Re: [MD] Free will.
My position ? It IS NOT illusory. How we perceive it IS full of illusions - from our subjective perspective (see anthropic). Science of the brain (and wider bodily systems) may explain more of the illusory perceptions of our minds - deciding to act based on what we know - but I don't believe it can ever take away the we. The causal relation between knowledge and action is no weirder than causation itself. Given the complex system of systems (of systems) that must comprise our minds, I prefer free-won't to free-will. Ian On Mon, Mar 26, 2012 at 7:09 PM, John Carl ridgecoy...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Carl, Is free will an illusion? No. But if you want, you can choose to think so. Yours, John On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 7:46 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote: Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link: http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will.
Hi Carl, Is free will an illusion? No. But if you want, you can choose to think so. Yours, John On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 7:46 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote: Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link: http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
[MD] Free-will
Interesting link to discussions. Mark? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
[MD] Free will.
Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link: http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free-will
Yup interesting but not too dynamic. The past does not the present describe. Was there a free will one in particular that caught your interest? Sent laboriously from an iPhone, Mark On Mar 22, 2012, at 7:45 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote: Interesting link to discussions. Mark? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will.
Oh, disregard my last communication... Sent laboriously from an iPhone, Mark On Mar 22, 2012, at 7:46 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote: Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link: http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Mark, Isn't 'freewill' a conceptually constructed static pattern? And what do you mean by act as if. Is act as if anything other than pattern that we are rarely aware of? Btw, Mark, by what measurement are you judging whether Susan Blackmore is or isn't a friend of the MoQ? Marsha On Oct 5, 2011, at 1:29 AM, 118 wrote: Yes, what nonsense, everything was already set forth with the Original Idea and nothing has changed since then. Complete Monistic Intelligent Design babble. We intuitively act as if we have free will because our intuition is much more complex and sophisticated than our simple static (and ever changing) intellectual constructs. Obviously Susan is no friend of MoQ. Her loss, IMHO. Mark On Oct 3, 2011, at 12:09 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Here's Susan Blackmore on free will (4:35): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rglQHgMdHuQfeature=related ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Yes, what nonsense, everything was already set forth with the Original Idea and nothing has changed since then. Complete Monistic Intelligent Design babble. We intuitively act as if we have free will because our intuition is much more complex and sophisticated than our simple static (and ever changing) intellectual constructs. Obviously Susan is no friend of MoQ. Her loss, IMHO. Mark On Oct 3, 2011, at 12:09 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Here's Susan Blackmore on free will (4:35): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rglQHgMdHuQfeature=related ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Here's Susan Blackmore on free will (4:35): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rglQHgMdHuQfeature=related ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Greetings, I wrote to Daniel Dennett. Post and reply are below... Marsha On Oct 1, 2011, at 1:50 PM, Dennett, Daniel C. wrote: There is no video of my seminar, sad to say. In a sentence, I think that the only grounds for wanting 'real' randomness (quantum indeterminacy) is if you are worried about being mind-read by an omniscient agent! Short of that, determinism is no enemy of freedom. DCD On 10/1/11 11:13 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Dear Dr. Dennett, I am member of Robert Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality (MoQ) Discussion List (http://www.moq.org/), and there has been a very long running debate on James's Free Will versus Compatibilism. I watched the 6-part presentation (youtube) given by Bob Doyle on William James's Free Will. And a short youtube video by you, 'Dennett on free will and determinism' where you explain Compatibilism. Bob Doyle mentioned that he was attending your October 2010 Seminar at Tuft's University. I was wondering if this seminar (Free Will) was videoed and is available for public viewing? Some of us would love to know your response to him and his presentation of the Jamesian two-stage model of free-will. Thank you. Marsha Valkyr ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Cheers Mark On Sep 16, 2011, at 8:07 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, 'I' is a conventional designation. Maybe you should stick to your 'automatic writing' where you can continue to impress yourself. I am not interested in your further interpretation. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 10:32 PM, 118 wrote: Hi Marsha, When you start out below with I, what are you pointing at? Your quotes below are interesting, and I have read many similar philosophical arguments. When you complain about DMV not being consistent that surprises me since you subscribe to ever changing patterns. I would think that you would fully understand DMV based on that theory. So, I do not know if you are just being argumentative for fun, or if you are very confused about what you are. What you further describe in the first paragraph is simply the confusion that living in Language brings, nothing more. When I have more time I will provide my interpretation of what you quote below and how it all points to the existence of self. Cheers, Mark On Sep 16, 2011, at 4:44 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, I experience only a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. The 'self' can best be represented by the tetralemma formulation. - This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the ‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an inherent self-existence. That is, everything exists by being related to everything else (‘dependent co- origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is no way to state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need for the logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as Nishida puts it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in Buddhist philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is the tetralemma: One cannot say that the self exists. One cannot say that the self does not exist. One cannot say that self both exists and does not exist. One cannot say that the self neither exists nor does not exist. (Roberts, 2004) Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static): In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and contingency belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that all things ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of every conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real nature) there is the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of the ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that the ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself. (Cooper,2002) (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality,pp.55-56) - Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 3:26 PM, 118 wrote: Marsha, Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our realities if they exist. I could say that nothing exists in theory and that we should drop that word from our vocabulary since it only misdirects. So, if the self does not exist, there is no need to describe it other than non-existent. Is this where you are at with your metaphysics? If so, then I must caution you that you are in a cul-de-sac, on a very long and rewarding road. Accept your existence as analogy and move on. All in MHO. If the self does not exist, then what does it? Ball in your court, love-love. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:57 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011,
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
[Mark] I stick with Piraig's MoQ. It is you who are way out in left field. [Arlo] Pirsig's MOQ denies any sensible agent, there self in the MOQ is a set of value patterns, it is not an autonomous agent that creates value, it is a response to value. If you feel the need to distort the man's idea to feign agreement, so be it, but this is like walking into a Randian forum and saying that Rand's ideas really deny the individual exists, and everyone who doesn't agree with you is out in left field. [Mark] If you are only going to converse with those that agree with you, then what the fuck are you doing addressing me or Ham? [Arlo] I flag posts that mention me by name, you and Ham are otherwise on my ignore list. If I wanted to spend my time talking to people who reject Pirsig's central premises, I'd join a different forum. Is that why you joined the MOQ forum, so you could spend your time talking to people who you disagree with? Let's say I ride a Honda, and I think my Hondae is better than Harley-Davidson. Do I join a Harley forum and spend all my time trying to convince everyone there that Hondas are far superior to Harleys? Is that your idea of a valuable use of your time? Sorry, guess I evaluate my time on a different scale. Hmm... I disagree with Pirsig's central ideas, so let me join a Pirsig forum and try to teach everyone there why Pirsig is inconsistent and incomprehensible, and why my ideas are far superior... [Mark] You need to be in the Mutual Admiration Forum, not in any philosophy forum. If you can't take the heat, then take a cold shower my friend. [Arlo] Heat? That's funny. I'd say you and Ham generate nothing but static, white noise, fuzz. If you want to think you are some Great Disruptive Voice, then its you who needs a cold shower. There is disagreement, as I've been having in recent discussions with Horse and Dan, and there is rejection and denial of what Pirsig said. I'll take educated disagreement over points, this is healthy and how ideas evolve, but I won't waste my time with someone trying to teach my why Pirsig is incomprehensible and that I should become an Essentialist instead. There are voices of dissent, and there are voices of rejection/conversion. One is worth my time, the other is not. I don't expect you'd understand the distinction, but you should think about it. But I guess there are people who invite the Jehovah witnesses in... Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Marsha, Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our realities if they exist. I could say that nothing exists in theory and that we should drop that word from our vocabulary since it only misdirects. So, if the self does not exist, there is no need to describe it other than non-existent. Is this where you are at with your metaphysics? If so, then I must caution you that you are in a cul-de-sac, on a very long and rewarding road. Accept your existence as analogy and move on. All in MHO. If the self does not exist, then what does it? Ball in your court, love-love. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:57 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote: OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Mark, I experience only a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. The 'self' can best be represented by the tetralemma formulation. - This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the ‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an inherent self-existence. That is, everything exists by being related to everything else (‘dependent co- origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is no way to state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need for the logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as Nishida puts it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in Buddhist philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is the tetralemma: One cannot say that the self exists. One cannot say that the self does not exist. One cannot say that self both exists and does not exist. One cannot say that the self neither exists nor does not exist. (Roberts, 2004) Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static): In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and contingency belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that all things ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of every conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real nature) there is the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of the ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that the ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself. (Cooper,2002) (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality,pp.55-56) - Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 3:26 PM, 118 wrote: Marsha, Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our realities if they exist. I could say that nothing exists in theory and that we should drop that word from our vocabulary since it only misdirects. So, if the self does not exist, there is no need to describe it other than non-existent. Is this where you are at with your metaphysics? If so, then I must caution you that you are in a cul-de-sac, on a very long and rewarding road. Accept your existence as analogy and move on. All in MHO. If the self does not exist, then what does it? Ball in your court, love-love. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:57 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote: OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Hi Marsha, When you start out below with I, what are you pointing at? Your quotes below are interesting, and I have read many similar philosophical arguments. When you complain about DMV not being consistent that surprises me since you subscribe to ever changing patterns. I would think that you would fully understand DMV based on that theory. So, I do not know if you are just being argumentative for fun, or if you are very confused about what you are. What you further describe in the first paragraph is simply the confusion that living in Language brings, nothing more. When I have more time I will provide my interpretation of what you quote below and how it all points to the existence of self. Cheers, Mark On Sep 16, 2011, at 4:44 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, I experience only a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. The 'self' can best be represented by the tetralemma formulation. - This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the ‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an inherent self-existence. That is, everything exists by being related to everything else (‘dependent co- origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is no way to state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need for the logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as Nishida puts it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in Buddhist philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is the tetralemma: One cannot say that the self exists. One cannot say that the self does not exist. One cannot say that self both exists and does not exist. One cannot say that the self neither exists nor does not exist. (Roberts, 2004) Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static): In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and contingency belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that all things ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of every conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real nature) there is the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of the ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that the ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself. (Cooper,2002) (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality,pp.55-56) - Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 3:26 PM, 118 wrote: Marsha, Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our realities if they exist. I could say that nothing exists in theory and that we should drop that word from our vocabulary since it only misdirects. So, if the self does not exist, there is no need to describe it other than non-existent. Is this where you are at with your metaphysics? If so, then I must caution you that you are in a cul-de-sac, on a very long and rewarding road. Accept your existence as analogy and move on. All in MHO. If the self does not exist, then what does it? Ball in your court, love-love. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:57 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote: OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Mark, 'I' is a conventional designation. Maybe you should stick to your 'automatic writing' where you can continue to impress yourself. I am not interested in your further interpretation. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 10:32 PM, 118 wrote: Hi Marsha, When you start out below with I, what are you pointing at? Your quotes below are interesting, and I have read many similar philosophical arguments. When you complain about DMV not being consistent that surprises me since you subscribe to ever changing patterns. I would think that you would fully understand DMV based on that theory. So, I do not know if you are just being argumentative for fun, or if you are very confused about what you are. What you further describe in the first paragraph is simply the confusion that living in Language brings, nothing more. When I have more time I will provide my interpretation of what you quote below and how it all points to the existence of self. Cheers, Mark On Sep 16, 2011, at 4:44 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, I experience only a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. The 'self' can best be represented by the tetralemma formulation. - This formulation is a tool towards understanding concepts such as the not-self (or anatta) doctrine that is not handled particularly well by binary logic. So, as with every static value pattern, the notion of the ‘self’ in Buddhist philosophy is not simply considered an ‘illusion’ or an entity (as claimed by some Christian understandings of the ‘soul’) with an inherent self-existence. That is, everything exists by being related to everything else (‘dependent co- origination’ is the usual term), but does not exist by itself. There is no way to state this in a way that conforms to Aristotelian logic. Hence the need for the logic of contradictory identity. The self exists by negating itself, as Nishida puts it. So, the phrase ‘the self is an illusion’ is just as much an error in Buddhist philosophy as ‘the self exists’. The traditional Buddhist formulation is the tetralemma: One cannot say that the self exists. One cannot say that the self does not exist. One cannot say that self both exists and does not exist. One cannot say that the self neither exists nor does not exist. (Roberts, 2004) Though he doesn’t knowingly employ the logic of the tetralemma, Pirsig does share numerous ontological beliefs with Buddhist philosophy such as Nagarjuna’s (c.300a, p.251) perception that the unconditioned (or Dynamic) is the fundamental nature of the conditioned (or static): In their ultimate nature things are devoid of conditionedness and contingency belongs to this level. This very truth is revealed by also saying that all things ultimately enter the indeterminate dharma or that within the heart of every conditioned entity (as its core, as its true essence, as its very real nature) there is the indeterminate dharma. While the one expresses the transcendence of the ultimate reality, the other speaks of its immanence. The one says that the ultimate reality is not an entity apart and wholly removed from the determinate, but is the real nature of the determinate itself. (Cooper,2002) (McWatt, A Critical Analysis of Robert Pirsig’s Metaphysics of Quality,pp.55-56) - Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 3:26 PM, 118 wrote: Marsha, Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our realities if they exist. I could say that nothing exists in theory and that we should drop that word from our vocabulary since it only misdirects. So, if the self does not exist, there is no need to describe it other than non-existent. Is this where you are at with your metaphysics? If so, then I must caution you that you are in a cul-de-sac, on a very long and rewarding road. Accept your existence as analogy and move on. All in MHO. If the self does not exist, then what does it? Ball in your court, love-love. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:57 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote: OK, so you do believe in the existence of
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
[Ham] Really, Arlo? If you can explain experience in the absence of a sensible agent, you'll be doing RMP and the rest of us a momentous favor. [Arlo] I'm not going to waste time with your disingenous question, Ham. This is like a flat-earther asking for proof the earth is round. You've rejected any possible answer before its offered. You're not looking to understand Pirsig, you're looking for yet another soapbox to trumpet your Essentialism and its ridiculous sensible agent. Okay, fair enough, you disagree with Pirsig and you think you're ideas are better. Then why the hell are you here? Why do you waste your time in a forum about a philosophy that denounces your theism and your sensible agent? As far as I can tell, about the only reason you have ever demonstrated for being here is to seek converts (how's that working out for you?). Okay, Pirsig wrote you a letter years ago saying he saw similarities between his metaphysics and your thesis, but in the entire time you've been here you have only condemned the man for not embracing your god (in effect) and its creation of holy man (right, I'm a nihilistic atheist because I find laughable the notion that Essence negated itself so its negates (us) could worship it...). I don't care that you are here, but the only thing you do is continuously look for people to convince them Pirsig is wrong. Given that, I have no interest in discussing your sensible agent nonsense or any such Essentialism theology. Pirsig's comments about experience are solid enough, and don't need me to expand upon them for you. If you haven't even so much as learned the answer to your question in the years you've been here, the fault lies with you, not with Pirsig or anyone here. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Arlo, Why don't you do the rest of us a favor and answer Ham's ingenuous question as he suggested? As soon as you begin attacking Ham on issues that have nothing of substance and have nothing to do with the subject, you look like a complete idiot! Such a thing make this forum look like a teenage chat room. All evidence points to the presence of a sensible agent as Ham calls it. To deny that is to put your head in the sand! (see, I can attack you without refrain, did you learn anything from that?!!) The best proof, is that thing that is looking through your eyes. Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Buddha used this conceptual (static) tool to enlighten, not because is was a Truth. If Buddha did not exist, what is there to reach nirvana, a non-existent nothing? If a pattern reaches nirvana, what have you got? A Free carpet? Was Aladdin riding around on a Buddha's back? How is it that we can rightfully imprison a non-existent murderer in this age? Ethics, as presented by Pirsig, is firmly grounded in the premise that we exist and that we are morally responsible for our decisions. 'Nuff said, Mark On Thu, Sep 15, 2011 at 9:08 AM, Arlo Bensinger ajb...@psu.edu wrote: [Ham] Really, Arlo? If you can explain experience in the absence of a sensible agent, you'll be doing RMP and the rest of us a momentous favor. [Arlo] I'm not going to waste time with your disingenous question, Ham. This is like a flat-earther asking for proof the earth is round. You've rejected any possible answer before its offered. You're not looking to understand Pirsig, you're looking for yet another soapbox to trumpet your Essentialism and its ridiculous sensible agent. Okay, fair enough, you disagree with Pirsig and you think you're ideas are better. Then why the hell are you here? Why do you waste your time in a forum about a philosophy that denounces your theism and your sensible agent? As far as I can tell, about the only reason you have ever demonstrated for being here is to seek converts (how's that working out for you?). Okay, Pirsig wrote you a letter years ago saying he saw similarities between his metaphysics and your thesis, but in the entire time you've been here you have only condemned the man for not embracing your god (in effect) and its creation of holy man (right, I'm a nihilistic atheist because I find laughable the notion that Essence negated itself so its negates (us) could worship it...). I don't care that you are here, but the only thing you do is continuously look for people to convince them Pirsig is wrong. Given that, I have no interest in discussing your sensible agent nonsense or any such Essentialism theology. Pirsig's comments about experience are solid enough, and don't need me to expand upon them for you. If you haven't even so much as learned the answer to your question in the years you've been here, the fault lies with you, not with Pirsig or anyone here. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
[Mark] Why don't you do the rest of us a favor and answer Ham's ingenuous question as he suggested? [Arlo] Because I have no interest in a dialogue he has already decided upon. Is that hard for you to comprehend? [Mark] As soon as you begin attacking Ham on issues that have nothing of substance and have nothing to do with the subject, you look like a complete idiot! [Arlo] I wasn't attacking Ham, your kneejerk reaction is idiotic. Ham offers nothing but how Pirsig is wrong and Essentialism is right. Its been that way since day one with him. If you want to play with him, by all means, do so. Tell you what, Mark, I can post two dozen quotes from Ham beginning with yesterday where he calls Pirsig's philosophy everything from incomprehensible to inconsistent. Can you post that many where he had anything positive to say about Pirsig's ideas? How far back do you think YOU will have to go? [Mark] All evidence points to the presence of a sensible agent as Ham calls it. To deny that is to put your head in the sand! [Arlo] I deny it. Pirsig denies it. The MOQ denies it. So why the fuck are YOU here? Are you looking to redeem the wayward masses as well? Sell us on some individualistic essentialism? I mean really, if you disagree with the core of his ideas, isn't there a Randian or Essentialism forum where you and Ham can give each other's sensible agents a friendly reach-around? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Hi Ham, On Sep 14, 2011, at 10:16 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Steve (Arlo mentioned) -- On Tues, 9/13/11 at 12:07 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote: On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: If the world is composed of values, then who is doing the valuing? Pirsig's response to Bodvar: This is a subtle slip back into subject-object thinking. Values have bee converted to a kind of object in this sentence, and then the question is asked, If values are an object, then where is the subject? The answer is found in the MOQ sentence, It is not Lila who has values, it is values that have Lila. Both the subject and the object are patterns of value. (Annotn 76). [snip] If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a figure of speech. There you have succinctly laid out the inconsistencies in Pirsig's thesis that result in an incomprehensible epistemology. Everything is analogy -- a figure of speech; so there is no fundamental principle that we can believe in and rely on. The individual himself is a figure of speech -- a collection of Quality patterns; so there is no sensible agent who can assess or interpret the Value that ostensibly resides in the realm of Dynamic Quality. Most importantly, where there is no chooser there is no Choice, which rules out Free Will as well as moral responsibility. That everything is an analogy is an analogy. The point is not to confuse language for reality, just like one would not confuse a map for a country. As you may recall from ZMM, it was at this point that Phaedrus went quickly downhill. Such is the bewitchment by language. Once one realizes it for what it is, deep in the language free area of our minds, one can get quite lost. It is not for the timid or for those without a deeper sense of Being. Of course he does not mean that an individual is a figure of speech. Just the opposite. He means that an individual is nothing like a figure of speech. The author's statement that Quality has Lila would suggest that Value itself is an agent (agency?) of reality. But does that agency possess the sensibility needed to make moral decisions? No, because Morality is posited as the inherent quality of the evolutionary universe, which makes such appraisals unnecessary. In other words, since the continuous movement to Betterness is deterministic, the individual in only a redundant product of evolution with no active role or purpose in the process. Ham, our perception of Lila is a perception of qualities. Therefore, Quality has Lila. Does this make sense? What we sense is not the thing itself, but it's qualities. In this way our reality is Quality. If you still do not get this, I will provide another analogy. As far as I am concerned, the continual movement to Betterness is a tautology, just like survival of the fittest. Later, Arlo says to Dan: I'd say that seeing free will as some existential out there thing that floats around and controls experience is certainly an illusion. But the concept of free will is an intellectual pattern of value, a way we explain and make sense of our experience. [Steve comments]: Once we reject the first sense of an existential free will, what is left to debate in the old free will-determinism controversy? [Arlo replies]: Little, personally. But I think we can (and are) continuing to improve our explanations of experience. Really, Arlo? If you can explain experience in the absence of a sensible agent, you'll be doing RMP and the rest of us a momentous favor. Thanks Steve, and good luck Arlo, --Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Arlo, I stick with Piraig's MoQ. It is you who are way out in left field. If you want to believe you don't exist, be my guest. If you are only going to converse with those that agree with you, then what the fuck are you doing addressing me or Ham? You need to be in the Mutual Admiration Forum, not in any philosophy forum. If you can't take the heat, then take a cold shower my friend. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 6:20 PM, ARLO J BENSINGER JR ajb...@psu.edu wrote: [Mark] Why don't you do the rest of us a favor and answer Ham's ingenuous question as he suggested? [Arlo] Because I have no interest in a dialogue he has already decided upon. Is that hard for you to comprehend? [Mark] As soon as you begin attacking Ham on issues that have nothing of substance and have nothing to do with the subject, you look like a complete idiot! [Arlo] I wasn't attacking Ham, your kneejerk reaction is idiotic. Ham offers nothing but how Pirsig is wrong and Essentialism is right. Its been that way since day one with him. If you want to play with him, by all means, do so. Tell you what, Mark, I can post two dozen quotes from Ham beginning with yesterday where he calls Pirsig's philosophy everything from incomprehensible to inconsistent. Can you post that many where he had anything positive to say about Pirsig's ideas? How far back do you think YOU will have to go? [Mark] All evidence points to the presence of a sensible agent as Ham calls it. To deny that is to put your head in the sand! [Arlo] I deny it. Pirsig denies it. The MOQ denies it. So why the fuck are YOU here? Are you looking to redeem the wayward masses as well? Sell us on some individualistic essentialism? I mean really, if you disagree with the core of his ideas, isn't there a Randian or Essentialism forum where you and Ham can give each other's sensible agents a friendly reach-around? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Mark, The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist, nor neither exists and doesn't exist. Marsha On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote: OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake. Mark On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote: Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does, but that is nonsense. Mark, I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Pirsig said: But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with
increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels.
Steve replied:
I posted that quote months ago and am well aware of it. ...It is certainly not
the logical and necessary basis for moral responsibility like the traditional
view of free will.
McWatt says:
.., it's apparent that this 'value' continuum (of freedom) stretches between
largely determined sub-atomic particles to complete artistic freedom. This is
important (metaphysically) as this continuum facilitates, in a largely
deterministic physical world, a notion of moral responsibility and a
considerable intellectual freedom for an individual regarding aesthetic
decisions. ( Anthony's PhD, P 137).
Steve said to Ron:
Right, there is no need to get rid of the term the individual but as Pirsig
describes what that means in MOQ terms it stops being important to ask whether
this collection of patterns _has_ free will.
Pirsig says:
But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing
freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels.
Steve says:
In my opinion free will ceases to be a useful concept for describing experience
once we embrace MOQ terms. Worse, I think that the way dmb uses the term he is
slipping a bunch of SOM BS in the backdoor of the MOQ (e,g,, when he says that
accepting that humans have free will is necessary for thinking that humans can
be held morally responsible for their actions).
dmb quotes Pirsig and McWatt in response:
Pirsig says, But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with
increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels, and McWatt says,
This is important as this continuum facilitates, in a largely deterministic
physical world, a notion of moral responsibility and a considerable
intellectual freedom for an individual regarding aesthetic decisions.
Ron said to Steve:
When Dave says that accepting free will is necessary for moral responsibility
he is framing the idea in MoQ context. Because free will {DQ} the ability to
change and evolve is moral responsibility, because the consequences are to risk
poor quality and death, to not exist. Adhere to the static, stick to the
conservative, and one risks being left behind. We see it manifest in every
facett of life from politics to staying competitive in the job market. It has
very real Pragmatic consequences in experience.
dmb says:
Thanks, Ron. Yes, I certainly want to be framing the issue in the context and
terms of the MOQ. (It sure feels like I'm constantly having to repeat myself
just to clear away Steve's distortions.) As I see it, in the MOQ there is both
freedom and constraint. This freedom is not conceived as the property that some
independent entity has and the constraints are not conceived as causal or
mechanical laws. Those ways of conceiving freedom and constraint are predicated
on the context and terms that the MOQ has already rejected, of course, namely
SOM. If we're going to talk about freedom and constraint ACCORDING to the MOQ,
we have to detach them from those rejected metaphysical assumptions. This is
why I objected to Steve's use of Harris and Parfit. It's just terribly confused
and backwards to discuss the MOQ's formulation in terms of causal determinism.
Pirsig's formulation is predicated on rejecting exactly that premise. Instead
of extending the laws of cause and effect upward
from atoms to the sphere of human action, as classical scientific determinism
usually does, the MOQ begins with the human capacity to make choices and
extends it downward to atoms.
In the MOQ, people are not something apart from Quality. The MOQ divides all of
reality into the static quality of order and the Dynamic Quality of freedom.
And that's how it describes Lila's battle and everybody's battle. It's an
evolutionary battle against the static patterns of her own life, an
evolutionary struggle toward freedom. In the MOQ, freedom and constraint are
not just real, they are the whole game. That's why I object so vigorously to
the suggestion that the whole question is an illusion or that free will is
permanently superglued to the assumptions of SOM or the Cartesian self so that
it should just be thrown out with the bathwater. I'm saying there is definitely
a baby worth saving. Why? Because the MOQ can argue that free will exists at
all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels
and this is important as this continuum facilitates, in a largely
deterministic physical world, a notion of moral responsibility and a considera
ble intellectual freedom for an individual regarding aesthetic decisions.
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Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Hi Steve (Arlo mentioned) -- On Tues, 9/13/11 at 12:07 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote: On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: If the world is composed of values, then who is doing the valuing? Pirsig's response to Bodvar: This is a subtle slip back into subject-object thinking. Values have bee converted to a kind of object in this sentence, and then the question is asked, If values are an object, then where is the subject? The answer is found in the MOQ sentence, It is not Lila who has values, it is values that have Lila. Both the subject and the object are patterns of value. (Annotn 76). [snip] If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a figure of speech. There you have succinctly laid out the inconsistencies in Pirsig's thesis that result in an incomprehensible epistemology. Everything is analogy -- a figure of speech; so there is no fundamental principle that we can believe in and rely on. The individual himself is a figure of speech -- a collection of Quality patterns; so there is no sensible agent who can assess or interpret the Value that ostensibly resides in the realm of Dynamic Quality. Most importantly, where there is no chooser there is no Choice, which rules out Free Will as well as moral responsibility. The author's statement that Quality has Lila would suggest that Value itself is an agent (agency?) of reality. But does that agency possess the sensibility needed to make moral decisions? No, because Morality is posited as the inherent quality of the evolutionary universe, which makes such appraisals unnecessary. In other words, since the continuous movement to Betterness is deterministic, the individual in only a redundant product of evolution with no active role or purpose in the process. Later, Arlo says to Dan: I'd say that seeing free will as some existential out there thing that floats around and controls experience is certainly an illusion. But the concept of free will is an intellectual pattern of value, a way we explain and make sense of our experience. [Steve comments]: Once we reject the first sense of an existential free will, what is left to debate in the old free will-determinism controversy? [Arlo replies]: Little, personally. But I think we can (and are) continuing to improve our explanations of experience. Really, Arlo? If you can explain experience in the absence of a sensible agent, you'll be doing RMP and the rest of us a momentous favor. Thanks Steve, and good luck Arlo, --Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
[MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Andre quoted Pirsig on free will in the MOQ (from Lila's Child): Hugo: In my view, free will is a term that can only be used of self-conscious (self reflective) creatures. Will is a term we may use of any organism- of any autonomous entity- describing the goal involved in autonomy. And free will is the ability to change that goal; the ability of the autonomous entity to chose between more than one predetermined (as for that entity) goal (p 216) Pirsig's response: Traditionally, this is the meaning of free will. But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. At the lowest inorganic level, the freedom is so small that it can be said that nature follows laws but the quantum theory shows that within the laws the freedom is still there... (Annotn 75) dmb says: Thanks, Andre. Nice work, as usual. This is what I've been saying all along. It probably won't convince Steve, but I think these sentences are more than enough to defeat his position. I also think these lines don't add anything to the explanation as it's given in Lila. These lines neatly summarize the MOQ's reformulation of free will and the only notable difference is that he actually uses the term free will. In Lila's Child, he says,...free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels In Lila, he says the same thing,.. ...even at the most fundamental level of the universe, static patterns of values and moral judgements are identical. The 'Laws of Nature' are moral laws. OF COURSE IT SOUNDS PECULIAR AT FIRST and awkward and unnecessary to say that hydrogen and oxygen form water because it is moral to do so. But it is no less peculiar and awkward and unnecessary than to say chemistry professors smoke pipes and go to movies because irresistible cause-and-effect forces of the cosmos force them to do it. IN THE PAST the LOGIC HAS BEEN that if chemistry professors are composed exclusively of atoms and if atoms follow only the laws of cause and effect, then chemistry professors must follow the laws of cause and effect too. But his logic can be applied in A REVERSE DIRECTION. We can just as easily deduce the morality of atoms from the observation that chemistry professor are, in general, moral. If chemistry professors EXERCISE CHOICE, and chemistry professors are composed exclusively of atoms, th en it follows that ATOMS MUST EXERCISE CHOICE TOO. (I had already added the emphasis when presenting this quote to Steve a month ago.) Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Hi dmb, Pirsig's response: Traditionally, this is the meaning of free will. But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. At the lowest inorganic level, the freedom is so small that it can be said that nature follows laws but the quantum theory shows that within the laws the freedom is still there... (Annotn 75) dmb says: Thanks, Andre. Nice work, as usual. This is what I've been saying all along. It probably won't convince Steve... Steve: Convince me of what? I quoted that bit several times and long ago in this discussion. You seemed to have missed the quotes that add something interesting... On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: If the world is composed of values, then who is doing the valuing? ... Pirsig's response to Bodvar: This is a subtle slip back into subject-object thinking. Values have bee converted to a kind of object in this sentence, and then the question is asked, If values are an object,then where is the subject? The answer is found in the MOQ sentence,It is not Lila who has values, it is values that have Lila.Both the subject and the object are patterns of value.( Annotn 76). To further clarify: It's important to remember that both science and Eastern religions regard the individual as an empty concept. It is literally a figure of speech. If you start assigning concrete reality to it, you will find yourself in a philosophic quandary.( Annotn 77) The freewill vs determinism debate can better be restated in terms of preference and probability (which, as Pirsig says, are subsets of value). This makes much more sense, also from an evolutionary perspective where ...Pirsig's particular perception of the universe's evolution [is seen] as being primarily an evolution of values ( Anthony's PhD p 87) Steve: If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a figure of speech. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Steve said to dmb: You seemed to have missed the quotes that add something interesting... dmb says: No, I didn't miss those quotes. I merely focused on one particular quote, the one that utterly defeats your position. Naturally, you breezed right past my actual without any apparent comprehension. As the old saying goes, talking to you is like talking to a brick wall. I made a choice. I selected one quote simply because it was the one most directly relevant to my point. As I see it, your objection is a bogus attempt to evade that point, to change the subject. I think it's pretty damn sleazy. It's like responding to the term checkmate by knocking the board onto the floor. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Steve: If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a figure of speech. Ron: Everything is just a figure of speech Steve, The point remains that you maintain that it is meaningless to discuss free will in the MoQ, when, everything in the MoQ is a figure of speech(what else could it be). The topic then remains about the meaning of the figure of speech called free will of which Pirsig addresses: But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. which is all Dave is saying . He also says this about the value of talking about the individual: it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like 'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they are terms for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their own. (LILA, p158) One then has to ask exactly what you mean when you require that these figures of speech have a metaphysical reality because when we are talking about meaning in the MoQ, It seems that we are definitly NOT talking about any sort of metaphysical reality we are talking about the usefulness of concepts, the values of certain types of values. . Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free will according to the MOQ
Hello Steve, On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 7:40 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote: Steve: If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally are our value choices. Quality has Lila. The question in the MOQ is not about whether the individual possesses free will but whether values themselves are free. Pirsig's answer is that DQ is the free sort. SQ is the non-free sort. Talking about a person choosing one thing or another has no metaphysical reality in the MOQ. It is just a figure of speech. Ron: Everything is just a figure of speech Steve, The point remains that you maintain that it is meaningless to discuss free will in the MoQ, when, everything in the MoQ is a figure of speech(what else could it be). Steve: I don't think talk about free will is meaningless in the MOQ. What becomes meaningless in the MOQ (in the sense that the question gets dissolved rather than answered) is the question of whether we _have_ free will. We should certainly talk about free will just as we talk about other such SOM Platypi that the MOQ completely dissolves. Is the locus of control for human behavior internal or external to the will? is one more version of Is the Quality in the subject or the object? The answer isn't one or the other or some wishy-washy kinda both. The answer is that such questions are based on premises rejected by the MOQ. When we reject the underlying SOM premise, we stop asking such questions. Ron replies: Again, It's the either/or distinction which is dissolved and rejected not the concepts themselves on both accounts, which is where the crux of the dispute lies. It most certainly then IS a wishy-washy both, its only wishy washy when trying to frame it into a rigid system of conception. Free will is following Dynamic Quality keep in mind. It is associated with natural selection and I think you are striking at the most important point with the question you put to Arlo: What experiences could ever distinguish between a will that is determined versus one that is free? Isn't this a distinction without a difference in pragmatic terms? It is a huge distinction in Pragmatic terms, it is the ability to respond to Dynamic Quality it is the ability to adapt and change with environment it is the ability to make choices that evolve an organism toward greater complexity, and in these terms it is the very definition of moral responability within a MoQ. Steve: The theory of free will predicts reality to be exactly as it is. So does the theory of determinism. Ron replies: Now indeed statements like this are a slip back into the either/or conception of theory when Pirsig suggests that there is no longer any need to link the two. As stated below. Ron: The topic then remains about the meaning of the figure of speech called free will of which Pirsig addresses: But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels. which is all Dave is saying . Steve: I posted that quote months ago and am well aware of it. I posted it originally because I think it punches up just how different Pirsig's conception of freedom is compared with the traditional formulation of the question in terms of free will versus determinism. The idea of having it makes no literal sense in the MOQ since freedom is associated with DQ which is no one's possession. Pirsig is saying that if you want to slip into SOM formulations and talk about having free will, then keep in mind that this is the sort of things that rocks have rather than being what separates humans from animals. It is certainly not the logical and necessary basis for moral responsibility like the traditional view of free will. In the MOQ morals go all the way down. They aren't posited as needing a basis but rather ARE the basis of everything. Ron replies: Again you are placing alot of emphasis on a figure of speech that has little impact in the face of that quote below previously stated: Ron: He also says this about the value of talking about the individual: it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like 'substance' they can be used as long as it is remembered that they are terms for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their own. (LILA, p158) Steve: Right, there is no need to get rid of the term the individual but as Pirsig describes what that means in MOQ terms it stops being important to ask whether this collection of patterns _has_ free will. The individual doesn't have values, the values have the individual and it is Value that is distinguished as free (DQ) or constrained (sq). Ron replies: In the similar fashon, the term having may be used as long as one keeps in mind that it is the value of
Re: [MD] Free Will
Mark On Aug 7, 2011, at 9:30 AM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 12:17 PM, 118 ununocti...@gmail.com wrote: I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally. We have the choice to Not do something. Ask someone with Tourette's about free won't. I don't need to, there is little free will there. How about you ask somebody who has to breathe, that is more to your point. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
[MD] free-will
Ms. Albahari's project is to examine self/non-self, but she offers a way of looking at the issue that is very interesting. She addresses the self in terms of 'self' and 'sense of self'. She happens to offers free-will as an example of the way the problem can be approached. ...Let us suppose that hard determinism is correct and that there is no such thing as libertarian free-will (such free-will is incidentally a feature commonly ascribed to the self that will star in later chapters). That is, we are supposing that it is not the case that, given a situation where we seem to exercise agency, we could have actually chosen (all other things being equal) to do otherwise. Every action is fully determined by factors of which none pertain to an agent's freedom to act otherwise. Libertarian free-will does not exist. Yet we can still entertain the idea that many people do harbour a deep-seated sense/belief/assumption/feeling that, given an identical situation, they could have chosen to act otherwise. This assumption of being a free agent, of having free-will, may well be real --- despite the fact that free-will does not, on this scenario, exist. So while (on this given scenario) the sense or assumption of free-will exists, libertarian freew ill does not exist: the deep-seated assumption turns out to be a mistaken one. The hard determinists will attempt to explain the common belief in free-will not in terms of actual free-will --- which would subjectively seem to explain it --- but in terms of cognitive and psychological factors that do not include free-will...) (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of Self ', pp.17-18) I can also see this tying into what Lila says in Chapter 14. Anyway, it might be interesting to look at 'sense of free-will' compared to 'free-will'. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally. We have the choice to Not do something. From the variety of impulses that come to mind, we discard all of those which do not seem appropriate at the time. This is freedom from irrationality. Rational positive choice is sq and has no freedom associated with it. We choose what not to do. Of course the likes of Krimel have covered this in the distant past. Cheers, Mark On Fri, Jul 8, 2011 at 11:43 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote: Suppose we attempt to build a free-will robot. It is designed to walk around town until it reaches an intersection with WALK/DON'T WALK signs. At that point it crosses in the WALK direction. It has the will component but not the free component. So we build in a random number generator. If it generates an odd integer it crosses in the DON'T WALK direction; if an even integer it crosses in the WALK direction. Now it has the free component but not the will component. So we replace the random number generator with memory rules. The robot remembers that crossing in the DON'T WALK direction makes a fine for jaywalking possible that crossing in the DON'T WALK direction makes harm more likely than crossing in the WALK direction. It is also given rules to minimize fines harm. So now the robot acts like we act when we're rational. But humans can act irrationally. So free will is the capacity to act rationally avoid acting irrationally. Craig Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 12:17 PM, 118 ununocti...@gmail.com wrote: I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally. We have the choice to Not do something. Ask someone with Tourette's about free won't. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
[Mark] I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally. We have the choice to Not do something. From the variety of impulses that come to mind, we discard all of those which do not seem appropriate at the time. This is freedom from irrationality. The first last sentences seem contradictory. Craig Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
For your information: http://bigthink.com/ideas/24120 Antonio Damasio: Yeah, exactly, yeah and that we are... we are in fact this hodgepodge of non-conscious and conscious processes with some part of our consciousness trying to ride herd over this mess of non-conscious processes and which of course needs to be very clearly spelled out because you have of course the people that listen to something like what we’re saying and say Oh my God, they’re saying that you have no control over one’s self and one’s behavior and no willpower of any kind. And of course that is false because we do have a measure of control, but it is not true that we have full control and it is not true that when we are executing an action we are necessarily controlling it at that moment consciously. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Craig, On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 3:17 AM, craig...@comcast.net wrote: [Steve] Dynamic Quality is what gets you off the hot stove before you ever _decide_ to get off the hot stove...This is THE paradigmatic example Pirsig uses to show what it means to follow DQ. I submit that this is what we ought to think about in unpacking to the extent that one follows dynamic quality...one's behavior is free. Craig: Back to my earlier example: Suppose we raise an infant in a controlled laboratory environment, where there are surfaces of various temperature. The infant will naturally recoil from surfaces that are too cold or too hot. Suppose that when the infant comes in contact with surfaces in the range of 70-72 degrees F, that we immediately apply an electric shock. Eventually the infant will automatically recoil from surfaces in the 70-72 degree F range to avoid the electric shock it has learned will follow. This is a paradigmatic example of CONDITIONED behavior. Steve: I agree, but I'm not sure what your point is or how it relates free will. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Ian, On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 3:35 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Steve, Much earlier in this debate dmb and Steve were looking at recent Sam Harris position on free-will ... DMB said, [The] neurological determinism of [Sam Harris] is new to me and I think it's just awful. Patricia Churchland, of all people, has criticized him for crude reductionism. She was harsh. And they're pretty good friends! She says she wishes he had waited a couple years to write that book. I agree with that. I'm a big fan of Sam Harris too, but his recent stuff he was touting round the speaking circuit based on his latest book was ill informed on the brain-science aspects, where he is no expert. His reductionism was too greedy to coin a Dennett term. Steve: Harris actually has a phD in neuroscience, so he actually is an expert when it comes to brain science. What position(s) does he hold that he regard as greedy reductionism? dmb: But again, I still can't see what you and dmb are actually disagreeing about when it comes to free-will. Steve: Really? Or is it that you can't see how dmb could still possibly be disagreeing? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ian said to Steve: I'm a big fan of Sam Harris too, but his recent stuff he was touting round the speaking circuit based on his latest book was ill informed on the brain-science aspects, where he is no expert. His reductionism was too greedy to coin a Dennett term. Steve replied: Harris actually has a phD in neuroscience, so he actually is an expert when it comes to brain science. What position(s) does he hold that he regards as greedy reductionism? dmb says: Right. Harris is a neuroscientist. It wouldn't be wrong to call him an expert. In the case I mentioned, Churchland's criticism of Harris's crude reductionism was given in the context of a discussion of her own book on the connections between neurology, evolution and morality. I mean, she is working in the same ball park as Harris AND is she is often criticized as being a reductionist. (You might recall that she and her husband both took a lot of heat for a speculative position known as eliminative materialism.) Ian also said: But again, I still can't see what you and dmb are actually disagreeing about when it comes to free-will. dmb says: It's actually a very trivial dispute but it seems to be destroying the conversation all the same. It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term free will means something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about the MOQ's conception of one's freedom. I don't even use the term all the much but Steve is quite insistent about enforcing this ban all the same. I think this insistence is a pointless distraction based on nothing but Steve's chip. You know, the one he keeps on his shoulder. He is enforcing this ban against the advice of the Stanford encyclopedia, which says... It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. In fact, Steve insists on defying both of these points. He insists on a very strict definition, one that carries metaphysical baggage that's incompatible with the MOQ and, against the second sentence, he insists that human agency is NOT necessary for persons to be morally responsible. As you may have noticed, Steve is unmoved by this sound and simple evidence against his assertions. You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Ian, dmb, dmb says: It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term free will means something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about the MOQ's conception of one's freedom. Steve: This is a lie. I haven't insisted on any particular definition of free will. In fact, I have been happy to let dmb offer whatever definitions he can find from dictionaries. Rather what I have been doing is arguing that the capacity to respond to DQ is incompatible with those definitions. Following DQ is indeed a sort of freedom, but it isn't free will by any common usage of the term most importantly because following DQ doesn't necessarily include any willing. dmb: I don't even use the term all the much but Steve is quite insistent about enforcing this ban all the same. I think this insistence is a pointless distraction based on nothing but Steve's chip. You know, the one he keeps on his shoulder. He is enforcing this ban against the advice of the Stanford encyclopedia, which says... It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. In fact, Steve insists on defying both of these points. He insists on a very strict definition, one that carries metaphysical baggage that's incompatible with the MOQ and, against the second sentence, he insists that human agency is NOT necessary for persons to be morally responsible. As you may have noticed, Steve is unmoved by this sound and simple evidence against his assertions. Steve: That is evidence that free will has been defined in many different ways, and I completely accept that, but it is not a license to just use the term to mean whatever you want it to mean and hope to be understood. For example, it doesn't say that it is OK to use the term free will to describe situations where there is no conscious willing involved such as an amoeba moving away from acid or hopping off a hot stove before you even become consciously aware of the low quality. It seems quite reasonable to insist that free will must involve will to make any sense. And given the qualifiers for the most part and not exclusively this quote does not support your claim that moral responsibility is inextricably tied up with free will. In fact it implies that at least some philosopher haven't taken it to be. So no, this is not evidence against anything I've said. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said to Ian: It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term free will means something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about the MOQ's conception of one's freedom. Steve replied: This is a lie. ... what I have been doing is arguing that the capacity to respond to DQ is incompatible with those definitions. Following DQ is indeed a sort of freedom, but it isn't free will by any common usage of the term most importantly because following DQ doesn't necessarily include any willing. dmb says: Huh? What is the difference between my lie and your correction of it? I do not see any difference. I said you are defining the term so that we cannot right use it while talking about the MOQ's version of freedom and you said the MOQ's version of freedom is incompatible with any usage of the term free will. How is that NOT saying exactly the same thing. And even if they are just pretty close to the same thing, I still like to know how could that be considered a lie? Steve said: That [Stanford quote] is evidence that free will has been defined in many different ways, and I completely accept that, but it is not a license to just use the term to mean whatever you want it to mean and hope to be understood. For example, it doesn't say that it is OK to use the term free will to describe situations where there is no conscious willing involved such as an amoeba moving away from acid or hopping off a hot stove before you even become consciously aware of the low quality. It seems quite reasonable to insist that free will must involve will to make any sense. dmb says: Use the term to mean whatever I want? That is ridiculous. The dictionary defines free will as the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate. That basic definition works just fine in my sentences and in the MOQ. An example of both at same time would be, To the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, one is free to act without the constraints of necessity or fate. That sentence doesn't differ in any important way from Pirsig's assertion about one's freedom. It is you and your insistence on enforcing a fake, made-up rule that keeps loading the term up with all sorts of metaphysical baggage. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
[Steve] Dynamic Quality is what gets you off the hot stove before you ever _decide_ to get off the hot stove...This is THE paradigmatic example Pirsig uses to show what it means to follow DQ. I submit that this is what we ought to think about in unpacking to the extent that one follows dynamic quality...one's behavior is free. Back to my earlier example: Suppose we raise an infant in a controlled laboratory environment, where there are surfaces of various temperature. The infant will naturally recoil from surfaces that are too cold or too hot. Suppose that when the infant comes in contact with surfaces in the range of 70-72 degrees F, that we immediately apply an electric shock. Eventually the infant will automatically recoil from surfaces in the 70-72 degree F range to avoid the electric shock it has learned will follow. This is a paradigmatic example of CONDITIONED behavior. Craig Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve, Much earlier in this debate dmb and Steve were looking at recent Sam Harris position on free-will ... DMB said, [The] neurological determinism of [Sam Harris] is new to me and I think it's just awful. Patricia Churchland, of all people, has criticized him for crude reductionism. She was harsh. And they're pretty good friends! She says she wishes he had waited a couple years to write that book. I agree with that. I'm a big fan of Sam Harris too, but his recent stuff he was touting round the speaking circuit based on his latest book was ill informed on the brain-science aspects, where he is no expert. His reductionism was too greedy to coin a Dennett term. But again, I still can't see what you and dmb are actually disagreeing about when it comes to free-will. I can see in the exchange with John, the problem area may be more with the we (our patterns and values) rather than the will (which is also our patterns and values) ? Ian Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Instead of asking Do humans have free will?, why not try using reverse-reverse engineering to answer the question? Assume you are an all-powerful creator, how would you create an entity with free will? You would give it life, consciousness, perception, memory, et al. Is there any characteristic you would have to give it, that humans do not have? How would you test to see if you were successful? Craig Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb says: If you deny free will, then by definition you are a determinist. If you then deny determinism too, then you are simply incoherent. Call me a dick if you like, but this is a real criticism and you have not answered it, as far as I can tell. Steve: How can you say that I haven't answered? I've answered that charge probably 50 times at this point. And the thing is, you deny free will too! When I say what it is that I'm denying, you accuse me of setting up a straw man. But that straw man is what pretty much everyone takes free will to mean. Consult any dictionary on the subject. You've insisted to Marsha that she use standard dictionary definitions, but Pirsig's redefinition of free will as the capacity to respond to DQ is not at all what is typically meant by the term. Why can't you admit that? When Pirsig reformulated the question of freedom (and he quickly dropped the term will), what he described is not some faculty to be excessed or not. It is not the thing deep within each soul that adjudicates between competing values. It is not the possession of a person who can claim to have it. It is the groundstuff of reality. This concept is so different from the SOM concept of free will that it would be better not to use that term to avoid confusion. Let's just call it DQ. Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that shorthand helpful even around here? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve: Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that shorthand helpful even around here? Ron: Compatibilism in this context has been around for quite some time and believe it or not would be understood by more than this forum. If you do a quick search on the topic you find that there would not be much confusion at all in using these terms. As Stanford encyclopedia writes: .1 Free Will It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ . Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ron, http://www.answers.com/topic/weasel-word Marsha On Jul 31, 2011, at 1:37 PM, X Acto wrote: if you cant respond in a relevent way to the post. take your DMB hate some place else I don't remember you or Steve mentioning anything about the terms or meanings in a philosophical context at all either You claim not to care yet continue to post hate regardless and Steve claims that it is a meaningless topic of discussion, similar to locke. Yet the fact remains it is a relevent topic of discussion regardless. Especially when we are speaking about a moral Philosophy it remains a topic for the sheer reason that it is dissolved by the explansion of the explanation not by a denial of there even needing one. - Original Message From: MarshaV val...@att.net To: moq_disc...@moqtalk.org Sent: Sun, July 31, 2011 12:47:49 PM Subject: Re: [MD] Free Will Strange, Ron, I don't remember dmb's explanation addressing compatibilism. Actually, I don't remember dmb presenting being much of an explanation either. On Jul 31, 2011, at 12:19 PM, X Acto wrote: Steve: Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that shorthand helpful even around here? Ron: Compatibilism in this context has been around for quite some time and believe it or not would be understood by more than this forum. If you do a quick search on the topic you find that there would not be much confusion at all in using these terms. As Stanford encyclopedia writes: .1 Free Will It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ . ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve said: Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that shorthand helpful even around here? dmb says: I think that objection is super-flimsy for one simple reason. We are not talking to people outside this forum. Put another way, the discussion is between people who are perfectly well aware of the fact that we are discussing Pirsig's view. You are literally making a mess for the sake of unnamed people who are not here and do not care what we say to each other. Come to think of it, flimsy might be a bit too generous. Ron quoted the Stanford encyclopedia on Free Will: It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. dmb says: Thanks, Ron. It probably goes without saying, but the guy who wrote the Stanford article did not have our conversation in mind. He could be talking about anyone who tries to define to term too specifically or narrowly but it certainly applies to what you've been done to the term, which is to superglue it to SOM assumptions. But, he says, despite the variations in meaning, the question of free will is centrally and almost exclusively about human agency, which is necessary for persons to be morally responsible. Human agency is another names for free will. And in Pirsig's formulation is about the extent to which one is free. Come on, Steve, everybody knows we are talking about the MOQ's reformulation of free will and determinism, regardless of what you call it. It simply isn't true that the term is welded to Descartes or to the Church and even if it were we could cut that connection with the analytic knife. I think you're gumming up the works by insisting on observing a rule that never existed in the first place. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 4:45 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Steve said: Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that shorthand helpful even around here? dmb says: I think that objection is super-flimsy for one simple reason. We are not talking to people outside this forum. Put another way, the discussion is between people who are perfectly well aware of the fact that we are discussing Pirsig's view. You are literally making a mess for the sake of unnamed people who are not here and do not care what we say to each other. Come to think of it, flimsy might be a bit too generous. Ron quoted the Stanford encyclopedia on Free Will: It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. dmb says: Thanks, Ron. It probably goes without saying, but the guy who wrote the Stanford article did not have our conversation in mind. He could be talking about anyone who tries to define to term too specifically or narrowly but it certainly applies to what you've been done to the term, which is to superglue it to SOM assumptions. But, he says, despite the variations in meaning, the question of free will is centrally and almost exclusively about human agency, which is necessary for persons to be morally responsible. Human agency is another names for free will. And in Pirsig's formulation is about the extent to which one is free. Come on, Steve, everybody knows we are talking about the MOQ's reformulation of free will and determinism, regardless of what you call it. It simply isn't true that the term is welded to Descartes or to the Church and even if it were we could cut that connection with the analytic knife. I think you're gumming up the works by insisting on observing a rule that never existed in the first place. Steve: I accept that human agency is another name for free will, but I can't see how Pirsig's the extent to which definition in terms of whether one follows DQ versus static quality answers the question of agency or has anything to do with moral responsibility. That's why I think you are smuggling the SOM version of free will in the back door. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 1:37 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote: ... Steve claims that it is a meaningless topic of discussion, similar to locke. Yet the fact remains it is a relevent topic of discussion regardless. Especially when we are speaking about a moral Philosophy it remains a topic for the sheer reason that it is dissolved by the explansion of the explanation not by a denial of there even needing one. I do NOT think that free will is a meaningless topic, as I've said to you a few times before. (Why do you keep saying this in spite of my denials?) What I've said is that the MOQ denies both horns of the traditional free will determinism dilemma and replaces it with Pirsig's the extent to which one follows DQ/sq formulation of the question of freedom. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve said: ...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John replied: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. ... dmb says: Yes, of course the question of free will is about whether or not we have any free will. Knowing something about HOW choices are made can inform your opinion as to whether we are determined or free, but that certainly is the question. This seems to be just of one of several ways in which Steve has confused that question. One of the biggest problem in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Take a look at these lines from Harris's blog and then tell me if you don't think he's a classic SOM determinist. Sam writes, ...You seem to be an agent acting of your own free will. The problem, however, is that this point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the human brain. All of our behavior can be traced to biological events about which we have no conscious knowledge: this has always suggested that free will is an illusion. ...The truth seems inescapable: I, as the subject of my experience, cannot know what I will next think or do until a thought or intention arises; and thoughts and intentions are caused by physical events and mental stirrings of which I am not aware. Of course, many scientists and philosophers realized long before the advent of experimental neuroscience that free will could not be squared with an understanding of the physical world. ...If the laws of nature do not strike most of us as incompatible with free will, it is because we have not imagined how human action would appear if all cause-and-effect relationships were understood. ...we cannot help but let our notions of freedom and responsibility travel up the puppet’s strings to the hand that controls them. ...Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, willpower, etc., are causal states of the brain, leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors lead to outcomes in the world. That's enough. You get the idea Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dmb, I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again. Marsha: Three questions: Have you dropped the words 'free-will' and 'determinism'? If you are using new words please define them clearly? Please clearly explain the reformulation as you understand? If you are not using 'free-will' and 'determinism' as defined in the dictionary, than you must agree that I was correct to neither accept 'free-will' and 'determinism', nor reject 'free-will' and 'determinism'. They are irrelevant within the MoQ. Of course, you are about to explain the new words to use and new understanding. I look forward to your explanations. Marsha On Jul 26, 2011, at 10:53 AM, david buchanan wrote: Steve said: ...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John replied: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. ... dmb says: Yes, of course the question of free will is about whether or not we have any free will. Knowing something about HOW choices are made can inform your opinion as to whether we are determined or free, but that certainly is the question. This seems to be just of one of several ways in which Steve has confused that question. One of the biggest problem in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Take a look at these lines from Harris's blog and then tell me if you don't think he's a classic SOM determinist. Sam writes, ...You seem to be an agent acting of your own free will. The problem, however, is that this point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the human brain. All of our behavior can be traced to biological events about which we have no conscious knowledge: this has always suggested that free will is an illusion. ...The truth seems inescapable: I, as the subject of my experience, cannot know what I will next think or do until a thought or intention arises; and thoughts and intentions are caused by physical events and mental stirrings of which I am not aware. Of course, many scientists and philosophers realized long before the advent of experimental neuroscience that free will could not be squared with an understanding of the physical world. ...If the laws of nature do not strike most of us as incompatible with free will, it is because we have not imagined how human action would appear if all cause-and-effect relationships were understood. ...we cannot help but let our notions of freedom and responsibility travel up the puppet’s strings to the hand that controls them. ...Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, willpower, etc., are causal states of the brain, leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors lead to outcomes in the world. That's enough. You get the idea Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Come on, dmb, how about answering the questions instead of conflating Steve and Sam Harris... Marsha On Jul 26, 2011, at 11:49 AM, MarshaV wrote: Dmb, I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again. Marsha: Three questions: Have you dropped the words 'free-will' and 'determinism'? If you are using new words please define them clearly? Please clearly explain the reformulation as you understand? If you are not using 'free-will' and 'determinism' as defined in the dictionary, than you must agree that I was correct to neither accept 'free-will' and 'determinism', nor reject 'free-will' and 'determinism'. They are irrelevant within the MoQ. Of course, you are about to explain the new words to use and new understanding. I look forward to your explanations. Marsha On Jul 26, 2011, at 10:53 AM, david buchanan wrote: Steve said: ...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John replied: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. ... dmb says: Yes, of course the question of free will is about whether or not we have any free will. Knowing something about HOW choices are made can inform your opinion as to whether we are determined or free, but that certainly is the question. This seems to be just of one of several ways in which Steve has confused that question. One of the biggest problem in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Take a look at these lines from Harris's blog and then tell me if you don't think he's a classic SOM determinist. Sam writes, ...You seem to be an agent acting of your own free will. The problem, however, is that this point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the human brain. All of our behavior can be traced to biological events about which we have no conscious knowledge: this has always suggested that free will is an illusion. ...The truth seems inescapable: I, as the subject of my experience, cannot know what I will next think or do until a thought or intention arises; and thoughts and intentions are caused by physical events and mental stirrings of which I am not aware. Of course, many scientists and philosophers realized long before the advent of experimental neuroscience that free will could not be squared with an understanding of the physical world. ...If the laws of nature do not strike most of us as incompatible with free will, it is because we have not imagined how human action would appear if all cause-and-effect relationships were understood. ...we cannot help but let our notions of freedom and responsibility travel up the puppet’s strings to the hand that controls them. ...Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, willpower, etc., are causal states of the brain, leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors lead to outcomes in the world. That's enough. You get the idea Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dmb, Let me add one more question: If you think within the MoQ that free-will and determinism have new definitions, please offer them... Many thanks, Marsha On Jul 26, 2011, at 11:49 AM, MarshaV wrote: Dmb, I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again. Marsha: Three questions: Have you dropped the words 'free-will' and 'determinism'? If you are using new words please define them clearly? Please clearly explain the reformulation as you understand? If you are not using 'free-will' and 'determinism' as defined in the dictionary, than you must agree that I was correct to neither accept 'free-will' and 'determinism', nor reject 'free-will' and 'determinism'. They are irrelevant within the MoQ. Of course, you are about to explain the new words to use and new understanding. I look forward to your explanations. Marsha On Jul 26, 2011, at 10:53 AM, david buchanan wrote: Steve said: ...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John replied: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. ... dmb says: Yes, of course the question of free will is about whether or not we have any free will. Knowing something about HOW choices are made can inform your opinion as to whether we are determined or free, but that certainly is the question. This seems to be just of one of several ways in which Steve has confused that question. One of the biggest problem in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Take a look at these lines from Harris's blog and then tell me if you don't think he's a classic SOM determinist. Sam writes, ...You seem to be an agent acting of your own free will. The problem, however, is that this point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the human brain. All of our behavior can be traced to biological events about which we have no conscious knowledge: this has always suggested that free will is an illusion. ...The truth seems inescapable: I, as the subject of my experience, cannot know what I will next think or do until a thought or intention arises; and thoughts and intentions are caused by physical events and mental stirrings of which I am not aware. Of course, many scientists and philosophers realized long before the advent of experimental neuroscience that free will could not be squared with an understanding of the physical world. ...If the laws of nature do not strike most of us as incompatible with free will, it is because we have not imagined how human action would appear if all cause-and-effect relationships were understood. ...we cannot help but let our notions of freedom and responsibility travel up the puppet’s strings to the hand that controls them. ...Decisions, intentions, efforts, goals, willpower, etc., are causal states of the brain, leading to specific behaviors, and behaviors lead to outcomes in the world. That's enough. You get the idea Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 10:53 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Steve said: ...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John replied: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. ... dmb says: Yes, of course the question of free will is about whether or not we have any free will. Knowing something about HOW choices are made can inform your opinion as to whether we are determined or free, but that certainly is the question. This seems to be just of one of several ways in which Steve has confused that question. Steve: Oh, is that it? Now I don't even understand what the question of free will is? Look, we KNOW we make choices. We have pizza instead of sushi or whatever. The question in the ancient free will/determinism debate is whether that sort of choice is made freely or is determined by forces external to the will. dmb: One of the biggest problem in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Steve: That's just another of your attempts to misrepresent my position rather than engaging in honest intellectual discussion. What I have said countless times at this point is that the MOQ denies both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma (a position which it appears you have finally come around to), and since Sam Harris never uses the words dynamic and static quality (or even ever talks about metaphysics except for his footnote favoring realism over pragmatism in TEOF), I am confident that his his view is completely INcompatible with the the MOQ's reformulation of the problem. And WTF? Sam Harris was one of your heroes not very long ago. You loved his book. You called him a rockstar. Why are you hating on him all the sudden? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said: ... One of the biggest problems in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation and the result is not pretty. Steve: That's just another of your attempts to misrepresent my position rather than engaging in honest intellectual discussion. dmb says: Dishonest? Misrepresent your views? I'm fairly certain that this whole free will debated began when you posted Sam Harris quotes on the issue. His name and those quotes slowly faded into the background but you've maintained the basic ideas. Anyway, you can quibble about the details if you like, but there is nothing dishonest about the idea that you're mixing Sam and the MOQ on this issue. Anyone who doubts it can check the archives. Steve continued: What I have said countless times at this point is that the MOQ denies both horns of the traditional SOM free will/determinism dilemma (a position which it appears you have finally come around to), and... dmb says: Come around to denying both horns, to deny both free will and determinism? No, I don't get that. I've tried several times to explain why I think that notion is logically impossible. Doesn't Pirsig say we are free to some extent and determined to some extent? That's not denying both horns. That's more like a partial affirmation of both horns, a new form of compatibilism. Steve continued: ...since Sam Harris never uses the words dynamic and static quality (or even ever talks about metaphysics except for his footnote favoring realism over pragmatism in TEOF), I am confident that his his view is completely INcompatible with the the MOQ's reformulation of the problem. dmb says: Well, okay, But you are the one who brought him into it and you have been denying free will, just as he does. I know, you say you deny determinism too. But that's what I do not get. If you deny free will, then by definition you are a determinist. If you then deny determinism too, then you are simply incoherent. Call me a dick if you like, but this is a real criticism and you have not answered it, as far as I can tell. Steve said: And WTF? Sam Harris was one of your heroes not very long ago. You loved his book. You called him a rockstar. Why are you hating on him all the sudden? dmb says: I don't hate Sam. But this neurological determinism of his is new to me and I think it's just awful. Patricia Churchland, of all people, has criticized him for crude reductionism. She was harsh. And they're pretty good friends! She says she wishes he had waited a couple years to write that book. Anyway, by mixing the MOQ with Sam's views I think you've come up with a kind of value determinism and I'm criticizing you for it. I think it's ...not pretty. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Steve, Some month ago you said: On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 8:36 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.comwrote: Hi John, I'm packing for a short trip, but quickly... You concede that free will is redundant, but below in response to my claim that we don't choose our values but rather we ARE our values you said that Choice and valuing are synonomous. Is what I've been saying. John: Ah. Then it's all cleared up then. yay. We fundamentally agree. Steve: What we choose is what we value. What we value is what we choose. Individuality IS our choice, so thus it could be said that we don't make choices, we ARE our choices. That's just as true and points to the fundamentalness of choice as well. If, as you say, we ARE our choices and values and choices are, as you say, synonymous, that it sounds like you are ready to agree that we ARE our values. But then, saying we choose our values seems empty. John: Well, only because it's so obvious. But that's no refutation, fer sure. Steve: We choose our choices? Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made. John: Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether it's possible to choose, to freely decide. To choose between given alternatives is the only freedom I can imagine and yet there are those who make choices beyond the merely given, and they are geniuses and source of DQ to our species. But I believe individuality is itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices, choices make us. And yes, I think that is the exact opposite of determinism. I guess I have no real bone to pick with you. It's that Sam Harris guy I find ridiculous. Mebbe I should write to him instead of Hawking. So many idiots, so little time... John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Happy Independence Day Steve! about 3 weeks late... On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:58 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.comwrote: Steve: To my knowledge Pirsig never talks about responsibility, but he does talk about freedom. In fact in his preface to ZAMM he describes freedom as merely a negative and therefore a lousy goal, and he describes ZAMM itself as offering a positive alternative to freedom that can serve as a positive goal, namely Quality. Pirsig: The hippies had in mind something that they wanted, and were calling it “freedom,” but in the final analysis “freedom” is a purely negative goal. John: Freedom's just another word, for nuthin left to lose Some hippie chick sang that and I've always admired the thought. I think Bob might have gone a little overboard on his rhetoric on his quote. the final analysis hadn't actually been made yet. He shoulda said, his latest analysis. 'twould have been the truer statement. But I think Lila clears some of this up because if you equate intellectual and social freedom with DQ, you see it's a lot more than a merely negative goal. And even though the hippies didn't articulate it all that well (how could they? bein' as stoned as they were?) I think they were on to something our chemistry professor might have missed. When you're stuck in a stultifyingly static social system, breaking out of that system is the highest good imaginable from within that system. when you are in prison, Freedom is the only Quality you can imagine. And it's as positive as it gets. Pirsig: It just says something is bad. Hippies weren’t really offering any alternatives other than colorful short-term ones, and some of these were looking more and more like pure degeneracy. Degeneracy can be fun but it’s hard to keep up as a serious lifetime occupation. John: Well, if you can't make fun a serious lifetime occupation, what do you recommend? My old friend Steve used to work on the F-111. I think karma-wise, the world would be better off with fun-loving hippies. Steve: You see? The freedom you think I am undermining is something that Pirsig thinks is a negative rather than THEE foundation for moral responsibility, and he even hangs his hat on having offered us a positive alternative for freedom. And like I said, I think Lila's introduction of DQ ties it all together nicely. In the final analysis... well, my latest final analysis. John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ho Dan: And Harris does seem to be missing out on the most vital ingredient... Dynamic Quality. But so does pragmatism, from what I understand. That is RMP's great insight, is it not? Yes yes and more yes. I believe what we are exploring, is the relation of dynamic to free. See, to my mind they are synonomous because when we use the term dynamic, we mean something that is unconstrained by existing conditions. Of any two choices, the one that lead to more dynamicism is also the one that leads to more freedom. They are identical in meaning, ultimately. Is what I've been going on about for some time. John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi All -- Rose and I were away on a relaxing vacation in the Berkshires for a few days, while you folks stretched this topic into yet another week. There were 176 messages in my e-mail box when we returned today, at least half of them on the Free Will dilemma. It's enough to make a grown man cry! Joe was sticking with his IMHO that only the emotional level processes DQ. Indefinable emotions create the values for the hues of our choice for the intellectual level. Steve was saying that Determinism is denied with a world composed of nothing but value, and it is meaningless to add the word 'free' in claiming 'free will'. I think that's metaphysically significant. Craig tried to reduce the issue to three questions: 1) Is there a real (as opposed to illusionary) experience that we call free will? 2) If so, is 'free will' a good term to describe this experience? 3) Also if so, is the traditional explanation or an explanation in MoQ terms better? His conclusion: 3) is the issue we should work on. Dmb said: ...Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level - and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Ian may have unwittingly put his finger on the crux of this dilemma when he said: We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of argumentation that created them. (With apologies to Einstein.) The argumentation that has created the Free Will problem is stated as follows by the MoQ author: In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. What Pirsig is telling us is that there is no Free Will. The logic here is elementary, once it is realized that behavior must be controlled by either static patterns or Dynamic Quality. The phrase to the extent that one follows does not allow for preference OR choice, since if one does not follow DQ his behavior necessarily is controlled by SQ. In other words, there are no options to Quality Control. The issue is not an argument about Determinism vs. Free Will--even though MoQ's Quality determines actions. It's an argument about dogma; specifically, the doctrine that there is no free agent. And this is what is so repulsive to people like me who not only believe in Freedom but who view the world as designed explicitly for man's (autonomous) realization of Value. In the absence of individual freedom, human existence has no meaning. Man's perceptions, emotional responses, preferences, moral and intellectual judgments, creativity, and ultimate destiny are all controlled by a cosmic force called Quality. This is not what the Creator had in mind. And it's not what Mr. Pirsig wanted to say in so many words, hence the euphemism to the extent that one follows. But let's not mince words or fudge meanings when it comes to understanding his principle. Either we are free to carry out our lives in accordance with our value sensibility or we are slaves to an involuntary existence. Valuistically yours, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is CONTROLLED by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one FOLLOWS Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (Pirsig) [Dan] When we FOLLOW static patterns of quality, we are without choice. Note that Pirsig says CONTROLLED not FOLLOW. He leaves it open whether we can choose to follow static patterns. [Dan] Marriage is a social pattern of quality predicated on monogamy. There is no choice involved once two people are married. Not so. Couples can agree on an open marriage where there are other sexual choices possible or on spouse swapping where respective partners are are paired with another couple. Craig Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On 7/13/11 8:59 AM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote: snip This is not what the Creator had in mind. And it's not what Mr. Pirsig wanted to say in so many words, hence the euphemism to the extent that one follows. But let's not mince words or fudge meanings when it comes to understanding his principle. Either we are free to carry out our lives in accordance with our value sensibility or we are slaves to an involuntary existence. Valuistically yours, Ham snip Hi Ham and all, Mathematics has had a good run in the last few centuries. What is not decided in the language of mathematics is: What am I talking about? And now the mathematician decides the logic of what the Creator has in mind. I prefer to leave the mind of the creator in the DQ bin. Joe Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 1:30 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote: In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is CONTROLLED by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one FOLLOWS Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (Pirsig) [Dan] When we FOLLOW static patterns of quality, we are without choice. Note that Pirsig says CONTROLLED not FOLLOW. He leaves it open whether we can choose to follow static patterns. Can you say: clutching at straws? There. I knew you could. [Dan] Marriage is a social pattern of quality predicated on monogamy. There is no choice involved once two people are married. Not so. Couples can agree on an open marriage where there are other sexual choices possible or on spouse swapping where respective partners are are paired with another couple. Craig I already addressed this, Craig. Re-read my post. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi DMB This I agree with DMB I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This though confuses two aspects of causation itself: DMB This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Even when exercising freedom and choice, we nevertheless expect causal relations between what we choose, and the intended outcomes (Steve made this point with reference to Dennett). In both cases determinism or free-will, we all need to recognise that causation is not a simple hard one-way effect (not even at the physical level at you say) hence woollier preference implying more complex uncertain interacting effects at play. The word preference does also imply choice - but many different patterns and all levels making choices, patterns that both free will and determinism are made of. Causation is simply a useful linguistic metaphor as if one thing mechanistically caused another. Pirsig is reminding us not to forget that is always merely a convention. BTW - Dennett offers the distinction between greedy reductionist view of determinism being contrary to free-will, and the more enlightened view that free-will and determinism co-exist in more complex patterns. I suspect Steve also mentioned that already. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 8:28 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote: Steve: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make sense as questions. If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. Ron: Oh, if we use prefference, rather than choice then you can chill. we can have a discussion all day about PREFFERING our values but as soon as we use the term choice it becomes meaningless. Steve: Though I am glad to discuss and am quite chill, I don't think that helps. Preferring our values is just to say we value our values, which is tautological. Ron: I dunno...if we are framing the discussion, note, discussion..not dilemma,, for the DILEMMA disapears.. in MoQ then the terms we use should'nt make a difference, because in a MoQ frame work their meaning is the same. Steve: I think this is what I was saying to dmb about the word cause. The MOQ reinterprets causation (like it reinterprets everything) in terns of value. In the case of free will, Pirsig sees the underlying question as concerned with freedom which he has much to say about, but he drops the SOM notion of the will. Ron: seems like you are the only one hung up and haunted by the terms and their former implications so much so, you cant even submit to the idea that when we speak about the distinction of freewill and determinism we are talking about the distinction between dynamic and static Quality sans the either/or Dilemma. Steve: No, I agree that Pirsig reformulates the old SOM debate in terms of static and dynamic quality. Ron: Taking away the either/or Dilemma takes away certainy, absolute truth,, ect..all those conepts you insist are still invoked with the usage of the terms, those terms do not change the context, context changes the usage. Steve: I think the MOQ also drops the notion that the freedom question is about causes internal to (subjective) or external to (objective) the will. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said: ...That's WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level - and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Dan replied: Lets consult LILA in an effort to clear things up. This is what RMP says about replacing causality with value: The only difference between causation and value is that the word cause implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of value is one of preference. Note that he states THE ONLY DIFFERENCE... he says nothing about introducing choice, only preference. dmb says: He says nothing about choice, only preference? To have a choice means that you can choose or decide when faced with two or more options. It means you can express your preference for one of the options over the others. I mean, given the meaning of the terms choice and preference, it seems quite strange to embrace one and reject the other. Their definitions aren't exactly the same but I can't see any important difference between those terms. As I read it, my claim and the Pirsig quote say exactly the same. Where I said causality refers to a law-like mechanical obedience, Pirsig says causation implies absolute certainty. Those are two ways of saying the same thing. Where I said the switch to preferences introduces freedom and choice even among the most predictable patterns, Pirsig says the implied meaning of value is one of preference - as opposed to the absolute law-like certainty. We can easily say that is the only difference between causation and values and still say it's a very BIG difference with very big implications. Dan said: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. dmb says: Value does not introduce choice? Choice implies certainty? Are you pulling my leg? At this point I have to ask what you mean by the word choice because I think you're just plain wrong here. Choice is what you get when the certainty of causality is removed. Making a choice is an expression of our preferences. To choose is to select one option among other options. Steve keeps saying that it makes no sense to say we choose our values because we ARE our values. But this seems to assume that there are no conflicts between our values, as if we can follow biological values and intellectual values without any contradictions or tensions, as if we are monolithic or fully harmonized, as if we were determined by our values instead of the laws of causality. This just puts us right back into the determinist soup again. This removes richness and complexity and the unpredictable Dynamic component too. As Pirsig paints it in the larger picture, everybody is engaged in struggle with the patterns of their own lives. Lila's battle is everybody's battle, he says. The captain is dominated by intellectual values while Richard Rigel is dominated by social level values and Lila is mostly limited to biological values - and she suffers greatly for it. Her options are extremely limited - the captain guesses she'll end up in church life or a mental hospital, if not the grave. Rigel is just one of those keep-your-nose-clean types. He's the one who will likely take Lila to church to get her all cleaned up - and considering her extremely low status, that would be an improvement. Rigel has a larger range of options than Lila but he's more or less limited to social level conventions and morals. The captain is a hyper-intellectual but he's also really looking forward to the openness of the ocean, which is a very nice metaphor for DQ. Quality is what you like. We prefer the choice cuts of meat in the butcher shop window and we are willing to pay more for them. This is static and even routine. But following DQ means we are led forward by a dim apprehension of we know not what. It just seem like the right direction even if we don't see where it's going to lead us. Quality is what you like in that case too. As a practical, everyday matter we are constantly making choices because our values are so often in conflict with one another. We cannot simply follow these static patterns because they would lead us in several different directions at once. I mean, a married person cannot indulge in novel nookie and at the same time choose to be faithful. These options are mutually exclusive and so we have to choose one or the other even though, on some level, we value both. And so it is with the whole jungle of preferences, wherein we struggle with value
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve said: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. ...If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. Ron replied: Oh, if we use preference, rather than choice then you can chill. We can have a discussion all day about PREFFERING our values but as soon as we use the term choice it becomes meaningless. When we choose/follow the dynamic in our lives, it's not the same as preferring it.. When we choose/follow the determined static in our lives, its not the same as preffering it... ...Seems like you are the only one hung up and haunted by the terms and their former implications so much so, you can't even submit to the idea that when we speak about the distinction of freewill and determinism we are talking about the distinction between dynamic and static Quality sans the either/or Dilemma. Taking away the either/or Dilemma takes away certainy, absolute truth,, ect..all those conepts you insist are still invoked with the usage of the terms, those terms do not change the context, context changes the usage. dmb says: Yep. Steve is operating as if any word that has ever been associated with SOM is permanently and irreversibly infected with some metaphysical disease - and he does so regardless of how the terms are actually being used or qualified or put into an entirely different metaphysical context. That's what the MOQ's switch from causality to values and preferences does; it puts the issue of free will and determinism into a completely different metaphysical context so that they are no longer mutually exclusive choices. That's what dilemma means and that's why we speak of dilemmas as having two horns. In a dilemma, you're faced with getting gored by one or the other. In the MOQ it is not just one or the other and so it's not a dilemma. Anyway, Steve's hang up with these terms has actual negative consequences. Because of his insistence that terms like choice and will are inherently and irrevocably married to the assumptions of SOM, he has saddled me with all sorts of claims that I never made or even explicitly denied. At various points, he has construed my statements as advocating pre-destination, the divine soul, a metaphysical entity called Free Will and as advocating SOM, just to name a few off the top of my head. I really don't see how an honest person could attribute such views to anything I've said. And so I denied it, of course, and accused Steve of making stuff up. And when I complain about these wild distortions, he calls me a dick. That's called adding insult to injury. Plus it's just confusing and it total frustrates any effort to gain clarity on these issues. That's the real problem. A few insults and over-heated reactions are just normal and they're no big deal. But to insist that ordina ry words necessarily carry all the metaphysical baggage that's ever been loaded upon them is to insist that we can't ever use them in any other way and that just ain't so. Nobody has to assert the existence of an immortal soul in order to assert human freedom. You don't have to subscribe to the metaphysics of substance to believe that restraints are real. And since NOBODY around here is saying any such thing, Steve's objections are meaningless. They're aimed at claims that nobody made. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb says: Yep. Steve is operating as if any word that has ever been associated with SOM is permanently and irreversibly infected with some metaphysical disease - and he does so regardless of how the terms are actually being used or qualified or put into an entirely different metaphysical context. Steve: That's true, and in fact, isn't this exactly what you are insisting on with regard to the word cause. dmb: Anyway, Steve's hang up with these terms has actual negative consequences. Because of his insistence that terms like choice and will are inherently and irrevocably married to the assumptions of SOM, he has saddled me with all sorts of claims that I never made or even explicitly denied. Steve: But that isn't what I do with such terms. I have repeatedly said that we make choices and have the subjective sense of willing or intending many of the things we do. What I have questioned is in what way does it make sense to say that willing is free or to reify this subjective sense of willing into a belief in a self that comes before and explains this subjective feeling. In the MOQ, though, freedom is an issue of dynamic versus static quality. Free will gets reinterpreted as the capacity to respond to DQ rather than the capacity to freely choose among a set of options. (By the way, no one on any side of the free determinism denies that human beings make choices. The SOM question is always, what is the _basis_ of such choices? Are they imposed by external objective forces or willed internally by a free subject? These are, of course, SOM questions that an MOQer doesn't have. The basis of choice is simply Quality.) dmb: At various points, he has construed my statements as advocating pre-destination, the divine soul, a metaphysical entity called Free Will and as advocating SOM, just to name a few off the top of my head. I really don't see how an honest person could attribute such views to anything I've said. And so I denied it, of course, and accused Steve of making stuff up. And when I complain about these wild distortions, he calls me a dick. Steve: You can probably imagine that I see the situation somewhat differently, that is, unless you are as narcissistic as you so often seem to be. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi dmb, On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:15 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Steve keeps saying that it makes no sense to say we choose our values because we ARE our values. But this seems to assume that there are no conflicts between our values, as if we can follow biological values and intellectual values without any contradictions or tensions, as if we are monolithic or fully harmonized, as if we were determined by our values instead of the laws of causality. Steve: I don't assume that these is no conflict between our values. No SOMer even thinks that. What I deny in denying the SOM notion of free will is that there is something called the will that adjudicates between values in such cases. In the MOQ, the only thing that can settle a conflict between values is another value or DQ. Again, in the MOQ, free will is NOT reinterpreted as the capability to make choices. We DO make choices, but that's not what Pirsig means by free will. He redefines free will in MOQ terms as the capability to respond to DQ. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 9:15 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: dmb said: ...That's WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level - and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Dan replied: Lets consult LILA in an effort to clear things up. This is what RMP says about replacing causality with value: The only difference between causation and value is that the word cause implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of value is one of preference. Note that he states THE ONLY DIFFERENCE... he says nothing about introducing choice, only preference. dmb says: He says nothing about choice, only preference? To have a choice means that you can choose or decide when faced with two or more options. It means you can express your preference for one of the options over the others. I mean, given the meaning of the terms choice and preference, it seems quite strange to embrace one and reject the other. Their definitions aren't exactly the same but I can't see any important difference between those terms. Dan: The difference is subtle, I agree. If I choose to do something, I do it. I choose steak for dinner. And I eat a steak dinner. If I prefer to do something, I might do it. Or I might not. I prefer steak for dinner. But I have salmon instead. Isn't that what RMP is on about? dmb: As I read it, my claim and the Pirsig quote say exactly the same. Where I said causality refers to a law-like mechanical obedience, Pirsig says causation implies absolute certainty. Those are two ways of saying the same thing. Where I said the switch to preferences introduces freedom and choice even among the most predictable patterns, Pirsig says the implied meaning of value is one of preference - as opposed to the absolute law-like certainty. We can easily say that is the only difference between causation and values and still say it's a very BIG difference with very big implications. Dan: It is a big difference, I agree. Yet there are subtleties involved as well. Dan said: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. dmb says: Value does not introduce choice? Choice implies certainty? Are you pulling my leg? At this point I have to ask what you mean by the word choice because I think you're just plain wrong here. Choice is what you get when the certainty of causality is removed. Making a choice is an expression of our preferences. To choose is to select one option among other options. Dan: Yes it is possible I am plain wrong. Still, I prefer not to get into a shit-sling with anyone. But, it isn't what I said... it is what RMP said (and I notice you've snipped the quotes from my original post, heaven knows why... maybe you didn't feel they are important?): In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. Dan comments: He is saying specifically that one's behavior is without choice when controlled by static patterns of quality. His wording, not mine. Now, if you want to make a case that preference and choice are the same, okay. But I have to disagree. He doesn't say without preference in the above quote. He says without choice. There is a difference. dmb: Steve keeps saying that it makes no sense to say we choose our values because we ARE our values. But this seems to assume that there are no conflicts between our values, as if we can follow biological values and intellectual values without any contradictions or tensions, as if we are monolithic or fully harmonized, as if we were determined by our values instead of the laws of causality. This just puts us right back into the determinist soup again. This removes richness and complexity and the unpredictable Dynamic component too. As Pirsig paints it in the larger picture, everybody is engaged in struggle with the patterns of their own lives. Dan: Yes, that's right. The MOq states that the four levels don't work in harmony... in fact, they oppose each other. And this is where the matter of choice or preference seems to illuminate how our lives unfold. We don't choose to follow static patterns of quality. When we follow them, we are without choice. We may prefer not to do as the law prescribes but
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding? On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Thanks Marsha, If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say, let Steve speak. (Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual - church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless your objective is insanity. There but for the grace etc.) Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding. On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:58 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Jul 11, 2011, at 6:04 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Thanks Marsha, If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say, let Steve speak. (Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual - church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless your objective is insanity. There but for the grace etc.) Hmmm. I don't find those who resort to ad hominem attacks to be very intellectual, certainly not in an academic way. If anything, they are trying to hide their own intellectual incompetence. They are nothing to fear, especially if one is not too vested in one's own ego. And I take RMP's admonition to 'still' all intellectual patterns to be good advice and a good note on which to end LILA. Marsha Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding. On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:58 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). Steve: How have evolutionary philosophers the than RMP resolved this platypus? Ian: And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Steve: I'm not trying to offer any radical idea about whether this question replaces the SOM question. I'm just referring to what RMP does here in response to the SOM question of free will/determinism: To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (LILA, Chapter 12) Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Steve, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:16 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). Steve: How have evolutionary philosophers the than RMP resolved this platypus? [IG] I can come back to this, since it is clearly the more important question, but was an aside here, to the main point which was about the problem of the SOMist style of church of reason argumentation. (Incidentally - ie by way of an aside for now, glad you see Pirsig as one of the evolutionary philosophers - it's where I came in many years ago.) Ian: And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Steve: I'm not trying to offer any radical idea about whether this question replaces the SOM question. I'm just referring to what RMP does here in response to the SOM question of free will/determinism: [IG] Good, my overthinking presumably. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (LILA, Chapter 12) [IG] This was the basic point of my exchange - to highlight the to the extent that qualification of both sentences - reacting to Dan's suggestion that you had somehow suggested mutual exclusivity of the two halves of the equation. I agree with both of Pirsig's sentences, but - like you it is now clear - don't see this as the entire Free-Will vs Determinism debate in two sentences. (Which we can come back to.) I'm more interested (in this particular exchange) in how Dan saw that exclusivity ? Regards Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Pirsig in Lila: It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she holds, are the end product of three and a half billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it came to be. Steve commented on the quote: In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are not determined by values. We are not free to choose our values. We ARE our values. Choosing is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the fact of such choices (value patterns) from which the will or the self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you posted he shifts from free will to freedom) as the capacity to respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to distinguish humanity from the animals. dmb says: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. I think this misconception begins with a misreading of the quote above. William James can help to illuminate the meaning of the quote. In his essay Does Consciousness Exist? James contrasts his own view of consciousness with the idea, to use his analogy, that consciousness and its content are two different things the way paint can be separated into the oil or latex and the pigment suspended therein. In this analogy the thinker is distinct from the thoughts so that we say the mind contains ideas, so that there is a consciousness that has thoughts. This is what Pirsig is denying in the quote above. He's saying Lila doesn't HAVE static values and she doesn't HAVE Dynamic Quality either because there is no Lila above and beyond that. James famously said no, if by consciousness you mean the entity that has the thoughts, there is no such thing. Consciousness, he says, is just a name for the fact the the content is known. After explaining the usual Cartesian and neo-Kantian view of consciousness through the oil and pigment analogy, he says... Now, my contention is exactly the reverse of this. EXPERIENCE, I BELIEVE, HAS NO SUCH INNER DUPLICITY; AND THE SEPARATION OF IT INTO CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTENT COMES, NOT BY WAY OF SUBTRACTION, BUT BY WAY OF ADDITION - the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of experiences, in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds. (Emphasis is James's, 1144) This is what people are talking about when they say consciousness doesn't exist. This is the ridiculous fictional self that Pirsig rejects and that's what he's denying in the quote about what Lila (and everyone else) is. But, James says, this means that consciousness exists as a process, as the thinking itself. You might know about the ill-fated attempts among European phenomenologists like Husserl who thought they could examine the structures of consciousness itself through careful introspection and he was famous for discovering that consciousness always has a content. He called it intentionality, this idea that consciousness seems to always have a content, like you can never get the pigment (content) to settle to reveal pure oil of consciousness. James was a very different kind of phenomenologist. I think he would have said, had he lived long enough, that you'll never find the
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Dan, Dan: Within the framework of the MOQ, it is not an exclusive, either/or proposition but rather both. From a static quality, conventional point of view, both free will and determinism are seen as correct. From a Dynamic point of view, both free will and determinism are illusions, the result of a dysfunctional narrative in which we have come to believe. . Steve: I still don't follow you on what these two different perspectives are. I never claim to have anything other than a conventional perspective. Dan: Yes, I see. But Robert Pirsig does talk about it quite a lot. From LILA'S CHILD: The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a “self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to “big self” and “small self.” Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. “Hunting for weaknesses, [in your paper] I find that on page one, paragraph four, there is a sentence, ‘Fundamentally Pirsig’s term is a mystic one, and refers to the undifferentiated, indeterminate, reality from which the universe has evolved (or grown) from.’ Although this is true at a Buddha’s level of understanding, it would be confusing and illogical in the world of everyday affairs to say that the world is evolving both from and toward the same thing. I have had some reader mail that has pointed out at one place I seem to imply that Quality and chaos are the same and at another that they are different, so I haven’t been clear on this myself and have left an opening to attack. To close it up, let us say that the universe is evolving from a condition of low quality (quantum forces only, no atoms, pre-Big Bang) toward a higher one (birds, trees, societies and thoughts) and that in a static sense (world of everyday affairs) these two are not the same.” (Letter from Robert Pirsig, March 29, 1997. The word “mystic” originally in bold not italics.) DG: ...a materialist might dream that someday science will develop a theory of everything. On the other hand, an idealist might tend to side with the Buddhists in saying intellectual concepts of reality are not central to or even part of reality itself? That we will never develop a theory of everything? That there’s no chance we can ever intellectually know reality? RMP: The confusion here seems to result from the two languages of Buddhism, the language of the Buddha’s world and language of everyday life. In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are different. From the language of the Buddha’s world, they are the same, since there is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha’s world. Dan comments: From the everyday perspective, free will and determinism are different and mutually exclusive notions. The MOQ brings them together, however, by stating that the dilemma of free will vs determinism doesn't come up. They are both correct in a conventional static quality sense. But from a Dynamic perspective, one free of any intellectual divisions, they are illusions. Does that help you see better what I am getting at? Steve: I Think I have a better idea what you mean by these two perspectives, but I would unpack the perspective of Big Self versus small self to this issue differently. Here is what I wrote on the issue when I first weighted in on the free will debate back in April (!): From: Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM Subject: [MD] The MOQ has no soul No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns (small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi dmb, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. Steve: A lot of philosophers have thought so anyway, but since we don't accept the underlying premise of the traditional SOM free will/determinism debate, there isn't much of a point of taking sides on the matter. dmb: This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Steve: The MOQ obviously reinterprets (rather than wipes from our vocabularies) EVERYTHING as patterns of preference, so when Pirsig uses the word cause we of course know that he means a stable pattern of preference rather than the law-like obedience of metaphysical objects to cosmic rules. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:20 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Pirsig in Lila: It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she holds, are the end product of three and a half billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it came to be. Steve commented on the quote: In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are not determined by values. We are not free to choose our values. We ARE our values. Choosing is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the fact of such choices (value patterns) from which the will or the self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you posted he shifts from free will to freedom) as the capacity to respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to distinguish humanity from the animals. dmb says: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM: No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. ... dmb says: I think that we can reject SOM and the Cartesian self and still ask legitimate questions about freedom and constraint. There is no law that says the issue HAS to be framed around those metaphysical assumptions and in fact Pirsig's reformulation does exactly that. The issue is tackled without those assumptions and he does not let that difference get in the way of asserting human freedom. A human being is a collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence over a society. Ideas are patterns of value. They are at a higher level of evolution than social patterns. ...And beyond that is an even more compelling reason: societies and thoughts and principles themselves are no more than sets of static patterns. These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality. Only a living being can do that. The strongest moral argument against capital punishment is that it weakens a society's Dynamic capability - its capability for change and evolution. (Lila 160-161) The increase in versatility is directed toward Dynamic Quality. The increase in power to control hostile forces is directed toward static quality. Without Dynamic Quality the organism cannot grow. Without static quality the organism cannot last. Both are needed. (Lila 147) In traditional, substance-centered metaphysics, life isn't evolving toward anything. Life's just an extension of the properties of atoms, nothing more. It has to be that because atoms and varying forms of energy are all there is, But in the MOQ, what is evolving isn't patterns of atoms. What's evolving is static pattens of value, and while that doesn't change the data of evolution it completely up-ends the interpretation that can be given to evolution. (Lila, 139) Life can't exist on DQ alone. It has no staying power. To cling to DQ alone apart from any static patterns is to cling to chaos. ...Static quality patterns are dead when they are exclusive, when they demand blind obedience and suppress Dynamic change. But static patterns, nevertheless, provide a necessary stabilizing force to protect Dynamic progress from degeneration. Although DQ, the Quality of freedom, creates this world in which we live, these patterns of static quality, the quality of order, preserve our world. Neither static nor Dynamic Quality can survive without the other. (Lila, 121) Steve, by contrast, said: ... We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ... Cultivating practices such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free. dmb says: Well if you ever wonder where I got the impression that you're asserting some kind of value determinism, this would be one of many places to point. Your characterization of static quality as bondage, slavery and unfreedom is incompatible with countless statements made by Pirsig, a sampling of which is presently before you. Where you call them a form of bondage, Pirsig calls them a necessary stabilizing force. Where you say we are slaves to these patterns, Pirsig says they are the quality of order that preserves our world, not to mention our integrity as organisms. Where you say we can't choose our preferences, Pirsig says that it takes a living being to perceive and adjust to DQ. For these reasons, and more, I think you're very much at odds with Pirsig on this particular issue and at odds with the MOQ in general. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. Hi Ian It's the way Steve framed the statement that suggests we cannot follow both static quality and Dynamic Quality at the same time. According to the way I read that statement, we follow one OR the other to some extent. It is entirely possible that I read it wrong, however. Ian: I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Dan: So what do you suggest? If we don't have [the church of] reason, what do we have? Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said to Steve: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve replied: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. dmb says: I did not assume your statement was predicated on SOM. I still think they are contradictory and logically incoherent even in a world where we are our values. Please explain how the switch from SOM to the MOQ saves your statements from being a logical train wreck. How does this switch allow you to say, at the same time, that we are not free AND we are not determined? Are you NOT saying we are identical to the values over which we have no choice or control? Do you imagine that logic does not obtain anymore once you reject the Cartesian self? Does the rejection of SOM entail the rejection of consistency or clarity of thought? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote: Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. Hi Ian It's the way Steve framed the statement that suggests we cannot follow both static quality and Dynamic Quality at the same time. According to the way I read that statement, we follow one OR the other to some extent. It is entirely possible that I read it wrong, however. Again, Dan, I have not set out to formulate the issue. I was relating how Pirsig formulates the issue when he said: To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. Dan: Yes, exactly. That is what I mean: causality is tantamount to the preclusion of morality. I probably misspoke by saying morality and causality are equal. Sorry for the misunderstanding. dmb: This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. Dan: But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked. dmb: That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Dan: Lets consult LILA in an effort to clear things up. This is what RMP says about replacing causality with value: The only difference between causation and value is that the word cause implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of value is one of preference. Dan comments: Note that he states THE ONLY DIFFERENCE... he says nothing about introducing choice, only preference. And here he is examining determinism vs free will: On the other hand, if the determinists let go of their position it would seem to deny the truth of science. If one adheres to a traditional scientific metaphysics of substance, the philosophy of determinism is an inescapable corollary. If everything is included in the class of substance and its properties, and if substance and its properties is included in the class of things that always follow laws, and if people are included in the class everything, then it is an airtight logical conclusion that people always follow the laws of substance. To be sure, it doesn't seem as though people blindly follow the laws of substance in everything they do, but within a Deterministic explanation that is just another one of those illusions that science is forever exposing. All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on the bedrock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws of human behavior exist. Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all, are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real nature of the world. A moral person acts conventionally, watches out for the cops, keeps his nose clean, and nothing more. In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. Dan comments: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: dmb said to Steve: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve replied: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. dmb says: I did not assume your statement was predicated on SOM. I still think they are contradictory and logically incoherent even in a world where we are our values. Please explain how the switch from SOM to the MOQ saves your statements from being a logical train wreck. How does this switch allow you to say, at the same time, that we are not free AND we are not determined? Are you NOT saying we are identical to the values over which we have no choice or control? Do you imagine that logic does not obtain anymore once you reject the Cartesian self? Does the rejection of SOM entail the rejection of consistency or clarity of thought? Steve: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make sense as questions. If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. If you don't see that, I'm not sure that I can help you. I can see you are struggling (your frustration with these difficult concepts is demonstrated once again with your usual ad hominems), and I really do want to help you understand the MOQ, but I don't know how else to say it. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan: But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked. Steve: Right. This is dennett's point as well. If actions didn't have predictable results, freedom to choose would be pointless. Dan comments: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. Steve: Another concept that is conspicuously absent once Pirsig makes this switch is the notion of the will. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi dmb, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:37 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM: No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. ... dmb says: I think that we can reject SOM and the Cartesian self and still ask legitimate questions about freedom and constraint. Steve: I've never heard anyone say otherwise. dmb: There is no law that says the issue HAS to be framed around those metaphysical assumptions and in fact Pirsig's reformulation does exactly that. The issue is tackled without those assumptions and he does not let that difference get in the way of asserting human freedom. Steve: I agree, of course. dmb quotes: Steve, by contrast, said: ... We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ... Cultivating practices such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free. dmb says: Well if you ever wonder where I got the impression that you're asserting some kind of value determinism, this would be one of many places to point. Your characterization of static quality as bondage, slavery and unfreedom is incompatible with countless statements made by Pirsig, a sampling of which is presently before you. Where you call them a form of bondage, Pirsig calls them a necessary stabilizing force. Where you say we are slaves to these patterns, Pirsig says they are the quality of order that preserves our world, not to mention our integrity as organisms. Where you say we can't choose our preferences, Pirsig says that it takes a living being to perceive and adjust to DQ. For these reasons, and more, I think you're very much at odds with Pirsig on this particular issue and at odds with the MOQ in general. Steve: If you read more carefully, you will see that you are misunderstanding and misrepresenting what I said. I did not say, we are not free without qualification. I said TO THE EXTENT THAT we identify with static patterns we are not free and to the extent we identify with DQ we are free. This is what Pirsig says as well. I am doing my best to help you understand the MOQ, but if you don't read carefully you will continue to struggle to get a grip on what Pirsig is saying. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make sense as questions. If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. Ron: Oh, if we use prefference, rather than choice then you can chill. we can have a discussion all day about PREFFERING our values but as soon as we use the term choice it becomes meaningless. when we choose/follow the dynamic in our lives, it's not the same as preferring it.. when we choose/follow the determined static in our lives, its not the same as preffering it... I dunno...if we are framing the discussion, note, discussion..not dilemma,, for the DILEMMA disapears.. in MoQ then the terms we use should'nt make a difference, because in a MoQ frame work their meaning is the same. seems like you are the only one hung up and haunted by the terms and their former implications so much so, you cant even submit to the idea that when we speak about the distinction of freewill and determinism we are talking about the distinction between dynamic and static Quality sans the either/or Dilemma. Taking away the either/or Dilemma takes away certainy, absolute truth,, ect..all those conepts you insist are still invoked with the usage of the terms, those terms do not change the context, context changes the usage. .. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve: I am doing my best to help you understand the MOQ, but if you don't read carefully you will continue to struggle to get a grip on what Pirsig is saying. Ron: I just despise this use of rhetorical strategy its infantile.. ...If anything is meaningless its this tripe.. / Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan: To the extent one follows the undefined, they are free. This is very powerful stuff. How does a person go about following that which is not this, not that? Ron: Well thats why I favor better-ness for we follow dynamic quality when we choose to wing-it, when we put the nava-computer away on our bombing run on the death star and use the force .Luke. It explains when we just hurl ourselves into the maelstrom of life, we do so with the experience of the joy of freedom . Not this, not that, quiets the mind and is used to put the typical static cautions to sleep, a sort of intellectual way to a fuk-it attitude, that helps us just go and do something off the cuff, something crazy new and wild, to be playful and experiment, explore. But yea, that has always been my trouble with not this not that as far as the best intellectual explanation of Dynamic Quality its only half an explanation. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Sun, Jul 10, 2011 at 12:24 AM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote: Steve replied to Dave: I don't disagree with Pirsig or the dictionary as far as the classic dilemma. I disagree with how YOU think this dilemma could possibly still come up in the MOQ while Pirsig specifically says this dilemma does not come up in the MOQ! Ron: Bob specifically states that when we follow Dynamic Quality we are free. He states that natural selection aka evolution is dynamic quality at work, which is what touched this whole pissing match off. Steve: My point is that the traditional notion of free will is a completely different concept from Pirsig's conception of freedom in terms of DQ. Do you disagree? Also, does Lila have Quality? Ron: What you Steve seem to insist on, is that free-will or dynamic quality as re-named by Pirsigs MoQ, can not be or should not be talked about. Yet we see how he connects the two concepts not as diametrically opposed but as a cohesive total explanation. Steve: I've never said that free will can not be talked about. In fact, I think most would agree that I've talked quite a lot about this SOM concept. Ron: What would be a more relevent and meaningful discussion on the MD but a discussion involving deterministic static patterns and their freedom to evolve? How does the denial and rejection of a dilemma ever solved or dissolved? not by avoiding it or ignoring it as a non-issue but by it's explanation, and the power that lies in Pirsigs MoQ is explanitory not negation. The Dilemma is disolved by explanation, not ignoring the debate entirely as meaningless. Only rigid pricks do that. Steve: My position is that the traditional question, is the cause of man behavior internal to the subject or externally imposed by objects?, is a version of the question, is the quality the subject or the object? Far from being a question that gets ignored by the MOQ, it is a question that got the whole ball rolling. But it is a question that gets called out by Pirsig as one based on a flawed premise--that the only way to talk about the world philosophically is to begin by cutting reality into subjects and objects. Instead, Pirsig suggests that a better first cut is sq/DQ in a reality conceived of as equivalent to experience or Value. If human beings are a set of values with the capacity to respond to DQ rather than existing in a universe of metaphysical subjects and objects, it makes no sense to ask the age old free will/determinism question, is the cause of man behavior internal to the subject or externally imposed by objects? This question gets replaced in the MOQ by the question, to what extent is human behavior governed by static patterns of value , and to what extent is it a response to DQ? Perhaps you can answer, Ron, to exactly what extent is that? As far as I can see, this is a question with no clear answer, but we do have the picture of an evolutionary hierarchy where evolution is characterized as a migration of static patterns toward dynamic quality, so human's as having intellectual patterns are more free than social or biological or inorganic patterns. Though the SOM concept of free will seems to be a cherished belief for you, Pirsig nevertheless re-tools the notion of free will to be the capacity to respond to DQ. In Pirsig's conception, everything including atoms, rocks, and trees has this capacity to varying degrees. I'm sorry that it offends you to say so, but free will in the MOQ is just not at all the sort of thing referred to in the SOM traditional definition that you seem to cherish. It is not the concept of a subject having freedom from casual forces imposed by an objective world since it rejects the SOM premise upon which that definition rests. With regard to that sort of free will, the MOQ says, mu. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Dan, Dan: I think Steve is taking the quote out of context here by stating the dilemma doesn't come up. From LILA: ... In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. [Robert Pirsig, LILA] Dan comments: When RMP states that the dilemma doesn't come up, he is saying that determinism and free will are both illusions based on extenuating circumstances arising from both a preconditioned point of view (a traditional scientific metaphysics of substance) and the undefined (a Dynamic point of view). What Steve seems to be saying is: dilemma solved... no more need to talk about it. Steve: That's not what I mean to say. Dan: But it isn't solved so much as it is reformulated. And there is every reason to further explore this line of inquiry, to build upon it and expand it. But that means letting go of some preconceived notions of which we are all very fond of, like the notion of free will. Steve: But I agree that this problem gets reformulated. The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? The one dilemma gets dissolved but is replaced by another puzzler. The difference in our views may be the extent to which we still see a concept that is similar enough to the traditional notion of free in the re-formulation to warrant maintaining the old SOM term in talking about what we want to talk about without being misunderstood. What I thinks tend to go on with the way the term free will gets used in these parts is that it gets slipped in the back door as the extent to which behavior is a response to DQ, but then it reverts back to the SOM notion of free will once inside. So I think it would be better to drop the term from the MOQ vocabulary and maintain it only as an SOM term worth criticizing. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ron said to Steve: Bob specifically states that when we follow Dynamic Quality we are free. He states that natural selection aka evolution is dynamic quality at work,.. What you, Steve, seem to insist on, is that free-will or dynamic quality as re-named by Pirsig's MoQ, can not be or should not be talked about. Yet we see how he connects the two concepts not as diametrically opposed but as a cohesive total explanation. What would be a more relevent and meaningful discussion on the MD but a discussion involving deterministic static patterns and their freedom to evolve? How does the denial and rejection of a dilemma ever solved or dissolved? not by avoiding it or ignoring it as a non-issue but by it's explanation, and the power that lies in Pirsigs MoQ is explanitory not negation. The Dilemma is disolved by explanation, not ignoring the debate entirely as meaningless. dmb says: I think that's right. Thank you. Pirsig reformulates the issue so that freedom and restraint are connected to Dynamic Quality and static quality - as opposed to the traditional theistic or materialistic framings of the dilemma. To say that the dilemma doesn't come up because the MOQ rejects both horns is to say that the MOQ rejects both freedom and restraint. But if we do not ignore Pirsig's reformulation into terms that avoid causality and SOM, where freedom and constraint belong to DQ and sq, we can see that freedom and constraint are built right into the structure of the MOQ and both elements permeate human experience. That's the whole of what we are, not just the static values. Pirsig says this reformulation is a simple resolution of the dilemma but he also says the the MOQ has a whole lot more to say about ethics and he goes on to introduce the levels of static patterns as a moral hierarchy, with each succeeding level more moral than the next PRECISELY BECAUSE it offers more freedom, more capacity to respond Dynamically. Because freedom increases as the static patterns evolve, it makes very little sense to construe this reformulation as a kind of value-determinism. Static patterns aren't determining factors, like God's will or causality would be, because static patterns are supposed to preserve the evolutionary gains toward freedom. Think of the way the social level laws liberate us from the laws of the jungle, for example. They constrain behavior but for the purpose of giving us the freedom to do something beyond staying alive, filling our bellies or staying warm and dry. Evolution is predicated on freedom and freedom is the goal. And the MOQ's re formulated claims are definitely NOT predicated on the assumptions of SOM, scientific materialism, causality or Free Will as a metaphysical entity. The central point of the pure-experience theory is that 'outer' and 'inner' are names for two groups into which we sort experiences according to the way in which they act upon their neighbors. 1207 My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known. 1142 ..my central thesis [is] that subjectivity and objectivity are affairs not of what an experience is aboriginally made of, but of its classification. Classification depends on our temporary purposes. 1208 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
