Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not wh

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust physical universe". ?

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 02 Nov 2012, at 20:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, Why do you consider "magic" as a potential answer to your question? After thinking about your question while I

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 02 Nov 2012, at 21:19, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 1) Yes,

Re: Against Mechanism

On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means. Com

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your ch

Re: AGI

On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:44, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: you got me. I wrote about things we cannot know - we have no capability to think of it - and you deny that based on products of the human mind (math - logic) saying YES, we can know everything (that we or our products DO know). I am sor

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to b

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the literature. Dear Bruno, Did you notice that I dis

Does your monad (your 1p) survive artificial changes to the brain ?

Hi Bruno Marchal I think the issue of your survival of the doctor's operation or whatever is clouded by the solipsism issue. It should work, for better or worse, as long as you can affirm you have survived by your subjective (1p) experience. More comments are below, but that is the bottom lin

arithmetic truth and 1p truth

Hi Bruno Marchal I think in computationalism you only have to be able to say that the result is arithmetically or algebraically true. Arithmetic truth is what you seek. However, I still have yet to know if a particular computation seems true to your 1p. That would be 1p truth. Does the arithme

Necessary truth and contingent truth

Hi Bruno Marchal There are, as Leibniz said, two types of truth: the a priori truths of necessary reason and the contingent, a posteriori truths, which depend on the test of data verification. Unfortunately we can not know if a theoretical truth (information theory) is "true" unless it works

On uniqueness

Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, and keep in mind that there may be more than one theory that gives the same results in the form of data. So in this world, the truth must lie in the data, which is unique, and not the theory, which may not be unique. In this world, data is king. Roger Clough, rclo...@ver

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation". So your thinking about them is not a

Re: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor

Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I misconstrued the river/man analogy. Heraclitus said instead that a man cannot stand in the same river twice (or even from moment to moment). It's just a statement of contingency. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of apprehension of p

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of knowing!!! Yes and no, Truth is limited to the *possibility* of knowledge of it. In the absence of the possibility of a statement bei

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Hi, This paper might be interesting to any one that would like to see a nice discussion of who it is that we come to understand numbers: http://web.medi

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:20, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linkin

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the derivative notions. OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is independent of 1

heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow

Hi Bruno Marchal As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or platonia (same 1p, same identity), because although its contents keep c

The contingency of theories

Hi Bruno Marchal All theories are based on the a priori but can only give contingent results (this world results). However, arithmetic is not a theory, it is arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especial

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our theories. [SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. That is arithmetic

The two types of truth

Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html "Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Truths of reaso

knowledge by description vs knowledge by acquaintance

Hi Hal Ruhl What you provide, which is useful, are the objective predicates of life, such as the a and b of life is a life is b They are descriptors of life. But life itself is subjective, being the subject "life" of those propositions. Life is what it is, just the same as you or me. But it is

Re: (mathematical) solipsism

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and the absence of all other possible values. In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism.

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not?

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a stateme

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Russell is still a pregödelian philosophers. Gödel refutes his general philosophy of math in a precise way. Any idea in what book or paper is Gödel's refutation? I wish to read this! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the derivative notions. OK, then how is it t

Re: RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

Hi Hal Ruhl Information is a collection of facts or data. There must be a reason (a sufficient reason) for their being so. We do not know what that is, although scientists do construct theories to give us a sufficient reason or two. To do this, they use their intelligence, which is from the pl

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:43, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our theories. [SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of any mean

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers, logic and the laws we assume. Dear Bruno, How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me, it never has as it do

Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Quentin Anciaux Any statement that cannot be contradicted is always true. As such these truths are called "a priori". They were here before the world or you or me was created. Prime numbers seem to be such. A posteriori truths are truths of existence called facts. They may be contradicted,

Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics "an enchanted land" and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever

Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King The Platonic Realm doesn't exactly exist, because it is non-contradictory truth beyond spacetime. It is the a priori, the One, from which all things come. Sometimes I think of it as Cosmic Mind, Universal Intelligence, which has the attributes of God. Roger Clough, rclo...@v

Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King 1 + 1 =2 is a necessary truth, not a fact. It is always true. A priori. So there are necessary truths such as arithmetical truths which were here before the contingent world of facts was created. And will always be. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is

Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King The platonic realm is nothing. Intelligence is nothing. Life itself is nothing. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver:

Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end.

Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King Those are psychological versions of numbers etc,. The innate properties are arithmetical. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King R

Re: Re: (mathematical) solipsism

Hi Stephen P. King Although well-founded, solipsism still remains a psychological theory, a fact, if you will. As such, it belongs to the contingent world, not the world of necessary reason. There may be beings to which it does not hold. Mystics claim to have merged with the mind of God. Or pe

Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen P. King Contingent truths (facts) are not always true. They are constructed by inference or induction by man (a la Francis Bacon). Quantities are such. Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Arithmetic o

Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen, ' Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.n

which kind of truth are you talking about ?

Hi meekerdb There are all kinds of "truth", depending on which you have faith in or which seems most appropriate. There's arithmetical truth, necessary truth, contingent truth, pragmatic truth, truth by correspondence, truth by coherency the list is long. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 7:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:20, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see

Re: The two types of truth

On 11/3/2012 7:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html "Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], and truths of fact [which are not alwa

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 8:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the der

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:43, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our theories. [SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to

RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

Hi Stephen: -Original Message- > Hi Hal, > > Could it be that information is being created and "forcing" the > physical universe to make room for its instantiation? After all, space > is not a conserved quantity! > > [HH] I think that what you mention is at least part of the sourc

Re: Against Mechanism

On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 at 11:01 AM, John Clark wrote: > > > Your contradiction is that at some times you accept survival and other >> times you deny there is survival. >> > > Well depending on circumstances sometimes you survive and sometimes you > don't, there have been a huge number of permutation

Re: Against Mechanism

On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: > You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after > pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can happen, > which is not a prediction. > A list is necessary because there are 2 things, if I know they are going to ha

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the > framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is > not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. > > Stephen, in your philosophy d

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics "an enchanted land" and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger,

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King 1 + 1 =2 is a necessary truth, not a fact. It is always true. A priori. So there are necessary truths such as arithmetical truths which were here before the contingent world of facts was created. And will always be. Hi Roger,

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/3/2012 8:51 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The platonic realm is nothing. Intelligence is nothing. Life itself is nothing. 1-1 = 0 2-2 = 0 3-3 = 0 ... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this grou

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a pri

Re: (mathematical) solipsism

On 11/3/2012 9:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Although well-founded, solipsism still remains a psychological theory, a fact, if you will. As such, it belongs to the contingent world, not the world of necessary reason. There may be beings to which it does not hold. Mystics claim to have merged with th

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Yes, but not just discovered, they must be communicable. Arithmetic or had to exist before man or the Big Bang woujld not have w

Re: Emergence of Properties

On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are collective data of the universe. Hi R

Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

On 11/3/2012 12:10 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi Stephen: -Original Message- Hi Hal, Could it be that information is being created and "forcing" the physical universe to make room for its instantiation? After all, space is not a conserved quantity! [HH] I think that what you mention

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 1:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, theref

Re: What is Life?

On 11/3/2012 2:46 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I see life as a very broad spectrum. In my thinking, instances life occurs when ever an entropy flow can be harnessed to sustain autopoiesis . also s

Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism between mathematics and reality. p. 208 "Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934: 'A science can never determine its subject-mat

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 2:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. So what means do you used to eval

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 6:58 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 2:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulnes

Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

Nice. I was just writing about mathematics and use of symbols: http://s33light.org/post/34935613677 Craig On Saturday, November 3, 2012 3:01:55 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > > Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation: > Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what W

Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

> > : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not > expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory?" > > Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in the reality

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 11/3/2012 6:24 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the derivative notions. OK, then how is it that you

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 7:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers ! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confu

RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

Hi John: My responses are below within an edited original post. Thanks for your comments. 1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. * Re the use of "ability" here: What I am t

Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism between mathematics and reality. p. 208 "Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934: '

Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

On 11/3/2012 6:47 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory?" Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific th

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers ! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can m

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers ! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the po

Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

Hi, Hal, and thanks for your reply. I don't feel up to discuss YOUR ideas: as I touched I WAS a polymer(chem) scientist as long as I lost my faith in the conventional views (giving place to agnosticism upon the infinite complexity I call "everything". So consider my responses 'second rate' - ideas

Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers ! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable