Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Michael and John,

Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael.

I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out 
some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a 
wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and 
political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information 
across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling 
and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in 
relations of reciprocity and interdependence.

I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, 
chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. 
Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list 
or as part of a small research and discussion group.

Yours,

Jeff Downard
Flagstaff, AZ
Philosophy, NAU

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany 
Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)
John, List:

I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century.

I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that 
time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company 
(HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two 
personal observations:

1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce 
railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In 
evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in 
Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > 
individual selection.

However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about 
socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth 
transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many 
examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with 
naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even 
"greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary 
wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most 
successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. 
Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful 
model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent 
phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once 
put it).

2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates 
understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained 
transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, 
vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write 
qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can 
understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the 
reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction 
as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at.


Warm regards,

Michael J.J. Tiffany
Portsmouth, New Hampshire


On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses  Jerry's note 
about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's 
writings for our time (the 21st C).

Basic point:  Peirce was writing for the future.  Those of us who value his 
contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our 
present.

John



Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM
To: John Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science 
(U Pitt)

John,

I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s 
‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical 
positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in 
philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global 
existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. 
Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition 
to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, 
the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a 
radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the 
‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century 
later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution.

In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Rober Burch seems 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello John, Jon, List,

Peirce examines both first and second intentional logics. The distinction 
appears to be similar, in some respects, to the contemporary distinction 
between first and second order logics. Here, for instance, is an SEP entry on 
higher order logics:  
https://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/logic-higher-order/#HighOrdeLogiVisVisTypeTheo

Does Peirce’s explorations in the Gamma system of the EG, and his contemplation 
of a possible Delta system, bear some similarities to contemporary discussions 
of higher order logics, such as third order, or fourth order, etc.?

--Jeff D

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Date: Thursday, March 7, 2024 at 7:42 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was 
Delta Existential Graphs
John, List:

It looks like you sent the message quoted below only to me, but I assume that 
you intended it for the entire List, so I am replying accordingly.

JFS: In the copy of your note, included below, please note that the five EGs 
are BETA graphs. The lines of identity refer to things that Peirce called 
circumstances. A circumstance is a THING that is indistinguishable from a 
context by McCarthy or a situation by Barwise. In fact, a possible world can 
also be called a THING.

If this were true, then there would be no need for all the different formal 
systems of modal logic--S1-S5, T, B, P, etc.--because we could just use 
first-order predicate logic (FOPL). There would also be no need for "a Delta 
part [of EGs] in order to deal with modals," because we could just use Beta 
EGs. On the contrary, circumstances as possible states of things (PSTs) are not 
themselves "things" that can be denoted by ordinary lines of identity (LoIs), 
and propositions are not "properties" that can be attributed to such "things" 
by attaching letters to those heavy lines. As I acknowledged when I corrected 
your mistranslations of Peirce's modal EGs on R 339:[340r] the first time, 
there is an analogy between quantifying predicates (general concepts) over 
subjects (indefinite individuals) and quantifying propositions over PSTs, but 
they still require different formal systems.

In fact, the usual permissions for transforming LoIs in Beta EGs served as my 
starting point for working out the new permissions for transforming lines of 
compossibility (LoCs) in my candidate for Delta EGs, but then I had to adjust 
them to account for the peculiarities of PSTs vs. individuals and propositions 
vs. concepts. There are at least two obvious notational differences--in Beta, a 
name must always be attached to at least one LoI, and it can only be attached 
to more than one LoI if it denotes a dyadic or triadic relation; while in 
Delta, a letter can be unattached to any LoCs when it denotes a proposition 
that is true in the actual state of things (AST), and it can be attached to 
multiple LoCs for iterated modalities unless system P is being implemented to 
preclude them.

JFS: I don't have the page number of R514 in front of me, but I remember that 
the following sentence ended in the middle with [end].

Again, why the rush? This is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L nor Schmidt-L, so we should 
always take the time and make the effort to look up any passages in Peirce's 
writings that we are planning to cite in a post, make sure that they actually 
say what we remember them saying, and then include the relevant exact 
quotations to support our points. In this case, you are presumably referring to 
the following.

CSP: One of my possibly slight improvements, is that I begin by drawing 
(preferably with a red pencil), a line all round my sheet at a little distance 
from the edge; and in the margin outside the red line, whatever is scribed is 
merely asserted to be possible. Thus, if the subject were geometry, I could 
write in that margin in the postulates, and any pertinent problems stated in 
the form of postulates such as, that “if, on a plane, there be circle with a 
ray cutting it, and two points be marked [end] (R 514:[18-19], 1909)

As I keep emphasizing, this notational innovation has nothing to do with modal 
logic nor metalanguage. It simply converts the entire sheet--there is only one 
sheet here--into a scroll for material implication with the antecedent (e.g., 
postulates) in the margin (outer close) and the consequent (e.g., theorems) 
within the red line (inner close). Peirce does not say anything about this in R 
L376, and he does not say anything about the "many papers" concept in R 514, so 
I am still not seeing any explicit connection between those two manuscripts. As 
I have said before, a further improvement is shading the margin instead of 
drawing a red line as its inner boundary. This is a more iconic way of 
conveying that it is a different surface from the unshaded interior, 
representing a universe of possibility--"in the margin ... whatever is scribed 
is merely asserted to be possible."

JFS: As for 

[PEIRCE-L] Law of Mind and Origins of Order in the Cosmos

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello,

Peirce offers strategies for framing questions and fruitful hypotheses in 
metaphysics about the origins of order in the cosmos. I've seen reconstructions 
of his account by a number of interpreters, including Andrew Reynolds in 
Peirce's Scientific Metaphysics. Some Peirce scholars, including T.L. Short, 
have expressed concerns about the plausibility of Peirce's speculations.

Given the current state of theorizing in cosmology and physics, the questions 
seem remarkably abstruse and complicated. I'm wondering if there are simple 
models that might be used to clarify the philosophical side of the questions 
and competing hypotheses. I suspect others on the list have considerably 
stronger backgrounds in physics and mathematics than I do. As such, I'd be 
interested in hearing suggestions about where one might start.

Thus far, my strategy has been to follow the line of interpretation developed 
by Reynolds. This starts with a conception of randomness based on the law of 
large numbers and the central limit theorem, and then explains the role of the 
law of mind in the growth of order in a random system. Taking Peirce's own 
example of the rolling of dice, how might the gradual wearing of corners of the 
die shape the future rolls? My hunch is that the rolling of many dice, and the 
growth of habits, might serve as a useful model for the evolution of order in 
the early cosmos.

The many rolls of a die can be modeled using the tools of phase and parameter 
spaces. Adopting this type of model, my hope is that a profitable analogy can 
be drawn to something like quark-gluon interactions in vacuum space, which have 
been modeled by Derek Leinweber. His models were used by Wilczek in his 2004 
Physics Nobel Prize 
Lecture.
 Here is an introductory video:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3xLuZNKhlY=72s
[https://i.ytimg.com/vi/J3xLuZNKhlY/maxresdefault.jpg]
Empty Space is NOT Empty
An atom is mostly empty space, but empty space is mostly not empty. The reason 
it looks empty is because electrons and photons don't interact with the stuff 
...
www.youtube.com

If members of the list have suggestions for better models, please let me know. 
Similarly, if anyone is interested in taking up these sorts of questions 
on-list or possibly off-list by video conference, I'd be interested in having a 
discussion.

Yours,

Jeff Downard
Dept. of Philosophy
NAU
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[PEIRCE-L] Atkins monograph

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi John,

The Atkins monograph is not yet available from OUP.

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/peirce-on-inference-9780197689066?cc=us=en;

It is scheduled to ship in July. I'd be interested in discussing the work when 
it does appear in print. Let me know if you are interested.

--Jeff

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Mary Libertin 
Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 11:19 AM
To: John F Sowa 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - 
Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

John and Peirce-List,

Here is the link to an excerpt from the book Peirce on Inference: Validity, 
Strength, and the Community of Inquirers by Richard Kenneth Atkins.


Peirce on 
Inference
books.google.com
[content.jpeg]

Best,
Mary

On Jun 8, 2023, at 12:01 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Mary,

Thanks for citing that book.

Note to all:  If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or 
con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or 
 summary that might clarify these issues.

After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to 
refute Kant's claims are getting stronger.  Just consider the case of identical 
twins.  When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct 
individuals.  But the differences between them are minor aspects of their 
appearance.  Are there any considerations other than surface observations that 
could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"?

For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of 
beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny 
discrepancies from their intended specifications.

John


From: "Mary Libertin" 
Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM

John, Peirce-list

For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this 
discussion.

  *
  *   Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, 
By Richard Kenneth Atkins


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello John, Mary, all,

I'd be happy to compare notes on Peirce's, Kant's, Leibniz's arguments and 
remarks about the intelligibility of a "thing in itself." As I've suggested 
earlier, it is helpful to read Kant's claims in light of his attempt to respond 
to Leibniz. Similarly, it is helpful to read Peirce's claims in light of his 
attempt to respond to Kant and, in turn, to Leibniz.

Given John's notes about individuating individuals who are biological twins, he 
appears to be interested in the logical and semantic character of Leibniz's two 
principles:  (1) the identity of individuals that are indiscernible and (2) the 
indiscernibility of individuals that are identical.

In order to sort out the points of agreement and disagreement between Peirce, 
Kant and Leibniz on the application of those principles to actual things, it 
will be helpful to consider the differences in their respective accounts of how 
signs can be used to refer to individual objects as existing and as having 
qualities and real relations to other objects. That is, I think we can make 
progress on sorting out their disagreements by looking at their respective 
accounts of representation of actual individual's, the abstract qualities they 
may possess, and the real general laws that govern such individuals.

A fundamental disagreement is over the types of signs that are essential for 
cognition. Leibniz claims there is one fundamental type of sign, which is that 
of a general conception. The sensations that are part of our perceptual 
observations of actual objects are just confused general conceptions. Kant 
maintains that there are two basic types of signs, individual representations 
as perceptual "intuitions" of things as being at a place in time and space, and 
general conceptions. Peirce, of course, maintains that signs can be classified 
triadically based on their own character, that of the object and that of the 
interpretant—and the requisite relations between those three. The result is a 
richer theory of signs and relations than either Leibniz or Kant provide.

We need to interpret Peirce's responses to Kant's, or to Leibniz's claims about 
the intelligibility of a "thing in itself" in light of these differences in 
their accounts of signs and semiotic relations. Then, we need to consider 
different kinds of "things" that we might try to individuate, such as a rock, a 
human person or God. Contrast the attempts of these philosophers to clarify the 
grounds for individuating such various things as individuals, as compared to 
the grounds for understanding something—such as a law of causality--to be a 
real universal that governs actual individual objects.

Here is a passage from the CP where Peirce tries to diagnose an error by Kant 
and Leibniz:


Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, and others appeal to the universality of certain 
truths as proving that they are not derived from observation, either directly 
or by legitimate probable inference. … Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant more or 
less explicitly state that that which they say cannot be derived from 
observation, or legitimate probable inference from observation, is a universal 
proposition in sense (3), that is, an assertion concerning every member of a 
general class without exception.  CP 2.370

How do you interpret Peirce's objection to each?

--Jeff



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of John F Sowa 
Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2023 9:01 AM
To: Mary Libertin 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
; jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - 
Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

Mary,

Thanks for citing that book.

Note to all:  If anybody has a copy of that book (or any other reference pro or 
con the issue of the "thing in itself"), please find and send us any excerpt or 
 summary that might clarify these issues.

After further thought about this issue, my doubts about Peirce's attempts to 
refute Kant's claims are getting stronger.  Just consider the case of identical 
twins.  When they are in the same room, it's clear that they are two distinct 
individuals.  But the differences between them are minor aspects of their 
appearance.  Are there any considerations other than surface observations that 
could distinguish them as two distinct "things in themselves"?

For mass produced items today -- ranging from newly minted coins to bottles of 
beer -- there is no way to distinguish their "ding an sich" except for tiny 
discrepancies from their intended specifications.

John


From: "Mary Libertin" 
Sent: 6/8/23 9:58 AM

John, Peirce-list

For Our Information: Oxford UP has just published a book appropriate to this 
discussion.

  *
  *   Peirce on Inference: Validity, Strength, and the Community of Inquirers, 
By Richard Kenneth Atkins

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon,

Which claim about the "thing in itself" in Kant do you take to be mistaken? Can 
you put it in clear terms and tell me where he makes the claim? I'd be 
interested in knowing where you think he goes wrong in more precise terms.

As I've suggested before, one of Kant's main aims in the discussion of the 
conception of a "thing in itself" is to diagnose the errors of other 
philosophers such as Leibniz in his metaphysical account of monads.

Here is an example of a fairly clear passage from the Prolegomena:


§ 32.  Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have 
conceived, besides the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make 
up the sensible world, certain creations of the understanding 
(Verstandeswesen), called noumena, which should constitute an intelligible 
world. And as appearance and illusion were by those men identified (a thing 
which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch), actuality was only conceded 
to the creations of thought.


And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, 
confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not 
this thing in its internal constitution, but only know its appearances, viz., 
the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The 
understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants the existence of 
things in themselves also, and so far we may say, that the representation of 
such things as form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere creations of 
the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable.

Our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort (noumena), but 
rather limits the principles of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility) 
to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as everything would then be 
turned into mere appearance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of 
possible experience. Hereby then objects of the understanding are granted, but 
with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception: "that we 
neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the 
understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our 
pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, 
consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these 
concepts retain no meaning whatever."

What strikes me about this passage is the extent to which Kant and Peirce 
appear to agree about the "rule which admits of no exception."

--Jeff

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, June 2, 2023 1:23 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - 
Again). (Assemblage Formalisms - inference).

Jack, List:

Again, if the "thing in itself" can be inferred, then it can be represented and 
is not incognizable after all. So, Peirce was right and Kant was wrong.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 2, 2023 at 1:46 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
The disagreement is about whether a complete representation of an object would 
be impossible in principle, even in the infinite future after infinite inquiry 
by an infinite community; Kant says yes, Peirce says no.
Yes, to this I go directly. I say I have proven Kant is correct here via the 
"thing in itself" which by logical series and deconstruction of the mediatory 
process itself, must be inferred. As it is "in itself", it can never be, to us, 
"as it is in itself".

Best

Jack
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - Again).

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jack, list,

Before attributing views to Kant with respect to the notion of a thing in 
itself or the conception of a noumenon, you might start with some passages from 
Kant's first Critique where he actually employs such notions and conceptions. 
Or, at least refer us to the sections you have in mind. Then, we can see how 
your remarks might (or might not) fit what Kant says.

In many places where Kant employs the conception of a thing in itself, for 
instance, he is criticizing other philosophers, such as Leibniz and Wolff. 
Leibniz claims that monads are non- extended non- composite mind- like 
substances. Kant is asking if the category of substance can be employed 
meaningfully in judgments about existing things if those things are not located 
at a place and time. Locating things in space and time are, on Kant's view, 
necessary to refer to them as existing in judgments concerning positive matters 
of fact, where the judgments are held assertorically.

As such, it is important to distinguish between Kant's views and those he is 
criticizing. I often see them conflated.

Alternately, you might refer to Leibniz's conception of a thing in itself and 
not attribute Leibniz's claims to Kant.

Yours,

Jeff

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Wednesday, May 3, 2023 2:04 PM
To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: The Thing In Itself (Kant and Peirce - 
Again).

Jon, List

Semeiotic is, however you define it, a schema for a series of relations between 
predicates (or qualities or whatever you want to call a classificatory schema). 
It is a formalism - to be frank. Now being a formalism the terms "dynamical 
object" and so on -- these are about as arbitrary as it gets. For they are 
"stand in" predicates for a given quality within a formal structure (semiotic). 
In understanding Kant's thing in itself, we must throw it all away (suspend it 
until the noumena has been comprehended insofar as it can be).

Kant's noumenal/thing in itself is pre-form wherein the metaphysical may be of 
the physical but is always pre-physical. Pre-capacity to even understand 
form/content. That is what the noumena is (for humans). You cannot usefully use 
Peirce to address the thing-in-itself (via semiotic formalisms) for it 
transcends the very notion of form.

The noumenal is pre-consubstantiality even as consubstantiality is how we make 
sense of it. It is not possible to represent the thing in itself via form, or 
any means, because it goes before - our attempts to do so will always be wrong. 
Except we know via consubstantiality/contiguity that it, the noumenal, 
necessarily is.

So

Salt-Snail-Poison

Ignoring any formal terms, semeiotic or otherwise, it is best to restrict 
theses to the simplest terms possible. Quality/Element/Subject. To a physicist, 
perhaps all three are elements?


That the "quality" of the "element" (salt) is "poison" to a snail, is the 
formal - semiotic - classifcation of the relation in its simplest possible form.

That the Q of the E(s) is not poison to any other organism (or need not be) is 
the point. Thus, the essence of salt, as it is in itself, is proven (regardless 
of formal structure but via formal structure - as with Godel).

Thus Q of E(S) = V(P-H[S]) but not [X]. To humans, always V(-X) (in itself, 
there, but not possible to represent). All mathematics/lexicals/sciences/logics 
produce a value within a formal relata (relational schema) which value is never 
the thing in itself (but we know the thing in itself necessarily is and is 
pre-form). That is as scientific as Semeiotic may ever be. But only if it 
understands the X restriction which enables its liftoff - the fallibilism upon 
which science is based and which Peirce always embraced - thus there should be 
no reticience in disregarding large chunks of Peircean terminology as that is 
what Peirce aimed for (semeiotic as science).

Quality of Element(Snail) = Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail]). That is the 
semeiotic "standing for" schema simplified. I.e, Salt-Snail-Poison = 
Value(Poison-to-Human[-of-Snail].

However, P-H[S] is necessarily not Poison to a Snail which in semiotic/formal 
terms is more like P(S[Sa]). The first has a human intermediary - we cannot 
pretend that this doesn't "count" (formal logic and mathematics will tell you 
that it does). Thus, what salt - as poison - is to a snail, in absentia of 
human understanding, cannot be the "same" thing (Reality or otherwise) as it is 
to a snail minus the human predicate. And this is only in logical terms - which 
occludes the fact that no animal understands such things via logic (of this 
lexical, received, variety, other than the human).

We have no idea - no matter what anyone says - of how a snail perceives salt. 
We assume it is the same - or similar - as in "fire is hot" (Kantian 
objectivity 1.0) but similar, mutual threshold of understanding, is not 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, Gary F, all,

Jon, I've read your paper on time, although it was some time ago, so my memory 
is not fresh.

The diagram of the lines and the circles in figure3 do not appear to show three 
different types of conic sections. Rather, they show three circles intersecting 
with a line at two, one and no places. One can give the same sort of diagram 
for an ellipse, parabola or hyperbola.

In order to use the diagrams to clarify points about the relationships between 
conic sections and a line at infinity in projective space, it would be helpful 
to supply more than is shown in Figures 3 or 4. In fact, I think a lot more 
needs to be shown about the character of the absolute in projective geometry 
for the key points to be made clearer.

The points I was emphasizing the passage at CP 6.210 appear to support Gary F's 
suggestions about the general principle govern the passage from the ideal 
starting point of inquiry to its ideal ending point. The same holds for the 
metaphysical hypothesis offered as an explanation of the cosmological evolution 
of the universe.

Yours,

Jeff

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2023 5:19 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

Jeff, List:

You and I seem to be more or less on the same page here, along with Martin in 
light of his helpful clarification that avoiding "originalism" and "endism" 
simply means recognizing that inquiry has no definite beginning or end--just 
like the universe in Peirce's cosmology, and consistent with his thoroughgoing 
synechism that precludes any singularities within a true continuum such as time 
(CP 1.498, c. 1896; CP 6.210, 1898; CP 1.274-275, 1902). Attached are two 
relevant diagrams that I included in my "Temporal Synechism" paper--the first 
(Figure3.tiff) showing the relations between the three different conic sections 
and the line at infinity in projective geometry, and the second (Figure5.tiff) 
showing how a hyperbolic continuum is mapped to two parallel lines of infinite 
length. As Peirce explains ...

CSP: I may mention that my chief avocation in the last 10 years has been to 
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to 
a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of things in the 
infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the 
total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is 
death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and 
absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of 
things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some 
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the 
growth of habit. ... As to the part of time on the further side of eternity 
which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317, 1891)

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 4:10 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> wrote:
Gary F., Jon S, all,

I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and 
logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an end 
and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his 
discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the 
starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an analogy 
between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and the 
cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy between 
the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry and the 
starting and ending points of the cosmos.

How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end? Consider 
what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the topological model at 
CP 6.581

Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption 
that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of 
reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation, derivation, 
involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its own nature not 
requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also, there is suggestion of 
goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason and nature is perfected. A 
principle of movement must be assumed to be universal. It cannot be supposed 
that things ever actually reached the stopping-point, for there movement would 
stop and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Jon S, all,

I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and 
logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an end 
and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his 
discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the 
starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an analogy 
between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and the 
cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy between 
the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry and the 
starting and ending points of the cosmos.

How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end? Consider 
what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the topological model at 
CP 6.581


Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption 
that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of 
reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation, derivation, 
involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its own nature not 
requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also, there is suggestion of 
goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason and nature is perfected. A 
principle of movement must be assumed to be universal. It cannot be supposed 
that things ever actually reached the stopping-point, for there movement would 
stop and the principle of movement would not be universal; and similarly with 
the starting-point. Starting-point and stopping-point can only be ideal, like 
the two points where the hyperbola leaves one asymptote and where it joins the 
other.



In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.

1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even ideal. 
Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point, has no 
definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.

2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one 
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the 
very same nothingness from which it advances.

3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature 
has ideal end different from its origin.

The aim, I think, is fairly clearly stated. He is using the topological model 
in an effort to clarify the conception of a principle of movement. Our 
conception of growth in our understanding—such that progress is really 
possible--stands in need of clarification both because it is vague and because 
we are prone to doubt its legitimacy for our logica utens. As such, the aim is 
to frame a clearer hypothesis about the principle of movement in the 
philosophical theory of logic (i.e., our logica docens). As Gary F. is pointing 
out, the ideal stopping point can "only be ideal." At that ideal limit, the 
"movement would stop and the principle of movement would not be universal." (my 
emphasis) The same holds for the ideal starting point.

My hunch is that Peirce is using the topological model for the theory of logic 
to help establish the sorts of proportions that are important for the sake of 
inductively ascertaining the likelihood that a given hypothesis is true or 
false--within some margin of error. As such, the topological model serves as 
the basis of a measure of degrees of error for our inquiries generally. Drawing 
out the connections between the topological, projective (i.e., proportion) and 
metrical conceptions would take some work.

Yours,

Jeff








From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2023 6:44 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists


Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction.

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the 
greater community closer to the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon S, Gary R and Gary F, all,


I want to think the three of you for giving presentations at the 10-minute 
discussion on Zoom. I found each of the presentations and following discussion 
helpful.


I'd like to respond to some of the points Gary F makes in his discussion of 
"Nonlinear Semiotics".


Here are some initial thoughts about the general thesis of the presentation:  
that Peirce's semiotic account of the growth of signs is nonlinear in character.



Let me start by saying that I agree with the thesis. It seems fairly clear that 
Peirce was explicitly trying to make sense of how things grow and evolve— (1) 
in logic, semiotics and cognition, (2) in the metaphysics that is prior to the 
special sciences, and (3) in the physics, chemistry. biology and psychology of 
his day. This is especially clear in the essays and notes leading up to and 
after "A Guess at the Riddle." The central conceptions that are guiding the 
inquiries are high level conceptions like continuity and complexity as well as 
conceptions that appear to be designed for more specialized uses in physics and 
chemistry such as nonconservative and nonlinear.



My interpretative hypothesis is that Peirce saw from early on that the patterns 
of inference governing experimental inquiry involve an iterative process. What 
is more, the conceptions involved in the premises and conclusions in these 
patterns of inference undergo a process of being logically multiplied by 
themselves in involution, with some conceptions functioning like constants that 
are added. As such, the semiotic model has all the features found in algebraic 
expressions such as are studied in the mathematical modeling of strongly 
nonlinear dynamical systems (e.g., the quadratic iterator) in a phase space or 
a parameter space.



It is interesting to note that Peirce is aware that the iteration of inferences 
in a two valued monadic system of logic (e.g., Aristotle's logic theory of the 
categorical syllogism) is mechanical in character and does not give rise to 
nonlinear dynamics. Often, in the formal study of deductive inference, we treat 
the values of the logical operations as having a simple true or false 
character. In the cycle of inquiry, however, the values vary in a number of 
respects—including the confidence we attribute to the propositions and the 
vagueness and degrees of inadequacy of the conceptions involved. The 
conceptions, propositions and arguments are growing in terms of their logical 
depth, breadth and information. Having values that allow continuous variations 
makes possible the kinds of dynamics that take a fractal character around 
attractors in terms of the underlying geometry. The process itself is 
self-organizing.



In short, I think Peirce's semiotic theory moves from an initial classification 
of signs to a physiological account of the functioning and growth of a systems 
of signs in their relation to the world via observation and action, This 
semiotic model of growth is guiding his inquiries in metaphysics and the 
special science about the complexity and nonlinear character of many different 
phenomena.



In effect, Peirce is offering semiotic models of growth and complexity and that 
can be used to explain the nonconservative and nonlinear character of real 
physical, chemical, biological and social systems. As a historical point, it 
appears that Peirce's understanding of what is special about nonlinear systems 
involving feedback was remarkably advanced and precedes important developments 
such as Poincare's study of the three body problem. With the advantage and 
hindsight afforded by a century of further inquiry along these lines in 
mathematics and the special sciences, this should not be too surprising to us 
given Peirce's goal of explaining how all laws themselves might evolve.



If this is right, then I am wondering how the semiotic account of the dynamical 
growth and evolution of sign systems might serve as a philosophical model to 
help us explain the evolution of order, regularity and laws in nature? Can we 
offer some simple models and straightforward explanations that will help to 
make things clearer and easier to comprehend? As far as I am concerned, the 
problems appear to be remarkably difficult and hard to comprehend. This is 
especially true for problems having to do with the origins of order in 
cosmological, biological and cognitive systems.


Gary F. has already responded to these sorts of questions at the 10 minute 
session. As such, I am offering this note and following questions to the 
members of the list with the hope others might engage with the points Gary has 
made in the presentation.


Yours,


Jeff




From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2023 2:34 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

List:

Gary R., Gary F., and I are grateful to those of you who 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon, List,


Thank you for sharing your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatism.


The focus of your inquiries is on the interpretation of Peirce's attempt to 
offer a proof of pragmatism around 1908. I tend to think the later writings 
often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof borrows by 
way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on 
Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what might have been added to 
the later argument by way of additional premisses.


Are any of the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of 
pragmatism missing in your reconstruction of the later argument? If so, might 
the addition of those premisses make the argument stronger?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 7:14:39 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism

List:

About 18 months ago, I posted my sketch of what Peirce might have had in mind 
for his "proof" of pragmatism using Existential Graphs 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00086.html). Some lively 
exchanges on Twitter over the holiday weekend prompted me to revisit it, and I 
thought that the following slightly updated summary might be of interest. In 
Peirce's terminology, it is in the form of an argument, "any process of thought 
reasonably tending to produce a definite belief," rather than an argumentation, 
"an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 
2:435, 1908). Any feedback or discussion would be welcome, as always.

1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only mode 
of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some stones 
possess the character of hardness."

2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of clearness) 
is the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or 
deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the character of hardness."

3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to individual habits of 
expectation described by indicative judgments--"If this stone possesses the 
character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it will resist 
scratching."

4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of 
clearness) is a general mental habit described by a subjunctive 
conditional--"If I were to rub any diamond with a knife, then it would resist 
scratching."

5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially 
surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub this 
stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it were a diamond, then that 
would be a matter of course."

6. A general mental habit manifests in self-controlled conduct described by a 
practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a relevant intention as 
the minor premiss--"I desire a stone that possesses the character of hardness, 
so I shall obtain a diamond."

Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 
(abduction/retroduction), but #6 (prescription) is the ultimate meaning of an 
intellectual concept in accordance with the maxim of pragmatism as clarified by 
Peirce's various reformulations of it, which I present and discuss in my 
Transactions paper on the subject (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787776). For 
example, consider how he contrasts his view with that of James in the first 
complete draft of his introductory article:

CSP: The most prominent of all our school and the most respected, William 
James, defines pragmatism as the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a concept 
expresses itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or of 
experience to be expected. Between this definition and mine there is certainly 
a slight theoretical divergence ...
These examples bear out James’s definition of pragmatism, which I have never 
denied is true of the logical meaning. My slight objection to it is that it 
seems to be true also of the existential meaning. Intellectual concepts are 
general or derivatives of generals, and therefore their meanings must be 
general. The general forms of psychic action besides concepts themselves are 
desires and habits. Desires are previous to the existential realization, while 
habits result from repeated such realizations. If, in place of James’s 
"experiences to be expected," we substitute the habits which must result from 
those experiences,--must result, I mean, if the defined concept be 
intellectual, but not if it be existential or emotional,--we finally extract, I 
think, the very quintessence of the logical meaning. 
(https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e51310, pp. 4&9, 1907)

Incorporating Peirce's amendment into James's definition, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon AS, Gary R, Phyllis, et al.


Sometimes, such as when I'm done thinking about a philosophical question, I 
look at the time and wonder where it went. I didn't write anything down, and I 
didn't talk to anyone about it. Gary F's question takes the following form:  
are my unuttered thoughts during this period internal sign tokens?


Consider a set of similar cases:


A.  I'm lost in thought, but occasionally muttering to myself. There is no one 
around to hear it, and I'm not even noticing that I'm quietly muttering.


B. I'm lost in thought and sketching a diagram. The diagram is something of a 
mess, and my thoughts are rather confused. I consider several changes that I 
might make, perhaps adding lines here, erasing some there, but I don't make the 
all of the changes considered. After an hour of doodling, I take the sheet of 
paper and throw it away. I don't come back to it later, nor does anyone else 
read it.


Whatever answer we give to your question about internal signs, I think the 
explanations should flow naturally to cover cases A and B. Similarly, the 
explanations should fit variations on A and B where someone else comes along 
and says, "you're muttering" what are you saying and I say "oh it's nothing" 
or, conversely, I reflect and offer an explanation of my thoughts. So, too, for 
the case of the diagram on the piece of paper when someone pulls it out of the 
trash and asks what I was thinking about when making the figure, and I give 
similar responses.


What is clear is that patterns of thought unuttered today may, at some point in 
the future, be uttered. As such, the analysis of those unuttered thoughts 
should account for the future possible forms in which they might be expressed 
verbally, in writing or in some other form of action.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 8:04:29 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,
Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless 
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway 
token furnishes one example.
My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take 
“uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an 
internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, 
specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a 
token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such 
attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so 
that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time 
of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies.
Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not 
even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be 
random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type 
of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor 
in a meaning space. Even a spontaneous 
thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some 
purpose, as all creative artists know.
Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other 
day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument 
(Peirce).
A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not 
necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a 
logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great 
symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element 
of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the 
universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to 
associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed 
in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, 
reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” 
As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those 
beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant.
However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the 
psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of 
purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the 
lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is 
a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we 
would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have conscious 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, JAS, List,


The points made about types and tokens are interesting.


Consider an inductive argument.


  1.  Socrates is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 71.
  2.  Plato is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 80.
  3.  Aristotle is a Greek philosopher, and he died at age 62.
  4.  Therefore, it is probable that most Greek philosophers die before age 100.


In this argument, the philosophers called by the names Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle are all paradigms of token individuals.


What about "most Greek philosophers?" In logical terms, we take a class--Greek 
philosophers--and then we quantify over it. The quantifier, Peirce points out, 
takes many individuals and treats them as a collection. We can, for the 
purposes of expressing the conclusion in the Beta system of the EG, treat that 
collection as an individual having the character of an existing group.


What is the status of the collection when we include the "it is probable that" 
and express the conclusion in the Gamma system of the EG? If we don't restrict 
the group to individuals who lived in the past, but include possible living 
Greek philosophers who have not yet died, then what should we say about "most 
Greek philosophers"? Type or token? General kind or group of particular 
individuals? How about a group that includes future Greek philosophers not yet 
born?


We can, for various purposes, restrict our attention in different ways. This 
is, after all, the function of indices--including the quantifiers employed in 
natural languages.


My suggestion is that we use the formal systems of the EGs as mathematical 
tools for clarifying hypotheses in the philosophical theory of logic. If our 
aim in a critical logic is to give explanations of function of the terms and 
propositions in the argument so as to explain the grounds of the validity of 
the reasoning, then I suspect we'd better take some care to sort out the 
relationships between the quantifiers and modal operators in the inductive 
reasoning.


This kind of concern, I believe, should be controlling when it comes to better 
understanding the classification of different kinds of signs in a theory of 
speculative grammar as types or tokens.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 3:23 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

Gary F., List:

Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative 
grammar is that only an individual embodiment of a sign is a token. 
Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an 
individual organism is properly called a token. Genus and species are both 
types, which correspond to different levels of generality that are at least 
somewhat arbitrary.

Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where they are 
actually written or spoken, and each of those individual instances is governed 
by the general type to which it conforms. However, individual humans are not 
tokens of the type "man" as a word in English, the type "homo" as a word in 
Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as a word in Greek; instead, they are the 
dynamical objects of those signs.

Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is simply 
"sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why the 
ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 9:31 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> 
wrote:
Jon, list,
JAS: I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more consistent with Peirce's 
various taxonomies for sign classification, in which every sign is either a 
type or a token (or a tone). However, mine is grounded in the idea that every 
type can (and usually does) have multiple tokens …
GF: I think the problem here is that the type/token relation, like the 
general/specific relation, can apply to several levels in a hierarchic or 
holarchic classification system, so that the reference is relative to the level 
in the hierarchy. For instance, in biological classification, the genus is type 
and the species is token, but the species is also the type of which an 
individual organism of that species is token (and there can be other levels 
intermediate between those two!).
Likewise when Peirce says that “Man, homo, ἄνθρωπος are the same sign’ (MS 9), 
the “sign” is the type of which the three terms are tokens; but the three terms 
are also types of which individual humans are tokens. And if we use the term 
“individual” in logical strictness, we can say that Philip 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jerry,


Let me offer a brief response to the rhetorical points you make at the end of 
your post. You say:


Jerry R:  I see the answer as being obvious.
Jeff D:  I don't think the answer as to what Peirce's view is concerning the 
real business of the phenomenology is obvious. If it were obvious, intelligent 
people wouldn't have disagreements about the matter.

Jerry R:  We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite?
Jeff D: My aim is to learn how to employ the methods Peirce recommends in 
philosophical inquiry. Given the challenges involved in doing it well, 
especially when it comes to phenomenology, I am often concerned that I 
misunderstand what it is that I'm supposed to be doing at each step in my 
inquiries about any positive question in philosophy. If the questions weren't 
so hard, and if there weren't so many competing hypotheses, things would be 
easier. As it is, I find myself struggling to ensure that I'm on a productive 
track.

Jerry R: For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!
Jeff D:  I'm trying to learn to do it better. It is not clear that I'm doing it 
well.

Jerry R:  And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite?
Jeff D: I don't assume Peirce must be right about how we should practice 
phenomenological inquiry. He is fallible, as am I. Having said that, I've 
studied other methods in philosophy, including those recommended by Plato, 
Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Quine, Goodman, Sellars, van Frassen, etc. Thus 
far, I've found limitations in their methods that are hard to fix. Thus far, 
Peirce's methods seem more promising. Having said that, I'm always looking for 
ways in which the methods I'm using might be refined and improved. I'm fairly 
confident Peirce was moved by the same aim of improving his methods.

Jerry R: For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean 
phenomenologist.
Jeff D: My assumption is that those who are having disagreements on this list 
about how to apply Peircean phenomenology to positive questions in the 
normative sciences and metaphysics are engaged in honest disagreements. The 
fact that we sometimes appear to be working at cross-purposes applying 
pragmaticist methods is something we're trying to sort out by talking it 
through. Otherwise, there is not much hope of learning one from another.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jerry Rhee 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 12:29:50 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide


Dear Jeff, list,


Thank you for making manifest where the disagreement lies.

For it is obvious to me, as it must be for you,

that it is inconsistent to agree with you

and to agree with Gary at the same time,

  -which is asserted by the speaker who says, ’I agree with Gary and Jeff’,

which is what JAS has said,

when you agree with John but disagree with Gary.


“I didn’t presuppose that!”


That is, JAS has said (more or less but not exactly),

“I didn’t presuppose that the main “business" of the Peircean phenomenologist 
when it comes to the practice of applying phenomenology to questions in the 
positive sciences is:


1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of conscious 
human experience.

1) The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the 
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific 
intelligence.”


(for where and when, exactly, does Peirce say this? Please state the reference 
and year)


So then, what needs to be done?

What, here, is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more rigorous

in order to ultimate aim?


I see the answer as being obvious.

We do what Peircean phenomenologist would do, amirite?

For we boast ourselves to be Peircean phenomenologist!

And what we do, as Peircean phenomenologist, must be right, amirite?

For we cannot be at cross-purposes because we are Peircean phenomenologist.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 1:20 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,


Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff."


Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of 
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact 
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I 
may have some disagreements.


At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still 
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more 
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on 
the apparent disagreement?


Let me try to formulate 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon, Gary F, John Sowa, List,


Jon says:  "I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff."


Note that I was agreeing with John Sowa and Richard Smyth about the main 
"business" of the Peircean phenomenologist when it comes to the practice of 
applying phenomenology to questions in the positive sciences. Given the fact 
that Gary was disagreeing with John on this topic, it appears that Gary and I 
may have some disagreements.


At this stage, the question of how our interpretations may differ is still 
somewhat unclear, at least to me. As such, I was inviting Gary F to say more 
about where he disagrees with Sowa (and Smyth and me). Where do you stand on 
the apparent disagreement?


Let me try to formulate the disagreement in clearer terms. When it comes to 
aims of Peirce's phenomenology one might hold that:


  1.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to build a theory of 
conscious human experience. The many aspects of consciousness are particularly 
puzzling, so we need phenomenology as a grounding theory for explanations of 
consciousness.
  2.  The primary goal of Peircean phenomenology is to give an account of the 
elemental features of experience--as may be shared by any sort of scientific 
intelligence. An account of the elemental features in experience--both material 
and formal--will be helpful for the practice of analyzing scientific 
observations of any sort of phenomena. Better analyses of the phenomena that 
are part of our common experience will be important for philosophical inquiry 
because we are highly prone to observational error in philosophy, and we are 
often at a loss as to how to make measurements of these phenomena and how to 
formulate plausible explanations. Most importantly, an account of the elemental 
forms of experience will put us in a better position to frame scientific 
questions and more clearly comprehend the space of possible hypothetical 
explanations. As such, a Peircean phenomenology will be similarly helpful in 
the special sciences, especially where there are disputes about (1) the proper 
forms of measurement of the phenomena and/or (2) the plausibility of various 
hypotheses.


Consider the subtitle of Richard Atkin's recent work on Peirce's phenomenology:


Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Charles S. Peirce's Phenomenology: Analysis and 
Consciousness. Oxford University Press, 2018.


The subtitle might lead one to think that (1) is the right approach to 
understanding the business of doing phenomenology. As such, the main advantage 
of getting the right theory of phenomenology is that we will then be able to 
formulate better metaphysical explanations of human consciousness. As I've 
indicated earlier, I think this approach is based on a misunderstanding of 
Peirce's phenomenology. I do not mean to suggest that Richard Atkins is 
committed to (1) and rejects (2). I'll let him speak for himself.


Having said that, I have yet to see an explanation of Peirce's phenomenology 
that does what I think needs to be done--which is to provide an adequate 
account of how an analysis of the elemental features of experience will enable 
scientific inquirers better to identify and correct for observational errors, 
frame questions, conceive of the space of possible hypotheses, develop informal 
diagrams, determine appropriate forms of measurement for given phenomena, and 
articulate formal mathematical models for competing hypotheses.


All of this is part of what is necessary to make philosophical inquiry more 
rigorous--i.e., mathematical as a science.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 10:35 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

John, Edwina, List:

ET (to JFS): Thank you for this outline - and I totally agree.

I agree with the responses this morning by both Gary F. and Jeff. As in the 
case of pure mathematics, Peirce's phenomenology/phaneroscopy is a distinct 
science in its own right, with its own purposes and subject matter, and must be 
carefully distinguished from its applications within the other positive 
sciences, including logic as semeiotic, metaphysics, and the special sciences.

ET: I think it's a key comment - to differentiate the subject matter of a 
science from the agent-who-works with that subject.

Just to clarify, where Peirce states that the mathematician frames a pure 
hypothesis and draws necessary conclusions from it without inquiring or caring 
whether it agrees with the actual facts or not, I understand him to be 
primarily talking about the subject matter rather than the agent-who-works. In 
other words, "mathematician" here simply means "practitioner of (pure) 
mathematics." Someone who does inquire and care about such things might be a 
self-described 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, John S, List


It is worth noting that Richard Smyth, who is a respected Peirce scholar, makes 
the same point in his monograph Reading Peirce Reading that John S has raised. 
In fact, he points out that the distinction between the phenomenological and 
nomological phases of inquiry was fairly well established in the sciences of 
physics and astronomy, and that Peirce may have been influenced by Herschel's 
phenomenological work in astronomy.


For my part, I think the point is important for understanding the business of 
the Peircean phenomenologist--especially when it comes to the application of 
the "pure" theory of the formal elements in experience to scientific questions 
in the normative sciences, metaphysics and the special sciences.


The main difference between the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic and 
the idioscopic sciences is that the former is focused on the analysis of 
observations made as part of our common experience, while the latter is focused 
on specialized observations that are often made with tools such as telescopes 
and microscopes. As Peirce notes, the fact that we are so familiar with common 
experience makes the practice of phenomenology in the cenoscopic sciences 
especially difficulty. This is due to the fact that we wear glasses colored by 
deeper assumptions, and it can be quite challenging to see the phenomena 
afresh--with the eyes of an artist.


In both cases, the practice of phenomenology is done for the sake of making 
more exact analyses of observations of reproducible phenomena--which is done 
for the sake of identifying and correcting for observational errors, 
determining the appropriate form of measurement, framing questions, developing 
informal diagrams of the problems, formulating competing hypotheses, 
articulating formal models, etc. Figuring out what might gained from the more 
exact analyses of the phenomena that have been observed for the sake of these 
abductive activities is no small feat.


That, at least, is what I see Peirce doing over and over again in his inquiries 
in logic, metaphysics. He often begins by pointing out that other philosophers 
have been mislead by an inadequate analysis of the phenomena in question--or 
have failed to pay attention to features in our experience that are clearly 
relevant to the question at hand.


Yours,


Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, August 30, 2021 5:26:00 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in reference 
to “The division of any science which is concerned with the description and 
classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or theoretical 
explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionary cites both Whewell and Hamilton as 
using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not surprise me 
if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a 
non-philosophical context.
I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 on 
referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a close 
reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference to a 
science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides a 
formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of the 
phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this science to 
“phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of that he was 
referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most primal of all the 
positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to change your mind, 
certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have to accept that what 
you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I refer to by those 
terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or when I am using 
them in any philosophical context.
I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. We 
are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some issues 
to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide


Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

wise there is no 
basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus serves as 
a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and reasoning, or between 
perception and conception. But if we take this as a boundary between 
unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary in the sense that (according to 
synechism) there is no real discontinuity between the two.
I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining why I don’t see 
a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say in response to it.
Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34


Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,



Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and 
account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on 
consciousness.



The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and 
techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. 
Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to 
develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.



Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising 
observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the 
logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.



Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms 
of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does 
phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias 
and prejudice?



If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, 
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry.



Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious 
experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias 
and prejudice that might shape our experience?



--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,


Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and 
account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on 
consciousness.


The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and 
techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. 
Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to 
develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.


Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising 
observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the 
logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.


Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms 
of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does 
phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias 
and prejudice?


If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, 
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry.


Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious 
experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias 
and prejudice that might shape our experience?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Gary F., List

So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a 
metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is 
triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? 
From Wikipedia "phenomenology":

"Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, 
phenomenology is, in essence, 
anti-reductionistic; the reductions 
are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, 
not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions."

So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they 
just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is 
phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected?

Best,
Helmut



 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or 
“seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The 
phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why 
percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for 
phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In 
phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some 
monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the 
three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Gary F., List

You wrote:
"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt 
whatever that what appears, appears.".

I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different 
points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible 
to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal 
reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the 
system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to 
serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this 
intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and 
can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares 
relations, is structurally coupled).

Best,
Helmut

 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Multi-value logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


On its face, the claim that "Every aspect of EG (as well as GrIn and SG) is 
triadic" sounds like an overgeneralization.


Insofar as an argument is represented in the system, it has the character of a 
thoroughly genuine triadic relation. Having said that, some of the signs 
scribed on a sheet of assertion represent monadic and dyadic relations.


Given the efforts Peirce has devoted to the study of dyadic relations in 
two-valued extensional systems of first intention, it should be pretty obvious 
that they play a similarly important role in higher-order logics such as the 
gamma system of the EG's.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2021 7:30:40 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Multi-value logic

Edwina, John, List:

Every aspect of EG (as well as GrIn and SG) is triadic. The sheet is triadic 
because there is always room to attach another graph-instance, a disjunction 
scroll is triadic because there is always room to add another inner close, an 
implication scroll is triadic because it mediates between the antecedent and 
the consequent, a line of identity is triadic because there is always room to 
add another branch connected with a name, a name is triadic because it 
symbolically represents a general concept, and the illative permissions are 
triadic because they correspond to rules of inference.

As for the modes of being, possibility (1-1) corresponds to an unattached name, 
inherence (2-1) to a line of identity attached to one name, existence (2-2) to 
different graph-instances on the sheet, diversity (3-1) to the continuous range 
of meanings associated with each name, persistence (3-2) to the continuity of 
each line of identity, and reality (3-3) to the continuity of the sheet itself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 11:07 AM Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

John, list

I'm not sure about this; don't the models [and graphs are, after all, models], 
have to show and explain Peircean semiosis - which is triadic?

After all, semiosis is all about Mind-as-Matter, and the three categories in 
both their genuine and degenerate modes are vital to this process. So, don't 
the logical models have to show, for example, the mediation provided by 
Thirdness - and this includes all three modes of Thirdness [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] -  
as well as show the border fuzziness of a mode such as 2-1?

Edwina

On Tue 16/02/21 11:45 PM , "John F. Sowa" 
s...@bestweb.net sent:

Edwina,

I agree with the points you made, but they could be stated in classical 
first-order logic.  Peirce's EGs, for example, are a version of two-valued 
logic {T, F} with no middle term.,

A typical example of three-valued logic would have values such as {True, 
Unknown, False}.  A five-valued logic might have values like {certainly true, 
true by default, unknown, false by default, certainly false}.

This issue is orthogonal to the issues about 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.  Peirce's EGs are 
very well suited to representing those categories.

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing Abduction in the EG

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John Sowa, List,


Thanks, that is helpful.


I agree that one can translate imperatives into declaratives for the sake of 
expressing them in a formal system. That is necessary when working with formal 
systems of logic--such as a first-order predicate logic with quantifiers--that 
lack the expressive resources needed properly to distinguish between 
interrogatives, imperatives, declaratives, and the like.


As you recommend, the first step in understanding the toothbrush icon is to 
start with the arguments, expressed in ordinary language, that we are trying to 
capture. Having done that, we will also need to make comparisons between the 
1903 system of the EG's that makes use of the toothbrush representation and 
later versions that use other syntactic and semantic forms.  Translating from 
one version of the formal system to another may, I hope, also be enlightening.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F. Sowa 
Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2020 9:18:56 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing Abduction in the EG

JBD> Many systems of logic do not have the power to express premisses or 
conclusions that articulate questions or lines of investigation.

General principle for any version of logic:  Restate the questions
as declarative sentences in English that are to be proved or disproved.
For example, Euclid stated his propositions as imperative sentences
about drawing particular kinds of structures.  Those sentences can
be rewritten as declarative sentences that say there exists a structure
with certain properties.  For some discussion of that issue, see
the slides I presented at a Peirce session of an APA conference in
2015:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .  At the bottom of slide #2
is the URL of an article in the Journal of Applied Logics that goes
into much more formal detail.

JBD> What is more, they don't have the ability to express a conclusion
of an abuctive argument as being plausible.

That requires Gamma graphs for representing metalanguage about the logic.
RLT has an example of a Gamma graph for "That you are a good girl is
much to be wished."  Peirce has some examples of metalanguage, but he
didn't develop it in detail.  I discuss some of those issues in a
talk I presented at the European Semantic Web Conference.  For the
slides, see http://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf .

JBD> I am particularly interested in the question of what the "toothbrush"
icon represents and how that logical notion might be better expressed in
later version of the EG.

First step:  State what you think it represents in English.  Then see
whether you can translate that to some version of logic.  You might
find some of the examples in eswc.pdf helpful

John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing Abduction in the EG

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John Sowa, List


I agree with the points you make.


Having said that, abductive inferences involve premisses and conclusions that 
may be expressed as interrogatives and/or investigands. I am particularly 
interested in the question of what the "toothbrush" icon represents and how 
that logical notion might be better expressed in later version of the EG.


Many systems of logic do not have the power to express premisses or conclusions 
that articulate questions or lines of investigation. What is more, they don't 
have the ability to express a conclusion of an abuctive argument as being 
plausible. As such, they are not well suited for the task of analyzing the 
logical character of these signs. The gamma graphs, I take it, are designed to 
remedy these sorts of shortcomings.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F. Sowa 
Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2020 8:27:37 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing Abduction in the EG


Jeff,  All versions of logic, by Peirce and by any logicians before or after 
Peirce, represent propositions.  Induction, abduction, and deduction are 
operations that relate propositions to one another in various ways.  Those 
operations can be performed in equivaent ways with any notation for logic -- or 
even with propositions stated in English or any other language.

JBD> It is an interesting question:  how might one represent abductive 
inferences in the EG?

Short answer:  Peirce stated rules of inference for deduction with EGs.  He 
also wrote a great deal about induction and abduction with examples stated in 
English.  To adapt those examples to EGs, translate the English to EGs and then 
perform the equivalent operations on the EGs.

John
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[PEIRCE-L] Representing Abduction in the EG

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon,


It is an interesting question:  how might one represent abductive inferences in 
the EG? You've probably seen this recent article by Pietarinen and Bellucci.


Bellucci, Francesco, and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. "Icons, interrogations, and 
graphs: On Peirce's integrated notion of abduction." Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society 56, no. 1 (2020): 43-61.


Here is a link:

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/63753139/Bellucci_and_Pietarinen_-_Icons__Interrogations__and_Graphs20200626-32312-6j2rg7.pdf?1593233689==inline%3B+filename%3DIcons_Interrogations_and_Graphs_On_Peirc.pdf=1607912765=W~4TRPayBH63QtHvUiT4vsgcGdWCUbLEawirGXFNzQBOdz2BiZA5fywVQapFo7GOEgRVvGgwyX9WHS8CkHBGgdvo5lRPjac~mZtTm5dwUqPGJP61Z7OFyOSFs8FXAHPP7DyhCnxu~daqvhim6MJ~DqQ51Xf~aD6dW34EQ0LPsqDoF4I8JpCSqSpFIsL2VvcEKFydwX8o4jmAj~jZ9seidDG4ajyKNXX10N0e5N3rX42yLnJuVsXaHF0hdhnAjdjlpPvZwVkH77gkEmgTP5j3p-ocFKguIxzu3NRwIiclTCqbWWs~6TGjoov1Ugmq5jHyolR6waY62K0pWK3Vb-CKog__=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA


When it comes to the question of how abduction might be represented in the EG, 
this seems like a good place to start. One can then go on to ask how the 
"toothbrush" icon that is introduced in 1903 might be more adequately 
represented in the later versions of the gamma system.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, December 13, 2020 4:46 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

List:

I have been thinking about existential graphs again lately and wondering how 
they might be employed to represent abduction, rather than deduction. Peirce 
describes the form of abductive inference as follows.

CSP: The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2:341, 1903)

He elaborates on this a few years later.

CSP: Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or 
another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some experience 
which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of 
expectation ... . The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all 
their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be 
resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible 
Explanation,--by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as 
necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with 
the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this 
Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with 
favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible" ... (CP 
6.469, EP 2:441, 1908)

Hence abduction is "reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (ibid) or 
reasoning from conclusion to premisses--i.e., reasoning backwards, which is why 
Peirce ultimately prefers to call it retroduction. Accordingly, in EGs we can 
scribe any true proposition on the sheet of assertion--such as a surprising 
fact (C)--and "scroll" it so that it becomes the consequent of a conditional 
(in the inner close), then insert any proposition whatsoever (A) as the 
hypothetical antecedent (in the outer close). Since C is true and we have 
complied with the transformation rules, the resulting consequence (if A then C) 
cannot be false no matter what we choose for A. But does this entail that it is 
true?

On the contrary, as with intuitionistic logic, excluded middle does not hold in 
such a case. Given that C is true, we only have reason to suspect that A is 
true if C follows from A as a matter of course. In other words, the 
plausibility of A as an explanation of C relies on there being a rational 
sequence from A to C. This requirement is obscured in classical deductive 
logic, "completely hidden behind the superfluous machinery which is introduced 
in order to give an appearance of symmetry to logical law" (R 490:29, CP 4.581, 
1906), by treating "if A then C" as equivalent to "not-(A and not-C)" or "not-A 
or C"--i.e., a scroll as equivalent to nested cuts or a shaded area enclosing 
an unshaded area--because the latter formulations are always true as long as C 
is true.

CSP: The second failure of Selectives to be as analytical as possible lies in 
their encouraging the idea that negation, or denial, is a relatively simple 
concept, and that the concept of Consequence, is a special composite of two 
negations, so that to say, “If in the actual state of things A is true, then B 
is true,” is correctly analyzed as the assertion, “It is false to say that A is 
true while B is false.” I fully acknowledge that, for most purposes and in a 
preliminary explanation, the error of this analysis is altogether 
insignificant. But when we come to the first analysis the inaccuracy must not 
be passed 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Reading Peirce Reading Others

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

principle. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06=294=principle)

There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from 
Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th.

CSP:  2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way 
ultimately determined or regulated. ...
"Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which 
Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, 
or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which 
something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original 
element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, 
principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations

Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something 
else depends," such as "an original law."  The 4th sense similarly defines it 
as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived."  The 
5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded 
middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it 
is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system."  In any case, 
Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the 
contrary ...

JD:  Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term.

CSP:  3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain 
phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule 
to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain 
class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which 
events really tend to conform. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04=705=law)

It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a 
representation.  He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all 
things ... conform, precisely and without exception."  As I said before, 
excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless.

JD:  Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly 
employs the Kantian distinction.

Where do you see such a distinction in that passage?  The only mention of the 
word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an 
explanation.  Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative 
principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his 
description of the principle of excluded middle as a hope rather than a law in 
what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii.

JD:  At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by 
reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's 
saying.

I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is 
necessary.  Surely it is not a requirement for anyone who wants to understand 
Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read everything that he was reading at the 
time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings.  And would we 
not then also need to read whatever all those other authors were reading when 
they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what they were saying?  And 
so on, ad infinitum.

On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being 
understood on his/her own terms.  As Gary Fuhrman once 
summarized<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html>, "I 
assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he 
means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List,

Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction 
between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of 
the term "principle" is instructive on this point. See the 4th and 5th senses 
and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. Compare that the 3rd 
sense of "law" in his definition of the term.

Here is a famous passage where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian 
distinction. It is especially pertinent to the passage you've quoted:

But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and 
logic forbids us to assume in regard to any give

[PEIRCE-L] Reading Peirce Reading Others

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

 founded, or from which others are 
derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In 
mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. 
...
5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; 
one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of 
the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, 
equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06=294=principle)

There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from 
Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th.

CSP:  2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way 
ultimately determined or regulated. ...
"Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which 
Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, 
or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which 
something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original 
element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, 
principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations

Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something 
else depends," such as "an original law."  The 4th sense similarly defines it 
as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived."  The 
5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded 
middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it 
is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system."  In any case, 
Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the 
contrary ...

JD:  Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term.

CSP:  3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain 
phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule 
to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain 
class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which 
events really tend to conform. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04=705=law)

It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a 
representation.  He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all 
things ... conform, precisely and without exception."  As I said before, 
excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless.

JD:  Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly 
employs the Kantian distinction.

Where do you see such a distinction in that passage?  The only mention of the 
word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an 
explanation.  Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative 
principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his 
description of the principle of excluded middle as a hope rather than a law in 
what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii.

JD:  At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by 
reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's 
saying.

I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is 
necessary.  Surely it is not a requirement for anyone who wants to understand 
Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read everything that he was reading at the 
time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings.  And would we 
not then also need to read whatever all those other authors were reading when 
they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what they were saying?  And 
so on, ad infinitum.

On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being 
understood on his/her own terms.  As Gary Fuhrman once 
summarized<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html>, "I 
assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he 
means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List,

Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction 
between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of 
the term "princip

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

 that helps.

--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 6:36:03 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and 
final version of EGs)

Jeff, List:

JAS:  In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely 
exceptionless law (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically 
prefers to call it a principle instead.

JD:  On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences 
between principles and laws.

Here is the passage by Peirce that I cited but did not quote.

CSP:  Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to 
hope some definite answer to it may be true. That hope with reference to each 
case as it comes up is, by a saltus, stated by logicians as a law concerning 
all cases, namely, the law of excluded middle. This law amounts to saying that 
the universe has a perfect reality. (NEM 4:xiii, no date)

Logicians typically treat excluded middle "as a law concerning all cases," but 
Peirce recognizes that this is "a saltus" (leap) grounded in the regulative 
hope that every question has a definite answer, which is only true if "the 
universe has a perfect reality."  Eisele references R 140, but this excerpt 
does not actually appear in that manuscript, and Robert Lane states in Peirce 
on Realism and Idealism, "I have not been able to identify its actual source" 
(p. 179 n. 17).

As far as I know, it is the only place in Peirce's vast corpus where he uses 
"law of excluded middle," although he discusses the "law of excluded third" as 
one of "the three fundamental laws of logic" according to "Boole's system" in a 
very early manuscript (NEM 3:316-318, 1865-6).  By contrast, "law of 
contradiction" appears five times in CP and is affirmed as such in each 
instance.

JD:  According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs 
the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an 
argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law.

To clarify, are you claiming that this was Peirce's view of the relationship 
between principles and laws, or suggesting that it is how we should distinguish 
them?  If the former, what specific passages in Peirce's writings do you 
interpret as endorsing such a view?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Aug 5, 2020 at 11:09 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon Schmidt, List,

I'd like to take up the distinction between principles and laws.

Jon S:  "In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely 
exceptionless law (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically 
prefers to call it a principle instead."

On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences 
between principles and laws. I think Peirce makes the following sort of 
distinction between the two. Consider the following argument, which is from the 
second section of Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals:

Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has 
the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in 
accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the 
derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical 
reason. (Ak 412)

According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs the 
relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an 
argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law.

A logic utens consists of the habits of inference that embody such principles. 
Those principles are subject to criticism precisely because they may not match 
up with the laws of logic themselves. The purpose of a philosophical theory of 
logic (i.e., a logica docens) is to build on the criticism of our common sense 
principles for the sake of arriving at a more adequate theoretical 
representation of the truth concerning the real laws that govern the logical 
relations between such facts.

As such, we can distinguish between the principles embodied in our logica utens 
and the principles embodied in a philosophical theory of logic--and either or 
both of these may deviate in some respects from the real laws of logic.

This distinction is at the root of the classification of genuine triadic 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my

[PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon Schmidt, List,


I'd like to take up the distinction between principles and laws.


Jon S:  "In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely 
exceptionless law (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically 
prefers to call it a principle instead."


On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences 
between principles and laws. I think Peirce makes the following sort of 
distinction between the two. Consider the following argument, which is from the 
second section of Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals:


Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has 
the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in 
accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the 
derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical 
reason. (Ak 412)


According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs the 
relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an 
argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law.


A logic utens consists of the habits of inference that embody such principles. 
Those principles are subject to criticism precisely because they may not match 
up with the laws of logic themselves. The purpose of a philosophical theory of 
logic (i.e., a logica docens) is to build on the criticism of our common sense 
principles for the sake of arriving at a more adequate theoretical 
representation of the truth concerning the real laws that govern the logical 
relations between such facts.


As such, we can distinguish between the principles embodied in our logica utens 
and the principles embodied in a philosophical theory of logic--and either or 
both of these may deviate in some respects from the real laws of logic.


This distinction is at the root of the classification of genuine triadic 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories 
from within". In this classificatory scheme, the laws of logic function as laws 
of fact insofar as they govern those facts directly, and they are in a 
genuinely triadic relation to the actual facts and those that are possible 
(i.e., in the future).


The principles of logic, on the other hand, function as symbolic 
representations that govern the self-controlled growth of our understanding. 
The principles of logic, Peirce points out, do not govern brute facts with mere 
necessity. Rather, they function as imperatives that dictate how we ought to 
think. As such, the principles of logic differ from the laws of logic insofar 
as they are in thoroughly genuine triadic relations to the premisses and 
conclusions that are part of our inquiries. The principles that govern our 
deductive inferences are capable of growth even if the laws of deductive logic 
are, in some sense, necessary laws.


Yours,


Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, August 4, 2020 6:59 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; ahti-veikko.pietari...@ttu.ee; 
francesco.belluc...@unibo.it; cdw...@iupui.edu; martin.irv...@georgetown.edu; 
Gary Richmond
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and 
final version of EGs)

John, All:

JFS:  I sent a complete analysis of these issues to you and others on the CC 
list.

Any analysis of these issues that treats cuts/shading as primitive in EGs, 
rather than derived from the scroll, is incomplete.  Peirce himself never 
claims in R 670 or in RL 231 to be giving a complete analysis or explanation of 
EGs.

JFS:  In response to the other comments in your recent note, I'll reply with a 
copy of Peirce's comments about scrolls in L231:  "  ", AKA silence.

An argument from silence is always logically weak, in this case especially so 
since Peirce elsewhere explicitly denies that a consequence is a composite of 
two negations and explicitly derives the cut from the scroll with a blackened 
inner close.  Again, I am not at all questioning the value of shading as a 
simpler and more iconic improvement over thin lines for representing these 
relations.  In fact, according to what seems to be Peirce's very first 
introduction of shading in EGs ("blue tint"), written five years earlier than R 
670 and RL 231, it is precisely what revealed to him that "if A then B" is not 
strictly equivalent to "not (A and not-B)."

CSP:  But I had better tell you that practically, I content myself with 
performing these cuts in my imagination, merely drawing a light line to 
represent the cut. The blue tint, however, of the area within the cut is a 
great aid to the understanding. How great I have only recently discovered. ...
The new discovery, which sheds such a light is simply that, as the main part of 
the sheet 

Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, List,


It might be helpful to make a clearer distinction between what is advantageous 
for the purposes of developing the EGs as a formal system of mathematical logic 
and what is advantageous for the purposes of developing theories of 
philosophical logic.


For the sake of illustrating the importance of the distinction, let me take up 
the following assertion


Jon Schmidt:  "Hence I continue to maintain that the cut for negation must be 
derived from the scroll for consequence with a blackened inner close, rather 
than treated as a primitive, even when shading is employed instead."


For the purposes of developing systems of mathematical logic, the logician can 
adopt various starting points in setting up the logical grammar for a given 
system. In symbolic systems, the rules determine what does and does not count 
as a well-formed-formula. The same holds in the case of the EGs. The 
grammatical rules determine what counts as a well-formed-graph.


Given all the work he has done on the symbolic systems of logic, Peirce sees 
that there are a number of different ways of setting up the grammatical rules 
that will, when taken together with the rules of inference and transformation, 
yield consistent results. For the sake of the EGs considered as a formal 
system, the scroll and two nested circles are logically equivalent. What is 
more, it makes no difference for the beta graphs whether the scroll (used to 
represent the conditional) or a shaded area within a boundary (used to 
represent negation) is taken as "primitive" in one sense or another.


Having said that, I do think there is a special philosophical significance that 
Peirce attaches to the scroll as a representation of the conditional. I do not 
think that it is mere artifact of his early explorations of the graphs. As 
Peirce points out, the graphs can be used to express any sort of proposition. 
As such, they can be put to use in philosophical inquiry for the sake of 
analyzing the logical relationships between any set of premisses and 
conclusions.


For the sake of giving a deeper philosophical analysis of the different classes 
of arguments we need to apply the EGs to the problem of analyzing synthetic 
forms of inference. In doing so, it will be helpful to have a variety of 
different icons that can be used to study the grounds of the validity of 
inductive and abductive inference. (MS 296, 499)


As far as I can see, the scroll is a special kind of iconic sign because it 
expresses the continuity in the relationship between antecedent and consequent 
of the conditional, and this mirrors the continuity in the relationship between 
premisses and conclusions in an argument. In the case of inductive and 
abductive inferences, the conditionals may take a variety of forms:  epistemic, 
alethetic, deontic, etc. In each of these cases, the topological character of 
the relations may vary.


Based on my own inquiries using the graphs to analyze these forms of inference, 
thinking about the relationship between the scroll and the shaded area 
representing negation has been a fruitful endeavor. It is possible that it has 
been fruitful given the fact that I am still at an early point in my 
application of the graphs to these problems of critical logic.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 7:06:34 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Cc: ahti-veikko.pietari...@ttu.ee; francesco.belluc...@unibo.it; 
cdw...@iupui.edu; martin.irv...@georgetown.edu; Gary Richmond
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and 
final version of EGs)

John, All, List:

With your permission given below, I am posting this reply on Peirce-L.  Anyone 
is obviously still free to respond off-List if that is preferred.

JFS:  The theory of EGs that Peirce presented in L231 (which I have been 
calling eg1911) is the one he wished Lady Welby and her group to consider his 
last and best version of EGs.

This claim is a plausible interpretative hypothesis based on the circumstances 
and timing of the letter, but it should be acknowledged that the text itself 
does not state or imply any such specific intention on Peirce's part.

JFS:  Some readers might be misled by Peirce's earlier writings to think that 
there is some "deeper" meaning that is not expressed by a nest of two ovals.

Such an impression is not misleading at all, since Peirce explicitly denies 
that a consequence (scroll) is strictly equivalent to a composite of two 
negations (nested cuts).  I already quoted the following passage in one of my 
Peirce-L posts, but it is worth repeating.

CSP:  The second failure of Selectives to be as analytical as possible lies in 
their encouraging the idea that negation, or denial, is a relatively simple 
concept, and that the concept of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Topical Continuum

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon Schmidt, List,


Congratulations on the publication of the paper. Here are some initial 
questions.


  1.  In the opening pages of his discussion of continuity in the last 
Cambridge Conferences lecture published in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 
Peirce distinguishes between the task of arriving at a conception of continuity 
adequate for mathematical inquiry and arriving at a conception adequate for 
philosophical inquiry. As he points out, once we have arrived at the former, 
that is where the real difficulties begin. Having read through your article, 
most of what you say pertains to the mathematical conception of continuity. Are 
you focusing on a definition adequate for a mathematical conception of 
continuity? Or, do you take yourself to have offered a definition of continuity 
that is adequate for philosophical inquiry in phenomenology, the normative 
sciences and metaphysics--as well as for mathematics?
  2.  At the end, you compare the components of your definition of continuity 
to the list of components provided by Fernando Zalamea. Much to my surprise, 
you brush aside the differences by saying Zalamea uses terms not found in 
Peirce's writings and that many of the conceptions he employs are only familiar 
to working mathematicians. If the aim is to provide an account of continuity 
that is adequate for inquiry in mathematics, then it would have made sense to 
compare the competing accounts and to engage in a discussion with what Zalamea 
says.
  3.  On its face, I find your suggestion that Zalamea uses terms not found in 
Peirce's texts to be puzzling. Let me focus on two components of his account 
that are not found in your list:  genericity and modality. Is there some reason 
that you've set genericity and modality to the side in your account?
  4.  In your discussion, you refer to Peirce's writings on topology, and you 
focus on the language used in the Articles set forth in the chapter on topics 
in the New Elements of Mathematics. One of the very first points that Peirce 
highlights in italics is the importance of generation--e.g., the process of 
generating something such as a continuous line. That is the conception Zalamea 
is focusing on under the heading genericity.
  5.  One of the later manuscripts you consider is on the EGs. As the 
distinction between the beta and gamma graphs highlights, modality is central 
in his own work in mathematical logic.
  6.  Let me take a step back from the details and focus on a larger question. 
What is needed for an adequate analysis of the concept of continuity? One way 
of coming at the matter is to provide a definition that will, as they say, 
stand the test of time. Another way of coming at the matter is to provide an 
account that is adequate for the time being. My sense is that you are looking 
for the former. In my view, Peirce is offering an account that is more limited: 
 i.e., it is meant to be adequate for mathematical inquiry and practice up to 
his time.
  7.  The future of mathematics is hard to see--even for the best of 
mathematicians. As such, he is surveying the most important ideas that have 
surfaced in mathematical inquiry ranging from the classical writings of Euclid 
right up to the 19th-century writings of Gauss and Riemann, and he is trying to 
identify the most important components in the current conception of continuity 
as it has arisen in the research of mathematicians working in areas 
including--but not limited to--topology, calculus and mathematical logic.
  8.  In the last lecture of RLT, Peirce provides a quick historical survey of 
modern work in topology (e.g., Möbius), projective geometry (e.g., Desargues, 
Poncelet), metrical geometries (e.g., Riemann and Lobochevsky) and group theory 
(e.g., Cayley and Klein). It will be difficult to see whether or not one 
definition of continuity or another (e.g., yours or Zalamea's) is adequate for 
these different areas without digging into paradigmatic examples of 
mathematical reasoning--as Peirce does time and again.
  9.  As far as I can see, Zalamea is following Peirce's lead. That is, he is 
drawing on Peirce for the sake of developing an account of continuity that is 
adequate for the additional work in mathematics that has been done in the 20th 
century--and he is pointing out that Peirce was remarkably prescient in his 
philosophical analysis of the mathematical conception--as recent work in 
category and topos theory shows.
  10. In the concluding remarks, you claim that the thick account you provide 
is more faithful to the common notion of continuity. Our common-sense notion is 
something Peirce turns to as a starting point for philosophical inquiry. As 
Peirce says in the passage you cite, Kant's basic idea is a pretty good 
starting point as far as our common notion goes. As such, it looks to me like 
you may be moving the target. Instead of starting and ending with a discussion 
of what is needed for an adequate definition of continuity for the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, List,


Jeff D:  If you substitute "texts" for "facts", as you have suggested, how does 
that constrain the inquiries?

Jon Schmidt:  Again, I suggest that it constrains the inquiries to discerning 
the author's intended meaning as expressed in the texts themselves.  At this 
stage, we are only seeking to ascertain what Peirce's actual views were as 
communicated by his writings, not assessing whether they are correct.

JD:  Readers need to carry out the inquiries themselves and then check to see 
if they arrive at the same result. Carrying out these inquiries seems to 
involve facts that go beyond the words written on the pages.

Jon S:  I agree, but I see it as a subsequent step.  First we test our 
interpretative hypotheses against "the words written on the pages" in a 
good-faith effort to make sure that we have properly understood them.  Then we 
test them against reality by conducting our own inquiries along the same lines.

Jeff D:  I disagree with the suggestion that it should be a two-step process. 
Let me distinguish the following questions we can ask as readers of Peirce's 
writings:


  1.   How should we interpret a given text?
  2.  How should we understand the methods Peirce is employing in his inquiries?

For my part, I think that we should try to understand and employ Peirce's 
methods at the same time we are reading the texts. That is, (1) and (2) go hand 
in hand. You really can't make much headway on (1) without considering how 
Peirce is using experimental methods to push inquiry forward. Often, the 
arguments he offers in the texts are really just signposts that he is offering 
readers in the hope that we will be able to follow his lines of inquiry.

In many cases, I find that Peirce is moving so fast and covering so much ground 
that the only way to fill in the gaps is to carry out the inquiries 
myself--drawing on his instructions and suggestions offered in other texts. If 
I am not inquiring myself about the same questions he is asking using the same 
methods he is employing, I often entirely fail to follow the directions 
contained in those signposts. In such cases, I have to start again in order to 
figure out where I lost the thread.

In your response, you seem to have fastened on the following question, which I 
think is quite different from (2) above:  Are the results that Peirce arrived 
at using those methods correct, or do we arrive at different results when using 
the same methods to address the same questions? Even here, we can ask this 
question in a modest fashion by using this approach as a check on our use of 
his methods. If I arrive at a different result, then I take it as an indication 
that I've misunderstood or misapplied his methods.

Having said that, I do take myself to be capable of engaging in my own 
inquiries using these methods, and I find it interesting when I arrive at a 
different result. What is more, one can ask if Peirce is using the right 
methods. Where we have doubts about his methods or results that persist, it is 
only natural to ask how might we improve on those methods in a manner that is 
consonant with the aim of seeking the truth about what is really the case. 
Whenever I head down this track on the List, I try to clarify what I'm doing by 
spelling out where my methods or results differ from Peirce's.

Yours,

Jeff D


On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 11:43 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, List,

The illustration I offer can be made clearer by examining Newton's 
interpretation of Galileo's experiments involving the acceleration of balls 
rolling down inclined planes as compared to the parabolic motion of a 
projectile.

If you are interested in reading Newton's works and examining his methods for 
formulating and testing hypotheses, then I recommend the Newton Project, which 
has the aim of transcribing all of his written works including his notebooks:

http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/texts/newtons-works/scientific?n=25=Science=1=1=date=asc

The Newton project has been a model for the SPIN project--the main difference 
is that the latter is crowdsourcing the transcription of Peirce's 
manuscriptions.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2020 8:20:10 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation

Jon S, List

How does the method you are employing compare to the methods articulated in 
"The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents"?

If you substitute "texts" for "facts", as you have suggested, how does that 
constrain the inquiries? Let me offer an example. If my aim is to interpret 
Peirce's writings on the study of gravity, then one thing I might do is to 
recreate his experiments by going out and swi

Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


The illustration I offer can be made clearer by examining Newton's 
interpretation of Galileo's experiments involving the acceleration of balls 
rolling down inclined planes as compared to the parabolic motion of a 
projectile.


If you are interested in reading Newton's works and examining his methods for 
formulating and testing hypotheses, then I recommend the Newton Project, which 
has the aim of transcribing all of his written works including his notebooks:


http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/texts/newtons-works/scientific?n=25=Science=1=1=date=asc


The Newton project has been a model for the SPIN project--the main difference 
is that the latter is crowdsourcing the transcription of Peirce's 
manuscriptions.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2020 8:20:10 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation


Jon S, List


How does the method you are employing compare to the methods articulated in 
"The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents"?


If you substitute "texts" for "facts", as you have suggested, how does that 
constrain the inquiries? Let me offer an example. If my aim is to interpret 
Peirce's writings on the study of gravity, then one thing I might do is to 
recreate his experiments by going out and swinging pendulums in the same 
locations--and then comparing my data, calculations and inferences to his.


This approach to reading important texts in the history of science has been 
adopted by schools such as St. John's, where students learn to understand 
Newton's inquiries and theories by building an experimental apparatus--such as 
the one Galileo used for rolling balls down an inclined plane--and by then 
making the measurements for themselves. Having done so, they then draw out the 
conclusions from those measurements and compare their results to Newton's.


In a number of places, Peirce says that something similar must be done to 
understand his inquiries in philosophy. Readers need to carry out the inquiries 
themselves and then check to see if they arrive at the same result. Carrying 
out these inquiries seems to involve facts that go beyond the words written on 
the pages.


--Jeff





Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2020 5:45:46 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation

List:

As outlined in my previous post, my method of interpreting Peirce's writings is 
retroductive rather than deductive, producing fallible but plausible hypotheses 
that attempt to explain the accompanying excerpts.  How should we go about 
assessing whether they are successful?  Consider another passage from the same 
discarded draft of his seventh 1903 Harvard Lecture, "Pragmatism as the Logic 
of Abduction," that I quoted last time.

CSP:  If it is to be good as an abduction it must subserve the end of 
abduction. Now the end of abduction is that the deductive consequences of it 
may be tested by induction. So alone is any application made of its essential 
anticipatory character. Consequently the good of abduction, as such, that is, 
its adaptation to its end, will consist of its being of such a character that 
its deductive consequences may be experimentally tested. (EP 2:532n12)

As I have said before, inductive evaluation of a proposed interpretation can 
only proceed by explicating its "deductive consequences" and then comparing 
them with what Peirce actually wrote in the texts themselves, including 
(wherever possible) others that were not part of the particular "mass" that 
prompted the initial flash of insight.  I do not stop reading and studying once 
I have come up with an interpretation, treating it as if it were a settled 
matter.  On the contrary, I keep looking for both confirming and disconfirming 
evidence, especially as additional texts come to light--in 
manuscript<https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php> 
images<https://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16>, in new 
volumes like Pietarinen's<https://books.google.com/books?id=IUnSDwAAQBAJ> and 
Bellucci's<https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/539483>, and in the secondary 
literature.

For me, the overall goal of interpretation is discerning the author's intended 
meaning as expressed in the text.  The second part of this is key, since the 
text itself is often the only objective basis for discerning what the author 
had in mind when composing it.  In semeiotic terms, we aim to translate the 
immediate interpretant (as written) into a dynamical interpretant (as actually 
understood) that closely approximates th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The sciences: mathematical and classificatory

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, Robert, Jon A, List,


Here are a few questions about the philosophical import of the mathematics of 
category theory. I'm hoping that you might have some ideas that would shed some 
light on the matter.


  1.   Category theory represents a class of objects as nodes and then 
connections are made in terms of directed arrows. It has the general aim of 
exploring structure-preserving morphisms within a mathematical system (e.g., a 
topology). Similarly, it can be used to explore maps between different systems 
of objects (e.g., between sets and groups). In these two respects, category 
theory bears a striking resemblance to the system of representations and 
resulting analysis developed by A.B Kempe in his A Memoir of the Theory of 
Mathematical Form. The upshot of both systems is that they enable the user to 
study the composition and decomposition of relations within and between 
virtually any mathematical system. Do you find the similarities between 
contemporary category theory and Kempe's system similarly striking?
  2.  Peirce was much impressed with the depth of the Kempe's insights into the 
formal features that are essential for inquiry in any area of mathematics. At 
this same time, he thought that Kempe's analyses fell short in a number of 
respects. One shortcoming was the result of treating objects as nodes that are 
connected by several arrows. This mirrors a central feature of Euler's graph 
theory. Peirce raises an objection that this does not provide the resources 
needed to analyze objects that are connected by three or more arrows in Kempe's 
systems. Peirce thought that the introduction of a branching relation that is 
inherently triadic in character might help to remedy this shortcoming. Do any 
of Peirce's objections apply both to Kempe's analysis of mathematical form and 
to contemporary category theory?
  3.  One of the striking features of category theory is that it enables the 
user to compare the structural features of wildly different types of 
mathematical systems. As such, systems that are infinite and continuous can be 
compared directly with systems that finite and discrete. Given Peirce's 
classification of these different kinds of mathematical systems, where does 
category theory itself fall? In particular, does the category of categories 
(i.e., the application of the theory to itself) belong to the part of 
mathematics that studies infinite and continuous systems, or does it belong to 
the study of systems that are finite and discrete, or does it fall somewhere in 
the middle?

Yours,

Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F. Sowa 
Sent: Friday, May 29, 2020 6:19:48 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The sciences: mathematical and classificatory


Robert and Jon,

I was browsing through and deleting some old email, and I came across the 
points quoted below.  I also remember that Jon claimed that Peirce's word 
'classificatory' for normative science made it sound trivial.

But there are only three  kinds of science: (1) mathematical, (2) 
classificatory. and (3) some combination of #1 and #2 in various proportions.  
Physics, after Galileo and Newton, became highly mathematical, but it has 
always depended on classification for its choice of hypotheses.  Chemistry 
began as the classificatory science of alchemy, but it became more and more 
mathematical as it used physics to interpret and develop its study of the 
phenomena.  And biology was almost purely classificatory until the late 20th 
century.

As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to 
the analysis of experiences in the phaneron.  (See R602, Photometric 
Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1 which the editors labeled 
'Phenomenology'.)

Pure mathematics (which includes mathematical logic) is the only science that 
is purely mathematical.  But mathematics in practice depends on the 
classificatory sciences for the choice of various hypotheses to study.

As for phaneroscopy, Peirce derived his semeiotic by applying mathematics to 
the analysis of experiences in the phaneron.  (See R602, Photometric 
Researches, and the sections of CP vol. 1, which the editors labeled 
'Phenomenology'.)   That is why I used the term "formal semeiotic" for the 
methods Peirce used to derive his categories.  And I agree that mathematical 
category theory is a powerful method for analyzing the structure.  I believe 
that it makes a strong case for the label "formal".

The next step after deriving formal semeiotic is to use it to classify the 
open-ended variety of phenomena labeled aesthetics, ethics, and rhetoric -- 
essentially every book on those subjects from Aristotle to the present.   All 
the work on government and legal matters combines ethics and rhetoric with some 
logic (mostly limited to Aristotle's version).  All that work is 
classificatory, and it's by no 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'.


Note that I did not use the term "predetermined." Neither did Monod in the 
passage I cited.


Is there some reason that you decided to reframe the assertions Monod made and 
the questions I was raising in terms of the conception of what is or isn't 
"predetermined"?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 2:21 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To 
put an end ...)


Jeff, list


I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your description of 
him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use of him in my own work in 
semiotics.


1] You write:

 JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
 "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at 
last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of 
which he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as 
implausible. "


EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie, 'that life is 
predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence of man is 
predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does begin with chance'. 
1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is rejecting predetermined 
morphologies, ie, the predetermined actualities of life. Instead, he posits 
self-organized evolution based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration  
[ie, agapistic evolution].

...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized rather than 
predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his notion of evolutionary 
freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear no resemblance to the substrates 
or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn; , S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11].  He 
includes functional self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, 
however, fit into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than 
deviant adaptation.


It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite similar to 
Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and anacasm but I disagree.


Edwina






On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,


The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good 
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical 
claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics.


Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to make 
out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He does a lot of hand waving 
and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he tries to locate his view 
within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many 
gaps in what he says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, 
logic and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.


Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is interested in 
looking more closely his monograph:  
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf


Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The 
universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last 
knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which 
he emerged only by chance." (180)


It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce 
entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as implausible.


Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions that have 
a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend 
to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions that typically surface 
in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that 
would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into 
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question that Monod 
seems largely to be ignoring is the following:  what kind of explanation can be 
given for the laws of physics, chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that 
appear to govern these natural systems take the shape that they do at this 
point in the evolution of the cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the 
laws of nature are themselves evolving.


Is t

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


How does your definition of the immediate interpretant compare to what Peirce 
says in the following passage:  "The Immediate Interpretant consists in the 
Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual 
reaction"? (CP 8.315)


JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify 
within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is 
whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the 
final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under 
ideal circumstances.


Notice the three features that are highlighted in Peirce's account. The 
immediate object of a sign is:


  1.  a Quality
  2.  of the Impression
  3.  that a sign is fit to produce

Let me try to frame a question. This account of the immediate interpretant 
seems to accept the further division Peirce draws between the presentation of 
immediate interpretants as possibles, existents and necessitants. How does this 
division apply to your definition?

Yours,

Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2020 9:57 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants

Auke, List:

JAS:  I continue to stand by my own definitions.

AvB:  Own definitions? I only see citations.

My own definitions are stated in the very next sentence, copied verbatim from a 
previous post.

JAS:  The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify 
within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is 
whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the 
final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under 
ideal circumstances.

This is my summary based on Peirce's various descriptions of the three 
interpretants in his writings.  The quotations that I provided were intended to 
support my understanding of the immediate interpretant in particular.

JAS:  I am really trying to understand both the system and the process.

AvB:  is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph indicating 
your process view?

Yes, any actual effect of a sign token is a dynamical interpretant--a feeling 
(emotional), an exertion (energetic), or a further sign token (logical).  The 
sign token itself is its efficient cause, the immediate interpretant is its 
formal cause, and the final interpretant is its final cause.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, May 26, 2020 at 4:13 AM 
mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl>> wrote:

Jon Alen,

you wrote: I continue to stand by my own definitions.

Own definitions? I only see citations.

You wrote: I am really trying to understand both the system and the process.

My question: is the text you wrote (see just below) in the same paragraph 
indicating your process view?

Every sign in actu is a token of a type that belongs to a particular system of 
signs and is determined by its dynamical object to determine a dynamical 
interpretant--an actual effect on an interpreter as a feeling (emotional 
interpretant), an exertion (energetic interpretant), or a further sign (logical 
interpretant).  However, an interpreter who is insufficiently acquainted with 
that system will be incapable of getting any idea signified by the sign token, 
or might (as in my example) misinterpret it as a token of a different sign type 
that belongs to a different system.

best,

Auke

Op 26 mei 2020 om 3:11 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>:


Auke, List:

AvB:  The relevant part: "I have been accustomed to identify this [immediate 
interpretant] with the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a 
mind".

Peirce leaves two options open for the immediate interpretant here--it is 
either the effect that the sign first (actually) produces upon a mind or the 
effect that the sign may (possibly) produce upon a mind.  In order to clarify 
this, I believe that the entire sentence is relevant, including a clause that I 
am underlining here because it is omitted from the quotation below.

CSP:  My Immediate Interpretant is, I think, very nearly, if not quite, the 
same as your "Sense"; for I understand the former to be the total unanalyzed 
effect that the Sign is calculated to produce, or naturally might be expected 
to produce; and I have been accustomed to identify this with the effect the 
sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it. 
(SS 110, 1909 Mar 14, underline added)

The effect that the sign is calculated to produce or naturally might be 
expected to produce or may produce is not necessarily the effect that the sign 
actually does produce--except perhaps in the initial moment of apprehension, 
before any reflection upon it whatsoever.  Later in the same paragraph, Peirce 
states, "I might describe 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:34 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate 
Opinion (was To put an end ...)

Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List,

I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that 
Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a 
system on another classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another 
subsumption level? Then the individual is acting according to this telos or 
purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus, life as a whole, or 
universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited. A super-telos of evolution is 
individuation, meaning, that instructions for acting shall not only come from 
such super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos 
is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means 
therefore, like brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.?

Best,

Helmut


Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:

Jeff, list



I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different 
views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible.



I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt  he 
supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological 
evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have 
a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from 
old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a 
'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought 
- with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his 
point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said, 
these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions - 
as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their 
positive functionality



I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is 
no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving 
into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the 
purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin 
to an ideal  [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an 
open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the 
'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all, 
the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection 
of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is 
objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating.



Edwina




On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Robert, Jon, List,



It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical 
hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some 
sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions 
differ on a number of points, including the following:



Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency 
for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the 
time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been 
sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry 
have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over 
those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the 
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.



On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating 
hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the 
grips of a metaphysical theory.  Instead, common sense tells us that the 
normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct 
that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would 
not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in 
orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry 
involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and 
reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems 
to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character 
of the conduct of inquiry.



Having said that, Monod seems to go further.  Drawing on the kinds of 
assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the 
deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected 
by  each individual in a radically free act of c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Robert, Jon, List,


It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical 
hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some 
sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions 
differ on a number of points, including the following:


Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency 
for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the 
time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been 
sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry 
have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over 
those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the 
ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves.


On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating 
hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the 
grips of a metaphysical theory.  Instead, common sense tells us that the 
normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct 
that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would 
not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in 
orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry 
involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and 
reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems 
to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character 
of the conduct of inquiry.


Having said that, Monod seems to go further.  Drawing on the kinds of 
assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the 
deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected 
by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes 
and principles are not authentic.


Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these 
radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of 
meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has 
been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the 
larger human community and not by any one individual.


The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see 
some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on 
principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is 
on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken 
as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that 
the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the 
test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of 
arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation 
of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes 
and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual.


As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts 
of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake 
of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as 
semiotics.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion 
(was To put an end ...)

Robert, Helmut, List:

RM:  In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's 
statements as an argument of authority.

HR:  Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he?

This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent.  I am 
not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says 
so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting 
that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod 
say so.  I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) 
affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of 
final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce.  I trust that no one 
disputes this.

HR:  "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite 
end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it?

No, why suggest that?  Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of 
an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation.  The reality of final 
causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not, 
by itself, entail the rejection of final causation.

RM:  Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a 
final cause there would 

Fw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

er," which is reminiscent of a passage in 
Kelly A. Parker's book, The Continuity of Peirce's Thought.

KAP:  The dynamical object in each successive representation in the process [of 
semeiosis] is necessarily different from that of its predecessor. The dynamical 
object of the first representation is the real universe at that time, and the 
immediate object is an abstraction consisting of some aspects of this reality. 
The next representation, however, cannot have exactly the same dynamical 
object. The real universe is at that point populated by at least one additional 
entity--the first representamen itself. Every successive representation in the 
semeiotic process thus has as its dynamical object not just the universe which 
the first representamen represented, but that universe plus the first 
representamen itself. (p. 148)

The object that determines the sign is different from the object that 
determines the interpretant, because the interpretant's object includes the 
sign itself.  Likewise, the past that determines the present is different from 
the past that determines the future, because the future's past includes the 
present itself.  Moreover, the object affects the sign and interpretant, but 
not vice-versa; and likewise, the past affects the present and future, but not 
vice-versa.  As ongoing and continuous processes, both semeiosis and time are 
irreversible because they conform to Gary R.'s vector of determination 
(2ns→1ns→3ns, object→sign→interpretant, past→present→future); and once the 
universe as a vast quasi-mind becomes more determinate, it cannot become less 
determinate again.  This leads us to the passage that you quoted in your second 
post.

CSP:  [1] I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been 
to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to 
a different state of things in the infinite future. [2] The state of things in 
the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the 
total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is 
death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and 
absence of all spontaneity. [3] Between these, we have on our side a state of 
things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some 
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the 
growth of habit ... [4] As to the part of time on the further side of eternity 
which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317; 1891)

The cosmological basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of process 
(1ns→3ns→2ns).  The universe is evolving from an absolutely indeterminate state 
of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding to "the commencement of all 
time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when everything would have been in the future, 
toward an absolutely determinate state of things at the hypothetical instant 
corresponding to "the completion of all time" (ibid), when everything would be 
in the past.  As I said at the end of my initial post, what is always realized 
in the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change, and this terminology 
conveniently lends itself to another categorial analysis--the present is an 
indefinitely gradual state of change in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state 
of change in its 2ns, and an indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of 
change in its 3ns.

Returning to mathematics, in a List 
post<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-09/msg00055.html> last 
September I proposed five properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient 
for a true Peircean continuum.  (Incidentally, I am pleased to report that my 
essay based on that and several related List discussions, "Peirce's Topical 
Continuum:  A 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for publication in 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.)  The first was regularity, 
which I now prefer to call rationality--every portion conforms to one general 
law or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole 
calls out its parts (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908).  I now suggest 
that time is a real Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state 
of change is the one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; 
i.e., every moment when it is present.

Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific 
questions in a later post.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Dan, List,


Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
discussion of time to be of special interest:


"Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587


If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
to take it up with you.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, pragmatics, 
and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a very hot topic 
these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due to participate in 
a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One of the phiosophers 
whose work on the language of time is most influential is Reichenbach. 30 years 
ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory of linguistic time 
(tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. Link to two versions: 
https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) an 
“Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things which 
are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the language of 
the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time words. Other 
examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color words but can 
easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. And some have no 
numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical tasks (another 
paper of mine: https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf)

Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is with 
the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in 
different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no 
signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some actions 
that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a book-lengh 
study here: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X)

So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely useful 
posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome.

Dan Everett


On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper<http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html> that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a letter 
to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate and number 
the points he makes.


1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to 
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to 
a different state of things in the infinite future.

2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the 
nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of 
things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in 
the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is 
some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to 
law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back 
from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by 
contraries.  8.316


Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast 
being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the 
further side of eternity?


A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What kind 
of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the infinite 
past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the contrast between 
our side of things and the further side of eternity?


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time


Hello Jon, List,


At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper<http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html> that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only 
distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to say, 
moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the 
same" (CP 7.656, 1903).  An event is "an existential junction of incompossible 
facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ...

CSP:  The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which 
in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in 
representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law 
of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a 
subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being 
is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries 
can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that 
which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations 
in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896)

In logi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon, List,


At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only 
distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to say, 
moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the 
same" (CP 7.656, 1903).  An event is "an existential junction of incompossible 
facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ...

CSP:  The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which 
in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in 
representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law 
of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a 
subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being 
is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries 
can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that 
which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations 
in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896)

In logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract 
qualities are denoted by terms--or, respectively, lines of identity and labeled 
spots in existential graphs--while states of things are signified by 
propositions (statements).  A fact is the state of things signified by a true 
proposition.

CSP:  Space, like Time, is a general respect to whose determinations 
realizations are relative. Only, in the case of space, the realizations instead 
of being of states of things signified by propositions are of objects 
representable by terms of propositions. Namely, if a proposition be so analyzed 
as to throw all general characters into the predicate,--as when we express 'all 
men are mortal' as 'whatever exists is either not a man or is mortal,'--then, 
if the universe of discourse is a collection of objects of a certain kind 
called things, each individual thing denoted by a subject of the proposition 
(reckoning as 'subjects' not only the subject nominative but the direct, 
indirect, and prepositional objects) each such individual exists and has such 
characters as it has, relatively to some determination of space. (NEM 3:1077; 
c. 1905)

CSP:  A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a 
nature that a proposition is needed to represent it ... A fact is so highly a 
prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a 
simple proposition ... (CP 5.549, EP 2:378; 1906).

An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that 
is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs.  An existential 
subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized, 
but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of 
that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time, which we directly perceive 
(NEM 3:59-60; c. 1895), is what facilitates this.

CSP:  Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of 
which 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Society Newsletter 3:2

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Ben,


Thanks for sharing those two resources. I'm eager to take a look myself.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Ben Udell 
Sent: Sunday, November 10, 2019 9:24:13 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Society Newsletter 3:2


Correction, sorry:

Diaconis & Graham did not write all the essays in The Mathematics of Various 
Entertaining Subjects, Vol. 3, published 2019, just the essay on Peirce there 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvd58spj . I got mixed up because I found that 
Diaconis & Graham did co-author a whole book published in 2011 Magical 
Mathematics: the mathematical ideas that animate great magic tricks 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7t0gq That is the book that won the Euler 
prize; but the essay on Peirce is not there.

- Best, Ben

On 11/10/2019 10:42 AM, Ben Udell wrote:

List,

I just noticed this in the Peirce Society Newsletter 3:2

Persi Diaconis and Ron Graham (2019), “The Magic of Charles Sanders Peirce,” In 
The Mathematics of Various Entertaining Subjects, Vol. 3, J. Beineke and J. 
Rosenhouse, eds.  Available in pdf here 
https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=4b43f513bc=860edf35dc

The whole book was co-authored by Diaconis & Graham and won the Euler prize.  
Persi Diaconis is renowned not only in probability theory and statistics but 
also in professional magic.  I used to have a friend who was highly respected 
in cards & coins magic, and he repeatedly spoke highly of Diaconis over the 
years.  I haven't read this PDF yet but Diaconis is in a great position to 
appreciate Peirce's work in probability and magic alike.  Graham is also a 
renowned mathematician; he also juggles; and evidently takes some interest in 
magic.

Well, I started to read it, and they love Menand's _The Metaphysical Club_ but 
most of the article is about some magic tricks of Peirce's.  If you have any 
interest in Peirce's magic, save this article.

Best, Ben

On 11/9/2019 12:01 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

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[PEIRCE-L] Phenomenological categories

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

 EG. In doing so, he is asking how he might clarify the meaning of the 
diagrammatic signs used in the EG (given the various options that are open) and 
the relations that hold between the hypotheses that lie at the bases of the 
alpha, beta and gamma systems. We should expect that the beta system adds some 
postulates to the alpha system, and that the gamma system adds some to the 
beta--just as projective geometry adds some postulates to topology, and 
metrical geometry adds some postulates to those used in projective geometry.


In the Lowell Lectures, Peirce moves from questions about the aims and 
principles that guide self-controlled inquiry (lecture 1), to a discussion of 
the alpha and beta graphs (lecture 2), to some points in phenomenology and 
semiotics (lecture 3), to the gamma graphs, (lecture 4), to a discussion of the 
mathematical conception of multitude (lecture 5) to a discussion of chance and 
probability (lecture 6) to a discussion of the grounds of the validity of 
induction (lecture 7) and finally to a discussion of the grounds of the 
validity of abduction (lecture 8).


Where do we find new developments? As far as I can see, Peirce is largely 
drawing on previous work in lectures 1, 2 and 3. He is tilling some new ground 
in lecture 4 as he thinks harder about the options for representing different 
kinds of modal relations. Then, he is applying these new developments in the 
gamma graphs to longstanding questions about how we should understand various 
kinds of infinite multitudes, chance and randomness. These are not separate 
discussions. We need to clarify mathematical conceptions of infinite multitudes 
because these are needed to better clarify our conception of chance. After all, 
the multitude of possibilities for systems that are governed by chance are 
rather large in number. In fact, the multitude of possibilities seems to exceed 
anything that could be ordered as a discrete collection.


In lectures 4, 5, and 6, it looks to me like he is trying to sort out a number 
of different lines of thought that he had been working on in various prior 
essays, lectures and collections of notes (e.g., in the 1890's work on the 
mathematics of multitude and chance, and in the early 1900's work on the gamma 
graphs). In sorting out these lines of thought, he is trying to make some 
headway on the big question that serves as the key to the lock on the door of 
philosophy:  what makes synthetic reasoning--inductive and abductive--both 
valid and sound?


Let me restate what I've held for some time. As Peirce reviews his own work in 
philosophy and tries to provide a map to the larger system he is trying to 
develop (i.e., in his science of review, including his architectonic plan), he 
is distinguishing between different notions of what are called categories. For 
my part, I wouldn't say that mathematics has its own conception of the 
categories. Or, it didn't have such a notion at Peirce's time. Recently, in 
what is called category theory, it may be developing something of that sort. 
Having said that, I take the phenomenological account of the categories of 
experience to be a universal set of elemental categories. All other sets of 
categories, logical and metaphysical, represent conceptual developments that 
originate from these elemental tones of experience.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Terry Moore 
Sent: Friday, October 11, 2019 12:55:17 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [ontolog-forum] Re: Peirce's 1870 "Logic Of 
Relatives"

Reading this piece by Sowa made me think of your project. I’m thinking you’re a 
“lumper.”

-Terry-




On October 11, 2019 at 3:52:16 PM, John F. Sowa 
(s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>) wrote:

Jon,


> whether I might be comparing apples and oranges in lumping philosophical and 
> mathematical categories under the same head...  there are many differences in 
> the categorical paradigms different observers developed over the centuries.

There are two kinds of people:  lumpers and splitters.  On this issue, one 
could argue for a single lump, as you do.  The mathematical category theory is 
so general that it could be applied to the philosophical theories.

But the kinds of problems that the mathematical theory was designed to solve 
are very different from the philosophical problems that Aristotle, Porphyry, 
Kant, and Peirce were trying to solve.

I believe that the pedagogical issues tip the balance in favor of the 
splitters.  It's easier to explain the philosophical issues without bringing in 
the mathematical theory, and it's easier to explain the mathematical theory 
without bringing in the philosophical issues.  The only people who could 
understand the application of the mathematical theory to the philosophical 
issues are those who already have a deep understand

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: "all exact thought is mathematical thought"

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon A, Jon S, List,


One can describe the arena of mathematical inquiry as a "contingent bubble 
world" that lives within its "own frame of reference". Doing so would not, 
however, explain what makes mathematical thought exact. It would be more 
precise, I think, to stress the idea that mathematical inquiry starts from 
hypotheses that are formal idealizations. Pure mathematics gains in exactness 
by restricting its attention to such idealizations and asking--what follows in 
a consistent manner by deduction from such hypotheses?


It was a considerable cognitive achievement for human beings to realize that 
confining attention to an arena in which the objects of inquiry are formal 
idealizations can teach us things that cannot be learned in other ways.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Awbrey 
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2019 6:02 AM
To: s...@bestweb.net; Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: "all exact thought is mathematical thought"

John,

Best I recall, Peirce's point was that mathematical thought
can be exact precisely because it is entirely hypothetical.
It operates purely relative to its own frame of reference,
taking place wholly within its own contingent bubble world.
This quality of exactness is strained to the breaking point
the moment we apply it to any external reality, as physics.

Regards,

Jon

On 9/19/2019 8:46 AM, John F. Sowa wrote:
>
>
>
> Jon AS, Gary R, List
>
> There is much more to say about
> continuity.?? But a preliminary discussion of the role of mathematics is
> essential.?? I changed the subject line to a quotation from NEM, p.
> 4.x:
>
>
> CSP:?? Philosophy requires exact thought, and all
> exact thought is mathematical thought. Especially, it behooves a
> sentimentalist to take double and triple pains to make his thought rigidly
> exact. For it is the nature of his cast of philosophical thought to be
> exceedingly dangerous if it is not
> bound down to a logic at least as
> rigid as that of Euclid... I have been bred in the lap of the exact
> sciences and I know what mathematical exactitude is, that is as?? far as I
> can see the character of my philosophical reasoning.
>
>
> Implication:?? The mathematics of metaphysics must be consistent with
> the?? mathematics of physics.?? For both sciences, the source of data is the
> experiences in the phaneron. The difference between them is in the kinds
> of questions one asks about those experiences.?? In every point of contact
> or overlap, the mathematics must be identical.
>
>
> The intro
> to NEM vol, 4 (pp. i to xxv) has many related quotations.?? For more
> discussion, see Carolyn Eisele's article "Mathematical methodology in
> the thought of Charles S. Peirce",
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0315086082901276
>
>
> Peirce had a high regard for Kant, who had been strongly
> influenced by his study of math & physics before he wrote his famous
> critiques.?? See below for excerpts from an article on "Kant's
> philosophical development".
>
>
> Unlike Peirce, who
> learned mathematics from his father, Kant didn't learn much more than
> arithmetic until later in life.?? But as he learned more mathematics, his
> metaphysics became significantly deeper and richer.
>
>
> Kant's development provides further evidence for Peirce's claim that all
> exact thought is mathematical thought.?? Thinking in words is OK as a rough
> guide to the mathematical issues involved.?? But the conclusions must
> always be verified in terms of the mathematical details.
>
>
> John
>
>
> _
>
>
> Excerpts
> from "Kant's philosophical development":
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/
>
> Kant
> can be seen as defending pantheism, naturalism, evolution, cosmic
> expansion theory and holism, even when doing so was incompatible with an
> academic career... [He] was always cautious when writing on such
> topics...
>
> Kant's generalization unites Kepler's law of photo
> measurement (1604), Newton's law of universal gravitation (1697), and
> Coulomb's later law of electrostatic force (1785) as instantiations of the
> spread of energy.[15] Kant's law governs multiple forms of free radiation,
> not just light, gravity, and electrostatic force, but also radioactivity,
> radio waves, and sound. Its most famous application, in its first,
> Keplerian, instantiation, was Hubble's measure of the luminosity of
> distant variable stars (1924) ??? which led to the discoveries of cosmic
> expansion and the Big Bang.
>
> Remarkable about his Newtonian
> conversion is not the change of heart, but the change in competence. His
> first publication, despite its brilliance, reveals his confusions over
> basic mechanics and a remedial grasp of the mathematics needed to
> understand Newton.?? His next group of works displays a firm grasp of
> celestial mechanics and a growing 

Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Vargas on Continuity

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, List,

Here is the message that was sent offlist about Francisco Vargas's presentation 
on Peirce's mathematical conception of continuity. I was thinking it was part 
of the thread I'd already brought back to the list discussion.

I don't remember the details of what Francisco said about SIA, although it is 
probably the most interesting system among those listed in the table for the 
sake of understanding what Francisco and Fernando are saying about Peirce's 
mathematical conception of continuity.

The system is based on Alexander Grothendieck’s work on Algebraic Geometry, as 
developed by the likes of  Bill Lawvere and John Bell. As with intuitionism, 
the law of excluded middle is being shelved. As with non-standard analysis, 
infinitesimals are the basis of all functions.

If you are interested in learning about Lawvere's use of category theory in the 
development of SIA, I highly recommend his book:  
https://img.4plebs.org/boards/tg/image/1460/05/1460059215690.pdf  It provides 
an accessible introduction to category theory, although more will be needed to 
see how that is being applied in SIA.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Friday, September 6, 2019 11:18 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Subject: Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Vargas on Continuity


Hi Jon,


I don't remember the details of what Francisco said about SIA, although it is 
probably the most interesting system for the sake of understanding what 
Francisco and Fernando are saying about Peirce's mathematical conception of 
continuity.


The system is based on Alexander Grothendieck’s work on Algebraic Geometry, as 
developed by the likes of  Bill Lawvere and John Bell. As with intuitionism, 
the law of excluded middle is being shelved. As with non-standard analysis, 
infinitesimals are the basis of all functions.


If you are interested in learning about Lawvere's use of category theory in the 
development of SIA, I highly recommend his book:  
https://img.4plebs.org/boards/tg/image/1460/05/1460059215690.pdf  It provides 
an accessible introduction to category theory, although more will be needed to 
see how that is being applied in SIA.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, September 6, 2019 10:00:03 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Vargas on Continuity

Jeff, List:

I have a few follow-up questions specifically about Smooth Infinitesimal 
Analysis (SIA).  Vargas's table indicates that SIA satisfies the conditions of 
inextensibility, potentiality, and infinitesimals, but has question marks for 
reflexivity and supermultitudeness.  Do you recall whether he discussed this 
particular assessment during his presentation, or perhaps have some ideas of 
your own about it?  In what sense is it doubtful, or at least uncertain, 
whether SIA adequately captures those two properties?  How exactly is Vargas's 
new model an improvement over SIA relative to Peirce's conception of a true 
continuum?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

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Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Vargas on Continuity

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

 the plane into 
three parts--the circle itself, the area inside it, and the area outside it.  
If it is not considered a part of the plane, then the latter remains a perfect 
continuum.

JD:  Again, I would keep the questions about the intrinsic character of the 
figure separate from the questions about the character of that figure being 
extrinsically considered as a part of a larger surface. I agree with the point 
that any line drawn on a surface introduces a discontinuity in the surface, 
just as an intersection made on a line creates a discontinuity on the line. I 
did exert my will in drawing the figures, and that exertion followed a general 
rule in generating the circular figures and then writing them down as actual 
figures. The discontinuities that are created at the points of intersection f 
and g have a lot to do with the fact that this particular token figure involve 
the placing of these token circles in an existential relation, one to another.  
 It does not follow that the lines, considered intrinsically, do not have 
certain kinds of continuity that remain. After all, the intersection does not 
prevent a particle from tracing a path all the way around B or C.

CSP:  Are these sets all discrete in the same way? When it comes to the types 
of things collected in each set, I think not.

JS:  My impression is that "the types of things collected in each set" are 
supposed to be irrelevant to the mathematical properties of the sets 
themselves.  Am I wrong?

JD:  After recognizing the paradoxes that had arisen in set theory, Russell 
introduced type theory into the interpretation of sets in order to avoid the 
problems. The theory of types explicitly recognizes the different sorts of 
things that are being collected in a given set. Russell distinguished, for 
instance, between sets of individual objects, predicates and predicates of 
predicates. Notice that we can have a set of {horse, dog, cat} and another set 
{Secretariat, Lassie and Kitty}. The first is a set consisting of three kinds 
of things. The second is a set of three individual objects. When constructing 
sets, mathematicians and logicians sometimes seem to feel that they can put 
anything into a given collection (creating sets of mixed types). The problem, 
as Peirce is well aware, is that there is a difference between a type and 
token--and that difference is sometimes ignored thereby causing confusion later 
when they try to reason about the sets.

JD:  If you want to get clearer about the nature of mathematical continuity, I 
recommend considering some concrete examples and then asking questions about 
them. Passages drawn from Peirce's writings will only take us so far.

JS:  As I have said before, although it is no doubt helpful, I do not believe 
that a mathematically rigorous conception of continuity is a strict 
prerequisite for a philosophically adequate conception of continuity.  The 
latter is what primarily interests me; in particular, Peirce's late topical 
theory as it applies to his semeiotic and metaphysics.

JD:  Adequacy comes in degrees. Peirce seems to think that we can improve the 
rigor and adequacy of our mathematical conception of continuity and thereby 
improve the rigor and adequacy of our logical and metaphysical conceptions of 
continuity. I am attracted to Peirce's suggestion that we should do what we can 
to improve rigor in philosophy by drawing on richer mathematical conceptions. 
It appears to be an unending task. Nonetheless, we stand here at the beginning 
of the 21st century with a wealth of resources at our disposal. I want to make 
use of what is available to the best of my abilities.

--Jeff


On Fri, Sep 6, 2019 at 8:09 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon, List,

Generally speaking, one way to get clearer about a conception is to draw a 
contrast to its opposite. As such, we stand to learn something about continuity 
by closely examining discreteness. What is more, many things admit of matters 
of degree. Continuity may be one of those things. As such, we will learn 
something about what is most continuous by looking at the gradations of what is 
less and then more connected.

When it comes to the mathematical conception of continuity, we need to remember 
that Peirce holds that the differences between (a) topology and (b) symbolic 
algebras is a matter of the dress they are wearing and not anything essential 
to the subject matter. Anything that we might study in topology using diagrams 
can also be studied algebraically using equations.

Set theory is really helpful in studying basic operations like addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and division in various algebras--including 
logical algebras. That is especially true when it comes to the analysis of 
various forms of order that matter when the algebra is applied to various 
systems of number.

As such, I accept the claim that a set-theoretical analysis of the real number 
line is not adequat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Existential Graphs (IEGs)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, John S, List,


Arnold Oostra gave presentations in English on his work on intuitionistic 
logics and the EG at the Peirce Centennial Congress in 2014 and on related 
themes at the later meeting on Peirce's work on mathematics in Bogota 
(organized by Fernando Zalamea). At the latter, he was effectively the keynote 
speaker.


Having searched Google Scholar, it is hard to fund much of his work that isn't 
in Spanish. Here is an example of a presentation in English to give you a 
flavor of what he is doing:  
https://matematicas.uniandes.edu.co/eventos/SLALM2012/slides/arnold_oostra.pdf


Fernando has created a community of students and scholars in Bogota who are 
working on Peirce and the EGs. Arnold has reproduced that model in Tolima. The 
quality of the research products of his undergraduate students is quite strong. 
It is clear that both Fernando and Arnold are remarkable teachers as well as 
researchers.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, September 5, 2019 1:04:55 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Existential Graphs (IEGs)

John, List:

Thanks for the additional background information.  For anyone interested in 
further details about Oostra's approach, attached is a combined PDF with his 
relevant papers in Spanish from the first five volumes of Cuadernos de 
Sistemática Peirceana.  The first and last relate Peirce's thought to 
intuitionistic mathematics and logic in general, while the middle three 
specifically explain his Alpha, Beta, and Gamma systems of IEGs.  He concludes 
by stating that (ironically) omitting what is now known as Peirce's Law from 
his 1885 article in The American Journal of Mathematics, "On the Algebra of 
Logic:  A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" (CP 3.359-403), would 
have provided the nucleus for an axiomatization of intuitionistic logic.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 1:46 PM John F. Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

Intuitionistic logic was founded by the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer.  
He objected to "nonconstructive" proofs by contradiction.

Many mathematicians have been sympathetic, but they were reluctant to use 
Brower's logic because it made many legitimate theorems more difficult to prove.

For more info, see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/

Re EGs:  Peirce's diagrammatic reasoning, which begins with diagrams and 
reasons about them is by its very nature constructive.  However, Peirce's rules 
of inference also allow proofs by contradiction.

The idea of making EGs intuitionistic would enforce constraints on the rules of 
inference to prohibit the options that are nonconstructive.  That could be 
considered as a kind of three-valued logic with True, False, and Not provable.  
But that's different from True, False, and Unknown -- or the fuzzy versions 
with a continuous range of values.

Susan Haack strongly objected to Zadeh's idea of a continuum of truth values.  
But it would be more appropriate to consider the fuzzy values as degrees of 
confidence or belief.

Re EGs: It's possible to translate any algebraic notation to and from an EG 
form.  Therefore, any interpretation -- fuzzy, intuitionistic, modal, 
metalanguage -- that could be expressed in an algebraic form could be adapted 
to an EG version and vice-versa.

By the way, Brouwer was a member of Lady Welby's Significs group, but it's 
unlikely that Peirce and Brouwer ever communicated.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's work in progress

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, List,


John:  Re Cosmology:  Peirce learned mathematics, physics, and astronomy at his 
father's knee. Until he lost his position at USCGS and JHU, his knowledge of 
those fields was at the forefront of research, and that research is reflected 
in his cosmology.  No one knows what he might have thought about quantum 
mechanics.  It supports his Tychism, but it poses a challenge to his preference 
for Synechism.  . . .  For these reasons, I'm skeptical about using Synechism 
to support claims about cosmology.  Peirce's logic and semeiotic are still at 
the forefront of research today.  But his physics is obsolete, and so is any 
mathematical metaphysics that is inconsistent with QM.


Jeff:  QM takes states--most of which are characterized in discrete terms--as 
the primary objects in the universe of discourse for the theory. As such, there 
appears to be a tension between Peirce's insistence on the importance of the 
principle of continuity for physics and the QM of the first part of the 20th 
century. Having said that, it was already recognized by 1920 that some things 
that seemed to have characteristics that could be characterized in the terms of 
discrete quanta, such as light, also needed to be understood in terms of waves 
moving in an EM field.


For my part, I don't think the tension between the emphasis on discreteness in 
the standard interpretation of QM and Peirce's synechism in physics is as great 
as some might take it to be. After all, the states are taken to involve 
probabilistic distributions where some characteristics are more continuous even 
if other characteristics are more discrete. In the latter part of the century, 
however, the standard theory of QM is understood to be just a part of the 
picture of what is happening at the quantum level. The fuller picture seems to 
involve explaining phenomena in relativistic terms (RQM). What is more, many 
things that are not sufficiently explained in the terms of RQM are better 
explained by appeal to quantum field theory, which takes operators and not 
states as the primary objects in the universe of discourse for the theory.  The 
operators in the fields are understood in terms of continuous distributions in 
fields.


My estimate, which is highly prone to error in these matters, is that many 
physicists today seem to take RQM and QFT to be more fundamental than the 
standard interpretation of QM.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: John F. Sowa 
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 8:33 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's work in progress



Jon and Gary R,

I had some work that kept me from spending time
on email. But that
delay gave me some time to put these issues into
perspective.  I
realized that Jon is constantly looking for Peirce's
"considered"
answers.  But Peirce didn't have final
answers.  He developed a
scientific framework for asking questions,
analyzing guesses, and
refining hypotheses into theories.  But no
theory is final.  Every
answer generates more questions.  There is no
stopping point.

Re classification of the sciences:  I
originally drew that diagram
for some discussions in the Ontolog
Forum email list.  I wanted to
show how Peirce's classification,
which is still the best available,
can relate the many theories of
science, engineering, law, art, and
everyday life.  Since then, I
discussed that diagram with several
Peirce scholars.  They made
helpful suggestions, which led me to
make some revisions.  Three
points: (1) It's my diagram, not Peirce's;
(2) Every feature of that
diagram is consistent with what Peirce wrote;
(3) It does not make
any assumptions that go beyond what he wrote.
See
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/cspscience.png

Re Cosmology:  Peirce
learned mathematics, physics, and astronomy at
his father's knee.
Until he lost his position at USCGS and JHU, his
knowledge of those
fields was at the forefront of research, and that
research is
reflected in his cosmology.  No one knows what he might
have thought
about quantum mechanics.  It supports his Tychism, but
it poses a
challenge to his preference for Synechism.

Re physical and
metaphysical cosmology:  In RLT p. 267, Peirce wrote
"The
subject of mathematical metaphysics, or cosmology, is not so
very
difficult, provided it be properly expanded and displayed."
But
there are infinitely many theories of math. With his blackboard
metaphor in RLT, Peirce illustrated his views of continuity.  But
that metaphor is not consistent with quantum mechanics.

For
these reasons, I'm skeptical about using Synechism to support
claims
about cosmology.  Peirce's logic and semeiotic are still at
the
forefront of research today.  But his physics is obsolete, and
so is
any mathematical metaphysics that is inconsistent with QM.

JAS
> Logic as the third branch of Normative Science is
"the science of
> the general laws of 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

expression "a kind of limiting idea" 
here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very 
un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of inquiry).

Peirce indeed argued against blocking the way of inquiry by "maintaining that 
this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of 
aught else, and utterly inexplicable" (CP 1.139, EP 2:49; 1898).  However, he 
also recognized that not everything demands an explanation.  Jeff is suggesting 
that "the original vague potentiality" is the kind of thing that does not call 
for any further explanation.  However, my response is that just as a "scriber" 
is needed to draw the chalk marks on the blackboard, likewise a "creator" is 
needed to make the blackboard in the first place; and accordingly, I suggest 
instead that the Reality of Ens necessarium is the kind of thing that does not 
call for any further explanation.

JD:  In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in calculus is the 
conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is better because the 
idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving continuous magnitudes 
that may have an indeterminate metrical character. Proportions are preserved, 
but not scalar values.

How does this square with Peirce's contention that topical geometry (or Topics) 
is the proper branch for mathematically investigating continuity, rather than 
projective geometry (or Graphics)?

JD:  As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the 
starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle touching 
the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of inquiry--the tip of the 
triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.

I quoted and commented on that entire passage very early in this thread as the 
sort of reasoning that Peirce might apply to the starting point of the 
universe, as well.  If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is the 
beginning, then what would correspond to the end--of cognition, or of inquiry, 
or of the universe?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R, List,


You ask:  "Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on how our 
Universe came into being?" I take most major philosophers to recognize a need 
to address the question:  what is the origin of all things. How will it end? A 
range of answers have been considered by the likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume 
and Kant, Quine to Plantinga.


Some say that the history of the cosmos goes back in time with no beginning, 
and that it will continue without end. Others say that it had a beginning and 
that it will have an end in time. Empirically minded philosophers have argued 
that metaphysical questions of this sort have no positive answers--one way or 
the other--that can be put to the test. Kant considers these opposing answers 
to be antinomies in the Dialectic of the first Critique. He suggests that we 
are lead by Reason to address questions concerning the absolute--and that we 
need to tease out where Reason might be leading us astray.


I take Peirce's explorations in the last lecture of RLT to be entirely 
consonant with what he says here:


Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.†4 Mind is 
First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. Such are the materials out of 
which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built, in order to represent 
the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century has brought us. Without 
going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic, we can 
readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed 
from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the most 
recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that 
in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a chaos of unpersonalized 
feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without 
existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would 
have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be 
evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit 
would be started; and from this, with the other principles of evolution, all 
the regularities of the universe would be evolved. At any time, however, an 
element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an 
absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last 
crystallized in the infinitely distant future.

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

t pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905).

JD:  One thing he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is 
to arrive at something that doesn't call out for further explanation.

GR:  I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting idea" 
here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very 
un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of inquiry).

Peirce indeed argued against blocking the way of inquiry by "maintaining that 
this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of 
aught else, and utterly inexplicable" (CP 1.139, EP 2:49; 1898).  However, he 
also recognized that not everything demands an explanation.  Jeff is suggesting 
that "the original vague potentiality" is the kind of thing that does not call 
for any further explanation.  However, my response is that just as a "scriber" 
is needed to draw the chalk marks on the blackboard, likewise a "creator" is 
needed to make the blackboard in the first place; and accordingly, I suggest 
instead that the Reality of Ens necessarium is the kind of thing that does not 
call for any further explanation.

JD:  In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in calculus is the 
conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is better because the 
idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving continuous magnitudes 
that may have an indeterminate metrical character. Proportions are preserved, 
but not scalar values.

How does this square with Peirce's contention that topical geometry (or Topics) 
is the proper branch for mathematically investigating continuity, rather than 
projective geometry (or Graphics)?

JD:  As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", the 
starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle touching 
the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of inquiry--the tip of the 
triangle--is a kind of limiting idea.

I quoted and commented on that entire passage very early in this thread as the 
sort of reasoning that Peirce might apply to the starting point of the 
universe, as well.  If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is the 
beginning, then what would correspond to the end--of cognition, or of inquiry, 
or of the universe?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R, List,


You ask:  "Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on how our 
Universe came into being?" I take most major philosophers to recognize a need 
to address the question:  what is the origin of all things. How will it end? A 
range of answers have been considered by the likes of Plato and Aristotle, Hume 
and Kant, Quine to Plantinga.


Some say that the history of the cosmos goes back in time with no beginning, 
and that it will continue without end. Others say that it had a beginning and 
that it will have an end in time. Empirically minded philosophers have argued 
that metaphysical questions of this sort have no positive answers--one way or 
the other--that can be put to the test. Kant considers these opposing answers 
to be antinomies in the Dialectic of the first Critique. He suggests that we 
are lead by Reason to address questions concerning the absolute--and that we 
need to tease out where Reason might be leading us astray.


I take Peirce's explorations in the last lecture of RLT to be entirely 
consonant with what he says here:


Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third.†4 Mind is 
First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. Such are the materials out of 
which chiefly a philosophical theory ought to be built, in order to represent 
the state of knowledge to which the nineteenth century has brought us. Without 
going into other important questions of philosophical architectonic, we can 
readily foresee what sort of a metaphysics would appropriately be constructed 
from those conceptions. Like some of the most ancient and some of the most 
recent speculations it would be a Cosmogonic Philosophy. It would suppose that 
in the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a chaos of unpersonalized 
feeling, which being without connection or regularity would properly be without 
existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbitrariness, would 
have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its other sportings would be 
evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue. Thus, the tendency to habit 
would be started; and from this, with the other principles of evolution, all 
the regulari

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

cated in terms of a conception of 
vague potentiality, as a kind of limiting idea. One thing he is trying to 
accomplish in clarifying such a limiting idea is to arrive at something that 
doesn't call out for further explanation. If someone asks, why does the 
original vague potentiality have the characteristics it does? His answer is:  
that doesn't need a further explanation.

I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting idea" here. 
Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very un-Peircean as 
Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of inquiry). Would you 
explain what you mean by "limiting idea" here (unless all you mean is that 
Peirce wholly uncharacteristically intended to stop further inquiry into the 
matter)?

And the question "why does the original vague potentiality have the 
characteristics it does" doesn't seem to me to catch the richness of the 
analogy, the blackboard diagram. In Peirce's presentaiton the blackboard per se 
represents only what I've termed the ur-continuity upon which these "possibles" 
will be drawn, chosen, as it were, from an infinite number of possibilities. As 
Jon has commented, that something is scribed upon the blackboard suggests that 
there is a scriber (it may not be able to avoid theology in that 
interpretation, although I don't think it's the only one possible--although it 
should be recalled that Peirce was a theist), and out of these unlimited 
possibilities only some were scribed. Peirce writes of our existing world's 
origins:

. . .we must suppose that as a rule the continuum has been derived from a more 
general continuum, a continuum of higher generality.

>From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all 
>its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary determination 
>of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . . CP 6.191- 92

Again, there was "a Platonic world" 'before', so to speak, the existing world 
came into being:

The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing 
universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have 
become or are becoming developed. CP 6.194

 And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes" theory:

At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the 
existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, 
to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one 
another; until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated 
the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be. CP 6.208

JD: Some philosophers might claim that Peirce is wrong to think the original 
vague potentiality doesn't need a further explanation, but I take that to be 
the view he is exploring in this last lecture.

What sort of "explanations" of "the original vague potentiality" have other 
philosophers entertained? Who are the philosophers making these claims of the 
inadequacy of Peirce of Peirce's thinking on the earliest situation of the 
cosmos? Who, besides Peirce (besides some theologians) have mused on how our 
Universe came into being?

It would appear that most astrophysicists simply accent the singularity of the 
Big Bang without questioning how something as vast as a cosmos could arise out 
of nothing (or they posit  truly vague and undeveloped ideas, such as "bouncing 
universes" and "quantum fluctuation" theories).

In my view, Peirce's musings of the origin of the universe is sui generis, 
highly stimulating from both scientific and philosophic (including 
metaphysical) standpoints, and the furthest any philosopher-scientist (whom I 
know of at least) has gone into considering the possible situation at our 
cosmic origin, pre-Big Bang (if one subscribes to that view) While in Peirce's 
view, the earliest cosmos took form "before time was."

Best,

Gary R



Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York




On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 5:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, Gary R, List,


On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error to suggest 
that he is making measurement intrinsic to the definition of those dimensions 
of either time, space or quality. Rather, the thrust of the argument is to 
start with mathematical conceptions and then use them for the sake of 
developing hypotheses in metaphysical cosmology. In doing so, he moves from the 
consideration of metrical geometries, to projective geometry to topology.


In doing so, he is setting metrical considerations to the side and focusing 
primarily on topological matters. It is clear that the topological 
points--including those about the possible dimensions of a such

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ile that is a continuum of possible 
dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of a continuum 
of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort. There are no 
points on this blackboard. There are no dimensions in that continuum. (CP 
6.203, RLT 261; 1898)

Rather than "a vague infinity of dimensions," there are no distinct 
dimensions--no definite dimensions--no discrete dimensions at all in the 
original continuum that is fundamental to the constitution of being.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 3:48 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, Gary F, List,

Peirce provides definitions for dimension, dimensional and dimensionality in 
the Century Dictionary. Nothing jumps out at me in the definitions offered, but 
it is worth noting that he does make a distinction between the dimensions of a 
mathematical space and that of a physical space.

For the sake of understanding the points made in the last lecture of RLT, the 
discussion of topological dimensions in the EM and the NEM are particularly 
helpful resources. There, Peirce describes the various ways that a particle can 
be moved from a point, a filament from a line, etc. This is consonant with the 
contemporary way of talking about the dimensions of a topological space in 
terms of the degrees of freedom that something can be moved.

Those mathematical ideas can be applied to physical space by asking questions 
about how something like an atom or a sub-atomic particle might be able to 
move. My sense is that Peirce is thinking in terms of continuous spatial fields 
as being more fundamental than discrete particles.

Cosmologically speaking, the permanence of something like a Hydrogen atom is 
explained in terms of the parts (e.g., the proton) of that whole evolving from 
something more basic. So, if we consider something like an extremely 
high-temperature plasma in which the particles (e.g., the quarks, leptons and 
bosons) are moving relatively freely in relation to one another, then it is 
helpful to think of those "particles" as spread areas of charge in a field.

If we think of the laws of physics as evolving in the early stages of the 
development of the universe, how might we envision gravity, and the strong and 
weak forces operating in a relatively dense plasma? More to the point, how 
might we envision the laws of time and space evolving where the universe is 
comprised of a dense plasma of charged areas in a multi-dimensional field?

In order to conceive of the evolution of time and space as involving a trend 
having a decrease in number from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more 
determinate number (e.g., from more than 100, to 12, to 10 to 4), we need some 
kind of tools to picture how this might work. Two of the resources that Peirce 
worked with in his various studies of topology, projective geometry and 
metrical geometries are Riemannian manifolds and Klein groups.

Those probably give us what we need for thinking, at least in broad terms, 
about the character of the dimensions of a space that are (1) vague and (2) 
infinite. Setting aside metrical considerations (which will naturally make 
things more vague), the question becomes a matter of explaining how a 
topological space (which may be folded, knotted and twisted in many ways) might 
evolve into a space that has projective characteristics (where there is 
"straightness" or homoloidal properties, but no preservation of angles or 
lengths under transformations).

If you will, let me think out loud using very rough terms about how some of the 
characteristics of sub-atomic particles in a plasma might change as those 
particles move through a space of high dimensions. What follows is conjectural 
in character. In the case of a real physical space that is highly folded, 
knotted and twisted, where the "particles" are charged areas that move through 
the space, how should we conceive of the dimensionality of such a space in the 
initial phases where the laws of time and space themselves are evolving as the 
number of dimensions of that space decrease?

It helps, I think to distinguish between the global character of such a space 
and its local character. Locally speaking, I imagine that the charged areas 
might "break up" into smaller areas as they move through different "branches" 
(i.e., handles, like a hole in a torus) that may twist (i.e., cross caps, as 
with a Mobius band) and that are knotted together and then recombine with other 
moving charged areas.

We tend to think of subatomic particles (e.g., quarks) as having relatively 
fixed masses (voltages). Neutrinos, on the other hand, have mass values that 
are 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

he techniques we might profitably employ to 
study the question of how the dimensions of space and time might have evolved 
in the early history of the cosmos.

Thanks for your patience as I've tried to talk out loud. In order to make any 
progress in cosmological metaphysics, we will need to make a transition from 
these sorts of conjectural musings on matters of cosmological physics to 
something that is easier to get one's mind around. As such, in a future post, 
I'd like to take up some graph-theoretical explorations of how we might think 
about the dimensions of space and time. In doing so, the aim will be to create 
some kind of diagram that helps to picture how time and space might be evolving 
from a vague infinity of dimensions to a more determinate and smaller number of 
dimensions.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2019 8:01 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Jeff, List:

JD (below):  What is the general trend:  an increase in dimensions from 1 to 4, 
or a decrease in dimensions from infinity to four? How might the rival 
metaphysical hypotheses be tested?

JD (to Gary F.):  We have to ask, if real space has 3 dimensions, then why is 
it a whole number and not an answer involving a decimal or fractional 
expression?

Those are interesting questions, but I suggest that we first explore a more 
fundamental one--what is a dimension in this context?

According to Wikipedia<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimension>, "the dimension 
of a mathematical space (or object) is informally defined as the minimum number 
of coordinates needed to specify any point within it."  Of course, discrete 
coordinates--as well as the discrete positions and instants that they are 
intended to mark--are arbitrary and artificial creations of thought for the 
purpose of describing motion through space-time, which in itself is continuous. 
 Does this perhaps entail that discrete dimensions of any whole number are 
likewise arbitrary and artificial creations of thought--hypothetical 
representations of space-time, rather than real characters of it?

The definition of a dimension given in the second video linked in the post 
addressed to Gary F.--the one about fractals--is even more obviously arbitrary 
and artificial as a measure of "roughness."  What meaning could we assign to a 
decimal or fractional value somehow assigned to real space-time as a continuous 
whole?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 6:35 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,

Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical 
cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier. 
Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically 
affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical cosmology, I 
tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible answers.

In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set of hypotheses and 
less on others. And, over the course of his career, he often does reassess the 
options he has considered up to that point. As a result of the inquiries, he 
does give greater weight to the plausibility of some metaphysical hypotheses as 
compared to others. In many cases where he might seem to be "taking a 
position", I find that he is merely pointing to defects in some of the 
hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in the cosmological metaphysics of 
his time failed in some degree to explain phenomena that clearly called out for 
explanation (e.g., why does our common experience of time involve 1 ordered 
dimension and our experience of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the 
problematic hypotheses might have been amended to remedy such defects.

I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that the big 
questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?" and "How did 
the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of questions that get 
answered over the course of millennia by whole communities of inquirers and not 
by any individual during the course of a lifetime. As such, I am cautious about 
proclaiming that Peirce's position on these types of questions was, at some 
particular point in his career, "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". 
Rather, I think that he took his own advice on questions of metaphysics and 
tended to hold some metaphysical hy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


I've been thinking about your question concerning the application of the 
conception of fractal dimensions to the possible evolution of the cosmos from a 
vague state having infinite dimensions to a more definite state having 4.


Not being an expert at thinking about things in higher dimensional spaces or in 
fractal dimensions, I find myself looking for some moving diagrams to help make 
things clearer.  Here are two resources I've found helpful:


  1.   On thinking about spheres in higher dimensional spaces:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4>
[http://img.youtube.com/vi/zwAD6dRSVyI/0.jpg]<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI>

Thinking outside the 10-dimensional box - 
YouTube<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwAD6dRSVyI>
www.youtube.com
Visualizing high-dimensional spheres to understand a surprising puzzle. Home 
page: https://www.3blue1brown.com/ Brought to you by you: 
http://3b1b.co/high-d-...

2.  Thinking about fractal dimensions:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4
Fractals are typically not self-similar - 
YouTube<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gB9n2gHsHN4>
www.youtube.com
An explanation of fractal dimension. Home page: https://www.3blue1brown.com/ 
Brought to you by you: http://3b1b.co/fractals-thanks And by Affirm: 
https://www...


With these introductory-level resources in mind, let me respond to your 
questions with a question. Which is more vague, claiming that a space has 3 
dimensions or claiming that another has 3.14159 dimensions? Normally, we think 
of the distinction between spatial frameworks having 1, 2, or 3 dimensions as 
being quite determinate in character. In comparison to answers that involve 
greater precision--spelled out in terms of a fifth decimal place, whole numbers 
no longer seem terribly precise or determinate.  We have to ask, if real space 
has 3 dimensions, then why is it a whole number and not an answer involving a 
decimal or fractional expression?


At the very least, it seems more natural to suppose space and time might have 
evolved by a process involving either an increase or a decrease in the number 
of dimensions--where the increase or decrease involved a continuous 
transformation rather than by great leaps via whole numbers.

--Jeff





Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2019 4:48:39 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang


Jeff, Jon, List,

It’s true that my suggestion of a radical split between the universes of 
discourse of physics and metaphysics oversimplifies the issues, as it tends to 
ignore not only the variety of metaphysical assumptions among physicists but 
also the variety and tentativity of Peirce’s own cosmological hypotheses. I’m 
looking forward to further inquiry along the lines Jeff has proposed.

Right now the only suggestion I can contribute is that a concept of time as a 
true topological continuum would be independent of scale, while any concept of 
historical time does have a fixed scale, which assigns the origin of the earth 
to around 5 billion years ago, the Big Bang to about 13.8 billion years ago, 
etc. You can’t have a scale in a temporal continuum without marking events in 
it and comparing the length of time between events, and those marks appear as 
discontinuities. To visualize an explanation of why we can’t locate the origin 
of “the universe” in continuous time, I sometimes use the analogy of “zooming 
in” on a representation of the Mandelbrot set: you can zoom in on any region 
forever (or you could if you had infinite computing power) without reaching an 
(“innermost”) end. (I wonder how the possibility of fractal dimensions would 
affect Jeff’s idea about the reduction of dimensions over time.)

I haven’t read the Quanta article yet and have a busy weekend ahead so this 
very rough sketch is all I can offer for awhile.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 23-Aug-19 12:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang



Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,



Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological 
metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As we 
know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, 
phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in 
cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put 
to the test in physics.



Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to 
address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the 
universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the 
big differences between the two types of inquiries is that m

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R., Jon S, Edwina, John S, List,


Keeping in mind the distinction that Peirce makes between metaphysical 
cosmology and physical cosmology, let me again stress a point made earlier. 
Instead of assuming that, at any point in his inquiries, Peirce typically 
affirmed one answer to each of the main questions in metaphysical cosmology, I 
tend to think that he explored a fairly wide range of possible answers.


In any given text, he often does spend more effort on one set of hypotheses and 
less on others. And, over the course of his career, he often does reassess the 
options he has considered up to that point. As a result of the inquiries, he 
does give greater weight to the plausibility of some metaphysical hypotheses as 
compared to others. In many cases where he might seem to be "taking a 
position", I find that he is merely pointing to defects in some of the 
hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses offered in the cosmological metaphysics of 
his time failed in some degree to explain phenomena that clearly called out for 
explanation (e.g., why does our common experience of time involve 1 ordered 
dimension and our experience of space involve 3 dimensions?) In some cases, the 
problematic hypotheses might have been amended to remedy such defects.


I tend to think that Peirce was remarkably sanguine about the fact that the big 
questions in metaphysics like "What is the origin of all things?" and "How did 
the universe evolve from such beginnings?" are the kinds of questions that get 
answered over the course of millennia by whole communities of inquirers and not 
by any individual during the course of a lifetime. As such, I am cautious about 
proclaiming that Peirce's position on these types of questions was, at some 
particular point in his career, "X" or that his final mature position was "Y". 
Rather, I think that he took his own advice on questions of metaphysics and 
tended to hold some metaphysical hypotheses as more plausible than others 
because they offered better explanations of the phenomena at hand or as worthy 
of our attention because they were easier to test.


I find it more interesting to articulate the reasons he offers for holding that 
one hypothetical explanation is better than other than to insist, on textual 
grounds, that some answer to a question was his considered and mature view. 
Clarity about the conceptions employed in the rival hypotheses comes from 
understanding those reasons and especially from seeing what we might do to put 
the rival explanations to the test.


So, here is a question. Consider two hypotheses: (a) the four dimensions of 
space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we live evolved by 
a process of an increase from a one-dimensional continuum and (b) the four 
dimensions of space and time that are characteristic of the world in which we 
lived are the result of a process of decrease from an objectively vague state 
having an infinite number of dimensions. What is the general trend:  an 
increase in dimensions from 1 to 4, or a decrease in dimensions from infinity 
to four? How might the rival metaphysical hypotheses be tested?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2019 3:00:16 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

Gary R., List:

One correction--CP 1.412 is from 1887-1888, not 1891, so it reflects an even 
earlier stage of Peirce's thinking on these matters than what he wrote in the 
Monist series.

Whether particular comments are snide, unprofessional, and/or insulting is in 
the eye of the beholder.  John Sowa and Gary Fuhrman suggested a couple of good 
List practices almost exactly a year ago, which I have tried (but sometimes 
failed) to employ ever since.

JFS:  Avoid the word 'you'.  Every occurrence of the word 'you' shifts the 
focus from the statement to the person who made the statement.  This 
immediately puts that person on the defensive--and the result is an escalating 
round of ad hominem attacks and defenses.

GF:  Do not take offense. If nobody takes offense, nobody can give offense, 
even if they are trying to. Those who are defensive about their own statements, 
on the other hand, will often take offense when none is intended. If we can 
avoid this, the impulse to give offense is likely to dry up, because the 
would-be offender will not succeed in getting the reaction he seeks.

Since you understandably (but mistakenly) thought that Edwina "actually quoted" 
me, for the record--yet again--here is what I actually said.

JAS:  Rational people are open to persuasion, rather than dogmatically 
maintaining their predetermined views regardless of the evidence.  Credible 
scholars ground their opinions about a past author in what his texts actually 
say, rather than projecting their predetermined views on 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce and the Big Bang

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,


Peirce engages in inquiries that fall under the headings "cosmological 
metaphysics" and "cosmological physics." (see, for example, CP 6.213,  As we 
know, he is drawing on a number of resources including mathematics, 
phenomenology and semiotics for the sake of directing the inquiries in 
cosmological metaphysics. In turn, those philosophical inquiries are being put 
to the test in physics.


Both the metaphysical and the physical inquiries in cosmology are attempting to 
address many of the same basic types of questions. What is the origin of the 
universe? What explains the historical development of the cosmos? One of the 
big differences between the two types of inquiries is that metaphysics draws on 
the common observations of ordinary experience, while physics draws on special 
observations in order to put its theories to the test.


As far as I am able to see, most cosmologists--ranging from Aristotle and 
Leibniz to Einstein and Hawking--draw on both philosophical and physical 
resources when framing the key questions and giving shape to their leading 
ideas. For the purposes of a science of review, Peirce thinks it is important 
to separate the two types of inquiry. Otherwise, we will run the risk of 
getting things out of order in ways that might bias and prejudice our inquiries.


Having said that much, I agree with John S in thinking that most of Peirce's 
explanations in his metaphysical and his physical inquiries in cosmology have 
the character of tentative hypothesis. What is more, Peirce often seems to be 
considering a wide range of hypotheses, many of which appear to be competing 
with each other. Some of the metaphysical hypotheses fit better with the best 
physical science of his day, but he is well aware that those theories were 
filled with vague ideas, had enormous gaps, and would likely be amended or 
replaced with better theories as inquiry proceeded. We might try to rate the 
key explanations he offers in his metaphysical and physical cosmological 
theories. For this purpose, we might employ the rating system he used in his 
inquiries in speculative grammar.


With respect to the conceptions employed and conceptual divisions made in the 
hypotheses under consideration at his time, we could label them in the 
following way:


   i. {d} for {délos}), clear 
apprehension of some,

 ii. {s} for {schedon}, almost 
clear,

iii. {m} for {metrios}, and a 
tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others

iv. {ch} for {chalepös} hardly 
better than {a}).

 v. {a} for {adélos}an 
unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others,


For my part, I would put a mark of a, ch, m or s to most of the conceptions 
that figure prominently in the hypotheses he offers, I and would put a mark of 
d to only a small number--at least as far as my own understanding of those 
conceptions goes.


If we compare Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to those that are under 
consideration today, then we have our work cut out for us. As far as I am able 
to tell, there appear to be a remarkable diversity of cosmological hypotheses 
that have been put forward for consideration by the community of physical 
cosmologists. In fact, there are so many that rest on such widely differing 
conceptions (e.g., of the nature of space and time), that it is hard to sort 
out the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the competing hypotheses.


As such, let's focus our discussion here on two hypotheses:  (a) the idea that 
the origin of the universe is in a singularity that changed abruptly at an 
event called the Big Bang and (b) the idea that the origin of the universe 
involves no such singularity and that the evolution of the cosmos from its 
origins involved a relatively smooth expansion of space over time. Let us call 
(a) the Hawking-Penrose abrupt change hypothesis and (b) the Hartle-Hawking 
smooth change hypothesis. Here is a popular summary of the two.


https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-debate-hawkings-idea-that-the-universe-had-no-beginning-20190606/

[https://d2r55xnwy6nx47.cloudfront.net/uploads/2019/06/Shuttlecock_Universe_1200_social.jpg]

Quanta 
Magazine
www.quantamagazine.org
A recent challenge to Stephen Hawking’s biggest idea — about how the universe 
might have come from nothing — has cosmologists choosing sides.

For those who are interested, the summary provides a link to the paper in which 
Hartle and Hawking formulated (b).


For the sake of comparing Peirce's cosmological hypotheses to (a) and (b), I'd 
be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Synechism Necessary? (was Lecture by Terrence Deacon)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


The questions lead, I think, to a natural progression.


1)  We seek a mathematically adequate conception of continuity for the sake of 
developing a sufficiently rich conception of continuity for inquiry in logic 
and semiotics.


2) In turn, we seek a logically adequate conception of continuity for the sake 
of developing a sufficiently rich conception of continuity for inquiry in 
metaphysics.


3) Finally, we seek a philosophical conception of continuity that is adequate 
for logic and metaphysics for the sake of developing a sufficiently rich 
conception of continuity for inquiries in the special sciences.


As such,  figuring out what conception of continuity is adequate for pure 
mathematics and, in turn in applied mathematics is essential.  For the sake of 
applying mathematics to positive questions in the sciences, a proper 
understanding of different kinds of mathematical models and forms of 
measurement are important for our inquiries in philosophy and the special 
sciences. After all, each of these cenoscopic or idioscopic sciences can be 
made rigorous only insofar as we are competent to employ the right sorts of 
mathematical models and forms of measurement in those areas of inquiry.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, August 3, 2019 5:09 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Synechism Necessary? (was Lecture by Terrence Deacon)

Jeff, List:

Thanks for your comments.  I agree that the contemporary field of mathematics 
still seems to be mostly wedded to the set-theoretical approach, although I 
wonder if category theory offers an alternative more conducive to Peirce's late 
"topological" conception of continuity; Fernando Zalamea, for one, seems to 
think so.  I tried to learn more about it a while back, but in all honesty, I 
never managed to attain a firm grasp of it.  As is presumably evident from my 
history of posts, personally I am more interested in your second and third 
questions.  From that standpoint, the possibility that set-theoretical notions 
might be sufficient for mathematically modeling continuity strikes me as 
largely beside the point.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 6:37 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon, List,

In the opening remarks of the last lecture in RLT, Peirce frames three 
questions. Let me restate them in my own words.

  1.   What conception of continuity is needed for mathematics?
  2.  What conception of continuity is needed for a philosophical theory of 
critical logic and the larger theory of semiotics?
  3.  What conception of continuity is needed for metaphysics?

We could add, what conception of continuity is needed for the special sciences, 
including the physical sciences as well as the human sciences?

Focusing on the first question, I don't think the ongoing disputes about what 
conception of continuity is needed, for instance, to ground the hypotheses that 
lie at the basis of the calculus are "much ado about nothing". In the late 19th 
and early 20th century, many mathematicians and philosophers tried to defend a 
general approach that grounds the calculus on set-theoretical notions 
concerning the limit. Peirce, on the other hand, argued that the conception of 
the infinitesimal is more fundamental and less problematic--logically speaking. 
Those questions have continued to call out for more inquiry in the latter part 
of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st.

I was in the audience when Matthew Moore delivered that presentation in Bogota. 
He seemed to be suggesting that set-theoretical notions involving certain types 
of infinity will suffice for all of mathematics. Given the fact that much 
inquiry in topology from the time of Poincaré to the present has moved in the 
direction of treating continuous paths and surfaces as point-sets, there are 
strong arguments that can be marshaled in support of this general approach to 
analyzing the mathematical conception of continuity as being sufficient for 
topology as well as for the calculus.

I don't buy those arguments, but they are probably the majority opinion in most 
mathematics departments in the U.S.

--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is Synechism Necessary? (was Lecture by Terrence Deacon)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


In the opening remarks of the last lecture in RLT, Peirce frames three 
questions. Let me restate them in my own words.


  1.   What conception of continuity is needed for mathematics?
  2.  What conception of continuity is needed for a philosophical theory of 
critical logic and the larger theory of semiotics?
  3.  What conception of continuity is needed for metaphysics?

We could add, what conception of continuity is needed for the special sciences, 
including the physical sciences as well as the human sciences?

Focusing on the first question, I don't think the ongoing disputes about what 
conception of continuity is needed, for instance, to ground the hypotheses that 
lie at the basis of the calculus are "much ado about nothing". In the late 19th 
and early 20th century, many mathematicians and philosophers tried to defend a 
general approach that grounds the calculus on set-theoretical notions 
concerning the limit. Peirce, on the other hand, argued that the conception of 
the infinitesimal is more fundamental and less problematic--logically speaking. 
Those questions have continued to call out for more inquiry in the latter part 
of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st.

I was in the audience when Matthew Moore delivered that presentation in Bogota. 
He seemed to be suggesting that set-theoretical notions involving certain types 
of infinity will suffice for all of mathematics. Given the fact that much 
inquiry in topology from the time of Poincaré to the present has moved in the 
direction of treating continuous paths and surfaces as point-sets, there are 
strong arguments that can be marshaled in support of this general approach to 
analyzing the mathematical conception of continuity as being sufficient for 
topology as well as for the calculus.

I don't buy those arguments, but they are probably the majority opinion in most 
mathematics departments in the U.S.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, August 3, 2019 3:55 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Is Synechism Necessary? (was Lecture by Terrence Deacon)

List:

The new subject line is the title of the paper by Matthew E. Moore that I 
quoted below.  It turns out that there are two versions available online--the 
original, delivered as a conference presentation in 2012 
(https://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures_papers/mattew-moore-paper.pdf),
 and a somewhat longer text that appeared in a 2013 issue of Cognitio 
(http://revistas.pucsp.br/cognitiofilosofia/article/download/16603/12457).  
Moore gives a negative answer to his own question, provocatively suggesting 
that continuity can be eliminated as a core component of Peirce's late 
philosophical system.  However, he focuses specifically on the 
"supermultitudinous" conception of continuity, rooted in Peirce's mathematical 
theory of collections, as deployed in the 1903 Harvard Lectures.

My response is that this is effectively much ado about nothing--as I already 
noted in a recent 
post, Peirce 
himself abandoned (or at least significantly modified) the "supermultitudinous" 
conception around 1906, adopting instead the "topological" conception as dubbed 
by Jerome Havenel in his 2008 paper, "Peirce's Clarifications of Continuity" 
(http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.9336=rep1=pdf).
  Again, the difference between the two is what I have in mind when contrasting 
a "bottom-up" approach with a "top-down" one--for any discrete collection, the 
parts are real and the whole is an ens rationis; but for any true continuum, 
the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis.  The latter obviously 
cannot be derived from the former; a continuum is not properly characterized as 
an aggregate of parts, even if those parts are considered potential rather than 
actual.

CSP:  I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite parts, although 
to endow it with definite parts of no matter what multitude, and even parts of 
lesser dimensionality down to absolute simplicity, it is only necessary that 
these should be marked off, and although even the operation of thought suffices 
to impart an approach to definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.
*This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not a 
real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another does 
not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. It shows, too, 
that Continuity is of a Rational nature. But it conveys no gleam of evidence 
that Continuity itself is Unreal ... (S30 [Copy T:6-7]; c. 1906)

Although Moore briefly acknowledges this later "topological" conception of 
continuity, he makes no attempt to assess whether it might have been able to do 
the work in 1903 for which he 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

is not purely dyadic: it is a relation 
through a sign: that is why it is dicible. Consequently the relation involved 
in duality is not dicible, but surd; and duality must contain as an ingredient 
of it a surd disquiparance.  ] EP2:382-3]

The quote from EP2:304 included in your post, Jon, refers to such a surd, 
dyadic relation as an “experiential reaction,” the only source of “direct 
knowledge of real objects.” As you said yourself, “Peirce required direct 
experience for all knowledge. See http://gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#dirxp for 
more of Peirce’s remarks on direct experience.

JAS: Both [common nouns and proper names] are represented in EGs by labeled 
Spots, and therefore correspond to general concepts;

GF: I don’t think so; I think proper names are represented in EGs, if at all, 
by Selectives. Spots represent rhemes, i.e. predicates, which are always 
general, unlike the Selectives, which ‘name’ lines of identity when they need 
to be distinguished from other lines.

Finally, Jon, your closing sentence quotes Peirce’s own statement of what I’ve 
been saying all along, that the ultimate meaning of religious concepts consists 
not in their conveying theoretical knowledge of an external Object but in their 
influence on the conduct of their interpreters: “After all, he explicitly 
considered his (Retroductive) Neglected Argument for the Reality of God to be 
‘the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very 
highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the 
self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life’ (CP 6.480, EP 2:446; 1908).

Now to Jeff’s post, with its extended quote from Peirce that includes a 
plethora of important points about “Meaning.” Jeff has pointed out some of the 
implications; here I’ll only focus on one sentence: “If a Sign is other than 
its Object, there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some 
explanation or argument or other context, showing how, upon what system or for 
what reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.”

If we consider signs as systems, we can view them as organized in holarchies, 
to use the term coined by Arthur Koestler. Every complex system can be analyzed 
into subsystems, but it also functions as a whole within the larger system 
which is its context. In Peirce’s scenario, this is an explanatory context, but 
as Jeff says, it raises questions about any case where a sign is part of 
another sign — which I would say is the usual situation if the sign is a symbol 
such as a proposition or an argument. The Universe as Sign, being a “text 
without a context” (as Thomas Berry says), would be an exception, maybe the 
only exception.

In living holarchies at least, the various levels of the holarchy are discrete 
in re and not as entia rationis, as sign and object are when the one is 
external to the other. This makes them discontinuous — but when the holons are 
nested within one another, the causal/determinative relations between levels 
may very well be continuous. These systemic causal relations are quite complex, 
as Peirce explains in “New Elements” (EP2:315). Even when operating at the same 
level in a holarchy, like concepts represented on the recto of an EG, they may 
be mutually determinative, as Peirce observes in the conclusion of his 1906 
“Prolegomena” (CP 4.572). All of this suggests that the requirement for the 
Object to be necessarily other than the Sign is not only “perhaps arbitrary,” 
as Peirce says, but vastly oversimplified in the case of complex and recursive 
sign systems.

I feel I’m not explaining this very well, so maybe it would be better for 
interested readers to just read again and ponder CP 2.230 as quoted by Jeff 
(below). By the way, according to Cornelis de Waal (2014), that passage is an 
excerpt from R 637, written in October 1909.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 20-May-19 23:58
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited



Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List



I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an 
object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim 
that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the 
object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the 
kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the 
sign.



This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual 
objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in 
the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a 
dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the 
object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the 
two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold.



If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

eran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 10:58 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List

I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an 
object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim 
that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the 
object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the 
kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the 
sign.

This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual 
objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in 
the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a 
dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the 
object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the 
two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold.

If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of a 
sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this question 
about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our attention on the 
following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from 1910:  "But in order 
that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, 
called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its 
Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make 
an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign."

Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted:

SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS

The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, 
or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not 
imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or 
pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when 
it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means 
"rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it 
refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must 
"represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the 
condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, 
since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a 
Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a 
character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the 
very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the 
crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On 
a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all 
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that 
represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A 
sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," 
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not 
regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of 
objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and 
often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the 
sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, 
there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or 
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the 
Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the 
Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a 
Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together 
with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding 
in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, 
containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and 
according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. 
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a 
Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of 
emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic 
might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter 
in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn 
away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of 
such whole. If the Si

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, John S, Edwina, Gary R, List


I'd like to raise some questions about the assertion that every sign has an 
object that is separate, in some sense, from that sign. The basis of the claim 
that the object must be separate from the sign, I am supposing, is that the 
object determines the sign. As a matter of principle, an object cannot be the 
kind of thing that determines a sign if that object is not separate from the 
sign.


This assertion seems, at least to me, to be clearest in the case of the actual 
objects that determine indexical sinsigns--where the objects and signs stand in 
the relation of agent and patient. This type of relation is classified as a 
dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered. For this type of sign, the 
object, as agent, cannot determine the indexical sinsign, as patient, if the 
two are identical. Diversity is requisite for the relation to hold.


If we can all agree on this much, then what shall we say about the case of a 
sign that is part of a sign? In order to anchor the discussion of this question 
about Peirce's semiotics in a text, l'd like to focus our attention on the 
following clarification that is offered in "Meaning" from 1910:  "But in order 
that anything should be a Sign, it must "represent," as we say, something else, 
called its Object, although the condition that a Sign must be other than its 
Object is perhaps arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make 
an exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign."


Here is the larger paragraph from which this sentence has been abstracted:


SIGNS AND THEIR OBJECTS



The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only imaginable, 
or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "fast," which is a Sign, is not 
imaginable, since it is not this word itself that can be set down on paper or 
pronounced, but only an instance of it, and since it is the very same word when 
it is written as it is when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means 
"rapidly" and quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it 
refers to abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must 
"represent," as we say, something else, called its Object, although the 
condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps arbitrary, 
since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an exception in the case of a 
Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts a 
character in an historical drama from carrying as a theatrical "property" the 
very relic that that article is supposed merely to represent, such as the 
crucifix that Bulwer's Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On 
a map of an island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all 
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not, that 
represents qua place on the map, the very same point qua place on the island. A 
sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed Abel," 
which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not 
regarded as it should, as having "a killing" as a third Object. But the set of 
objects may be regarded as making up one complex Object. In what follows and 
often elsewhere Signs will be treated as having but one object each for the 
sake of dividing difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, 
there must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or 
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what reason the 
Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does. Now the Sign and the 
Explanation together make up another Sign, and since the explanation will be a 
Sign, it will probably require an additional explanation, which taken together 
with the already enlarged Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding 
in the same way, we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, 
containing its own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and 
according to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object. 
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may call a 
Precept of explanation according to which it is to be understood as a sort of 
emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the Sign be an Icon, a scholastic 
might say that the "species" of the Object emanating from it found its matter 
in the Icon. If the Sign be an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn 
away from the Object, the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of 
such whole. If the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the 
"ratio," or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course, 
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) [CP 2.230]


Consider the three examples Peirce offers to illustrate this point about a sign 
that is part of a sign:


a)   "Thus nothing prevents the actor who acts 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Edwina, List,


I accept the claim that the sign is the first correlate of a genuinely triadic 
relation with respect to its object and interpretant. Having said that, some 
signs have the character of necessitants. These include legisigns, symbols, 
arguments. For signs that have these three characteristics, do they have the 
internal structure of a triadic relation connecting its parts? I think the 
answer is "yes". As such, some signs consist of triadic relations--even if they 
are the first correlate of a further triadic relation.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was 
Continuity...

Edwina, List:

Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of these 
terms.  Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant (CP 
2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or "Sign" and 
"Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905).  He never--not once--used "Sign" 
for a triad, since a triad is always a relation, while a Sign is always a 
correlate.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:29 PM Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am 
talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the Representamen, 
of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between the two and even 
to acknowledge the vital role of the full semiosic triad.

Edwina

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, List,


I recommend adding Emerson's essay "The Poet" to your list of resources on 
trinitarianism.


On a personal note, I was once asked to give a few presentations to a Unitarian 
Universalist congregation when they were without a pastor. I offered to give 
one on a defense of trinitarianism based on Emerson's remarks in "The Poet". 
One reason I wanted to give a presentation on that topic is that Emerson, 
himself, was a Unitarian minister. He gave up that ministry, in part, because 
of his attraction to certain patterns concerning what appears to be first, 
second and third in a number of different cultural traditions. As such, I 
thought it would be fun to explore his ideas on the topic.


Here is one particularly interesting passage from "The Poet":


For the Universe has three children, born at one time, which reappear under 
different names in every system of thought, whether they be called cause, 
operation and effect; or, more poetically, Jove, Pluto, Neptune; or, 
theologically, the Father, the Spirit and the Son; but which we will call here 
the Knower, the Doer and the Sayer. These stand respectively for the love of 
truth, for the love of good, and for the love of beauty. These three are equal. 
Each is that which he is, essentially, so that he cannot be surmounted or 
analyzed, and each of these three has the power of the others latent in him and 
his own, patent.


The poet is the sayer, the namer, and represents beauty. He is a sovereign, and 
stands on the centre. For the world is not painted or adorned, but is from the 
beginning beautiful; and God has not made some beautiful things, but Beauty is 
the creator of the universe. Therefore the poet is not any permissive 
potentate, but is emperor in his own right.


For better or worse, my offer to give a presentation on that topic was turned 
down by the committee.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 9:45:11 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric, was, 
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Jon, Gary f, Jeff, John, Edwina, List,

In this message I would once again like to suggest that the idea of trinity 
'properly understood'--by which I mean understood in a Peircean 
semeiotic/metaphysical sense--has the potential to contribute to a shared 
understanding which could facilitate that rapprochement of science and religion 
which Peirce imagined was yet possible. However, it seems important before 
attempting to go further with that challenging project that some other not 
unrelated work on trinity be considered as background.

I earlier mentioned Richard Rohr https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Rohr
Richard Rohr
en.wikipedia.org
Richard Rohr (born 1943) is an American author, spiritual writer, and 
Franciscan friar based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He was ordained to the 
priesthood...


as a contemporary of advocate of trinitarian thinking. Commenting on the work 
of another trinitarian of some note, Rohr wrote:

Raimundo (or Raimon) Panikkar (1918–2010). born to a Spanish Roman Catholic 
mother and an Indian Hindu father. . .  saw Trinity not as a uniquely Christian 
idea but as the very structure of reality. For him the Trinity overcame the 
challenges of monism (undifferentiated oneness), dualism (separation of sacred 
and profane), and pantheism (God and creation are indistinguishable). Richard 
Rohr, Newletter Archive, https://cac.org/category/daily-meditations/
Daily Meditations Archives — Center for Action and 
Contemplation
cac.org
Over the course of the 2019 Daily Meditations, Richard Rohr mines the depths of 
his Christian tradition through his Franciscan and contemplative lens. Each 
week builds on previous topics, but you can join at any time! Learn more about 
this year’s theme—Old and New: An Evolving Faith—watch a short intro, and 
explore recent reflections. Scroll down to read the most recent post. Sign up 
to receiveFr. Richard’s free messages in your email Inbox every day or at 
the end of each week. Select the email frequency that works best for you Please 
select... Daily Meditations Weekly Meditation Summary Monthly Newsletter First 
Name Last Name Email Re-Enter Email Phone Numbers only; no punctuation Country 
Please select... Afghanistan Albania Algeria American Samoa Andorra Angola 
Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia 
Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize 
Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana B



As I recently noted, Cynthia Bourgeault commenting on Ranikkar's idea of 
Cosmotheandric, writes:

Cosmotheandric is the term Panikkar invents to describe this dynamic relational 
ground. The word 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, Gary F, Jon S, Edwina, Gary R, List,


In addition to the suggestions John Sowa has offered for profitably reading 
textual fragments that pertain to difficult philosophical questions--such as 
questions about the common sense belief in God--I would add the following.


As we all know, Peirce often is directly engaging with the history of 
philosophy. Over the course of his writings, he is explicitly responding to the 
arguments of classical philosophers (e.g., Plato and Aristotle), medieval 
philosophers (e.g., Scotus and Ockham) and modern philosophers (e.g., Leibniz, 
Hume, Berkeley) on a wide range of questions that bear on the legitimacy of the 
common sense  notion of God. As such, we should try to reconstruct the 
development of Peirce's ideas on these big questions as being responsive to the 
various arguments other philosophers have made.


Here is one such historical strand I'd like to trace out a bit further. If one 
were to treat aesthetic, ethical and logical ideals that Peirce tries to give 
expression to in the normative sciences as being (1) perfect and (2) real, what 
would be the status of something--call it what you will--that is perfect in all 
three respects? As perfect, it would appear that such a unitary "thing" would 
not be immanent in the universe  as it is found at any time in its history. 
This holds both for (a) the three universes of the experience of cognitive 
beings like us and (b) for the real universe as it is independent of the way we 
might represent it at some point in our inquiries. The three universes of 
experience would not measure up because each is less than perfect. So, too, 
with the real universe as exists at any time.  In its actuality, it is clearly 
less than perfect. What is more, if the real laws of nature are all evolving, 
none are perfect. As perfect and ideal, that "thing" would appear to be 
timeless, in some sense. Kant follows the Latin tradition (e.g., of Aquinas) in 
calling the notion of what is perfect as the most encompassing Ideal an ens 
necessarium.


There are different ways of trying to explicate the idea that God is not 
immanent in the space and time of our universe. One such way is to suggest that 
God is somewhere else--perhaps in a different, more heavenly, universe. Another 
way of coming at the question, Kant suggests, is to note how the laws of logic 
apply to different sorts of things. Normally, we say that, for an individual  
subject, any given predicate or its opposite must apply. Kant points out that, 
for some things, there is a third possibility. There are some things (e.g., 
those that are taken to be infinite) to which the logical laws of 
non-contradiction and excluded middle do not apply in the normal way. Instead 
of saying of a thing that it is X or that it is not X, we say that the 
predicate X does not apply. Might such a point hold for predicates that involve 
temporal and spatial location? That which is infinite and perfect may be the 
kind of thing to which the representation of time and space as a whole does not 
apply.


Like Kant, Peirce affirms the need for a Platonic notion of one thing that is 
perfect and paradigmatic in its character as the full realization of truth, 
beauty and goodness. Like Plato, Kant and Peirce treat our Idea of such a 
perfect "thing" as a hypothesis. Kant argues that a hypothesis concerning what 
is most ideal is essential for schematizing the regulative principles that 
guide our lives. In effect, we need an iconic representation as a hypotyposis 
of the regulative Ideas. The hypotyposis is required as a standard for 
correctly applying regulative principles to individual cases.


If Peirce goes further than Kant in treating the ideal of what is most perfect 
as metaphysically real, then how can it be causally efficacious? Drawing on 
Aristotle's classification of different types of causes, it would seem to 
function as a final and formal cause and not as an efficient or material cause. 
In making such a metaphysical claim, I would expect Peirce's arguments for the 
legitimacy of such a hypothesis to be responsive to the objections Kant 
develops in the Dialectic of the first Critique. In that section, Kant gives 
objections to the traditional versions of the ontological, cosmological and 
teleological arguments for the existence of God. Out of curiosity, is the 
"semiotic" argument for the reality of God immune to these Kantian objections?


When reading the NA, my interpretative strategy is to anticipate various sorts 
of consonance between Peirce's points and the positive arguments Kant offers 
for treating God as a practical postulate in the second Critique and as an 
aesthetic and teleological hypothesis in the third Critique. On this sort of 
reading, Peirce is starting with a close and sustained examination at the 
observational basis for the common sense ideas that appear to be wrapped up in 
traditional conceptions of God.


These common-sense ideas include the 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


The ISP list indicates that Peirce provided definitions for both words. I'll 
leave the several definitions of the word "transcendent" to the side--despite 
the fact that the contrast may be enlightening.


Immanent:  Remaining within; indwelling.


There are a few passages from different sources illustrating the uses of the 
term. I'm not able to copy them (no djvu reader), and I won't bother to type 
them out. The first is particularly germane to this discussion. The contrasting 
terms with respect to the possible character of God's creation are immanent and 
transient. The term appears to take its root in a medieval interpretation of 
Aristotle's distinction between doing and making. It is in the modern 
philosophical discussion where the word "immanent" comes to be understood in 
organic terms.


The first definition of "create" which Peirce also provided, seems to stress 
the existence of what is created and the existence of the matter from which it 
is, or isn't made.


--Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 8:52 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Jeff, List:

It would be helpful if you could provide those actual definitions, and also 
confirm that Peirce is the one who wrote them.  Only "immanent" is strictly 
relevant, since Peirce used it himself in the four manuscript drafts for "A 
Neglected Argument" that I have been citing.  Moreover, my Semeiotic 
Argumentation does not rely on either word; what matters is that every Sign is 
determined by an Object other than itself--i.e., the Object is always external 
to, independent of, and unaffected by the Sign.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 10:05 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, Gary R, all,

For those who insist that the "semiotic" argument that God is transcendent and 
not immanent is a good argument (i.e., that the universe is a vast sign, and 
every sign must have an object distinct from itself), let me ask:  what 
conception of immanence and transcendence do you have in mind? Peirce provides 
definitions of these two terms in the Century Dictionary. There are a number of 
senses from which to pick. Which do you have in mind when you make that 
argument? Which of those senses do you take to be informing Peirce's remarks in 
the NA and elsewhere that God is not being conceived in such a way as to be 
immanent in the universe, the cosmos, nature, the three universes of 
experience, or what have you?

Consider the ideals of beauty, goodness and truth. In what sense are such 
ideals immanent or transcendent with respect their being in, a part of, or 
separate from the universe, the cosmos, nature, the three universes of 
experience, or what have you?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary R, all,


For those who insist that the "semiotic" argument that God is transcendent and 
not immanent is a good argument (i.e., that the universe is a vast sign, and 
every sign must have an object distinct from itself), let me ask:  what 
conception of immanence and transcendence do you have in mind? Peirce provides 
definitions of these two terms in the Century Dictionary. There are a number of 
senses from which to pick. Which do you have in mind when you make that 
argument? Which of those senses do you take to be informing Peirce's remarks in 
the NA and elsewhere that God is not being conceived in such a way as to be 
immanent in the universe, the cosmos, nature, the three universes of 
experience, or what have you?


Consider the ideals of beauty, goodness and truth. In what sense are such 
ideals immanent or transcendent with respect their being in, a part of, or 
separate from the universe, the cosmos, nature, the three universes of 
experience, or what have you?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2019 7:12:59 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Gary R., Edwina, List:

ET:  Peirce specifically says that the term Mind is an analogy with the term of 
'God'.
GR:  Where does he say this?

I was wondering about that, as well.  My best guess is that it is a 
misunderstanding of this passage that I quoted yesterday.

CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can only 
say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may deeply 
influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his portrait may 
make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson enabled poor Boswell 
to write an immortal book and a really sublime book, just as long study of the 
works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance, so if contemplation and study 
of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct 
analogous to the influence of a great man's works or conversation, then that 
analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that any human attribute is 
literally applicable--is what he means by "God." Of course, various great 
theologians explain that one cannot attribute reason to God, nor perception 
(which always involves an element of surprise and of learning what one did not 
know), and, in short, that his "mind" is necessarily so unlike ours, that 
some--though wrongly--high in the church say that it is only negatively, as 
being entirely different from everything else, that we can attach any meaning 
to the Name. This is not so; because the discoveries of science, their enabling 
us to predict what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, 
though we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His 
Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906, bold added)

What is the reference of "that analogue of a mind," which is "what he [a 
pragmaticist] means by 'God'"?  A cursory reading might take it to be "the 
physico-psychical universe," and thus misinterpret Peirce as saying that the 
Universe itself is God.  However, as I already pointed out, the entire long 
sentence draws parallels between different Signs whose Objects are persons.  A 
portrait is a Sign of "a man of great character," Boswell's "really sublime 
book" is a Sign of Dr. Johnson, and "the works of Aristotle" are a Sign of 
their author; and in each case, the Sign conveys knowledge of the person.  
Likewise, "the physico-psychical universe" is not itself God, but rather a Sign 
of God that conveys knowledge of Him.  We "catch a fragment of His Thought" 
through "contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe," which 
enables us "to predict what will be the course of nature," even though we 
cannot predict the conduct of God Himself (cf. CP 6.489; 1908).

ET:  Jon interprets the Peircean axiom that the Universe is composed of Signs 
AND the axiom that all Signs require an external Object to mean that the 
Universe as a Sign requires an external Object, aka, God, external to the 
Universe.

I am not sure that Peirce would agree with the characterization of these 
propositions as "axioms."  In any case, what is missing here is the theorem 
that "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system 
constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; 1904).  Therefore, if "the Universe is 
composed of Signs," then the Universe "constitutes one sign"; and if the 
Universe constitutes one Sign, then it "requires an external Object."  Again, 
the only way to avoid this deductive conclusion is to deny one of the 
premisses--i.e., claim either that the Universe is not composed of Signs, or 
that some Signs do not have external Objects, both of which would be clear and 
obvious departures from Peirce's stated 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

ent, it would seem to 
follow that it must be Insufficient. I ought to apologize for introducing such 
Buffoonery into serious lectures. I do so because I seriously believe that a 
bit of fun helps thought and tends to keep it pragmatical ...
It is therefore the precise analogue of pure self-consciousness. As such it is 
self-sufficient. It is saved from being insufficient, that is as no 
representation at all, by the circumstance that it is not all-sufficient, that 
is, is not a complete representation but is only a point upon a continuous map. 
(CP 5.71; 1903)

This hypothetical example is intended to illustrate something about the most 
degenerate 3ns, a 1ns representing itself to itself, which is all that a 
quality can do--like the point that is contained in all of the maps, which is 
the map of itself.  By contrast, Peirce considered the Universe to be a Symbol 
and an Argument, thus exemplifying genuine 3ns; and in any case, again, he 
explicitly ruled out panentheism by emphatically denying that God is immanent 
in Nature or the three Universes.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 1:40 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, List,

Consider the following sort of sign:

Imagine that upon the soil of a country, that has a single boundary line … [and 
on the ground] there lies a map of that same country. This map may distort the 
different provinces of the country to any extent. But I shall suppose that it 
represents every part of the country that has a single boundary, by a part of 
the map that has a single boundary, that every part is represented as bounded 
by such parts as it really is bounded by, that every point of the country is 
represented by a single point of the map, and that every point of the map 
represents a single point in the country. Let us further suppose that this map 
is infinitely minute in its representation so that there is no speck on any 
grain of sand in the country that could not be seen represented upon the map if 
we were to examine it under a sufficiently high magnifying power. Since, then, 
everything on the soil of the country is shown on the map, and since the map 
lies on the soil of the country, the map itself will be portrayed in the map, 
and in this map of the map everything on the soil of the country can be 
discerned, including the map itself with the map of the map within its 
boundary. Thus there will be within the map, a map of the map, and within that, 
a map of the map of the map, and so on ad infinitum. These maps being each 
within the preceding ones of the series, there will be a point contained in all 
of them, and this will be the map of itself. Each map which directly or 
indirectly represents the country is itself mapped in the next; i.e., in the 
next [it] is represented to be a map of the country. In other words each map is 
interpreted as such in the next. We may therefore say that each is a 
representation of the country to the next map; and that point that is in all 
the maps is in itself the representation of nothing but itself and to nothing 
but itself. [CP 5.71]

In addition to representing each part of the country, the map seems to 
represents itself. As such, a part of the map is the object of the map, 
considered as a sign. What is more, the map appears to contain an 
interpretation of itself, and endlessly so. Insofar as the map lies on the 
ground of the country, it is a part of that country.

How might we analyze the relations between the objects, signs, and 
interpretants involved in this sort of self-referential case? Does it make any 
difference as to whether we focus on the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
functions of the map in its relation to itself?

Yours,

Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


Consider the following sort of sign:


Imagine that upon the soil of a country, that has a single boundary line … [and 
on the ground] there lies a map of that same country. This map may distort the 
different provinces of the country to any extent. But I shall suppose that it 
represents every part of the country that has a single boundary, by a part of 
the map that has a single boundary, that every part is represented as bounded 
by such parts as it really is bounded by, that every point of the country is 
represented by a single point of the map, and that every point of the map 
represents a single point in the country. Let us further suppose that this map 
is infinitely minute in its representation so that there is no speck on any 
grain of sand in the country that could not be seen represented upon the map if 
we were to examine it under a sufficiently high magnifying power. Since, then, 
everything on the soil of the country is shown on the map, and since the map 
lies on the soil of the country, the map itself will be portrayed in the map, 
and in this map of the map everything on the soil of the country can be 
discerned, including the map itself with the map of the map within its 
boundary. Thus there will be within the map, a map of the map, and within that, 
a map of the map of the map, and so on ad infinitum. These maps being each 
within the preceding ones of the series, there will be a point contained in all 
of them, and this will be the map of itself. Each map which directly or 
indirectly represents the country is itself mapped in the next; i.e., in the 
next [it] is represented to be a map of the country. In other words each map is 
interpreted as such in the next. We may therefore say that each is a 
representation of the country to the next map; and that point that is in all 
the maps is in itself the representation of nothing but itself and to nothing 
but itself. [CP 5.71]


In addition to representing each part of the country, the map seems to 
represents itself. As such, a part of the map is the object of the map, 
considered as a sign. What is more, the map appears to contain an 
interpretation of itself, and endlessly so. Insofar as the map lies on the 
ground of the country, it is a part of that country.


How might we analyze the relations between the objects, signs, and 
interpretants involved in this sort of self-referential case? Does it make any 
difference as to whether we focus on the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
functions of the map in its relation to itself?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2019 11:04 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

John, List:

JAS:  I did not claim that my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God is 
unavoidable; I said that it furnishes what seems to me to be the unavoidable 
answer to the specific question that I had just posed--if the entire Universe 
is a Sign, then what is its Object?

JFS:  The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is a sign of 
itself -- it's a sinsign.  That observation ties up the loose ends.  To go 
further is an unjustified assumption.

No, that answer is obviously incorrect, since every Sign--including every 
Sinsign or Token--is determined by an Object other than itself.  I already 
acknowledged that every Sign is its own Object in a trivial sense, but if it 
has no other Object, then it does not represent anything or mediate between two 
other correlates in a genuine triadic relation--i.e., it is not a Sign at all.

JFS:  Peirce merely said "ens necessarium and creator of the three universes".  
That definition is consistent with many hypotheses, and there is no clear 
reason for choosing any one:  (1) Pantheism, God = Universe.  (2) God is 
transcendent -- outside of the universe.  (3) God is inside (a part of) the 
universe.  (4) God is ineffable, and wherever or whatever God may be, no sign 
can describe God.  (5) God does not exist -- as Peirce himself said, all 
theories are fallible.

Again, (1) and (3) are ruled out by classifying the Universe as a Sign, as well 
as by the designation of God as "creator of all three Universes of Experience," 
since the creator of X obviously cannot be X itself, let alone merely part of 
X.  Moreover, as I apparently have to keep repeating and will finally here 
quote, Peirce explicitly denied that God is "immanent in" nature or the three 
Universes in four different drafts of "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  I do not mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is 
"immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of 
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them. (R 843:11)

CSP:  Indeed, meaning by "God," throughout this paper will be meant, the Being 
whose 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

hat I see between the law of inertia and the law of 
gravity is that, on Peirce's account, the former is governed by (if you will) a 
logical law of deductive demonstration. As such, the law is taken to be 
unchanging in its form.

The law of gravity, on the other hand, might very well continue to evolve. For 
instance, gravitational "constant" in Newton's version of the law might be 
evolving. Furthermore, it's being an inverse square law and not an inverse of a 
2.1 power might not be fixed. Rather, the inverse power relation (as a function 
of distance) might be evolving.

The fundamental law governing the evolution of the law of gravity is, on 
Peirce's account, the one law of mind. On my reading of this text, we can 
understand that law to be an objective manifestation of the one law of logic. 
In this case, the third clause that is governing the law of gravity is not one 
of deductive demonstration. Rather, it is one that brings abductive and 
inductive patterns of inference to bear on the ongoing formation of the spatial 
and temporal habits in their relations to the distribution of mass both locally 
and globally (e.g., understood in terms of the paths that are possible through 
a given space).

There appears to be a difference between the operation of these laws. The law 
of inertia is, at this point in the history of the universe, relatively static 
and dead. For the most part, it operates in an efficient, mechanical, linear, 
conservative manner. The law of gravity, on the other hand, continues to 
evolve. As a law, it appears to have some sort of life.

Is the claim that the law of inertia seems to govern the motions of masses in a 
manner that is akin to a form of logical demonstration, while the law of 
gravity seems to govern the relations between space and mass in a manner that 
is akin to a form of logical abduction and/or induction testable as a 
hypothesis? My hunch is that it is a testable hypothesis.

Yours,

Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, May 12, 2019 11:57 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

Jeff, List:

JD:  I take the expression of the conditional to involve a genuinely triadic 
relation because there is a law that governs the relation.

What is the warrant for taking every relation that is governed by a law to be 
genuinely triadic on that sole basis?  On the contrary, most (if not all) 
dyadic relations that we encounter in experience are governed by laws in some 
way, but we still classify them as dyadic because they have exactly two 
correlates; the law itself is not a third correlate.

CSP:  Any dynamic action--say, the attraction by one particle of another--is in 
itself dyadic. It is governed by a law; but that law no more furnishes a 
correlate to the relation than the vote of a legislator which insures a bill's 
becoming a statute makes him a participator in the blow of the swordsman who, 
in obedience to the warrant issued after conviction according to that statute, 
strikes off the head of a condemned man. (CP 6.330; 1908)

Even a degenerate dyadic relation is governed by a law; e.g., the hardness of a 
diamond consists in the truth of the conditional proposition that if it were to 
be rubbed with another substance, it would resist scratching.  Are there any 
passages in Peirce's writings where he characterized a relation with exactly 
two correlates as triadic?

JD:  I take the EGs to be topological in character. As a formal system, they 
are based on the notion of relations of composition and transformation that 
hold between areas on a sheet of assertion that is, itself, continuous. Various 
discontinuities are introduced onto the sheet to represent what is existing and 
discrete as individuals, but the continuity of this type of logical system is 
central and not peripheral.

EGs represent the relations of (ter)coexistence and (ter)identity as 
continuous--we can always add another Graph to the Sheet of Assertion, and we 
can always add another branch to any Line of Identity--but they do not 
represent the process of semeiosis as continuous.  Instead, they represent a 
hypothetical instantaneous state of an Argument, and the transformation to a 
subsequent state is always by means of discrete steps.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 10:22 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, List,

JD:  In the Prolegomena, Peirce uses the modal tincture of Fur as a means of 
expressing intentions in the gamma system. The pattern of ermine (or the color 
yellow), is used to r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, John S, List,



GF: the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible with 
Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But i put 
the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as a 
testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of pragmatism. 
To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I do find in Peirce 
but not in my own feelings or beliefs.


JD:  For both Peirce and Kant, the regulative principles for scientific inquiry 
are akin to practical postulates. They are general rules that are adopted for 
the sake of regulating our conduct. In addition to regulating inquiry, they may 
also function as explanatory hypotheses that can be tested against common 
experience in metaphysics and against specialized forms of observation in the 
special sciences. Peirce affirms this in "The Logic of Mathematics, an 
attempt..." when he claims that Metaphysics consists in the results of the 
absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but 
as truths of being." [CP 1.486]

I'd like better to understand how Peirce's account of the law of metaphysics is 
modeled on his account of the law of logic. Here is the summary statement of 
the three clauses in each of those laws.

Law of Logic:

Monadic clause: is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry 
properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate 
indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with 
respect to each predicate.

Dyadic clause: there are two and but two possible determinations of each 
subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not 
only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by 
the double prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and 
second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and 
negative, but it is either one or the other. A third limiting form of 
determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose 
mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative 
zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an 
inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one.

Triadic clause:  the triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three 
elements in truth, (a) the idea, or predicate, (b) the fact or subject, (c) the 
thought which originally put them together and recognizes they are together; 
from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential process 
which either first follows the order of involution from living thought or 
ruling law, and existential case under the condition of the law to the 
predication of the idea of the law in that case [abduction]; or second, 
proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of that law in an 
existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the condition of the 
law [deductive demonstration]; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an 
existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of the 
idea of that law in that case to the living law itself [induction]. Thus the 
law of logic governs the relations of different predicates of one subject. [CP 
1.485]


Law of metaphysics:

Monadic clause:  accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an 
explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is 
to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; 
and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an 
identical being. This, or something like this, is the monadic clause of the law.

Dyadic clause:  second, drawing a general induction from all observed facts, we 
find all realization of existence lies in opposition, such as attractions, 
repulsions, visibilities, and centres of potentiality generally. »The very 
hyssop on the wall grows in that chink because the whole universe could not 
prevent its growing.« This is, or is a part of, a dyadic clause of the law.



Triadic clause:  under the third clause, we have, as a deduction from the 
principle that thought is the mirror of being, the law that the end of being 
and highest reality is the living impersonation of the idea that evolution 
generates. Whatever is real is the law of something less real. [CP 1.486]

What are the implications of there being three clauses for both of these laws? 
Does the division into three clauses provide us with any suggestions for 
thinking about the manner in which laws govern facts? The last assertion in the 
third clause is interesting. It seems to reflect the idea that laws form an 
interconnected system, and they govern the relations between individual facts 
in virtue of such systematic relations between laws of differing degrees of 
generality.

What guidance does this regulative principle offer 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

th utterer and interpreter in an ongoing dialogue in each of the 
three periods in the history of the universe? In what respects might it be in 
error about the laws of logic?


Yours,


Jeff



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2019 11:19 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

Jeff, List:

JD:  ... is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe 
initially uttered?

According to Peirce, the "utterance" of the Universe is not an event that 
happened thousands or billions of years in the past--it is still very much in 
progress.

CSP:  This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, 
that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take 
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today 
and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. (CP 1.615, EP 
2:255; 1903).

The Universe as an Argument and a Perfect Sign is not something static; it is 
an ongoing "inferential process" of semeiosis, and Peirce considered its very 
continuity to be one of many hints suggesting the Reality of God.

CSP:  To my humble intelligence, the Rationality of Continuity, the chief 
character of the foundation stones of the real universe, adds another to the 
hundred already interpretable revelations of our Super-august and Gracious 
Father. (R S30 [Copy T:7]; c. 1906)

Moreover, neither an utterer nor an interpreter is essential to a Sign--only an 
Object and an Interpretant (cf. EP 2:404-410; 1907).

JD:  ... I have no qualms about using the proper name God to refer to the 
Quasi-mind of the universe considered as a whole.

Again, a Quasi-mind is itself a Sign (SS 195; 1906 Mar 9), so how do you square 
such an approach with Peirce's unambiguous statements on multiple occasions 
that every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself?  What do you make 
of his emphatic assertions in four different manuscript drafts of "A Neglected 
Argument" (R 843) that the proper name "God" does not denote anything that is 
immanent in nature or the three Universes, but rather its/their "Sole Creator"? 
 Do you simply disagree with him on these points?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 11:42 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary F, Jon S, List,

For the sake of clarifying the questions, consider a few periods from the 
history of the universe.  Here is an abbreviated timeline:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_the_universe

Let me divide the story into the following three periods:

  1.   Opening chapters:  from the first moments of the Planck era to the dark 
ages.
  2.  Middle Chapters:  from the beginning of star formation to the present age.
  3.  Future Chapters:  from the near future to the distant future.

The questions might be reformulated in the following way. For the first of 
these periods, is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the 
Sign-Universe initially uttered? In what sense might such a Quasi-mind which is 
realized, perhaps, in the lawful habits that are taking shape in each chapter, 
speaking to itself? As a great body called the cosmos, it appears that the 
universe has undergone a remarkable series of metamorphoses over the course of 
its evolution. As the body of the universe as a whole has evolved, in what 
manner might the parts of that body be communicating information, meaning or 
purpose in relation to the other parts and to the larger whole of that body? In 
that first period, is the ongoing creation of more or less ordered relations in 
the three universes of possible experience given direction by some kind of 
ideal? Did such an all-encompassing ideal itself evolve? How did it take shape?

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the operation of chance itself 
has a kind of living character--especially insofar as we imagine that the seeds 
of the growth of order were spread throughout the universe of chance, conceived 
in terms of its potential qualities, from the start? Furthermore, let us assume 
that the ongoing sprouting and growth of the seeds of order is governed by a 
law of mind in virtue of which the qualities of the parts of the cosmos--at 
every scale--grow in their relations to one another in virtue of their 
affectability and, furthermore, that those facts that do occur at any time tend 
to increase the odds of what might happen next.


The operation of this law of mind might be understood, from a more external 
point of view, in terms of its governance of a universe of facts. The formation 
and growth of the habits governing these facts

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, List,


For the sake of clarifying the questions, consider a few periods from the 
history of the universe.  Here is an abbreviated timeline:


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chronology_of_the_universe

Chronology of the 
universe
en.wikipedia.org
The chronology of the universe describes the history and future of the universe 
according to Big Bang cosmology. The earliest stages of the universe's...

Let me divide the story into the following three periods:


  1.   Opening chapters:  from the first moments of the Planck era to the dark 
ages.
  2.  Middle Chapters:  from the beginning of star formation to the present age.
  3.  Future Chapters:  from the near future to the distant future.



The questions might be reformulated in the following way. For the first of 
these periods, is there a Quasi-mind that is the interpreter of the 
Sign-Universe initially uttered? In what sense might such a Quasi-mind which is 
realized, perhaps, in the lawful habits that are taking shape in each chapter, 
speaking to itself? As a great body called the cosmos, it appears that the 
universe has undergone a remarkable series of metamorphoses over the course of 
its evolution. As the body of the universe as a whole has evolved, in what 
manner might the parts of that body be communicating information, meaning or 
purpose in relation to the other parts and to the larger whole of that body? In 
that first period, is the ongoing creation of more or less ordered relations in 
the three universes of possible experience given direction by some kind of 
ideal? Did such an all-encompassing ideal itself evolve? How did it take shape?


Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the operation of chance itself 
has a kind of living character--especially insofar as we imagine that the seeds 
of the growth of order were spread throughout the universe of chance, conceived 
in terms of its potential qualities, from the start? Furthermore, let us assume 
that the ongoing sprouting and growth of the seeds of order is governed by a 
law of mind in virtue of which the qualities of the parts of the cosmos--at 
every scale--grow in their relations to one another in virtue of their 
affectability and, furthermore, that those facts that do occur at any time tend 
to increase the odds of what might happen next.


The operation of this law of mind might be understood, from a more external 
point of view, in terms of its governance of a universe of facts. The formation 
and growth of the habits governing these facts happens via a process of 
association by resemblance and contiguity. Or, from a more internal point of 
view, we might understand the operation of the law of mind as the governance of 
the laws of nature--considered as representations in a Quasi-mind--via patterns 
of synthetic inference in that are abductive and inductive in character. How do 
these hypotheses concerning the priority of the law of mind vis a vis all other 
laws shape our understanding of the questions posed above?


Turning now to the middle period when galaxies, stars and solar systems having 
biological forms of life evolved, how might we understand the questions and 
hypotheses considered above? Can the questions be clarified further? Do the 
hypotheses that are offered as possible answers to the questions take a 
different shape when it comes to explaining the evolution of the forms of order 
that are governing the universe in this period? Do the questions and hypotheses 
take yet a different shape as we look to the near and distant future?


Insofar as some of us in the community of inquiry accept the sorts of 
hypotheses listed above, I have no qualms about using the proper name God to 
refer to the Quasi-mind of the universe considered as a whole. As a matter of 
fact, my own inquiries in philosophy are shaped by such grand hypothesis. In 
turn, I hope that my actions and the cultivation of my habits of feeling are 
similarly guided.


For those who do have qualms about the use of that proper name, I'm also fine 
if they prefer to call it the Quasi-mind of the universe. If we adopt the 
hypotheses that Peirce recommends as plausible, then this great Quasi-mind is 
growing in its reasonableness as the cosmos comes to be governed by richer 
systems of physical, chemical, biological and other types of laws. While these 
aren't the only hypotheses available to explain the ongoing evolution of the 
cosmos, they do form a set of conjectures that I find particularly attractive. 
As such, I'd be interested in seeing how those hypotheses might be used to 
frame the more detailed explanations being developed in the special sciences to 
explain the origins of (1) physical order, (2) life and (3) self-controlled 
forms of thought in nature.


Yours,


Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

e heart, then B will die." What is the upshot of scribing 
both in the beta system? In particular, what is the import of representing the 
conditional by a scroll? I take the expression of the conditional to involve a 
genuinely triadic relation because there is a law that governs the relation. 
The generality of that relation is expressed iconically in terms of the 
relation between three spaces:  the area that is bounded by the innermost part 
of the scroll, the area that is bounded by the  outermost part of the scroll, 
and the area that is outside of both. The scroll is needed to represent the 
genuinely triadic character of such relations because the generality of the 
conditional cannot be adequately expressed in terms of the spots and lines of 
the beta system alone.

JD:  The analysis he provides shows that Peirce was thinking of a transfer 
involving money and a contract, which means that the transfer was not 
simultaneous. Barter, as a form of exchange, is often simultaneous. When it is, 
that makes the exchange considerably simpler in character.

JS:  A contract is not essential to the relation of selling, and my 
understanding is that time has no bearing on logical relations.  I still have a 
hard time seeing how bartering is any simpler than selling, other than the 
peculiar aspect of money being transferred rather than another item.

JD:  The contract was a part of Peirce's example. We shouldn't ignore those 
parts of the examples that appear to be essential to understanding his points. 
They are his examples, after all. My understanding is that the temporal order 
of A giving up B and then C acquiring B has a lot to do with our understanding 
of such phenomena. The dynamical dyadic relation of agent and patient, as a 
formally ordered relation, may depend on such a temporal ordering. If C tried 
to acquire B before A had given it up, then it wouldn't be a gift, would it?

See the points made above about the differences between phenomenological 
analyses, which may involve temporally ordered relations, and logical analyses, 
which may abstract from those relations. Note that some logical systems do take 
temporal relations into account. Does the gamma system enable one to represent 
relations of tense?Consider what Peirce says about Metal as a representation of 
what is actually the case:  "Different states of things may all be Actual and 
yet not Actual together" [Ms 295, p.44].  One way that things that are actually 
the case are not actual together is if they happened at different times.

JD:  It does not follow from the simple fact that the analyses involve entia 
rationis that such creations of the mind may not represent something real.

JS:  I did not suggest otherwise.  My point was that the number of different 
relations that we obtain from analysis is arbitrary to some degree, because we 
are using something discrete to represent something that in itself is 
continuous.

JD:  I take the EGs to be topological in character. As a formal system, they 
are based on the notion of relations of composition and transformation that 
hold between areas on a sheet of assertion that is, itself, continuous. Various 
discontinuities are introduced onto the sheet to represent what is existing and 
discrete as individuals, but the continuity of this type of logical system is 
central and not peripheral.

Yours,

Jeff




On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 12:42 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S, List,

JD:  In order to interpret "μ is the surrender by A of B" and "ν is the 
acquisition by A of D" as triadic and not merely dyadic relations, my hunch is 
that he is considering these actions as intentional in character.

JS:  Maybe, but then how would you restate them as explicitly having three 
correlates, perhaps by presenting each as an EG?  And would they then be 
genuine or degenerate triadic relations?

JD: The relation of surrendering, considered as formally ordered dynamical 
dyadic relation, is a relation that can be expressed in the beta system of the 
EG. If μ is understood to involve an intention on the part of A, then it can't 
be expressed in those terms. In the Prolegomena, Peirce uses the modal tincture 
of Fur as a means of expressing intentions in the gamma system. The pattern of 
ermine (or the color yellow), is used to represent iconically that the area 
shaded expresses an intention on the part of the agent (see Don Roberts, 
92-102). Understanding the character of the triadic relations that hold between 
the areas that are patterned or shaded one way to the other areas of the graph 
is not a simple matter. Hence the difficulties of sorting out the modal 
relations using the tinctures (or colors). In his monograph, Don Roberts 
attempts to revise the tinctures in order to overcome some of the concerns that 
Peirce raised about this manner of expressing modal relations in the gamma 
system. Given the complexities invol

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S,


If I understand you correctly, then it appears that we are guided--at least in 
part--by different purposes.


I am trying to interpret Peirce's account triadic relations and square it with 
what he says about tetradic and higher ordered relations. You, on the other 
hand, don't accept some of the claims he is making, and you are asking me for 
demonstrations that Peirce's analyses of these relations are correct.


Given the fact that I don't take myself to understand what he is saying in 
these puzzles passages in the 1905 letter to Lady Welby, it seems a bit 
premature to ask me for demonstrations that his assertions are correct. I'm 
just trying to work out some interpretative hypotheses and then see if they 
square with--and perhaps even shed some light on--what he says about the living 
character of thoroughly genuine triadic relations. My primary interest is in 
explaining the living character of these relations, and I'm looking at puzzling 
passages as a way of testing the general approach I've been exploring.


It is good, I think, to be clear about one's purpose in making a post. As such, 
I'm making mine more explicit now.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, May 11, 2019 6:02 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

John, List:

JFS:  To clarify these issues, search CP for every occurrence of "A gives B".

I did exactly that last night, and what I found has influenced my responses 
accordingly.

CSP;  ... every dyad by a particularization evolves a dyadic triad. Thus, A 
murders B is a generalization of A shoots that bullet, and the bullet fatally 
wounds B. (CP 1.474; c. 1896)
JFS:  By the same analysis, 'surrender' and 'acquisition' would be dyadic 
triads ...

What replaces the bullet as the third correlate if we evolve "A surrenders B" 
or "A acquires D" into a dyadic triad?

Incidentally, there are various circumstances when "A murders B" is not an 
accurate generalization of "A shoots that bullet" and "that bullet fatally 
woulds B"--e.g., if A and B are soldiers for opposing armies during a battle, 
or if A is acting in self-defense, or if B is not a human being, or if the 
shooting is accidental.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 1:26 PM John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
Jeff and Jon,

To clarify these issues, search CP for every occurrence of
"A gives B".  Peirce states the issues in different ways,
but the following example illustrates the general principle:

> A triad may be explicated into a triadic tetrad. Thus, A gives B
> to C becomes A makes the covenant D with C and the covenant D
> gives B to C.  (CP 1.474)

By this analysis, Peirce used hypostatic abstraction to convert
'gives' into a covenant D that relates A, B, and C.  But that
tetrad is "degenerate" in the sense that it is derived from
a triad.

Earlier in paragraph 1.474, he writes
> every dyad by a particularization evolves a dyadic triad. Thus,
> A murders B is a generalization of A shoots that bullet, and the
> bullet fatally wounds B.

By the same analysis, 'surrender' and 'acquisition' would
be dyadic triads in
> d.  μ is the surrender by A of B
> e.  m is the surrender by C of D
> g.  ν is the acquisition by A of D
> h.  η is the acquisition by C of B

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, Jon S, List,


JohnS:  To clarify these issues, search CP for every occurrence of
"A gives B".

Jeff D: Here is one passage that is particularly germane to the question at 
hand. When Peirce claims that giving is a genuinely triadic relation, I take 
note of the fact that in the "Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my 
categories from within" the intentional act of one person giving something to 
another person under a law is classified, on my reading of the text, as a 
paradigmatic example of thoroughly genuine triadic relation.

Consider the following passage:


I now come to Thirdness. To me, who have for forty years considered the matter 
from every point of view that I could discover, the inadequacy of Secondness to 
cover all that is in our minds is so evident that I scarce know how to begin to 
persuade any person of it who is not already convinced of it. ... Analyze for 
instance the relation involved in 'A gives B to C.' Now what is giving? It does 
not consist [in] A's putting B away from him and C's subsequently taking B up. 
It is not necessary that any material transfer should take place. It consists 
in A's making C the possessor according to Law. There must be some kind of law 
before there can be any kind of giving, -- be it but the law of the strongest. 
But now suppose that giving did consist merely in A's laying down the B which C 
subsequently picks up. That would be a degenerate form of Thirdness in which 
the thirdness is externally appended. In A's putting away B, there is no 
thirdness. In C's taking B, there is no thirdness. But if you say that these 
two acts constitute a single operation by virtue of the identity of the B, you 
transcend the mere brute fact, you introduce a mental element . . . . The 
criticism which I make on [my] algebra of dyadic relations, with which I am by 
no means in love, though I think it is a pretty thing, is that the very triadic 
relations which it does not recognize, it does itself employ. For every 
combination of relatives to make a new relative is a triadic relation 
irreducible to dyadic relations. Its inadequacy is shown in other ways, but in 
this way it is in a conflict with itself if it be regarded, as I never did 
regard it, as sufficient for the expression of all relations. My universal 
algebra of relations, with the subjacent indices and and, is susceptible of 
being enlarged so as to comprise everything; and so, still better, though not 
to ideal perfection, is the system of existential graphs. CP 8.331


In this passage, Peirce says that the relation of giving does not consist 
merely in the following two facts:


  1.  A's putting B away from him, and
  2.  C's subsequently taking B up.

On the analysis offered at CP 1.474, I agree that both of these 
facts--considered as individual facts about existing objects--are dyadic in 
character. Both facts may, by particularization, be evolved into a dyadic 
triad. Note that the particularization requires a further evolution of the 
dyadic relations involved in each fact into a dyadic triad.

Those same facts can also be analyzed as being parts of intentional actions. 
Insofar as there is a mental component involved in each, both are genuinely 
triadic in their character because the existential facts are now considered to 
be governed by general habits of thought. What is more, Peirce notes that B 
does need not be an existing object. It might, for instance, be a piece of 
intellectual property, such as the rights of ownership to a patented invention.

As such, I believe that this passage provides a basis for analyzing some acts 
of giving as involving three genuinely triadic relations.


  1.  The intentional action μ which consists in A surrendering B
  2.  The intentional action η which consists in C acquiring B
  3.  Μ is the performance of μ with the 
intent of bringing about η under a Law of some kind.

In offering this analysis, I accept the general point that a genuinely triadic 
relation a combination of two or more individual facts concerning existential 
objects under some genuine third that, as a general, governs the interaction of 
the two.

My suggestion is that a thoroughly genuine triadic relation also involves three 
genuinely triadic relations that are brought together by a genuinely triadic 
relation. What is special about representations, Peirce says, is that they are 
not governed by mere laws of fact.

Peirce says:


Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in 
the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or 
regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated 
entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. 
Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a 
sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an 
object and an interpreting thought. Now this 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,

JD:  In order to interpret "μ is the surrender by A of B" and "ν is the 
acquisition by A of D" as triadic and not merely dyadic relations, my hunch is 
that he is considering these actions as intentional in character.

JS:  Maybe, but then how would you restate them as explicitly having three 
correlates, perhaps by presenting each as an EG?  And would they then be 
genuine or degenerate triadic relations?

JD: The relation of surrendering, considered as formally ordered dynamical 
dyadic relation, is a relation that can be expressed in the beta system of the 
EG. If μ is understood to involve an intention on the part of A, then it can't 
be expressed in those terms. In the Prolegomena, Peirce uses the modal tincture 
of Fur as a means of expressing intentions in the gamma system. The pattern of 
ermine (or the color yellow), is used to represent iconically that the area 
shaded expresses an intention on the part of the agent (see Don Roberts, 
92-102). Understanding the character of the triadic relations that hold between 
the areas that are patterned or shaded one way to the other areas of the graph 
is not a simple matter. Hence the difficulties of sorting out the modal 
relations using the tinctures (or colors). In his monograph, Don Roberts 
attempts to revise the tinctures in order to overcome some of the concerns that 
Peirce raised about this manner of expressing modal relations in the gamma 
system. Given the complexities involved, I won't try to answer the question of 
whether the triadic relations involved are genuine or degenerate in some 
respects.

JD:  The case that you cite of an object being sold involves a transfer of 
money and a contract. The simpler case of exchange as barter with no contract 
is illustrative of how other kinds of relations may be involved when more 
general things, such as property laws and legal systems, are governing the 
intentional acts.

JS: There is no reference to a contract in the initial proposition, "S sells T 
to B for M"; and it is isomorphic with the allegedly simpler case, "A gives up 
B to C in exchange for D."  In other words, it seems to me that "sells X for Y" 
is logically the same relation as "gives up X in exchange for Y."  Do you 
disagree?  Again, is an essential element somehow omitted if we analyze the 
tetradic relation of selling (or bartering) as a combination of only four 
triadic relations, two of giving (genuine) and two of exchanging (degenerate)?

JD: The initial description is underdetermined. The analysis he provides shows 
that Peirce was thinking of a transfer involving money and a contract, which 
means that the transfer was not simultaneous. Barter, as a form of exchange, is 
often simultaneous. When it is, that makes the exchange considerably simpler in 
character. That is one reason that exchange by barter may have preceded the 
development of formal systems of law.

JD:  How many triadic relations are involved in this process of a young child 
learning? Well, it appears to grow according to a power law. As such, it grows 
into a multitude that exceeds any system of numbers that is numerable or even 
any system that is abnumerable.

JS: Of course it does, because real semeiosis is continuous--it is not composed 
of discrete relations (prescinded predicates) and their discrete correlates 
(abstracted subjects) as expressed in definite propositions; those are all 
artificial creations of thought for the purposes of description and analysis.

JD:  It does not follow from the simple fact that the analyses involve entia 
rationis that such creations of the mind may not represent something real. 
Notice how Peirce puts the point. In a tetradic relation, there are at most 10 
triadic relations involved, whereas in a pentadic relation, there are at most 
100 triadic relations involved. It does not follow from the claim that semiosis 
is continuous that there are, somehow, an unlimited number of triadic relations 
involved. Inserting a real triadic relation where, before, one was only a 
potentiality, can be done any number of times. In doing so, however, you've 
made a new relation.

Yours,

Jeff
<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:44 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Jon S., List,

My strategy for interpreting these passages is to take Peirce at his word when 
he refers to the triadic relations that are involved. In order to interpret "μ 
is the surrender by A of B" and "ν is the acquisition by A of D" as triadic and 
not merely dyadic relations, my hunch is that he is considering these actions 
as intentional in character. The object surrendered and the agent who 
surrenders it are existing individuals in the relation of agent and patient, 
but that existential description of the individuals is part of an intentional 
action by A. As a general sort of thing, the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

a child learning how to engage more or less 
self-controlled patterns of logical reasoning. My assumption is that the child 
was already capable of thinking in a manner that conformed to the laws of logic 
from an early age. The instinctive patterns of inference were not subject to 
much self-control at the ages of 1 and 2, but the child was learning how to use 
a conventional system of symbols (i.e., a natural language) as a matter of 
habit. In time, what the child learned was how to represent those laws to 
himself as principles. In turn, the child learned to recognise what those 
principles, functioning as imperatives, might require of him in terms of the 
future conduct of his inquiry.


How many triadic relations are involved in this process of a young child 
learning? Well, it appears to grow according to a power law. As such, it grows 
into a multitude that exceeds any system of numbers that is numerable or even 
any system that is abnumerable. The upshot of what I am suggesting is that 
Peirce's observation that there may be a power law involved in richer relations 
would explain his earlier assertions about the sort of infinity and resulting 
continuity that is involved in the growth of our cognitions.


Yours,


Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, May 10, 2019 6:40 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

Jeff, List:

That passage by Peirce is quite a head-scratcher.  For one thing, the relations 
of surrendering and acquiring are clearly dyadic, rather than triadic.  For 
another, it seems obvious that just as any triadic relation involves exactly 
three dyadic relations, likewise any tetradic relation involves exactly four 
triadic relations.  In the case of "A gives up B to C in exchange for D," they 
would be "A gives B to C," "C gives D to A," "A exchanges B for D," and "C 
exchanges D for B."  The difference is that a tetradic relation is always 
reducible to the combination of its constituent triadic relations, while a 
genuine triadic relation is irreducible.  Of course, "A gives B to C" is a 
paradigmatic example of a genuine triadic relation; so it is irreducible to the 
combination of its constituent dyadic relations--"A surrenders B," "C acquires 
B," and "A benefits C" (cf. CP 6.323; 1908).

I wonder if what Peirce had in mind as the result of analyzing a tetradic 
relation were not ten triadic relations, but ten relations of any lower 
adicity.  Besides the four triadic relations, there are six dyadic relations 
involved in any tetradic relation--e.g., "A surrenders B," "C surrenders D," "A 
acquires D," "C acquires B,"  "A trades with C," and "B is traded for D."  
However, such an approach would still not translate to the alleged "power law" 
for relations of increasing adicity--a pentadic relation involves five 
tetradic, ten triadic, and ten dyadic relations for 25 total relations, rather 
than 100; a hexadic relation involves 6+15+20+15=56 relations, rather than 
1,000; and an enneadic relation involves 9+36+84+126+126+84+36=501 relations, 
rather than 1,000,000.

By the way, Peirce elsewhere gave a different but (in my view) equally puzzling 
analysis of what amounts to the very same tetradic relation.

CSP:  Suppose a seller, S, sells a thing, T, to a buyer, B, for a sum of money, 
M. This sale is a tetradic relation. But if we define precisely what it 
consists in, we shall find it to be a compound of six triadic relations, as 
follows:
1st, S is the subject of a certain receipt of money, R, in return for the 
performance of a certain act As;
2nd, This performance of the act As effects a certain delivery, D, according to 
a certain contract, or agreement, C;
3rd, B is the subject of a certain acquisition of good, G, in return for the 
performance of a certain act, Ab;
4th, This performance of the act Ab effects a certain payment, P, according to 
the aforesaid contract C;
5th, The delivery, D, renders T the object of the acquisition of good G;
6th, The payment, P, renders M the object of the receipt of money, R. (CP 
7.537; no date)

Why introduce so many additional subjects, rather than sticking with the four 
in the initial proposition?  Is an essential element somehow omitted if we 
simply analyze selling as a combination of giving and exchanging?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 4:05 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

List,

I

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

List,


In a draft of a 1905 letter to Lady Welby, Peirce analyzes the tetradic 
relationship of A gives up B to C in exchange for D (Semiotic and Significs, 
190). I am interested in his remarks about the exchange of goods for the sake 
of better understanding his account of the relations that hold between signs, 
objects and interpretants.


Peirce argues that any tetradic or higher order relationship (i.e., valency >3) 
is complex and can be analyzed into elementary monadic, dyadic and triadic 
relations. Here is the upshot of his analysis of exchanging goods:



The tetradic relationship is reducible to, at most, 10 elementary triadic 
relations.  Here they are:


a. λ is an exchange of property (B and D) between A and C

b. ι is a transposition of ownership of B and D

c. L is an accomplishment of λ through ι

d. μ is the surrender by A of B

e. m is the surrender by C of D

f.  Μ is the performance of μ in 
reciprocal consideration of m (Note the error in the transcription, which has M 
instead of m at the end.)

g. ν is the acquisition by A of D

h. η is the acquisition by C of B

i.  Ν is the performance of μ in 
reciprocal consideration of η (Note the error in the transcription, which has N 
instead of η at the end.)

j.  L is carried out by the union of M and N.



On the basis of this type of analysis, Peirce generalizes to relationships of 
higher adicity. He claims there is a power law that holds for relations of 
adicity four or greater.


1. Tetradic relations such as exchanging appear to be reducible to, at 
most, 10 triadic relations.

2.  Pentadic relations are reducible to, at most, 100 triadic relations.

3. Hexadic relations are reducible to, at most, 1,000 triadic relations.

4. Enneadic relations are reducible to, at most, 1,000,000 triadic 
relations.


I'd like to ask two questions.  First, what is the basis of this claim 
concerning the power law that seems to govern higher-order relations? Second, 
how does this analysis apply to Peirce's paradigmatic case of giving--offered 
as an example of a genuinely triadic relation. Following the analysis of 
exchange offered above, giving is reducible to, at most, three triadic 
relations.



A gives B to C:

a. μ is the surrender by A of B

b. η is the acquisition by C of B

c. Μ is the performance of μ with the 
intent of bringing about η



I'd like to flag two points that can be made about this analysis. First, I'd 
like to note that the performance of μ with the intent of bringing about η has 
the implied condition that, if C does not accept B as a gift, then A may 
reassert ownership.  Second, each of the relations might be understood as 
having the following condition:  _ in accordance with property laws R in 
legal system S. My hunch is that Peirce is, in this analysis, ignoring the 
relevance of the property laws that would, typically, govern exchanges and 
gifts.


Let me end by restating the question posed above: is this a fair analysis of 
the more elementary triadic relations that are involved in a genuinely triadic 
relation, such as giving?


Yours,


Jeff





Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] opportunities for transcribing Peirce?

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Orin,


Terry Moore and I have spearheaded the SPIN project, which has the aim of using 
online tools to support collaborative efforts to transcribe Peirce's 
manuscripts into a searchable form.


Here is a link to the site:  
https://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16

C. S. Peirce Manuscripts | 
FromThePage
fromthepage.com
C. S. Peirce Manuscripts - collection overview. The goal of the Scalable Peirce 
Interpretation Network (SPIN) is to develop a model environment for distributed 
collaboration that can support an international network of researchers, 
students, and citizen scholars in cooperative efforts to encode and interpret 
handwritten manuscripts, including those of high complexity. As our testbed, we 
plan to use the "Logic Notebook" that Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of 
Pragmatism, kept as the seedbed and greenhouse for his ideas together with 
related sets of manuscripts in logic and semiotics. We are treating the pages 
in the MS 145 folder as a sandbox. Take the platform for a test run and play 
with the toolset. The enhanced set of LaTeX tools for encoding the algebraic 
formulas and graphical diagrams have been added, and a set of guidelines for 
making the encodings is ready to go. Here are links to Transcription Guidelines 
on the SPIN Project website, digital images of the Ma



Thus far, the network of volunteers has transcribed about 2000 pages. If there 
are particular texts of interest to an individual or group who would like to 
make a concerted effort, then I would be willing to upload requested sets into 
the system if they are not already there. The resulting transcriptions can be 
downloaded in a large number of formats. If anyone has questions about getting 
started, guidelines are available via a link on the home page. If the 
information there does not answer any questions, let me know.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Orin Hargraves 
Sent: Thursday, May 9, 2019 6:19 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] opportunities for transcribing Peirce?

Hello,

I remember seeing in this list a link (perhaps more than one) to opportunities 
for transcribing Peirce's writings but I can't find it in the archive.

I've met a scholar who is adept at this and is eager to contribute.  I would 
appreciate a reminder about where I can find this.

Thanks,
Orin Hargraves

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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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[PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon S, List,


Let me start here:   "As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of 
Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding 
continuous motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than 
discrete positions in space and/or moments in time."


Over the years, several of my colleagues have expressed a similar sentiment:  
if only Peirce had been around to see Einstein's great discoveries concerning 
the special and general theories of relativity, then he would have been in a 
much better position to understand the nature of these things.


My initial reaction to such expressions is that Peirce's fundamental hypotheses 
concerning the nature of time and space--and the relations between them--may 
very well run deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein had 
to offer.  Taking the discussion in lecture 8 of RLT as a starting point for a 
discussion, consider the following:


  1.   As far as we are able to glean from his writings, Einstein does not 
appear to accept the reality of chance.  In fact, he argues against it. Peirce, 
on the other hand, holds that an appeal to the reality of chance along with a 
tendency for relations between qualities and habitual patterns of order to grow 
can explain how space, time and the laws that govern them might have evolved.
  2.  Einstein does not appear to offer an adequate explanatory hypothesis 
concerning the origins of the spatial and temporal relations that hold between 
the kinetic energy that is initially distributed through space shortly after 
the big bang. Peirce does offer a hypothesis, and I find it somewhat plausible. 
More to the point, it seems especially productive as compared to other 
competing hypotheses. The hypothesis is that, from an initial condition of 
homogeneous possibility, the infinitude of spatial and temporal dimensions 
differentiated and unfolded by a process of the vague becoming more 
determinate. Homogeneity grows into heterogeneity. From chance, order grows.
  3.  From an initial condition of enormous potential (e.g., much concentrated 
potential energy), how did particles, nuclei, stars, atoms, molecules, etc. 
come to be as natural kinds? Starting with the explosion of the initial 
relatively mass-less force "particles" radiating as distributed fields (e.g., 
photons and gluons), more stable configurations of particle-like configurations 
of energy having qualities of spin and charge were attracted to one another 
based on the complementary character of their respective qualities. What law is 
at work? Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing 
the association of the different qualities that energy may take based on their 
respective relations of attractability and affectability.

While Peirce's grand hypotheses concerning the nature of time, space and the 
initial spread of kinetic energy are more vague than the explanations Einstein 
was able to offer, I think there may be principled limits to kinds of 
mathematical relations that may be fruitfully applied to the explanation of 
such basic laws as principles in our theories. In the study of the continuity 
of spatial and temporal relations, we move back from metrical geometries, to 
projective (as Einstein did), and focus our attention on the methods used in 
the study of topology. If we are trying to explain how space comes to have the 
metrical characters that it does (locally or globally), then Peirce appears to 
be on the right track in pointing out that the question of "why four 
dimensions, or 6, 12, or 16?" is the prior question. What is more, it doesn't 
look like the answer to that question can be given separately from explaining 
how the qualities of what is in space (e.g., the fields, particles, waves, or 
what have you) come to stand in stable relations to each other. In turn, we can 
ask:  does Peirce's hypotheses concerning the dimensionality of space and time 
help to explain the laws articulated in the general theory of relativity. If 
they do, then that would be a remarkable thing. What is more, do they help to 
correct what might be some possible errors in the expression of those laws in 
the general theory? Cosmologists working today on the relation between time and 
space (e.g., Lee Smolin) seem to suggest that the answer to both questions is 
"Yes."

In effect, what is the grand hypothesis that Peirce offers as the guess at the 
riddle? Let me state the question and the answer simply. Question:  what are 
fundamental laws governing all growth of order in the cosmos ranging from 
physical, to chemical, biological and human social systems? Answer:  the grand 
laws governing the evolution of all things are the laws of logic, together with 
the law of chance and the law of continuity. As human beings, we are fallible 
in our understanding of those laws. Our representations of the laws of logic 
function as guiding principles that govern our inquiry--and our 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Dan, List,


I, for one, don't share your view that Peirce missed the boat on this one. In 
making the assertion, are you claiming that modern mathematical logic 
demonstrates that relations that might appear to be genuinely triadic--- such 
as giving, or mediating or thinking--can be entirely reduced to dyadic 
relations using logical resources that do not, themselves, employ those very 
relations? Or, are you saying that this has been shown in modern philosophical 
logic?


In both areas of inquiry, I do not think the matter is--by any means--somehow 
now settled. Here, at the beginning of the 21st century, there are plenty of 
reasons to doubt the assertions of Quine, Church, Turing, et al, on this matter.


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2019 11:47 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, 
laws and symbols)

Yes, Jon, but Peirce was wrong.

These lexical decompositions are done by logicians.

Peirce unfortunately missed the boat on this and there is no solution from 
logic, because it is logic that points out the errors of Peirce's view of 
giving.

I will discuss this at length in my in-progress biography of Peirce, but also 
point to the overarching utility of his view in the notion of the interpretant.

He doesn't have to get everything right. The architectonic matters more than a 
few errors in specific solutions.

Dan

On Apr 21, 2019, at 2:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Dan, List:

Peirce was first and foremost a logician, not a linguist; and from a strictly 
logical/semeiotic standpoint, the relation that we call "giving" in English is 
irreducibly triadic.  In fact, Peirce repeatedly held it up as a paradigmatic 
example of just such a relation.  Moreover, according to his classification of 
the sciences, the principles of the Normative Sciences--including Logic as 
Semeiotic--are more fundamental than those of any Special Science, including 
linguistics.  Hence the triadicity of the relation that we call "giving" is 
independent of its expression in English, or in any other particular language 
or Sign System.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 21, 2019 at 1:31 AM Dan Everett 
mailto:danleveret...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Folks,

Lexical semantics is a large field and there are various positions specialists 
take on exactly how word-meanings are best to be characterized. For example, 
most scholars (not all), argue that there is no simple verb 'to give' but that 
this English verb is characterized by a representation along the lines of:

Anna gave Max a book.


give: lambda z lambda y lambda x lamba e act(x) & become poss(y,z)(e)

('lambda' is of course the lambda operator)

In other words, any verb, in this case 'give' is broken down into more basic 
components. No language is required to have a verb that is exactly like the 
English verb 'to give' but if it does, it must be composed of these finer 
predicates, so that the triadic semantics of 'to give' (English) is derivative, 
not basic (though the combinations of these basic predicates in this form will 
in fact produce a di-transitive or "triadic" syntax).

Some linguists would refer to the number of lexical arguments as the valency of 
the verb and the number of syntactic arguments as the transitivity of the verb 
(noun, etc).

And this can vary radically across languages.

For example, in the Piraha language that I have worked on for decades, there 
are only about 90 or so distinct verb roots (which are not to be confused with 
verb stems, in turn not to be confused with verbs, and not to be confused with 
lexical representations). So to produce a verb like 'bring back' (corresponding 
roughly to a single verb such as 'return', as in 'return the screwdriver when 
you're finished') in Piraha the actual verb might be: 'go-turn-carry-aspectual 
distinction affixes...' (i.e. a verb stem composed of several verb roots plus a 
number of affixes playing derivative semantic roles).

In a language like English with an extremely simple verbal morphology (maximum 
of five forms - sing, sang, sung, sings, singing) this is deceptively easy. In 
Spanish a verb would have 30-50 forms. But in Piraha (not uncommon for 
polysynthetic languages of the Americas) each verb can have as many as 65,000 
forms (sixty-five thousand). And there simply is no way to compare predicates 
ilke "give" one-to-one with any Piraha verb.

If we consider a basic English-conceived/interpreted predicate like 'give' then 
of course it is difficult to imagine that it 

[PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

retant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907)

This is reflected by the first EG in the attachment.  As Peirce stated here, 
there are also dyadic relations between the Object and the Sign, and between 
the Sign and the Interpretant--namely, that of determining--but the triadic 
relation cannot be reduced to these.  The second EG in the attachment is my 
initial attempt to diagram this--in accordance with the dyadic relations, "the 
flow of causation" is from Object to Sign to Interpretant; but although the 
Object also determines the Interpretant, it does so only through the mediation 
of the Sign.

JD:  You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in the 4th 
and fifth? ... For any interpretant that has a general nature, it will itself 
be a genuine triadic relation in its nature.

I do not see anything in any of the five clauses from CP 2.242 to warrant 
treating either a Sign or an Interpretant as a triadic relation, rather than a 
correlate of such a relation.  On the contrary, clause 1 states plainly that "A 
Representamen [such as a Sign] is the First Correlate of a triadic relation," 
and clause 4 states just as plainly that "the possible Interpretant is 
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same 
Object" (emphases added).

JD:  In the process of representation, correlate A functions as a sign in 
relation to some real interpretant C, where that interpretant C, in turn, 
serves as a sign in relation to some further object D [to some] interpretant E. 
What does interpretant C represent to E as a sign? For one thing, it represents 
object B is the same object as D (or B corresponds to D in some way).

My reading is instead that Interpretant C simply has B as its Object, just like 
Sign A; there is no need to posit "some further object D."  The difference is 
that Interpretant C is determined by Object B through the mediation of Sign A.  
Likewise, Interpretant E has B as its Object, but Interpretant E is determined 
by Object B through the mediation of Interpretant Sign C.  This is reflected by 
the third EG in the attachment.

JD:  What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that interpretant C 
embodies ...

Signs are embodied in their Replicas (1903) or Instances (1906), but where did 
Peirce ever say that a relation can be embodied?

JD:  Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and a fortiori, all symbols have 
the character of being, themselves, genuine triadic relations. What is more, 
I've argued that all symbolic signs are, in themselves, thoroughly genuine 
triadic relations.

You have offered these assertions, but so far I am frankly not seeing any 
arguments for them.  Again, CP 2.242 seems quite explicit that Signs and 
Interpretants are correlates, not triadic relations, genuine or otherwise.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:40 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hello Jon S, List,

Does the sign itself constitute a triadic relationship? You say, No. It is the 
first correlate of a triadic relation, but it is not itself a triadic relation. 
Let me adopt the other side of the argument and see what points I can marshall 
in its favor.

First, I'd like to point out that any sign that is general in character: (i.e., 
all legisigns, and therefore all symbols) have the nature of genuine triadic 
relations. Legisigns have that nature in themselves. Symbolic legisigns have 
that nature in themselves and in the relation that holds between sign and 
object. That much follows from the account of genuine triadic relations offered 
in a number of places, including "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to 
develop my categories from within."

Furthermore, consider the following definition of a sign offered in NDTR:

A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second 
Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being 
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is 
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same 
Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which 
some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens 
that have been much studied. (1903 - C.P. 2.242)


Let's separate the clauses:


  1.  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
  2.  the Second Correlate being termed its Object,
  3.  and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant,
  4.  by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be 
the First Correlate of the same tr

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Monument

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon S, List,


Does the sign itself constitute a triadic relationship? You say, No. It is the 
first correlate of a triadic relation, but it is not itself a triadic relation. 
Let me adopt the other side of the argument and see what points I can marshall 
in its favor.


First, I'd like to point out that any sign that is general in character: (i.e., 
all legisigns, and therefore all symbols) have the nature of genuine triadic 
relations. Legisigns have that nature in themselves. Symbolic legisigns have 
that nature in themselves and in the relation that holds between sign and 
object. That much follows from the account of genuine triadic relations offered 
in a number of places, including "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to 
develop my categories from within."


Furthermore, consider the following definition of a sign offered in NDTR:


A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second 
Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being 
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is 
determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same 
Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which 
some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens 
that have been much studied. (1903 - C.P. 2.242)


Let's separate the clauses:


  1.  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
  2.  the Second Correlate being termed its Object,
  3.  and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant,
  4.  by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be 
the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object,
  5.  and for some possible Interpretant.


You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in the 4th and 
fifth?  For those interpretants that really are general signs in relation to 
some further object and interpretant, what is the character of such a sign? For 
the sake of the argument, let's set to the side interpretants that are, in 
themselves, mere possibles or mere existents. For any interpretant that has a 
general nature, it will itself be a genuine triadic relation in its nature.


Let me ask:  why is this important for the sake of offering explanations of how 
signs and interpretants function in the process of semiosis? As we try to 
answer this question, let us shift the focus of our attention from the anatomy 
to the physiology of signs and explain what is essential to their proper 
functioning. In the process of representation, correlate A functions as a sign 
in relation to some real interpretant C, where that interpretant C, in turn, 
serves as a sign in relation to some further object D interpretant E. What does 
interpretant C represent to E as a sign? For one thing, it represents object B 
is the same object as D (or B corresponds to D in some way). What is more, 
Peirce suggests, C represents the relation that A holds to B to interpretant E. 
C cannot really serve the function of representing such features about A and B 
to E without itself being genuinely triadic in character.


What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that interpretant C embodies 
is not a genuine triadic relation of quality (i.e., what he calls a law of 
quality) or a genuine triadic relation of fact (i.e., a law of fact). Rather, 
it is what  Peirce calls a thoroughly genuine triadic relation. These sorts of 
relations are special in that the general character of C, in serving the 
function of both an interpretant in relation to A and as a sign in relation the 
further interpretant E, is not a mere law. That is, it is not simply a rule 
having some sort of generality or some sort of necessity. Rather, as a 
representamen, C has the character of a living general--one that has life and 
is capable of growth. This is something that C itself possess as a sign.


Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and a fortiori, all symbols have the 
character of being, themselves, genuine triadic relations. What is more, I've 
argued that all symbolic signs are, in themselves, thoroughly genuine triadic 
relations. One reason they must have this character is that it is essential for 
serving, in turn, the function as a symbolic sign in relation to some further 
object and interpretant.


What should we say of signs that are, in their nature, iconic qualisigns 
(tones) or indexical sinsigns (tokens)? Without arguing the point, I would like 
to point out that they are always capable of serving as parts of larger 
inferences. I'll leave it at that.


--Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2019 11:48:58 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Monument

List:

Surprisingly, the manuscript number in the design 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Analysis of Signs (was Phaneroscopy and logic)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


I, too, am interested in the way the EGs, as a mathematical tool, might help us 
clarify the nature of propositions and inferences and the roles that they serve 
in processes of inquiry. In order to apply such mathematical tools to questions 
in any part of a semiotic theory (conceived as a normative science), it will 
help to be clear about the way we are interpreting the various signs in the 
mathematical system. As such, a close examination of what, in our common 
experience, is being represented in each part of the formal system will require 
proper use of a phenomenological theory.


Consider the converse direction of the inquiry. As Peirce tries to get clear 
about the syntax, conventions, precepts and other starting points that have 
served, up to a given point in his inquiries, as the elements for the formal 
systems of the EGs, he is progressively trying to formulate clearer postulates 
from which deductions might proceed. On the one hand, deduction from postulates 
within a formal system will not be improved by an appeal to a philosophical 
theory of phenomenology or semiotics. Mathematicians don't need assistance from 
philosophers in making such deductions. That is their forte. On the other hand, 
the task of developing and clarifying the postulates for a system that is under 
development or revision is a task that may very well be benefitted from proper 
input from philosophy--including theories of phenomenology and semiotics.


Having stated these general points, let me formulate the points you are making 
in different terms. Instead of starting with semes, let's start with rhemes. 
These are signs of unsaturated predicates that typically are formed by 
precisive abstraction. And, instead of asking how a seme is represented in the 
Beta or Gamma system, let's ask how a rheme is represented in the Alpha system. 
In doing so, we get a much clearer sense that the rheme is represented by an 
area on the sheet of assertion. Each indeterminate point in that area is a 
possible object that belongs to the class represented by the rheme. So, if one 
expresses the rheme "__is red" on the sheet using the index A, then the points 
in the area of A on the sheet are taken to encompass all white things in the 
universe of discourse.


It is important to keep in mind that, in the EGs, unlike the Euler graphs or 
system of Venn diagrams, the system is understood to be intensional in 
character and not extensional. What do I mean by that? The basic way in which 
areas in the alpha system are related is in terms of the scroll. If A, then B. 
All assertions, including those are categorical in terms of their surface 
grammar, are understood on the model of conditionals. Let's suppose that the 
conditional expresses: "if anything is red, then it is colored." This is a 
positive assertion, even though it does not represent any actual thing to exist 
as an individual.


The upshot of my suggestion is that, when it comes to clarifying the ideas that 
are guiding the development of the postulates for the EGs, phenomenology can 
and should provide considerable guidance as we seek to clarify what each sign 
in the system means. As such, I recommend considering the role of 
phenomenological analysis of our experience of engaging in acts of 
self-controlled reasoning (nicely illustrated in the first Lowell Lecture) in 
the way Peirce is developing and refining the postulates stated, for instance, 
in "On the Simplest Branch of Mathematics, Dyadics," MSS 2-3, MSS 511-512, 
1903. Note that the first set of postulates for the alpha system provides an 
account of the precepts governing the assertion of a proposition (e.g., what 
counts as a well-formed formula in the system). The second set of postulates 
provides an account of the postulates for transforming any proposition in that 
system in a way that ensures the validity of the inference. These are the 
inference rules. How are the guiding principles of deductive inference 
represented as rules in the alpha system?  Look at the postulates. More 
importantly, look at how those postulates are being formed and what each means. 
What are the features of common experience--such as the experience of drawing a 
self-controlled deductive inference that is taken to be valid--that Peirce is 
trying to represent in each postulate?


Let me try to state the upshot of what I'm suggesting again, but in simpler 
terms. Phenomenology can guide us in two ways when it comes to mathematical 
systems of logic such as we find in the EGs:


1) In the application of the mathematical tools to philosophical problems--such 
as those in semiotics.


2) In the development and refinement of the postulates for a system.


The second task is particularly difficult. It is one that Peirce seems to excel 
at.


Is your aim in the remarks you are making along the lines of 1 or 2? Either 
way, the emphasis you are placing on semes, spots and lines of identity may 
lead to misinterpreting the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce admitted that his terminology of 1906 was bad.

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


As you listen, perhaps, to the Dark Side of the Moon, I recommend the following 
instance where Peirce reflects on his own blunder concerning the "blot". He 
says:


I can make this blackened Inner Close as small as I please, at least, so long 
as I can still see it there, whether with my outer eye or in my mind's eye. Can 
I not make it quite invisibly small, even to my mind's eye? "No," you will say, 
"for then it would not be scribed at all." You are right. Yet since confession 
will be good for my soul, and since it will be well for you to learn how like 
walking on smooth ice this business of reasoning about logic is -- so much so 
that I have often remarked that nobody commits what is called a "logical 
fallacy," or hardly ever does so, except logicians; and they are slumping into 
such stuff continually -- it is my duty to [point out] this error of assuming 
that, because the blackened Inner Close can be made indefinitely small, 
therefore it can be struck out entirely like an infinitesimal. That led me to 
say that a Cut around a Graph instance has the effect of denying it. I retract: 
it only does so if the Cut enclosed also [has] a blot, however small, to 
represent iconically, the blackened Inner Close. I was partly misled by the 
fact that in the Conditional de inesse the Cut may be considered as denying the 
contents of its Area. That is true, so long as the entire Scroll is on the 
Place. But that does not prove that a single Cut, without an Inner Close, has 
this effect. On the contrary, a single Cut, enclosing only A and a blank, 
merely says: "If A," or "If A, then" and there stops. If what? you ask. It does 
not say. "Then something follows," perhaps; but there is no assertion at all. 
This can be proved, too. For if we scribe on the Phemic Sheet the Graph 
expressing "If A is true, Something is true," we shall have a Scroll with A 
alone in the Outer Close, and with nothing but a Blank in the Inner Close. Now 
this Blank is an Iterate of the Blank-instance that is always present on the 
Phemic Sheet; and this may, according to the rule, be deiterated by removing 
the Blank in the inner close. This will do, what the blot would not; namely, it 
will cause the collapse of the Inner Close, and thus leaves A in a single cut. 
We thus see that a Graph, A, enclosed in a single Cut that contains nothing 
else but a Blank has no signification that is not implied in the proposition, 
"If A is true, Something is true." When I was in the twenties and had not yet 
come to the full consciousness of my own gigantic powers of logical blundering, 
with what scorn I used to think of Hegel's confusion of Being with Blank 
Nothing, simply because it had the form of a predicate without its matter! Yet 
here am I after devoting a greater number of years to the study of exact logic 
than the probable number of hours that Hegel ever gave to this subject, 
repeating that very identical fallacy! Be sure, Reader, that I would have 
concealed the mistake from you (for vanity's sake, if for no better reason), if 
it had not been "up to" me, in a way I could not evade, to expose it.

-- From "Copy T," c. 1906; one of a number of fragmentary manuscripts designed 
to follow the present article.


For my part, I tend to think Peirce uses the term "blot" in an ordinary way to 
refer to an instance of a relatively large spot of, say, ink on a page.  Blots, 
like spots on a page, are instances or replicas. Dots, as instanced by a 
heavily drawn spot, on the other hand, are taken be logical symbols that are 
interpreted according to a general rule (see, for example, Convention 4 of the 
Beta Graphs). So, we have dots, spots and blots. How might we interpret the 
philosophical meaning of a blot that fills part of a scroll in the gamma part 
of the EG where there is a recto and verso side of the page? Might it be 
analogous in some ways to a side of a moon on which the rays of the sun do not 
directly shine?


That general idea appears to be something that Peirce explored when he 
suggested that we can imagine projective rays emanating from the starting 
points of inquiry, illuminating the recto side of each page in a larger book of 
assertions expressed alternately in the mood of interrogatives, optatives, 
imperatives and indicatives. If inquiry is honest and is governed by the goal 
of seeking adequate explanations of what really is the case, then we can 
imagine those rays converging as they pass through a book with an unending 
multitude of pages at an ideal of truth at the end of such inquiry. As such, we 
need not lose heart in the face of blunders--big or small. (see CP 6.581-7)


Yours,


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2019 9:21 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce admitted that his terminology of 1906 was 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce admitted that his terminology of 1906 was bad.

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Gary R., List,


I've been thinking about the general themes of "conceptual spaces" as it is 
developed in Gardenfors The Geometry of Meaning, with the aim of comparing 
various features in this account to themes in Peirce's semiotics. One thing 
that seems underdeveloped in Gardenfors account of meaning is the role of 
feelings and emotions in thought.


On Peirce's semiotic theory, qualisigns (i.e., tones) seem to play an essential 
role in explaining how feelings and emotions function in the various processes 
of thought. Given the character of a qualisign as possibles, how we might 
understand the operation of such signs as having iconic relations of similarity 
to qualities considered as abstract ideas?


If anyone can help point me to diagrammatic models of how the processes of 
thought involving feelings and emotions might be understood, I'd appreciate it. 
For my part, I think that models drawing on the idea of a field of potentiality 
using, for instance, vectors to represent flow in a phase space would seem to 
be a natural way to represent things.


Thus far, my searches through the literature have turned up little in the way 
of such diagrammatic models.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Friday, April 12, 2019 5:32:08 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce admitted that his terminology of 1906 was bad.


John, list,

Thanks for providing the text of this very interesting letter, especially 
considering that it must have been written just before the fall at Arisbe that 
incapacitated Peirce for almost two years (in a 1913 letter he says that the 
injury occurred on Dec. 13, 1911). The introduction of the term “blot” for “the 
simplest part of speech which this syntax contemplates” is especially 
interesting, as I’d never seen it before (although he did use the term “blot” 
in 1903 to explain why a cut should be read as negation).

Also the mention that he would need a Delta part to deal with modals raises the 
question of how the Gamma part is different from the Beta. The only hint I can 
find about this is the statement that the utterer and interpreter “may conceive 
that the "phemic sheet" embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before 
the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual 
conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces 
relate to one subject and part to another.” That would seem to apply to Gamma, 
not Beta.

Since the references to EGs in the letter are all about the syntax of the 
system, perhaps you can explain a bit more what you mean by saying that the 
shading for negative areas (instead of cuts) “puts the emphasis on *semantics*.”

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa 
Sent: 11-Apr-19 23:15
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Mary Keeler 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce admitted that his terminology of 1906 was bad.



Folks,



I have repeatedly said that Peirce's description of existential graphs in 
1909-1911 was his final preferred version.



I'm happy to report that he explicitly said so in a letter to Risteen, MS L 
376, December 6, 1911:



> An account of [the syntax of existential graphs] was given in the

> Monist of Oct. 1906.  In this I made an attempt to make the syntax

> cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me.  The description was, on

> the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one

> Dr. Carus rejected.  For although the system itself is marked by

> extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a

> hundred technical terms applying to it.  The necessity for these was

> chiefly due to the lines called "cuts" which simply appear in the

> present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of

> the sheet.  The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into

> three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma,

> parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to

> add a Delta part in order to deal with modals.



Yes, indeed.  Note that the idea of cuts and recto/verso made a huge increase 
in the complexity of the description.  The shading for negative areas makes the 
graphs far more readable, and it puts the emphasis on *semantics* instead of 
the horrible terminology.



For Peirce's 1911 explanation (8 pages instead of 55 pages), see 
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf



For the same 1911 description plus more commentary and examples, see 
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm



But note that Peirce also wrote that the description of modals in 1906 "has not 
satisfied" him and that he would "add a Delta part in order to deal with 
modals."



See the attached L376.txt.  But it ends abruptly at "[end].



John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, List,


In order to ground the suggestions I made in a text, consider what Peirce says 
in MS 518 about the sheet of assertion. This manuscript is part of a larger 
project to explain the connections between the first principles of logical 
algebra and the EG.


§1. As the fundamental transformations of any algebra, if strict logical method 
is desired, choose indecomposable transformations. But an indecomposable 
transformation is either an omission or an insertion, since any other may be 
analyzed into an omission followed by an insertion.

§2. The algebraic symbols are written on the surface of paper, wherein it is 
assumed that a surface is capable of representing every logical relation. That 
the surface must be capable of iconically representing every logical relation 
is not evident; and though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove 
it.

We provide ourselves, therefore, with a surface which we call the sheet of 
assertion; and pretend to hold ourselves responsible for the truth of whatever 
we may write upon it.

But as long as it remains blank we are irresponsible. Hence, the first rule of 
transformation will be

Rule I. The whole of what is written on the sheet of assertion may be erased, 
without danger of falsehood.


Here is the passage I find particularly suggestive:  "That the surface must be 
capable of iconically representing every logical relation is not evident; and 
though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove it."


So, instead of saying that a diagrammatic system of logic depends upon certain 
relations being invisible, I would say that the system makes clear to us not 
only what has been explicitly asserted on a sheet--but also what can be 
asserted that is consistent with what has been thus far. As such, the blank 
sheet iconically represents all that is logically possible (1) at each 
indeterminate point and (2) on the surface as a whole within the given system 
of logical hypotheses.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 7:22 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic


Jeff, Jon,

Thanks for your comments, all helpful! Though I may need more time to study 
yours, Jeff, and see how it relates to phaneroscopy.

I recall that Michael Polanyi wrote a book on The Tacit Dimension. Maybe that’s 
a good name for what the blank sheet of assertion represents.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 7-Apr-19 17:49
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Gary F, Jon S, List,



GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!



Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what is 
invisible, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in NDDR, to the 
effect that the representation of every logical relation implies something 
about some type of inverse of the relation. Without getting into the details of 
the matter, allow me to gesture in the direction of the broader ideas that are 
in play.



In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and 
correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is not 
merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential relation, 
and that is not a mere dyadic identity, etc. In other words, every assertion of 
some relation involves indefinitely many implications about what is and is not 
possible with respect to the converse of the relation--and so too with all 
other relations that are composed of such relations. Peirce takes the time to 
provide a nomenclature system inspired by the system used in organic chemistry 
in order to spell out what is and is not involved in the inverse or converse of 
progressively richer sorts of relations.



What follows from the blank sheet of assertion?  At every possible point where 
there is no assertion, the open space has implications that extend to any and 
every kind of relation that might, within a given system (e.g., such as the 
gamma graphs) be written on the sheet. As such, every possible point on any 
sheet of assertion involves all of the possible assertions that could be made 
at any point that are consistent with what is written elsewhere. If nothing has 
yet been scribed and the sheet is blank, that leaves a lot of possibilities.



What should we say about an assertion involving three nested cuts? For all of 
those points outside the outmost cut, there is no fourth or fifth cut. So too 
for the areas inside of the cuts. In addition to expressing what is positively 
the case, each assertion written in diagrammatic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John, Dan, List,


In holding that our presentation of space as a whole has an a priori in 
character, I do not believe that Kant was arguing in the first Critique that we 
have a biological instinct to see things in a Euclidean way. Again, I believe 
that Smyth's Forms of Intuition: an Historical Introduction to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic provides an interpretation that is sensitive to the 
texts and the sources from which Kant was drawing in developing these 
arguments. It is worth noting that from early on (e.g., see "Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man"), Peirce interprets Kant's 
account of our experience of space in a similar way and points out in a long 
footnote that his own remarks about our perceptions involving spatiality and 
temporality should not be interpreted as contrary to Kant's views on the main 
points.


Attributing to Kant the view that the a priori character of the presentation of 
space implies that we have a biologically "instinctive" theory of space that is 
inherently Euclidean in character runs directly at odds with the fact that Kant 
was engaged in close discussions with Lambert who developed a fairly extensive 
system of perspective geometry. In the transcendental aesthetic, Kant is asking 
"what are the formal conditions for mapping in our common sense and our 
scientific cognitions from one temporal or spatial perspective onto another?" 
As far as I am able to determine, Peirce's phenomenological theory is an 
attempt to generalize on this sort of question. For both Kant and Peirce, 
biological explanations of what is or is not instinctive will not answer 
philosophical questions about the formal relations that are necessary for 
making valid inferences.


Having said that, I acknowledge that Peirce is keen to provide explanations in 
philosophy that (a) fit with our common sense and (b) can be tested in the 
special sciences such as biology.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 8:33:28 AM
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

John,

Great stuff.

There is a huge amount of information that Kant was wrong about these things. 
Someone today mentioned Michael Polyani’s work on personal knowledge/tacit 
knowledge. And, at the risk of being a bore, there is my book, Dark Matter of 
the Mind: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X, 
in which I survey a lot of the literature, proposing my own theories (not as 
much interaction with Peirce as there should have been, I am sure).

There is also a point that Kant missed entirely and that Peirce had little 
chance to observe: cross-cultural variation.

Dan


On Apr 8, 2019, at 11:17 AM, John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.

Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.

For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
through traffic, and took public transportation to work.

Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.

For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness

For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf

By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
See the article 
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm

Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, List,


GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!


Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what is 
invisible, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in NDDR, to the 
effect that the representation of every logical relation implies something 
about some type of inverse of the relation. Without getting into the details of 
the matter, allow me to gesture in the direction of the broader ideas that are 
in play.


In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and 
correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is not 
merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential relation, 
and that is not a mere dyadic identity, etc. In other words, every assertion of 
some relation involves indefinitely many implications about what is and is not 
possible with respect to the converse of the relation--and so too with all 
other relations that are composed of such relations. Peirce takes the time to 
provide a nomenclature system inspired by the system used in organic chemistry 
in order to spell out what is and is not involved in the inverse or converse of 
progressively richer sorts of relations.


What follows from the blank sheet of assertion?  At every possible point where 
there is no assertion, the open space has implications that extend to any and 
every kind of relation that might, within a given system (e.g., such as the 
gamma graphs) be written on the sheet. As such, every possible point on any 
sheet of assertion involves all of the possible assertions that could be made 
at any point that are consistent with what is written elsewhere. If nothing has 
yet been scribed and the sheet is blank, that leaves a lot of possibilities.


What should we say about an assertion involving three nested cuts? For all of 
those points outside the outmost cut, there is no fourth or fifth cut. So too 
for the areas inside of the cuts. In addition to expressing what is positively 
the case, each assertion written in diagrammatic form also expresses--and 
thereby allows us to see--what is and is not possible in terms of the converse 
relations.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 1:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

Gary F., List:

Just a few quick responses to some of your comments over the last couple of 
days.

GF:  I hesitated over your statement that “a definition can only serve as an 
Immediate Interpretant,” because I don’t think that applies to a term defined 
for use in pure mathematics ...

Yes, I had in mind mainly linguistic Semes that purport to represent real 
Objects.  A definition in pure mathematics is more of a hypothetical stipulation

GF:  But it took me a while to recognize that the absence of lines is also a 
mode of connection, as Peirce says above, and that both of these are 
“degenerate Secundan,” i.e. symmetrical dyadic relations in which there is no 
reaction of one correlate upon the other where one is relatively active and the 
other relatively passive.

I agree that neither correlate is active or passive with respect to the 
other--that is what makes these relations symmetrical rather than 
asymmetric--but I think that it would be misleading to say on this basis that 
there is no reaction between them at all.  On the contrary, coexistence is 
precisely a form of reaction--"existence is that mode of being which consists 
in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all the 
other such individuals of the same universe" (CP 6.336; 1908).

GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!

I suggest that the Icons in question are invisible because their Objects are 
likewise invisible; i.e., invisibility is one of the respects in which the 
absence of lines resembles the mode of connection that constitutes coexistence. 
 Recall that the blank Phemic Sheet represents "all that is tacitly taken for 
granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their 
discussion" (CP 4.553; 1906).  That which is taken for granted--like 
coexistence as a relation that everything in the Universe has with everything 
else in the Universe--is invisible, unless and until we deliberately attend to 
it.

GF:  But you are quite right to point out that this usage of “empirical” is “a 
much broader notion of the term than often is used by 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John, List,


Richard Smyth has two monographs that deal squarely with these sorts of 
questions. I recommend both.


In the Forms of Intuition, he reconstructs the central arguments in Kant's 
transcendental aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason. One of the salient 
points that Smyth makes is that Kant's distinctions between what is a priori 
and a posteriori, on the one hand, and the what is analytic and what is 
synthetic apply first and foremost to the classification of different sorts of 
cognitions. That is, neither distinction is used by Kant as a distinction 
between kinds of truths--as many 20th century analytic philosophers take the 
latter distinction (and sometimes even the former) to be.


One obvious reason for thinking that philosophers like Goodman and Quine are 
using the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic in a very 
different way from Kant is that, on Kant's account, one and the same thing can 
be known in these two different ways. The same thing, I believe, is true for 
what is cognized a priori and what is cognized a posteriori.


In geometry, for instance, if I draw the conclusion that the sum of the 
interior angles of a triangle is believed to be 180 degrees by measuring each 
angle with a protractor and then adding the numbers, then the cognition is a 
posteriori in character. If, on the other hand, the sum of the angles of a 
triangle are shown to be equal to two right angles by extending the base, 
constructing a parallel to the far side through the vertice where the base has 
been extended, and then proving the conclusion by opposite and adjacent angles, 
as is illustrated in the Elements, then the conclusion is known a priori. The 
key difference is that the conclusion of the former cognition, where the angles 
are measured with a protractor, can be generalized by induction and will hold 
only with some degree of probability for actual triangles as drawn on boards. 
The latter conclusion can be generalized to show that it holds necessarily for 
all idealized triangles in Euclidean space.  It is these latter marks of having 
a universal and necessary character that Kant takes to be the hallmark of what 
is a priori as a cognition, inference, judgment, concept, element, etc. If an 
element in an a priori cognition is essential to the validity of that 
cognition, then the element is itself a priori in character.


In an epilogue at the end of the work, Smyth draws out some of the implications 
of Kant's arguments in the transcendental aesthetic for better understanding 
the character of our cognitions in mathematical logic. This part of the 
discussion is, I think, very Peircean in inspiration and character.


In Reading Peirce Reading, Smyth makes the point that Kant's division between 
what is known analytically and what is known a synthetically is, for Peirce, 
the fundamentally historical in character. What is, at one point in inquiry, 
known synthetically may, at a later point in inquiry, be known analytically. 
This can be seen in mathematics where something that is proven at an earlier 
synthetic stage of inquiry as a theorem may, at some later point, be treated by 
mathematicians as an axiom in a later development of the system. This point 
about geometry can, of course, also be applied to mathematical systems of logic.


The upshot of Smyth's reconstruction of Peirce's account of what is cognized 
synthetically or analytically can be understood by thinking o the matter in 
light of a principle of continuity as applied to the growth of our cognitions 
over time. What, do you think, are the implications for applying the principle 
of continuity to the distinction between what is cognized a priori and a 
posteriori. Does the division have a timeless character, or does it have 
historical character that is indexed to our state of information at a given 
time and the growth of our understanding over time?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 12:29:40 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

On 4/7/2019 1:59 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> As an example of an /a priori/ element in moral cognition, consider
> the role of the /feeling/ of respect in deliberation about the what is
> required as a matter of duty. As an example of an a priori element in
> aesthetic judgment, consider the condition of seeking harmony in the
> experience of the beautiful. As an example of an /a priori/ element in
> mathematical cognition, consider the role of the intuition of the whole
> of ideal space in geometrical reasoning.
>
> In each case, I tend to think that Peirce agrees with Kant that these
> are /a priori/ and not merely /a posteriori/ elements in our practical,
> aesthetic and mathematical cognition.

That's an interesting argumen

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Helmut, Gary F, List,


On my reading of Kant and Peirce, Kant's reasons for holding that the 
fundamental principle of morality expresses unconditional requirements for the 
validity of practical reasoning are consonant with Peirce's reasons for holding 
that the laws of logic express unconditional requirements for the validity of 
all reasoning generally.


Having said that, I should point out that Kant uses the term a priori to 
characterize quite a number of cognitions and their parts including inferences, 
judgments, conceptions, and other elements of cognition. As an example of an a 
priori element in moral cognition, consider the role of the feeling of respect 
in deliberation about the what is required as a matter of duty. As an example 
of an a priori element in aesthetic judgment, consider the condition of seeking 
harmony in the experience of the beautiful. As an example of an a priori 
element in mathematical cognition, consider the role of the intuition of the 
whole of ideal space in geometrical reasoning.


In each case, I tend to think that Peirce agrees with Kant that these are a 
priori and not merely a posteriori elements in our practical, aesthetic and 
mathematical cognition.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 9:00:46 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: 'Peirce-L'; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

Jeffrey, list,
I wonder, whether the concept of "a priori" is different with Kant and with 
Peirce. E.g. the categorical imperative is "a priori" for Kant (a synthetic a 
priori statement), because it is logically necessary, comes from pure 
reasoning, and not from empiric. For Peirce, the "a priori" method of fixating 
belief, I guess, is rather a matter of intuition and not so much of reasoning, 
that would be the scientific method. Is that so?
Best,
Helmut

Sonntag, 07. April 2019 um 17:35 Uhr
"Jeffrey Brian Downard" 
wrote:

Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,



Is Cenoscopy an empirical science? It is clear that, on Peirce's account, it is 
a positive science. Having said that, let me narrow the question down a bit. 
Within the larger branch of the cenoscopic sciences, are the normative sciences 
empirical sciences?



Let's try to clarify the question. In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill argues 
that the only evidence anything is good is empirical evidence. In the Grounding 
for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that our cognitions concerning the 
fundamental principles of morality and logic are a priori and not a posteriori 
in character. The reason, I take it, is that both logic and ethics study what 
ought to be. Ethics studies how we ought to act and logic studies how we ought 
to think. On his account, there would be no imperatives in thinking logically 
or ethically if the principles that serve as the grounding for those 
imperatives were not laws of reason.



For my part, I take Peirce to be saying that one reason cenoscopy (and not pure 
mathematics) is a positive science is that it rests on positive observations, 
and those sorts of observations can help us determine what really is the case. 
In the pure normative sciences of logic and ethics, the key observations do not 
appear to be based on the "impressions of the senses", to use the account of 
that word "empirical" that Hume and Mill favor. Rather, the observations are 
evaluative in character. The primary kind of observations that form the data 
for a theory of critical logic are judgments that some examples of reasoning 
are good (i.e., valid) and that others are bad (i.e., invalid).



It is interesting, I think, that Peirce offers a very definition of the word 
"empirical" in the Century Dictionary. The first definition is wide enough to 
cover normative evaluations of the goodness of argument--including practical 
arguments that might form the basis of a theory of ethics. In calling them 
empirical in this broad way, however, it will be good to keep in mind that it 
is a much broader notion of the term than often is used by classical British 
empiricists as well as contemporary empiricists of a more analytical 
orientation.



--Jeff







Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 7:18:12 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

Gary R, Jeff, list,
Jeff’s question is an open-ended one, which indicates to me that we cannot 
expect an exhaustive answer to it. There is no end to the loose ends …
I think Gary R’s points are well taken, and will add just one more to it, with 
a focus on the concept of “observation.” In any empirical science (including 
cenoscopy), perception 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Mr. A. B. Kempe, in his important memoir on the “Theory of 
Mathematical Forms,” presents an analysis which amounts to a formidable 
objection to my views. He makes diagrams of spots connected by lines; and it is 
easy to prove that every possible system of relationship can be so represented, 
although he does not perceive the evidence of this. But he shows (§68) that 
every such form can be represented by spots indefinitely varied, some of them 
being connected by lines, all of the same kind. He thus represents every 
possible relationship by a diagram consisting of only two different kinds of 
elements, namely, spots and lines between pairs of spots. Having examined this 
analysis attentively, I am of opinion that it is of extraordinary value. It 
causes me somewhat to modify my position, but not to surrender it. For, in the 
first place, it is to be remarked that Mr. Kempe's conception depends upon 
considering the diagram purely in its self-contained relations, the idea of its 
representing anything being altogether left out of view; while my doctrine 
depends upon considering how the diagram is to be connected with nature. It is 
not surprising that the idea of thirdness, or mediation, should be scarcely 
discernible when the representative character of the diagram is left out of 
account. In the second place, while it is not in the least necessary that the 
spots should be of different kinds, so long as each is distinguishable from the 
others, yet it is necessary that the connections between the spots should be of 
two different kinds, which, in Mr. Kempe's diagrams, appear as lines and as the 
absence of lines. Thus, Mr. Kempe has, and must have, three kinds of elements 
in his diagrams, namely, one kind of spots, and two kinds of connections of 
spots. In the third place, the spots, or units, as he calls them, involve the 
idea of firstness; the two-ended lines, that of secondness; the attachment of 
lines to spots, that of mediation.  ] CP 3:422-3 ]
I have bolded the part where Peirce refers to the absence of lines as a 
necessary mode of connection in Kempe’s diagrams. And there we have it — proof 
of the relationship between Peircean phaneroscopy and existential graphs, even 
before EGs were invented (late 1896) and phaneroscopy was named (1904).
Maybe this is a good place to wrap up my contributions to this thread (except 
replies to other people’s contributions). I now see the connections between 
phaneroscopy and EGs much more clearly than I did a month ago, and now I need 
to ponder the implications for my own phenomenology (or phenoscopy as I’ve been 
calling it lately). I do look forward to seeing what others think of all this, 
especially of things I might have missed or got wrong. And more questions are 
always welcome.
Gary f.

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: 7-Apr-19 00:22
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

Jeff, Gary f,

Jeff wrote: "What are the different options open for interpreting the "could 
ever be" part of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be 
present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron"?
Good question.

Note that Peirce immediately says after what you quoted: "Then the substance of 
every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the 
Phaneron."

My immediate thought (including my thought of that which is "much beside 
Thought") is that, just as there are semiotic and metaphysical 'may-bes' (1ns), 
'is's==existents, (2ns)) and 'would-bes' (3ns), there are phaneroscopic forms 
of these in "all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any 
sense." (See, for example, Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic 
Perspective on Human Subjectivity, Vincent Colapietro, p. 17, for a brief 
discussion of 'may-bes', 'is's' and 'would-bes'. There are also variations on 
these: 'can-bes' and 'might-bes'.)

Albert Adkin concludes his Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
Peirce's pragmatism https://www.iep.utm.edu/peircepr/ by remarking:

Peirce’s [. . . ] mature take on modal notions, as we know, is to be a realist 
about “would-bes.” This makes his pragmatism focus less on actual occurrences 
and more on potential effects. It also has the further effect of making his 
pragmatism take the idea of laws and long run habit more seriously; the idea of 
natural law concerning the “hardness” of diamonds is, after all, part of his 
explanation of why the destroyed diamond can count as hard.

Best,

Gary R


Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York



On Sat, Apr 6, 2019 at 9:03 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R, Gary F, List,



What are the different options open for interpreting the "could ever be" part 
of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the 
mi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

modify my position, but not to surrender it. For, in the 
first place, it is to be remarked that Mr. Kempe's conception depends upon 
considering the diagram purely in its self-contained relations, the idea of its 
representing anything being altogether left out of view; while my doctrine 
depends upon considering how the diagram is to be connected with nature. It is 
not surprising that the idea of thirdness, or mediation, should be scarcely 
discernible when the representative character of the diagram is left out of 
account. In the second place, while it is not in the least necessary that the 
spots should be of different kinds, so long as each is distinguishable from the 
others, yet it is necessary that the connections between the spots should be of 
two different kinds, which, in Mr. Kempe's diagrams, appear as lines and as the 
absence of lines. Thus, Mr. Kempe has, and must have, three kinds of elements 
in his diagrams, namely, one kind of spots, and two kinds of connections of 
spots. In the third place, the spots, or units, as he calls them, involve the 
idea of firstness; the two-ended lines, that of secondness; the attachment of 
lines to spots, that of mediation.  ] CP 3:422-3 ]

I have bolded the part where Peirce refers to the absence of lines as a 
necessary mode of connection in Kempe’s diagrams. And there we have it — proof 
of the relationship between Peircean phaneroscopy and existential graphs, even 
before EGs were invented (late 1896) and phaneroscopy was named (1904).

Maybe this is a good place to wrap up my contributions to this thread (except 
replies to other people’s contributions). I now see the connections between 
phaneroscopy and EGs much more clearly than I did a month ago, and now I need 
to ponder the implications for my own phenomenology (or phenoscopy as I’ve been 
calling it lately). I do look forward to seeing what others think of all this, 
especially of things I might have missed or got wrong. And more questions are 
always welcome.

Gary f.



From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: 7-Apr-19 00:22
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Jeff, Gary f,



Jeff wrote: "What are the different options open for interpreting the "could 
ever be" part of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be 
present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron"?

Good question.



Note that Peirce immediately says after what you quoted: "Then the substance of 
every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the 
Phaneron."



My immediate thought (including my thought of that which is "much beside 
Thought") is that, just as there are semiotic and metaphysical 'may-bes' (1ns), 
'is's==existents, (2ns)) and 'would-bes' (3ns), there are phaneroscopic forms 
of these in "all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any 
sense." (See, for example, Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic 
Perspective on Human Subjectivity, Vincent Colapietro, p. 17, for a brief 
discussion of 'may-bes', 'is's' and 'would-bes'. There are also variations on 
these: 'can-bes' and 'might-bes'.)



Albert Adkin concludes his Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
Peirce's pragmatism https://www.iep.utm.edu/peircepr/ by remarking:



Peirce’s [. . . ] mature take on modal notions, as we know, is to be a realist 
about “would-bes.” This makes his pragmatism focus less on actual occurrences 
and more on potential effects. It also has the further effect of making his 
pragmatism take the idea of laws and long run habit more seriously; the idea of 
natural law concerning the “hardness” of diamonds is, after all, part of his 
explanation of why the destroyed diamond can count as hard.



Best,



Gary R





Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York







On Sat, Apr 6, 2019 at 9:03 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Gary R, Gary F, List,



What are the different options open for interpreting the "could ever be" part 
of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the 
mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron"?



--Jeff



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, Gary F, List,


What are the different options open for interpreting the "could ever be" part 
of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the 
mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron"?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2019 11:14:43 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

Gary f, List,

You wrote:

[Peirce] also wrote in CP 1.286 [. . .\ c. 1904):
[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody [. . .] ]]
Then in one of his drafts for the 1906 “Prolegomena” we find:
[[ Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the 
mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron. Then the substance of every 
Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the 
Phaneron. The Phaneron being itself far too elusive for direct observation, 
there can be no better method of studying it than through the Diagram of it 
which the System of Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. ] “PAP”, R 293 
(NEM4:320) ]
Gf: Can the Phaneron be both “directly open to observation” and “far too 
elusive for direct observation”? Or is this a case of Peirce contradicting 
himself? Or did he change his mind about the nature of the Phaneron? Perhaps 
the very concept of the Phaneron is so vague (like the concept of God) that the 
principle of contradiction does not apply to it; Peirce indeed offered that as 
a “scientific definition” of vagueness (CP 5.448, EP2:351).
Just a thought: That which Peirce says in 1904 is "directly open to 
observation" are "phanerons." Notice the plural; directly afterwards he writes 
of "those" phanerons "familiar to everybody." Again, plural, suggesting that 
here he is not talking about the phaneron tout court, but "those. . . familiar 
to everybody."
In 1906 he refers to the "collective whole" as the "phaneron," singular. If 
"The Phaneron [. . .] is far too elusive for direct observation," while "the 
substance of every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a 
Constituent of the Phaneron," perhaps what can be studied "through the Diagram 
of it which the System of Existential Graphs" are exactly the Constituents of 
it.

If this is so, than phaneron (singular) may refer to the whole of any 
phaneroscopic observation, while phanerons (plural) refers to each "Constituent 
of the Phaneron," which, through some form of abstraction, can now be made an 
element of and studied via EGs.

Analogously, we can observe the sky generally and vaguely, but then begin to 
single out elements of it, describe them, name them, etc.

Again, just a quick thought.

Best,

Gary R


On Sat, Apr 6, 2019 at 11:51 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> 
wrote:
Jon, list,
I think I’m with you on all of this. I hesitated over your statement that “a 
definition can only serve as an Immediate Interpretant,” because I don’t think 
that applies to a term defined for use in pure mathematics; but maybe such a 
term is not a Seme, because it does not serve as a substitute for an object 
which existed before the definition. Still, I would want to emphasize that 
definition is pragmatically a recursive process. The more a term has been used 
in any given discourse, the more “real” its meaning is, prior to any explicit 
definition of it. Peirce the lexicographer certainly did not define terms in 
the same way as Peirce the pure mathematician. Yet even the pure mathematician, 
when he gives a verbal definition, has to use words with which the interpreter 
is already familiar.
One of the loose ends I wanted to address in this thread is a problem of 
definition. Peirce defined his new term “phaneron” as follows:
[[ The word φανερόν is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifest.… 
There can be no question that φανερός means primarily brought to light, open to 
public expression throughout.… I desire to have the privilege of creating an 
English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to 
assured observation. ] R 337:4-5, 7, 1904 ]
He also wrote in CP 1.286 (R 336, “Logic viewed as Semeiotics, Introduction 
Number 2, Phaneroscopy,” c. 1904):
[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. ]]
Then in one of his drafts for the 1906 “Prolegomena” 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

uld answer “Yes” to your question regarding quaternions, “would it also 
make sense to say that the representation of these modes in the gamma system 
can be interpreted in the third sense of the term as well, where we employ a 
mathematical system of numbers that are understood to be in four 
dimensions--one real and three imaginary?”

But having said that much, I’m not prepared to go into further detail because I 
am not yet familiar enough with Peirce’s writings on quaternions. For the time 
being, then, I’ll have to leave the further exploration of that to you (and 
others who may be better prepared than I to do the exploring).

I’ve been devoting my free time over the past two days to reading through Ahti 
Pietarinen’s full transcription of the talk Peirce gave at the National Academy 
of Science meeting in April 1906. I must thank Jon A.S. for posting the link to 
that ( 
here<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/AHTI_Pietarinen2/publication/271419583_Two_Papers_on_Existential_Graphs_by_Charles_Peirce/links/54c753d30cf289f0ceccf607.pdf>
 ), as I think it is at least as informative as the other texts I’ve been 
posting here, and anyone who’s been following this thread with interest should 
read it, in my opinion. After I’ve finished reading through it myself, I’ll try 
to pick out some highlights from it and tie up some “loose ends” of the thought 
process Peirce was going through in drafting all of these documents. After that 
I’ll be ready to dig deeper into the matter of quaternions (with your help of 
course).

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 2-Apr-19 20:16
To: 'Peirce List' ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Gary F, List,



The texts to which you are drawing our attention are fascinating. Let me ask a 
question that we should be able answer in a yes or no way, even if we don't see 
all of the implications of the competing answers.



In "Prolegomena to an Apology to for Pragmaticism," Peirce makes some comments 
about "The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism." The remarks are found in the CP in 
footnote 1 to 4.553 (on page 443 of Vol. 4). He says:  "It is chiefly for the 
sake of these convenient and familiar modes of representation of Petrosancta, 
that a modification of heraldic tinctures has been adopted. Vair and Potent 
here receive less decorative and pictorial Symbols. Fer and Plomb are selected 
to fill out the quaternion of metals on account of their monosyllabic names."



When he refers to the "quaternion" of the metals, it is clear that he means to 
use the term in the first of the sense that he articulates in the Century 
Dictionary, which is something that belongs to a group of four. In making the 
point, would it also make sense to say that the representation of these modes 
in the gamma system can be interpreted in the third sense of the term as well, 
where we employ a mathematical system of numbers that are understood to be in 
four dimensions--one real and three imaginary? In a number of places, both in 
the earlier writings on the symbolic systems of logic and the later writings on 
the existential graphs, Peirce applies the mathematical system of the 
quaternions for sake of thinking about the values of the variables where the 
values are (1) continuous in their variation (and not merely binary T or F), 
and (2) related as part of a system having more than three dimensions. As such, 
I think that the answer may be "yes", that we might interpret the relations 
between the tinctures that are used to designate the boundaries around 
different sheets as related in manner that is analogous to a four dimensional 
system of quaternions.



The reason I point this out is that it has a direct bearing on the way we might 
interpret the improvement offered on the gamma graphs where the relation 
between the recto and verso is taken to represent a relation between 
existential facts and possibilities of different kinds (depending on the tint 
of the outer boundary on the verso side)--where a cut in a page is conceived to 
go down through subsequent pages in a book that represents other kinds of 
possibilities depending upon the tint of the recto and verso of each of those 
pages.



In the system of the quaternions, the relations between the dimensions is 
different in a number of respects from that which is represented in an algebra 
of multiple dimensions where all of the dimensions are understood in terms of 
rational or real systems of number. One of the big differences is that in the 
system of quaternions, the multiplication of values in two of three imaginary 
dimensions (say i and j) takes you directly to a value in the other dimension 
(say k).



Why possible basis might I have for suggesting that Peirce may drawing on the 
Hamiltonian system of quaternions as a possible model for interpreting the 
relations between what is asserted on different pages have different tinctures?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, List,


The texts to which you are drawing our attention are fascinating. Let me ask a 
question that we should be able answer in a yes or no way, even if we don't see 
all of the implications of the competing answers.


In "Prolegomena to an Apology to for Pragmaticism," Peirce makes some comments 
about "The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism." The remarks are found in the CP in 
footnote 1 to 4.553 (on page 443 of Vol. 4). He says:  "It is chiefly for the 
sake of these convenient and familiar modes of representation of Petrosancta, 
that a modification of heraldic tinctures has been adopted. Vair and Potent 
here receive less decorative and pictorial Symbols. Fer and Plomb are selected 
to fill out the quaternion of metals on account of their monosyllabic names."


When he refers to the "quaternion" of the metals, it is clear that he means to 
use the term in the first of the sense that he articulates in the Century 
Dictionary, which is something that belongs to a group of four. In making the 
point, would it also make sense to say that the representation of these modes 
in the gamma system can be interpreted in the third sense of the term as well, 
where we employ a mathematical system of numbers that are understood to be in 
four dimensions--one real and three imaginary? In a number of places, both in 
the earlier writings on the symbolic systems of logic and the later writings on 
the existential graphs, Peirce applies the mathematical system of the 
quaternions for sake of thinking about the values of the variables where the 
values are (1) continuous in their variation (and not merely binary T or F), 
and (2) related as part of a system having more than three dimensions. As such, 
I think that the answer may be "yes", that we might interpret the relations 
between the tinctures that are used to designate the boundaries around 
different sheets as related in manner that is analogous to a four dimensional 
system of quaternions.


The reason I point this out is that it has a direct bearing on the way we might 
interpret the improvement offered on the gamma graphs where the relation 
between the recto and verso is taken to represent a relation between 
existential facts and possibilities of different kinds (depending on the tint 
of the outer boundary on the verso side)--where a cut in a page is conceived to 
go down through subsequent pages in a book that represents other kinds of 
possibilities depending upon the tint of the recto and verso of each of those 
pages.


In the system of the quaternions, the relations between the dimensions is 
different in a number of respects from that which is represented in an algebra 
of multiple dimensions where all of the dimensions are understood in terms of 
rational or real systems of number. One of the big differences is that in the 
system of quaternions, the multiplication of values in two of three imaginary 
dimensions (say i and j) takes you directly to a value in the other dimension 
(say k).


Why possible basis might I have for suggesting that Peirce may drawing on the 
Hamiltonian system of quaternions as a possible model for interpreting the 
relations between what is asserted on different pages have different tinctures? 
The straightforward reason is that Peirce is well aware that, in systems of 
number that are not complex (e.g., the integers, rationals or reals), there is 
no closure over the inverse operation of multiplying something by itself (i.e., 
raising it to a power). The inverse of this operation (e.g., taking the square 
root), requires the use of a system of complex numbers in order to have closure 
for the system. One of the things that the system of gamma graphs allows--which 
the alpha and beta systems do not--is the representation of the operation of 
hypostatic abstraction. In logical terms, this allows the introduction of 
objects that are formed on the basis of  abstractions of predicates--such as 
with a lambda operator in logics of Church or a Hilbert operator in the systems 
of Hilbert. As such, I think that Peirce sees that a modal logic--such as he is 
exploring in the gamma graphs--may need something that has the formal 
properties of the quaternions as a basis for interpreting the possible values 
of the variables. That, at least, is the guess I'd like to explore.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 10:22:07 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic


Jerry C,

You’re right that my perspective on the role of chemistry in Peirce’s work has 
changed quite a lot since a decade ago — but then, so have many other ideas I 
had about Peirce then. I daresay my ideas even about the ‘basic framework’ of 
his philosophy are still changing as I read and re-read more of his work.

I do think he meant the word “bedrock” in his title as a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, List,


Is there some textual reason to give priority to the analysis of the 
proposition in the argument for the categories?


For my part, I take the logical arguments for the categories to be based on the 
requirements for having valid arguments as well as meaningful propositions and 
terms. The question that he articulates in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an 
attempt to develop my categories from within" is:  what are the elemental kinds 
of relations--both formal and material--that are necessary for logic? The 
question of what is necessary for each of the three main classes of argument to 
be valid seems to be at least as important--if not more--than the question of 
what is necessary for a proposition to represent a fact in the effort to 
provide an internal grounding for the claim that there must be three elemental 
formal relations:  monadic, dyadic and triadic.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, February 9, 2019 10:47 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy


Jon, list,

If you’ve read the whole of the Atkins book I’ll have to catch up with you, as 
I’m only on Chapter 5 (of 7). But we could begin this thread with what Atkins 
calls the “Modified Kantian Insight”: The phenomenological categories somehow 
are based on, are derived from, are generated by, or otherwise correspond to 
the logical forms of propositions as discovered in formal logic, which is a 
part of mathematics.

I’m inclined to agree with Atkins that Peirce never abandoned this “insight,” 
and that from 1902 on, Peirce’s phenomenology included both logical analysis 
and “inspective analysis.” I associate the latter with Peirce’s more 
experiential descriptions of the categories, such as his description of 
Secondness as the “double consciousness” of effort and resistance we experience 
when pushing against a door that refuses to open. This corresponds to a dyadic 
relation in the formal logic of relations. This in turn is represented in EGs 
by a rhema or predicate that takes two subjects, such as “_ kills _”, 
which appears on the sheet of assertion (or phemic sheet) as a “Spot” with two 
“Pegs.” Attach a Line of Identity to each Peg and you have an icon of a 
proposition (not a pure icon, of course, because the interpretation is 
conventional, and because the Spot has a verbal label). It is logically 
analyzed into a predicate represented by the Spot with its Pegs, and two 
subjects represented by the two Lines of Identity.

If you’ve gone along with this so far, I need to ask why you seem to posit a 
correspondence between continuous predicates and Lines of Identity in your 
recent posts -- for instance in your recent reply to John S., referring to “the 
continuity of the single predicate being represented by continuous Lines of 
Identity.” Lines of Identity are of course continuous, but how can they come to 
represent a predicate rather than a subject? (Are you possibly reading the 
verbal label on a Spot as a subject?) If you’ve already explained this, I must 
have missed it.

My own best guess at the moment is that Peirce’s continuous predicate cannot be 
diagrammed with EG’s at all. It is continuous because it cannot be analyzed 
into parts which differ from one another, and I don’t see how this kind of 
continuity can be represented in EGs. I have a similar hunch that modality 
cannot be represented visually, at least not in the iconic way that EGs 
represent the -adicity or “valency” of predicates, and that Peirce eventually 
abandoned the Gamma graphs for precisely that reason. I would love to be proved 
wrong on both counts, because for years I have been looking for a way to use 
visual diagrams to explain the phenomenological categories to people untrained 
in logic or mathematics. So far my efforts to use the EGs for that purpose have 
come to naught. They are fine for logical analysis, but their correspondence to 
the experiential basis of the “indecomposable elements of the phaneron” is not 
obvious, at least not to me. Or rather it’s not obvious how they correspond; 
the Atkins formulation of the modified Kantian insight says they correspond 
“somehow”, but I’d like to make that less vague by visual means.

Hence my interest in this topic.

Gary f.

} For a burning would is come to dance inane. [Finnegans Wake 250] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway





From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 8-Feb-19 14:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy



Gary F., List:



I, for one, am very interested in the topic that you are proposing, having 
recently read Atkins's book myself.  In fact, his insights about the 
correspondence of the forms of propositions to the Categories, especially in 
Peirce's early writings, prompted some of my own thinking that led to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, List,


You say:  "That would explain why Peirce never used the term 'continuous 
semiosis': Semiosis is a kind of cognition.  Cognition is a continuous process. 
Therefore, semiosis is a continuous process.  Eating is a continuous process.  
Therefore, nobody talks about continuous eating.  If something X is continuous, 
it's redundant to say "continuous X"."


While I accept your point about terminology--i.e., that I don't see instances 
where Peirce puts these terms together as "continuous semiosis"--I think this 
analogy rests on an assertion (i.e., "Cognition is a continuous process) that 
is not universally accepted. Nominalists such as Hume and Mill, for instance, 
argue that cognition is entirely composed of discrete impressions of sense. Any 
process of cognition, they claim, consists of a finite number of steps 
involving discrete parts.


As such, the claim that the process of semiosis is essentially continuous is a 
claim that calls out for (1) greater clarification and (2) supporting arguments.


How might we use the mathematical ideas involved in Peirce's later conception 
of continuity for the sake of pursuing (1) and (2)?


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2019 1:15:59 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

Jerry R and Jeff BD,

I would never stop anybody from discussing anything they wish.

But Peirce objected to people who took his words ('pragmatism', for
example) and used them in ways that were inconsistent with the way
he defined them.

JR
> Correct me if I’m wrong, but isn’t semiosis a greek term?

The base word in Greek is 'sema' (sign or mark).  The ending is also
Greek.  Peirce put the parts together in a way that is consistent
with classical usage.

JR
> To use your arguments to declare such limits as to how we ought
> to engage in this conversation...

I have no objection to the conversation.  My only point is that we
should distinguish the terms that Peirce used from terms that he might
have used, but didn't.

JBD
> Consider the following well-known passage...
> "The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of
> inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice,
> is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are
> of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects
> are real and those whose objects are unreal..."

That quotation explains what is going on.  Note that Peirce does not
use the term 'continuous cognition".  Instead, he says that cognition
is a continuous process.

That would explain why Peirce never used the term 'continuous semiosis':
Semiosis is a kind of cognition.  Cognition is a continuous process.
Therefore, semiosis is a continuous process.

Eating is a continuous process.  Therefore, nobody talks about
continuous eating.  If something X is continuous, it's redundant to
say "continuous X".

Since semiosis is a kind of cognition, Peirce would not talk about
continuous semiosis for the same reason that he would not talk
about continuous cognition or continuous eating.

This is why careful observation of Peirce's terminology is important.
Noticing whether Peirce avoids a certain kind of term is just as
significant as noticing that he uses it.

By the way, inferences from the absence of something are often
very important, but they are easy to miss.  Sherlock Holmes was
very good at such inferences.  So are expert bridge players.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, List,


Consider the following well-known passage:


At any moment we are in possession of certain information, that is, of 
cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from 
previous cognitions which are less general, less distinct, and of which we have 
a less lively consciousness. These in their turn have been derived from others 
still less general, less distinct, and less vivid; and so on back to the ideal 
first, which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness. This ideal 
first is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist as such. That is, 
there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the 
mind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from 
that relation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of 
inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as 
one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the 
true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose 
objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which 
we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an 
illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for 
which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private 
inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens 
such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or 
later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is 
therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of 
the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the 
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite 
increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognition -- the real and the 
unreal -- consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community 
will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same 
conditions, will ever after be denied. Now, a proposition whose falsity can 
never be discovered, and the error of which therefore is absolutely 
incognizable, contains, upon our principle, absolutely no error. Consequently, 
that which is thought in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There 
is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and 
it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we 
can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case. CP 5.311


It looks to me like the semiotic processes involved in cognition that Peirce 
describes in the first part of this passage have material parts, and those 
parts consist of an infinite series of inductive and abductive inferences. In 
turn, the inferences have material parts, and those parts consist of the 
propositions that function as premisses and conclusions. In turn, the 
propositions have material parts, and those parts consist of the terms that 
function as subjects and predicates.


Let us ask:  do the propositions that serve as premisses and conclusions of 
inferences have material parts (i.e., the terms) in the same sense in which the 
inferences have parts (i.e., the propositions)? The answer, I think, is "yes".


In this way, we can see some of the significance of Peirce's 
reconceptualization of the nature of the proposition. He says:


I mentioned on an early page of this paper that this System leads to a 
different conception of the Proposition and Argument from the traditional view 
that a Proposition is composed of Names, and that an Argument is composed of 
Propositions. It is a matter of insignificant detail whether the term Argument 
be taken in the sense of the Middle Term, in that of the Copulate of Premisses, 
in that of the setting forth of Premisses and Conclusion, or in that of the 
representation that the real facts which the premisses assert (together, it may 
be, with the mode in which those facts have come to light) logically signify 
the truth of the Conclusion. In any case, when an Argument is brought before 
us, there is brought to our notice (what appears so clearly in the Illative 
Transformations of Graphs) a process whereby the Premisses bring forth the 
Conclusion, not informing the Interpreter of its Truth, but appealing to him to 
assent thereto. This Process of Transformation, which is evidently the kernel 
of the matter, is no more built out of Propositions than a motion is built out 
of positions. The logical relation of the Conclusion to the Premisses might be 
asserted; but that would not be an Argument, which is essentially intended to 
be understood as representing what it represents only in virtue of the logical 
habit which would bring any logical Interpreter to assent to it. ... It thus 
appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and the 
Argument, is by no means a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, Jon S, Helmut, List,


As Peirce points out in the last lecture in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, 
clarifying the mathematical conception of continuity is quite difficult. 
Putting that mathematical conception to work for the sake of clarifying a 
philosophical conception of continuity is significantly more difficult.


Having re-read the really nice article by Potter and Shields on the development 
of Peirce's understanding of the mathematical conception, I'd like to put some 
of those ideas to work for the sake of addressing a philosophical question. 
Let's focus on some questions that surface in the semiotic theory about the 
"endless" character of the process of semiosis.  Here is a passage where Peirce 
seems to characterize different ways in which the process is endless.


The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a sign, 
or representation. A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, 
or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from 
without. That for which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, 
its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object 
of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first 
representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of representations, 
each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute 
object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a 
representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived 
as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely 
stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an 
infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another 
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as 
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. 
(1.339)


If my memory serves me right, this passage is from an unpublished manuscript 
written a little before "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my 
categories from within" (1896). As such, I am trying to interpret what he is 
saying in light of his account of the role of geniune triadic relations in the 
growth of the meaning of signs.


As far as I can tell, there appear to be three different sorts of endless 
series that are being described:


1)  "an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it."

2) "The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In 
fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of 
irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it 
is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite 
regression here."

3) "Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which 
the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its 
interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series."


How might we use Peirce's later mathematical conception of continuity--as is 
clarified in the essay by Potter and Shields--for the sake of explaining what 
is endless in each of three cases? My assumption is that some of these endless 
series are infinite in a manner that involves real continuity. As such, getting 
clearer on the endless character of each sort of series might help us 
understand the kind of continuity that is involved in each of these three cases.


Grading them in order of difficulty, I would say that the endless series that 
goes back in time to earlier interpretations is probably the easiest of the 
three. The case that involves future possible interpretations seems harder. The 
case that involves the diaphanous character of what one has after removing the 
"irrelevant clothing from a given" representation seems most puzzling--at least 
to me. Perhaps we should work on them one at a time--starting with the easiest 
case.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Friday, January 11, 2019 2:14:56 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis

Helmut, list,

If you desire to think deeply about Peirce's conception of continuity, Helmut, 
I can recommend no better book than Fernando Zalamea's Peirce's Logic of 
Continuity: A Conceptual and Mathematical Approach.
https://www.amazon.com/Peirces-Logic-Continuity-Conceptual-Mathematical/dp/0983700494

Here's an editor's blurb about it:

Peirce’s logic of continuity is explored from a double perspective: (i) 
Peirce’s original understanding of the continuum, alternative to Cantor’s 
analytical Real line, (ii) Peirce’s original construction of a topological 
logic –- the existential graphs -– alternative to the algebraic presentation of 
propositional and first-order calculi. Peirce’s general architectonics, 
oriented to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] John Kaag on William James (& Peirce & Whitman) on "The greatest uses of life"

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, List,


John Kaag's essay is beautifully written. The pace, the examples, the poetry 
draw one forward from James' "Maybe" to the question itself:  "Is my life 
really worth living?".


I'd be interested in a threaded discussion if others have similar interests.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond 
Sent: Monday, October 1, 2018 12:04:02 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] John Kaag on William James (& Peirce & Whitman) on "The 
greatest uses of life"

List,

An engaging essay, "The greatest uses of life," by John Kaag appeared in the 
e-journal, Aeon, today, and I thought it might provide an interesting 
springboard for discussion of a facet of the work of William James, Peirce, and 
Walt Whitman relating to the title of the essay. See: 
https://aeon.co/essays/is-life-worth-living-the-pragmatic-maybe-of-william-james?utm_source=Aeon

We've been concentrating intensely and for some time now here on Peirce's 
semeiotic, especially its first branch, theoretical grammar, and for a while 
now I must admit that, as interesting and valuable as I have found that 
discussion to be, I've been looking to find a way to open a thread on some 
aspect of pragmatism not directly involving logic as semeiotic. I'm hoping that 
this essay might provide something of a springboard into a discussion of the 
theme of Kaag's essay in the light of pragmatism, James', Peirce's, Whitman's, 
and other's.

The work of Kaag, author of American Philosophy: A Love Story (2016) and, more 
recently, Hiking with Nietzsche, published this year, has been briefly 
discussed on Peirce-L from time to time in recent years and it is my sense that 
at least some forum members find his work of interest.

Of course we all have notions as to "the greatest uses of life" which we could 
expound upon without further reflection, but I'd like to ask those who might be 
interested in a threaded discussion on the topic to read Kaag's short essay 
before posting. To perhaps pique your interest, here's the conclusion of "The 
greatest uses of life."

Before the Brooklyn Bridge was built, a ferry carried passengers from one side 
of the river to the other. Walt Whitman was often among the crowd. The American 
poet was one of James’s longstanding heroes, the embodiment of the capacious 
‘healthy mind’ he describes in the Varieties. James occasionally sensed the 
sublime or the religious on his hikes in the Adirondacks or in the testament of 
mystics, but Whitman could tap into it on a routine basis, even on a dirty 
ferry ride, which most people would regard as a rather annoying commute. It 
wasn’t annoying for Whitman. In his poem ‘Crossing Brooklyn Ferry’ (1855), he 
described the spectacle – the experience of nature and the experience of the 
human throng. Both were inexplicable and hopeful and shared:

Others will enter the gates of the ferry, and cross from shore to shore,
Others will watch the run of the flood-tide;
Others will see the shipping of Manhattan north and west, and the heights of 
Brooklyn to the south and east;
Others will see the islands large and small;
Fifty years hence, others will see them as they cross, the sun half an hour 
high.
A hundred years hence, or ever so many hundred years hence, others will see 
them,
Will enjoy the sunset, the pouring in of the flood-tide, the falling back to 
the sea of the ebb-tide.
3.
It avails not, neither time or place – distance avails not.

James read and reread this poem. This was wonder, and there was enough of it to 
go around. It turns out that one can probably set aside the nuttier aspects of 
the Society for Psychical Research and still retain a Whitman-esque experience 
of the world, the numinous immanence of an all-too-human ferry ride. That, at 
least, was James’s hope. Whitman’s vision, in James’s words, was sufficient ‘to 
prompt our curiosities and hopes and suspicions’. The world is not always, or 
ever, exactly as it seems. A dirty ferry ride might be more than just a dirty 
ferry ride. There is something more – at least it is possible. Whitman’s was a 
type of religious experience – and so very different from the way that most 
people experience the world. Reflecting on ‘Crossing Brooklyn Ferry’, James 
explained:

When your ordinary Brooklynite or New Yorker, leading a life replete with too 
much luxury, or tired and careworn, about his personal affairs, crosses the 
ferry or goes up Broadway, his fancy does not thus ‘soar away into the colours 
of the sunset’ as did Whitman’s, nor does he inwardly realise at all the 
indisputable fact that this world never did anywhere or at any time contain 
more of essential divinity, or of eternal meaning, than is embodied in the 
fields of vision over which his eyes so carelessly pass.

However, one does not have to be careless. Thankfully there are other ways to 
pass the time and other times to pass away. 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

York
718 482-5690



On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 11:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Francesco, Jon S., Robert, List,


The list Robert has compiled contains an entry that bears on the question of 
how we might understand the character of the immediate object. The entry the 
40th in the list, and it is from MS 318, Pragmatism (1907).


I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, --since in scientific 
inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds:  nothing hazard, nothing 
gain. I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by 
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determining the interpretant in 
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign".


The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; 
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover, the sign 
being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is confidently to be 
expected that object and interpretant should precisely correspond, each to the 
other. In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional 
interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, 
too, pertain to all signs without exception. The real object and energetic 
interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things. But to our 
surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not correspond with any 
kind of object. This defect of correspondence between object and interpretant 
must be rooted in the essential difference there is between the nature of an 
object and that of an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes 
while the latter succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a 
relatively future tense.


The relevant passage is the one where he says of the immediate object and the 
emotional interpretant that "both, too, pertain to all signs without 
exception." This seems to suggest that any sign that involves the apprehension 
of an object does so in virtue of its having a relation to an immediate object. 
While some external signs may not, at some point in time, be apprehended by an 
interpreter, all are capable of being so apprehended. This suggests that all 
signs have an immediate object--at least as a possible sort of thing--even if 
the object is not actually apprehended at some given time. When the sign of any 
type is interpreted in actu, it will come to be apprehended in this way--and 
the immediate object appears to be essential for the interpretation of every 
sign.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2018 11:13:58 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign 
classification

Robert, List:

How can our understanding of the different correlates be "superfluous" to the 
classification of Signs accordingly?  For one thing, the internal/external 
distinction helps explain why there are additional trichotomies for the 
(external) relations between the Sign and the Dynamic Object/Interpretant, but 
not the (internal) relations between the Sign and the Immediate 
Object/Interpretant.  Again, why did Peirce divide Signs according to the Mode 
of Presentation of the internal correlates vs. the Mode of Being of the 
external correlates, if he did not consider both of these distinctions to be 
noteworthy and perhaps connected?

I have come across your "76 Definitions" in the past, but have not reviewed it 
recently.  I agree that many of the editorial choices for CP were unfortunate, 
and wish that the Peirce Edition Project had made much better progress to date 
at publishing the Writings in chronological order.  As for your animation, it 
reflects the notion of infinite semiosis, although it only proceeds forward 
rather than also reaching backward.  My understanding of Peirce's late view is 
that he came to recognize the termination of semiosis upon the production of a 
feeling or effort as the Dynamic Interpretant, rather than another Sign, or a 
habit or habit-change as the ultimate Logical Interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Sep 24, 2018 at 5:51 AM, 
mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr>> wrote:
‌
Would you agree that these internal vs. external distinctions (which I readily 
admit) are superfluous w