Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness?

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 09:14, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 24 Sep, 00:45, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness.  But did you also mean to imply that

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do inexplocably. But the significant point is that nothing else solves the HP

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM has no trouble explaining how people play chess. It hasn't got lost - e.g. two sentences later I said I have

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:50, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than experience, CTM has no trouble explaining how people play

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 14:32, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: If you don't think CTM solves the HP then presumably you don't hold that conscious states supervene on the physical tokens of particular computational types. They might do

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Right..so you are using third person to mean cognitive and 1st person to mean experiential...? I assume that when the term cognitive is used it is intended to be cashed out in some third-person way. However, many terms seem to be used somewhat

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread david.nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM +structure. The difference is that the structure is finer-grained. Agreed. But the harping was motivated

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM +structure. The difference is that the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think physicalism is equally sueless? After all, phsycialism is just PM

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Flammarion
On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Why harp on the fact that CTM isn't physicalist enough, if you think

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
What are the common relevant physical details of all the proposed executing scheme ? Quentin 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 17:34, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 24 Sep, 16:16, david.nyman

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: if it can't, we need another strategy to disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in comp. There is no ambiguity in the reduction of computation to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: if it can't, we need another strategy to disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in comp. There is no ambiguity in the reduction

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread m.a.
And HP stands for??? - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM Subject: Re: Dreaming On 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:50 AM Subject: Re: Dreaming On 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Another point that has got rather lost here is that computationalists tend to be a lot more concerned about cognition than

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread David Nyman
On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them. Such a theory

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them.

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Flammarion
On 23 Sep, 02:06, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Flammarion
On 23 Sep, 03:20, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: David Nyman wrote: inherent in MR. Such a theory is available. It is the evolutionary account of the development of consciousness, c.f. Thomas Metzinger, Antonio Damasio, Julian Jaynes, Daniel Dennett. Knowing the physical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Flammarion
On 23 Sep, 08:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 23:47, Flammarion wrote: On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that nonetheless the realisation of a computation IS consciousness? If so, why didn't you say so? And how would that now

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: True, but this is to give a third-person behavioural account, not a first-person experiential one. I'm right in assuming that you don't intend to offer a third-person account as an eliminativist dismissal of first-person experience - yes? I

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is part of the standard package of materialism, it is

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true by a computational observer (us if CTM is true). If a level 0 is

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 18:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather that comp is CTM properly understood.  Its 'supervention' on virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside - means that demanding that it further

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Flammarion
On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has nothing that can be detected/tested if CTM is true

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The level 0 has

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, a 2009/9/22 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 22 Sep, 21:29, Quentin

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a computer, and running it on an abaccus, with a pen and a sheet of paper, in

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Flammarion
On 13 Sep, 17:51, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making.  If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Flammarion
On 22 Sep, 21:53, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Well little problem in gmail sorry. So I do it again /o\ Sorry I wanted to write it does *add* nothing. Level 0 is not part of the computation. And I still don't see how you can relate physically running a program on a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also mean to imply that

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-14 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: So then question then becomes how close together do the intermediate points have to be to constitute the same experience. An interesting question. We might investigate it empirically by noting how closely the brain processes during one

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-14 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive, but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain, and hence in principle

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state.

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask what makes this causal

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and actually attempting

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical, and

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-11 Thread Flammarion
On 10 Sep, 14:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-11 Thread Flammarion
On 10 Sep, 23:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same problem that leads to the question, Does a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Brent, I guess you know my reply to this, but I want to make it clear, for the benefit of the general discussion. I add a point though. On 10 Sep 2009, at 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote: But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away from a context in which there is action

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation causes consciousness , as opposed to the claim that mental states

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation causes consciousness , as opposed

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same problem that leads to the question, Does a rock compute every function? When looking at a physical process

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-09 Thread Flammarion
On 9 Sep, 01:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 1. Computationalism in general associates that consciousness with a specific comptuer programme, programme C let's say. 2. Let us combine that with the further claim that programme C causes cosnciousness, somehow leveraging

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-03 Thread Flammarion
On 3 Sep, 09:41, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/3 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 3 Sep, 01:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 23:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of which is out of date? Well, as well as

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Sep 2009, at 03:17, Brent Meeker wrote: But only by isolating a bit of computation from the rest of universe. And it doesn't show that a computation supervenes on zero physical activity. And even if it did show that, it would not follow that mental computation *does* supervene on

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear to us as possessing internal temporal duration and

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a higher level. I see nothing

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Flammarion
On 2 Sep, 16:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative character of such snapshots, one might also wonder about the curious fact that such 'frozen' capsules nonetheless appear

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Flammarion
On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different at some lower level can be said to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Flammarion
On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I wonder what you mean by either physically realized or in Platonia? ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is indeed nothing problematic in saying that

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question Well, a computation is a type, and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread Flammarion
On 2 Sep, 21:20, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to the question Well, a computation is a type, A type of computation is a type. A token of a type of computation is a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/2 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and is thus not any particular physical object. A specific physical implementation is a token of that computational type, and is indeed a physical object, albeit one whose physical details can be of any variety so long as they continue to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, surely you must see that in saying abstracta are arrived at by ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects you are simply agreeing with Quentin that if everything is reduced

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*). I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: It's more an attempt to characterise our metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring, immediate, self-referential and self-relative.   Actually, reflecting on

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: That says nothing about qualia at all. It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time.  Most of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I think you should be more concerned about the long passages I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely incomprehensible. In that case you may wish to reconsider whether there is any point in your commenting at all. I don't see

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I think you should be more concerned about the long passages I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely incomprehensible. In that case you may wish to reconsider

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory. Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions that we are 1

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Exactly, if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one). There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine running on this

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic. If such were possible, I suspect it would require

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory. Au contraire,

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote: Can't matter have processes? But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is propertyless. How something without property can implement processes, with or

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Exactly, if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it is being simulated on the level 0 of the real (if there is one). There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual machine running

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote: Can't matter have processes? But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is propertyless. How

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I don't think we can make any further progress together

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on real reality, fair enough, but then you must

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:26, David Nyman wrote: Bruno hasn't yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind on some such basis is actually untenable. I don't think I have ever said that. All what I propose is a (constructive) proof of the following equivalent

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of physics. It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote: On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote: On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Aug 2009, at

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Bruno hasn't yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind on some such basis is actually untenable. I don't think I have ever said that. No, you're right. However I was referring to the fact that you sometimes attach

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote: Can't matter have processes? But in that line of discussion, the question should

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote: Can't matter have processes? But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary matter have processes. You said yourself

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:59, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote: Can't matter have processes? But in

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions. The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of just. There is no possibility of a context-free 'objective' exchange of views. There must be some sympathetic matching of

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point. I should say that my starting position before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't yet persuaded me that an

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point. I should say that my starting position before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on the basis of any consistent notion of

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions. The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of just. Really? There is no possibility of a context-free

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point.  I should say that my starting position before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point. I should say that my starting position

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: it is standard practice for lecturers to ask for quesitons when they have finished. They do that because it works -- it clears up misudnerstandings. Assuming that miscommunication has to be the audiences fault doesn;t work. I have never seen that

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point. I should say that my starting position before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread David Nyman
On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate. If there is nothing at the bottom of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up. Yes, it sounds

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point.

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Flammarion
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote: On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: That is the point. I should say that my starting position before

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:52, David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Bruno hasn't yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind on some such basis is actually untenable. I don't think I have ever said that. No, you're right. However I was

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