Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. ? On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues. But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position Bruno. All we are doing is
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 25 Mar 2014, at 07:45, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. ? On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues. But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position Bruno. All we are doing is playing around with word definitions. You are saying that your philosophy of science is that it iswhat you say above. No, it is just some vague precision on the meaning of the term implicitly or explicitly accepted but scientist. It's a philosophical positioning Bruno. I don't see this. I think you are confuse the meta-level and the level of the inquiry. If not, could you tell me what is the philosophical positioning that you see, and how does it influence the reasoning? May be you might explain what you mean by philosophy. All you do in your most recent line above, is formulate yet another form of words, I really would prefer you quoting and exemplifying your saying, because you lost me here. Not sure I can even understand an expression like formulate a form of words. which like all the others, presumably, seeks a convincing way to define philosophy, or science, such that one either is, or isn't, or neither are, or both. In just the last few posts you've defined the relationships - apparently anyway - about 3 ways, each next trivialising the former. You trying to define your way out of, what are, inherent and fundamental problems. Not at all, or in a trivial vacuously true sense. In our subject, it is difficult because both philosophy of mind is often done without the scientific method, and in the philosophical way, that is by defending some truth, or by using the intuitive meaning of terms, but this is not what I do, except for pedagogical purpose. It is not a philosophical position, it is an axiom on science on which I was hoping you could accept, if only most of this will (often vacuously true) when the science of the ideally self- referentially correct machine will be shown played by the beweisbar predicate in arithmetic. OK, let's just look at the components we have in play here, and the links between them. Let's assume point blank what you state above is 100% not philosophy. here is the problem. It is can be 100% philosophy and at the same time 100% science, as they have a non empty intersection, unless you use some curriculum type of definition, in which case it is better to see it as science. That's the component, then, of not-philosophy. We're talking about the nature of science so the component on the other side is 100% science that may or may not also be philosophy. So how do you attach these two components such that one defines the nature of the other. It's middle, joining, component that decides this Bruno. the joining component can be stated very generically and high level, but that carries the property of always being true regardless of what else is said too. You lost me. It is too much inclear, I can interpret this in many ways. It's a statement like this defines the nature of that. And that is, and will always be, philosophical. I don't see why. Are you like some philosophers pretending that some part of philosophy can never been handled by the scientific method? You can define science and philosophy as heavily overlapping. You can define science as an overrated, misconception liced regional backwater of a grand philosophy, as Deutsch and Popper do. I don't do that. You can define things such that, the nature of science - that middle link joining something - that may be 100% scientif - on one side, to what is on the other side, which may be science, which may be 100% scientific and 0% philosophy. o You really lost me. But the link in the middle is defined - and intractably so - as your assertion, your option to select from any number of variations or completely different options. Your gift to choose. A philosophical positioning I don't understand. I don't see the philosophical positioning. I think you confuse the level and the metalevel of the theory. Science can be done without philosophy, that is, in a way such than any rationalist person can understand, even if he:she agrees or not with the assumption. The choice of the axioms can be done privately from philosophy or any personal reason, that nobody should be interested in, except the historian and the philosopher of science. Basically,
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. ? On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues. But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position Bruno. All we are doing is playing around with word definitions. You are saying that your philosophy of science is that it iswhat you say above.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 1:38:07 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, ghi...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. Russll has said it a few times. I have not bought the idea that computation is intrinsically conscious. I do not believe that the emacs process I'm typing this email into is in any way conscious, for example. I do accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility that consciousness is a computational process, or can be implemented in one. This is COMP. I don't believe it, and certainly have somne reservations about it. But I do buy the UDA, and its conclusion of reversal. In fact I think its conclusion probably remains valid, even if you relax COMP to a more general functionalism position (not Putnam's functionalism, mind you, but the more usual variety), although this has more to do with observers finding themselves in the Library of Babel, as one cannot rely on the Church Thesis as one does with the UDA. Cheers I would accept consciousness is a computational process, if the term 'computational' were stripped right down to its bare bones, with all assumptions removed that link the term to computing concepts as they stand at the moment. But that would mean specifically not assuming it's a possibility for software compiled and run on hardware currently in play. I'd be interested to hear your view about this (and Bruno's) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. ? On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues. So if that's your hunch the question becomes..are there any definitions not derived from creative analysis? Are there any that define how the different definitions should be analysed, compared, and the superior model selected Which - not Unhappy with you about it - but I'm frequently on record that it's easy to make as much as you want Science if you define
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 19 Mar 2014, at 23:53, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: I still remember back maybe in the 1990's, having to keep a sick bucket nearby, for every tirme some daft comp scientist wheeled himself out to say consciousness was purely about processing speed. Remember that one? That was pretty big in its day. I remember the same expressions and the solemnlu offered corrections every time I pointed out it was just totally groundless and thoughtless. Same corrections This would seem to suggest not-comp ? Not sure I relate. What I have often explained, is that one role of consciousness, in the Löbian theory of mind, is that consciousness can speed-up computations. But in that context, consciousness is approximated by the bet on self-consistency, or self-correctness, and handled mathematically. That result is related to Gödel's length of proof theorem, or Blum speed theorem and its generalization on creative and subcreative sets of numbers. In fact, self-speedability characterize subcreativity. Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. Russll has said it a few times. yes, sure. You must not take those expression literally. There are shorthand for not repeating the whole UDA, all the time. Conceptually it is an error if youy mean it literally, as no 3p object can think, it can only supports a thinking person, with some probabilities relatively to a universal environment. That one seems quiety dropped now. But for old time's sake Bruno, hand on heart, was that something you were saying too? If the answer is paradoxical then how about coming out against it...is that something you also did? There is nothing paradoxical. That is the type of thing which became intuitively clearer once we distinguish the 1p and the 3p. Then it became mathematically clear in the math part, but this requires more work. ou... It just cannot be the right way to go about thingsor maybe these two instances aren't tycical of what you do, If they were, it'd quickly become meaningless what you thought you had been shown right about in the fullness of time, how consistently you'd held onto a key set of ideas, how rigourous you thought your logic was. All of require the same things you can be shown right about, to show you wrong about also, You lost me, here. That's really not clear. it looks again like a critic, but without any specific points. Start from the paper, and try to understand, or tell me anything that you would not understand, and I will explain. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). John Case just show that for inference inductive machine, adding the Popperian criterion, limit the classes of phenomena they are able to inductively infer. It is a theorem in math, about digital machines. Could you give me which few lines in the middle? Not now...but I'll come back to you about it in the near future...maybe in private if you allow it I would prefer online, if you don't mind too much. By experience, when I accept private talks on such subject, I end up explaining the same thing to many people, and worst, I usually forget which people get the explanations, and which don't. Thanks for understanding. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. So if that's your hunch the question becomes..are there any definitions not derived from creative analysis? Are there any that define how the different definitions should be analysed, compared, and the superior model selected Which - not Unhappy with you about it - but I'm frequently on record that it's easy to make as much as you want Science if you define science philosophically. 'v But all that's about is lowering the standard to philosophy or theology or whatever. accomplished the some thing as Deutsch. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 8:21:58 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. I can agree. I don't believe in philosophy. Nor do I really believe in science. I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some astronomers. The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, science is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, of science. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. With science and with conscience, I can agree with that. In the comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out of the [], from the arithmetical reality. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. I might feel to be more in the second camp myself, except that precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. Thanks for reassuring me. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. OK. No problem. I just try sincerely to understand your point. I know OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already tested theories. ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I wrote for youbecause I thought you'd get it. I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different meaning from one university to another one). How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions? If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core. So if that's your hunch t Much more recently and still emerging is - at least with me - you proving just a tad intellectually slippery as to what you do and don't believe. and what you have and have not said, understood when I have said, etc. Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. Russll has said it a few times. And so have youmore than a few. That with the fact on
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 03:53:02PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: Then - the notion of Computation being intrinsically conscious - a basic assaumption that I'[d call a major recurrent theme of computionralism over a pretty long period. A lot o.f your friends have said they buy it. Russll has said it a few times. I have not bought the idea that computation is intrinsically conscious. I do not believe that the emacs process I'm typing this email into is in any way conscious, for example. I do accept, for the sake of argument, the possibility that consciousness is a computational process, or can be implemented in one. This is COMP. I don't believe it, and certainly have somne reservations about it. But I do buy the UDA, and its conclusion of reversal. In fact I think its conclusion probably remains valid, even if you relax COMP to a more general functionalism position (not Putnam's functionalism, mind you, but the more usual variety), although this has more to do with observers finding themselves in the Library of Babel, as one cannot rely on the Church Thesis as one does with the UDA. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science in his own term, paradoxically).ime Bruno - how do you mean this? In the paradoxical way, as showing that popper has a point, but that it should not be taken too much seriously. 0+x = x is hardly refutable, yet a *very interesting and fundamental* scientific idea. You have consistently defined science in popper terms? It is mine, or Socrates one. Popper insists rightly on this, but you can see this as common sense. This has not prevented Popper to take some physicalism for granted, though, and Popper is far from being the most Popperian scientist. But then I have rarely seen a philosopher following his own philosophy. OK, this time I'm going to go and find you untold quotes of you referring to popper, in your papers, in your talks and so on. Saying you accept popper. I'd do the computer is consciousness thing at the same time. ? I accept Popper for a sufficient criterion of being reasonably scientific, but I find it part of science and 3p discourses, and first person plural one, since Socrates. It is just nice that Popper insists on that criterion. You've defined theory in conjectural terms. Theory, or just belief. the theory that you have parents is a theory. You need to assume it without proof. the same for the existence of sun and moon. You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance - of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism. If something is testable, it is science. But if something is not testable, it is not necessarily bad science. well you have the same views as popper on anything philosophy of science I've seen. Nice! But I am not that sure. He wrote a curious book in philosophy of mind, with Eccles. That was a sort of attempt to rescued dualism in a non mechanist theory. Poorly convincing, but rather honest and naive (so I appreciate, even if I am not convinced). Then Popper missed badly the Everett QM, (not to mention the comp arithmetic), and developed his propensity theory, which in my opinion, illustrates an incorrect use of the analytical tools, like in the error of logicism and positivism. Falsifiability might be more a criterion of interestingness, and an help for clarity, in place the falsifiability is out the possible practice (like with String Theory according to some, (but not with comp)). so it's the same cloak whatever :O) ? I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that logicallyjust the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can* explain science. I meando you really think that if, as it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an explanation. So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the question. There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether explicitly or by default. The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I can't get you to see what I am saying. But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I've asked questions about method. You have not answered them. You say you have been trying to understand me. I believe you have been trying. But what you haven't been doing, is trying to understand me at all. Evidence? Well, is there a single instance in all our discussion where you say ok, so is this what you mean? I can see what you are thinking. OK, I don't agree, but let's work this through on your terms, and I believe we can do that , because I believe the science is robust. Let's do that, and through doing that, let us take that slightly scenic view together, off the beaten track; walk with me and I'll escort you back to where I am already. Because there are many paths, but only one landscape. Or words to that effect. And I get it, that you don't understand what I am thinking, and there's likely a consensus around that too, that I'm not being coherent. Well, thanks for answering for me. I might indeed have some difficulty seeing your point here. Usually I prefer to separate philosophical analysis from the technical points. That is why I separate also completely the question of the truth of comp and its consequences from the question as to know if comp does lead to such consequences. And I'm accommodating that and answering that, above. How could you get what I'm asking while cloaked in the Popperian view as true. I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science in his own term, paradoxically).ime Bruno - how do you mean this? In the paradoxical way, as showing that popper has a point, but that it should not be taken too much seriously. 0+x = x is hardly refutable, yet a *very interesting and fundamental* scientific idea. You have consistently defined science in popper terms? It is mine, or Socrates one. Popper insists rightly on this, but you can see this as common sense. This has not prevented Popper to take some physicalism for granted, though, and Popper is far from being the most Popperian scientist. But then I have rarely seen a philosopher following his own philosophy. You've defined theory in conjectural terms. Theory, or just belief. the theory that you have parents is a theory. You need to assume it without proof. the same for the existence of sun and moon. You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance - of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism. If something is testable, it is science. But if something is not testable, it is not necessarily bad science. You've acknowledged popperianism as the best explanation in various ways, in various contexts, in various places. Just an interesting and important feature of science, but not as a definitive criterion. I don't think this exist. Most of my lines of argument that you typically return a blank on involve a criticism of assumptions you are building in, that assume popper as true? Partially true. I can use it when I talk to Popperian, but I am not that much Popperian. I don't remember you acknowledging a single point as even understood. I don't remember you changing a major inbuilt assumption of popper, some of which I've pointed at agaain and again, some of which you were explicitly putting at the centre of a theory. You didn't complain at the popper linkageon the contrary the indicate fun has been you acknowledged and applied popper faithfully and regarded doing so as a virtue. OK. Now you say you regard popper as refuted. Only if you take him literally, which I do not. I just do science, not philosophy of science. Did I just refute popper in your view? Why? No. I don't see it. John Case did it, at least in theory: CASE J. NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979, Refinements of inductive inference by Popperian machines. Tech. Rep., Dept. of Computer Science, State Univ. of New- York, Buffalo. You might find help in studying also: CASE J. SMITH C., 1983, Comparison of Identification Criteria for Machine Inductive Inference. In Theoretical Computer Science 25,.pp 193-220. I don't think that's only a refutation of popper. Nor is it the only refutation of popper. I think - or I theorized as part of the effort - that I would seek to provide something that'd be my best shot at something that you would get. For being also, something that you'd
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I've asked questions about method. You have not answered them. You say you have been trying to understand me. I believe you have been trying. But what you haven't been doing, is trying to understand me at all. Evidence? Well, is there a single instance in all our discussion where you say ok, so is this what you mean? I can see what you are thinking. OK, I don't agree, but let's work this through on your terms, and I believe we can do that , because I believe the science is robust. Let's do that, and through doing that, let us take that slightly scenic view together, off the beaten track; walk with me and I'll escort you back to where I am already. Because there are many paths, but only one landscape. Or words to that effect. And I get it, that you don't understand what I am thinking, and there's likely a consensus around that too, that I'm not being coherent. Well, thanks for answering for me. I might indeed have some difficulty seeing your point here. Usually I prefer to separate philosophical analysis from the technical points. That is why I separate also completely the question of the truth of comp and its consequences from the question as to know if comp does lead to such consequences. And I'm accommodating that and answering that, above. How could you get what I'm asking while cloaked in the Popperian view as true. I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science in his own term, paradoxically).ime Bruno - how do you mean this? In the paradoxical way, as showing that popper has a point, but that it should not be taken too much seriously. 0+x = x is hardly refutable, yet a *very interesting and fundamental* scientific idea. You have consistently defined science in popper terms? It is mine, or Socrates one. Popper insists rightly on this, but you can see this as common sense. This has not prevented Popper to take some physicalism for granted, though, and Popper is far from being the most Popperian scientist. But then I have rarely seen a philosopher following his own philosophy. OK, this time I'm going to go and find you untold quotes of you referring to popper, in your papers, in your talks and so on. Saying you accept popper. I'd do the computer is consciousness thing at the same time. You've defined theory in conjectural terms. Theory, or just belief. the theory that you have parents is a theory. You need to assume it without proof. the same for the existence of sun and moon. You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance - of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism. If something is testable, it is science. But if something is not testable, it is not necessarily bad science. well you have the same views as popper on anything philosophy of science I've seen. so it's the same cloak whatever :O) You've acknowledged popperianism as the best explanation in various ways, in various contexts, in various places. Just an interesting and important feature of science, but not as a definitive criterion. I don't think this exist. Most of my lines of argument that you typically return a blank on involve a criticism of assumptions you are building in, that assume popper as true? Partially true. I can use it when I talk to Popperian, but I am not that much Popperian. I don't remember you acknowledging a single point as even understood. I don't remember you changing a major inbuilt assumption of popper, some of which I've pointed at agaain and again, some of which you were explicitly putting at the centre of a theory. You didn't complain at the popper linkageon the contrary the indicate fun has been you acknowledged and applied popper faithfully and regarded doing so as a virtue. OK. Now you say you regard popper as refuted. Only if you take him literally, which I do not. I just do science, not philosophy of science. Did I just refute popper in your view? Why? No. I don't see it. John Case did it, at least in theory: , Case was philosophy standardmine is science standard. Would you mind actually reading it please..it's only a few lines in the middle? CASE J. NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979,
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:24:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 13:22, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: I don't feel so much cloaked in the Popperian view. It has been been refuted by John Case, notably (showing that Popper was doing science in his own term, paradoxically).ime Bruno - how do you mean this? In the paradoxical way, as showing that popper has a point, but that it should not be taken too much seriously. 0+x = x is hardly refutable, yet a *very interesting and fundamental* scientific idea. You have consistently defined science in popper terms? It is mine, or Socrates one. Popper insists rightly on this, but you can see this as common sense. This has not prevented Popper to take some physicalism for granted, though, and Popper is far from being the most Popperian scientist. But then I have rarely seen a philosopher following his own philosophy. OK, this time I'm going to go and find you untold quotes of you referring to popper, in your papers, in your talks and so on. Saying you accept popper. I'd do the computer is consciousness thing at the same time. ? I accept Popper for a sufficient criterion of being reasonably scientific, but I find it part of science and 3p discourses, and first person plural one, since Socrates. It is just nice that Popper insists on that criterion. You've defined theory in conjectural terms. Theory, or just belief. the theory that you have parents is a theory. You need to assume it without proof. the same for the existence of sun and moon. You've defined the terms for evaluation and criteria for acceptance - of a theory - multidimensionally in popper terms in line with dimensions of popperian philosophy itself. You've rejected or said you don't understand, wherever and whenever I have spoken as if in reference to something other than popper. You've claimed something is science because testable, and testable as falsifiable, and all of this nothing added or subtracted from boiler plate popperianism. If something is testable, it is science. But if something is not testable, it is not necessarily bad science. well you have the same views as popper on anything philosophy of science I've seen. Nice! But I am not that sure. He wrote a curious book in philosophy of mind, with Eccles. That was a sort of attempt to rescued dualism in a non mechanist theory. Poorly convincing, but rather honest and naive (so I appreciate, even if I am not convinced). Then Popper missed badly the Everett QM, (not to mention the comp arithmetic), and developed his propensity theory, which in my opinion, illustrates an incorrect use of the analytical tools, like in the error of logicism and positivism. Falsifiability might be more a criterion of interestingness, and an help for clarity, in place the falsifiability is out the possible practice (like with String Theory according to some, (but not with comp)). so it's the same cloak whatever :O) ? I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and reduce one problem into another. You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to the UDA, or to AUDA? I just try sincerely to understand your point. You've acknowledged popperianism as the best explanation in various ways, in various contexts, in various places. Just an interesting and important feature of science, but not as a definitive criterion. I don't think this exist. Most of my lines of argument that you typically return a blank on involve a criticism of assumptions you are building in, that assume popper as true? Partially true. I can use it when I talk to Popperian, but I am not that much Popperian. I don't remember you acknowledging a single point as even understood. I don't remember you changing a major inbuilt assumption of popper, some of which I've pointed at agaain and again, some of which you were explicitly putting at the centre of a theory. You didn't complain at the popper linkageon the contrary the indicate fun has been you acknowledged and applied popper faithfully and regarded doing so as a virtue. OK. Now you say you regard popper as refuted. Only if you take him literally, which I do not. I just do science, not philosophy of science. Did I just refute popper in your view? Why? No. I don't see it. John Case did it, at least in theory: , Case was philosophy standardmine is science standard. Would you mind actually reading it please..it's only a few lines in the middle? ? Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science standard. Could you give me which few lines in the middle? You lost me completely. Sorry, Bruno CASE J. NGO-MANGUELLE S., 1979, Refinements of inductive inference
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non- comp, especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with- collapse. Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of absence of magic. Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of knowledge is inaccurate (S4)). Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it seems to predict an inflation of self-superposition in infinitely many histories. This fails, because 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. Bruno I don't look at it like that. There's a lot we see things differently about. For example in our discussions about comp, you've persistently interpreted what I have said solely in terms of your own theory. Which is understandable because your view is that science, in context of one person relating a theory to another person, seeking take-up, operates by that other person accepting the terms of that theory as the starting point, as standard. The reason you probably think that is because your starting points enjoy a consensus in the field you work in, and among those proximate to you. Like most others here on this list. But that isn't the true starting point for the scientist, but instead a special case of the starting point defined by whatever the shared position is at the outset. The true starting point is to look at the field, or its components, at a high level and
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:39:21 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 21:40, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp, especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse. Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of absence of magic. Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of knowledge is inaccurate (S4)). Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it seems to predict an inflation of self-superposition in infinitely many histories. This fails, because 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. Bruno I don't look at it like that. There's a lot we see things differently about. For example in our discussions about comp, you've persistently interpreted what I have said solely in terms of your own theory. Which is understandable because your view is that science, in context of one person relating a theory to another person, seeking take-up, operates by that other person accepting the terms of that theory as the starting point, as standard. The reason you probably think that is because your starting points enjoy a consensus in the field you work in, and among those proximate to you. Like most others here on this list. But that isn't the true starting point for the scientist, but instead a special case of
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp, especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse. Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of absence of magic. Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of knowledge is inaccurate (S4)). Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it seems to predict an inflation of self-superposition in infinitely many histories. This fails, because 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp, especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse. Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of absence of magic. Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of knowledge is inaccurate (S4)). Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it seems to predict an inflation of self-superposition in infinitely many histories. This fails, because 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. Bruno I don't look at it like that. There's a lot we see things differently about. For example in our discussions about comp, you've persistently interpreted what I have said solely in terms of your own theory. Which is understandable because your view is that science, in context of one person relating a theory to another person, seeking take-up, operates by that other person accepting the terms of that theory as the starting point, as standard. The reason you probably think that is because your starting points enjoy a consensus in the field you work in, and among those proximate to you. Like most others here on this list. But that isn't the true starting point for the scientist, but instead a special case of the starting point defined by whatever the shared position is at the outset. The true starting point is to look at the field, or its components, at a high level and assess first whether the construction
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Friday, March 14, 2014 8:26:47 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, March 14, 2014 5:21:05 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Mar 2014, at 16:18, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, March 9, 2014 6:32:08 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride hear hear. And MWI. Frankly, to me comp seems less speculative than any form of non-comp, especially if it relies on the faith in primitive matter. Then QM-without-collapse, which is just MWI as far as we agree to not play with words, seems to me less speculative than QM-with-collapse. Comp is a theory of mind, it is a weak form of what most people take granted in the cognitive sciences. It is a quasi assumption of absence of magic. Non comp is either non intelligible or invoke actual infinities. Then the TOE eventually postulates only non negative integers and + and *, which is a subtheory of many other theories in used everyday. Comp might be false, and if Z1* departs from QM, I might really begin to believe that comp is false (finding not plausible the simulation move, ... nor do I find plausible that the classical definition of knowledge is inaccurate (S4)). Until then, I would say that asserting that comp is false or already refuted, requires an extraordinary evidence. UDA should be perhaps understood as a (failed) refutation of comp, as it seems to predict an inflation of self-superposition in infinitely many histories. This fails, because 1) our best actual very good (indeed) theory, QM, makes practically no sense, without a similar inflation of self-superposition. 2) taking into account self-correctness imposes a quantum like structure on the way universal machines can view themselves in the picture, so we have to do the math before concluding arithmetic inflates too much. Now, if you have a genuinely non-comp theory to offer, I am all ears. Bruno I don't look at it like that. There's a lot we see things differently about. For example in our discussions about comp, you've persistently interpreted what I have said solely in terms of your own theory. Which is understandable because your view is that science, in context of one person relating a theory to another person, seeking take-up, operates by that other person accepting the terms of that theory as the starting point, as standard. The reason you probably think that is because your starting points enjoy a consensus in the field you work in, and among those proximate to you. Like most others here on this list. But that isn't the true starting point for the scientist, but instead a special case of the starting point defined by whatever the shared position is at the outset. The true starting point is to look at the field, or its
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
It seems to me that you're just attacking a straw men... it's obvious in multivalued outcome, that probability doesn't mean only one outcome arise out of many... so as I said previously if that's what you mean and attacking us for, it's bad faith on your side. Quentin 2014-03-13 1:18 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com: Hi Bruno * But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent as justifying the probability talk, even the usual boolean one.* There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by positing some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the place of probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are actual classical probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't appear to recognize that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you present the alleged existence of classical probability from the first person as some kind of surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a virtue. Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only one gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are experienced in one observation or another, must have an account in which probabilities are derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because classically probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between objective outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. Alternatively, one can live with classical probability of 1 that all outcomes will be observed, and discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' the usual probabilities obtained. Either approach is just the first step in making a coherent account of probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. But you don't do either. Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, surely? It seems to leave your account incomplete or perhaps even just incoherent. It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on the train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the platform going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if you say Alice predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she would predict spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets her 0.5 elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences between your accounts. Its not just vocab. -- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700 From: gabebod...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all to solve the hard problem? When I think about it qualia, I have five main questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. 1. What are qualia made of? 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances? What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc? 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their information and talk and write about them? 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? How could our instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain processes? Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 12 Mar 2014, at 20:31, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all to solve the hard problem? A priori, no. The point of the UDA is not that comp solves any problem, but that it leads to a new problem: the problem = to justify the empirical statistics from a statistics of computations as seen by the machines/numbers. Comp is not a solution, comp *is a problem*. The advantage, is that, thanks to the work of Cantor, Gödel, Kleene, ..., we do have a powerful tool, computer science/mathematical logic, to formulate the question mathematically, and in this case, it consists in just listen to what the machines can already say about themselves. And in a nutshell, the machine describes a theology, including a physics, so we can test comp. When I think about it qualia, I have five main questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. OK. 1. What are qualia made of? Qualia are not made of something. if you dream about a statue, *that* statue that you see in your dream is not made of anything, as there is only a computation occurring in your brain. With comp or without comp, we know today that a tiny part of the arithmetical reality emulates, in the Church-Turing sense, all computations. This does not explain qualia, but illustrates why there is no sense to the idea that qualia are *made of something*. They are only mental, or Turing universal machines' constructions. What happens is that if we attribute the qualia to brains activity, qua computatio, then we have to attribute qualia to infinities of arithmetical relations. 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? The comp most classical qualia theory (which is X1*) can hardly help for that question, but I guess it is how nature implemented what is necessary in the X1* maintenance. So to speak. 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances? By analogies, and long histories. Given the unpleasant character of being wounded, notably in battle field, or aggression by predator, the color red get connotational meaning, well handled by associative machineries. Of course you ask interesting questions, and we can only scratch the surface. More below. What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc? In Hobson theory of dreams, dreams are just the re-enacting of the cortical, and some limbic, of neurons, trigged by the cerebral stem. Universal machine can imitate themselves too, in different contexts, and it is useful for planning, compiling, summarizing, classifying, ranging, and eventually the hard work: forgetting the irrelevant information which respect to the fundamental goal. 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their information and talk and write about them? Unlike pure consciousness, qualia have perceptible fields. They have geometries, maps, and help to summarized gigantic information flux into meaningful scenario. Some insects' qualia are what plants taught them to guide them into pollination. 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? Like consciousness, the machines cannot justify a part of the meaning of qualia. That part can still be derived, for simple machines, and shown invariant for their sound extension. Those are the qualia appearing in the annulus X1* \ X1. The qualia are observable ([]p t), and true (p): []p t p, with p sigma_1 arithmetical, to define the measure on UD*, or the sigma_1 complete reality. How could our instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain processes? By breeding them, or if you want, by dialogs open to truth, and avoiding lies. A large part of AI *has to be* experimental. It is already like that for the most part of arithmetic, when lived from inside. Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5. The machine can already justify why you ask something impossible. If you truly believe that 5 can have an answer, you might build on a assumption incompatible with comp. No problem with that. Comp is believed by almost
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all to solve the hard problem? When I think about it qualia, I have five main questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. 1. What are qualia made of? 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances? What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc? 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their information and talk and write about them? 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? How could our instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain processes? Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent as justifying the probability talk, even the usual boolean one. There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by positing some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the place of probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are actual classical probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't appear to recognize that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you present the alleged existence of classical probability from the first person as some kind of surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a virtue. Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only one gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are experienced in one observation or another, must have an account in which probabilities are derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because classically probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between objective outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. Alternatively, one can live with classical probability of 1 that all outcomes will be observed, and discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' the usual probabilities obtained. Either approach is just the first step in making a coherent account of probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. But you don't do either. Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, surely? It seems to leave your account incomplete or perhaps even just incoherent. It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on the train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the platform going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if you say Alice predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she would predict spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets her 0.5 elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences between your accounts. Its not just vocab. Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700 From: gabebod...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all to solve the hard problem? When I think about it qualia, I have five main questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. 1. What are qualia made of? 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances? What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc? 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their information and talk and write about them? 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? How could our instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain processes? Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom Could you elaborate? Imagine you embed yourself in a virtual environment hereby. We might easily fake a reality obeying different laws, yet the first person probabilities we stay in those fake physical universe, is inheritated by their emulation in our normal neighborhoods, hereby. We can experience fiction, and indeed we do that all the time. In that virtuality reality you can decide to compare its logic of observability, if you find one, and the universal machine physics, as defined in step seven in UDA, and by []p t in AUDA (mainly, with p sigma_1, it determine the modal logic Z1*). Now, in a very superficial cartoon-like reality, you might obviously single out the trick, and not been deluded, a bit like in a lucid dream. But in our physical reality? Imagine that Z1* and the physical reality differ. What can we conclude? Well we might conclude either that [comp + Theaetetus] is refuted, or that we belong in a fake simulation done at a the authentic Z1* arithmetical level, perhaps by our descendants. If that is the (arithmetical) case we might access to state when we remember having decided to live an ancestor life, or something of that kind. Descartes understood that if mechanism is true, we might be failed by daemons, and that is why he want to assume that God is good, and protects us from the liar daemons. But the arithmetical reality is a terrible gallery of illusions, and Z1* describes what follows from below our substitution level, but as I said, we cannot know it, we can only trust, or not trust, a doctor and probable universal neighbors. With comp, a red pill can lead to other red pills, like a sequence of false awakenings. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 22:01, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Monday, March 10, 2014 2:08:14 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: That relativism argues against comp, and even implicitly against Church thesis. But my point is not that comp is true, just that with comp, the theory QM + comp is redundant, and we have to justify QM (at the least its logic) from self-reference. And up to now, it looks it works. Bruno A physicalist would presumably point out that the redundancy of QM +comp doesn't tell you which is original and which is derivative. Like Everett restore locality and determinacy in the physical reality, comp restores the person and its points of view. Physicists usually assume, or take for granted, large portion of the arithmetical reality, already. So comp is just simpler, and it avoids the elimination of the person which is almost obligatory if you want to maintain senses and references, when assuming both comp and a primitive matter. In the terms of the Aristotle vs. Plato distinction you pointed out, I'm unaware of evidence on which to make a decision. So I don't, which is why I mentioned that ignorance prior. OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. Then assuming comp, there is no need in a complex mathematical realm. Church's thesis rehabilitates Pythagorus. I can explain if you are interested. Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 08:14, LizR wrote: I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.) Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :) 'In vino veritas', but there are less destructive path. The first person 'semantic of self-perturbation is interesting but of extreme complexity. To live in two realities makes sense only relatively to a third reality. You can experience two different dreams in your separate hemisphere when your corpus callosum is too much sleepy, with respect to the hemisphere. That has been suggested and studied by Jouvet. There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance? http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1 Thanks for the link. Still a feeling those guys are unaware of Gleason, or Paulette Février. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 8:14 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 March 2014 15:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Decoherence is what I described above. It's tracing over the environment variables, having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer, in order to get the reduced density matrix and then saying Obviously we should measure/observe one of these diagonal values with the proportional probability. So when you get right down to how the math goes it's pretty close to choosing the Heisenberg cut - except you then say and my other selves will measure/observe the other diagonal values which soothes one's angst over randomness. Have I been misinformed? I thought decoherence was supposed to be a physical mechanism which reduced the off-diagonal elements to virtual nonexistence? Sort of. But it only does it in some particular basis and in applying the theory we choose the pointer basis by saying something like We're going to look at the position of the detector which in effect is us choosing our classical selves, pretty much the way Bohr chose the Heisenberg cut. Although there are some suggestive results and most people thing it must work out, I don't think there's any fundamental way been found to define the pointer basis. And then, even after you've got it diagonalized, you need a theory connecting the physics to consciousness to show why you only experience one of them and not all of them. There's a very nice review paper by Schlosshauer on the subject, see arXiv. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.) Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :) There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance? http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 09 Mar 2014, at 00:53, meekerdb wrote: On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions? To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction. OK. A 3p mechanism can't explain a 3p intrinsic randomness. Only pseudo-randomness a priori. Yet, a very simple mechanism exists which explains the 1p appearance of randomness: self-duplication. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 09 Mar 2014, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote: On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; Why? Not at all. except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. This is entirely explained by the self-duplication (with comp, in arithmetic), or with self-superposition (with Everett-QM). Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). That explains nothing without the MWI, or without self-duplication. Decoherence explains just why it is hard to get the interference effects with macro-bodies, as they get entangled quickly with the environment. decoherence might explain also the importance of the position observable, in the story of our brain. But the explanation of indeterminacy, within a deterministic frame is provided by the SWE, or by arithmetic (assuming comp). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? Hmm... Only, as Omnes explained in once of this book, by accepting to be irrational on this. My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, Which QM? Copenhagen QM works very well, but does not make sense (to be short). Everett-QM works as well, makes sense, but uses computationalism, which forces us to derive the SWE 1p plural appearance from pure arithmetic. But that is nice, as it suggests where the wave comes from. but comp as a new speculative theory It is the oldest theory of humanity, I would say. And I think that it is less speculative than the alternate theory, which either use sacred text (a non sequitur in science), or a speculation that Church thesis might be false, etc. kind of gets a free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we not experience superpositions? Why isn't there a superposition of the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp. ?? What would that mean? Comp explains, completely, why the M-guy feels to be only in M, and why the W-guy feels to be only in W, despite being in both city, from a external point of view. How can consciousness be instantiated by physical processes? Comp explains this by self-reference and its intensional nuance. Most people on this list just assume it can't and dismiss the very idea as mere physicalism. Not at all. Consciousness needs in all case a physical body, to manifest itself relatively to other universal machine. If not we would get only the dreams, and no sharable interference. But they don't ask how can consciousness be instantiated by infinite threads of computation - that's mysterious and consciousness is mysterious, so it's OK. Comp is not a solution per se. Comp makes just possible to translate the problem into an explanation of where the physical laws come from, in a constructive way, so that we can test comp. If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking. But you know that is not what is done. QM predicts probability distributions that are confirmed to many decimal places. Which QM? QFT predicts some
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true when physically realized, No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the existence of infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and this without presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I am not even sure how you will just defined what is prime number. Given a correspondence theory of truth and this kind of physicalism, mathematical theorems would be true if and only if there's a corresponding physical reality. So, for example, if the universe is finite, then there wouldn't be infinitely many prime numbers. Nor would there be infinitely many integers. But there would still be integers and primes. Numbers, addition, and multiplication would be patterns that our brains recognize in material things, at first due to experience counting objects, grouping them, and counting groups. We abstract those patterns to symbolic form in our heads or our writing for convenience, and we generalize the notation to cover a wide variety of patterns. But our process of abstracting and generalizing may omit important limitations (such as finitude) of the physical reality on which it was originally based. or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true for humanlike brains, OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof that 1+1=2 from that definition. Due to our shared evolutionary history, humans share nearly all their brain architecture in common. Due to our shared cultural history, many of the humans we regularly encounter share much of their set of background assumptions and beliefs in common. It appears that there's no such thing as such a perfectly lucid and detailed description or set of instructions that one person could give another that eliminates the need for the other person to grok the meaning, i.e. to connect the ideas appropriately and fill in the missing information based on their own wiring and their own experience. (Take Edgar as an demonstration of this apparent fact. ;) Consequently, some suppose that communication with an extraterrestrial intelligence may fail due to there being an almost total mismatch in wiring and experience. (When language fails, we humans resort to pointing at objects and pantomiming, but without shared sensory systems and emotional responses, even that may well fail to be grokked by the alien.) It's also possible that the symbolic structure of our mathematics is dependent on our wiring and experience; indeed there is some evidence that the way humans use language is due to an evolutionarily recent genetic mutation. For these two reasons, our mathematical definitions, theorems, proofs, etc may only be suitable for use by other humans, and so by a pragmaticist alethiology, only true for humans. The usual proofs then apply, because we're humans. with an alethiology of the sort preferred by the American pragmatist school of philosophy. keep in mind that you mention people who are Aristotelian, and the point I do is only that IF comp is true, THEN such approach get inconsistent or epistemologically non sensical. Hm. Can you elucidate what you mean by saying they are Aristotelian? What is the key contrast? Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me about 25% confidence for each. :) ONLY IF you develop your alternate assumptions. The idea that 1+1 is prime independently of human is far more simple (and used) than the idea that 1+1 is prime is relative to the human brain. The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. You can always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set of axioms. I don't know that the other cases I've mentioned are more complex. Physicalism just puts some mysterious matter first and makes math derivative of it. That may be wrong, but it's hard to see why it's more complex than comp's reversal of it. The relativism described above isn't an additional supposition added to math; it takes ideas from biology and linguistics to see what consequences there might be when they intersect with math. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think is his doctoral thesis. He later expanded it into a book. Brent On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote: I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.) Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :) There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance? http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 01:17, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent as justifying the probability talk, even the usual boolean one. The notion of first person, and first person sequences are well defined, and it is a combinatorial exercise to show that the vast majority of first person memories will feel white noise. The existence of that white noise is proved in a third person way, and the real question will concern the invariance of that indeterminacy for 3p transformation. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side. if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them. In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant. QM+collapse is not a theory, it is a collection of attempts to make theories, with often weird role played by apparatus or humans. Then with Everett, things just get understandable, except that by using computationalism, I show that we have to extract the wave from an uncertainty structure related to relative computational states. The rest seems to me like using vocabulary to avoid a problem, which is sad, as it is an interesting problem. A positive solution, that is a match between Z1* and empirical quantum logic would suggest how the laws of physics emerge in the mind of some stable collection of universal numbers. A negative solution would need either to abandon Theatetetus, or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom, or abandon comp, that is abandon Church thesis, or yes doctor. Bruno Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 02:15, meekerdb wrote: On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote: Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a particular size? Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one reality, and not a superposition. The mechanism is: look in your diary. If you are in the superposed state seeing the cat dead + seeing the cat alive, there is no mysterious connection between the two brains, and simple robotics explains why each brains is confronted with unique but different alternate reality. In Everett, it is the simple comp first person plural indeterminacy, or even generalization of it. There is no reason at all, with comp, that you will feel seeing M, instead of W, but you know, by comp, that you will feel to be in only one city. The same occurs when you look to a cat in the state dead+alive, in the base {dead, alive}. Bruno Brent While QM on its own (i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no collapse threshold - that if you can keep a system from decohering, it will remain in a superposition regardless of how large it is. So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for collapse, and at that point it becomes testable, at least in theory (depending on our level of technology, I mean). On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side. if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them. In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant. Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom Could you elaborate? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/10/2014 8:16 AM, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. You can always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set of axioms. I don't know that the other cases I've mentioned are more complex. Physicalism just puts some mysterious matter first and makes math derivative of it. That may be wrong, but it's hard to see why it's more complex than comp's reversal of it. The relativism described above isn't an additional supposition added to math; it takes ideas from biology and linguistics to see what consequences there might be when they intersect with math. -Gabe Simplicity and Ockham's razor are nice heuristics, but they aren't determinative. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:16, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true when physically realized, No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the existence of infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and this without presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I am not even sure how you will just defined what is prime number. Given a correspondence theory of truth and this kind of physicalism, mathematical theorems would be true if and only if there's a corresponding physical reality. That is too much vague for me. I can interpret this in too much sense. So, for example, if the universe is finite, then there wouldn't be infinitely many prime numbers. This is non sense. In my humble sincere feeling. Even if physicists get a knock down argument in favor of a finite universe, that would not refute at all Euclid's theorem that there is an infinity of prime. A prime number is just not a physical object. Nor would there be infinitely many integers. That is ultrafinitism. That is why I make arithmetical realism sometime explicit. In that case indeed we are out of the scope of my expertize. But if step 8 is correct, that moves will still prevent you to say yes to the doctor, unless more and more ad ptolemaic redefinition of matter. But there would still be integers and primes. Thanks for reassuring me. I was about to close Platonia for bankruptcy :) Numbers, addition, and multiplication would be patterns that our brains recognize in material things, With Church thesis, we have a notion of universal machine which generalizes this, non trivially. Comp makes obvious the use of those mathematical tools. at first due to experience counting objects, grouping them, and counting groups. We abstract those patterns to symbolic form in our heads or our writing for convenience, and we generalize the notation to cover a wide variety of patterns. But our process of abstracting and generalizing may omit important limitations (such as finitude) of the physical reality on which it was originally based. Assuming a physical reality at the start. For the mind body problem it is better to be, at least methodologically agnostic, about that. You describe well how humans got the numbers, but it is a projection to believe that the notion of humans is more conceptually simple than the notion of numbers. The question is only, do you agree on the axioms I gave. With comp, your numbers are a human cultural construction becomes numbers are universal machine cultural construction. or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true for humanlike brains, OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof that 1+1=2 from that definition. Due to our shared evolutionary history, humans share nearly all their brain architecture in common. Due to our shared cultural history, many of the humans we regularly encounter share much of their set of background assumptions and beliefs in common. It appears that there's no such thing as such a perfectly lucid and detailed description or set of instructions that one person could give another that eliminates the need for the other person to grok the meaning, i.e. to connect the ideas appropriately and fill in the missing information based on their own wiring and their own experience. (Take Edgar as an demonstration of this apparent fact. ;) That's why you publish, or put down thesis. You have to play the academic game. The academic is the worst of all systems, except for all the others (to parody Churchill). Consequently, some suppose that communication with an extraterrestrial intelligence may fail due to there being an almost total mismatch in wiring and experience. (When language fails, we humans resort to pointing at objects and pantomiming, but without shared sensory systems and emotional responses, even that may well fail to be grokked by the alien.) It's also possible that the symbolic structure of our mathematics is dependent on our wiring and experience; indeed there is some evidence that the way humans use language is due to an evolutionarily recent genetic mutation. That's a computationalist type of explanation, no problem. For these two reasons, our mathematical definitions, theorems, proofs, etc may only be suitable for use by other humans, and so by a pragmaticist alethiology, only true for humans. ? If comp is true for human, that's what counts. It means that they can survive through a relative universal numbers, but then, without adding magic, what is true for all
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Monday, March 10, 2014 2:08:14 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: That relativism argues against comp, and even implicitly against Church thesis. But my point is not that comp is true, just that with comp, the theory QM + comp is redundant, and we have to justify QM (at the least its logic) from self-reference. And up to now, it looks it works. Bruno A physicalist would presumably point out that the redundancy of QM+comp doesn't tell you which is original and which is derivative. In the terms of the Aristotle vs. Plato distinction you pointed out, I'm unaware of evidence on which to make a decision. So I don't, which is why I mentioned that ignorance prior. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it? On 11 March 2014 05:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think is his doctoral thesis. He later expanded it into a book. Brent On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote: I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.) Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :) There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance? http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Actually I assume it's this... http://www.amazon.com/Decoherence-Quantum---Classical-Transition-Collection/dp/3642071422/ref=sr_1_2?s=booksie=UTF8qid=1394489389sr=1-2keywords=Maximilian+Schlosshauer Well I will start with the paper. It maye be beyond my brain (no fluffy kittens). On 11 March 2014 10:35, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it? On 11 March 2014 05:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think is his doctoral thesis. He later expanded it into a book. Brent On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote: I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.) Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :) There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance? http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote: Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it? Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Ta. On 11 March 2014 14:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote: Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it? Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 08 Mar 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ? I just said: the UD existence is a theorem of PA, even of RA. It exists like the number 19 exists. Its entire execution exist too, a bit like all prime numbers exist. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. As much as rejecting the possibility that moon is really made of cheese. No doubt. That are dogma, but also fertile hypothesis, as the cheese-moon theory explains nothing new. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; We rule it out because not only it explains nothing new, but it introduces insuperable difficulties, and also, it opens to explanation- by-the-gap. It looks like a reification of ignorance. especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. Well you get them just by postulating the SWE, or, when assuming comp, just postulating, for all x y: 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. OK. Nice, and thanks for telling. personally I also like comp and everett for removing 3p-randomness, and 3p-non locality. Are you sure that you can make sense of 3p-randomness? I can do that from a purely logical perspective, but I still find hard to believe it can make sense in a physical reality, as it introduces events without a cause, and that looks like don't ask sort of magic to me, doubly so, when we see that computationalism implies that kind of magic in the 1p-views (by self-duplication or self-superposition). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/ assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we not experience superpositions? Why isn't there a superposition of the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp. How can consciousness be instantiated by physical processes? Most people on this list just assume it can't and dismiss the very idea as mere physicalism. But they don't ask how can consciousness be instantiated by infinite threads of computation - that's mysterious and consciousness is mysterious, so it's OK. If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking. But you know that is not what is done. QM predicts probability distributions that are confirmed to many decimal places. QFT predicts some measured values to 11 decimal places. And you rely on QM to explain the world in in you theory of comp. Your approach is to explain QM and then let QM do the rest of the work - which is fine. But my point is that QM can still do the work even if it's a probabilistic theory. So unless comp can make some better predictions than comp it's just an interpretation and it's trading off a distaste for randomness (a very restricted and well defined randomness) for a love of everythingism. Which is why I hope comp can predict something about consciousness; where it may offer something beyond just interpretation. Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side. if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them. In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant. Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a particular size? While QM on its own (i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no collapse threshold - that if you can keep a system from decohering, it will remain in a superposition regardless of how large it is. So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for collapse, and at that point it becomes testable, at least in theory (depending on our level of technology, I mean). On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno * With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really?the last time I quoted her:What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it.* Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side. if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them. In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant. -- Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism. At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism. But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect? My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote: Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a particular size? Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one reality, and not a superposition. Brent While QM on its own (i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no collapse threshold - that if you can keep a system from decohering, it will remain in a superposition regardless of how large it is. So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for collapse, and at that point it becomes testable, at least in theory (depending on our level of technology, I mean). On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com mailto:chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno * With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: /What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down./ But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it.* Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side. if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them. In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant. -- Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/ assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for most
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 March 2014 14:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote: Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a particular size? Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one reality, and not a superposition. I think that's been dealt with for the MWI, hasn't it? (But not yet for QM+collapse, AFAIK.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 6:34 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 March 2014 14:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote: Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a particular size? Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one reality, and not a superposition. I think that's been dealt with for the MWI, hasn't it? (But not yet for QM+collapse, AFAIK.) So exactly how has MWI dealt with this? Everett just sort of said it has to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density matrix). But there's not really a theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were, there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose. Note that this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical process. Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the predicted frequency. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So exactly how has MWI dealt with this? Everett just sort of said it has to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density matrix). But there's not really a theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were, there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose. Note that this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical process. Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the predicted frequency. I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out maybe 15 years after Everett produced his thesis? If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as I know; I assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're entangled, and that we're entangled with it due to the various quantum interactions that got that version of us there. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
For some reason google decided to post that last post just as I was about to remove iirc.from in front of recall. I'm sure it had good reasons for doing so... On 10 March 2014 15:00, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So exactly how has MWI dealt with this? Everett just sort of said it has to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density matrix). But there's not really a theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were, there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose. Note that this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical process. Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the predicted frequency. I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out maybe 15 years after Everett produced his thesis? If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as I know; I assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're entangled, and that we're entangled with it due to the various quantum interactions that got that version of us there. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 7:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So exactly how has MWI dealt with this? Everett just sort of said it has to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density matrix). But there's not really a theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were, there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose. Note that this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical process. Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the predicted frequency. I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out maybe 15 years after Everett produced his thesis? If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as I know; I assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're entangled, and that we're entangled with it due to the various quantum interactions that got that version of us there. Decoherence is what I described above. It's tracing over the environment variables, having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer, in order to get the reduced density matrix and then saying Obviously we should measure/observe one of these diagonal values with the proportional probability. So when you get right down to how the math goes it's pretty close to choosing the Heisenberg cut - except you then say and my other selves will measure/observe the other diagonal values which soothes one's angst over randomness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/9/2014 7:01 PM, LizR wrote: For some reason google decided to post that last post just as I was about to remove iirc.from in front of recall. I rely on the kindness of strangers...to correct my typos. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 10 March 2014 15:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Decoherence is what I described above. It's tracing over the environment variables, having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer, in order to get the reduced density matrix and then saying Obviously we should measure/observe one of these diagonal values with the proportional probability. So when you get right down to how the math goes it's pretty close to choosing the Heisenberg cut - except you then say and my other selves will measure/observe the other diagonal values which soothes one's angst over randomness. Have I been misinformed? I thought decoherence was supposed to be a physical mechanism which reduced the off-diagonal elements to virtual nonexistence? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 20:17, meekerdb wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent): On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? What do you mean by true randomness? I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary true random sequence: it is 1... It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super unlucky , in case he bet on zero!). But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough. Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the following: 1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality, 2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events. I'm not sure what 1) means. I was hypothesizing (not assuming) 2). 1) means that there is a primitive physical reality which has to be assumed and can't be explained by something else (non physical). That would make the irreducible random events irreducibly random. I just try to grasp what you mean by true randomness. I use terms like theory, assumption, postulate, hypothesis as basically synonymous. That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that invoking such true randomness in an explanation is just a god-of- the-gap type of explanation. it is like don't ask or don't try to understand. It is more like, Some things just happenlike a UD. The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. Some things just happens seems to me as convincing than God made it, and less us talk on something else. As I said, that is the don't ask idea. Bruno Brent I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the belief in such true 3p randomness. I don't push it that far though. Bruno Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 21:06, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Friday, March 7, 2014 10:59:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and either sound or unsound. Regarding UDA's soundness: I have no problem saying Yes Doctor. Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis. But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it. You don't believe in the prime numbers? All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or just Church thesis don't make sense without AR. AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the beliefs in elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical hypothesis, together with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *). Heh, yes, I believe in prime numbers. All right. That's arithmetical realism. Unless you believe that the truth of there are prime numbers is a consequence of physics, or of the existence of a primitive physical universe. But in The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations you wrote of AR that it is the assumption that arithmetical propositions ... are true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that exists), etc. Just to make it clear. Without this you cannot assess something like Church thesis, which identify all possible classes of computable functions from N to N. Some could argue that this is even more demanding than AR. A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true when physically realized, No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the existence of infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and this without presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I am not even sure how you will just defined what is prime number. or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true for humanlike brains, OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof that 1+1=2 from that definition. with an alethiology of the sort preferred by the American pragmatist school of philosophy. keep in mind that you mention people who are Aristotelian, and the point I do is only that IF comp is true, THEN such approach get inconsistent or epistemologically non sensical. And a third meta-account is that reality might be a way that doesn't make sense to me. Then indeed comp is false, but also physics, etc. No problem. Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me about 25% confidence for each. :) ONLY IF you develop your alternate assumptions. The idea that 1+1 is prime independently of human is far more simple (and used) than the idea that 1+1 is prime is relative to the human brain. The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. You can always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set of axioms. Then, with respect to the UDA, to make much more complex a theory just to avoid a mathematical problem is not good science, imo. I can present my theory(*). Can you present yours? I agree that comp might be false, but today that is speculation, and it is useless to speculate on the negation of a theory to avoid testing it. Keep in mind that I do not defend comp, on the contrary I only show it testable, and show that thanks to Gödel and QM, it works pretty well. (*) Classical logic + (for all x and y): 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x or if you prefer 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x And this is not just the theory of numbers (on which most people agree), it is proved to be, once comp is assumed at the meta-level, the theory of everything including consciousness and physics. (Something I try to explain to Liz and some others right now, and is the result of my research. Is that not simple and elegant :) Well, my point is only that this is testable. Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 08 Mar 2014, at 00:04, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it. Quentin said: That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. And you agreed with Quentin: Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. Are you saying you now actually agree with Greaves and that assigning probability 1 to both outcomes is in fact correct? No, even Greaves agrees that this would minimize the interests of the copies. Bruno Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:40:53 -0800 From: ghib...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote: I'm not sure I follow. Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they are hexadecimal translations. or very different bases anyway. Of course the bloody average 1's about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's binary. Which works by flipping. That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get the sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally doubled up! The correct sequences should read: 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure. binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 2^n, and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to hexadecimal without a calculator, in two steps only. 1101101100111111 it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor break the copy up into sets of four. 1101 1010 0001 0011 1100 0011 the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1. So if you have 1101 and you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh I just taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there was ONE person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o) I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences? I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above) or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me? Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the bases, allowing for translation. I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter seem more accessible. ...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large infinity of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I read that, it put me on the floor. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Wednesday, February 26, 2014 3:18:50 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Jason, This initially interesting post of course exposes fundamental flaws in its logic and the way that a lot of people get mislead by physically impossible thought experiments such as the whole interminable p-clone, p-zombie discussion on this group. First there is of course no physical mechanism that continually produces clones and places them in separate rooms, nor is there any MW process that does that, so the whole analysis is moot, and frankly childish as it doesn't even take into consideration what aspects of reality change randomly and which don't. Specifically it's NOT room numbers that seem random, it's quantum level events. If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments randomly. But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'. Edgar Edgar, so how do you explain things like the two slit experiment and entanglement with this theory? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Ghibbsa, I explain spin entanglement paradox this way: When the particles are created their spins must already be equal and opposite orientations due to conservation. But this is true only in the mini spacetime which is defined by their conservation. That spacetime fragment is NOT LINKED to the spacetime alignments of the observer and laboratory. Thus because separate spacetimes can have no alignments with respect to each other, the spin alignment is still undetermined in the frame of the observer. Only when the spin alignment of one particle is measured do these separate spacetimes merge through that common event and at this point they are automatically aligned so the spin orientations of both particles are aligned in the frame of the lab. As soon as we understand that spacetime is not just a single universal common structure but actually consists of separate dynamic fragmentary spacetimes that need to be glued together by common events for alignments to resolve, then all quantum paradox is resolved because all quantum paradoxes seem paradoxical only with respect to the single common fixed universal spacetime MISTAKENLY ASSUMED. All quantum randomness arises because there can be no deterministic rules to align completely separate spacetime fragments, thus nature must act randomly to align them.. Edgar On Saturday, March 8, 2014 3:53:22 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, February 26, 2014 3:18:50 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Jason, This initially interesting post of course exposes fundamental flaws in its logic and the way that a lot of people get mislead by physically impossible thought experiments such as the whole interminable p-clone, p-zombie discussion on this group. First there is of course no physical mechanism that continually produces clones and places them in separate rooms, nor is there any MW process that does that, so the whole analysis is moot, and frankly childish as it doesn't even take into consideration what aspects of reality change randomly and which don't. Specifically it's NOT room numbers that seem random, it's quantum level events. If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments randomly. But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'. Edgar Edgar, so how do you explain things like the two slit experiment and entanglement with this theory? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions? (Of course not being able to imagine something doesn't rule it out.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions? To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Sun, Mar 9, 2014 at 12:53 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions? To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction. Dovetailing on the real numbers etc. It blows the mind, but an arithmetic UD would have to (both blow the mind and dovetail on the reals). So this would be like asking why a function functions? Funcy, but I'm not sure :-) PGC Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 9 March 2014 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.). I can't hardly imagine something less random than that. But we don't know that it exists. ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism. I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body problem. It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions? To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction. Exactly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 00:33, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone. pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. They are mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of everyone? Yes. For everyone = everyone among scientists. You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of everyone'. You can't compare Darwin general complex scheme, and a statement like P(M) = 1/2 in a simple protocol. This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. I have no theory, and I defend no truth. You say that a reasoning is not valid, it is up to you to prove this. Handwaving on vocabulary does not do the task. Only by providing an determinacy algorithm, can you refute the 1p indeterminacy in duplication experience. On the other hand, just because a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely that will make you happy? Well, if you provide a refutation, I would be. But you did not. You only pretend to have one, but nobody has seen it. Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the impossibility of ever refuting any theory. In that sense, OK. But I am not doing philosophy. Bruno You're talking to someone who hasn't placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100 On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. I have
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 03:12, chris peck wrote: Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in H you predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong. The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. It is not, once you get the difference between the 1-view and the 3- view, and keep in mind that we *assume* comp. You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. This is trivially false, in the 3-1 description. Obviously there will be, from the 3p view, two conscious survirvors whoi both are me (in the usual sense that I am me, even after change like drinking a cup of coffee, or taking a plane). But by comp we know in advance (in Helsinki) that both first person view of the survivors will be unique from their 1p pov. So in Helsinki P(I will feel to be in only one city) = 1. Whoever I will feel to be, I know that will be unique, and thus either W or M in that protocol. Do you agree with this? Do you agree that P(I will feel to be in only one city) = 1, in step 3 protocol? The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the probability that either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, Of course there is. We just know that with comp, the subject will not feel any split or duplication, like in Everett. and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who. Not when you use the 3 and 1 p nuances. ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever listening to what the duplicated persons say. Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't make any difference whether you look at it from the objective or subjective view. The probabilities work out the same either way. And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons say' by adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly out of his body into a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on both W and M guys, dream their 1p views, fly back and integrate their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a hugely contorted confusion of the lot. So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to provide it. On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet understood it, less still rebutted it. tell me if you agree with this: If you are told, in H, (in the step 3 protocol) that you will be offered a cup of coffee in both W and M, after the reconstitution. Do you agree that the probability(I will drink a cup of coffee) is one? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? What do you mean by true randomness? I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary true random sequence: it is 1... It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super unlucky , in case he bet on zero!). But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 7 March 2014 15:12, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the probability that either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who. I agree, given the context, the question is badly posed. However, I know what it means - the same as when you ask a scientist what is the probability that the Geiger counter will click in the next minute or the photon will go through the semi-silvered mirror, and they say 50% even though they believe the MWI to be the correct interpretation of QM. It simply shows that given the assumptions, there is a first person indeterminacy in this situation, as Everett showed occurs in the MWI. That is all it shows, or needs to show... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, because the evolution of the system is deterministic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent): On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? What do you mean by true randomness? I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary true random sequence: it is 1... It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super unlucky , in case he bet on zero!). But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough. Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the following: 1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality, 2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events. That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that invoking such true randomness in an explanation is just a god-of-the- gap type of explanation. it is like don't ask or don't try to understand. I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the belief in such true 3p randomness. I don't push it that far though. Bruno Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Thursday, March 6, 2014 12:32:32 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. Yes, that's what I mean. An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and either sound or unsound. Regarding UDA's soundness: I have no problem saying Yes Doctor. Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis. But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it. There are other options that seem just as sensible, and there's always the possibility that reality is quite unlike any of the ideas that seem sensible to us. In the usual Bayesian sense of probability it's fine to place a bet with a level of confidence between 0 and 1 even on fully determined unique events like whether AR is true. My bet would be about 25%. If someday I survive a bomb blast by quantum tunneling to safety, then I'll update to virtually 100%. :) Regarding validly, it's also the case that I don't have complete confidence that when I perceive an argument to be valid it actually is valid. For me this wariness developed in response to having been religious for many years in a way I no longer think was rationally justified, even if it seemed so at the time. UDA looks valid to me but it shares many of the features of other metaphysical arguments that I find suspicious, so I remain a bit suspicious of my capacity to judge it without succumbing to biases. I'd bet nearly 1 but not 1 on its validity. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 6, 2014 12:32:32 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. Yes, that's what I mean. An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and either sound or unsound. Regarding UDA's soundness: I have no problem saying Yes Doctor. Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis. But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it. You don't believe in the prime numbers? All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or just Church thesis don't make sense without AR. AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the beliefs in elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical hypothesis, together with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *). There are other options that seem just as sensible, and there's always the possibility that reality is quite unlike any of the ideas that seem sensible to us. Keep in mind that we assume computationalism. This entails a relation between mind and number relations, and we reason from there. We don't known reality, but we can try theories, and after the discovery of the universal machine, the comp theory inherit a solid and rich mathematics, which can help in that possibly highly counter- intuitive study. In the usual Bayesian sense of probability it's fine to place a bet with a level of confidence between 0 and 1 even on fully determined unique events like whether AR is true. My bet would be about 25%. If someday I survive a bomb blast by quantum tunneling to safety, then I'll update to virtually 100%. :) Regarding validly, it's also the case that I don't have complete confidence that when I perceive an argument to be valid it actually is valid. For me this wariness developed in response to having been religious for many years in a way I no longer think was rationally justified, even if it seemed so at the time. UDA looks valid to me but it shares many of the features of other metaphysical arguments that I find suspicious, so I remain a bit suspicious of my capacity to judge it without succumbing to biases. I'd bet nearly 1 but not 1 on its validity. OK. I take it that you have to dig deeper to improve your capacity to judge, and that is very wise. Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Brent because the evolution of the system is deterministic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/7/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent): On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? What do you mean by true randomness? I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary true random sequence: it is 1... It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super unlucky , in case he bet on zero!). But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough. Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the following: 1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality, 2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events. I'm not sure what 1) means. I was hypothesizing (not assuming) 2). That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that invoking such true randomness in an explanation is just a god-of-the-gap type of explanation. it is like don't ask or don't try to understand. It is more like, Some things just happenlike a UD. Brent I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the belief in such true 3p randomness. I don't push it that far though. Bruno Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Friday, March 7, 2014 10:59:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and either sound or unsound. Regarding UDA's soundness: I have no problem saying Yes Doctor. Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis. But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it. You don't believe in the prime numbers? All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or just Church thesis don't make sense without AR. AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the beliefs in elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical hypothesis, together with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *). Heh, yes, I believe in prime numbers. But in The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations you wrote of AR that it is the assumption that arithmetical propositions ... are true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that exists), etc. A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true when physically realized, or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be true for humanlike brains, with an alethiology of the sort preferred by the American pragmatist school of philosophy. And a third meta-account is that reality might be a way that doesn't make sense to me. Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me about 25% confidence for each. :) -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote: I'm not sure I follow. Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they are hexadecimal translations. or very different bases anyway. Of course the bloody average 1's about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's binary. Which works by flipping. That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get the sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally doubled up! The correct sequences should read: * 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 * Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure. binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 2^n, and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to hexadecimal without a calculator, in two steps only. 1101101100111111 it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor break the copy up into sets of four. 1101 1010 0001 0011 1100 0011 the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1. So if you have 1101 and you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh I just taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there was ONE person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o) I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences? I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above) or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me? Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the bases, allowing for translation. I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter seem more accessible. ...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large infinity of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I read that, it put me on the floor. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. Really? the last time I quoted her: What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. Quentin said: That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact. And you agreed with Quentin: Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. Are you saying you now actually agree with Greaves and that assigning probability 1 to both outcomes is in fact correct? Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:40:53 -0800 From: ghib...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote:I'm not sure I follow. Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they are hexadecimal translations. or very different bases anyway. Of course the bloody average 1's about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's binary. Which works by flipping. That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get the sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally doubled up! The correct sequences should read: 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure. binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 2^n, and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to hexadecimal without a calculator, in two steps only. 1101101100111111 it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor break the copy up into sets of four. 1101 1010 0001 0011 1100 0011 the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1. So if you have 1101 and you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh I just taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there was ONE person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o) I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences? I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above) or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me? Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the bases, allowing for translation. I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter seem more accessible. ...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large infinity of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I read that, it put me on the floor. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/ assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 8 March 2014 18:16, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote: On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? * If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, True; but I don't assume that. Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you *are* assuming? I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience? You said *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? - I don't understand what you mean by that, except given some particular assumptions.* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 06 Mar 2014, at 01:52, chris peck wrote: Hi Jason/Gabriel Thanks for the posts. They were both really clear. I can see that it was a mistake to hedge my bets on exact figures and also, given Jason's comments, to think that seemingly regular sequences were quite common. I do maintain that proportions of roughly 50/50 splits are a spurious measure of 'seemingly random' though and that irregularity of change is a better one. I agree, and that is why I justify randomness by incompressiblity. It is an exercise to show that in the iterated self-duplication, the 1- views grows more and more intrinsically non regular, indeed non algorithmically compressible. There also seems to me to be a big difference between Tegmark's game as described in the quote below, and flicking coins. Tegmark's game is a process guaranteed to generate (over 4 iterations) 16 unique and exhaustive combinations of 0s and 1s (heads or tails). If 16 people were to flick a coin 4 times and write down the results there is only a low probability that the resulting set would map on to that generated by Tegmarks game. There is fair chance there would be some repetition. Jason, you say: Even if your pattern were: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1, you still have no better than a 50% chance of predicting the next bit, so despite the coincidental pattern the sequence is still random. I disagree here. In Tegmarks game you know a particular outcome is not exclusive and that you'll have two successors who get one and the other. The next outcome is (01010101010 AND 01010101011) not (01010101010 XOR 01010101011). That is the 3-1 views. If you predict in that setting your future 1- view by (01010101010 AND 01010101011), both copies will refute it, and you loss the bet. If you predict (01010101010 XOR 01010101011), both copies win the bet. here the bet can be done in the 1p-plural way, with someone accompanying you in the telebox. Now this might influence how you bet. If you care about your successors you might refuse to make a bet because you know one successor will lose. If we rolled dice rather than flicked coins and were to bet on getting anything but a 6, in a modified Tegmark game we might still refuse to bet knowing that one successor would certainly lose. Its a bet we almost certainly would take if we were rolling die in a classical world without clones. More dramatically, if you play Russian roulette in Everettian Multiverse you always shoot someone in the head. Crossing the road becomes deeply immoral because vast numbers of successors trip and get run down by trucks. A final confusion: Does anything ever seem 'apparently random' in a Marchalian/Tegmarkian game? Given that you know outcomes are generated by a mechanical process and given you know exactly what the following set of outcomes will be, how can they seem random? Even 100010110011 isn't looking very random anymore. Like John, you keep describing the 3-1 views, which we know already are deterministic. But the question bears on the 1-views themselves, and it is easy to see that any specific prediction (without using or or xor) will fail. If in helsinki you predict I will see M and I will see W, when opening the door, well, both copies, when opeing the doors will have to assess that they were wrong, as they see only W, xor M. Bruno Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 10:21:47 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 6 March 2014 06:45, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Thank you, that's exactly what I was attempting to say in my cack- handed way. (And it is almost certainly what Max intended
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 06 Mar 2014, at 02:51, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno The question is: can you refute this. To my own satisfaction? Yes. To your satisfaction? Apparantly not. Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone. Though perhaps you have an ideological agenda Which one would that be. Could you focus on the technical point. and are just trying very hard not to be refuted? The exact contrary. I have made all this public only after convincing more than hundreds of person, and then the submission has followed the academical rule, and this without much problems, except some not even related to anything technical. And for the UDA, you don't need the 50%. You need only to assess the indeterminacy, and its invariance for the changes described in the next steps. By your own admission your steps are dumbed down for morons like me and display a lack of rigour. You cannot say something like this. It is unscientific in the extreme. You must say at which step rigor is lacking. You make vague negative proposition containing precise error in elementary statistics. Perhaps your book might help? If I don't buy my little 2 year old a treat this month maybe I can afford it. Are there an awful lot of sums? I hate sums. Well its your call Bruno, should I treat my son or buy your book? What is you talk about the step 4? It asks if the way to evaluate the P(W) and the P(M) changes if some delay of reconstitution is introduced in W, or in M. It doesn't change as far as I can see. Its still P(1) for both. Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in H you predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong. Like Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever listening to what the duplicated persons say. Given that the question bears on those data, available in the 3-view, you just abstract yourself from the question asked. So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to provide it. Bruno I'll tell you what, I'll have another look at step 7. see if I can make head or tails of it the fifth or sixth time aroundLast time I got stuck at the floating pen. Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 14:05:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Brent, could you please reply to Edgar? He is, I'm sure, eagerly awaiting your response so he can unleash a torrent of carefully thought out arguments which will cover every point you've made. (As indeed am I.) On 1 March 2014 13:46, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Brent, Are you addressing that question to me? You are responding to a post by Liz talking about your theory. If so I'll be glad to answer. On Friday, February 28, 2014 6:14:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 2/28/2014 2:43 PM, LizR wrote: If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments randomly. OK, I'll bite. Show us the maths and the experts can see how it stacks up against Everett et al. But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'. On the contrary, I am interested in your theory of quantum randomness IF you can flesh it out. For example how do you describe a Stern-Gerlach experiment, a Vaidman no-interaction measurment, an EPR experiment, Bose-Einstein condensate,...? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. I have much formal logic to learn before I have any meaningful opinion about AUDA. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. I have much formal logic to learn before I have any meaningful opinion about AUDA. OK. Fair enough to say. I often come back to zero, so you might enjoy a ride eventually :) Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone. pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. They are mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of everyone? You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of everyone'. This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. On the other hand, just because a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely that will make you happy? Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the impossibility of ever refuting any theory. You're talking to someone who hasn't placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100 On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. I have much formal logic to learn before I have any meaningful opinion about AUDA. OK. Fair enough to say. I often come back to zero, so you might enjoy a ride eventually :) Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno ou cannot say something like this. It is unscientific in the extreme. You must say at which step rigor is lacking. I think you're missing the fact that I was poking fun at a comment you made to Liz. Don't worry about it. You make vague negative proposition containing precise error in elementary statistics. It wouldn't be at all unusual for me to make mistakes in sums, but that 'error in elementary statistics' is not seen as one by prof's at Oxford, which gives me great confidence that Im on to something and that the error is yours . Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in H you predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that the prediction was wrong. The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the probability that either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who. ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever listening to what the duplicated persons say. Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't make any difference whether you look at it from the objective or subjective view. The probabilities work out the same either way. And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons say' by adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly out of his body into a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on both W and M guys, dream their 1p views, fly back and integrate their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a hugely contorted confusion of the lot. So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to provide it. On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet understood it, less still rebutted it. All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 23:33:15 + Hi Bruno Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone. pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. They are mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of everyone? You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of everyone'. This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. On the other hand, just because a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely that will make you happy? Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the impossibility of ever refuting any theory. You're talking to someone who hasn't placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100 On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/6/2014 6:12 PM, chris peck wrote: The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the probability that either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who. Yes, that's the same difficulty I had with the question. But it boils down to Where will you be? It equivocates on you, but that's the point, it's how it models Everett's interpretation of QM. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Wed, Mar 5, 2014 at 6:52 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.comwrote: Hi Jason/Gabriel Thanks for the posts. They were both really clear. I can see that it was a mistake to hedge my bets on exact figures and also, given Jason's comments, to think that seemingly regular sequences were quite common. I do maintain that proportions of roughly 50/50 splits are a spurious measure of 'seemingly random' though and that irregularity of change is a better one. There also seems to me to be a big difference between Tegmark's game as described in the quote below, and flicking coins. Tegmark's game is a process guaranteed to generate (over 4 iterations) 16 unique and exhaustive combinations of 0s and 1s (heads or tails). If 16 people were to flick a coin 4 times and write down the results there is only a low probability that the resulting set would map on to that generated by Tegmarks game. There is fair chance there would be some repetition. Jason, you say: * Even if your pattern were: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1, you still have no better than a 50% chance of predicting the next bit, so despite the coincidental pattern the sequence is still random.* I disagree here. In Tegmarks game you know a particular outcome is not exclusive and that you'll have two successors who get one and the other. The next outcome is (01010101010 AND 01010101011) not (01010101010 XOR 01010101011). Now this might influence how you bet. If you care about your successors you might refuse to make a bet because you know one successor will lose. Interesting, I wonder what difference in the decision theory is required to weight the two cases differently, the ANDs vs. the XOR.. Are there any? Perhaps there is an argument for some quantum suicide experiments. If we rolled dice rather than flicked coins and were to bet on getting anything but a 6, in a modified Tegmark game we might still refuse to bet knowing that one successor would certainly lose. Its a bet we almost certainly would take if we were rolling die in a classical world without clones. But from the first person view, the existence of clones changes nothing that you can detect. It is a difference that makes no difference. More dramatically, if you play Russian roulette in Everettian Multiverse you always shoot someone in the head. Crossing the road becomes deeply immoral because vast numbers of successors trip and get run down by trucks. Everything you do affects an infinite number of future selves, choose wisely. :-) A final confusion: Does anything ever seem 'apparently random' in a Marchalian/Tegmarkian game? Given that you know outcomes are generated by a mechanical process and given you know exactly what the following set of outcomes will be, how can they seem random? Even 100010110011 isn't looking very random anymore. :( A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Jason -- Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 10:21:47 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 6 March 2014 06:45, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Thank you, that's exactly what I was attempting to say in my cack-handed way. (And it is almost certainly what Max intended to say.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On Thu, Mar 6, 2014 at 11:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote: A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI? Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? Do you not agree that FPI can generate apparent randomness? If so then at least some appearance of true randomness is due to FPI. We don't know one way or the other whether fundamental randomness exists or not, so either way you are doing some pretending (e.g., pretending to know true randomness exists in the first place). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. -Gabe On Monday, March 3, 2014 1:36:11 AM UTC-6, chris peck wrote: * If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time.* There's something strikes me as very strange about this idea. Tegmark's method is just a means of writing down binary sequences. Being strict, already with binary sequences just 4 digits long, only 37.5% of those contain half zeros. This drops the longer the sequences get. So, with sequences 6 digits long, only 31.25% contain half zeros. With sequences 8 digits long only 27% and with 16 digits only about 19%. If his experiment continued for a year, (365 digits) many people would find that either room 1 or room 0 was dominating strongly. For these people a change in room would seem very odd, a glitch in the matrix that wouldn't be of any great concern vis a vis prediction once 'normality' kicked back in the following night. For others, a change in room would occur at regular intervals and would seem very predictable. There would be the guy who changed room every night. There would be all the guys whose room changed every night except for the one time when it stayed the same. A little glitch is all. In truth, the longer you continued the game and the more people got involved the less chance a person would have of finding room assignment random at all. There would be increasingly few people willing to bet 50/50 on a particular room assignment. -- Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 17:13:23 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: liz...@gmail.com javascript: To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: Hello, dear, looking for a bit of multi-sense realism? On 2 March 2014 16:35, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: heh heh heh I love this place. It's like walking through an eccentric street market where traders call out their wares GETCHYOUR P-TIME 2 for 1 logico-computational really real structure today only Assuming comp only, that's right comp only. Theology but done like science. Madam you are ugly but I will be sober in the morning. You there, you reek of not-comp, get lost. Ah sir, did you like the dreams? Same again? GETCHOR P-TIME..,. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 6 March 2014 06:45, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Thank you, that's exactly what I was attempting to say in my cack-handed way. (And it is almost certainly what Max intended to say.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Jason/Gabriel Thanks for the posts. They were both really clear. I can see that it was a mistake to hedge my bets on exact figures and also, given Jason's comments, to think that seemingly regular sequences were quite common. I do maintain that proportions of roughly 50/50 splits are a spurious measure of 'seemingly random' though and that irregularity of change is a better one. There also seems to me to be a big difference between Tegmark's game as described in the quote below, and flicking coins. Tegmark's game is a process guaranteed to generate (over 4 iterations) 16 unique and exhaustive combinations of 0s and 1s (heads or tails). If 16 people were to flick a coin 4 times and write down the results there is only a low probability that the resulting set would map on to that generated by Tegmarks game. There is fair chance there would be some repetition. Jason, you say: Even if your pattern were: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1, you still have no better than a 50% chance of predicting the next bit, so despite the coincidental pattern the sequence is still random. I disagree here. In Tegmarks game you know a particular outcome is not exclusive and that you'll have two successors who get one and the other. The next outcome is (01010101010 AND 01010101011) not (01010101010 XOR 01010101011). Now this might influence how you bet. If you care about your successors you might refuse to make a bet because you know one successor will lose. If we rolled dice rather than flicked coins and were to bet on getting anything but a 6, in a modified Tegmark game we might still refuse to bet knowing that one successor would certainly lose. Its a bet we almost certainly would take if we were rolling die in a classical world without clones. More dramatically, if you play Russian roulette in Everettian Multiverse you always shoot someone in the head. Crossing the road becomes deeply immoral because vast numbers of successors trip and get run down by trucks. A final confusion: Does anything ever seem 'apparently random' in a Marchalian/Tegmarkian game? Given that you know outcomes are generated by a mechanical process and given you know exactly what the following set of outcomes will be, how can they seem random? Even 100010110011 isn't looking very random anymore. :( Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 10:21:47 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 6 March 2014 06:45, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Thank you, that's exactly what I was attempting to say in my cack-handed way. (And it is almost certainly what Max intended to say.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Brent, could you please reply to Edgar? He is, I'm sure, eagerly awaiting your response so he can unleash a torrent of carefully thought out arguments which will cover every point you've made. (As indeed am I.) On 1 March 2014 13:46, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Brent, Are you addressing that question to me? You are responding to a post by Liz talking about your theory. If so I'll be glad to answer. On Friday, February 28, 2014 6:14:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 2/28/2014 2:43 PM, LizR wrote: If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments randomly. OK, I'll bite. Show us the maths and the experts can see how it stacks up against Everett et al. But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'. On the contrary, I am interested in your theory of quantum randomness IF you can flesh it out. For example how do you describe a Stern-Gerlach experiment, a Vaidman no-interaction measurment, an EPR experiment, Bose-Einstein condensate,...? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Hi Bruno The question is: can you refute this. To my own satisfaction? Yes. To your satisfaction? Apparantly not. Though perhaps you have an ideological agenda and are just trying very hard not to be refuted? And for the UDA, you don't need the 50%. You need only to assess the indeterminacy, and its invariance for the changes described in the next steps. By your own admission your steps are dumbed down for morons like me and display a lack of rigour. Perhaps your book might help? If I don't buy my little 2 year old a treat this month maybe I can afford it. Are there an awful lot of sums? I hate sums. Well its your call Bruno, should I treat my son or buy your book? What is you talk about the step 4? It asks if the way to evaluate the P(W) and the P(M) changes if some delay of reconstitution is introduced in W, or in M. It doesn't change as far as I can see. Its still P(1) for both. I'll tell you what, I'll have another look at step 7. see if I can make head or tails of it the fifth or sixth time aroundLast time I got stuck at the floating pen. Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 14:05:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Brent, could you please reply to Edgar? He is, I'm sure, eagerly awaiting your response so he can unleash a torrent of carefully thought out arguments which will cover every point you've made. (As indeed am I.) On 1 March 2014 13:46, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Brent, Are you addressing that question to me? You are responding to a post by Liz talking about your theory. If so I'll be glad to answer. On Friday, February 28, 2014 6:14:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 2/28/2014 2:43 PM, LizR wrote: If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature is forced to make those alignments randomly. OK, I'll bite. Show us the maths and the experts can see how it stacks up against Everett et al. But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'. On the contrary, I am interested in your theory of quantum randomness IF you can flesh it out. For example how do you describe a Stern-Gerlach experiment, a Vaidman no-interaction measurment, an EPR experiment, Bose-Einstein condensate,...? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html -Gabe On Monday, March 3, 2014 1:36:11 AM UTC-6, chris peck wrote: If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. There's something strikes me as very strange about this idea. Tegmark's method is just a means of writing down binary sequences. Being strict, already with binary sequences just 4 digits long, only 37.5% of those contain half zeros. This drops the longer the sequences get. So, with sequences 6 digits long, only 31.25% contain half zeros. With sequences 8 digits long only 27% and with 16 digits only about 19%. If his experiment continued for a year, (365 digits) many people would find that either room 1 or room 0 was dominating strongly. For these people a change in room would seem very odd, a glitch in the matrix that wouldn't be of any great concern vis a vis prediction once 'normality' kicked back in the following night. For others, a change in room would occur at regular intervals and would seem very predictable. There would be the guy who changed room every night. There would be all the guys whose room changed every night except for the one time when it stayed the same. A little glitch is all. In truth, the longer you continued the game and the more people got involved the less chance a person would have of finding room assignment random at all. There would be increasingly few people willing to bet 50/50 on a particular room assignment. Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 17:13:23 +1300 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 From: liz...@gmail.com To: everyth...@googlegroups.com Hello, dear, looking for a bit of multi-sense realism? On 2 March 2014 16:35, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: heh heh heh I love this place. It's like walking through an eccentric street market where traders call out their wares GETCHYOUR P-TIME 2 for 1 logico-computational really real structure today only Assuming comp only, that's right comp only. Theology but done like science. Madam you are ugly but I will be sober in the morning. You there, you reek of not-comp, get lost. Ah sir, did you like the dreams? Same again? GETCHOR P-TIME..,. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 04 Mar 2014, at 04:18, chris peck wrote: So has Tegmark convinced me that in his thought experiment I would assign 50/50 probability of seeing one or the other room each iteration? Not really. The question is: can you refute this. And for the UDA, you don't need the 50%. You need only to assess the indeterminacy, and its invariance for the changes described in the next steps. What is you talk about the step 4? It asks if the way to evaluate the P(W) and the P(M) changes if some delay of reconstitution is introduced in W, or in M. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
On 3/3/2014 11:55 PM, chris peck wrote: * I'm not reading Max's book, so I don't know exactly what he said,* Im reading the quote Jason kindly provided and responding to exactly what Tegmark said. *but using FPI as in Everett QM and writing down which of two equally likely events you actually experience is an example of bernoulli trials. * and the figures I've been stating reflect bernoulli trials precisely. * The proportion of 1s and 0s both converge to 1/2 in probability. * but in doing so call in to question definitions of 'about' 'roughly' and 'almost all'. But then you haven't read the Tegmark quote so you won't be able to add anything substantive about that. I read Jason's quote: If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time. In other words, causal physics will produce the illusion of randomness from your subjective viewpoint in any circumstance where you're being cloned. But I don't know what Figure 8.3 is. * It is irrelevant that the proportion of subsequences that have exactly equally 1s and 0s goes down.* Whats irrelevant is the use of proportion of 1s and 0s in determining 'apparent randomness'. It doesn't. Which is my point. The figures for exact proportions were just my arse about tit way of getting there. That's true. The proportions of 1s and 0s doesn't determine randomness, it just determines the relative measures of experiencing room 1 and room 0. But what Max wrote is true also; there would be 2^N yous and most of them would have written down sequences that were within z/sqrt(N) of 50/50 and looked random (i.e. incompressible) where you can choose z to be whatever you want to define most of them. But whatever you choose for z, z/sqrt(N) still goes toward zero as N-inf. Brent But still, even though I seemed to get there on my tod, at least I know what a Bernoulli trial is now. Thanks for that. -- Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 21:43:29 -0800 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 I'm not reading Max's book, so I don't know exactly what he said, but using FPI as in Everett QM and writing down which of two equally likely events you actually experience is an example of bernoulli trials. The proportion of 1s and 0s both converge to 1/2 in probability. This is exactly the way prediction of probabilities are evaluated experimentally. It is irrelevant that the proportion of subsequences that have exactly equally 1s and 0s goes down. Brent On 3/3/2014 8:32 PM, chris peck wrote: Hi Liz * I'm not sure I follow.* Me neither. * wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time.* there would be no 'about' it were your interpretation right, Liz. It would be all the time, exactly 50%. Hes saying that zeros occur about 50%of the time in the zeros and ones you have written down. That corresponds to the individual bit strings. Not the entire collection of them. * I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences?* I suspect its sloppy interpretation rather than sloppy phrasing that implies that. * I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above)* 6/16 isn't half is it? I measured 1 divided by 2 just now and it still seems to come out as 0.5 here. * or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me?* I wrote a little program Liz that collects together all the bit strings that can be made from 16 bits. Then it counts the number of 1s and 0s in each one. It has a little counter that goes up by one every time there are 8 zeros. there are 65536 combinations. 12870 of them have 8 zeros. 12870 / 65536 * 100 = 19%. 6/16*100 = 37% I don't know about you but 19, being less than 37, suggests to me that the percentage is going down. But ofcourse ask a mathematician if you're not certain of that yourself. * I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter seem more accessible.* Yeah, which is preferable to people with similar ideas being slap dash in order to make them less accessible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com