On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?
On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do inexplocably. But the significant point
is that nothing else solves the HP
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
has no trouble explaining how people play chess.
It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said I have
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do
On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists
tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM
has no trouble explaining how people play
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold
that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular
computational types.
They might do
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Right..so you are using third person to mean cognitive
and 1st person to mean experiential...?
I assume that when the term cognitive is used it is intended to be
cashed out in some third-person way. However, many terms seem to be
used somewhat
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
+structure.
The difference is that the structure is finer-grained.
Agreed. But the harping was motivated
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
+structure.
The difference is that the
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think
What are the common relevant physical details of all the proposed executing
scheme ?
Quentin
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
if it can't, we need another strategy to
disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
comp.
There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation
to
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
if it can't, we need another strategy to
disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter
conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in
comp.
There is no ambiguity in the reduction
And HP stands for???
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here
david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Another point that has got rather lost here is that
computationalists
tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing.
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how
you can
On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
What would make a theory of consciousness a
physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
relation between them. Such a theory
David Nyman wrote:
On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
What would make a theory of consciousness a
physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of
physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise
relation between them.
On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
argument?
I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
You concluded that the realisation of a computation
On 23 Sep, 03:20, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
inherent in MR.
Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the
development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio,
Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical
On 23 Sep, 08:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing.
Level 0 is
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless
the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't
you say so? And how would that now
2009/9/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a
first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't
intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal
of first-person experience - yes? I
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism,
it is
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
by a computational observer (us if CTM is true).
If a level 0 is
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
means that demanding that it further
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The level 0 has
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing.
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, a
2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing.
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an
abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the
realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause
consciousness, that would entail that no
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Well little problem in gmail sorry.
So I do it again /o\
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing.
Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can
relate physically running a program on a
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
argument?
I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original
argument?
I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go.
You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't
cause consciousness. But did you also
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
So then question then becomes how close together do the intermediate points
have to
be to constitute the same experience.
An interesting question. We might investigate it empirically by noting how
closely the
brain processes during one
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in principle
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (=
non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
because we talk about a computation at a very high level of
abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (=
non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right
because we talk about a computation at a very high level of
abstraction. But when we ask
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
necessitates making the relation between experience and process
*explicitly* physical, and actually attempting
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem.
The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind
necessitates making the relation between experience and process
*explicitly* physical, and
On 10 Sep, 14:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
It is strictly an argument against the claim that
computation
On 10 Sep, 23:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away
from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same
problem that leads to the question, Does a
Brent,
I guess you know my reply to this, but I want to make it clear, for
the benefit of the general discussion. I add a point though.
On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away
from a context in which there is action
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
It is strictly an argument against the claim that
computation causes consciousness , as opposed
to the claim that mental states
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio
arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation.
It is strictly an argument against the claim that
computation causes consciousness , as opposed
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to
be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their
apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why
the fine-grained
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away
from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same
problem that leads to the question, Does a rock compute every
function? When looking at a physical process
On 9 Sep, 01:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
1. Computationalism in general associates that consciousness with a
specific comptuer programme, programme C let's say.
2. Let us combine that with the further claim that programme C
causes cosnciousness, somehow leveraging
On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/3 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of
which is out of date?
Well, as well as
On 02 Sep 2009, at 03:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
But only by isolating a bit of computation from the rest of universe.
And it doesn't show that a computation supervenes on zero physical
activity. And even if it did show that, it would not follow that
mental
computation *does* supervene on
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as
possessing internal temporal duration and
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
higher level. I see nothing
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious
fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
at some lower level can be said to
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia?
ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
is restricted to the sense of physical
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia?
ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
indeed nothing problematic in saying that
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
the question
Well, a computation is a type, and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
computational type, and is indeed a
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
the question
Well, a computation is a type,
A type of computation is a type.
A token of a type of computation is a
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and is thus not any particular physical
object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that
computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose
physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, surely you must see that in saying abstracta are arrived at by
ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects you are simply
agreeing with Quentin that if everything is reduced
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
It's more an attempt to characterise our
metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
on
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That says nothing about qualia at all.
It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider whether there is any point in
your commenting at all. I don't see
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
that we are 1
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
running on this
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic.
If such were possible, I suspect it would require
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
Au contraire,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How something without property can implement processes,
with or
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
real reality, fair enough, but then you must
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:26, David Nyman wrote:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
All what I propose is a (constructive) proof of the following
equivalent
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was referring to the fact that you
sometimes attach
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
Can't matter have processes?
But in
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
just. There is no possibility of a context-free 'objective'
exchange of views. There must be some sympathetic matching of
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
the basis of any consistent notion of
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
just.
Really?
There is no possibility of a context-free
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
it is standard practice for lecturers to ask for quesitons when they
have
finished. They do that because it works -- it clears up
misudnerstandings.
Assuming that miscommunication has to be the audiences fault doesn;t
work.
I have never seen that
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
If there is nothing at the bottom
of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
Yes, it sounds
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point.
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:52, David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno hasn't
yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
That is the point. I
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
Bruno wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
Not at all. This definitely convinces me that you have not even try to
begin to read the proof.
Ontically you can say there is a bottom. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, (that is
0 and the
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