-without collapse, (and non 
cloning, non locality, indeterminacy + quantum logic) we can say that up to now 
Nature confirms Mechanism, and quasi refute Materialism or at lest materialism 
+ consciousness exists.

Bruno



> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
>> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
>> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is 
>> your theory, isn't it?
> 
> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually 
> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. 
> 
> 
>> If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG
> 
> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much 
> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why 
> there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the 
> “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that 
> the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum 
> mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. Only 
> by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible confirmation of 
> the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of mechanism: that we are 
> multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is “only” a statistics on all 
> relative computations (“seen from inside”).
> 
> Comare the three theory of physics:
> 
> Copenhagen:
> SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree
> 
> Everett
> SWE + mechanism
> 
> Your servitor
> Mechanism.
> 
> Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely) but 
> it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first)

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-20 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Ha! Thanks Bruno. I am kind of a physicalist-materialist sort of dude, and if 
these universes are forever untouchable, it because all pedantic as they say. 
Unless for example, the Borisov comet is really an interstellar craft, it's 
only moderately interesting. On math, please place me at the back of the class 
;-)

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Sep 19, 2019 7:08 am
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On 16 Sep 2019, at 23:06, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Yes, Bruno, it's all axiomatic. Having said this, we can do away with MWI by 
simply calling it all, an infinite (my term is near-infinite, a non sequitur), 
and we still hypothetically receive the same results as chaotic inflation, or 
the happy Hugh Everett, dance of worlds. From trans-cosmic invaders from 
alternate Earths, I'd hope it would be from 3 different cosms where other human 
species were successful. Dance with Denisovans, battle with Neanderthals, do 
mathematics with Boskones (they gota be good at math with those big heads?). We 
leave one discussion out of our thoughts. Which is how many of these oblate 
spheroids that we split off to, are just empty vacuums, or false vacuums? Thus, 
it's the internal content of any given cosmos that matters. No minds (to me) 
equals non-consciousness, and that Swiss guy, Schrodinger seems to agree with 
me. I'll just jot off and submit this to the committee and await my Fields 
Prize. 

Not sure if we differ. It is a bit fuzzy to me to be honest. Good luck for the 
Fields Medal. If you are older than 40, it is no more possible (I let you know).
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 16, 2019 1:25 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
unconcerned. 

Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.
1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we said 
that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. We have 
believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the world, 
then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments made 
of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less mysterious as 
it implies a still bigger multiplication. 

2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without the 
axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your theory.The 
theory 
Mechanism + SWE 
is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 
SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave (without 
mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).
Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to re-prove 
constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising result (I dare to 
say) in that direction.
Yes, the less axioms you have, the more possibilities/models you get, and with 
mechanism, there is a simple explanation why the possibilities have to 
interfere at some point. 
The most plausible theory is Mechanism. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 & Co. 
The appearance of the many worlds and they laws is explained from that, and in 
a precise way so that it can be tested, and thanks to QM, it works, and it 
explains the relation between qualia and quanta, consciousness and matter, etc. 
Maybe wrongly, but that has to be shown.
There are zero universe, also. So we get the conceptual Occam (smaller theory) 
and the ontological Occam, no physical universe at all, but a universal dreamer 
(the universal machine lost in an incredible web of dreams, some coherent up to 
make it able to say “hello” to itself, and develop infinite conversations, like 
bacteria ...

Having said this, many cosmologists are still having a cat fight about the 
Hubble Constant (The rate of cosmological expansion). my suspicion is, that 
once we get to the point of hanging truly gigantic telescopes on the periphery 
of the solar system, new discoveries will be made, and revisions to old laws of 
physics will be done. We'll gain a few definitive answers through observation, 
and we shall see that quantum in action at a vastly large scale. Relatedly, 
hey!, where's my dark matter? in fact, hey!, where's my fusion reactors. Ah! So 
much for the 'mentally fit' physicists and astronomers….

Nothing is simple. Not even Nothing.
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: Philip Thrift 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Sun, Sep 15, 2019 7:03 pm
Subj

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Sep 20, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>

 *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they
 occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *

>>>
>>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080
>>> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and 
>>> more
>>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level 
>>> at
>>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
>>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and 
>>> there
>>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
>>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).
>>>
>>
>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive
>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes,
>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. 
>> No
>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity
>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any
>> universe. AG
>>
>
> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are
> not uncountable.
>
>> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of
 the necessary existence of copies. AG

>>>
>>> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is
>>> finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
>>>
>>
>> What I have shown is that it's hypothetically possible to have countable
>> universes wherein there are no repeats, no exact copies. AG
>>
>
> It might be imaginable but there being no duplicates of any finite spaces
> within an infinite space violates the Bekenstein bound and holographic
> principle.
>

That is simply false. The duplicates could contain no information. The
Bekenstein bound applies to black holes, suggesting that if the infinite
space has a finite matter density, it will close to form a BH. The
holographic principle is a conjecture based on disfavoured string theory.

Bruce

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Jason Resch

On Thursday, September 19, 2019, Alan Grayson 
wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:



 On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
 wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson <
>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then
>>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is
>>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
>>> proven, or
>>> even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a
>> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
>> OBSERVABLE
>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
>> infinite
>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them 
>> in
>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go
>> to see such a thing.
>>
>
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
> coming
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
> number
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated 
> with a
> different universe. AG
>
>
>
> Tegmark missed this?
>
> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave
> rather good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having 
> non
> countable universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise 
> to a
> continuum (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” 
> brought by
> the measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to 
> say the
> least.
>

 *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes --
 which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious 
 that
 any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *



 I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat
 exist, indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some
 point the difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital 
 mechanist
 truncate, which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non 
 countable
 case.

>>>
>>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they
>>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>>>
>>
>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080
>> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more
>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at
>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there
>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).
>>
>
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive
> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes,
> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. 
> No
> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity
> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any
> universe. AG
>

 If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are
 not uncountable.

> --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of
>>> the necessary

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 6:56:25 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a 
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:


 On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then 
>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
>> proven, or 
>> even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>
>
> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a 
> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
> OBSERVABLE 
> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
> infinite 
> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them 
> in 
> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to 
> see such a thing. 
>

 What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
 UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
 coming 
 into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
 number 
 of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with 
 a 
 different universe. AG



 Tegmark missed this? 

 Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave 
 rather good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having 
 non 
 countable universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise 
 to a 
 continuum (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” 
 brought by 
 the measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to 
 say the 
 least.

>>>
>>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- 
>>> which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious 
>>> that 
>>> any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat 
>>> exist, indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some 
>>> point the difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital 
>>> mechanist 
>>> truncate, which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non 
>>> countable 
>>> case.
>>>
>>
>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they 
>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>>
>
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  
> pixels then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more 
> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at 
> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation 
> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there 
> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an 
> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). 
>

 Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive 
 integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, 
 such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. 
 No 
 matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity 
 for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any 
 universe. AG

>>>
>>> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are 
>>> not uncountable.
>>>
 -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of 
>> the necessary existence of copies. AG 
>>
>
> Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is 
> finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite?
>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 09:47, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux
>>> wrote:



 Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a
 écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:


> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then
> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is
> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
> proven, or
> even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>

 Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a
 finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
 OBSERVABLE
 universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
 infinite
 then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in
 fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to
 see such a thing.

>>>
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
>>> coming
>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
>>> number
>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a
>>> different universe. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tegmark missed this?
>>>
>>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather
>>> good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non 
>>> countable
>>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a 
>>> continuum
>>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the
>>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the
>>> least.
>>>
>>
>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes --
>> which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that
>> any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist,
>> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point 
>> the
>> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate,
>> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>>
>
> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they
> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>

 Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels
 then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more
 "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at
 which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
 thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there
 are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
 infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).

>>>
>>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive
>>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes,
>>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No
>>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity
>>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any
>>> universe. AG
>>>
>>
>> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are
>> not uncountable.
>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the
> necessary existence of copies. AG
>

Do you think the number of mental states a human can possibly have is
finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


Virus-free.
www.avast.com

<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:31:18 PM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a 
>>> écrit :
>>>


 On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then 
 there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
 frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
 proven, or 
 even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*

>>>
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a 
>>> finite number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire 
>>> OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is 
>>> infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to 
>>> see such a thing. 
>>>
>>
>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
>> coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the 
>> number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>>
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather 
>> good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non 
>> countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a 
>> continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the 
>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the 
>> least.
>>
>
> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- 
> which I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that 
> any repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>
>
>
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point 
> the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>

 *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they 
 occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *

>>>
>>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels 
>>> then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more 
>>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at 
>>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation 
>>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there 
>>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an 
>>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). 
>>>
>>
>> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive 
>> integers, and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, 
>> such as a continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No 
>> matter how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity 
>> for any repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any 
>> universe. AG
>>
>
> If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not 
> uncountable.
>
>> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

I specifically used a COUNTABLE model as a possible counter example of the 
necessary existence of copies. AG 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 20 Sep 2019 at 01:15, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then
>>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is
>>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
>>> proven, or
>>> even plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite
>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE
>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite
>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in
>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to
>> see such a thing.
>>
>
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
> coming
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a
> different universe. AG
>
>
>
> Tegmark missed this?
>
> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather
> good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable
> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum
> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the
> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the
> least.
>

 *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which
 I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any
 repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *



 I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist,
 indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the
 difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate,
 which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.

>>>
>>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they
>>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>>>
>>
>> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels
>> then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more
>> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at
>> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
>> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there
>> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
>> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).
>>
>
> Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers,
> and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a
> continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter
> how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any
> repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG
>

If finite precision of a continuous quantity is used, the outcomes are not
uncountable.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 7:47:44 AM UTC-6, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  > a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>
>
> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
> such a thing. 
>

 What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
 UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes 
 coming 
 into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
 of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
 different universe. AG



 Tegmark missed this? 

 Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather 
 good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
 universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
 (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the 
 measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the 
 least.

>>>
>>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which 
>>> I haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
>>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
>>> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
>>> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
>>> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>>>
>>
>> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they 
>> occur, just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>>
>
> Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels 
> then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more 
> "precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at 
> which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation 
> thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there 
> are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an 
> infinity of them (at the correct level and below it). 
>

Let's suppose we correspond possible universes with the positive integers, 
and also assume there's a property with uncountable outcomes, such as a 
continuous mass in some range for any particle of your choice. No matter 
how many countable universes you can imagine, there's no necessity for any 
repeats of the mass of your particle; hence, no repeats of any universe. AG 

>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
>>> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
>>> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is 
>>> your theory, isn't it? *
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually 
>>> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. 
>>>
>>>
>>> *If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much 
>>> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why 
>>> there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the 
>>> “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that 
>>> the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum 
>>> mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. 
>>> Only by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible 
>>> confirmation of the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of 
>>> mechanism: that we are multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is 
>>> “only” a statistics on all relative computations (“seen from inside”).
>>>
>>> Comare the

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le jeu. 19 sept. 2019 à 15:37, Alan Grayson  a
écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:


> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>

 Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite
 number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE
 universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite
 then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in
 fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see
 such a thing.

>>>
>>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of
>>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming
>>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number
>>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a
>>> different universe. AG
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tegmark missed this?
>>>
>>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather
>>> good argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable
>>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum
>>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the
>>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the
>>> least.
>>>
>>
>> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I
>> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any
>> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist,
>> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the
>> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate,
>> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>>
>
> *I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur,
> just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *
>

Imagine a movie in 1280x720 pixels, then the same in  1920x1080  pixels
then in 3840x2160 pixels... always the same but with more and more
"precision", once you are at the correct substitution level (the level at
which your consciousness is preserved) then any more precise simulation
thant the ones at the correct level (which exists by assumption and there
are an infinity of them) does not make any difference, but there are an
infinity of them (at the correct level and below it).

>
>>
>>
>>
>> *As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and
>> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the
>> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is
>> your theory, isn't it? *
>>
>>
>> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually
>> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame.
>>
>>
>> *If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG*
>>
>>
>> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much
>> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why
>> there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the
>> “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that
>> the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum
>> mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism.
>> Only by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible
>> confirmation of the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of
>> mechanism: that we are multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is
>> “only” a statistics on all relative computations (“seen from inside”).
>>
>> Comare the three theory of physics:
>>
>> Copenhagen:
>> SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree
>>
>> Everett
>> SWE + mechanism
>>
>> Your servitor
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely)
>> but it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of
>> the materialist velleity to dismiss them.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light
 years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one
 centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 5:02:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
 must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
 claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
 plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*

>>>
>>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
>>> such a thing. 
>>>
>>
>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG
>>
>>
>>
>> Tegmark missed this? 
>>
>> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
>> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
>> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
>> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the 
>> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the 
>> least.
>>
>
> *What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
> repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *
>
>
>
> I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, 
> indeendly of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the 
> difference are not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, 
> which makes the repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.
>

*I don't believe in repeats and I haven't seen any proofs that they occur, 
just assertions from the usual suspects. AG  *

>
>
>
>
> *As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is 
> your theory, isn't it? *
>
>
> It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually 
> attributed to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. 
>
>
> *If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG*
>
>
> It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much 
> mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why 
> there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the 
> “many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that 
> the physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum 
> mechanics, due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. 
> Only by reading Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible 
> confirmation of the most startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of 
> mechanism: that we are multiplied "all the times”, and that physics is 
> “only” a statistics on all relative computations (“seen from inside”).
>
> Comare the three theory of physics:
>
> Copenhagen:
> SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree
>
> Everett
> SWE + mechanism
>
> Your servitor
> Mechanism.
>
> Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely) 
> but it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of 
> the materialist velleity to dismiss them.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
>>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
>>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
>>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
>>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
>>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
>>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>>>
>>
>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>> finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
>> of the CMBR. AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is there a copy of you 
>>> 
>>>
>>>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 16 Sep 2019, at 23:06, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Yes, Bruno, it's all axiomatic. Having said this, we can do away with MWI by 
> simply calling it all, an infinite (my term is near-infinite, a non 
> sequitur), and we still hypothetically receive the same results as chaotic 
> inflation, or the happy Hugh Everett, dance of worlds. From trans-cosmic 
> invaders from alternate Earths, I'd hope it would be from 3 different cosms 
> where other human species were successful. Dance with Denisovans, battle with 
> Neanderthals, do mathematics with Boskones (they gota be good at math with 
> those big heads?). We leave one discussion out of our thoughts. Which is how 
> many of these oblate spheroids that we split off to, are just empty vacuums, 
> or false vacuums? Thus, it's the internal content of any given cosmos that 
> matters. No minds (to me) equals non-consciousness, and that Swiss guy, 
> Schrodinger seems to agree with me. I'll just jot off and submit this to the 
> committee and await my Fields Prize. 

Not sure if we differ. It is a bit fuzzy to me to be honest. Good luck for the 
Fields Medal. If you are older than 40, it is no more possible (I let you know).

Bruno


> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list 
> Sent: Mon, Sep 16, 2019 1:25 pm
> Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
> 
> 
>> On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
>> MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
>> unconcerned.
> 
> 
> Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.
> 
> 1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we said 
> that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. We have 
> believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the world, 
> then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
> eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
> multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments made 
> of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less mysterious as 
> it implies a still bigger multiplication. 
> 
> 
> 2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without 
> the axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your 
> theory.
> The theory 
> 
> Mechanism + SWE 
> 
> is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 
> 
> SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave 
> (without mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).
> 
> Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
> extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to 
> re-prove constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising result 
> (I dare to say) in that direction.
> 
> Yes, the less axioms you have, the more possibilities/models you get, and 
> with mechanism, there is a simple explanation why the possibilities have to 
> interfere at some point. 
> 
> The most plausible theory is Mechanism. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 & 
> Co. The appearance of the many worlds and they laws is explained from that, 
> and in a precise way so that it can be tested, and thanks to QM, it works, 
> and it explains the relation between qualia and quanta, consciousness and 
> matter, etc. Maybe wrongly, but that has to be shown.
> 
> There are zero universe, also. So we get the conceptual Occam (smaller 
> theory) and the ontological Occam, no physical universe at all, but a 
> universal dreamer (the universal machine lost in an incredible web of dreams, 
> some coherent up to make it able to say “hello” to itself, and develop 
> infinite conversations, like bacteria ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Having said this, many cosmologists are still having a cat fight about the 
>> Hubble Constant (The rate of cosmological expansion). my suspicion is, that 
>> once we get to the point of hanging truly gigantic telescopes on the 
>> periphery of the solar system, new discoveries will be made, and revisions 
>> to old laws of physics will be done. We'll gain a few definitive answers 
>> through observation, and we shall see that quantum in action at a vastly 
>> large scale. Relatedly, hey!, where's my dark matter? in fact, hey!, where's 
>> my fusion reactors. Ah! So much for the 'mentally fit' physicists and 
>> astronomers….
> 
> 
> Nothing is simple. Not even Nothing.
>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 16 Sep 2019, at 22:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/16/2019 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body obeys 
>> laws which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing mathematical 
>> definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that there no magic 
>> happening in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is Digitally emulable *at 
>> some description level* relevant for staying alive and well.
> 
> But then you conclude that physical objects, like brains, are not Turing 
> computable...and thus arrive at contradiction to your starting hypothesis.

No. As the reasoning show only that the particular matter used in the digital 
substitution does not matter, which we knew at the start.

To get a contradiction you need to show that the matter that we observed is 
differ,t from the matter brought bay the infinitely many computations 
statistically interfering below our substitution level, but we do find there 
exactly what nature shows us there. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 16 Sep 2019, at 17:18, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>  
>> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
>> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
>> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
>> 
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite number 
>> of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE universe, can 
>> be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite then there is 
>> going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in fact. Max Tegmark 
>> has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such a thing. 
>> 
>> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
>> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
>> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
>> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG
> 
> 
> Tegmark missed this? 
> 
> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure 
> can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.
> 
> What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
> haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any repeats 
> necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG 


I assume the mechanist hypothesis, which shows that the repeat exist, indeendly 
of the cardinality of the number of histories. At some point the difference are 
not more relevant, due to the Digital mechanist truncate, which makes the 
repeats even more numerous in the non countable case.



> 
> As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
> presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
> natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is your 
> theory, isn't it?

It is a theorem. Not a theory. My theory is not mine. It is usually attributed 
to Descartes, and revised by Turing in the digital frame. 


> If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG

It explains many things, some trivially, like why physics seems so much 
mathematical. But it is also the only theory that I know which explains why 
there is a physical universe, instead of nothing. Then I found the 
“many-histories” and its quantum logic by myself well before I realise that the 
physicists were already there. In fact even when I studied quantum mechanics, 
due to the collapse, I taught that QM was refuting mechanism. Only by reading 
Everett will I realise that QM is an incredible confirmation of the most 
startling (and shocking I guess) aspect of mechanism: that we are multiplied 
"all the times”, and that physics is “only” a statistics on all relative 
computations (“seen from inside”).

Comare the three theory of physics:

Copenhagen:
SWE + unintelligible dualist theory of mind on which nobody agree

Everett
SWE + mechanism

Your servitor
Mechanism.

Not only Mechanism explains the quanta (qualitatively and quantatitavely) but 
it explains the qualia, and protect consciousness and (first) person of the 
materialist velleity to dismiss them.

Bruno




>> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is 
>> correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>> 
>> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for finite 
>> time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature of the 
>> CMBR. AG 
>> 
>> 
>> Is there a copy of you 
>> 
>> 
>> > Morevover, I don't believe a universe of finite age, such as ours which 
>> > everyone more or less agrees began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially 
>> > infinite.
>> 
>> I see no reason in principle why something can't be finite along one 
>> dimension and infinite along another dimension.
>> 
>> In general, one can of course have some dimensions

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-17 Thread Alan Grayson



On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 11:13:37 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 07:42:18PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 7:20:57 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > > 
> > > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously 
> posted, an 
> > > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. 
> AG  
> > > 
> > 
> > Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that 
> defines 
> > it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from 
> > an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable 
> number 
> > of copies of each world. 
> > 
> > 
> > This argument breaks down if worlds are infinite. To prove any of this,  
> > we need to do some real mathematics. So far I see it as conjectural. AG  
> > 
>
> I just don't see how it could be possible for a world to contain an 
> infinite amount of information. But as people have noted here, the 
> word "world" is ambiguous. 
>
> By "world" I first mean our universe, our bubble, including the
unobservable region, and which cosmologists are in general
agreement that it's infinite in spatial extent.; hence infinite
information. Personally, I think it's finite, a huge hypersphere
which is measured almost flat due its size. AG
 

>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-16 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 07:42:18PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 7:20:57 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote:
> >
> > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an
> > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG 
> >
> 
> Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines
> it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from
> an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number
> of copies of each world.
> 
> 
> This argument breaks down if worlds are infinite. To prove any of this, 
> we need to do some real mathematics. So far I see it as conjectural. AG 
>

I just don't see how it could be possible for a world to contain an
infinite amount of information. But as people have noted here, the
word "world" is ambiguous.



-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 7:20:57 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > 
> > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an 
> > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG  
> > 
>
> Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines 
> it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from 
> an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number 
> of copies of each world. 
>

This argument breaks down if worlds are infinite. To prove any of this, 
we need to do some real mathematics. So far I see it as conjectural. AG 

>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-16 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an
> uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG 
> 

Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines
it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from
an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number
of copies of each world.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-16 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Yes, Bruno, it's all axiomatic. Having said this, we can do away with MWI by 
simply calling it all, an infinite (my term is near-infinite, a non sequitur), 
and we still hypothetically receive the same results as chaotic inflation, or 
the happy Hugh Everett, dance of worlds. From trans-cosmic invaders from 
alternate Earths, I'd hope it would be from 3 different cosms where other human 
species were successful. Dance with Denisovans, battle with Neanderthals, do 
mathematics with Boskones (they gota be good at math with those big heads?). We 
leave one discussion out of our thoughts. Which is how many of these oblate 
spheroids that we split off to, are just empty vacuums, or false vacuums? Thus, 
it's the internal content of any given cosmos that matters. No minds (to me) 
equals non-consciousness, and that Swiss guy, Schrodinger seems to agree with 
me. I'll just jot off and submit this to the committee and await my Fields 
Prize. 


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Sep 16, 2019 1:25 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
unconcerned. 


Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.
1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we said 
that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. We have 
believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the world, 
then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments made 
of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less mysterious as 
it implies a still bigger multiplication. 

2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without the 
axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your theory.The 
theory 
Mechanism + SWE 
is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 
SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave (without 
mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).
Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to re-prove 
constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising result (I dare to 
say) in that direction.
Yes, the less axioms you have, the more possibilities/models you get, and with 
mechanism, there is a simple explanation why the possibilities have to 
interfere at some point. 
The most plausible theory is Mechanism. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 & Co. 
The appearance of the many worlds and they laws is explained from that, and in 
a precise way so that it can be tested, and thanks to QM, it works, and it 
explains the relation between qualia and quanta, consciousness and matter, etc. 
Maybe wrongly, but that has to be shown.
There are zero universe, also. So we get the conceptual Occam (smaller theory) 
and the ontological Occam, no physical universe at all, but a universal dreamer 
(the universal machine lost in an incredible web of dreams, some coherent up to 
make it able to say “hello” to itself, and develop infinite conversations, like 
bacteria ...






Having said this, many cosmologists are still having a cat fight about the 
Hubble Constant (The rate of cosmological expansion). my suspicion is, that 
once we get to the point of hanging truly gigantic telescopes on the periphery 
of the solar system, new discoveries will be made, and revisions to old laws of 
physics will be done. We'll gain a few definitive answers through observation, 
and we shall see that quantum in action at a vastly large scale. Relatedly, 
hey!, where's my dark matter? in fact, hey!, where's my fusion reactors. Ah! So 
much for the 'mentally fit' physicists and astronomers….



Nothing is simple. Not even Nothing.
Bruno







-Original Message-
From: Philip Thrift 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Sun, Sep 15, 2019 7:03 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 5:46:13 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:


On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 3:34:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

 

Sean Carroll's many-selves

And the good news is ... the one in this world is going bald. AG 


And (many would say) going crazy.
There is obviously (in his view) a world where a Sean Carroll is a "one world" 
quantum theorist. 

@philipthrift





https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=zsXCwUsuvKo


@philipthrift
On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
https://www.wired.com/story/ sean-carroll-thinks-we-all- 
exist-on-multiple-worlds/



-- 
You received this me

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-16 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/16/2019 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body 
obeys laws which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing 
mathematical definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that 
there no magic happening in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is 
Digitally emulable *at some description level* relevant for staying 
alive and well.


But then you conclude that physical objects, like brains, are not Turing 
computable...and thus arrive at contradiction to your starting hypothesis.


Brent

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 11:31:26 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 3:31 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 10:45:41 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>> Jason; it turns out you were right about the consensus among 
>> cosmologists; that the universe is thought to be *flat*. But I am 
>> studying some videos which seem to suggest that a flat universe can be* 
>> finite* in spatial extent, maybe like a cyclinder without an edge. Try 
>> try this, and the two which follow:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_k3_B9Eq7eM=youtu.be
>>
>>
> That is interesting and it is a good reminder how how flexible math is to 
> representing various spaces and geometries.  Most cosmologists work under 
> the assumption that space is "simply connected", rather than doughnut 
> shaped or otherwise, in which case if space is simply connected, and flat, 
> then it ought to be infinite.
>
> There are also interesting things that can be done as far as compacting 
> space, so that a finite cylinder can represent an infinite space evolving 
> through time.  There are some good illustrations of this here:
>
> https://www.podevin.com/single-post/2019/01/24/Einsteins-Dream-of-a-Grand-Unified-Theory
>
> Also known as a "Poincare disk" 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_disk_model   
> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PoincareHyperbolicDisk.html
>
> Jason
>

Concerning a flat and spatially finite geometry, say shaped like a square, 
when you get to what appears an edge, how do you wind up emerging on the 
opposite appearing edge? AG 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-16 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 3:31 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 10:45:41 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
> Jason; it turns out you were right about the consensus among cosmologists;
> that the universe is thought to be *flat*. But I am studying some videos
> which seem to suggest that a flat universe can be* finite* in spatial
> extent, maybe like a cyclinder without an edge. Try try this, and the two
> which follow:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_k3_B9Eq7eM=youtu.be
>
>
That is interesting and it is a good reminder how how flexible math is to
representing various spaces and geometries.  Most cosmologists work under
the assumption that space is "simply connected", rather than doughnut
shaped or otherwise, in which case if space is simply connected, and flat,
then it ought to be infinite.

There are also interesting things that can be done as far as compacting
space, so that a finite cylinder can represent an infinite space evolving
through time.  There are some good illustrations of this here:
https://www.podevin.com/single-post/2019/01/24/Einsteins-Dream-of-a-Grand-Unified-Theory

Also known as a "Poincare disk"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_disk_model
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PoincareHyperbolicDisk.html

Jason

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

> On 16 Sep 2019, at 02:46, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
> MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
> unconcerned.

Hmm… I will criticise this on two levels.

1) there are evidence: Nature loves to multiply things, and each time we said 
that we know what our universe is, we get later that it was multiple. We have 
believe that Earth was the world, then that the solar system was the world, 
then that the galaxy was the world, then thanks to Hubble the guy, we 
eventually accept what Kant did suggest, that our galaxies are themselves 
multiple, and now we see them like little bacteria engulfed in filaments made 
of a mysterious matter, along with an observable matter no less mysterious as 
it implies a still bigger multiplication. 

2) Occam Razor. If you can explain everything with the axiom A and without the 
axiom B, get rid of axiom B, especially if it put some mess in your theory.
The theory 

Mechanism + SWE 

is simply much more conceptually simple than the theory 

SWE + an ontological physical collapse of on ontological physical wave (without 
mentioning the dualism in the implicit theory of mind).

Only one problem, for Mechanism to work, and notably to get the qualia 
extending the quanta (like G* extend G, or Z1* extends Z1), we need to re-prove 
constructively that Mechanism -> SWE, but there are promising result (I dare to 
say) in that direction.

Yes, the less axioms you have, the more possibilities/models you get, and with 
mechanism, there is a simple explanation why the possibilities have to 
interfere at some point. 

The most plausible theory is Mechanism. You need only to believe in 2+2=4 & Co. 
The appearance of the many worlds and they laws is explained from that, and in 
a precise way so that it can be tested, and thanks to QM, it works, and it 
explains the relation between qualia and quanta, consciousness and matter, etc. 
Maybe wrongly, but that has to be shown.

There are zero universe, also. So we get the conceptual Occam (smaller theory) 
and the ontological Occam, no physical universe at all, but a universal dreamer 
(the universal machine lost in an incredible web of dreams, some coherent up to 
make it able to say “hello” to itself, and develop infinite conversations, like 
bacteria ...

> Having said this, many cosmologists are still having a cat fight about the 
> Hubble Constant (The rate of cosmological expansion). my suspicion is, that 
> once we get to the point of hanging truly gigantic telescopes on the 
> periphery of the solar system, new discoveries will be made, and revisions to 
> old laws of physics will be done. We'll gain a few definitive answers through 
> observation, and we shall see that quantum in action at a vastly large scale. 
> Relatedly, hey!, where's my dark matter? in fact, hey!, where's my fusion 
> reactors. Ah! So much for the 'mentally fit' physicists and astronomers….

Nothing is simple. Not even Nothing.

Bruno

> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Philip Thrift 
> To: Everything List 
> Sent: Sun, Sep 15, 2019 7:03 pm
> Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 5:46:13 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 3:34:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
>  
> 
> Sean Carroll's many-selves
> 
> And the good news is ... the one in this world is going bald. AG 
> 
> 
> And (many would say) going crazy.
> 
> There is obviously (in his view) a world where a Sean Carroll is a "one 
> world" quantum theorist. 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=zsXCwUsuvKo 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsXCwUsuvKo>
> 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
> https://www.wired.com/story/ sean-carroll-thinks-we-all- 
> exist-on-multiple-worlds/ 
> <https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/>
> -- 
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>  
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3b7a3a0d-b3e0-43ef-b886-c393eb35c9b0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email_source=footer>
> .
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because y

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 15 Sep 2019, at 21:02, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:05 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 9:58:53 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running 
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how 
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their 
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that 
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame 
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for 
>> working with quantum gravity,
>> 
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, 
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those 
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure 
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden 
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an 
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say 
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of 
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, 
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If 
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the 
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration 
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>> 
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to 
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a 
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and 
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the 
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many 
>> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>> 
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed by 
>> the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued. 
>>  
> 
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more than 
> an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity.
> 
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be infinite 
> since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had a discussion 
> with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in time doesn't 
> preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am missing 
> something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 
> 
> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) accounts 
> of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, rather than 
> everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is at best only 
>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 15 Sep 2019, at 17:58, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running 
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how 
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their 
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that 
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame 
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for 
>> working with quantum gravity,
>> 
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, 
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those 
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure 
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden 
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an 
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say 
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of 
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, 
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If 
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the 
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration 
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>> 
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to 
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a 
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and 
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the 
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many 
>> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>> 
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed by 
>> the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued. 
> 
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more than 
> an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity.
> 
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be infinite 
> since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I had a discussion 
> with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in time doesn't 
> preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am missing 
> something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 
> 
> I think what you may be missing is that in popular (but misleading) accounts 
> of the BB they often say everything originated from a point, rather than 
> everywhere at once.  To say "everything came from a point" is at best only 
> valid for describing the observable universe (or any finite portion of the 
> universe) but is invalid to extrapolate it to the whole

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> *> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>>> plausibly argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?*
>>>
>>
>> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite 
>> number of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE 
>> universe, can be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite 
>> then there is going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in 
>> fact. Max Tegmark has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see 
>> such a thing. 
>>
>
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
> different universe. AG
>
>
>
> Tegmark missed this? 
>
> Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
> argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable 
> universe. That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum 
> (2^aleph_0) of histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the 
> measure can have lower cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the 
> least.
>

*What you're not addressing is that with uncountable universes -- which I 
haven't categorically denied could arise -- it's not obvious that any 
repeats necessarily occur. I don't believe any repeats occur. AG *

*As to your general theory, that with mechanism (replacing brains and 
presumably consciousness, with digital copies), computability, and the 
natural numbers, we can derive the physical universe we observe. This is 
your theory, isn't it? If so, I just don't see it as explanatory. AG*

> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
>> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
>> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
>> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
>> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
>> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
>> is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
>>
>
> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
> finite time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature 
> of the CMBR. AG 
>
>>
>>
>> Is there a copy of you 
>> 
>>
>> * > Morevover, I don't believe a universe of finite age, such as ours 
>>> which everyone more or less agrees began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially 
>>> infinite.*
>>>
>>
>> I see no reason in principle why something can't be finite along one 
>> dimension and infinite along another dimension.
>>
>
> In general, one can of course have some dimensions finite and others 
> infinite. But if *our* universe is *finite* *in time* since the BB, 13.8 
> BY, its spatial extent must be finite, since that's how long its been 
> expanding. AG 
>
>
> I agree with Grayson here. (Accepting a lot of premises, like the BB is 
> the beginning of the physical reality, which I doubt).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
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>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



> On 14 Sep 2019, at 08:09, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
> 
> Am 13.09.2019 um 03:11 schrieb spudboy100 via Everything List:
>> On that Evgenii, we do concur. Yet, big companies or big governments 
>> probably head to this guy's door, if they need something to ask?Now, that 
>> may not be a big deal unless he is contributing to the DoD? 
> 
> By organizing a military strike from the parallel universe?

Weinberg, and Plaga on this list, if I remember well,  have argued that for 
this to be possible (an interaction in between parallel universe) you need to 
“delinearise” a little bit Quantum Mechanism. Then you can steal the oil in the 
parallel universe, and perhaps even meet your doppelgänger. 

But there is a price. Not only Special relativity get wrong, but even the 
second principle of thermodynamic get wrong, which demands a lot.

So, no need to frighten us, there are few chance we get invade by super-alien 
from the parallel universe. They can only interfere statistically, like in 
arithmetic, without magic, but by our ignorance on which parts of the structure 
of all computations emulate us.

Bruno





> 
> Evgenii
> 
>> Those comprising this group have interesting mathematical & quantum and 
>> cosmological philosophy, but we are not so prominent. The thinkers here 
>> participate because they love these topics, but their immediate impacts are 
>> something far off, potentially. Now, for me, MWI is fun, in the sense of 
>> science fiction is fun--unless we can somehow do trade somehow between 
>> Earths?I will buy Carroll's book if only for this reason. "A hominid's reach 
>> must exceed his grasp, or what's a multiverse for?" If he is absolutely 
>> wrong and we can prove it, then, very well, onward, to the World Series 
>> (Think FIFA World Cup).
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 14 Sep 2019, at 05:22, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:08:23 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 10:26 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
> > Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
> > exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed 
> > by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly 
> > argued.  What's the argument for such a claim?
> 
> Of course it's been proven! It's simple math, there are only a finite number 
> of ways the atoms in your body, or even the entire OBSERVABLE universe, can 
> be arranged so obviously if the entire universe is infinite then there is 
> going to have to be copies, an infinite number of them in fact. Max Tegmark 
> has even calculated how far you'd have to go to see such a thing. 
> 
> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of UNcountable 
> universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming into 
> existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number of 
> points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
> different universe. AG


Tegmark missed this? 

Deutsch did not, and in his book “fabric of reality”, he gave rather good 
argument in favour of Everett-type of multiverse having non countable universe. 
That makes sense with mechanism which give raise to a continuum (2^aleph_0) of 
histories, but the “equivalence class” brought by the measure can have lower 
cardinality, or bigger. Open problem, to say the least.




> 
> Your closest identical copy is 10^12 light years away. About 10^76 light 
> years away there is a sphere of radius 100 light-years identical to the one 
> centered here, so everything we see here during the next century will be 
> identical to those of our counterparts over there. And 10^102 light years 
> away the is a exact copy of our entire observable universe. And all this is 
> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is 
> correct or not, it only depends on the universe being spatially infinite.
> 
> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for finite 
> time, starting very small, as can be inferred from the temperature of the 
> CMBR. AG 
> 
> 
> Is there a copy of you 
> 
> 
> > Morevover, I don't believe a universe of finite age, such as ours which 
> > everyone more or less agrees began some 13.8 BYA, can be spatially infinite.
> 
> I see no reason in principle why something can't be finite along one 
> dimension and infinite along another dimension.
> 
> In general, one can of course have some dimensions finite and others 
> infinite. But if our universe is finite in time since the BB, 13.8 BY, its 
> spatial extent must be finite, since that's how long its been expanding. AG 

I agree with Grayson here. (Accepting a lot of premises, like the BB is the 
beginning of the physical reality, which I doubt).

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 13 Sep 2019, at 23:44, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 6:24:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running 
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how 
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their 
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that 
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame 
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for 
>> working with quantum gravity,
>> 
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, 
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those 
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure 
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden 
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an 
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say 
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of 
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, 
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If 
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the 
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration 
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>> 
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to 
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a 
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and 
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the 
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many 
>> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>> 
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed by 
>> the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued. 
> 
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more than 
> an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity.
> 
> Of course, (for those who are aware of Gödel 1931 and Turing 1936), 
> arithmetic contains all computations, which entails, when assuming mechanism, 
> an infinity of each os us. That explains both where the appearance of 
> universe come from, and the quantum mechanical type of formalism. In 
> “many-world”, the “many” makes sense, but the term “world” is not well 
> defined and should not been taken literally. It is more histories than worlds 
> per se.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> It would be best to separate MWI from the multiverse for at least the moment. 
> There are several levels of the multiverse. MWI does define a high level 
> multiverse, but MWI is not all multiverses.
> 
> The first level has to do with what exists beyond the cosmological horizon 
> and in particular if the spatial surface of spacetime is flat. This would be 
> an infinite R^3 manifold. Since the level of complexity or the number of 
> possible states is bounded by the size of the cosmology horizon, out about 13 
> billion light years, this means there are other regions that are copies of 
> this world. This is just plain combinatorics. 
>  
> The type II multiverse, or maybe type IIA, is where a deSitter or FLRW 
> spacetime with an inflationary vacuum at high energy is unstable and there 
> are vacuum transitions in regions within it. These regions have a vacuum at a 
> much lower energy and define what are sometimes called pocket worlds. Since 
> this inflationary cosmology is in a hugely

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 6:17:12 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> Carroll is in irreversible mental decline. He's lost contact with reality. 
> Sad case. I stand by my assessment. He doesn't even understand basic linear 
> algebra, and that his "state vector" has no unique representation, and thus 
> the mythical interpretation of the superposition of the wf is totally 
> illusional. AG 
> 
> 
> 
> He can play with math, like anyone else, but his fictions are a little too 
> real for him.

That is the problem with fictionalism. Like atheism it is not a doctrine, it is 
the statement that “my god is the real one”. 

I guess you know that the physical reality is not itself a fiction, but how can 
you know that?

The idea of doing research is searching the truth.

> 
> In the landscape of fictions modeling quantum phenomena, his not only denies 
> probability, but denies the 'self' (in the sense of consciousness bring a 
> real thing).

The complete contrary. I start from consciousness, I recover consciousness in 
the discourse of the machine, and I listen to what the machine already says, 
and the sound one see quick where the illusion/fiction of a physical primary 
reality comes in.

More precisely, I explain why machine cannot identify the third person self 
([]p) with their first person self ([]p & p) that they cannot even define, 
unless invoking some notion of truth (that they cannot define either by Tarski 
theorem) and … mechanism.

Then I don’t deny probability, again, I justify them, without bring absurd 
notion like events without a cause. That is the whole point of Mechanism: it 
transforms physics into a study of the probability on our consistent (and 
arithmetically sound) extensions. With mechanism, we understand quickly why 
physics is before all a statistic calculus.

You might study my sane04 paper(*), perhaps.

Bruno

(*)B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International 
System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 
2004.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
(sane04)

> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:18:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 00:44, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:44:51 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 8:45:22 AM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running 
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how 
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their 
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that 
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame 
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for 
>> working with quantum gravity,
>> 
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, 
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those 
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure 
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden 
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an 
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say 
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of 
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, 
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If 
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the 
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration 
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>> 
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to 
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a 
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and 
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the 
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> 
>> QBism is not the dialectical opposite of MWI. This is:
>> 
>> https://twitter.com/DowkerFay/status/1110683583570759680 
>> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift 
>> 
>> The MWI and this path integral interpretation are both  ψ-ontic and are thus 
>> not opposite.
> 
> I agree. I would even add that with Feynman path formalism, the reduction of 
> the wave packet does no more make sense. Feynman said it in his little book 
> on light: he consider the Wave reduction as a confusion and appeal to magic 
> (footnote at the end of the second chapter).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> Not for those of us who watch horseraces! Applied to QM, the wf becomes 
> irrelevant when the measurement occurs.

I agree. But relevant/irrelevant is not relevant when we search a conceptual 
understanding. That the wave is irrelevant after a measurement does not mean 
that there has been an actual physical collapse, which would entails FTL action 
at a distance, as Einstein explained in 1927 at the Solvay Congress (and made 
precise in the EPR paper, and then more with Bell, etc.). Then Everett QM (QM 
without collapse) the appearance of collapse is explained by the wave (adding 
or not the Born rule).



> Wave packet reduction, by which I assume you mean "collapse", is nothing more 
> than a bookkeeping device. AG 


I can’ agree more, but then, you get the many relative worlds/histories. Which 
is nice, given that the many computations is a theorem of arithmetic, and the 
“many worlds” appearance is provable from that, even without ever mentioning 
quantum mechanics.

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)


> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:24, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running 
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how 
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have yet to read their 
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that 
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame 
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for 
>> working with quantum gravity,
>> 
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately, 
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those 
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure 
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden 
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an 
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say 
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of 
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, 
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If 
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing 
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the 
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration 
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the 
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>> 
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to 
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a 
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and 
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the 
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>> 
>> LC
>> 
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many 
>> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>> 
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must 
>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed by 
>> the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued. 
> 
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more than 
> an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity.
> 
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be infinite 
> since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY.

Assuming that there is a physical universe, and that the big bang is its 
origin. OK.




> I had a discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite 
> in time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am 
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 


I might be with you on this, at least from a physicalist perspective (in which 
I do not believe, but which could be a consistent theory). From my 
understanding, space itself is born with the Big Bang, *if* the Big Bang is the 
origin (which I doubt), and that implies it is still finite after a finite time.
Now, with mechanism, I could show a model where space is infinite, but I think 
time can be deduced from it to be infinite too, so yes. Maybe Brent can add 
something (maybe he did already).



> 
> Of course, (for those who are aware of Gödel 1931 and Turing 1936), 
> arithmetic contains all computations, which entails, when assuming mechanism, 
> an infinity of each os us.
> 
> I really don't see how you make that jump.

The fact that all computations are executed in arithmetic is "well known” by 
the expert in the field since the 1930s.
("Executed”is used in the mathematical sense of the logiciens who discovered 
the computer). A (universal) Turing machine cannot distinguish, by 
introspection, between being emulated by a

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 10:45:41 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>

Jason; it turns out you were right about the consensus among cosmologists; 
that the universe is thought to be *flat*. But I am studying some videos 
which seem to suggest that a flat universe can be* finite* in spatial 
extent, maybe like a cyclinder without an edge. Try try this, and the two 
which follow:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_k3_B9Eq7eM=youtu.be

AG

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:03:06 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:05 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 9:58:53 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson <
> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno 
>> Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan 
>>> Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, 
 Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, 
> Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, 
>> Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world 
>> of quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
>> instead of 
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from 
>> probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens 
> have a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived 
> from MWI  I 
> have yet to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this 
> I might get 
> to it. One advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the 
> world as a 
> sort of quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This 
> nonlocal property 
> might be useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations 
> that 
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
> decidable. There 
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. 
> The proof is 
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays 
> of the state 
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the 
> hidden variables 
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or 
> whether this localization is the generation of information in 
> a local 
> context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as 
> with 
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then 
> auxiliary physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the 
> framework of 
> what Carrol and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and 
> this defines the Born rule. If I am right the degree of 
> ψ-epistemontic 
> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is 
> the nature of 
> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
> quantum 
> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the 
> Born

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-15 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

My guess is among the physics community, most, would be mildly, skeptical of 
MWI, because it's a bridge too far to get evidence of, as yet and thus, 
unconcerned. Having said this, many cosmologists are still having a cat fight 
about the Hubble Constant (The rate of cosmological expansion). my suspicion 
is, that once we get to the point of hanging truly gigantic telescopes on the 
periphery of the solar system, new discoveries will be made, and revisions to 
old laws of physics will be done. We'll gain a few definitive answers through 
observation, and we shall see that quantum in action at a vastly large scale. 
Relatedly, hey!, where's my dark matter? in fact, hey!, where's my fusion 
reactors. Ah! So much for the 'mentally fit' physicists and astronomers


-Original Message-
From: Philip Thrift 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Sun, Sep 15, 2019 7:03 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 5:46:13 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:


On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 3:34:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

 

Sean Carroll's many-selves

And the good news is ... the one in this world is going bald. AG 


And (many would say) going crazy.
There is obviously (in his view) a world where a Sean Carroll is a "one world" 
quantum theorist. 

@philipthrift





https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=zsXCwUsuvKo


@philipthrift
On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
https://www.wired.com/story/ sean-carroll-thinks-we-all- 
exist-on-multiple-worlds/



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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-15 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 5:46:13 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 3:34:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> Sean Carroll's many-selves
>>
>
> And the good news is ... the one in this world is going bald. AG 
>


And (many would say) going crazy.

There is obviously (in his view) a world where a Sean Carroll is a "one 
world" quantum theorist. 


@philipthrift



>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsXCwUsuvKo
>>
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 3:34:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>  
>
> Sean Carroll's many-selves
>

And the good news is ... the one in this world is going bald. AG 

>
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsXCwUsuvKo
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-15 Thread Philip Thrift


 

Sean Carroll's many-selves


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsXCwUsuvKo



@philipthrift

On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-15 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

That's genius, Evgenii, sheer, unadulterated, genius!  


-Original Message-
From: Evgenii Rudnyi 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, Sep 14, 2019 2:09 am
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

Am 13.09.2019 um 03:11 schrieb spudboy100 via Everything List:
> On that Evgenii, we do concur. Yet, big companies or big governments probably 
> head to this guy's door, if they need something to ask?Now, that may not be a 
> big deal unless he is contributing to the DoD? 

By organizing a military strike from the parallel universe?

Evgenii

>Those comprising this group have interesting mathematical & quantum and 
>cosmological philosophy, but we are not so prominent. The thinkers here 
>participate because they love these topics, but their immediate impacts are 
>something far off, potentially. Now, for me, MWI is fun, in the sense of 
>science fiction is fun--unless we can somehow do trade somehow between 
>Earths?I will buy Carroll's book if only for this reason. "A hominid's reach 
>must exceed his grasp, or what's a multiverse for?" If he is absolutely wrong 
>and we can prove it, then, very well, onward, to the World Series (Think FIFA 
>World Cup).
> 

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:05 PM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 9:58:53 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson <
 agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno
> Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6,
>>> Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip
 Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5,
> Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
> instead of
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from 
> probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens
 have a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived 
 from MWI  I
 have yet to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this 
 I might get
 to it. One advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the 
 world as a
 sort of quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal 
 property
 might be useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations 
 that
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
 decidable. There
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. 
 The proof is
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of 
 the state
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or
 whether this localization is the generation of information in 
 a local
 context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as 
 with
 ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then
 auxiliary physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the 
 framework of
 what Carrol and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and
 this defines the Born rule. If I am right the degree of 
 ψ-epistemontic
 nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is 
 the nature of
 the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
 quantum
 interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the 
 Born rule
 within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
 opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a
 working system to

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 9:58:53 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson <
>>> agrays...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno 
 Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan 
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
>> Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
>>> Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
 Grayson wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
 instead of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from 
 probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens 
>>> have a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived 
>>> from MWI  I 
>>> have yet to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I 
>>> might get 
>>> to it. One advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the 
>>> world as a 
>>> sort of quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal 
>>> property 
>>> might be useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations 
>>> that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
>>> decidable. There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. 
>>> The proof is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of 
>>> the state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether 
>>> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
>>> context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
>>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of 
>>> what Carrol 
>>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines 
>>> the Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic 
>>> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is 
>>> the nature of 
>>> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
>>> quantum 
>>> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the 
>>> Born rule 
>>> within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
>>> opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a 
>>> working system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking 
>>> things too 
>>> far. However, it is a part of some open questions concerning 
>>> the 
>>> fundamentals

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 10:08:00 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:45 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>> and COOLER after 380,000 years had elapsed. All of the foregoing makes a 
>>> decent case for a universe which was very very tiny right after the BB. 
>>> AG 
>>>
>>
>> I still see no connection between the temperature at time 380,000 
>> years, and the size of the universe.  Can you do more to explain more 
>> why 
>> you think there is a relation?  I can see how you might relate the 
>> initial 
>> temperature and density at an earlier time to the temperature and 
>> density 
>> after 380,000 years, but I am not seeing how you relate the size of the 
>> universe to either the temperature or density at time 380,000 years.
>>
>
>> *Oh, because the temperature is decreasing from just after the BB to 
>> 380,000 years, we need a very small universe to inflate to explain the 
>> current homogeneity. Otherwise the present large scale homogeneity is only 
>> explicable by appealing to highly improbable chance in a causally 
>> disconnected universe, our present universe. AG *
>>
>
> Inflation requires a *minimum* starting size (which can be microscopic), 
> and *minimum* duration of inflation (which can be as little as ~100 
> doublings) taking as little as 10^-35 seconds, but as far as I know these 
> are only the minimums to be congruent with observations.  Inflation, by no 
> means requires the preinflation universe to be tiny, nor the time period of 
> inflation to be short.  Either the preinflation size could be unboundedly 
> large, or the inflation duration could be unboundedly long.
>
> Jason
>
> If inflation is to solve large scale homogeneity in a causally 
non-connected universe, which is the case of our present observable 
universe, it must start with a very small universe that IS causally 
connected. I think this is pretty obvious, unless you want to insist that 
the large scale homogeneity is purely accidental -- which I do not. AG

Incidentally, I didn't claim that inflation per se is totally speculative. 
It solves a number of problems so it is more than pure speculation. I was 
then referring to speculation that some parts of the total universe, either 
within our observable or unobservable regions, or in the presumed 
substratum from which bubbles arise, or in other bubbles, are experiencing 
any types of inflations. The only inflation that I am discussing is within 
our bubble, and perhaps extended to our unobservable regions by applying 
the Cosmological Principle. AG

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:45 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
> and COOLER after 380,000 years had elapsed. All of the foregoing makes a
>> decent case for a universe which was very very tiny right after the BB. 
>> AG
>>
>
> I still see no connection between the temperature at time 380,000
> years, and the size of the universe.  Can you do more to explain more why
> you think there is a relation?  I can see how you might relate the initial
> temperature and density at an earlier time to the temperature and density
> after 380,000 years, but I am not seeing how you relate the size of the
> universe to either the temperature or density at time 380,000 years.
>

> *Oh, because the temperature is decreasing from just after the BB to
> 380,000 years, we need a very small universe to inflate to explain the
> current homogeneity. Otherwise the present large scale homogeneity is only
> explicable by appealing to highly improbable chance in a causally
> disconnected universe, our present universe. AG *
>

Inflation requires a *minimum* starting size size (which can be
microscopic), and *minimum* duration of inflation (which can be as little
as ~100 doublings) taking as little as 10^-35 seconds, but as far as I know
these are only the minimums to be congruent with observations.  Inflation,
by no means requires the preinflation universe to be tiny, nor the time
period of inflation to be short.  Either the preinflation size could be
unoundedly large, or the inflation duration could be unboundedly long.

Jason

Jason

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan
 Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip
>> Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
>>> Grayson wrote:


 https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
>>> instead of
>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have
>> a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  
>> I have yet
>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get 
>> to it. One
>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a 
>> sort of
>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>> might be
>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
>> decidable. There
>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. 
>> The proof is
>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of 
>> the state
>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>> variables
>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether
>> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
>> context from
>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of 
>> what Carrol
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines
>> the Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic
>> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is 
>> the nature of
>> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
>> quantum
>> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the 
>> Born rule
>> within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
>> opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a
>> working system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking 
>> things too
>> far. However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the
>> fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of
>> quantum interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes 
>> for some
>> interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> If you read the link, it's pretty

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 6:36:25 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:


 On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
 wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan 
 Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
>> Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
>>> Grayson wrote:


 https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
>>> instead of 
>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have 
>> a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  
>> I have yet 
>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get 
>> to it. One 
>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a 
>> sort of 
>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>> might be 
>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations 
>> that 
>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
>> decidable. There 
>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. 
>> The proof is 
>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of 
>> the state 
>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>> variables 
>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether 
>> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
>> context from 
>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of 
>> what Carrol 
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines 
>> the Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic 
>> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is 
>> the nature of 
>> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
>> quantum 
>> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the 
>> Born rule 
>> within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
>> opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a 
>> working system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking 
>> things too 
>> far. However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>> fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of 
>> quantum interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes 
>> for some 
>> interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Sunday, September 15, 2019 at 1:01:23 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan 
>>> Grayson wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
> Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but 
>> instead of 
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have 
> a paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  
> I have yet 
> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get 
> to it. One 
> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a 
> sort of 
> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
> might be 
> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
> decidable. There 
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
> proof is 
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of 
> the state 
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
> variables 
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether 
> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
> context from 
> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of 
> what Carrol 
> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines 
> the Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic 
> nature is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the 
> nature of 
> the Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of 
> quantum 
> interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born 
> rule 
> within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
> opposite of MWI?
>
> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a 
> working system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking 
> things too 
> far. However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
> fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of 
> quantum interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes 
> for some 
> interesting things to think about.
>
> LC
>

 If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes 
 the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 

>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 12:02 AM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

 On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
>>> Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip
 Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
> Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>
>
>
> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead 
> of
> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>
> @philipthrift
>

 This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
 paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
 have yet
 to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get 
 to it. One
 advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort 
 of
 quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
 might be
 useful for working with quantum gravity,

 I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
 unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
 are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not 
 decidable. There
 is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
 proof is
 set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
 state
 space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
 variables
 localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether
 this localization is the generation of information in a local 
 context from
 quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
 ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
 physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of 
 what Carrol
 and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the
 Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature
 is mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature 
 of the
 Born rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum
 interpretations. Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born 
 rule
 within QuBism, which is what might be called the dialectic 
 opposite of MWI?

 To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
 system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too 
 far.
 However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
 fundamentals of
 QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
 interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
 interesting things to think about.

 LC

>>>
>>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes
>>> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>>>
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then
>> there must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is
>> frequently claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, 
>> proven, or
>> even plausibly argued.
>>
>>

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 4:34:28 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
>> Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip 
>>> Thrift wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
 Grayson wrote:
>
>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>



 Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
 quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead 
 of 
 running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.

 @philipthrift

>>>
>>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
>>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
>>> have yet 
>>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
>>> it. One 
>>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort 
>>> of 
>>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>>> might be 
>>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>>
>>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
>>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
>>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>>> There 
>>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
>>> proof is 
>>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>>> state 
>>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>>> variables 
>>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether 
>>> this localization is the generation of information in a local 
>>> context from 
>>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
>>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
>>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
>>> Carrol 
>>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the 
>>> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is 
>>> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of 
>>> the Born 
>>> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations. 
>>> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within 
>>> QuBism, which 
>>> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>>
>>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
>>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too 
>>> far. 
>>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>>> fundamentals of 
>>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
>>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
>>> interesting things to think about.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes 
>> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 
>>
>
> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is 
> frequently 
> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
> plausibly argued.  
>
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 3:03:38 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 9:33 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> >> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
>>> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest 
>>> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even 
>>> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this 
>>> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>>>

>> *> Physics doesn't need all the real numbers, just some of them, say any 
>> continuous range of any variable; like the mass of the electron.*
>>
>
> The electron doesn't have a continuous range of mass. 
>

Sure, in OUR universe, but it might be a continuous variable when other 
universes are created. That was my conjecture, and it need not be mass, but 
other properties of other variables. AG
 

> And mass is the force on a object divided by its acceleration, but 
> acceleration 
> is the change in speed per unit of time and speed is the change in 
> positional distance per unit of time, so if neither time or space is 
> continuous then mass can't be either. 
>

Space and time could be continuous. Just because there's a lower limit on 
what we can measure, doesn't guarantee any inherent graininess. AG 

>
> > *Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. *
>
>
> Physics theories may need PI but physics itself probably doesn't. PI has 
> been calculated to 31 trillion digits and even that is only an 
> approximation, but only 8 or 9 digits are needed to explain every physical 
> observation ever made, and the same thing is true for e.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-14 Thread Jason Resch

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 3:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson 
 wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip
>> Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan
>>> Grayson wrote:


 https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of
>>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a
>> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I 
>> have yet
>> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
>> it. One
>> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of
>> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property 
>> might be
>> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete
>> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that
>> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
>> There
>> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
>> proof is
>> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
>> state
>> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
>> variables
>> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this
>> localization is the generation of information in a local context from
>> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with
>> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
>> Carrol
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the
>> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is
>> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of 
>> the Born
>> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
>> interpretations.
>> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
>> which
>> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working
>> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far.
>> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
>> fundamentals of
>> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum
>> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some
>> interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes
> the many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>

 Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there
 must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently
 claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even
 plausibly argued.


 The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate
 more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of
 homogeneity.

>>>
>>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be
>>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>>> had a
>>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in
>>> time doesn't preclude

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

2019-09-14 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 9:33 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and
>> considerable evidence to think it does not. To my mind the strongest
>> evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is incapable of even
>> approximating most real numbers, I happened to have posted a proof of this
>> yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" thread.
>>
>>>
> *> Physics doesn't need all the real numbers, just some of them, say any
> continuous range of any variable; like the mass of the electron.*
>

The electron doesn't have a continuous range of mass. And mass is the force
on a object divided by its acceleration, but acceleration is the change in
speed per unit of time and speed is the change in positional distance per
unit of time, so if neither time or space is continuous then mass can't be
either.

> *Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. *

Physics theories may need PI but physics itself probably doesn't. PI has
been calculated to 31 trillion digits and even that is only an
approximation, but only 8 or 9 digits are needed to explain every physical
observation ever made, and the same thing is true for e.

John K Clark

-- 
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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:18:40 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:22 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> What I think you're missing (and Tegmark) is the possibility of 
>> UNcountable universes. In such case, one could imagine new universes coming 
>> into existence forever and ever, without any repeats.  Think of the number 
>> of points between 0 and 1 on the real line, each point associated with a 
>> different universe. AG*
>>
>
> There is no reason to think physics needs all the real numbers and 
> considerable evidence to think it does not. 
>

Einstein's field equations use PI, and so do Maxwell's equations. And I 
think some of the laws of physics use the natural logarithm. As I 
previously postulated, all one needs is some *continuous* range of some 
variable to determine new universes in which no copies emerge. I find the 
hypothesis of infinite copies of anything highly repugant, like the MWI, 
which I don't claim is a proof of anything. But a univere with zero copies 
seem more elegant than the opposite. AG
 

> To my mind the strongest evidence is that a physical Turing Machine is 
> incapable of even approximating most real numbers, I happened to have 
> posted a proof of this yesterday on the "Observation versus assumption" 
> thread.
>
> Actually, physics might not even need all the rational numbers as there is 
> probably a grainy structure to both space and time. Distances can't get 
> smaller than the Planck Length and time shorter than the Planck Time. Maybe.
>  
>
>> >> true regardless of if the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum 
>>> Mechanics is correct or not, it only depends on the universe being 
>>> spatially infinite.
>>>
>>
>> *> But our universe is NOT spatially infinite if its been expanding for 
>> finite time,*
>>
>
> Sure it can, space could have started out infinitely large 13.8 billion 
> years ago and still be expanding today, it could even be accelerating. The 
> radius of the observable universe is 45.5 billion light years ( the light 
> from the most distant galaxies took 13.8 billion years to reach us but 
> during that time the galaxies have been accelerating away from us) but that 
> doesn't mean there aren't galaxies much more distant than 45.5 billion 
> light years.
>
>  John K Clark
>

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)



On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:46:27 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2019, 4:36 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 12:34:18 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, September 13, 2019, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>


 On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 4:42:00 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 8:25 AM Alan Grayson  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson 
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan 
>> Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of 
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of 
>> running away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a 
> paper on how supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI  I have 
> yet 
> to read their paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to 
> it. One 
> advantage that MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of 
> quantum frame dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might 
> be 
> useful for working with quantum gravity,
>
> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete 
> unfortunately, where the two sets of quantum interpretations that 
> are ψ-epistemic and those that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. 
> There 
> is no decision procedure which can prove QM holds either way. The 
> proof is 
> set with nonlocal hidden variables over the projective rays of the 
> state 
> space. In effect there is an uncertainty in whether the hidden 
> variables 
> localize extant quantities, say with ψ-ontology, or whether this 
> localization is the generation of information in a local context from 
> quantum nonlocality that is not extant, such as with 
> ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary 
> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what 
> Carrol 
> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the 
> Born rule. If I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is 
> mixed. So the intriguing question we can address is the nature of the 
> Born 
> rule and its tie into the auxiliary postulates of quantum 
> interpretations. 
> Can a similar demonstration be made for the Born rule within QuBism, 
> which 
> is what might be called the dialectic opposite of MWI?
>
> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working 
> system to understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. 
> However, it is a part of some open questions concerning the 
> fundamentals of 
> QM. If MWI, and more generally postulates of quantum 
> interpretations, are connected to the Born rule it makes for some 
> interesting things to think about.
>
> LC
>

 If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the 
 many worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG 

>>>
>>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there 
>>> must exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently 
>>> claimed by the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even 
>>> plausibly argued.  
>>>
>>>
>>> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate 
>>> more than an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of 
>>> homogeneity.
>>>
>>
>> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be 
>> infinite since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY. I 
>> had a 
>> discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite in 
>> time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I 
>> am 
>> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG 
>>
>
> I think

Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)