subject:"RE\: Tegmark and UDA step 3"

On 3/9/2014 8:14 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 March 2014 15:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Decoherence is what I described above. It's tracing over the environment
variables,
having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer,
in order
to get the reduced density matrix and then saying Obviously we should
measure/observe one of these diagonal values with the proportional probability.
So when you get right down to how the math goes it's pretty close to choosing the

Heisenberg cut - except you then say and my other selves will
measure/observe the
other diagonal values which soothes one's angst over randomness.

Have I been misinformed? I thought decoherence was supposed to be a physical mechanism
which reduced the off-diagonal elements to virtual nonexistence?

Sort of. But it only does it in some particular basis and in applying the theory we
choose the pointer basis by saying something like We're going to look at the position
of the detector which in effect is us choosing our classical selves, pretty much the way
Bohr chose the Heisenberg cut. Although there are some suggestive results and most people
thing it must work out, I don't think there's any fundamental way been found to define the
pointer basis.

And then, even after you've got it diagonalized, you need a theory connecting the physics
to consciousness to show why you only experience one of them and not all of them.

There's a very nice review paper by Schlosshauer on the subject, see arXiv.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the
brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course,
but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave
classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are
classical, we will only see one reality and so on.)

Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm
a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :)

There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer,
several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you
wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best
repay me looking at them, perchance?

http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 09 Mar 2014, at 00:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in  
arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).


I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the  
possibility of randomness in the world is just dogma.  Of course we  
can study and try to understand and minimize randomness is our  
theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we  
don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and  
untestable everythingism.  I like your theory, but not because it  
avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to  
address the mind-body problem.


It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one  
that doesn't involve hidden variables. Any  suggestions?


To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a  
contradiction.


OK. A 3p mechanism can't explain a 3p intrinsic randomness. Only  
pseudo-randomness a priori.


Yet, a very simple mechanism exists which explains the 1p appearance  
of randomness: self-duplication.


Bruno




Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 09 Mar 2014, at 19:32, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:

On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true  
randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an  
instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't  
pretending,

True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some  
context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell -  
perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could  
assume something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start  
with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one  
instance of you continues.  Doesn't that accord with all experience?


Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest  
theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or  
computationalism.


At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but  
that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two  
slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions  
act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in  
QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.


But you have to explain this anyway;


Why? Not at all.




except the question is transformed into why do I only experience one  
reality.


This is entirely explained by the self-duplication (with comp, in  
arithmetic), or with self-superposition (with Everett-QM).






Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal terms  
of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero).


That explains nothing without the MWI, or without self-duplication.  
Decoherence explains just why it is hard to get the interference  
effects with macro-bodies, as they get entangled quickly with the  
environment. decoherence might explain also the importance of the  
position observable, in the story of our brain. But the explanation of  
indeterminacy, within a deterministic frame is provided by the SWE, or  
by arithmetic (assuming comp).




Once you have this answer then you can look at the density matrix,  
as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory, so it  
predicts probabilities.  What did you expect?


Hmm... Only, as Omnes explained in once of this book, by accepting to  
be irrational on this.






My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is  
a mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions,


Which QM?
Copenhagen QM works very well, but does not make sense (to be short).
Everett-QM works as well, makes sense, but uses computationalism,  
which forces us to derive the SWE 1p plural appearance from pure  
arithmetic. But that is nice, as it suggests where the wave comes from.







but comp as a new speculative theory



It is the oldest theory of humanity, I would say. And I think that it  
is less speculative than the alternate theory, which either use sacred  
text (a non sequitur in science), or a speculation that Church thesis  
might be false, etc.






kind of gets a free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we  
not experience superpositions?  Why isn't there a superposition of  
the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp.


??

What would that mean? Comp explains, completely, why the M-guy feels  
to be only in M, and why the W-guy feels to be only in W, despite  
being in both city, from a external point of view.








How can consciousness be instantiated by physical processes?


Comp explains this by self-reference and its intensional nuance.



Most people on this list just assume it can't and dismiss the very  
idea as mere physicalism.


Not at all. Consciousness needs in all case a physical body, to  
manifest itself relatively to other universal machine. If not we would  
get only the dreams, and no sharable interference.





But they don't ask how can consciousness be instantiated by infinite  
threads of computation - that's mysterious and consciousness is  
mysterious, so it's OK.


Comp is not a solution per se. Comp makes just possible to translate  
the problem into an explanation of where the physical laws come from,  
in a constructive way, so that we can test comp.








If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a  
God to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do  
that, *logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful  
thinking.


But you know that is not what is done.  QM predicts probability  
distributions that are confirmed to many decimal places.


Which QM?




QFT predicts some

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-10 Thread Gabriel Bodeen



On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously are 
 (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might only be 
 true when physically realized, 

 No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you 
 really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the existence of 
 infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and this without 
 presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I am not even sure 
 how you will just defined what is prime number.


Given a correspondence theory of truth and this kind of physicalism, 
mathematical theorems would be true if and only if there's a corresponding 
physical reality.  So, for example, if the universe is finite, then there 
wouldn't be infinitely many prime numbers.  Nor would there be infinitely 
many integers.  But there would still be integers and primes.  Numbers, 
addition, and multiplication would be patterns that our brains recognize in 
material things, at first due to experience counting objects, grouping 
them, and counting groups.  We abstract those patterns to symbolic form in 
our heads or our writing for convenience, and we generalize the notation to 
cover a wide variety of patterns.  But our process of abstracting and 
generalizing may omit important limitations (such as finitude) of the 
physical reality on which it was originally based.  

or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might 
 only be true for humanlike brains, 

 OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof that 
 1+1=2 from that definition.


Due to our shared evolutionary history, humans share nearly all their brain 
architecture in common.  Due to our shared cultural history, many of the 
humans we regularly encounter share much of their set of background 
assumptions and beliefs in common.  It appears that there's no such thing 
as such a perfectly lucid and detailed description or set of instructions 
that one person could give another that eliminates the need for the other 
person to grok the meaning, i.e. to connect the ideas appropriately and 
fill in the missing information based on their own wiring and their own 
experience.  (Take Edgar as an demonstration of this apparent fact. ;)  
Consequently, some suppose that communication with an extraterrestrial 
intelligence may fail due to there being an almost total mismatch in 
wiring and experience.  (When language fails, we humans resort to 
pointing at objects and pantomiming, but without shared sensory systems and 
emotional responses, even that may well fail to be grokked by the alien.)  
It's also possible that the symbolic structure of our mathematics is 
dependent on our wiring and experience; indeed there is some evidence 
that the way humans use language is due to an evolutionarily recent genetic 
mutation.  For these two reasons, our mathematical definitions, theorems, 
proofs, etc may only be suitable for use by other humans, and so by a 
pragmaticist alethiology, only true for humans.

The usual proofs then apply, because we're humans.

with an alethiology of the sort preferred by the American pragmatist school 
 of philosophy.  

 keep in mind that you mention people who are Aristotelian, and the point I 
 do is only that IF comp is true, THEN such approach get inconsistent or 
 epistemologically non sensical.


Hm.  Can you elucidate what you mean by saying they are Aristotelian?  What 
is the key contrast?
 

 Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me about 
 25% confidence for each. :)

 ONLY IF you develop your alternate assumptions. The idea that 1+1 is 
 prime independently of human is far more simple (and used) than the idea 
 that 1+1 is prime is relative to the human brain. 
 The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. 
 You can always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set 
 of axioms.

 
I don't know that the other cases I've mentioned are more complex.  
Physicalism just puts some mysterious matter first and makes math 
derivative of it.  That may be wrong, but it's hard to see why it's more 
complex than comp's reversal of it.  The relativism described above isn't 
an additional supposition added to math; it takes ideas from biology and 
linguistics to see what consequences there might be when they intersect 
with math.

-Gabe

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think is his doctoral 
thesis.  He later expanded it into a book.


Brent

On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote:
I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the brain (and body) 
are classical, which almost begs the question of course, but it means that whatever 
causes macro-objects to generally behave classically also applies to the brain. (And the 
senses - if the eyes are classical, we will only see one reality and so on.)


Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but I'm a bit that 
way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when drunk :)


There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer, several with 
titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at 
the list and tell me which one(s) would best repay me looking at them, perchance?


http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 10 Mar 2014, at 01:17, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using  
different vocabulary.


Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the  
following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should  
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty)  
expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see  
spin-down.



But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a  
maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent  
with the FPI, without naming it.



Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about  
accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary  
used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies  
your probability distribution from the first person perspective.



I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get  
equivalent as justifying the probability talk, even the usual  
boolean one.


The notion of first person, and first person sequences are well  
defined, and it is a combinatorial exercise to show that the vast  
majority of first person memories will feel white noise.


The existence of that white noise is proved in a third person way, and  
the real question will concern the invariance of that indeterminacy  
for 3p transformation.








But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one  
side.


if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your  
theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of  
deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say that  
there is only a difference in terminology between your theory and  
any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by  
some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to  
the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these  
theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger  
all to choose between them.


In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian  
QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity  
improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement  
in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change  
intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do  
that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your  
theories are scientifically irrelevant.


QM+collapse is not a theory, it is a collection of  attempts to make  
theories, with often weird role played by apparatus or humans.


Then with  Everett, things just get understandable, except that by  
using computationalism, I show that we have to extract the wave from  
an uncertainty structure related to relative computational states.


The rest seems to me like using vocabulary to avoid a problem, which  
is sad, as it is an interesting problem.  A positive solution, that is  
a match between Z1* and empirical quantum logic would suggest how the  
laws of physics emerge in the mind of some stable collection of  
universal numbers.


A negative solution would need either to abandon Theatetetus, or to  
bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom, or  
abandon comp, that is abandon Church thesis, or yes doctor.


Bruno










Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at  
all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context  
- which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you  
could tell us what you are assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could  
assume something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start  
with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance  
of you continues.  Doesn't that accord with all experience?


Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest  
theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or  
computationalism.


At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but  
that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two  
slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions  
act in the micro and not the macro

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 10 Mar 2014, at 02:15, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism  
that causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being  
gravitational) and therefore predicts that at some point that  
mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a  
particular size?


Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only  
one reality, and not a superposition.


The mechanism is: look in your diary.

If you are in the superposed state seeing the cat dead + seeing the  
cat alive, there is no mysterious connection between the two brains,  
and simple robotics explains why each brains is confronted with unique  
but different alternate reality.


In Everett, it is the simple comp first person plural indeterminacy,  
or even generalization of it.


There is no reason at all, with comp, that you will feel seeing M,  
instead of W, but you know, by comp, that you will feel to be in only  
one city.


The same occurs when you look to a cat in the state dead+alive, in the  
base {dead, alive}.


Bruno




Brent

While QM on its own (i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no  
collapse threshold - that if you can keep a system from decohering,  
it will remain in a superposition regardless of how large it is.


So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for  
collapse, and at that point it becomes testable, at least in theory  
(depending on our level of technology, I mean).




On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using  
different vocabulary.


Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the  
following premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should  
expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty)  
expect to see spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to  
see spin-down.



But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a  
maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent  
with the FPI, without naming it.



Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about  
accept that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary  
used is identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies  
your probability distribution from the first person perspective.  
But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put that to one  
side.


if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your  
theory and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of  
deriving the bare quantities you want, then you may as well say  
that there is only a difference in terminology between your theory  
and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5  
by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your  
theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that  
all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine  
with bugger all to choose between them.


In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian  
QM does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity  
improves on Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement  
in predictive capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change  
intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it can only do  
that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your  
theories are scientifically irrelevant.


Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:
On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness  
at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't  
true   
randomness?


If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,
True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some  
context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell -  
perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could  
assume something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start  
with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one  
instance of you continues.  Doesn't that accord with all experience?


Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest  
theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or  
computationalism.


At each branching only one

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-10 Thread David Nyman

On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom


Could you elaborate?

David

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On 3/10/2014 8:16 AM, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:


The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything else. You 
can
always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a simple set of axioms.


I don't know that the other cases I've mentioned are more complex.  Physicalism just 
puts some mysterious matter first and makes math derivative of it.  That may be wrong, 
but it's hard to see why it's more complex than comp's reversal of it. The relativism 
described above isn't an additional supposition added to math; it takes ideas from 
biology and linguistics to see what consequences there might be when they intersect with 
math.


-Gabe


Simplicity and Ockham's razor are nice heuristics, but they aren't 
determinative.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 10 Mar 2014, at 16:16, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:




On Saturday, March 8, 2014 2:37:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take  
seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical  
propositions might only be true when physically realized,
No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you  
really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the  
existence of infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and  
this without presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I  
am not even sure how you will just defined what is prime number.


Given a correspondence theory of truth and this kind of physicalism,  
mathematical theorems would be true if and only if there's a  
corresponding physical reality.


That is too much vague for me. I can interpret this in too much sense.




So, for example, if the universe is finite, then there wouldn't be  
infinitely many prime numbers.


This is non sense. In my humble sincere feeling.

Even if physicists get a knock down argument in favor of a finite  
universe, that would not refute at all Euclid's theorem that there is  
an infinity of prime.


A prime number is just not a physical object.






Nor would there be infinitely many integers.


That is ultrafinitism. That is why I make arithmetical realism  
sometime explicit.


In that case indeed we are out of the scope of my expertize.
But if step 8 is correct, that moves will still prevent you to say  
yes to the doctor, unless more and more ad ptolemaic redefinition of  
matter.







But there would still be integers and primes.


Thanks for reassuring me. I was about to close Platonia for  
bankruptcy  :)





Numbers, addition, and multiplication would be patterns that our  
brains recognize in material things,


With Church thesis, we have a notion of universal machine which  
generalizes this, non trivially. Comp makes obvious the use of those  
mathematical tools.






at first due to experience counting objects, grouping them, and  
counting groups.  We abstract those patterns to symbolic form in our  
heads or our writing for convenience, and we generalize the notation  
to cover a wide variety of patterns.  But our process of abstracting  
and generalizing may omit important limitations (such as finitude)  
of the physical reality on which it was originally based.


Assuming a physical reality at the start. For the mind body problem it  
is better to be, at least methodologically agnostic, about that.


You describe well how humans got the numbers, but it is a projection  
to believe that the notion of humans is more conceptually simple than  
the notion of numbers.


The question is only, do you agree on the axioms I gave.

With comp, your numbers are a human cultural construction becomes  
numbers are universal machine cultural construction.






or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions  
might only be true for humanlike brains,
OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof  
that 1+1=2 from that definition.


Due to our shared evolutionary history, humans share nearly all  
their brain architecture in common.  Due to our shared cultural  
history, many of the humans we regularly encounter share much of  
their set of background assumptions and beliefs in common.  It  
appears that there's no such thing as such a perfectly lucid and  
detailed description or set of instructions that one person could  
give another that eliminates the need for the other person to grok  
the meaning, i.e. to connect the ideas appropriately and fill in the  
missing information based on their own wiring and their own  
experience.  (Take Edgar as an demonstration of this apparent fact. ;)



That's why you publish, or put down thesis. You have to play the  
academic game.
The academic is the worst of all systems, except for all the others  
(to parody Churchill).







Consequently, some suppose that communication with an  
extraterrestrial intelligence may fail due to there being an almost  
total mismatch in wiring and experience.  (When language fails, we  
humans resort to pointing at objects and pantomiming, but without  
shared sensory systems and emotional responses, even that may well  
fail to be grokked by the alien.)  It's also possible that the  
symbolic structure of our mathematics is dependent on our wiring  
and experience; indeed there is some evidence that the way humans  
use language is due to an evolutionarily recent genetic mutation.


That's a computationalist type of explanation, no problem.





For these two reasons, our mathematical definitions, theorems,  
proofs, etc may only be suitable for use by other humans, and so by  
a pragmaticist alethiology, only true for humans.


?
If comp is true for human, that's what counts. It means that they can  
survive through a relative universal numbers, but then, without adding  
magic, what is true for all

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-10 Thread Gabriel Bodeen

On Monday, March 10, 2014 2:08:14 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 That relativism argues against comp, and even implicitly against Church 
 thesis. But my point is not that comp is true, just that with comp, the 
 theory QM + comp is redundant, and we have to justify QM (at the least its 
 logic) from self-reference. And up to now, it looks it works.

 Bruno


A physicalist would presumably point out that the redundancy of QM+comp 
doesn't tell you which is original and which is derivative.

In the terms of the Aristotle vs. Plato distinction you pointed out, I'm 
unaware of evidence on which to make a decision.  So I don't, which is why 
I mentioned that ignorance prior.

-Gabe

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read
it?


On 11 March 2014 05:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think
 is his doctoral thesis.  He later expanded it into a book.

 Brent


 On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote:

  I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the
 brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course,
 but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave
 classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are
 classical, we will only see one reality and so on.)

  Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but
 I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when
 drunk :)

  There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by Schlosshauer,
 several with titles that suggest they could be the one you mean... you
 wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s) would best
 repay me looking at them, perchance?

  http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

Actually I assume it's this...

http://www.amazon.com/Decoherence-Quantum---Classical-Transition-Collection/dp/3642071422/ref=sr_1_2?s=booksie=UTF8qid=1394489389sr=1-2keywords=Maximilian+Schlosshauer

Well I will start with the paper. It maye be beyond my brain (no fluffy
kittens).

On 11 March 2014 10:35, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to
read it?

On 11 March 2014 05:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

It's this one http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312059v4.pdf which I think
is his doctoral thesis. He later expanded it into a book.

Brent

On 3/10/2014 12:14 AM, LizR wrote:

I would imagine the reason we only perceive one reality is because the
brain (and body) are classical, which almost begs the question of course,
but it means that whatever causes macro-objects to generally behave
classically also applies to the brain. (And the senses - if the eyes are
classical, we will only see one reality and so on.)

Of course I'd happily believe we don't only experience one reality, but
I'm a bit that way inclined. Maybe one can only see superpositions when
drunk :)

There appear to be quite a number of papers co-authored by
Schlosshauer, several with titles that suggest they could be the one you
mean... you wouldn't be able to glance at the list and tell me which one(s)
would best repay me looking at them, perchance?

http://arxiv.org/find/all/1/all:+Schlosshauer/0/1/0/all/0/1

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote:

Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to read it?


Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer

Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

Ta.


On 11 March 2014 14:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 3/10/2014 2:35 PM, LizR wrote:

 Thanks. Do you know the title of the book, in case I get the chance to
 read it?


 Decoherence and The Quantum-to-Classical Transition Springer

 Brent


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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:

On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness  
at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?
Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,

True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some  
context - which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell -  
perhaps you could tell us what you are assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could  
assume something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start  
with MWI but then suppose that at each branching only one instance  
of you continues.  Doesn't that accord with all experience?


Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest  
theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or  
computationalism.


At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but  
that does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two  
slits experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act  
in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (=  
SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.


If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God  
to fit your favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that,  
*logically*, but this is no more truth research, but wishful thinking.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Mar 2014, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in  
arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).


I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


But we don't know that it exists.


?

I just said: the UD existence is a theorem of PA, even of RA. It  
exists like the number 19 exists. Its entire execution exist too, a  
bit like all prime numbers exist.




ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in the world is  
just dogma.



As much as rejecting the possibility that moon is really made of  
cheese. No doubt. That are dogma, but also fertile hypothesis, as the  
cheese-moon theory explains nothing new.





Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize randomness  
is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because  
we don't like it;


We rule it out because not only it explains nothing new, but it  
introduces insuperable difficulties, and also, it opens to explanation- 
by-the-gap. It looks like a reification of ignorance.





especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable  
everythingism.


Well you get them just by postulating the SWE, or, when assuming comp,  
just postulating, for all x y:



0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1))  - x = y
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x




  I like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as  
Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body  
problem.


OK. Nice, and thanks for telling. personally I also like comp and  
everett for removing 3p-randomness, and 3p-non locality.


Are you sure that you can make sense of 3p-randomness? I can do that  
from a purely logical perspective, but I still find hard to believe it  
can make sense in a physical reality, as it introduces events without  
a cause, and that looks like don't ask sort of magic to me, doubly  
so, when we see that computationalism implies that kind of magic in  
the 1p-views (by self-duplication or self-superposition).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:
On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at
all? Or
is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?

*Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?
*

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,

True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you
haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/
assuming?

I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something
different than QM and MWI. For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each
branching only one instance of you continues. Doesn't that accord with all experience?

Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest theories we have for
most if not all experiences, like QM, or computationalism.

At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that does not accord
well with the simplest explanation of the two slits experience. You will have to explain
why the superpositions act in the micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in
QM (= SWE), or even bigger to computationalism.

But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed into why do I only
experience one reality. Presumably the answer is in decoherence and the off-diagonal
terms of the density matrix becoming very small (or maybe even zero). Once you have this
answer then you can look at the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a
probabilistic theory, so it predicts probabilities. What did you expect?

My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a mature theory with
lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new speculative theory kind of gets a
free ride on the very same questions, e.g. why do we not experience superpositions? Why
isn't there a superposition of the M-guy and the W-guy according to comp. How can
consciousness be instantiated by physical processes? Most people on this list just assume
it can't and dismiss the very idea as mere physicalism. But they don't ask how can
consciousness be instantiated by infinite threads of computation - that's mysterious and
consciousness is mysterious, so it's OK.

If not, you can always consistently assume everything is done by a God to fit your
favorite philosophical expectations. You can do that, *logically*, but this is no more
truth research, but wishful thinking.

But you know that is not what is done. QM predicts probability distributions that are
confirmed to many decimal places. QFT predicts some measured values to 11 decimal
places. And you rely on QM to explain the world in in you theory of comp. Your approach
is to explain QM and then let QM do the rest of the work - which is fine. But my point is
that QM can still do the work even if it's a probabilistic theory. So unless comp can
make some better predictions than comp it's just an interpretation and it's trading off a
distaste for randomness (a very restricted and well defined randomness) for a love of
everythingism. Which is why I hope comp can predict something about consciousness; where
it may offer something beyond just interpretation.

Brent

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/

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RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-09 Thread chris peck

Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different 
vocabulary. 

Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.


But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a maximization of 
the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without 
naming it.


Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept that. I 
mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between 
you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from 
the first person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I 
put that to one side.

if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and 
Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare 
quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference 
in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After 
all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just 
relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that 
all these theories are just re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger 
all to choose between them. 

In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does not 
improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian 
physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. 
Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties 
but it can only do that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your 
theories are scientifically irrelevant. 

Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


  

  
  
On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal
  wrote:




  
On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:


  
  
On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR
  wrote:



  

  On 8 March 2014 08:14,
meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:


  

  On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

  
  

  
On 7 March 2014
  18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
  wrote:

  

  
On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason
  Resch wrote:


A
  related question is, is there
  any such thing as true
  randomness at all? Or is every
  case of true randomness an
  instance of FPI?
  
  Or is FPI
  just a convoluted way to
  pretend there isn't true
  randomness?

  
  
  If one assumes QM and the MWI
are correct then it isn't
pretending, 

  

  

True; but I don't assume that.



Since your original statement above only makes
  sense in some context - which you haven't
  revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could
  tell us what you are assuming?


  

  



I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one
could assume something different than QM and MWI.  For
instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each
branching only one instance of you continues.  Doesn't
that accord with all

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that
causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and
therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we
can only have superpositions up to a particular size? While QM on its own
(i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no collapse threshold - that if you
can keep a system from decohering, it will remain in a superposition
regardless of how large it is.

So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for collapse,
and at that point it becomes testable, at least in theory (depending on our
level of technology, I mean).



On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Bruno











 * With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different
 vocabulary. Really?the last time I quoted her:What ... should
 Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she
 knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she
 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with
 certainty) expect to see spin-down.But that can only be a 3-1 description.
 She handles the 1p by a maximization of the interests of the copies, and
 that is equivalent with the FPI, without naming it.*


 Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept
 that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is
 identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your
 probability distribution from the first person perspective. But a bigger
 problem for you raises its head if I put that to one side.

 if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory
 and Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare
 quantities you want, then you may as well say that there is only a
 difference in terminology between your theory and any other interpretation
 of QM. After all they all deliver 0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too.
 You've just relugated your theory to the purely metaphysical. You're
 tacitly admitting that all these theories are just re-skins of the same
 underlying engine with bugger all to choose between them.

 In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM
 does not improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on
 Newtonian physics. There is no concomitant improvement in predictive
 capability on offer. Its a purely theoretical change intended to smooth out
 conceptual difficulties but it can only do that by delivering further
 difficulties of its own. All your theories are scientifically irrelevant.

 --
 Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
 From: meeke...@verizon.net
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

 Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

 On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


  On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

  On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all?
 Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?


 *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? *


 If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,

  True; but I don't assume that.


 Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context -
 which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell
 us what you *are* assuming?


 I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume
 something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start with MWI but then
 suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues.
 Doesn't that accord with all experience?


  Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest
 theories we have for most if not all experiences, like QM, or
 computationalism.

  At each branching only one instance of you continue, you say, but that
 does not accord well with the simplest explanation of the two slits
 experience. You will have to explain why the superpositions act in the
 micro and not the macro, and this needs big changes in QM (= SWE), or even
 bigger to computationalism.


 But you have to explain this anyway; except the question is transformed
 into why do I only experience one reality.  Presumably the answer is in
 decoherence and the off-diagonal terms of the density matrix becoming very
 small (or maybe even zero).  Once you have this answer then you can look at
 the density matrix, as Omnes does, and say, QM is a probabilistic theory,
 so it predicts probabilities.  What did you expect?

 My point is that these sharp questions are asked of QM because it is a
 mature theory with lots of very accurate predictions, but comp as a new
 speculative theory kind

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:
Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that causes the 
collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore predicts that 
at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have superpositions up to a 
particular size?


Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one reality, and not 
a superposition.


Brent

While QM on its own (i.e. Everett) predicts that there is no collapse threshold - that 
if you can keep a system from decohering, it will remain in a superposition regardless 
of how large it is.


So at some point QM+Collapse has to come up with a mechanism for collapse, and at that 
point it becomes testable, at least in theory (depending on our level of technology, I 
mean).




On 10 March 2014 13:17, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com 
mailto:chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:


Hi Bruno
*
 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different 
vocabulary.

Really?

the last time I quoted her:


/What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following 
premise:
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to 
see. So, she
should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty)
expect to see spin-down./


But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a 
maximization of the
interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with the FPI, without 
naming it.*


Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept 
that. I mean
personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you 
and
Greaves and she explicitly denies your probability distribution from the 
first
person perspective. But a bigger problem for you raises its head if I put 
that to
one side.

if, as you claim, there is no substantive difference between your theory and
Greaves' just because she has some other mechanism of deriving the bare 
quantities
you want, then you may as well say that there is only a difference in 
terminology
between your theory and any other interpretation of QM. After all they all 
deliver
0.5 by some now irrelevant metric too. You've just relugated your theory to 
the
purely metaphysical. You're tacitly admitting that all these theories are 
just
re-skins of the same underlying engine with bugger all to choose between 
them.

In a way that is something that I have felt for a while. Everettian QM does 
not
improve upon QM + collapse in the way say relativity improves on Newtonian 
physics.
There is no concomitant improvement in predictive capability on offer. Its 
a purely
theoretical change intended to smooth out conceptual difficulties but it 
can only do
that by delivering further difficulties of its own. All your theories are
scientifically irrelevant.


--
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2014 11:32:08 -0700
From: meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com

Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 3/9/2014 12:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Mar 2014, at 06:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:

On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

A related question is, is there any such thing 
as true
randomness at all? Or is every case of true 
randomness
an instance of FPI?

*Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there 
isn't true
randomness?
*

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't 
pretending,

True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some 
context -
which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you 
could
tell us what you /are/ assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could 
assume
something different than QM and MWI.  For instance, start with MWI 
but then
suppose that at each branching only one instance of you continues. 
Doesn't that accord with all experience?



Like Ptolemeaus epicycles. The point is to accord with the simplest 
theories we
have for most

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 10 March 2014 14:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:

  Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that
 causes the collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and
 therefore predicts that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we
 can only have superpositions up to a particular size?

  Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one
 reality, and not a superposition.


I think that's been dealt with for the MWI, hasn't it? (But not yet for
QM+collapse, AFAIK.)

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 3/9/2014 6:34 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 March 2014 14:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/9/2014 5:36 PM, LizR wrote:

Surely QM + collapse makes the prediction that there is a mechanism that
causes the
collapse (e.g. Penrose's idea about it being gravitational) and therefore
predicts
that at some point that mechanism will kick in, so we can only have
superpositions
up to a particular size?

Just as there must be some mechanism that causes us to perceive only one
reality,
and not a superposition.

I think that's been dealt with for the MWI, hasn't it? (But not yet for
QM+collapse, AFAIK.)

So exactly how has MWI dealt with this? Everett just sort of said it has to be that way,
i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make measurements which diagonalize
their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density matrix). But there's not really a
theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if
there were, there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the
density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose. Note that this is a purely
mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical process. Omnes looks at the
same mathematical process and says, once we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix
we've predicted probabilities, and so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized
and with the predicted frequency.

Brent

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 So exactly how has MWI dealt with this?  Everett just sort of said it has
 to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make
 measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the
 whole density matrix).  But there's not really a theory of consciousness
 that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were,
 there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the
 density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose.   Note that
 this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical
 process.  Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've
 diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and
 so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the
 predicted frequency.


I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out
maybe 15 years after Everett produced his thesis?

If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as
I know; I assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're
entangled, and that we're entangled with it due to the various quantum
interactions that got that version of us there.

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

For some reason google decided to post that last post just as I was about
to remove iirc.from in front of recall.

I'm sure it had good reasons for doing so...


On 10 March 2014 15:00, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 So exactly how has MWI dealt with this?  Everett just sort of said it has
 to be that way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make
 measurements which diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the
 whole density matrix).  But there's not really a theory of consciousness
 that tells us how it's like a measuring instrument AND, even if there were,
 there's not a theory that tells us why it's OK to diagonalize a part of the
 density matrix, but not all of it, in some basis we choose.   Note that
 this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do - not some physical
 process.  Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and says, once we've
 diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted probabilities, and
 so we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the
 predicted frequency.


 I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out
 maybe 15 years after Everett produced his thesis?

 If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as
 I know; I assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're
 entangled, and that we're entangled with it due to the various quantum
 interactions that got that version of us there.



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On 3/9/2014 7:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 10 March 2014 14:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

So exactly how has MWI dealt with this?  Everett just sort of said it has 
to be that
way, i.e. humans are like measuring instruments and so they make 
measurements which
diagonalize their reduced density matrix (but not the whole density 
matrix).  But
there's not really a theory of consciousness that tells us how it's like a 
measuring
instrument AND, even if there were, there's not a theory that tells us why 
it's OK
to diagonalize a part of the density matrix, but not all of it, in some 
basis we
choose.   Note that this is a purely mathematical operation we choose to do 
- not
some physical process. Omnes looks at the same mathematical process and 
says, once
we've diagonalized the reduced density matrix we've predicted 
probabilities, and so
we should be satisfied that one of them is realized and with the predicted 
frequency.


I was thinking of decoherence, which I seem to recall iirc was worked out maybe 15 years 
after Everett produced his thesis?


If so, this isn't anything specifically to do with consciousness as far as I know; I 
assume we should observe whichever part of the multiverse we're entangled, and that 
we're entangled with it due to the various quantum interactions that got that version of 
us there.


Decoherence is what I described above.  It's tracing over the environment variables, 
having selected what counts as environment and what as instrument/observer, in order to 
get the reduced density matrix and then saying Obviously we should measure/observe one of 
these diagonal values with the proportional probability.   So when you get right down to 
how the math goes it's pretty close to choosing the Heisenberg cut - except you then say 
and my other selves will measure/observe the other diagonal values which soothes one's 
angst over randomness.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On 3/9/2014 7:01 PM, LizR wrote:
For some reason google decided to post that last post just as I was about to remove 
iirc.from in front of recall.


I rely on the kindness of strangers...to correct my typos.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 10 March 2014 15:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Decoherence is what I described above.  It's tracing over the environment
 variables, having selected what counts as environment and what as
 instrument/observer, in order to get the reduced density matrix and then
 saying Obviously we should measure/observe one of these diagonal values
 with the proportional probability.   So when you get right down to how the
 math goes it's pretty close to choosing the Heisenberg cut - except you
 then say and my other selves will measure/observe the other diagonal
 values which soothes one's angst over randomness.


Have I been misinformed? I thought decoherence was supposed to be a
physical mechanism which reduced the off-diagonal elements to virtual
nonexistence?

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Mar 2014, at 20:17, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/7/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent):



On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true  
randomness at all? Or is every case of true randomness an  
instance of FPI?


Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


What do you mean by true randomness?

I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense  
of total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite  
binary true random sequence: it is


1...

It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super  
unlucky , in case he bet on zero!).


But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all  
you need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p  
experienced experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is  
random enough.





Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the  
following:


1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality,
2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events.


I'm not sure what 1) means.  I was hypothesizing (not assuming) 2).


1) means that there is a primitive physical reality which has to be  
assumed and can't be explained by something else (non physical). That  
would make the irreducible random events irreducibly random. I just  
try to grasp what you mean by true randomness.


I use terms like theory, assumption, postulate, hypothesis as  
basically synonymous.









That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that  
invoking such true randomness in an explanation is just a god-of- 
the-gap type of explanation. it is like don't ask or don't try  
to understand.


It is more like, Some things just happenlike a UD.


The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in  
arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).


I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.

Some things just happens seems to me as convincing than God made  
it, and less us talk on something else.


As I said, that is the don't ask idea.

Bruno







Brent



I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the  
belief in such true 3p randomness. I don't push it that far though.


Bruno






Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Mar 2014, at 21:06, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:




On Friday, March 7, 2014 10:59:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:



An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or  
invalid, and either sound or unsound.  Regarding UDA's soundness:   
I have no problem saying Yes Doctor.  Similarly I have no problem  
with the Church thesis.  But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism,  
I don't know of any convincing reasons to believe it.


You don't believe in the prime numbers?

All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the  
notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or  
just Church thesis don't make sense without AR.
AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the  
beliefs in elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical  
hypothesis, together with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *).


Heh, yes, I believe in prime numbers.


All right. That's arithmetical realism. Unless you believe that the  
truth of there are prime numbers is a consequence of physics, or of  
the existence of a primitive physical universe.





But in The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations you wrote of AR  
that it is the assumption that arithmetical propositions ... are  
true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if  
that exists), etc.


Just to make it clear. Without this you cannot assess something like  
Church thesis, which identify all possible classes of computable  
functions from N to N. Some could argue that this is even more  
demanding than AR.





A couple other accounts of how things might be that I take seriously  
are (1) physicalism in the sense that arithmetical propositions  
might only be true when physically realized,


No problem, and indeed this would make comp false. of course, if you  
really defend that thesis, you have to explain and prove the existence  
of infinitely many prime numbers by using physics, and this without  
presupposing addition and multiplication of integers. I am not even  
sure how you will just defined what is prime number.




or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions  
might only be true for humanlike brains,


OK, but same remark. Defined human-like brain, and give me a proof  
that 1+1=2 from that definition.





with an alethiology of the sort preferred by the American pragmatist  
school of philosophy.


keep in mind that you mention people who are Aristotelian, and the  
point I do is only that IF comp is true, THEN such approach get  
inconsistent or epistemologically non sensical.




And a third meta-account is that reality might be a way that doesn't  
make sense to me.


Then indeed comp is false, but also physics, etc. No problem.



Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me  
about 25% confidence for each. :)


ONLY IF you develop your alternate assumptions. The idea that 1+1 is  
prime independently of human is far more simple (and used) than the  
idea that 1+1 is prime is relative to the human brain.
The axiomatic of natural numbers is far more simple than anything  
else. You can always propose a much more complex theory to falsify a  
simple set of axioms.


Then, with respect to the UDA, to make much more complex a theory just  
to avoid a mathematical problem is not good science, imo.


I can present my theory(*). Can you present yours? I agree that comp  
might be false, but today that is speculation, and it is useless to  
speculate on the negation of a theory to avoid testing it.


Keep in mind that I do not defend comp, on the contrary I only show it  
testable, and show that thanks to Gödel and QM, it works pretty well.



(*) Classical logic + (for all x and y):

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

or if you prefer

0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1))  - x = y
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

And this is not just the theory of numbers (on which most people  
agree), it is proved to be, once comp is assumed at the meta-level,  
the theory of everything including consciousness and physics.  
(Something I try to explain to Liz and some others right now, and is  
the result of my research.
Is that not simple and elegant :) Well, my point is only that this is  
testable.


Bruno





-Gabe



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Mar 2014, at 00:04, chris peck wrote:



Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different  
vocabulary.


Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following  
premise: whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with  
certainty!) to see. So, she should (with certainty) expect to see  
spin-up, and she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down.


But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a  
maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent  
with the FPI, without naming it.







Quentin said:

That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.

And you agreed with Quentin:


Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. 

Are you saying you now actually agree with Greaves and that  
assigning probability 1 to both outcomes is in fact correct?


No, even Greaves agrees that this would minimize the interests of the  
copies.


Bruno







Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:40:53 -0800
From: ghib...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote:
I'm not sure I follow. Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning  
experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room  
number each time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence  
of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring  
about 50% of the time.


Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed  
tell us the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they  
are hexadecimal translations. or very different bases anyway. Of  
course the bloody average 1's about 50% of the time, as well as 0's.  
It's binary. Which works by flipping.





That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you  
get the sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have  
accidentally doubled up! The correct sequences should read:


  0001  0010  0011  0100  0101  0110  0111  1000  1001  1010   
1011  1100  1101  1110  


Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a  
few of those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall,  
for sure.


binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the  
series 2^n, and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the  
following to hexadecimal without a calculator, in two steps only.


1101101100111111

it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your  
cursor break the copy up into sets of four.


1101      1010  0001  0011   1100  0011

the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it  
round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1.  So if you have  
1101 and you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in  
each binary column by 1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position.  
So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts  
in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing everything aftter 10 with  
a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh


I just taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But  
maybe there was ONE person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know  
hex :o)



I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in  
most sequences? I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the  
16 sequences above) or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with  
longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me?


Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's  
an archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most  
implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through  
the bases, allowing for translation.


I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the  
chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make  
his subject matter seem more accessible.


...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large  
infinity of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First  
time I read that, it put me on the floor.


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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread ghibbsa


On Wednesday, February 26, 2014 3:18:50 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Jason,

 This initially interesting post of course exposes fundamental flaws in its 
 logic and the way that a lot of people get mislead by physically impossible 
 thought experiments such as the whole interminable p-clone, p-zombie 
 discussion on this group.

 First there is of course no physical mechanism that continually produces 
 clones and places them in separate rooms, nor is there any MW process that 
 does that, so the whole analysis is moot, and frankly childish as it 
 doesn't even take into consideration what aspects of reality change 
 randomly and which don't. Specifically it's NOT room numbers that seem 
 random, it's quantum level events.

 If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already 
 provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by 
 quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no 
 deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature 
 is forced to make those alignments randomly.

 But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only 
 relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'.

 Edgar

 
 
Edgar, so how do you explain things like the two slit experiment and 
entanglement with this theory?

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread Edgar L. Owen

Ghibbsa,

I explain spin entanglement paradox this way:

When the particles are created their spins must already be equal and 
opposite orientations due to conservation. But this is true only in the 
mini spacetime which is defined by their conservation. That spacetime 
fragment is NOT LINKED to the spacetime alignments of the observer and 
laboratory. Thus because separate spacetimes can have no alignments with 
respect to each other, the spin alignment is still undetermined in the 
frame of the observer.

Only when the spin alignment of one particle is measured do these separate 
spacetimes merge through that common event and at this point they are 
automatically aligned so the spin orientations of both particles are 
aligned in the frame of the lab.

As soon as we understand that spacetime is not just a single universal 
common structure but actually consists of separate dynamic fragmentary 
spacetimes that need to be glued together by common events for alignments 
to resolve, then all quantum paradox is resolved because all quantum 
paradoxes seem paradoxical only with respect to the single common fixed 
universal spacetime MISTAKENLY ASSUMED.

All quantum randomness arises because there can be no deterministic rules 
to align completely separate spacetime fragments, thus nature must act 
randomly to align them..

Edgar

On Saturday, March 8, 2014 3:53:22 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, February 26, 2014 3:18:50 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote:

 Jason,

 This initially interesting post of course exposes fundamental flaws in 
 its logic and the way that a lot of people get mislead by physically 
 impossible thought experiments such as the whole interminable p-clone, 
 p-zombie discussion on this group.

 First there is of course no physical mechanism that continually produces 
 clones and places them in separate rooms, nor is there any MW process that 
 does that, so the whole analysis is moot, and frankly childish as it 
 doesn't even take into consideration what aspects of reality change 
 randomly and which don't. Specifically it's NOT room numbers that seem 
 random, it's quantum level events.

 If anyone is looking for the source of quantum randomness I've already 
 provided an explanation. It occurs as fragmentary spacetimes are created by 
 quantum events and then merged via shared quantum events. There can be no 
 deterministic rules for aligning separate spacetime fragments thus nature 
 is forced to make those alignments randomly.

 But sadly no one on this group is interested in quantum theory, only 
 relativity, and far out philosophies such as 'comp'.

 Edgar

  
  
 Edgar, so how do you explain things like the two slit experiment and 
 entanglement with this theory?


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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread meekerdb


On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic (like x+0=x, 
etc.).


I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the possibility of randomness in 
the world is just dogma.  Of course we can study and try to understand and minimize 
randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it out because we don't 
like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and untestable everythingism.  I 
like your theory, but not because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because 
it seems to address the mind-body problem.


Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread LizR

On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in
 arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).

 I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


 But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the possibility of
 randomness in the world is just dogma.  Of course we can study and try to
 understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to
 simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing
 an unobservable and untestable everythingism.  I like your theory, but not
 because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to
 address the mind-body problem.


It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that
doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions?

(Of course not being able to imagine something doesn't rule it out.)

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread meekerdb


On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote:

On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in arithmetic 
(like
x+0=x, etc.).

I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.

But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the possibility of 
randomness
in the world is just dogma. Of course we can study and try to understand and
minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to simply rule it 
out
because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing an unobservable and
untestable everythingism.  I like your theory, but not because it avoids 
randomness
(as Everett does too), but because it seems to address the mind-body 
problem.

It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that doesn't involve 
hidden variables. Any suggestions?


To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Sun, Mar 9, 2014 at 12:53 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in
 arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).

  I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


 But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the possibility of
 randomness in the world is just dogma.  Of course we can study and try to
 understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to
 simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing
 an unobservable and untestable everythingism.  I like your theory, but not
 because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to
 address the mind-body problem.


 It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that
 doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions?


 To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction.


Dovetailing on the real numbers etc. It blows the mind, but an arithmetic
UD would have to (both blow the mind and dovetail on the reals). So this
would be like asking why a function functions? Funcy, but I'm not sure :-)
PGC



 Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-08 Thread LizR

On 9 March 2014 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/8/2014 3:41 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 9 March 2014 08:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/8/2014 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 The existence of the UD is a consequence of elementary axioms in
 arithmetic (like x+0=x, etc.).

  I can't hardly imagine something less random than that.


 But we don't know that it exists.  ISTM that rejecting the possibility of
 randomness in the world is just dogma.  Of course we can study and try to
 understand and minimize randomness is our theories - but I see no reason to
 simply rule it out because we don't like it; especially by hyposthesizing
 an unobservable and untestable everythingism.  I like your theory, but not
 because it avoids randomness (as Everett does too), but because it seems to
 address the mind-body problem.


 It's hard to imagine a mechanism for randomness, especially one that
 doesn't involve hidden variables. Any suggestions?


 To me, a mechanism for intrinsic randomness sounds like a contradiction.


Exactly.

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 07 Mar 2014, at 00:33, chris peck wrote:


Hi Bruno

Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone.

pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on  
subjective uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just  
two.


With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different  
vocabulary.




They are mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted  
to the 'satisfaction of everyone'; consequently whether something  
has or hasn't been doesn't tells us much. Refuting something to the  
'satisfaction of everyone' is extraordinarily rare in the scientific  
and philosophical community; less still the wider community. Has  
Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of everyone?


Yes. For everyone = everyone among scientists.





You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly  
speaking, has been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he  
employed was in conflict with his wider principles of selection. His  
theory was internally incoherent and he never spotted it. What does  
that tell us? That theories have extraordinary value even when they  
ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of everyone'.


You can't compare Darwin general complex scheme, and a statement  
like P(M) = 1/2 in a simple protocol.






This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory  
to my own satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it.


I have no theory, and I defend no truth.
You say that a reasoning is not valid, it is up to you to prove this.  
Handwaving on vocabulary does not do the task. Only by providing an  
determinacy algorithm, can you refute the 1p  indeterminacy in  
duplication experience.





On the other hand, just because a theory has been (or ought to have  
been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me to reject it entirely  
either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in step 3 to my  
own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely  
that will make you happy?


Well, if you provide a refutation, I would be. But you did not. You  
only pretend to have one, but nobody has seen it.





Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It  
was pivotal in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he  
discusses the impossibility of ever refuting any theory.


In that sense, OK. But I am not doing philosophy.

Bruno



You're talking to someone who hasn't placed any currency in  
refutation for over twenty years.


All the best

Chris.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100


On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:

On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:

Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show  
you what's happening.  The strangeness that you noticed occurs  
because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%.


binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375
binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125
binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374
binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964
binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178
binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006

Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%.

binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922
binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677
binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939
binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427
binocdf(15,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(5,2e9,0.5)=0.9747

Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing  
number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up,  
so any exact proportion becomes less likely.  But at the same time,  
as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of  
proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the  
expected value.  So for tests when you do two million flips of a  
fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads  
and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and  
50.05%.



Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am  
interested to know.


the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the bernouilly  
épreuve (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you  
grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p.


Bruno

(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html


Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris?

I don't object to any step in UDA.  It seems internally consistent  
and plausible to me.  I'm unsure what level of confidence I would  
assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the  
vicinity of 25%.


A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of  
the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its  
neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ?


I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the  
false and the unbelievable.




I have

Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 07 Mar 2014, at 03:12, chris peck wrote:



 Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in  
H you predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that  
the prediction was wrong.


The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed.



It is not, once you get the difference between the 1-view and the 3- 
view, and keep in mind that we *assume* comp.




You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this  
question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one  
unique successor of H.


This is trivially false, in the 3-1 description. Obviously there will  
be, from the 3p view, two conscious survirvors whoi both are me (in  
the usual sense that I am me, even after change like drinking a cup of  
coffee, or taking a plane).


But by comp we know in advance (in Helsinki) that both first person  
view of the survivors will be unique from their 1p pov.


So in Helsinki P(I will feel to be in only one city) = 1. Whoever I  
will feel to be, I know that will be unique, and thus either W or M in  
that protocol.


Do you agree with this? Do you agree that P(I will feel to be in only  
one city) = 1, in step 3 protocol?






The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up  
is: what is the probability that either of your two successors sees  
M. Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p  
then the correct question is: what is the probability that (you in  
M will see M) and (you in W will see W)? And the answer to that  
*is* simple and obvious. It is 1.
It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The  
question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will  
embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability  
that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the  
question,


Of course there is. We just know that with comp, the subject will not  
feel any split or duplication, like in Everett.




and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants  
begin to wonder who in fact is who.


Not when you use the 3 and 1 p nuances.





 ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever  
listening to what the duplicated persons say.


Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't  
make any difference whether you look at it from the objective or  
subjective view. The probabilities work out the same either way.


And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons  
say' by adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly  
out of his body into a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on  
both W and M guys, dream their 1p views, fly back and integrate  
their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If  
we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a hugely  
contorted confusion of the lot.


 So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to  
provide it.


On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet  
understood it, less still rebutted it.


tell me if you agree with this: If you are told, in H, (in the step 3  
protocol) that you will be offered a cup of coffee in both W and M,  
after the reconstitution. Do you agree that the probability(I will  
drink a cup of coffee) is one?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness  
at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?


Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


What do you mean by true randomness?

I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of  
total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary  
true random sequence: it is


1...

It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super  
unlucky , in case he bet on zero!).


But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you  
need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced  
experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 7 March 2014 15:12, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:


 The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is
 the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes
 the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only
 question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: what is the
 probability that either of your two successors sees M. Or, if you want to
 keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is:
 what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see
 W)? And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1.

 It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The
 question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody
 your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will
 see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so
 pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder
 who in fact is who.


I agree, given the context, the question is badly posed. However, I know
what it means - the same as when you ask a scientist what is the
probability that the Geiger counter will click in the next minute or the
photon will go through the semi-silvered mirror, and they say 50% even
though they believe the MWI to be the correct interpretation of QM. It
simply shows that given the assumptions, there is a first person
indeterminacy in this situation, as Everett showed occurs in the MWI.

That is all it shows, or needs to show...

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all?
 Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?

 Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?


If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending, because
the evolution of the system is deterministic.

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent):



On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness  
at all? Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?


Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true  
randomness?


What do you mean by true randomness?

I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of  
total arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary  
true random sequence: it is


1...

It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super  
unlucky , in case he bet on zero!).


But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you  
need is too realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced  
experience is algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough.





Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the following:

1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality,
2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events.

That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that  
invoking such true randomness in an explanation is just a god-of-the- 
gap type of explanation. it is like don't ask or don't try to  
understand.


I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the belief  
in such true 3p randomness. I don't push it that far though.


Bruno






Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread Gabriel Bodeen



On Thursday, March 6, 2014 12:32:32 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:

 Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? 

 I don't object to any step in UDA.  It seems internally consistent and 
 plausible to me.  I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it 
 being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%.  


 A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the 
 premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist 
 consequences in the vicinity of 25% ?

 I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false 
 and the unbelievable.


Yes, that's what I mean.

An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and 
either sound or unsound.  Regarding UDA's soundness:  I have no problem 
saying Yes Doctor.  Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis.  
But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing 
reasons to believe it.  There are other options that seem just as sensible, 
and there's always the possibility that reality is quite unlike any of the 
ideas that seem sensible to us.  In the usual Bayesian sense of probability 
it's fine to place a bet with a level of confidence between 0 and 1 even on 
fully determined unique events like whether AR is true.  My bet would be 
about 25%.  If someday I survive a bomb blast by quantum tunneling to 
safety, then I'll update to virtually 100%. :)

Regarding validly, it's also the case that I don't have complete confidence 
that when I perceive an argument to be valid it actually is valid.  For me 
this wariness developed in response to having been religious for many years 
in a way I no longer think was rationally justified, even if it seemed so 
at the time.  UDA looks valid to me but it shares many of the features of 
other metaphysical arguments that I find suspicious, so I remain a bit 
suspicious of my capacity to judge it without succumbing to biases.   I'd 
bet nearly 1 but not 1 on its validity.

-Gabe

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3



On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:




On Thursday, March 6, 2014 12:32:32 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:


Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris?

I don't object to any step in UDA.  It seems internally consistent  
and plausible to me.  I'm unsure what level of confidence I would  
assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the  
vicinity of 25%.


A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of  
the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its  
neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ?


I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the  
false and the unbelievable.


Yes, that's what I mean.

An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid,  
and either sound or unsound.  Regarding UDA's soundness:  I have no  
problem saying Yes Doctor.  Similarly I have no problem with the  
Church thesis.  But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't  
know of any convincing reasons to believe it.


You don't believe in the prime numbers?

All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the  
notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or  
just Church thesis don't make sense without AR.
AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the beliefs  
in elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical hypothesis,  
together with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *).





There are other options that seem just as sensible, and there's  
always the possibility that reality is quite unlike any of the ideas  
that seem sensible to us.


Keep in mind that we assume computationalism. This entails a relation  
between mind and number relations, and we reason from there.


We don't known reality, but we can try theories, and after the  
discovery of the universal machine, the comp theory inherit a solid  
and rich mathematics, which can help in that possibly highly counter- 
intuitive study.





In the usual Bayesian sense of probability it's fine to place a bet  
with a level of confidence between 0 and 1 even on fully determined  
unique events like whether AR is true.  My bet would be about 25%.   
If someday I survive a bomb blast by quantum tunneling to safety,  
then I'll update to virtually 100%. :)


Regarding validly, it's also the case that I don't have complete  
confidence that when I perceive an argument to be valid it actually  
is valid.  For me this wariness developed in response to having been  
religious for many years in a way I no longer think was rationally  
justified, even if it seemed so at the time.  UDA looks valid to me  
but it shares many of the features of other metaphysical arguments  
that I find suspicious, so I remain a bit suspicious of my capacity  
to judge it without succumbing to biases.   I'd bet nearly 1 but not  
1 on its validity.


OK.  I take it that you have to dig deeper to improve your capacity to  
judge, and that is very wise.


Bruno





-Gabe

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread meekerdb


On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? 
Or is
every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?

Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,


True; but I don't assume that.

Brent


because the evolution of the system is deterministic.

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread meekerdb


On 3/7/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Mar 2014, at 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Brent):



On 07 Mar 2014, at 06:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all? Or is every 
case of true randomness an instance of FPI?


Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?


What do you mean by true randomness?

I have no problem with that notion, though. I use it in the sense of total 
arbitrariness. I illustrate this by giving my favorite binary true random sequence: it is


1...

It is the true random sequence of the superlucky guy (or super unlucky , in case he 
bet on zero!).


But for the FPI, for example in the iterated WM-duplication, all you need is too 
realize that the the vast majority of 1p experienced experience is 
algorithmic-incompressible. That is random enough.





Hmm, Brent, you were perhaps meaning by true randomness the following:

1) you assume a 3p primitive physical reality,
2) you assume it can contain primitive, irreducible random events.


I'm not sure what 1) means.  I was hypothesizing (not assuming) 2).




That is logically consistent, so I am agnostic, but I believe that invoking such true 
randomness in an explanation is just a god-of-the-gap type of explanation. it is like 
don't ask or don't try to understand.


It is more like, Some things just happenlike a UD.

Brent



I feel close to Einstein on this, who define insanity by the belief in such true 3p 
randomness. I don't push it that far though.


Bruno






Bruno





Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread Gabriel Bodeen



On Friday, March 7, 2014 10:59:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 07 Mar 2014, at 17:05, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:


 An argument on its own merits is presumably either valid or invalid, and 
 either sound or unsound.  Regarding UDA's soundness:  I have no problem 
 saying Yes Doctor.  Similarly I have no problem with the Church thesis.  
 But when it comes to Arithmetical Realism, I don't know of any convincing 
 reasons to believe it. 


 You don't believe in the prime numbers? 

 All theories presuppose arithmetical realism. Many notions, like the 
 notion of digital machine presupposes arithmetical realism. Comp or just 
 Church thesis don't make sense without AR. 
 AR is not an hypothesis in metaphysics, it is the name of the beliefs in 
 elementary arithmetic. It is a set of mathematical hypothesis, together 
 with its usual semantic the structure (N, +, *).


Heh, yes, I believe in prime numbers.  But in The Origin of Physical Laws 
and Sensations you wrote of AR that it is the assumption that 
arithmetical propositions ... are true independently of me, you, humanity, 
the physical universe (if that exists), etc.  A couple other accounts of 
how things might be that I take seriously are (1) physicalism in the sense 
that arithmetical propositions might only be true when physically realized, 
or even (2) relativism in the sense that arithmetical propositions might 
only be true for humanlike brains, with an alethiology of the sort 
preferred by the American pragmatist school of philosophy.  And a third 
meta-account is that reality might be a way that doesn't make sense to me.  
Four options plus an ignorance prior and little evidence gives me about 25% 
confidence for each. :)

-Gabe


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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread ghibbsa


On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure I follow. Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning 
 experiment from Figure 8.3 many times and wrote down your room number each 
 time, you'd in almost all cases find that the sequence of zeros and ones 
 you'd written looked random, with zeros occurring about 50% of the time.

 
Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us 
the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - 
they are hexadecimal translations. or very different bases anyway. Of 
course the bloody average 1's about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's 
binary. Which works by flipping. 
 
 
 


 That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get 
 the sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally 
 doubled up! The correct sequences should read:

 *  0001  0010  0011  0100  0101  0110  0111  1000  1001  1010  1011  
 1100  1101  1110  *

 Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of 
 those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure.

 binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 
2^n, and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to 
hexadecimal without a calculator, in two steps only. 
 
1101101100111111 
 
it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor 
break the copy up into sets of four. 
 
1101      1010  0001  0011   1100  0011 
 
the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it round 
the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1.  So if you have 1101 and you 
want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 
1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 
0x2 + 1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, 
replacing everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- 
Eh
 
I just taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there 
was ONE person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o) 
 
 

 I guess the sloppy phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most 
 sequences? I don't know if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 
 sequences above) or if it becomes more true (or almost true) with longer 
 sequences. Maybe a mathematician can enlighten me?

 
Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an 
archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most 
implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the 
bases, allowing for translation.  


 I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the 
 chapters I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his 
 subject matter seem more accessible.

 
...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large 
infinity of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I 
read that, it put me on the floor. 

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RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread chris peck


Hi Bruno

 With respect to the UDA, graves and me are just using different vocabulary. 

Really?

the last time I quoted her:


What ... should Alice expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: 
whatever she knows she will see, she should expect (with certainty!) to see. 
So, she should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she should (with 
certainty) expect to see spin-down.

Quentin said:

That's nonsense, and contrary to observed fact.

And you agreed with Quentin:


Yes, it is the common confusion between 1 and 3 views. 

Are you saying you now actually agree with Greaves and that assigning 
probability 1 to both outcomes is in fact correct?


Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:40:53 -0800
From: ghib...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3


On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 3:49:21 AM UTC, Liz R wrote:I'm not sure I follow. 
Tegmark said If you repeated the cloning experiment from Figure 8.3 many times 
and 
wrote down your room number each time, you'd in almost all cases find 
that the sequence of zeros and ones you'd written looked random, with 
zeros occurring about 50% of the time.
 Did Tegmark really say that? I don't believe it. And he just deemed tell us 
the nature of mathematics. Of course they look random - they are hexadecimal 
translations. or very different bases anyway. Of course the bloody average 1's 
about 50% of the time, as well as 0's. It's binary. Which works by flipping.
That seems to me to be correct. If you do the experiment 4 times you get the 
sequences I typed out before, except I seem to have accidentally doubled up! 
The correct sequences should read:


  0001  0010  0011  0100  0101  0110  0111  1000  1001  1010  1011  1100  
1101  1110  

Depending on how you decide something looks random, I'd say quite a few of 
those sequences do. And 0s do occur 50% of the time overall, for sure.


binary relates to other bases simple if the other base is in the series 2^n, 
and arithmetically otherwise. For example, convert the following to hexadecimal 
without a calculator, in two steps only.  1101101100111111  
it's 2^n so easy peasy. Just copy the sequence below, then with your cursor 
break the copy up into sets of four.  1101      1010  0001  0011   1100 
 0011  the right to left column value of binary goes 1,2,4,8 so putting it 
round the same way as the binary that's 8, 4, 2, 1.  So if you have 1101 and 
you want to convert to hex, you jusmultiply the value in each binary column by 
1 or 2 or 4, or 8 depending on its position. So 1101 would be 1x8 + 1x4 + 0x2 + 
1x1 = 15 in decimal which counts in 10's. But hex counts in 16's, replacing 
everything aftter 10 with a letter of the alphabet, thus 15d -- Eh I just 
taught a lot of people how to suck eggs right there. But maybe there was ONE 
person that wasn't 100% and is glad to now know hex :o)   I guess the sloppy 
phrasing is he implies 0s happen half the time in most sequences? I don't know 
if that is true (it's true for 6 of the 16 sequences above) or if it becomes 
more true (or almost true) with longer sequences. Maybe a mathematician can 
enlighten me?
 Yeah it's basically a load of bollocks any much significance as it's an 
archetype of the base and all the translations intrinsic in most 
implementations. Ask why the pattern doesn't remain constant through the bases, 
allowing for translation.  

I admit Max seems a little slapdash in how he phrases things in the chapters 
I've read so far, presumably because he's trying to make his subject matter 
seem more accessible.
 ...I will describe..[reality from math] the greatest most large infinity 
of all the others to date is what sticks in my mind. First time I read that, 
it put me on the floor. 




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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

  On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

 A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at all?
 Or is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?


 *Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness? *


 If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,

  True; but I don't assume that.


Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context -
which you haven't revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell
us what you *are* assuming?

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

2014-03-07 Thread meekerdb


On 3/7/2014 8:26 PM, LizR wrote:

On 8 March 2014 08:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/7/2014 1:24 AM, LizR wrote:

On 7 March 2014 18:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/6/2014 9:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

A related question is, is there any such thing as true randomness at 
all? Or
is every case of true randomness an instance of FPI?

*Or is FPI just a convoluted way to pretend there isn't true randomness?
*

If one assumes QM and the MWI are correct then it isn't pretending,

True; but I don't assume that.

Since your original statement above only makes sense in some context - which you haven't 
revealed, as far as I can tell - perhaps you could tell us what you /are/ assuming?


I'm not assuming anything, I'm just pointing out that one could assume something different 
than QM and MWI.  For instance, start with MWI but then suppose that at each branching 
only one instance of you continues.  Doesn't that accord with all experience?


Brent

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Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3