Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 28 Nov 2012, at 17:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know  
why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of  
math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from  
this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically  
defined) and why they obey apparent laws


So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why  
this electron instead of that electron?


Comp provides two type of explanation. Programs (that is number), and  
programs 1p expectation when distributed in the UD. Apparently if you  
look where an electron is, in some orbital (you know its excitation  
level of energy), there will be no explanation of why it is here or  
there, by first person indeterminacy on the branches relative to your  
knowledge of its energy. Like we can explain why nobody can explain to  
the W-man why he is the W-man and not the M-man, in the WM- 
duplication. But we can explain the W and M and not Vienna, by the  
program and its local history.





It seems your arguments are all of the form, If comp is true, then  
everything true is explained by comp.


OK, but this in the same sense that if physicalism is true, then  
everything true is explained by physicalism.


Yet, when physicalism fails on consciousness, people tend to say, - 
Ah! but this means probably that consciousness is not true, and I  
feel like I have better to run away. It is really like changing the  
data when the theory is wrong, or changing the people when the tyrant  
is tired.


Comp start from consciousness admittance, and then explain matter by  
the relation than numbers have with possible truth including  
consciousness.


And comp is made very precise by Church thesis, and computer science,  
when physicalism still seem unaware of its assumption aspect, based  
on a rough speculation extrapolated by our animal conception of  
reality. Progress has begun when the Greeks depart from that habit, to  
take matter for granted, but the bad habit get back through a  
simplification of Aristotle imposed by tradition of authorities.


If comp is true everything HAS TO BE explained in arithmetic and  
arithmetic only, and with reasonable definitions.

That would be more correct to say.

Bruno





Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:08, Jesse Mazer wrote:




On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com 
 wrote:



On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

 Richard,


 On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno,
 Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



 Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come  
from

 arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

 Bruno


Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard



If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum  
production in a program and solve the world's energy problem.  
Instead, we find that in all real implementations of computing, comp  
invariably consumes net energy. Why would that be? Does comp allow  
anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some  
kilowatt hours back.


Craig


Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you  
have one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to  
have its own simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical  
computers, then those computers could be used to simulate another  
world, a simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having  
petroleum production in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not  
going to provide any energy to the original simulated world, despite  
the fact that they are both computer simulations. So, the fact that  
we cannot get energy from simulations of oil production, and don't  
get wet from simulations of rainstorms and such, is no argument  
against the idea that our own universe might just be a computational  
system.


I agree with your point, as a valid rebuttal of Craig, but with comp  
we definitely know that the universe is not a computational system a  
priori, as the physical reality supervene on the first person plural  
indeterminacy which is a sum on all computations, and this is not a  
priori computable. Indeed that is why we have to hunt the white rabbit  
away.


Digital physics implies comp, and comp implies the negation (a priori)  
of digital physics, and this makes digital physics inconsistent (with  
or without comp).


Bruno




Jesse


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Nov 2012, at 16:32, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

Richard,


On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?




Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

Bruno



Since energy is what makes things happen


Wow, you are quick here. What you say assume a priori Energy, some  
physical laws relating energy and happening, etc.





then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.


There is a sense to say that arithmetic makes everything happen, from  
the 1pov view of the arithmetical creature, and that this follows from  
the comp supposition, OK, but it is still an open problem if this  
gives a quantum multiverse, or Everett precise relative state. But  
there are sign that it might be the case indeed. It is testable.


Bruno







On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:



On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




  How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation

(the
quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive
operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization,

which
exists already.
snip




UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if  
we are

machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
justified by
the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to  
it.




Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a  
piece of

iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
between
pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have  
to be
matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic  
alone. Can

we
use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what  
we feel?




Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.




The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't  
know why

and
how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in  
physics.
With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can  
explain

why
numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
apparent
laws



How do tangible things interface with logic -


I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask  
for some

amount of consistency.



how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and  
through

what
capacity can they express that obedience?


With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
(actually
0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to  
divide

6,
for example.















Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption

of
logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in  
logic

quite
a lot.




I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes  
it even
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then  
what is

it
that you are reducing it from?


?




If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded  
by a

universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need  
the pork

loin?


Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological  
sense, bu
assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal  
numbers about

it.



Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or  
shapes or

anything other than what they actually are)?


By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into  
add 0 to

the
content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the  
real

case
of the roasted pork smelly experiences.













Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level,  
only simple

substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.




Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It  
sounds like

this:

C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).




We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Nov 2012, at 16:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:

 Richard,


 On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno,
 Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



 Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come  
from

 arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

 Bruno


Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard



If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum  
production in a program and solve the world's energy problem.  
Instead, we find that in all real implementations of computing, comp  
invariably consumes net energy. Why would that be? Does comp allow  
anti-comp?


Well, not really. But comp allows the consistency of non comp (but  
consistency is very cheap, so this does not say too much).





Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some kilowatt  
hours back.


Lol

Of course (of course ?), to go backward needs reversibility, and  
reversibility needs no loss of energy. It is ironical.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

Richard,


On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from  
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.


Bruno




On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:



On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




   How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation (the
quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive
operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which

exists already.
snip



UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we  
are
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by

the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a  
piece of
iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface  
between
pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have  
to be
matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone.  
Can we
use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we  
feel?



Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.



The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know  
why and
how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in  
physics.
With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can  
explain why
numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey  
apparent

laws



How do tangible things interface with logic -


I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for  
some

amount of consistency.



how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and  
through what

capacity can they express that obedience?


With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities  
(actually

0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to  
divide 6,

for example.















Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of

logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in  
logic quite

a lot.



I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it  
even
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then  
what is it

that you are reducing it from?


?



If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need  
the pork

loin?


Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological  
sense, bu
assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers  
about

it.



Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or  
shapes or

anything other than what they actually are)?


By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add  
0 to the
content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the  
real case

of the roasted pork smelly experiences.













Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only  
simple

substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It  
sounds like

this:

C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).



We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
everything that makes sense is logical.


You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least,  
and with

UDA: at most.











B: Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any  
logic. All

you really need is logic.



You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that  
you don't
need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The  
arithmetic (or

equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.



What does logic and arithmetic need?


?
Nothing, I would say.












Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a
machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the  
existence of
such machine does not require the 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Richard Ruquist
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Richard,


 On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:

 Bruno,
 Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



 Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
 arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

 Bruno


Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard



 On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




How exactly does the comparison occur?


 By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
 (the
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization,
 which
 exists already.
 snip



 UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
 machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
 justified by
 the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



 Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
 iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
 between
 pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
 matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can
 we
 use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?



 Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
 On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.



 The question though is how does that happen?


 Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why
 and
 how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
 With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain
 why
 numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
 apparent
 laws



 How do tangible things interface with logic -


 I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
 amount of consistency.



 how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through
 what
 capacity can they express that obedience?


 With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
 (actually
 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

 The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide
 6,
 for example.













 Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption
 of
 logic?


 At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic
 quite
 a lot.



 I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
 worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
 logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is
 it
 that you are reducing it from?


 ?



 If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


 It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
 universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



 then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
 loin?


 Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
 assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
 it.



 Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
 anything other than what they actually are)?


 By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to
 the
 content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the real
 case
 of the roasted pork smelly experiences.











 Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
 substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



 Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
 this:

 C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?


 We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
 (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).



 We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
 everything that makes sense is logical.


 You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and
 with
 UDA: at most.










 B: Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic.
 All
 you really need is logic.



 You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you
 don't
 need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic
 (or
 equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.



 What does logic and arithmetic need?


 ?
 Nothing, I would say.




Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
 mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: 
 wrote: 
  Richard, 
  
  
  On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
  
  Bruno, 
  Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? 
  
  
  
  Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from 
  arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. 
  
  Bruno 
  

 Since energy is what makes things happen 
 then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. 
 Richard 



If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in a 
program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in all 
real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. Why 
would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers 
backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

Craig
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ktJeXGYHWSQJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Jesse Mazer
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be
 wrote:
  Richard,
 
 
  On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
 
  Bruno,
  Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
 
 
 
  Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
  arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
 
  Bruno
 

 Since energy is what makes things happen
 then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
 Richard



 If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in
 a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in
 all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy.
 Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our
 computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

 Craig


Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have
one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own
simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then
those computers could be used to simulate another world, a
simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production
in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy
to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both
computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from
simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of
rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe
might just be a computational system.

Jesse

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, November 30, 2012 2:08:34 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:



 On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be 
 wrote: 
  Richard, 
  
  
  On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
  
  Bruno, 
  Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? 
  
  
  
  Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from 
  arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. 
  
  Bruno 
  

 Since energy is what makes things happen 
 then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. 
 Richard 



 If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in 
 a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in 
 all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. 
 Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our 
 computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

 Craig


 Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have 
 one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own 
 simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then 
 those computers could be used to simulate another world, a 
 simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production 
 in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy 
 to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both 
 computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from 
 simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of 
 rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe 
 might just be a computational system.


I'm using this argument precisely to show that comp has no sensible way of 
handling levels of simulation. There is no simulation of energy, because 
energy is intrinsically tied to *the sole cosmos of realized mass and 
spacetime*. A simulation of motion is still motion. A simulation of color 
is still color. I only need one layer of hardware to simulate endless 
levels of cartoon universes, but none of these cartoon universes can 
simulate anything 'outside' of the ground floor hardware. Within the 
simulations, there is no problem. I can have a set of containers running 
virtual Windows servers, and they can have virtual Web browsers on them, 
which can run another virtual Windows server nested in that, etc... None of 
them have any problem simulating whatever worldly conditions I want to 
create. Whatever level confusion could arise is easily solved. I can change 
one byte on a virtual gear of a virtual engine and have it go from 
representing grinding torque and acceleration of mass to a ghostly image of 
gear shaped shadows spinning merrily through each other. 

Nothing like this happens in the bottom level of hardware. If anything 
realism is defined explicitly in opposition to this arbitrary 
materialization. There is strict thermodynamic conservation and concretely 
irreversible events. From any level within any of the simulations, there is 
no problem making radical changes to the physics on any other level, except 
the level that actually touches matter-energy-space-time. Comp is based on 
the reckless and unfounded assumption that there is no sole cosmos of 
realized function, and it uses that error to lock us in a tautological 
multiverse of Platonic phantoms. To me, it's great fiction, but it fails to 
locate reality.

Craig


 Jesse



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/G1d28YsbIrYJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Richard Ruquist
Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




 How exactly does the comparison occur?


 By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which
 exists already.
 snip


 UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
 machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by
 the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.


 Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
 iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between
 pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
 matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we
 use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?


 Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
 On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.


 The question though is how does that happen?


 Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and
 how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
 With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why
 numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent
 laws



 How do tangible things interface with logic -


 I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
 amount of consistency.



 how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what
 capacity can they express that obedience?


 With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually
 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

 The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6,
 for example.













 Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of
 logic?


 At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite
 a lot.


 I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
 worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
 logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it
 that you are reducing it from?


 ?


 If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


 It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
 universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



 then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
 loin?


 Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
 assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
 it.



 Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
 anything other than what they actually are)?


 By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to the
 content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the real case
 of the roasted pork smelly experiences.











 Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
 substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.


 Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
 this:

 C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?


 We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
 (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).


 We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
 everything that makes sense is logical.


 You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with
 UDA: at most.










 B: Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All
 you really need is logic.



 You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't
 need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or
 equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.


 What does logic and arithmetic need?


 ?
 Nothing, I would say.










 Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a
 machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of
 such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.


 I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness
 of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic
 at all.


 Logic is defined by the minimum we 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread meekerdb

On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron 
obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math 
(arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically 
defined) and why they obey apparent laws


So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why this electron instead 
of that electron?  It seems your arguments are all of the form, If comp is true, then 
everything true is explained by comp.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 28 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things  
interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do  
they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that  
obedience?


It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things  
and logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such  
that you don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself.


Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness.


OK.




Even if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell  
that it had.


Not really.
PA can discover and prove the existence of prime numbers, and can also  
prove that PA can prove the existence of the prime numbers. In at  
least a sense, she can know the prime numbers exist, and she can know  
that she can know that prime numbers exist.



Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must  
first exist the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in  
sensory experience of some kind.


OK.
And the comp hypothesis suggest to explain or defined the capacity to  
detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind by  
mechanical, or arithmetical (it is equivalent, with CT), relation.
The riddle of consciousness is explained by the existence of truth  
about numbers, that numbers can develop many beliefs about, sometimes  
true, yet unjustifiable, and in some case knowingly unjustifiable by  
them.


At the propositional level we inherit for the ideal sound machines two  
logics of self-reference, one give the provable part of self-reference  
(G) and the other (G*) give the true, including the non provable, part  
of self-reference.





That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.


Which sense? Mine? Yours? The jumping spider's sense? The computer's  
sense?


Sorry but it is easier for me to make sense of numbers making sense,  
than making sense of sense making numbers not making sense.


There is a theory of self-reference for the relative numbers, relative  
to *probable* universal numbers.
Physics origin is explained by that probability calculus on the  
universal number histories competing for your continuation (from your  
1p view).


Comp extends Darwin and Everett on arithmetic, somehow. And I don't  
say the result is the true physics,  I say that it is testable.



Bruno






Craig


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/coScMFmqtOIJ 
.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:





How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the  
observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from  
the arithmetical quantization, which exists already.





How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,  
which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with  
measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p arithmetical  
sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to  
be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the  
quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes  
possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum  
logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.



The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical  
comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here,  
because it is not obvious.


The logic exists, because,
so far so good.
by UDA,
Isn't UDA a logical construct already?


UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are  
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views  
related to it.


Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece  
of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface  
between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't  
have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by  
logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we  
see or feel what we feel?


Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.










Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic  
quite a lot.


I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it  
even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that,  
then what is it that you are reducing it from?


?






Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only  
simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.


Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds  
like this:


C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).






B: Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any  
logic. All you really need is logic.



You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you  
don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The  
arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical  
detail.






Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/ 
number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of  
such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.


I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about  
awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the  
possibility of logic at all.


Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that p  q is true, when p is true and q is true, and  
only then.
We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p-q), then we  
cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.
Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations  
between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily  
related to foundations.









That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after  
that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha  
and omega answer to all possible questions.


On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize  
that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make  
the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some  
shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's  
conception of reality (even Pythagorus).
This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between  
Plato and Aristotle in theology.


How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by  

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Nov 2012, at 17:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a trueSigma_1  
sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the  
observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p, with  
p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical  
reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is  
given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and  
this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of  
quantum logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.


The question is why is the sentence about anything.


Well, we are supposed to choose them accordingly.




It's easy to write down axioms and prove theorems from them, but  
that doesn't make them true of anything.


No. That is why we ask politely at the start if you agree with them,  
if only temporarily for the sake of the argument.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread meekerdb

On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things interface with logic 
- how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity 
can they express that obedience?


It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and logic is just 
some rules about making inferences in a way such that you don't end up inadvertently 
contradicting yourself.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

  On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

 The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things 
 interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do they 
 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?


 It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and 
 logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such that you 
 don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself. 


Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness. Even 
if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell that it had. 
Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must first exist 
the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of 
some kind. That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.

Craig
 


 Brent
  

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/coScMFmqtOIJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

  


 How exactly does the comparison occur? 


  By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the 
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive 
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which 
 exists already. 

   

 How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, 
 only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?



 The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a 
 relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be 
 provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by 
 []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the 
 way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum 
 logic is given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and 
 this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum 
 logic into arithmetic. 
 Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum 
 propositions, new one, different one, etc.



The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison 
happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not 
obvious. 

The logic exists, because, 

so far so good. 

by UDA, 

Isn't UDA a logical construct already? Is your answer to 'what makes logic 
happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic? That's ok with me, but you 
don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed 
to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions. 

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a 
true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. 

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes 
things true? How does it actually happen?

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p 
arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality 
has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the 
quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes possible 
to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into 
arithmetic. 


Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being 
the reality and the specialized logic being one category of specialized 
mechanisms within that?
 
Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/sOajveYc7DIJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread meekerdb

On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. 
What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative 
physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and 
consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p 
arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be 
redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []p, 
thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal 
translation of quantum logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, 
new one, different one, etc.


The question is why is the sentence about anything.  It's easy to write down axioms and 
prove theorems from them, but that doesn't make them true of anything.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:





How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation  
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which exists already.





How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,  
which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with  
measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p arithmetical  
sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to  
be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the  
quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and this makes  
possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic  
into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.



The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical  
comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here,  
because it is not obvious.


The logic exists, because,
so far so good.
by UDA,
Isn't UDA a logical construct already?


UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are  
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views  
related to it.





Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic  
quite a lot. Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological  
level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.  
Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/ 
number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of  
such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.




That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after  
that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha  
and omega answer to all possible questions.


On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize  
that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make  
the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape  
of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception  
of reality (even Pythagorus).
This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between  
Plato and Aristotle in theology.





when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty  
into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and  
consistent.
Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What  
makes things true? How does it actually happen?


We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with  
proposition like 44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number.  
Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are  
willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is  
supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also  
Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not  
so much philosophically).




So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp  Dt  p,  
with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the  
physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum  
logic is given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p -  
[]p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal  
translation of quantum logic into arithmetic.


Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.


It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional  
logicians, who are not really aware of this.


I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for  
all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic- 
branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily  
using when sending a post to a list (implicitly).
AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer  
science and mathematical logic.





Comparison is used in the everyday sense.
Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense'  
being the reality


That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer  
everything. It is a bit like why do you waste your time trying to  
understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why  
not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?


The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:

  


 How exactly does the comparison occur? 


  By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the 
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive 
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which 
 exists already. 

   

 How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is 
 involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of 
 logics?



 The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a 
 relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be 
 provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by 
 []p = Bp  Dt  p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the 
 way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum 
 logic is given by the quantization []p, thanks to the law p - []p, and 
 this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum 
 logic into arithmetic. 
 Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum 
 propositions, new one, different one, etc.



 The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison 
 happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not 
 obvious. 

 The logic exists, because, 

 so far so good. 

 by UDA, 

 Isn't UDA a logical construct already? 


 UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are 
 machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by 
 the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.


Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron 
into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure 
logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, 
even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic 
to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?





 Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of 
 logic? 


 At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite 
 a lot. 


I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even 
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited 
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it 
that you are reducing it from? 
 

 Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple 
 substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms. 


Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like 
this:

C: How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?

B: Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All 
you really need is logic.
 

 Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number 
  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine 
 does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.


I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of 
participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic 
at all.




 That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you 
 are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer 
 to all possible questions. 


 On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that 
 we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the 
 questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the 
 answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality 
 (even Pythagorus).
 This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato 
 and Aristotle in theology.


How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating 
everything that doesn't fit our axioms?





 when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a 
 true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. 

 Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes 
 things true? How does it actually happen?


 We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with 
 proposition like 44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number. 


What are the mechanics of that assumption though? The details of the 
propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of 
proposition itself. What is it? Who proposes? How do they do it exactly? 
That is the only magic that consciousness contains. Beyond that, it's just 
mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out forever. Participation is 
everything and no amount of interrogating functions can conceivably 
synthesize that 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus  
contradict comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of  
1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating  
with each other as a 'physical reality?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from  
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation  
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which exists already.






Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an  
equiprobable way.


?




There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we  
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so- 
called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find  
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It  
seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the  
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.


?





But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between  
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the  
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a  
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the  
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B  
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.  
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,  
and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both  
observations are correct in the first person picture of that  
observer. A person with the third person perspective, sees  
observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse,  
each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum  
Mechanics.
Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the  
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution  
of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from  
that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for  
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample  
from it.
Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the  
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to  
observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis  
and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen  
which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular  
is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM  
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen  
interpretation, and is the spooky nature of QM. I used to think  
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because  
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such  
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are  
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a  
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take  
this spookiness seriously.


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of  
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in  
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have  
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being  
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single  
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the  
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.



?









I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a  
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider...  
Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the  
physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-22 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/22/2012 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that 
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with 
each other as a 'physical reality?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from 
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation 
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear 
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical 
quantization, which exists already.




Dear Bruno,

How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is 
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of 
logics?




Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an 
equiprobable way.


?


Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?



There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we 
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the 
(so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find 
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It 
seems to me that /the observational act itself is a breaking of the 
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds/.


?





But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between 
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


***Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the 
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a 
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the 
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B 
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. 
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and 
Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are 
correct in the first person picture of that observer. /A person 
with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as 
inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate 
measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics./


*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the 
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of 
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that 
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for 
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.


*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the 
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? 
An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y 
axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which 
direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is 
observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM 
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen 
interpretation, and is the spooky nature of QM. I used to think 
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because 
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such 
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are 
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a 
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take 
this spookiness seriously.


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of 
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in 
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have 
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being 
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single 
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the 
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.



?









I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a 
physical world 

Re: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal 

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the 
subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?

Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.

 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation




On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are 
humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that 
some set of observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities. Is a 
reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll 
put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the 
distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me 
that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those 
reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the 
Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much 
like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not 
computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors 
to work for comp, IMHO.)



Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although objective, 
concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some 
sense).

Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within 
comp's theoretical structure.



You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of 
the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L bian reality (RA or 
the UD).










I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a 
difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, 
instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that 
this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It 
is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that 
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be 
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass 
of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical 
object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance 
that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and 
Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens 
to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are 
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something 
more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know 
of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK 
with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)



Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please 
allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and 
whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is 
called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be 
different from it, but again, it might be the very same stream. For example, 
consider the stream s whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail 
of the tail of s

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Nov 2012, at 14:10, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the
subject cannot be part of the predicate ?


Yes. the subject (1p) can't. But the machine can still refer to itself.




Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?


Eve,ntually the system belongs only to the imagination of the subject.




Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.


Possible. the universal knower in ourself might then be the supreme  
monad. But it is not the outer God, it more the universal soul, the  
third greek god.


Bruno








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett  
Interpretation



On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that  
we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of observers with compatible  
bases can sharing their realities. Is a reality something that  
is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that  
aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered  
about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's  
catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being  
assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that  
is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the  
Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that  
is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus  
problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of  
infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp,  
IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
objective, concerned the 1p, which might contains actual  
infinities (at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted  
within comp's theoretical structure.


You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the  
reasoning of the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non  
L bian reality (RA or the UD).








I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human  
or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be  
remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one  
complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that  
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical  
bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much  
different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not  
really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it  
has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind  
of substance that has persistent existence, like material  
substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this  
assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of  
mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are  
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a  
'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has  
no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get  
Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine  
atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this  
time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some  
thought on your part.


From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with 
each other as a 'physical reality?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from 
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur? Comp seems to necessitate 
all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. There is a deep 
problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from 
the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic 
principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what 
has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that /the 
observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of 
equiprobability of possible worlds/. But this claim implies violence to 
the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between 
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


***Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the 
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple 
example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an 
electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure 
the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the 
spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it 
aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first 
person picture of that observer. /A person with the third person 
perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a 
multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from 
Quantum Mechanics./


*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way 
I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of 
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that 
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different 
pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.


*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction 
changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron 
cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same 
time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the 
spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that 
fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both 
in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the spooky nature of 
QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, 
and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of 
such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble 
are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a 
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take 
this spookiness seriously.


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 
'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in 
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have 
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being 
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single 
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the 
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.





I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a 
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider... Is 
it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical 
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges 
from + and * (in the number base). It is indeed a first person 
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.


I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent 
structure and not some pre-defined ordering.




Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, 
making comp testable, 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
  
  What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why 
 any 
  one universe exists in the first place. 
  

 This could be one of two different questions, both of which are 
 evrything-list 101: 

 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
 1p) view of the multiverse. 


Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
internal views of the same universe.


 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
 information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
 simpler than universes. 


Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this 
morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
(this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing 
I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):

To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is 
that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s 
Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest 
distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something 
which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 

What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence. 
Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing 
basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding 
that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or 
substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must 
be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
horse.*

I am saying, if we are going to make the creation of the universe 
infinitely easy, then why have a creation requirement at all? If every 
change to every molecule on every hair on a dust mite’s head needs its own 
Andromeda galaxy to help make that change…and really every *possible* 
change on every hair on every dust mite in the Andromeda galaxy also needs 
universes in which each of the first dust mite’s possible changes exist, 
then why have these changes at all? Why hop between a matrix of static 
possibilities if those possibilities are already realized? 


 I don't see that regressions, infinite or otherwise, have a role to 
 play in either question. 

 -- 

  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/e2hUoOOBrPwJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that  
we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of observers with compatible bases  
can sharing their realities. Is a reality something that is 1p in  
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for  
now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered  
about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's  
catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being  
assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is  
being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin  
distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like  
Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not  
computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for  
such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
objective, concerned the 1p, which might contains actual  
infinities (at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted  
within comp's theoretical structure.


You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the  
reasoning of the Löbian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non  
Löbian reality (RA or the UD).








I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or  
a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be  
remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one  
complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that  
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical  
bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much  
different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not  
really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it  
has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind  
of substance that has persistent existence, like material  
substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this  
assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass  
of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered?  
What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' -  
something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem  
with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to  
consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which  
are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this  
time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some  
thought on your part.


From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a  
number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The  
first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The  
tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it  
might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s  
whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail  
of s is s itself. We have s = ⟨ 0, s⟩ , s = ⟨ 0, ⟨ 0,  
s⟩  ⟩ , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is  
natural to “unravel” its definition as:

(0,0,…,0,…)
It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite  
sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions  
whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the  
unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we  
want to take the stream s described above to be this function is an  
issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that  
since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way  
pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itself  

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
 
 On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
  1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
  1p) view of the multiverse. 
 
 
 Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
 experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
 internal views of the same universe.
 

The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if
observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts,
it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not
even wrong to say could exist.

 
  2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
  information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
  simpler than universes. 
 
 
 Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this 
 morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
 (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing 
 I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):
 
 To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
 bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is 
 that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
 Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
 be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s 
 Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest 
 distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
 universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something 
 which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 
 

You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to
interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly
violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. To
see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not
rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics
taught at high school.

 What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
 information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence. 
 Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
 sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing 
 basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding 
 that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or 
 substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
 things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
 way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must 
 be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
 being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
 infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
 horse.*

I don't understand your objection. The observer has a critical role to
play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical
role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of
Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent,
providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely
replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will
(if you're to believe Chalmers and his hard problem).

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
  
  
  On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: 
   
   
   1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
   1p) view of the multiverse. 
   
  
  Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
  experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
  internal views of the same universe. 
  

 The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if 
 observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts, 
 it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not 
 even wrong to say could exist. 


What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes 
because we know that beings observe the universe.'

From my view, with a universe composed only of beings who not only observe 
but participate in the universe, the idea of a multiverse is superfluous.


  
   2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
   information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
   simpler than universes. 
   
  
  Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote 
 this 
  morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
  (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same 
 thing 
  I've already said... makes 'sense', right?): 
  
  To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
  bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it 
 is 
  that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
  Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
  be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving 
 Occam’s 
  Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The 
 shortest 
  distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
  universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze 
 something 
  which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 
  

 You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to 
 interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly 
 violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. 


Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that 
I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the 
case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by 
your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive 
light.
 

 To 
 see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not 
 rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics 
 taught at high school. 


Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions 
of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate 
Occam's razor any more if it tried. The fact that the Emperor's Clothes 
require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again 
- my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same 
universe.
 


  What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
  information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory 
 coherence. 
  Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
  sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated 
 (Church-Turing 
  basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the 
 understanding 
  that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated 
 or 
  substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
  things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
  way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it 
 must 
  be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
  being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
  infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
  horse.* 

 I don't understand your objection. 


My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous 
complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication 
in abstract mathematical theory.
 

 The observer has a critical role to 
 play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical 
 role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of 
 Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent, 
 providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely 
 replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will 
 (if you're to believe Chalmers and his hard problem). 


If you have a multiverse, what is the point of having beings who experience 
an illusion of choice? All choices would be 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 03:23:55PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
 
 On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
 
  On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
   
   Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
   experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
   internal views of the same universe. 
   
 
  The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if 
  observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts, 
  it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not 
  even wrong to say could exist. 
 
 
 What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes 
 because we know that beings observe the universe.'
 

A multiverse that didn't have universes wouldn't be a multiverse. A
soccer team that didn't have soccer players wouldn't be a soccer
team. Sheesh!

 
  You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to 
  interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly 
  violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. 
 
 
 Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that 
 I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the 
 case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by 
 your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive 
 light.
  

You are showing your ignorance here. Read chapter 2 of my book,
understand it, _then_ come back with your objections. As I said, this
is everything list 101. If you just stick your fingers in your ears
and sing la la la, you will not be persuaded of anything.


 
  To 
  see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not 
  rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics 
  taught at high school. 
 
 
 Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions 
 of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate 
 Occam's razor any more if it tried. 

Because, quite simply, it doesn't! This is a gross, gross
misunderstanding of Occam's razor. Just because it is commonly held,
does not make it any more right.

The fact that the Emperor's Clothes 
 require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again 
 - my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same 
 universe.
  

This is not a question of perspective.

 
  I don't understand your objection. 
 
 
 My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous 
 complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication 
 in abstract mathematical theory.
  

This statement is based on (unfortunately widely held) misconception,
as mentioned above. As a consequence, it is a load of baloney.

 
 If you have a multiverse, what is the point of having beings who experience 
 an illusion of choice? All choices would be inevitable.
 

An illusion seems to be good enough for some people. For me, the term is
misleading, as the illusion is just as real as the computer in front
of me, and the table it sits on. You pays your money and takes your choices.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

   I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus contradict  
comp, which is assumed also.





... as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles,


That was my critics on the ASSA idea (Absolute self-sampling  
assumption). But both in comp and in QM all probabilities are relative  
to a prepared state. They have the shape aIb, meaning: being in  
the Ia state, what is the probability to be in the Ib state (or  
finding some b eigenvalue).






which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Do you think that apes are not conscious?

Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,  
exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we  
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of observers with compatible bases  
can sharing their realities. Is a reality something that is 1p in  
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for  
now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about  
the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It  
seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about  
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for  
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a  
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established  
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's  
rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work  
for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
objective, concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities  
(at least in some sense).





I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a  
giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered  
and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I  
have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that  
can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be  
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the  
center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all  
as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in  
some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of  
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in  
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is  
'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate  
when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if  
consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more  
like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I  
know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does  
seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a  
stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including  
all streams.





Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of  
bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an  
obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the  
existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument,  
something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left  
with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?


But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate  
on a flaw in step 8, to get this. I thought for a long time on this  
list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a  
small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like  
philosophy, which was the starting of this very list.


Also, to be left with the body problem is what is intersting in  
comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be  
explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.


Bruno




I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is  
necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it  
backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between  
being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being  
conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw  
'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from  
the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the  
'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording  
does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.


The best explanation that I have to point to 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

   I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also. 

Dear Bruno,

Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each 
other as a 'physical reality? I hope that we can agree that there is at 
least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  
can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


--
Onward!

Stephen


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as pan assumed some physical reality and thus contradict  
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p  
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with  
each other as a 'physical reality?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from  
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.




I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a  
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider... Is  
it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical  
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges  
from + and * (in the number base). It is indeed a first person  
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.


Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws,  
making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult, but up to  
now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without  
QM. That would not have the case if p-[]p was not a theorem of  
the Z1* logics (matter).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Sunday, November 18, 2012 4:23:14 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:

 On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
  Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
  thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
  argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would 
 need 
  a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
  information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
  separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
  overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
  paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a 
 second 
  order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
  resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe? 
  
  Craig 

 There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse 


What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent 
upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to 
keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?

Craig
 

 (of which 
 there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far 
 less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The 
 individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the 
 observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship 
 between world and observer. 

 There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own 
 chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate 
 with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only 
 observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving 
 rise to the illusion (as it were) of a single external classical 
 reality. 

 Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I 
 found the perfect explanation of this in that book either 
 ... :(. Others may have different suggestions. 


 -- 

  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/0eq_ScFkbFoJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
 
 What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent 
 upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
 than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
 superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to 
 keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
 preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
 

There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
I have no clue as to why you are postulating one Can anyone else
explain Craig's concerns?

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 03:16:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
 which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
 out in my book.
 
 I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
 possible observers.
 
 Do you think that apes are not conscious?


Not at all. (nonhuman-)Apes are not that much less complex mentally
than ourselves, at least according to our current crude notions of
complexity. I'm skeptical about your jumping spiders though ...

 
 Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,
 exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?
 

Not at all. Of course in nearby universes, actual humans exist. But I
would also expect many beings of similar mental capacity and structure
to be spread throughout the universe. But very few super intelligent
beings (and they are probably hive minds anyway). And none that are
orders of magnitude less complex.

 Bruno
 
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at 
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread meekerdb

On 11/19/2012 4:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being
created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be
made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have
its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing.

What does this even mean? Anyone else know?


It means Craig is a wordbot?  :-)

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
 What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any 
 one universe exists in the first place.
 

This could be one of two different questions, both of which are
evrything-list 101:

1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
1p) view of the multiverse.

2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
simpler than universes.

I don't see that regressions, infinite or otherwise, have a role to
play in either question.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 04:48:14PM -0600, meekerdb wrote:
 On 11/19/2012 4:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
 What does this even mean? Anyone else know?
 
 It means Craig is a wordbot?  :-)
 
 Brent
 

:)

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

 I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we 
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a 
particular basis that some set of observers with compatible bases 
can sharing their realities. Is a reality something that is 1p in 
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about 
the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Bostrom#Simulation_hypothesis) 
and Occam's catastrophe 
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg22943.html. 
It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about 
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for 
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a 
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established 
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Algorithmic_probability. 
Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to 
work for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although 
objective, concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities 
(at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted 
within comp's theoretical structure.




I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is 
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, 
as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a 
giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered 
and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I 
have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that 
can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be 
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center 
of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a 
substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some 
way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of 
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in 
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not 
even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when 
the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is 
not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams'. 
Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am 
trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK 
with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. 
Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on 
your part.


From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams


A/stream of numbers/is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a 
number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The 
first coordinate is called the/head/, and the second the/tail/. The tail 
of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the 
very same stream. For example, consider the stream/s/whose head is 0 and 
whose tail is/s/again. Thus the tail of the tail of/s/is/s/itself. We 
have/s/= ? 0, /s/? ,/s/= ? 0, ? 0, /s/? ? , etc. This stream/s /exhibits 
object circularity. It is natural to unravel its definition as:


   (0,0,...,0,...)

It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an/infinite 
sequence/; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions 
whose domain is the set/N/of natural numbers. So we can take the 
unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we want 
to take the stream/s/described above to/be/this function is an issue we 
want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that since we 
defined/s/to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way pairs are 
constructed in ordinary mathematics that/s/will not 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 
 
 In a recent paper entitled
  “Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
  Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the 
  many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.
 
  The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever 
  presented this argument so clearly. 
 
  In a nutshell, the argument is this:
  To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis, which is an 
  old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often finds the 
  claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M Schwindt 
  points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence solves 
  the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the system into 
  subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment). But if the 
  state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split is not 
  unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is all what 
  exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define separate 
  worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in the 
  states of the Hilbert space themselves. 
 
  As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he mentions 
  observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian 
  interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not 
  fundamental at all.
 
 source http://www.physicsforums.com/blog.php?b=4289

Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the
bill.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

As I see it - the argument is not new, and has been adequately
addressed within the Everett framework. What surprises me are people
like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 18 Nov 2012, at 09:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:



In a recent paper entitled

“Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the
many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever
presented this argument so clearly.

In a nutshell, the argument is this:
To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis,  
which is an
old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often  
finds the
claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M  
Schwindt
points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence  
solves
the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the  
system into
subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment).  
But if the
state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split  
is not
unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is  
all what
exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define  
separate
worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in  
the

states of the Hilbert space themselves.

As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he  
mentions

observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian
interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not
fundamental at all.


source http://www.physicsforums.com/blog.php?b=4289


Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the
bill.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

As I see it - the argument is not new,


Yes old argument keep getting copied and pasted, probably due to  
perish or publish.





and has been adequately
addressed within the Everett framework.


Absolutely so. Even in Everett original long version text (his thesis).



What surprises me are people
like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...


I agree, although I thought that David changed his mind on this.  
People does not read the original work of Everett which shows clearly  
the independence from the choice of a basis, even if the global  
picture remains unclear. About this, with comp we know why (there are  
no global physical picture a priori).


Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Craig Weinberg
Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need 
a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second 
order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?

Craig


On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:29:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 18 Nov 2012, at 09:19, Russell Standish wrote: 

  On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
  
  
  In a recent paper entitled 
  “Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”: 
  http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447 
  Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the 
  many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
  
  The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever 
  presented this argument so clearly. 
  
  In a nutshell, the argument is this: 
  To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis,   
  which is an 
  old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often   
  finds the 
  claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M   
  Schwindt 
  points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence   
  solves 
  the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the   
  system into 
  subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment).   
  But if the 
  state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split   
  is not 
  unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is   
  all what 
  exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define   
  separate 
  worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in   
  the 
  states of the Hilbert space themselves. 
  
  As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he   
  mentions 
  observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian 
  interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not 
  fundamental at all. 
  
  source http://www.physicsforums.com/blog.php?b=4289 
  
  Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the 
  bill. 
  
  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation 
  
  As I see it - the argument is not new, 

 Yes old argument keep getting copied and pasted, probably due to   
 perish or publish. 



  and has been adequately 
  addressed within the Everett framework. 

 Absolutely so. Even in Everett original long version text (his thesis). 


  What surprises me are people 
  like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases... 

 I agree, although I thought that David changed his mind on this.   
 People does not read the original work of Everett which shows clearly   
 the independence from the choice of a basis, even if the global   
 picture remains unclear. About this, with comp we know why (there are   
 no global physical picture a priori). 

 Best, 

 Bruno 



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 





-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/uVdj22yCT20J.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
 thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
 argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need 
 a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
 information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
 separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
 overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
 paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second 
 order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
 resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?
 
 Craig

There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse (of which
there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far
less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The
individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the
observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship
between world and observer.

There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own
chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate
with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only
observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving
rise to the illusion (as it were) of a single external classical
reality.

Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I
found the perfect explanation of this in that book either
... :(. Others may have different suggestions.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
 Hi Russell,
 
 I agree with this view, especially the part about the
 compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
 gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
 phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
 can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
 could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
 panpsychism.
 

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:



 I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all 
 possible observers. 


why?

Craig
 



  

 Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
 Principal, High Performance Coders 
 Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
 University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2xhvcVV51esJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish
Application of the Occam's razor theorem to Anthropic Selection. See
Section 5.1 of my book Theory of Nothing.

Cheers

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 06:59:52PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
 
  I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all 
  possible observers. 
 
 
 why?
 
 Craig
  
 
 
 
  
   
 
  Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
  Principal, High Performance Coders 
  Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: 
  University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
  
   
 
 
 
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To view this discussion on the web visit 
 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2xhvcVV51esJ.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at 
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
 

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

 I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we 
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular 
basis that some set of observers with compatible bases can sharing 
their realities. Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It 
isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the 
distribution arguments (ala Bostrum 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Bostrom#Simulation_hypothesis) and 
Occam's catastrophe 
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg22943.html. 
It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about 
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for 
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a 
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established 
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Algorithmic_probability. Bruno's 
rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for 
comp, IMHO.)
I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is 
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as 
I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant 
Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and 
passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with 
reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be 
defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that 
the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The 
C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object 
and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of 
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in 
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not 
even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the 
members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 
'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams'. 
Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am 
trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with 
Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)
Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of 
bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure 
form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 
'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's 
razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body 
problem' where the 'res extensa 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Res_extensa' used to be?



I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary 
for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; 
could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 
'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that 
Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like 
being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What 
we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity 
itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been 
trying to explain.


The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and 
Zuckerman  Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a 
formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with 
itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision 
of the universe as being well founded and 'regular 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_regularity' - that there are a 
single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the 
ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much 
influence over our thinking!



--
Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To 

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Stephen P. King

On 11/18/2012 11:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

To Russell,

Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards


That I meant by this is that it is our ability to know that we are 
conscious that allows us to think about that consciousness is and ask 
questions like could other entities be conscious?.


--
Onward!

Stephen


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Apr 2012, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/20/2012 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 19 Apr 2012, at 22:04, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem

Nor am I aware of any such problem. The hardest part of the mind  
body problem is figuring out what the hell the problem is.


There tuns of books. You might try McGuin, if you have a problem  
with Nagel. Michael Tye wrote a good book too. See the   
references in my URL.




The religious demand a explanation of mind, by which they mean  
give a description of mind in terms of something other than mind,  
as using a thing to define itself is rather pointless;


That is what we can do with recursion equation. It explains self- 
reproduction and self-reference. See my paper amoeba, planaria and  
dreaming machine.




so scientists do so and explain mind in terms of X (biological  
brains, electronic computers, abstract Turing Machines, and other  
things that are not mind ), but when they do so the religious  
complain but X is not mind!. Well of course X is not mind, if  
they explained mind in terms of mind then it would be a pretty  
silly explanation,


That depends on the theory you are choosing. And it is indeed a  
priori more easy to explain something immaterial, like  
consciousness from something immaterial, like numbers, than from  
primary matter, which we still don't know what it is, or if that  
exists.



I don't think you have to explain it from *primary* matter.


That is what UDA proves, indeed.



In fact it is usually explained in terms of electrochemistry of  
neurons and hormones, which are several steps up from quarks and  
electrons which themselves may not be primary.


But it uses some identity mind/brain thesis, which does not work (by  
UDA). They use the background identity of primitive matter to attach  
the mind to a primitive body, and inconsistently so if if they suppose  
a digital substitution level anywhere.










but fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how  
mind works.


Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material  
explanation explains only the behavior.



I'm not convinced though that comp is any better.


At least comp does reduce the problem to a well define mathematical  
problem.



It comes down to saying qualia are computations seen from the  
inside.  But you could as well say they are brain processes seen  
from the inside.


They can be both, but UDA shows that this leads to a reduction of  
physics to arithmetic. The reduction is constructive, so comp become  
testable and acquire a scientific status (which is my main point).
My point is not that comp is true. Just that it is scientifically  
testable. then I show mathematical evidence that indeed the quantum is  
recovered from comp. And I give a gift: the qualia are too.








By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks  
ago and thought it was excelent.


He does not explain where the physical laws come from, nor does he  
addressed the consciousness issue.
But of course you need to develop your understanding of the mind- 
body problem. The english literature contains many good texts. Then  
the UDA explains how to reformulate the problem into a purely  
arithmetical problem.


But at the expense of turning physics and everything else into an  
arithmetical problem.


But that is nice. It explains physics from something else.


The problem I see with the UDA is that its passivity is contagious.   
In order to function as an AI in the world it needs more and more of  
the world to be subsumed into it's computation.


UDA is valid,  ... or it is not (but then you have to find a flaw).  
UDA is a proof. The problem with UDA is a problem with logic and/or  
reality.


Bruno




Brent



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2411/4947 - Release Date:  
04/19/12


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything- 
l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to 

Re: Nothing

2012-04-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 4/21/2012 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Brent wrote: It comes down to saying qualia are computations seen 
from the inside.  But you could as well say they are brain processes 
seen from the inside.


They can be both, but UDA shows that this leads to a reduction of 
physics to arithmetic. The reduction is constructive, so comp become 
testable and acquire a scientific status (which is my main point).
My point is not that comp is true. Just that it is scientifically 
testable. then I show mathematical evidence that indeed the quantum is 
recovered from comp. And I give a gift: the qualia are too.



Dear Bruno,

Could you point to where the constructability of the reduction is 
shown?


--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-21 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The 1-views are assimilated to the content of the personal diary that the
 candidate takes with him in the teleportation or duplication experiments.
 The 3-views are corresponding to what is roughly described by an external
 observer


Your proof hinges on the fundamental difference between this 1-view and
3-view stuff but you haven't unambiguously nailed down what you mean by
those terms as you must if you want to use them in a mathematical proof. In
the first place just because a outside observer sees somebody write
something in a personal diary does not prove that is what a person feels,
it does not prove that is a description of the subjective experience (or
the 1-view in your obscure terminology) or is even proof that a 1-view,
any 1-view even exists. The only 1-view you know for a fact to exist is
your own.

In the second place despite my repeated requests you can not give me a
single example of something identical from the 3-view but not from the
1-view and I've lost track of how many times you've chastised me for
misunderstanding and not looking at things from the 1-view which is
supposed to be very different.

 Step 2 illustrates already, without duplication, the difference between
 the 1-view and the 3-view.


If things are identical from the 1-view they may or may not be identical
from the 3-view, BUT if they are identical from the 1-view then they are
always identical from the 1-view.

 We can vary arbitrarily the delays in step 2


Delays are a needless complication  that add nothing to the thought
experiment.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Apr 2012, at 18:10, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 4/21/2012 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Brent wrote: It comes down to saying qualia are computations seen  
from the inside.  But you could as well say they are brain  
processes seen from the inside.


They can be both, but UDA shows that this leads to a reduction of  
physics to arithmetic. The reduction is constructive, so comp  
become testable and acquire a scientific status (which is my main  
point).
My point is not that comp is true. Just that it is scientifically  
testable. then I show mathematical evidence that indeed the quantum  
is recovered from comp. And I give a gift: the qualia are too.



Dear Bruno,

   Could you point to where the constructability of the reduction is  
shown?


It is AUDA. Or the interview of the machine. The logic of observable  
has already been retrieved, and theorem provers provided. At the  
propositional level the logic is shown decidable.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 21 Apr 2012, at 19:45, John Clark wrote:




On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The 1-views are assimilated to the content of the personal diary  
that the candidate takes with him in the teleportation or  
duplication experiments. The 3-views are corresponding to what is  
roughly described by an external observer


Your proof hinges on the fundamental difference between this 1-view  
and 3-view stuff but you haven't unambiguously nailed down what you  
mean by those terms as you must if you want to use them in a  
mathematical proof.


Quite contrary. People needs only to agree on the basic principles  
used in the reasoning. It is the (semi-)axiomatic method, which is  
what we use in any applied field.




In the first place just because a outside observer sees somebody  
write something in a personal diary does not prove that is what a  
person feels,


Of course. But it is, once we assume the comp hypothesis.


it does not prove that is a description of the subjective experience  
(or the 1-view in your obscure terminology) or is even proof that  
a 1-view, any 1-view even exists. The only 1-view you know for a  
fact to exist is your own.


How do you know that about me? Answer: because you assume there is a  
feeler behind this sentence. With comp, we agree that the copy will  
feel like you, and among the default hypotheses, we assume that the  
guy feeling to be in Washington will not perversely write I am in  
Moscow.
So you are right, but not relevant as far as the validity of the  
reasoning is concerned.





In the second place despite my repeated requests you can not give me  
a single example of something identical from the 3-view but not  
from the 1-view


It told you an infinity of times that this is impossible, and that I  
have never pretend the contrary anywhere.




and I've lost track of how many times you've chastised me for  
misunderstanding and not looking at things from the 1-view which  
is supposed to be very different.


In case the 3-view have diverged, like after opening the teleportation/ 
duplication boxes.





 Step 2 illustrates already, without duplication, the difference  
between the 1-view and the 3-view.


If things are identical from the 1-view they may or may not be  
identical from the 3-view, BUT if they are identical from the 1-view  
then they are always identical from the 1-view.


Absolutely so.




 We can vary arbitrarily the delays in step 2

Delays are a needless complication  that add nothing to the thought  
experiment.


Just wait for the sequel. So you agree with step 0, 1, 2. And all your  
attempts to refute step 3 have been debunked by many people here.

What about step 4 and 5, and 6 (recently posted on FOAR)?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Apr 2012, at 19:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:



Hi David,



I attach a comment by Victor Stenger on Lawrence Krauss's A Universe
from Nothing.  You might also want to follow the link to David
Albert's critical review.  Is it meaningful to speak of a nothing
beyond the void of RQFT?  Or beyond the truths of arithmetic?

http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4754utm_source=philosophynwsutm_medium=facebook



Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem, and they take  
for granted a speculation on one universal number (and then Dawkins  
is glad because it is not theology.


I did not see the message was public. No big problem, I hope.

Another problem with the notion of nothing, is that it is relative to  
a theory. Either set theory, in which case much more than arithmetic  
is assumed, or quantum physics, etc. In each case some strong axioms  
are assumed in non equivalent theories.


Krauss clearly assumes the physical laws, which is an assumption which  
cannot work with comp (by UDA), unless we eliminate consciousness.


Bruno





You may be interested in today's BBC Radio 4 In Our Time with  
Melvyn

Bragg et al, which was about Neo-Platonism and Plotinus.

http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/radio4/iot/iot_20120419-1145a.mp3


That seems much more interesting :)

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Apr 2012, at 22:04, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem

Nor am I aware of any such problem. The hardest part of the mind  
body problem is figuring out what the hell the problem is.


There tuns of books. You might try McGuin, if you have a problem with  
Nagel. Michael Tye wrote a good book too. See the references in my URL.




The religious demand a explanation of mind, by which they mean give  
a description of mind in terms of something other than mind, as  
using a thing to define itself is rather pointless;


That is what we can do with recursion equation. It explains self- 
reproduction and self-reference. See my paper amoeba, planaria and  
dreaming machine.




so scientists do so and explain mind in terms of X (biological  
brains, electronic computers, abstract Turing Machines, and other  
things that are not mind ), but when they do so the religious  
complain but X is not mind!. Well of course X is not mind, if they  
explained mind in terms of mind then it would be a pretty silly  
explanation,


That depends on the theory you are choosing. And it is indeed a priori  
more easy to explain something immaterial, like consciousness from  
something immaterial, like numbers, than from primary matter, which we  
still don't know what it is, or if that exists.




but fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how mind  
works.


Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material explanation  
explains only the behavior.





By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks ago  
and thought it was excelent.


He does not explain where the physical laws come from, nor does he  
addressed the consciousness issue.
But of course you need to develop your understanding of the mind-body  
problem. The english literature contains many good texts. Then the UDA  
explains how to reformulate the problem into a purely arithmetical  
problem.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how mind works.


  Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material explanation
 explains only the behavior.


Only?! However unfortunate it may be the fact remains that in dealing with
minds other than your own behavior is all you have to work with. That's why
those who really want to explore this write computer code or examine the
firings of neurons, while dilettantes talk about qualia and consciousness
because its so easy to do so, any theory they dream up to explain it will
work as well as any other theory, but doing real science is hard work.

And I've asked this question nineteen dozen times before and have yet
received no answer: if Darwin was right and if consciousness is not
inextricably linked with behavior then how to you explain the fact that you
Bruno Marchal came to be and is conscious?

 By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks ago and
 thought it was excellent.


  He does not explain where the physical laws come from,


Krauss is well aware of that criticism and discusses it at considerable
length in his new book, in fact he explores that topic more extensively
than any other subject in the book. I would humbly suggest that before you
criticise a book by a well respected physicist and think your opinion on it
would be of interest to others it might be wise to actually read the thing.



  nor does he addressed the consciousness issue.


How would you like him to address that? Do you want him to explain
consciousness in terms of consciousness as so many philosophers before him
have done all to useless effect?

 But of course you need to develop your understanding of the mind-body
 problem. The english literature contains many good texts.


 Like What is it like to be a bat?, like The Chinese Room, like endless
speculation about the noise free will? Pure moronic drivel.

 Then the UDA explains how to reformulate the problem into a purely
 arithmetical problem.


I don't think so. You go on and on about the profound differences between
various increasingly convoluted views and yet you can't give a single
example of two things being identical by what you call the 3-view but not
by the 1-views themselves. Not one example even though your entire
argument hinges on it.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/4/20 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Fri, Apr 20, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how mind works.


  Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material explanation
 explains only the behavior.


 Only?! However unfortunate it may be the fact remains that in dealing with
 minds other than your own behavior is all you have to work with. That's why
 those who really want to explore this write computer code or examine the
 firings of neurons, while dilettantes talk about qualia and consciousness
 because its so easy to do so, any theory they dream up to explain it will
 work as well as any other theory, but doing real science is hard work.

 And I've asked this question nineteen dozen times before and have yet
 received no answer: if Darwin was right and if consciousness is not
 inextricably linked with behavior then how to you explain the fact that you
 Bruno Marchal came to be and is conscious?

  By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks ago
 and thought it was excellent.


  He does not explain where the physical laws come from,


 Krauss is well aware of that criticism and discusses it at considerable
 length in his new book, in fact he explores that topic more extensively
 than any other subject in the book. I would humbly suggest that before you
 criticise a book by a well respected physicist and think your opinion on it
 would be of interest to others it might be wise to actually read the thing.



Craig and you are both example of unwise guys who thought that they are the
greatest, it's so funny to read your moronic comments.




  nor does he addressed the consciousness issue.


 How would you like him to address that? Do you want him to explain
 consciousness in terms of consciousness as so many philosophers before him
 have done all to useless effect?

  But of course you need to develop your understanding of the mind-body
 problem. The english literature contains many good texts.


  Like What is it like to be a bat?, like The Chinese Room, like
 endless speculation about the noise free will? Pure moronic drivel.


Yes what you can't talk about is moronic... maybe you are the moron ?


  Then the UDA explains how to reformulate the problem into a purely
 arithmetical problem.


 I don't think so. You go on and on about the profound differences between
 various increasingly convoluted views and yet you can't give a single
 example of two things being identical by what you call the 3-view but not
 by the 1-views themselves. Not one example even though your entire
 argument hinges on it.


His argument does not hinge on it... Should I say it be wise for you to
understand it before criticising it ?



   John K Clark




  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.




-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Apr 2012, at 17:28, John Clark wrote:



I don't think so. You go on and on about the profound differences  
between various increasingly convoluted views and yet you can't  
give a single example of two things being identical by what you call  
the 3-view but not by the 1-views themselves.


You keep contradicting what I said, systematically. Give the quotes  
and be specific if you really want an explanation.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 12:30 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 I don't think so. You go on and on about the profound differences
 between various increasingly convoluted views and yet you can't give a
 single example of two things being identical by what you call the 3-view
 but not by the 1-views themselves.


  You keep contradicting what I said, systematically. Give the quotes and
 be specific if you really want an explanation.


OK. On April 2 2112 among other things I said I can understand your desire
to gloss over this major difficulty, so on April 3 2112 you responded to
that comment with:

I thought you just grasped it. What major difficulty? The only one you
have ever mentionned as been shown to be a confusion of 1-view and 3-view
(or on the 3-view on the 1-views, and the 1-views themselves. Reread
perhaps the preceding posts).

I did reread the previous posts and they were just as clear as the above
assortment of words. Not very.

  John K Clark







 want an explanation.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



  --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Apr 2012, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:




On Fri, Apr 20, 2012 at 12:30 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 I don't think so. You go on and on about the profound differences  
between various increasingly convoluted views and yet you can't  
give a single example of two things being identical by what you call  
the 3-view but not by the 1-views themselves.


 You keep contradicting what I said, systematically. Give the  
quotes and be specific if you really want an explanation.


OK. On April 2 2112 among other things I said I can understand your  
desire to gloss over this major difficulty, so on April 3 2112 you  
responded to that comment with:


I thought you just grasped it. What major difficulty? The only one  
you have ever mentionned as been shown to be a confusion of 1-view  
and 3-view (or on the 3-view on the 1-views, and the 1-views  
themselves. Reread perhaps the preceding posts).


I did reread the previous posts and they were just as clear as the  
above assortment of words. Not very.


I have just re-explained all this on the FOAR list. Please tell me  
(here if you want), what you don't understand. The 1-views are  
assimilated to the content of the personal diary that the candidate  
takes with him in the teleportation or duplication experiments. The 3- 
views are corresponding to what is roughly described by an external  
observer (i.e. not entering in the teleportation boxes).


Do you agree with the step 0? the step 1, the step 2?

Step 2 illustrates already, without duplication, the difference  
between the 1-view and the 3-view. We can vary arbitrarily the delays  
in step 2, changing considerably the 3-views, and this does not change  
the 1-view. This is sum up by: the 1-views remains unchanged for the  
introduction of delays. Are you OK with this?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-20 Thread meekerdb

On 4/20/2012 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Apr 2012, at 22:04, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem


Nor am I aware of any such problem. The hardest part of the mind body problem is 
figuring out what the hell the problem is.


There tuns of books. You might try McGuin, if you have a problem with Nagel. Michael Tye 
wrote a good book too. See the references in my URL.




The religious demand a explanation of mind, by which they mean give a description of 
mind in terms of something other than mind, as using a thing to define itself is rather 
pointless;


That is what we can do with recursion equation. It explains self-reproduction and 
self-reference. See my paper amoeba, planaria and dreaming machine.




so scientists do so and explain mind in terms of X (biological brains, electronic 
computers, abstract Turing Machines, and other things that are not mind ), but when 
they do so the religious complain but X is not mind!. Well of course X is not mind, 
if they explained mind in terms of mind then it would be a pretty silly explanation,


That depends on the theory you are choosing. And it is indeed a priori more easy to 
explain something immaterial, like consciousness from something immaterial, like 
numbers, than from primary matter, which we still don't know what it is, or if that exists.



I don't think you have to explain it from *primary* matter.  In fact it is usually 
explained in terms of electrochemistry of neurons and hormones, which are several steps up 
from quarks and electrons which themselves may not be primary.







but fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how mind works.


Elimanating often the qualia and consciousness. Material explanation explains only the 
behavior.



I'm not convinced though that comp is any better.  It comes down to saying qualia are 
computations seen from the inside.  But you could as well say they are brain processes 
seen from the inside.





By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks ago and thought it was 
excelent.


He does not explain where the physical laws come from, nor does he addressed the 
consciousness issue.
But of course you need to develop your understanding of the mind-body problem. The 
english literature contains many good texts. Then the UDA explains how to reformulate 
the problem into a purely arithmetical problem.


But at the expense of turning physics and everything else into an arithmetical problem.  
The problem I see with the UDA is that its passivity is contagious.  In order to function 
as an AI in the world it needs more and more of the world to be subsumed into it's 
computation.


Brent



Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2411/4947 - Release Date: 04/19/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything 
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi David,



I attach a comment by Victor Stenger on Lawrence Krauss's A Universe
from Nothing.  You might also want to follow the link to David
Albert's critical review.  Is it meaningful to speak of a nothing
beyond the void of RQFT?  Or beyond the truths of arithmetic?

http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4754utm_source=philosophynwsutm_medium=facebook



Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem, and they take for  
granted a speculation on one universal number (and then Dawkins is  
glad because it is not theology.



You may be interested in today's BBC Radio 4 In Our Time with Melvyn
Bragg et al, which was about Neo-Platonism and Plotinus.

http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/radio4/iot/iot_20120419-1145a.mp3


That seems much more interesting :)

Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-19 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hmm... They are not aware of the mind body problem


Nor am I aware of any such problem. The hardest part of the mind body
problem is figuring out what the hell the problem is. The religious
demand a explanation of mind, by which they mean give a description of mind
in terms of something other than mind, as using a thing to define itself is
rather pointless; so scientists do so and explain mind in terms of X
(biological brains, electronic computers, abstract Turing Machines, and
other things that are not mind ), but when they do so the religious
complain but X is not mind!. Well of course X is not mind, if they
explained mind in terms of mind then it would be a pretty silly
explanation, but fortunately they use things other than mind to explain how
mind works.

By the way I read Krauss's A Universe from Nothing a few weeks ago and
thought it was excelent.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



Re: Nothing

2012-04-19 Thread John Mikes
David: when I first tried to make sense of the 'world' (that was after
retirement and ~200 recently issued books on advanced 'thoughts') I started
with an 'ode':
In the Beginning there was Nothingness and when Nothingness realized it's
Nothingness, it changed. becoming a Somethingness. - The rest is history.

IMO the ominous 'mind-body' problem arose when Descartes wanted to escape
the threat of the Inquisition and included the eternal SOUL into his
worldview (cf: dualism). I wonder if that smart mind indeed believed it.
However it fooled some centuries ever since and supported superstitious
views all over the 'civilized' world.

Since I did not receive even a refutation (?) I repeat myself:
Viewed by comparison over millennia, our (knowledge) inventory of the
'world' increases continually and there is a solid basis to believe in
further increment, meaning yesterday we did not know them all. Tomorrow we
may know even more, so our today's level MUST be treated with the
agnosticism of all we so far did not learn. And we do learn!
We live in a* 'model'* world of our so far acquired knowledge base and our
dear conventional science tries to explain everything from (by?) it, until
the newly to-be-acquired knowledge forces us to *ACK*nowledge newer
additions and change our *'model'*.
A big truth: We don't know what we don't know, so whatever is 'hidden'
beyond the limitations of our present 'model' is unknown for now.
*Y E T* *it influences* *whatever we experience.*  All the newcomer details
are *UNKNOWN* before we learn them (anticipation and creativity may be not
so  absolutely reliable) so my agnosticism (more decent word than
ignorance) is justified as long as we cannot claim omniscience. (And IMO
not even the Universal Machine - any! - can claim it).

I feel free to call the 'beyond our model' an infinite complexity of
relations.
I have no idea WHAT relations and WHAT complexity and how are our terms
(items, functions, facts(?) or observations) related to their ORIGIN in
that infinite complexity. This may be the fallacy of the physical world,
the figments of matter, mass, energy, etc. etc. - even our (excuse me,
Bruno) arithmetic.
I like to call on the spirit of Robert Rosen in such aspects, nevertheless
I am not in complete congruence with neither his 'followers' nor his
publications - I only THINK he had ideas similar to those I exposed. He
worked and wrote -  published in a conventional science environment as a
bio-mathematician and formulated his issues for an understanding among the
late 20th c. scientific audience. I have cut my natural (polymer) science
past when I started to think (see above).  I may be wrong and do not want
to proselytize.




On Thu, Apr 19, 2012 at 11:29 AM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:

 I attach a comment by Victor Stenger on Lawrence Krauss's A Universe
 from Nothing.  You might also want to follow the link to David
 Albert's critical review.  Is it meaningful to speak of a nothing
 beyond the void of RQFT?  Or beyond the truths of arithmetic?


 http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4754utm_source=philosophynwsutm_medium=facebook

 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
 Everything List group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-25 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes

 Lee Corbin writes:
 
  I anticipate that in the future it will, as you say so well,
  be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to
  conscious states, except I also expect that by then the
  meaning of conscious states will be vastly better informed
  and filled-out than today.  In particular, the concept will
  have migrated from a mix of 1st and 3rd person notions, to
  entirely 3rd person notions. I speculate that after this
  occurs, people won't consider the old 1st person notion to
  be of much value (after all, you can't really use it to
  communicate with anyone about anything).
 
 I really can't imagine how you could make consciousness entirely a 3rd 
 person notion, no matter how well it is understood scientifically. Suppose 
 God, noting our sisyphian debate, takes pity on us and reveals that in fact 
 consciousness is just a special kind of recursive computation. He then gives 
 us a dozen lines of C code, explaining that when implemented this 
 computation is the simplest possible conscious process.

Good example.

 OK, from a scientific point of view, we know *everything* about this
 piece of code.

And, let's say further that we have all sorts of descriptions of it,
which make enormous intuitive sense; but only as much as an experienced
electrical engineer has explanation after explanation, and metaphor after
metaphor, with which he understands and can explain electrical phenomena.

 We also know that it is conscious, which is normally a 1st person thing, 
 because God told us.

Yes, but let's say that it also makes sense, i.e., fits in with
the way that we know how the brains of mammals work, etc. (I do
believe I am only fleshing out your hypothesis---very sorry if
I'm damaging it or changing it.)

 But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
 implemented on a computer.
 We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
 experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
 we start doing either of these things, we are replacing the 3rd 
 person perspective with the 1st person.

Yes.  Doesn't it seem that you want the impossible?  That you want
to be the code and yet remain someone else?

It seems like only by actually *being* that code---having its
emotional reactions, its same impressions of everything---can
you possibly know what it's like... to be the code. This point
was made by someone here before. Namely, that if *you* become
a bat in order to learn what it's like to be a bat, then you
aren't you anymore.

Lee



RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Lee Corbin writes:


 But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
 implemented on a computer.
 We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
 experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
 we start doing either of these things, we are replacing the 3rd
 person perspective with the 1st person.

Yes.  Doesn't it seem that you want the impossible?  That you want
to be the code and yet remain someone else?

It seems like only by actually *being* that code---having its
emotional reactions, its same impressions of everything---can
you possibly know what it's like... to be the code. This point
was made by someone here before. Namely, that if *you* become
a bat in order to learn what it's like to be a bat, then you
aren't you anymore.


I agree with everything you have said. You have to be the code to know what 
it is like to be the code. And consciousness is the only thing in the 
universe of which this is true.


--Stathis

_
Free wallpapers on Level 9 http://level9.ninemsn.com.au/default.aspx



Re: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 25-mai-05, à 13:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



Lee Corbin writes:


 But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
 implemented on a computer.
 We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
 experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
 we start doing either of these things, we are replacing the 3rd
 person perspective with the 1st person.

Yes.  Doesn't it seem that you want the impossible?  That you want
to be the code and yet remain someone else?

It seems like only by actually *being* that code---having its
emotional reactions, its same impressions of everything---can
you possibly know what it's like... to be the code. This point
was made by someone here before. Namely, that if *you* become
a bat in order to learn what it's like to be a bat, then you
aren't you anymore.


I agree with everything you have said. You have to be the code to know 
what it is like to be the code. And consciousness is the only thing in 
the universe of which this is true.


--Stathis


I do agree too. Mainly. But, to prevent future misunderstandings, I 
think it is better to say we are the owner of the code. If we forget 
this it will be hard to figure out later that consciousness can not 
been exclusively associated to the code but to some equivalence class 
of the code through the multiverse (or UD* the effective set of all 
computational histories). We would miss eventually the possibility of 
interference both with comp and with Everett's QM.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-24 Thread Lee Corbin
Stathis writes

  Do you imagine that it's possible that we could go to
  another star, and encounter beings who discoursed with
  us about every single other thing, yet denied that they
  had consciousness, and professed that they had no idea
  what we were talking about?
 
 The above question is a version of the zombie problem, and there are two 
 slightly different answers depending on whether you are talking about human 
 zombies or zombies from another planet. Human zombies are easy: they're not 
 really zombies.

I agree, and add the reasons you state to ones I already have.

 I would still say that even if it could somehow 
 be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to conscious states, 
 which I suspect is the case, it would still not be clear how this comes 
 about, and it would still not be clear what this is like unless you 
 experience the brain/conscious state yourself, or something like it.

I anticipate that in the future it will, as you say so well,
be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to
conscious states, except I also expect that by then the
meaning of conscious states will be vastly better informed
and filled-out than today.  In particular, the concept will
have migrated from a mix of 1st and 3rd person notions, to
entirely 3rd person notions. I speculate that after this
occurs, people won't consider the old 1st person notion to
be of much value (after all, you can't really use it to
communicate with anyone about anything).

But of course, all that is just speculation.

 You could dismiss this as unimportant, but I think it makes 1st person 
 experience fundamentally different from everything else in the universe.

Yes, but I don't think that there is any answer to the hard problem.
Concretely, I conjecture that of the 10^5000 or so possible strings
of 5000 words in the English language, not a single one of them solves
this problem. But if so, then even after the scientific problem of
learning what brain circuits are probably necessary and sufficient
to capture all conscious appearing behaviors, then there will still
be people who feel mystified.

 As for aliens, I don't see how we could possibly assume that organisms who 
 did not even evolve on our planet have anything in common with us mentally. 
 They may be more fundamentally alien and different to us than bats or 
 lobsters are, and it may be completely impossible to empathise with them, 
 even if we could somehow tap into their minds.

I agree that nothing is for sure; yet I'd expect that they'd have
incentives to metabolically survive, and have a will to exert 
control over their immediate environments just as we do. So there
would eventually be negotiations, and I'm confident that even
empathy for them would develop.

In your other email you write

 ...I would have to repeat my reply to Jonathan Colvin, which 
 is that we basically agree on the facts of the matter but
 choose to appraise/ interpret/ describe them in a different way.

It's possible that we have reached that point so far as I'm
concerned now; thanks for continuing.

Lee



Re: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 24-mai-05, à 14:03, Lee Corbin a écrit :


Yes, but I don't think that there is any answer to the hard problem.
Concretely, I conjecture that of the 10^5000 or so possible strings
of 5000 words in the English language, not a single one of them solves
this problem.


And in French ?;)



In particular, the concept will
have migrated from a mix of 1st and 3rd person notions, to
entirely 3rd person notions.


This has been done. (Not yet in english, I mean with all the
technical details).



I speculate that after this
occurs, people won't consider the old 1st person notion to
be of much value (after all, you can't really use it to
communicate with anyone about anything).



I hope you are wrong. But comp, fortunately predicts the contrary, and 
this in

a pure third person way. Remember we *can* talk in a third person way
about the first person notions. And comp predicts that for any 
introspective

 machine, its first person knowledge grows more quickly than its third
person knowledge. Admittedly with some definitions, conjectures,
and hypotheses, but that will always be the case in science, as you say
often yourself. But so the explanation is testable.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Lee Corbin writes:

[quoting Stathis]

 I would still say that even if it could somehow
 be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to conscious 
states,

 which I suspect is the case, it would still not be clear how this comes
 about, and it would still not be clear what this is like unless you
 experience the brain/conscious state yourself, or something like it.

I anticipate that in the future it will, as you say so well,
be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to
conscious states, except I also expect that by then the
meaning of conscious states will be vastly better informed
and filled-out than today.  In particular, the concept will
have migrated from a mix of 1st and 3rd person notions, to
entirely 3rd person notions. I speculate that after this
occurs, people won't consider the old 1st person notion to
be of much value (after all, you can't really use it to
communicate with anyone about anything).


I really can't imagine how you could make consciousness entirely a 3rd 
person notion, no matter how well it is understood scientifically. Suppose 
God, noting our sisyphian debate, takes pity on us and reveals that in fact 
consciousness is just a special kind of recursive computation. He then gives 
us a dozen lines of C code, explaining that when implemented this 
computation is the simplest possible conscious process. OK, from a 
scientific point of view, we know *everything* about this piece of code. We 
also know that it is conscious, which is normally a 1st person thing, 
because God told us. But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* 
the code implemented on a computer. We might be able to guess, perhaps from 
analogy with our own experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; 
but once we start doing either of these things, we are replacing the 3rd 
person perspective with the 1st person.


--Stathis Papaiuoannou

_
Don’t just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! 
http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/




RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

Lee Corbin wrote:


A friend sends me this link:

http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/CONSC_INFO_PANPSY.html

which will perhaps be of interest to a number of people here.

But the familiar first sentence just sends me into orbit:

   The hard problem of consciousness, according to
   David Chalmers, is explaining why and how
   experience is generated by certain particular
   configurations of physical stuff.

Just how the devil do you all you Chalmerites expect
that the world could have been any different in this
regard than it is???

Do you imagine that it's possible that we could go to
another star, and encounter beings who discoursed with
us about every single other thing, yet denied that they
had consciousness, and professed that they had no idea
what we were talking about? Yes or No! I want an answer.
Do you think that this *could* happen someday?


The list is very active recently and as I have to work, eat etc. I haven't 
had time to properly digest (let alone reply to) all the excellent posts. 
The above question is a version of the zombie problem, and there are two 
slightly different answers depending on whether you are talking about human 
zombies or zombies from another planet. Human zombies are easy: they're not 
really zombies. If they behave like humans, they almost certainly have the 
same subjective experiences as humans. If this were not necessarily true, 
then the added complication of consciousness would never have evolved. 
Nature cares only about behaviour, and has no way of knowing about 
subjective experience. This almost certainly means that consciousness is a 
necessary side-effect of the type of complexity needed to create human type 
behaviour. From memory, Chalmers suggests that this is possibly true, but 
still maintains that it is *logically* possible for human zombies to exist, 
supporting his thesis that it is not possible to derive consciousness from 
brain states (the hard problem). Without getting into a discussion of what 
logically possible means, I would still say that even if it could somehow 
be shown that appropriate brain states necessarily lead to conscious states, 
which I suspect is the case, it would still not be clear how this comes 
about, and it would still not be clear what this is like unless you 
experience the brain/conscious state yourself, or something like it. You 
could dismiss this as unimportant, but I think it makes 1st person 
experience fundamentally different from everything else in the universe.


As for aliens, I don't see how we could possibly assume that organisms who 
did not even evolve on our planet have anything in common with us mentally. 
They may be more fundamentally alien and different to us than bats or 
lobsters are, and it may be completely impossible to empathise with them, 
even if we could somehow tap into their minds.


--Stathis Papaioannou

_
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar – get it now! 
http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/




RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-22 Thread Lee Corbin
Bruno writes

  Do you imagine that it's possible that we could go to
  another star, and encounter beings who discoursed with
  us about every single other thing, yet denied that they
  had consciousness, and professed that they had no idea
  what we were talking about? Yes or No! I want an answer.
  Do you think that this *could* happen someday?
 
 No. But that does not solve the problem. Even Feigenbaum's Eliza was 
 able to talk on consciousness.

Only to the approximate extent that a tape recorder does.
The key difference is that one understands that actual
computations are performed in the legitimate cases of 
consciousness.

 1) Do you agree it is wrong to torture a sensible being? (and right to 
 send someone who does that in jail) ?

Certainly.

 2) Do you agree there is nothing wrong to torture a sculpture or a doll?

I do.

 Now japanese, I have read, makes cleverer dolls who simulate quite well 
 being tortured, or looking as being sensible, but of course they 
 are just zombie, not more clever than Feigenbaum's Eliza.

Exactly.

 But they makes progress. The mind-body problem is: at which stage of 
 the progress  should we send a doll's torturer in jail?
 Should we wait for the doll being able to win a trial in court? Even 
 women in many countries are not yet able to do that, you know.

That's a good question. I strongly affirm that WE NEED IN EVERY CASE
TO MAKE A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE MACHINERY INVOLVED, AND USE
OUR BEST INSIGHTS. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.

Lee



Re: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!

2005-05-22 Thread Stephen Paul King

Dear Lee,

   Are we not dancing around the Turing Test here?

Stephen

- Original Message - 
From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, May 22, 2005 2:23 PM
Subject: RE: Nothing to Explain about 1st Person C!



Bruno writes


 Do you imagine that it's possible that we could go to
 another star, and encounter beings who discoursed with
 us about every single other thing, yet denied that they
 had consciousness, and professed that they had no idea
 what we were talking about? Yes or No! I want an answer.
 Do you think that this *could* happen someday?

No. But that does not solve the problem. Even Feigenbaum's Eliza was 
able to talk on consciousness.


Only to the approximate extent that a tape recorder does.
The key difference is that one understands that actual
computations are performed in the legitimate cases of 
consciousness.


1) Do you agree it is wrong to torture a sensible being? (and right to 
send someone who does that in jail) ?


Certainly.


2) Do you agree there is nothing wrong to torture a sculpture or a doll?


I do.

Now japanese, I have read, makes cleverer dolls who simulate quite well 
being tortured, or looking as being sensible, but of course they 
are just zombie, not more clever than Feigenbaum's Eliza.


Exactly.

But they makes progress. The mind-body problem is: at which stage of 
the progress  should we send a doll's torturer in jail?
Should we wait for the doll being able to win a trial in court? Even 
women in many countries are not yet able to do that, you know.


That's a good question. I strongly affirm that WE NEED IN EVERY CASE
TO MAKE A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THE MACHINERY INVOLVED, AND USE
OUR BEST INSIGHTS. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.

Lee




RE: Nothing trivial

2004-05-22 Thread Ron McFarland



On 22 May 2004 at 6:26, george wrote:
 As a novice lurker on this list:
 You have given me an opening.
 The universe is infinite in time and space. That's the only logical
 way for it to be. You must agree. How could it arise from nothingness.
 
 Altho appearing random, every effect has a cause, so how could the U
 be really random? It that sense, it is preordained. 
 
 The U is indifferent, however.
 
 I agree in the consequences of our doing and thinking, however.
 
 Is ennui the same as entropy?
 
 Ron, I don't know how, at this point, to put this on the list.
 Nor do I know if this sort of philosophy is interesting to the 
 List-people. And I do enjoy physics more than math... SO tell
 Me if there is a better place for me.
 
 George

For the record, friend George, my post of yesterday was certainly meant to be taken 
tongue in cheek, so to say. It was spurred on a whim by my brother asking me to 
tell him all I know.grin My answer I decided to post here, too. The list has been a 
little quiet of late even though there is very recent new Chandra evidence in support 
of dark energy, see:
Dark Energy
I am pleased that my post has invited you to comment, and I'm sure we would all 
like for you to put forth your thoughts in much greater degree. There are some 
*very* educated people on this list, some come at the genre of this list from a 
philosophical view, some primarily from a mathematical view, some from a pure 
logic point of view, some from a conjecture point of view, and many from some sort 
of combination of those views.


Back on 2-Nov-03 I joined this list and argued from a logic point of view, and with 
distant reference to data from such things as that Chandra article alludes to. I poked 
fun at the mathematicians by stating that mathematics is a subset of logic which can 
not fully describe the universe because mathematics is digital but the universe is 
analog ... those decimal places keep confusing things!grin This did not exactly 
enamor me to those members of the list, but I believe they realize the intended 
humor being that we just don't really have a good enough tool to measure what we 
see. Mathematics certainly models a very good representation of our universe.


There, on 2-Nov-03, I argued that the universe and by way of quantum mechanics 
did indeed arise from nothingness. I went further to state that the expansion of the 
universe is its apparent effort to return to that original state (kind of like a bubble in 
a vacuum), and that we perceive this effort as being what we call dark energy (an 
ever acceleration of the expansion of the universe that will eventually lead to what 
has been called the Big Rip), that a black hole is yet another route to that same 
seeking of state, and more. I was surprised to see the main arguments against my 
post being primarily about if the Big Rip will really occur or not, a subject that is still 
being hotly debated in the general scientific community.


But make no mistake, I am not a scientist. I am only a thinker, one who seeks proof 
of being misguided. Logic is my only tool. Others here are much more educated in 
these matters than I am, and all here are tolerated and respected.


Welcome to the list about the Theory of Everything, George. :)


Ron McFarland




Re: Nothing trivial

2004-05-22 Thread Norman Samish



Ron McFarland,
 Too much of what I read on this list is 
over my head, but every once in awhile somebody like you has something 
illuminating to say. Thanks for an understandable presentation of your 
views.I find that theycoincide with mine - even that digital 
mathematics cannot fully describe an analog universe. 
Norman

- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Ron 
  McFarland 
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  Sent: Saturday, May 22, 2004 8:35 
AM
  Subject: RE: Nothing trivial
  
  . . . There are some 
  *very* educated people on this list, some come at the genre of this list from 
  a philosophical view, some primarily from a mathematical view, some from a 
  pure logic point of view, some from a conjecture point of view, and many from 
  some sort of combination of those views.
  
  Back on 
  2-Nov-03 I joined this list and argued from a logic point of view, and with 
  distant reference to data from such things as that Chandra article alludes to. 
  I poked fun at the mathematicians by stating that mathematics is a subset of 
  logic which can not fully describe the universe because mathematics is digital 
  but the universe is analog ... those decimal places keep confusing 
  things!grin This did not exactly enamor me to those members of the 
  list, but I believe they realize the intended humor being that we just don't 
  really have a good enough tool to measure what we see. Mathematics certainly 
  models a very good representation of our universe.
  
  There, on 
  2-Nov-03, I argued that the universe and by way of quantum mechanics did 
  indeed arise from nothingness. I went further to state that the expansion of 
  the universe is its apparent effort to return to that original state (kind of 
  like a bubble in a vacuum), and that we perceive this effort as being what we 
  call dark energy (an ever acceleration of the expansion of the universe that 
  will eventually lead to what has been called the Big Rip), that a black hole 
  is yet another route to that same seeking of state, and more. I was surprised 
  to see the main arguments against my post being primarily about if the Big Rip 
  will really occur or not, a subject that is still being hotly debated in the 
  general scientific community.
  
  But make no 
  mistake, I am not a scientist. I am only a thinker, one who seeks proof of 
  being misguided. Logic is my only tool. Others here are much more educated in 
  these matters than I am, and all here are tolerated and 
  respected.
  
  Welcome to the 
  list about the Theory of Everything, George. :)
  
  Ron 
  McFarland


Re: Stability re Nothing and Everything

2000-11-19 Thread GSLevy

Fine, you are trying to provide a path for the creation, or a rational for 
the existence, of the Plenitude.  You describe the Superverse as an enormous 
fractal of possible machines. But nowhere do you discuss some of the most 
important question, in my view, the perception of the self and the first 
person perspective. 

Trying to find a explanation for the plenitude is kind of doing things 
backwards. The plenitude does not need an explanation, because it is 
precisely the acausal state. When NO CAUSE exist for a particular object to 
be in any ONE particular state, then the object is in ALL possible states.  
Ultimately the ABSENCE of ANY cause leads to the Plenitude. This acausal 
principle is kind of the complement of the causal principle. 

The reductionist-in-reverse path from our universe to the plenitude, could 
have numerous (maybe an infinite number  of) alternatives. It's like being a 
worm inside an onion and peeling the layers from the inside... except that 
there is no guarantee that you'll ever see the light of day. You may end up 
crying for ever. :-)

George




Stability re Nothing and Everything

2000-11-18 Thread Hal Ruhl

My current approach to this.

Once Nothing becomes Everything to answer its own stability, the question 
of the stability of Nothing is no longer meaningful to Everything neither 
is Nothing? itself, so Everything is now stuck as Everything.

Hal