On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
generated
by
On 28 Aug, 15:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that
On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:15, Flammarion wrote:
When discussing fundamental science, no use of the word exist
should
be taken literally.
Fine. Then I am not literally being simulated by an immateial UD.
If you want. But my point is that NO use of the word exist should be
taken
On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
1. Something that ontologically
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process
at
all. I
On 22 Aug, 00:38, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
explaining away qua elimination.
Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
below. But
On 25 Aug, 08:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
with the full force of necessity --
I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.
Where?
Well,
On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or
generated
by something else that does
2. I ontologically exist
3. According
On 28 Aug 2009, at 13:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that
non-theoretical truth have to be redefined as theoretical
possibilities
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
with the full force of necessity --
I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.
Where?
Well, if it;s tacit you wouldn't find a trace.
I wake up this
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:38, Flammarion wrote:
That is false. You are tacitly assuming that PM has to be argued
with the full force of necessity --
I don't remember. I don't find trace of what makes you think so.
Where?
Well, if it;s tacit you wouldn't find a trace.
If I use this
On 19 Aug, 15:16, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
by something else that does
2. I ontologically exist
3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
Step 4 is really step 0
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:26, Flammarion wrote:
I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your
defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on CTM +PM = true.
Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim?
OK. It's invalid because you can't have
Flammarion wrote:
...
We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-
existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has been
that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is
an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2009 00:13:54 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
Flammarion wrote:
...
We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-
existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
Only Bruno thinks computation trancends
On 20 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
So someone else noticed Peter dodging the consequences of what he
originally claimed with respect to Quinean paraphrase! Thanks.
What consequence was that?
On 20 Aug, 00:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into
On 20 Aug, 11:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:
Indeed, you don't believe in the number seven. But sometimes you seem
to believe in their mathematical existence, and that is all what I
need.
No. I always qualify mathematical
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I was pursuing the same conclusion that
you attribute to Dennett as
On 21 Aug, 17:25, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I was
On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process
at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
explaining away qua elimination.
Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
below. But it's a false distinction, as I point out below.
But also - just
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from
contingent
structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
existence. It is not a structure of anything.
On 19 Aug, 21:49, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion
On 20 Aug 2009, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation
is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.
The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with
On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into
On 20 Aug 2009, at 10:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from
contingent
structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2009, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation
is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing *for*
eliminative materialism, except as
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 01:56:27 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 21:49, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From
On 20 Aug 2009, at 14:30, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Your second sentence answers the first one. Your paragraph above
also.
The current seventh step series is leading to the understanding of
what is a computation, and a machine, for a
2009/8/20 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing
On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal
activity.
But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA
proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is
implausible to
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 12:23:51 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal
activity
2009/8/20 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16244.html
and http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16257.html
Thanks, Jesse - I'll take a look.
David
...this notion of causal structure isn't totally
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we see around us
is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a
correct
argumentation
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that what we see around us
is material, then the
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting
a statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about
reality and thus being forced to accept
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
consciousness
of
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
So to save
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
ontological RITISAR existence.
So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
running on
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
No,
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
subset of the class of computational
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material, and that
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form.
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:58, Flammarion wrote:
I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that
if you write down hypothetical truths about what
an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude
that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine.
I don't proceed in that way at
Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
not about
explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
contingency as the price
paid for
Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of
Darwin idea that things evolve.
We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
rigorous spelling out
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat
Seems like this post didn't go through, so I'll resend it:
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e.
CTM
and
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable* of
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter.
The notion of computation and computability have been
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is
On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other way
round.
Are you
On 18 Aug, 02:47, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:
AFAICS the assumption of primary matter 'solves' the white rabbit
problem by making it circular: i.e. assuming that primary matter
exists entails restricting the theory to just those mathematics and
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
On 18 Aug, 00:41, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yep. I have no problem with any of that
Really? Let's see then.
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
statement like unicorns have one horn
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
described or
explain.
But what is this primary
On 18 Aug, 01:43, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:44, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 18:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Does Bruno assume arithmetic is really real or just a really good
model, and can the
difference be known?
I don't think Bruno believes there is anything else
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
What do you mean by ontological existence?
Real in the Sense that I am Real.
What does that mean?
Do you mean real in the sense that 1-I is real? or
do you mean real in the sense that 3-I is real?
The 1-I reality (my consciousness) is
On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
Any Platonists
On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
What do you mean by ontological existence?
Real in the Sense that I am Real.
What does that mean?
Do you mean real in the sense that 1-I is real? or
do you mean real in the sense
On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
the term in a way
On 16 Aug, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Aug 2009, at 14:34, 1Z wrote:
On 14 Aug, 09:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You are dismissing the first person indeterminacy. A stuffy TM can
run
a computation. But if a consciousness is attached to that
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From
On 18 Aug 2009, at 11:59, Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 10:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:48, Flammarion wrote:
What do you mean by ontological existence?
Real in the Sense that I am Real.
What does that mean?
Do you mean real in the sense that
On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
we
have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
arithmetical existence, if only because this is taught in school, and
its enough to justified the existence of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 11:11, 1Z wrote:
Without Platonism, there is no UD since it is not observable within
physical space. So the UDA is based on Plat., not the other
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2009, at 22:41, Flammarion wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:
But those space-time configuration are themselves described by
mathematical functions far more complex that the numbers
described or
explain.
But
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:37:02 -0700
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On 18 Aug, 01:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
On 17 Aug, 14:46
On 18 Aug 2009, at 19:17, Brent Meeker wrote:
Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
more sure of your position.
I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
truth=existence is extraordinary
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about reality
and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could
instead paraphrase this in
On 18 Aug, 15:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 12:14, Flammarion wrote:
Each branch of math has its own notion of existence, and with comp,
we
have a lot choice, for the ontic part, but usually I take
arithmetical existence, if only because this is
Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Flammarion
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2009 1:43 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55
On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
some
possible
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