Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Gene thanks for putting the time and effort into this post. You have most
certainly addressed my criticisms that leading to your conclusion:

EH:  Again, I deeply admire Peirce’s vast philosophy. But I also abhor the
narrow-mindedness of these types of private beliefs he seems to have held,
all the more so given the fecundity of his ideas such as agapasm. I wish
that the deep poverty and injustice Peirce personally suffered could have
tempered his prejudices in later life and opened his eyes to some of the
institutional sources of injustice and poverty, but I don’t get the sense
that that happened.


I think I will have to reevaluate my view of Peirce's character as I've had
to do with other thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. For now I will
say that your argumentation is persuasive.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Dear Gary R.,
>
> Sorry that I misconstrued your criticism earlier, that it was
> not about potential catastrophe but about whether “greed, power, and
> especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals” are
> features of actually existing science and technology rather than external
> to them. Yes, we do disagree and probably will continue to, though I am
> grateful for your criticism.
>
> When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T.
> H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th
> century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy
> access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long
> unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of
> actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist
> and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical
> murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which
> wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of
> science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging
> the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction.
>
> You also say, “You will have to offer much more evidence if
> I’m to believe that Peirce’s character and Carnegie's were ‘similar,’ that
> Peirce was ‘hypocritical’ in his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed. And
> you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single
> comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the
> civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.”
>
> Fair enough. I admire Peirce’s criticism of the gospel of
> greed. I simply wanted to indicate that his aristocratic outlook struck me
> at odds with that criticism. I did not compare his character with
> Carnegie’s, only that other comments Peirce made later seemed similar to
> what Carnegie expressed.
>
>
>
> Here below is a fuller version of Peirce’s 1908 letter to Lady
> Welby, where he says “The people ought to be enslaved,” that universal
> suffrage is “ruinous,” that labor-organizations are “clamouring today for
> the ‘right’ to persecute and kill people as they please,” that the “lowest
> class” “insists on enslaving the upper class.”
>
> Peirce is clearly anti-worker, anti-union, anti-lower class,
> pro-upper-class in these statements, with zero empathy for the plight of
> workers in the face of rabid industrial capitalism in America. Consider,
> Upton Sinclair published his novel *The Jungle*, two years earlier,
> depicting the sordid conditions of slaughterhouse workers in Chicago.
> Consider that pragmatists John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were already
> actively involved with settlement houses in Chicago, with lower class
> immigrants and workers, seeking a critical understanding of democracy in
> the grip of industrial capitalism.
>
> Peirce: “Being a convinced Pragmaticist in Semeiotic, naturally and
> necessarily nothing can appear to me sillier than rationalism; and folly in
> politics can go no further than English liberalism. The people ought to be
> enslaved; only the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone
> can maintain their rule. England will discover too late that it has sapped
> the foundations of culture. The most perfect language that was ever spoken
> was classical Greek; and it is obvious that no people could have spoken it
> who were not provided with plenty of intelligent slaves. As to us
> Americans, who had, at first, so much political sense, we always showed a
> disposition to support such aristocracy as we had; and we have constantly
> experienc

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, Edwina, Kirsti,  list

Gene wrote:

EH: Regarding the potential for catastrophe, Gary R. stated, “that you
would, however, find it difficult to find in Peirce very much support for
your thesis.”


The potential for catastrophe (regarding which I fully agree with you) was
not the 'thesis' that I said you would "find it difficult to find In Peirce
very much support." Re: "catastrophe" I fully agree with you since
quotations we've both offered make Peirce's view of that quite clear, for
example, his writing in 'Evolutionary Love' "The twentieth century, in its
latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst upon the social
order -- to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that greed-philosophy has
long plunged it into guilt." Indeed the "deluge-tempest" didn't even take
as long as Peirce thought it would as the First World War broke out just a
few months following his death. The rest of the horror of that century and
the continued horror in this century, both brought about by the crazed
greed and power seeking of a few men is, in my view, virtually self-evident.

What I didn't agree with was your assertion that "The greed, power, and
especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not
simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are
essential features of the system." I have already given my reasons for
disagreeing with you on that thesis so I won't repeat them now; and I
assume that we are still in disagreement on this matter even while you've
offered additional examples of "corruption within science itself." There is
not an actual or even, I think, conceivable institution where one won't
find corrupt men and women (mainly men). I also agree with Edwina that
Peirce was entirely and explicitly opposed to Social Darwinism.

In addition, your impugning of Peirce's character seems to me over the top.
You wrote:

EH: Peirce’s criticism of the greed philosophy, including a reference to
how he was swindled, did not seem to apply to workers. In fact, his
criticism of the philosophy of greed rings hypocritical when some of his
other comments are taken into account, which read as similar to those of
Carnegie.


You will have to offer much more evidence if I'm to believe that Peirce's
character and Carnegie's were "similar," that Peirce was "hypocritical" in
his condemnation of the Gospel of Greed.

And you draw some extraordinarily conclusions from a few facts and a single
comment to Lady Welby by Peirce, while your question as to what side of the
civil war Peirce would place himself based on his father's views is bogus.
May none of our characters be judged on the basis of the views of our
parents. You wrote:

EH: As Peirce wrote to Lady Welby: “The people ought to be enslaved; only
the slaveholders ought to practice the virtues that alone can maintain
their rule.”  (*Semiotics and Significs, *edited by Charles S. Hardwick
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 78). Given that
Peirce lived through the American civil war (not fighting in it), and that
his father Benjamin had been pro-slavery before the war, Charles’s advocacy
of a “virtuous” slaveholding elite strikes me as repugnant and puerile.

Can you guess what side of the slaveholder/enslaved divide Peirce would put
himself on?


I do not take Peirce's comments about "the people" (not, btw, the African
people held as slaves in America) literally. He is writing to a, I
believe *relatively
*liberal, friend in England, a woman whom he's gotten to know well through
letters, one who will know that this is not to be taken literally (as you
clearly have). I find his comment (in context) more along the lines of
Jasper, very skeptical of majoritarian democracy, famously arguing for a
form of government guided by "an intellectual elite." There is just too
much else in Peirce suggesting that he upholds the ethics of the Gospel of
Love, including, for an example recently discussed on the list, his support
for Abbot against the unfair criticism of his work by Royce.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 3:41 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>
> *We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
> before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
> presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
> come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
> to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
> man's glory! **Peirce: CP 1.627 *
>
>
> In point of fact this quote is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] APA Pacific Meeting Author Meets Critics: From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Congratulations Gene!

I wish I could attend that APA meeting. Your book  From the Axial Age to
the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers, and a New
Understanding of the Idea <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137441584>
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan) is quite extraordinary, as always, extremely
well researched and beautifully written. I can whole-heartedly recommend it
to the list. As with all your books, even when I disagree with some of your
thinking I agree with much of it; and I always learn a great deal from your
occasionally very different (from my) perspectives. So, I hope that, among
other things, your book helps lead to a resurgence of more general interest
in Jaspers (of course there are particular fields where interest in his
work has never declined).

Jaspers, undoubtedly one of the greatest of 20th century thinkers, was only
a few decades being very widely read and discussed in quite diverse
intellectual circles, for example, in NYC in the 70's and 80's. I fondly
recall hanging out at Greenwich Village coffee shops with professors and
students at NYU interested in art, music, literature, and philosophy,
especially the 'symbolic' thinking of Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer,
Existentialism, for example, thinkers as diverse in their approaches as
Martin Buber and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, yes, Jaspers, esp. some of his
more 'popular' works. But then the intellectual climate changed and many of
these great 20th century thinkers were neglected in the last part of the
20th and early years of the 21st centuries.

At least until now. Besides your work centering on Jaspers, one could, for
example, point to the Peircean, Robert Innis, the local organizer of the
2013 Peirce Centennial at UMass, Lowell, who took a fresh look at Langer's
work in: Innis, Robert E. (2009), *Susanne Langer in focus: the symbolic
mind*, Indiana University Press. Her work in aesthetics and philosophy of
mind has parallels in Peirce's work, although her greatest influence was
"the philosophy of symbolic forms" of Cassirer.

But, again, congratulations and good luck with your presentation. I'm
fairly certain that your rediscovery of Stuart-Glennie and your reflections
on D. H. Lawrence will  provoke much interesting discussion.

And, if not now, soon, I'm sure that I'm not the only one in this forum who
would like to hear more about Peirce's "semiotic animism" as you phrased it.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 1:48 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> For anyone who might be interested, who will be at the
> American Philosophic Association Pacific meeting in San Diego at the end of
> this month. There will be an author meets critics session sponsored by the
> Karl Jaspers Society of North America, which will discuss my book, From
> the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl Jaspers,
> and a New Understanding of the Idea
> <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137441584>  (New York: Palgrave
> MacMillan).
>
> My book involves discussions of the revolutionary changes across different
> civilizations in the period roughly 2,500 years ago, which Jaspers labelled
> “the axial age” in 1949. I rediscovered a 19th century thinker, John
> Stuart-Glennie, who had advanced a full theory of the phenomena, which he
> termed "the moral revolution," and philosophy of history 75 years earlier,
> in 1873, only to be forgotten after he died in 1910. I also discovered
> while writing the book, that 20 years before Jaspers, D. H. Lawrence also
> addressed the phenomena, in ways that connect to contemporary discussions
> today on rationalization. Stuart-Glennie and Lawrence also address issues
> that relate to current discussions of “the new animism,” a relational
> ontology that easily connects to what could be called Peirce’s semiotic
> animism.
>
>Here is information on the session below.
>
> Gene Halton
>
>
>
> APA PACIFIC DIVISION ANNUAL MEETING
>
> Saturday, March 31 6:00 - 8:00 p.m., G10C, Westin Gaslamp Quarter Hotel,
> San Diego, CA
>
>
>
> Karl Jaspers Society of North America Session Two: Author meets Critics
>
> From the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution: John Stuart-Glennie, Karl
> Jaspers, and a New Understanding of the Idea (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)
>
>
>
> Author: Eugene Halton (University of Notre Dame)
>
>
>
> Chair: Elena Bezzubova (University of California, Irvine)
>
>
>
> Critics: Victor Lidz (Drexel University)
>
> Christopher Peet (The King's University, Canada)
>
> Benjamin Schewel (University o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote:

ET: I stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means
that no final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the
perfect' or even 'truth'.

I would tend to strongly agree "that no final state can be reached.",
Neither JAS nor I have suggested that a final state can be reached, in
fact, quite the contrary. As Jon wrote:

JAS:  As Gary R. . . pointed out, the text that I quoted clearly treats
perfection as an ideal, a *regulative hope*.  It is much like Peirce's
notion of "the final opinion," which will never *actually *be achieved,
either.

I must admit that I don't see what you're disagreeing with.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 6:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Peirce doesn't employ the notion of perfection in any concrete sense. I
> stand by my view that the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis means that no
> final state can be reached - whether that final state be 'the perfect' or
> even 'truth'.
>
> The basic composition of the universe, i.e., the Three Categories and the
> Triadic Semiosic Process means that deviation from a 'path' is basic to
> life. Indeed, your quotes below confirm my point - that no final state [and
> that includes perfection] is possible. Not merely not possible but it would
> be non-semiosic - for that triad and those three categories prevent
> finality.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 10/03/18 4:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the
> notion of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the
> perfect sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."
>
> Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
> does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
> by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.
>
> ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system
> that is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and
> Peirce himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and
> developing complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there
> is no Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity
> prevent such a linear and closed path.
>
> See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
> 'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
> him not to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
> a tendency exactly towards evolutionary growth, but that it is asymptotic
> and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
> out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
> neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
> Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
> inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.
>
> 1909 | Letters to William James  | EP 2:496-7
>
> …there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
> Interpretant, because  it is that which would finally be decided to be
> the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far
> that an ultimate opinion were reached.
>
> Notice the would in would finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could argue
> in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate opinion"
> in the snippet quoted above. These are general tendencies considered in
> futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909 letter Peirce
> writes:
>
> ". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
> about according to which a general description of result is made to come
> about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
> that particular way" (CSP).
>
>
> ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
> spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
> stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
> diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
> provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
> mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Edwina wrote: " I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion
of 'perfection'. I suggest that the very idea of 'perfection', 'the perfect
sign', etc, is the antithesis of Peircean semiosis."

Then why in the world, if they are "the antithesis of Peircean semiosis"
does Peirce employ them? Those quotations are Peirce's, not being "made up"
by Jon. They have, I'd argue,  semeiotic specific (not vernacular) meanings.

ET: The fact that there are three categorical modes, suggests a system that
is innately capable of infinite growth, complexity, diversity - and Peirce
himsels says this, referring to "the phenomenon of growth and developing
complexity, which appears to be universal" 6.64. That is - there is no
Final State of Perfection, for the reality of growth and complexity prevent
such a linear and closed path.

See my last message addressed to Jon S where I comment on Peirce's use of
'perfection' (and I'd add, related terms like 'finality') which are used by
him *not* to deny growth and evolution, but rather to suggest that there is
a tendency *exactly towards evolutionary growth,* but that it is asymptotic
and will--can--never be reached (for one thing, the sun will eventually die
out and all Earthly activity, including evolution, will cease--but that is
neither her nor there). In my opinion one needs to be keenly aware of how
Peirce is using the terminology he finds appropriate in his semeiotic
inquiries. Take for example what Peirce means by Final Interpretant.

1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:496-7

…there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final
Interpretant, because it is that which *would *finally be decided to be the
true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that
an ultimate opinion were reached.

Notice the *would* in *would* finally (emphasis is Peirce's). One could
argue in a similar manner concerning his use of 'ultimate' in "ultimate
opinion" in the snippet quoted above. These are *general tendencies*
considered in futuro. They are normative hopes. Earlier in the same 1909
letter Peirce writes:

". . .we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts
about according to which a general description of result is made to come
about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or
that particular way" (CSP).


ET: That is, the mode of Firstness provides a constant source of novelty,
spontaneity, chance, freshness - which would provide a deviation from any
stable format. The mode of Thirdness functions both to constantly reduce
diversity, mould commonality and generality - and this too would again,
provide a method of deviation from any stable format [of perfection]. The
mode of Secondness, with its focus on the particular and the linear, is
frankly the only mode that would be available for a path-to-perfection,
but not only does it not exist alone - Peircean semiosis has three modes -
but its very individuality precludes perfection.

This might be the case were the world to go on forever, grow and evolve as
if stars and planets didn't also grow old and die. (There is a theological
notion which I assume I'm not the only one to hold it--although I can't
recall where I got it--that none of *this *world's growth and evolution is
lost in the Mind of God, or just Mind if you prefer; however, this is
surely not the thread to get into *that* idea.)

ET: And the fact that semiosis is triadic, with a mediative node that
transforms the DO to the II/DI - means that this is a constantly
interactive and individual semiosis which is transformative and
complex rather than linear. There can be no necessitarian perfection or
'final state'


There is no "necessitarianism" in *Peirce's notion* of the 'perfect Sign',
etc. Take, for example, Peirce's understanding of "Final Causation":

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Prelogical Notions. Section I.
Classification of the Sciences (Logic II) | EP 2:120; CP 1.211

Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be
brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain *general
characte**r**. *(emphasis added by me)

In my view, the 'general character' of the evolution of the Cosmos through,
shall we say, infinite semiosis, is what Peirce means when he uses such
terminology as that involving 'final' and 'perfect' and 'Truth'.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List -
>
>  I would agree with the concerns expressed about the notion of
> 'perfection

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You concluded: "Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply
not be of much interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I
find it hard to believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been
posting. :-)"

I would imagine that there are several on this list (I could probably name
them) who find the topics you're discussing of considerable interest, and I
am one of them. I doubt that everyone--even and especially every one of
those interested individuals--agrees with everything you've been posting,
but I personally agree with much of it, having some reservations about some
of it which I'll have to discuss in a future post.

However, more to the middle reason you offered in the snippet I quoted
above as to why you haven't received much feedback recently. I myself have
been exceedingly busy of late and haven't had much time to fully digest
your very rich messages let alone respond to them. From off list messages,
I know two other list members who are quite interested in this line of
inquiry but who are now themselves very busy. This situation reminds me of
Joe Ransdell's comment on the Peirce-l page at the Arisbe web site.


 If nobody responds to your posts you should NOT assume that it is because
of lack of interest, or that your post is perceived as something
negligible. You really have no basis for doing that, given the
understandings and practices of lists like this. Frequently, the interested
people just don't have time to respond, and few of us have time to respond
to more than a small percentage of the things that interest us, in any
case. Since you usually have no way of knowing why you didn't get the
response you hoped for, it is best to be Stoic about it. . .  Pose your
questions and comments well by your own standards and remind yourself that
even if there is no overt response, what you have said or asked will be
read by hundreds of people in any case, and with what results or "fruits"
you cannot know.


While I'm still busy, for now I'd like to respond to a couple of more
substantive points made in your most recent post:

JAS:  After further contemplation, I now believe that Peirce was
describing *the
same thing* here as in the passage about "the ideal sign" that I have
mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple of years earlier.


You then quoted the passage from EP 2:304 which included these sentences:


CSP:  . . . Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*,
which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the
very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
denoted united with the very form signified by it.

This snippet from the longer quotation, especially the phrase "the ideal
sign which should be quite perfect," would seem to nearly confirm your
sense that what Peirce terms the "ideal sign" and, years later, the
"perfect sign" are, indeed, synonymous.

And I'm also "with you" in your revising your previous hypothesis.


​JAS: ​
Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous with
"Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
Universe.

​While I've held from the get-go that 'perfect Sign' and 'Quasi-mind' are
*not* the same thing, I'm beginning to return to my original thought that
the 'perfect Sign' expresses some kind of an ideal, some asymptotic
approach ​to "the Truth that corresponds to the Universe," a Universe
which, however, is ever-evolving.

So, it seems to me that 'perfection' (also, 'ideal') in Peirce's semieotic
sense is *not* being employed by him in some informal, every day,
colloquial way. I think that if respondents to your posts were to read more
of what Peirce means by these terms ('perfect' or 'ideal' + sign, 'the
Truth', etc.) rather than what they 'think' these may mean based on a less
scientific and more colloquial usage, that this inquiry could perhaps move
forward more speedily. Or not.

Best,

Gary R

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, Jon S, list,

Stephen wrote:

SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important.


I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In
fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic
which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it
is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason
whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this
as an important inquiry and quite the contrary.

SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used
in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000
references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.


Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your stats
hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of
certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for
example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and
never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one
might come up with a *very* different frequency rate.

Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about
it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a
great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a
fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of
terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances
of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a
number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years,
say. . .

SR:  I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not fundamental
to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended treatment as
something that will somehow advance u thinking.


What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road of
inquiry" because one  doesn't find it of personal interest or personal
value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by
Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further
research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of
the topics under consideration.

SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
lexicon


First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's
own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to
give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may
warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute
to it.

Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond
the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently
noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and
this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially
his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to
dictionaries, etc.

Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself
deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:

Do not block the way of inquiry.


Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>>
>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
>> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
>> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>
>>- It is the aggregate formed by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Terry, list,

Terry asked: Is there an estimate of what those ongoing maintenance and
repair costs [for the Peirce monument] might be?

I haven't personally been involved in the project, but I'll look into it.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Thanks, Gary! Is there an estimate of what those ongoing maintenance and
> repair costs might be?
>
>
>
> Still in One Peace,
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> rankin.te...@hotmail.com
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 8, 2018 8:57 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and
> Memorial
>
>
>
> Terry, list,
>
>
>
> Terry asked: "I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m wondering about
> ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?"
>
>
>
> That's a very good question. The notice I posted yesterday does note:
>
>
>
> The Monument Project page will provide regular updates on progress toward
> our goal. Any funds received in excess of the final project cost will be
> used for annual upkeep.
>
> http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
> <https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpeircesociety.us15.list-manage.com%2Ftrack%2Fclick%3Fu%3D2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c%26id%3D04387f977d%26e%3D860edf35dc&data=02%7C01%7C%7Cf82839af6ed04de75f4208d584fca104%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435%7C1%7C0%7C636561142929413736&sdata=mbsfvGGsoCRShk9cFDSpiKxcUiKSnJHbYewGK6RMzpI%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
>
> ​We can only hope that some means for permanent upkeep with finally be
> devised.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
> ​
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 6:18 AM, Terry L Rankin 
> wrote:
>
> Thank you for this notice! I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m
> wondering about ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?
>
>
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> *silkpei...@semiotic.com *
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 7, 2018 11:48 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
>
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
>
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
>
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
>
> [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
>
> Dear Gary,
>
> We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
> have le

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Terry, list,

Terry asked: "I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m wondering about
ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?"

That's a very good question. The notice I posted yesterday does note:


The Monument Project page will provide regular updates on progress toward
our goal. Any funds received in excess of the final project cost will be
used for annual upkeep.
http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c&id=04387f977d&e=860edf35dc>


​We can only hope that some means for permanent upkeep with finally be
devised.

Best,

Gary
​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 6:18 AM, Terry L Rankin 
wrote:

> Thank you for this notice! I contributed to the fund just now, but I’m
> wondering about ongoing upkeep of the monument and gravesite …?
>
>
>
> Terry Rankin
>
> *silkpei...@semiotic.com *
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 7, 2018 11:48 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
>
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
>
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
>
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
>
> [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
>
> Dear Gary,
>
> We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
> have led us to include you among those who regard Charles S. Peirce as one
> of the world’s great thinkers. Soon after their marriage, Peirce and
> Juliette moved to Milford, Pennsylvania, where they resided until Charles’s
> death in 1914. For the remainder of her impoverished life, Juliette kept
> the urn with Peirce’s ashes on a mantel at their home, Arisbe. When
> Juliette died in 1934, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, a friend of
> the Peirces with a grand home in Milford, arranged for Juliette’s burial in
> the local cemetery near the Pinchot family plots. The urn with Peirce’s
> ashes was placed in the casket with Juliette and was interred with her. A
> small inconspicuous tombstone was erected to mark the grave.
>
> In August 2014, after the close of the International Peirce Congress in
> Lowell, Massachusetts, a group of Peirce scholars travelled to Milford to
> install and dedicate a commemorative plaque in Peirce’s study at Arisbe.
> This excursion to Milford, arranged for by Rosa Mayorga, included a visit
> to the Milford Cemetery to visit Peirce’s grave. Even the few who had
> visited Peirce’s grave before and who knew approximately where it was
> located had difficulty finding it. We were told stories of visitors from
> around the world who had tried in vain to find Peirce’s burial place. O

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

Dan, list,

I would encourage those who have the opportunity to visit Milford, PA, a
charming town with a fine local museum which, as you mentioned, Dan, has a
small, but quite interesting room of Peirce artifacts. I agree with you
that it would be nice were Arisbe restored and made a Peirce museum. But
for now the scientific team at the National Park Service there will, I
believe, with some advance notice, give even a small group a tour of the
house which itself has some Peirce articles including a large, beautiful,
and totally fascinating Quincuncial Projection of the World which Peirce
created several versions of. This is, I believe, the largest rendering. On
Peirce's quincuncial projection, yet another mark of his scientific genius,
see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peirce_quincuncial_projection

One can also visit the beautiful mansion and extensive, well kept grounds
of the friends of the Peirces, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot and
his wife. In letters Peirce writes fondly of dinners with the Pinchots.
Peirce's grave site sits somewhat below the Pinchots and might help you in
finding it should you visit the cemetery in which the monument will be
placed.

To learn more about the project and to donate, please visit:
http://monument.peirce-foundation.org/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c&id=04387f977d&e=860edf35dc>

Please send your contributions to the Peirce Foundation. The Foundation,
which is a 501(c)3 corporation, will provide you with a receipt for tax
purposes.


The town itself has some nice galleries, shops, and restaurants, and two
inns, one rather grand and one quite quaint and modest. Near the center of
town and close to the museum is the grander of the two, Hotel Fauchere,
where Peirce and his wife, Juliette, stayed on their arrival in Milford on
April 28, 1887.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Mar 8, 2018 at 2:08 AM, Everett, Daniel 
wrote:

> Thanks very much for this. My wife and I recently visited Milford and
> Arisbe. My own hope is that someday Arisbe itself can be restored as a
> Peirce museum. But in the meantime this project is excellent.
>
> It was quite moving to visit the small Peirce section of the local Milford
> museum, to see photos and objects from his life and to read through
> facsimiles of his correspondence. No one at the museum knew all that much
> about him.
>
> A monument is a welcome project.
>
> Dan
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Mar 8, 2018, at 05:48, Gary Richmond  wrote:
>
> List,
>
> I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
> concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
> Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.
>
> I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
> the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
> placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
> now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
> Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
> ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
> found (but see the entire discussion below):
>
> The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
> after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
> celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
> in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
> signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
> made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
> a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.
>
>
> Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
> more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a
> monument plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now
> moved to the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be
> around $20,000 US and the committee is now asking interested members of the
> Peirce community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
> erected soon.
>
> Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
> information on how you may contribute.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
> Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of
> Peirce Alive
> [image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
> Dear Gary,
>
> We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
> have led us to include you among those who regard 

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce's Last House: A Monument and Memorial

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I am forwarding this announcement by the Charles S. Peirce Society
concerning a plan to erect a monument at the gravesite of Peirce in
Milford, PA, not far from his home, which he called Arisbe.

I was among a small group of Peirce scholars who, following the close of
the 2014 International Peirce Congress at UMass, Lowell, after a ceremony
placing a plaque commemorating the conference at Peirce's home in Milford,
now a nature research center belonging to the National Park Service and the
Delaware Water Gap National Recreation, went to the cemetery where his
ashes were placed after the death of his wife, Juliette. This is what we
found (but see the entire discussion below):

The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.


Shortly after that visit a committee was formed "to develop plans for a
more satisfactory memorial." Subsequently the committee adopted a monument
plan and settled on a design for the monument. The plan has now moved to
the funding and implementation stage. The total cost will be around $20,000
US and the committee is now asking interested members of the Peirce
community to make generous contributions so that the monument may be
erected soon.

Please see the complete announcement below which includes a link to
information on how you may contribute.

Best,

Gary Richmond


Peirce's Last House: The Community of Scholars Keeping the Memory of Peirce
Alive
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
Dear Gary,

We are writing to you as someone whose research interests and achievements
have led us to include you among those who regard Charles S. Peirce as one
of the world’s great thinkers. Soon after their marriage, Peirce and
Juliette moved to Milford, Pennsylvania, where they resided until Charles’s
death in 1914. For the remainder of her impoverished life, Juliette kept
the urn with Peirce’s ashes on a mantel at their home, Arisbe. When
Juliette died in 1934, Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, a friend of
the Peirces with a grand home in Milford, arranged for Juliette’s burial in
the local cemetery near the Pinchot family plots. The urn with Peirce’s
ashes was placed in the casket with Juliette and was interred with her. A
small inconspicuous tombstone was erected to mark the grave.

In August 2014, after the close of the International Peirce Congress in
Lowell, Massachusetts, a group of Peirce scholars travelled to Milford to
install and dedicate a commemorative plaque in Peirce’s study at Arisbe.
This excursion to Milford, arranged for by Rosa Mayorga, included a visit
to the Milford Cemetery to visit Peirce’s grave. Even the few who had
visited Peirce’s grave before and who knew approximately where it was
located had difficulty finding it. We were told stories of visitors from
around the world who had tried in vain to find Peirce’s burial place. Once
located, it was easy to see why the grave is hard to find. The tombstone is
small and slightly askew and the urn beside it was broken in two. It is a
very unimpressive marker indexing the final resting place of the man who
many believe to be America’s greatest philosopher.


The Lowell group who made the trek to the grave site, following so soon
after the Lowell Congress where Peirce’s intellectual achievements were
celebrated by over 250 scholars from at least 25 countries, were unanimous
in feeling troubled by the disregard, and even seeming disrespect,
signified by the paltry and decrepit monument to the man. A decision was
made to rectify this neglect and to arrange for a monument more suitable as
a manifestation of Peirce’s intellectual weight.

Following this group visit to Milford, Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou, then
President of the Peirce Society, appointed a special committee, composed of
members of the Peirce Society and the Peirce Foundation and chaired by Rosa
Mayorga, to develop plans for a more satisfactory memorial. This committee
secured the necessary permissions to erect a new monument on the grave site
and adopted a monument plan designed by Céline Poisson, Professor at the
School of Design at the University of Quebec at Montreal.


This plan has now moved to the funding and implementation stage. The
estimated cost for construction of this monument is $16,250.00 in addition
to costs related to the planning and design phases. To cover these costs we
seek to raise $20,000.00 and hope that you will help us achieve this goal.
We ask you to make a generous donation. To make sure this project succeeds,
we would like to be able to make definite arrangements for the

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Gene, list,

After some reflection I don't think I can completely agree with Gary f that
Political Economy is not a science at all in Peirce's time. Consider, for
example, Stanley Jevons book of 1879 titled The Theory of Political
Economy. See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy where
one reads:

In the late 19th century, the term "economics
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics>" gradually began to replace the
term "political economy" with the rise of mathematical modelling coinciding
with the publication of an influential textbook by Alfred Marshall
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Marshall> in 1890. Earlier, William
Stanley Jevons <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Stanley_Jevons>, a
proponent of mathematical methods applied to the subject, advocated
economics for brevity and with the hope of the term becoming "the
recognised name of a science".


However, it seems to me that what Peirce seems to be emphasizing in the
passage Gene quoted, but also elsewhere, the tendency of the entire
political-economic power structure toward what he terms "The Gospel of
Greed." So, in the quotation by Peirce just mentioned, he writes "an
exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed . . . has resulted in a
philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent
in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe," an
Ayn Randian notion if ever there was one.

I think that Gene has some support for his notion idea that Political
Economy was seen in the late 19th Century as a science and one which Peirce
sees as having detrimental effects.

As for the quotation concerning Darwin's *Theory of Evolution*, while I
tend to agree with Gene that it was Peirce's view that Darwin's theory was
quite incomplete and needed a consideration of all three categories to
complete it, it would appear that Darwin *was* influenced by Herbert
Spencer's 1852, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of
Human Fertility," while Darwin seems to have been himself influenced by
Spencer's 1857, "Progress: Its Law and Cause." However, I don't think this
represents or even hints at the full picture, and even though the term
Social Darwinism wasn't much used in the USA before the turn of the 20th
century. However, it seems to me likely that "greedy industrialists"
weren't much reading Devons or Spencer (although Peirce knew their work
quite well).

Gene concluded:

I’m criticizing the costs of outlooks which take precise elements of
reality as the whole of reality, myopically, while excluding real elements
in ways whose costs and consequences have now brought the biosphere to the
gates of catastrophe. Yes, I would agree that Peirce offers a much broader
understanding of science, but that does not excuse the ways in which
science and technology have been willing perps in unsustainability as well.


Firstly, it seems to me that the ideas of "political economy" and "social
Darwinism" overlap to some considerable effect, although I can't discuss
this just now. Mainly, I'd suggest that while there have been some in,
especially, contemporary science and technology who "have been willing
perps in unsustainability," that for the most part scientists have not been
(although I'm fairly certain that more than a few have been compromised by
the need to feed their families). I offered the example of in my last post
of 97% of climate scientists accepting the human cause of global warming,
which warming itself has, as Gene wrote, "brought the biosphere to the
gates of catastrophe." Consider only the possibility of the Siberian tundra
melting sufficiently to release vast amounts of methane, 36 times more
potent a greenhouse gas than carbon.

I think, Gene, that you would, however, find it difficult to find in Peirce
very much support for your thesis. However, in our age especially, I think
it's true that science, and especially technology, have been plundered and
misused--just as the biosphere has--and unless we make great efforts to
counter that misuse in the next decade or so, I think Gene's expressed
concern is not overstated.

Best,

Gary R





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 4:36 PM,  wrote:

> Gene,
>
> It’s questionable whether Political Economy is a science at all in the
> Peircean sense of that word; maybe to him it was no more genuinely
> scientific than, well, the Gospel. But if we consider 21st-century
> Economics as a science, then we should look for self-criticism, and
> criticism of “classical” economic theories, within the profession, as
> symptomatic of the science being genuine in that 

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry,

Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
"conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
Really?

Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
list.

Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> That sounds like conspiracy.
>
>
>
> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>
>
>
> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, list,
>>
>> You concluded:
>>
>> EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
>> deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
>> and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
>> admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
>> technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
>> with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
>> technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.
>>
>>
>> I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing.
>>
>> I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
>> very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
>> political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
>> locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
>> technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
>> scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
>> "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
>> disagree.
>>
>> Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a
>> number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing
>> global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies
>> that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_von_Storch> (1999). "Climate
>> Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
>> <http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/1520-0477%281999%29080%3C0439%3ACSAEEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2>
>> (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
>> 439–455.
>>
>> In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most part
>> scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy
>> and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support
>> policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of
>> the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.)
>> The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who
>> deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and
>> "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."
>>
>> But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
>> scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
>> unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
>> the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
>> That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
>> for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
>> science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
>> did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the
>> political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his
>> view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather
>> science and technology can be seen as p

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

their own best interests. And all
this too is, I believe, anticipated in a close reading of certain of
Peirce's writings, including those on education, because he saw it *well on
its way* in his own era.

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:12 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Dear Gary R.,
>  Yes, thanks, you understood my critique and likely difference of
> opinion.
>  From my point of view your response, like that of many Peirceans, and
> sci-tech proponents more generally, takes an ideal of what science and
> technology should be as an excuse to deny their actual complicity in the
> delusion of limitless development of human-all-too-human purposes that has
> brought us to the likelihood of an emerging collapse. The greed, power, and
> especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not
> simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are
> essential features of the system, despite the many admirable individuals
> within it. That is why actually existing science and technology represent
> possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world with humans still a
> part of it, and why actually existing science and technology must be
> critically confronted as part of the problem.
>   Gene
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:27 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gene, list,
>>
>> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
>> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
>> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>>
>> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
>> overpopulated earth.
>>  Such is man's glory!
>>
>>
>> You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
>> comment. All​
>> ​
>> ​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive*
>> results of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
>> incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
>> well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
>> been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
>> application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)
>>
>> However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
>> earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
>> power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
>> can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
>> haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
>> that's because of greed, etc.)
>>
>> Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
>> replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
>> books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
>> there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
>> computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
>> technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than
>> the greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that
>> you wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.
>>
>> In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
>> matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
>> technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
>> too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
>> population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
>> which they have almost unlimited control.
>> Best,
>> Gary
>>  ​
>>
>
>
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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen. list,

SR: I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
reading of the lectures is in question.


While the 1898 Cambridge lecture series--which Kirsti explicitly referred
to--doesn't express his "despair," there is little doubt that Peirce in
such places as the quotation your offered, which is *not* from this lecture
series but from the essay "Evolutionary Love," did see the Gospel of Greed
as having supplanted the Gospel of Love in American political economy.

As for my own thoughts on this supplanting, see my response today to Gene
Halton's post.

I am happy to hear that you don't think that my reading of the *Reasoning
and the Logic of Thing*s isn't in question, but we'll see about that since
Kirsti referenced *that* lecture series and not "Evolutionary Love."

Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:25 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> I think K. was referring to Peirce's "despair" about the application of
> reason by the bulk of humanity in this single passage. I don't think your
> reading of the lectures is in question. It would be fairly easy to go
> through CP and pick and choose a small quilt of expressions that amount to
> a sort of despair about American culture or a critique of her theology--
> greed and such.
> *"Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is this:
> Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the
> fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between
> men, and leads to the summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort.
> Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to
> say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political economy,
> the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. But the study of
> doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily encourage
> generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has encouraged
> necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to
> economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the
> beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment,
> until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that
> greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the
> evolution of the universe.* " 6.290
>
> On a more encouraging note, "*In general, God is perpetually creating us,
> that is developing our real manhood, our spiritual reality. Like a good
> teacher, He is engaged in detaching us from a False dependence upon Him."
> 6.507*
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 12:51 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Kirsti, list,
>>
>> You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:
>>
>> KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his
>> true views on science and vitally important matters.
>>
>> ​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see
>> any "despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my
>> interpretation of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis
>> and feel confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
>> offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
>> but from many sources.
>>
>> But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them
>> so often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce
>> claimed he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the
>> structure and content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps
>> the principal theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of
>> despair at all, but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he
>> explicitly argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair
>> whatsoever in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely
>> positive estimate of both within their own provinces.
>>
>> So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
>> offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
>> with no basis in fact.
>>
>> KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe
>>
>> I'd be eager to have you help me re

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, list,

Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"

Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
overpopulated earth.
 Such is man's glory!


You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of your
comment. All​
​
​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted, by writing "*positive* results
of scientific inquiry," was that there were definite, concrete,
incontrovertible results of such inquiry, not that they were necessarily
well applied "to matters of vital importance." All too often they haven't
been, or there have been unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their
application (think gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.)

However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying, overpopulated
earth" is precisely the *misuse* of the fruits of science by greedy,
power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and institutions. Yet,
can I say that some of the advances, say, in my example of medicine,
haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many or even most (but, again,
that's because of greed, etc.)

Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both hips
replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing me to, for example, read
books again after a couple of years of not being able to do so. And, again,
there are many other technologies--such as those associated with
computation--which, again, can be well or badly used. But the science and
technology are, in my estimation, at least *less* the root cause than the
greed and power grabbing. From reading your books I have a sense that you
wouldn't agree with this last stated opinion.

In short, in my estimation the "wicked problems" of the world are less a
matter of the advance of science (theory) and its fruits, such as
technology, and more the lack of humane and ethical conduct (practice) by
too many men (being yet the tiniest fraction of a percentage of the world
population) and the corrupt institutions they've put in place and over
which they have almost unlimited control.

Best,

Gary
 ​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive
> results of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be
> applied to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)"
>
> Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
> overpopulated earth.
>  Such is man's glory!
>  Gene H
>
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

You'll have to give me and the list reasons for your saying this:

KS: I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
views on science and vitally important matters.

​First, I have no idea what you mean by Peirce's "despair." I don't see any
"despair" expressed in the lecture I commented on nor in my interpretation
of that lecture. In any event, I fully stand by my analysis and feel
confident that I could support it by adding--to those I've already
offered--dozens of quotes not only from "Reason and the Logic of Things,"
but from many sources.

But just limiting myself to the lectures, I can say that I've read them so
often that, while I couldn't say that I've memorized them as Peirce claimed
he'd memorized Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, yet I know the structure and
content of each lecture. On that basis I'd say that perhaps the principal
theme if not the gist of the first is not an expression of despair at all,
but simply that *one ought not mix theory and practice* (he explicitly
argues against this mixing in the lecture). There's no despair whatsoever
in that methodological idea. Indeed, he offers an extremely positive
estimate of both within their own provinces.

So, Kirsti, if you'd like to challenge my view on this, you'll have to
offer some evidence and argumentation. Otherwise it's mere vapid criticism
with no basis in fact.

KB: ​The issue should be rethougth, I believe

I'd be eager to have you help me rethink it on the list. While at the
moment I have confidence that my view is supported not only by Peirce's
discussion in the 1898 lectures, but in *many* other places in his work, as
always, and in the spirit of Peirce, I would be delighted to have you prove
me wrong. Then I'd have learned something I hadn't known and corrected an
error in my thinking. Peirce called this approach 'Critical Commonsensism',
and commented that his Pragmatism could be thought of as but a development
of it.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
> views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>
>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>> _
>>>
>>
>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>
>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>> of a jury, now is it?
>>
>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>
>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>
>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. Howev

Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen quoted Peirce:

*We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
man's glory! **Peirce: CP 1.627 *


In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.

But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that of a
jury, now is it?

Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator ask
contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this off-list). The
quotation above appears in the first lecture of the 1998 lectures published
as *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*.

When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of lectures in
Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then speaking on logic and
science as he was wont to do, that instead Peirce ought speak on "topics of
vital importance" (which phrase appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626
and .636). Peirce, of course, chose to speak on what interested him at the
time, including logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.

In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he hadn't
taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins by arguing
that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a "theory of
reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But they *do* have
their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . . in practical
affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy to exaggerate the
importance of ratiocination" and in such matters Peirce will offer as
alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It is this snippet just
quoted that introduces the paragraph which concludes the quotation which
Stephen offered. However, ". . . in theoretical matters I refuse to allow
sentiment any weight whatsoever" (CP 1.634).

Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . . has
nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637), and it is
best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly untrammeled a
scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's concluded this discussion
of topics of vital importance being little aided by our vain power of
reason (witness the jury illustration!), he moves on in the lectures to
follow to discussions of topics of scientific importance.

Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results of
scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied to
matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)

Best,

Gary R










Best,

Gary R




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> *We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
> before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
> presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
> come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
> to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
> man's glory!*
>
> *Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††*
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, Gary f, list,

ET: I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.

I completely disagree. First, as you wrote, it is a "current focus." Other
foci are possible and, no doubt, desirable. If one is not interested in a
particular line of inquiry then one may leave the thread--don't even read
the posts in it.

But even better is to begin a thread on a 'focus' which *does* interest
you. There have been *many* focuses over the years, some of them not even
on semeiotics, but rather on other aspects of Peirce's thinking. I would
encourage the development of threads on any and all facets of science,
philosophy, art, literature, music, architecture, religion, etc. which are
Peirce-related.

In addition, and significantly, Peirce himself offers *many* "singular
definitions of terms" in his discussion of the three branches of semiotics,
typically relating them to other terms. I do not see why the "current
focus" on the meaning of, especially, some very intriguing terms which
Peirce uses in his late work in semeiotic, including "Quasi-mind" and
"perfect Sign", "obscures" semeiotic inquiry; rather the contrary is the
case in my view. I am finding the threads on Quasi-mind, etc. personally
quite stimulating, drawn back into the discussion just when I was about to
leave it in the direction of another 'focus'.

Finally, I think the dismissal of a particular approach to semeiotic
inquiry as 'obscuring it' tends to "block the way of inquiry."

ET: In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that
enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.

Firstly, I thought you weren't interested in the "singular definitions of
terms," but here you are participating in that "focus." In any event, I do
not agree that a Quasi-mind can be reduced to "a LOCAL articulation of
Mind" (see the many Peirce quotes Jon S offered which contradict that
interpretation @ https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322
.html)

As to your notion that the Quasi-mind is *not* a Sign, it is Peirce who
writes that the Quasi-mind *is* a Sign. For example, here (emphasis added):

1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195

I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will
try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in
the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what they
are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But
a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A
thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of
dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self
of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires
a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination
of a quasi-mind. *The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign.*

ET: Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects
the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network


I do not see the "linearity" that you speak of. Please show how the model
which, for example, Jon S, Gary f, and I are employing (despite our many
moments of sometimes significant disagreement on particulars) "disconnects
the semiosic action from the relations with a larger network." Indeed, I
would suggest that recent analyses around Quasi-mind do just the opposite,
while it is your notion of "Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind," for
example, which seems to "disconnect."

You will disagree, I'm certain, but I would say that as much as possible
that we are basing our recent analyses at least on Peirce's own model of
triadic semiosis (which is hardly linear), whereas I find a certain
"linearity" in, for example, your own model of input-mediation-output, your
notion of "dynamic transformic nature" in a semiotic context, whereas
Peirce generally uses terms like dynamic for dyadic action.

Best,

Gary R

*​*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
> clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
>
> My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This
> capacity requires [1]  a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2]
>  requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant
> interactional

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Jon S, list,

I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so
I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:

Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind?

I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that the
perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a Quasi-sign
are *not* the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns out to be that
it does *not* mean that the Object can be completely represented. I'd
suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of
representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect
Sign is "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its
occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial
interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a
Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured,
perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis.

Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
Object sounds like a *concept*— as, for example, your concept of a woman
includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?

Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the Sign
with respect to *some*, but not *all*, of its characters or qualities; and
that *partial *combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the Form
that the Sign communicates."  I am less certain that I would distinguish
the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing "Only the
Sign *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
(determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R and I seems to
me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating in some
literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is itself a
Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for me,
problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how completely
we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of certain
rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard distinctions seem
to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the Form which the
Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from it.

Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
correlate of a *triadic* relation?
I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction."

I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our
answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what your
understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is.

Best,

Gary R

​



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 11:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs
> in a Quasi-mind?
>
>
> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an *individual
> *Sign that is also a *complex *of Signs," and (in his words) "something
> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing
> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a *perfect *sign" as "the
> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
> with it."  I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter
> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
> metaphysical ground first.
>
> JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the 
> *entire
> *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>
>
> GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman
> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>
>
> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a
> Sign "is determined by the object, bu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote:

EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
identity as a Sign may have, with the *unity *of the very Matter denoted by
it and the very Form signified by it, such that its Interpretant is *the
Truth*.


If this is so, then, since any given Sign or accretion of Signs in a
Quasi-mind (say on a sheet of assertion) can only signify specific aspects
or facets of the Object (ITS Object, mind you) as a certain, shall we say,
"selected assemblage" of characters (its Form), it would seem to me that a
perfect Sign remains an Ideal, that even the perfect Sign can only
asymptotically approach the Truth that it means to represent.

So, in sum, the Object can never be *completely* represented even by a
perfect Sign, and even if, as Jon wrote:

The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object of the
Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the
*entire *effect that the Dynamic Object *itself *would have on the
Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).


It seems to me that "reproducing the *entire* effect that the Dynamic
Object itself would have on the Quasi-interpreter" is an impossibility.

Yet, Jon, I'm not clear if this interpretation is consistent with this part
of your conclusion:

Therefore, a perfect Sign in *this* sense is one that achieves Entelechy,
the complete unity of Matter and Form in its Interpretant.  This is
the final cause of all *triadic *semiosis, Truth as "the conformity of a
representamen to its object--its object, ITS object, mind you" (CP 5.554,
EP 2:380; 1906).

Of course I completely agree with your concluding sentence.


By contrast, *dyadic *action occurs when there is no mediating Sign; just
two Dynamic Objects directly and reciprocally affecting each other (cf. EP
2:411; 1907).


But here we are speaking of Science, while I believe that Art is--even if
rarely--able to perfectly represent its Object, one which however, it
retrospectively, so to speak, creates.

Best,

Gary R
-



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> Since there have been no comments on my revised summary of what Peirce
> wrote about Quasi-minds, I guess that we can move on to some related topics.
>
> As Gary R. pointed out a while back, Peirce observed that there are
> "various meanings of the word 'Mind,' Logical, Metaphysical, and
> Psychological" (CP 4.550; 1906); and presumably the same is true of his
> concept of a Quasi-mind.  Consequently, it is important to be clear about
> which one is in view, and I believe that so far we have been focusing
> primarily on its *logical *aspects.  However, presumably there must be
> *real* Quasi-minds that play an indispensable role in any *concrete*
> instance of semiosis.  This obviously takes us from logic into
> metaphysics.
>
>
>
> CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still
> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to
> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory … (EP 2:304; 1904)
>
>
>
> The following is my summary of a few passages that I think are especially
> helpful for sorting out the nature of *actual* Signs and Sign-action.  
> Interestingly,
> they lead to a notion of "perfect sign" that (at least initially) seems
> different from what Peirce described in EP 2:545n25.
>
>- EP 2:304 (1904) - Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/2ns),
>*signifies* characters or qualities (Form/1ns), and *determines* its
>Interpretant that unites them (Entelechy/3ns).
>- EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign is *passive *in its relation to its
>Object, being determined by but not affecting it; and *active *in its
>relation to its Interpretant, determining but not being affected by it.
>- EP 2:410 (1907) - The Sign *mediates *between its Object and
>Interpretant; it is determined by the Object *relatively to the
>Interpretant*, and determines the Interpretant *in reference to the
>Object*.
>- EP 2:544n22 (1906) - The Sign *communicates *a Form, which has the
>being of the *predicate*, the truth of a conditional proposition; it
>is in the Dynamic Object *entitatively* and in the Sign (as its
>Immediate Object) *representatively*.
>- EP 2:307 (1904) - A pure *Icon *is perfect in respect to
>signification, but lacking in denotation; while a pure *Index* is
>perfect in respect to denotation, but lacking in signification.
>- EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is *identical*, in such
>identity as a Sign may hav

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-minds Revisited

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

I would tend to agree with your conclusion.

JAS: [It] seems to me that a Quasi-mind can be defined as an *individual *Sign
that is also a *complex *of Signs, which are connected such that they are
susceptible to determination by *another *Sign to a *single *Interpretant.
The additional Sign may be either a *natural *Sign determined directly by a
Dynamic Object that the Quasi-mind encounters, or a *genuine *Sign
determined by another Quasi-mind (perhaps its *past *self) with which it
becomes welded in that Sign.  The resulting Interpretant may be a
*further *genuine
Sign that determines yet another Quasi-mind (perhaps its *future *self).

Peirce's characteristic emphasis on continuity is evident here.  The flow
of Signs within and between Quasi-minds is much like the flow of time
itself, which has no *discrete *instants--only *infinitesimal *moments (cf.
CP 7.653; 1903).  That is why *any *analysis of concrete semiosis must be
*arbitrary *to some degree--designating one Sign within a process of
Sign-action is like marking one point on a line; in both cases, we are
introducing a *discontinuity *into that which is *continuous *in itself.

Well analyzed!  As I'm now seeing it, the Quasi-mind, a Sign which, as you
wrote, is also a complex of Signs, is in itself nothing special--nothing
mysterious, and certainly not the perfect sign at all, but something like
the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication;  that is,
* a requirement of semiosis itself when one considers Sign-action in the
light of continuity.*

Best,

Gary R





*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 25, 2018 at 5:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> Per Gary R.'s suggestion, I set aside the concept of "perfect Sign" for a
> little while to focus on the concept of "Quasi-mind."  After going back
> through the key quotes (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/
> arc/peirce-l/2018-02/msg00322.html), all of which are from 1906, here is
> a revised summary.
>
>1. Every Sign is a *determination *of a Quasi-mind, which is something
>of the general nature of a Mind.
>   1. The Quasi-mind is *itself *a Sign that is susceptible to
>   determination, but it is not logically necessary that it possess
>   *consciousness*.
>   2. There are no *isolated *Signs, and multiple Signs connected such
>   that they can have *one *Interpretant are determinations of *one *
>   Quasi-mind.
>   3. The determinations of a Quasi-mind become Immediate
>   Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamic Interpretants are
>   dynamically connected
>   2. Every Sign requires *two *distinct Quasi-minds, a *Quasi-utterer*
>and a *Quasi-interpreter*, which may be temporally successive versions
>of the *same *Quasi-mind; as well as a *third *Quasi-mind that is
>their overlap, the *Commens*.
>   1. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-utterer is the (Dynamic)
>   Object, which determines the Sign *only *in the respect (Immediate
>   Object) that enables the Sign to act on the Quasi-interpreter as the 
> Object *itself
>   *would.
>   2. The essential ingredient of the Quasi-interpreter is the
>   (Dynamic) Interpretant, which the Sign produces as a *singular *event
>   by determining the Quasi-interpreter to a feeling, to an exertion,
>   or to another Sign.
>   3. The essential ingredient of the Commens is the Sign itself,
>   which *welds *the Quasi-utterer and Quasi-interpreter into *one 
> *Quasi-mind
>   that includes whatever they must *already *share for the Sign to
>   fulfill its function.
>   4. When there is no *actual *Quasi-interpreter, the (Immediate)
>   Interpretant is the range of *possible *effects that the Sign
>   *would *produce, if it *were *to determine a Quasi-interpreter.
>   5. When there *is *a Quasi-interpreter, the (Dynamic) Interpretant
>   is a state of activity, mingled with curiosity, that usually leads to
>   experimentation as the normal logical effect.
>3. In Existential Graphs, the Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is ...
>   1. the *matter *that the Graph-instances are to determine, in which
>   the Graphist and Interpreter are *at one*.
>   2. the *means *by which the Graphist and Interpreter *collaborate *in
>   composing a Pheme [or Dicisign] and in operating on this so as to 
> develop a
>   Delome [or Argument].
>   3. a Diagram of the logical Quasi-mind that is determined by all of
>   the Signs represented on it.
>   4. a Diagram of the logical Universe and a Seme [or Rheme] of *the
>   Truth*, the widest Universe of Reality.
>   

[PEIRCE-L] Extended Deadline: 2nd International Conference Semiosis in Communication: Differences and Similarities

[Gary Richmond]

Forwarded FYI: Extended Deadline: 2nd International Conference Semiosis in
Communication: Differences and Similarities

*2nd International* *Conference Semiosis in Communication: Differences and
Similarities*, June 14-16, 2018, Bucharest, Romania.

We are glad to announce that the abstract submission deadline for this
event is extended to *8th of April*, 2018.

For planning final conference arrangements, we would be very grateful if
you consider this new date as the final one.

*Important deadlines:*

   - Deadline for submission of Abstracts: 25th of February 2018– *8th of
   April 2018*
   - Notification of Acceptance: 11th of March 2018 – *15th of April 2018*
   - Deadline for participation fee:16th of April 2018 – *6th of May 2018*
   - Conference: *14-16 June, 2018*

Please visit the conference website for the call (CfP), the registration
procedure and every other detail at:
http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/semiosisc_2018.html (check regularly
for updates).

You can also find up-to-date information about the event on the Facebook
conference page, https://www.facebook.com/Semiosis.in.Communication/.

We welcome each and all of you to Bucharest, Romania to the National
University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania (NUPSPA).

For questions and details concerning the conference *Semiosis in
Communication: Differences and Similarities*, please write to Nicolae-Sorin
Drăgan at: dragan.nicolaeso...@gmail.com.

*updated version of Call for Papers*: Call_for_Papers
<http://iass-ais.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Call_for_Papers.pdf>



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Peircean linguistic view of the Second Amendment

[Gary Richmond]

or how
the prefatory clause should be interpreted


The first, known as the "states' rights
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States%27_rights>" or "collective right"
model, held that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals;
rather, it recognizes the right of each state to arm its militia. Under
this approach, citizens "have no right to keep or bear arms, but the states
have a collective right to have the National Guard". Advocates of
collective rights models argued that the Second Amendment was written to
prevent the federal government from disarming state militias, rather than
to secure an individual right to possess firearms. Prior to 2001, every
circuit court decision that interpreted the Second Amendment endorsed the
"collective right" model. However, beginning with the Fifth Circuit's
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Fifth_Circuit>
 opinion *United States v. Emerson* in 2001, some circuit courts recognized
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.In the
latter half of the 20th century, there was considerable debate over whether
the Second Amendment protected an individual right or a collective right
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_and_group_rights>.The debate
centered on whether the prefatory clause ("A well regulated militia being
necessary to the security of a free State") declared the amendment’s only
purpose or merely announced a purpose to introduce the operative clause
("the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed").
Scholars advanced three competing theoretical models for how the prefatory
clause should be interpreted.

The second, known as the "sophisticated collective right model",held that
the Second Amendment recognizes some limited individual right. However,
this individual right could only be exercised by actively participating
members of a functioning, organized state militia/ Some scholars have
argued that the "sophisticated collective rights model" is, in fact, the
functional equivalent of the "collective rights model." Other commentators
have observed that prior to *Emerson*, five circuit courts specifically
endorsed the "sophisticated collective right model"

The third, known as the "standard model", held that the Second Amendment
recognized the personal right of individuals to keep and bear
arms. Supporters of this model argued that "although the first clause may
describe a general purpose for the amendment, the second clause is
controlling and therefore the amendment confers an individual right 'of the
people' to keep and bear arms".Additionally, scholars who favored this
model argued the "absence of founding-era militias mentioned in the
Amendment's preamble does not render it a 'dead letter' because the
preamble is a 'philosophical declaration' safeguarding militias and is but
one of multiple 'civic purposes' for which the Amendment was enacted".

Under both of the collective right models, the opening phrase was
considered essential as a pre-condition for the main clause. These
interpretations held that this was a grammar structure that was common
during that era and that this grammar dictated that the Second Amendment
protected a collective right to firearms to the extent necessary for
militia duty. However, under the standard model, the opening phrase was
believed to be prefatory or amplifying to the operative clause. The opening
phrase was meant as a non-exclusive example – one of many reasons for the
amendment. This interpretation is consistent with the position that the
Second Amendment protects a modified individual right.

The question of a collective right versus an individual right was
progressively resolved in favor of the individual rights model, beginning
with the Fifth Circuit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Fifth_Circuit>
ruling
in *United States v. Emerson
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Emerson>* (2001), along
with the Supreme Court's rulings in *District of Columbia v. Heller* (2008),
and *McDonald v. Chicago* (2010). In *Heller*, the Supreme Court resolved
any remaining circuit splits <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circuit_split> by
ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. Although the
Second Amendment is the only Constitutional amendment with a prefatory
clause, such linguistic constructions were widely used elsewhere in the
late eighteenth century.

(See also the following sections.)


Meaning of "well regulated militia"

Meaning of "the right of the People"

Meaning of "keep and bear arms"




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 48

[PEIRCE-L] A Peircean linguistic view of the Second Amendment

[Gary Richmond]

List,

The conclusion of the Peircean linguist Michael Shapiro's blog post of 2014
on the Second Amendment. First, the Amendment.

 "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."

"The word militia of the first clause governs—is hierarchically
superordinate to—the phrase the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
The framers of the Constitution had the grammatical option to invert the
two clauses but did not. The element order speaks for itself, rendering
militia the pragmatistic scope (i. e., in the Peircean sense of the
philosophical doctrine of pragmatism) under which right to keep and bear
arms is restricted. " Michael Shapiro

His complete argumentation is, of course, longer; for which see his blog.
http://languagelore.net Included in Shapiro's post was this:

>From Dennis Baron, “Guns and Grammar: the Linguistics of the Second
Amendment” (www.english.illinois.edu/-people/faculty/debaron/essays/guns.pdf
):

“In our amicus brief in the Heller case we attempted to demonstrate,
• that the Second Amendment must be read in its entirety, and that its
initial absolute functions as a subordinate adverbial that establishes a
cause-and-effect connection with the amendment’s main clause; connection
with the amendment’s main clause;
• that the vast preponderance of examples show that the phrase bear arms
refers specifically to carrying weapons in the context of a well-regulated
militia;
• that the word militia itself refers to a federally-authorized, collective
fighting force, drawn only from the subgroup of citizens eligible for
service in such a body;
• and that as the linguistic evidence makes clear, the militia clause is
inextricably bound to the right to bear arms clause. 18th-century readers,
grammarians, and lexicographers understood the Second Amendment in this
way, and it is how linguists have understood it as well.”

Professor Joseph Dauben of the CUNY Graduate Center commented on Shapiro's
blog post in an email today: "It's clear from what you say that the
amendment means "the people" collectively, in their joint defense, not
every NRA member out there who may on his own want to keep a weapon handy,
whether there is a militia anywhere in sight or not."

I should note that this post is meant only to demonstrate one way in which
Peircean thought is being effectively employed in consideration of
contemporary issues.

Best,

Gary R


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Gary Richmond]

tant; this is the sense in
which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those previous Signs, which
serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants,
which serve as its Habits of Interpretation.


Again, I find your equating Quasi-mind and perfect Sign problematic
although I can agree with some of what you state concerning the Quasi-mind,
some concerning the perfect Sign. But as I reread your quote above, I still
am perplexed by what I am seeing as your possibly conflating the two.
Again, you may be correct; but you haven't yet produced enough evidence nor
a strong enough argument to have convinced me that the two are one. Again,
this is why I think it might be helpful to have a clear understanding of
Quasi-mind before leaping to that conflating (or equating, or whatever it
is).

JAS (2, continued): ​As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an
indispensable ingredient for any semiosis to occur.  For *natural *Signs,
there is no utterer, but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind.  For *genuine *Signs,
the utterer is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and their
overlap--where they are "welded" and become one in the Sign itself--is a
Quasi-mind.  This is illustrated by the Phemic Sheet, which is the
Quasi-mind where the Graphist and Interpreter are at one--not only in the
Signs that they proceed to scribe on it, but also in everything that is
tacitly taken for granted between them from the outset of their discussion,
when the sheet itself is still *blank*.  As always, these two Quasi-minds
can be different temporal versions of the *same* Quasi-mind.

​​

​I don't see why Nature cannot  be an utterer and I think Peirce somewhere
says as much (but I haven't been able to find that passage yet).  As for
your trio of Quasi-minds for genuine signs, I'll have to think about that.
Certainly this may be the case for the Graphist and Interpreter of a Phemic
sheet, but I don't know how far one ought generalize this *most* logical
example. I agree, however, that "two Quasi-mind can be different temporal
versions of the same Quasi-mind." My principal thought experiments
regarding the Quasi-mind has for years been my own thought process, that
dialogue with oneself which Peirce once illustrated with the (then)
commonplace expression, "So I says to myself. . ."; also, the way one
"catches" the thought of another, or she of you, etc.

​JAS (2. concluded):
As for Peirce's example of molecules, *unlike *when he called the universe
a Symbol and an Argument, he *explicitly stated* that he was presenting it
as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by "determination."

CSP:  This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon will do
good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric
of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical and phaneroscopical
concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without
metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion without a peel. Let a
community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid in a number of bottles ...
(EP 2:392; 1906)


I agree: the example of molecules is explicitly given as a metaphor.


JAS: 3.  We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages
of this inquiry.  Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would involve
analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a loud sound, the
vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the child who screams upon
touching a hot burner.  The bird, the person who sees the vase, and the
child and her mother are all presumably Quasi-minds.


​I would be interested in moving from the abstract to the concrete stage of
this inquiry, but only after we have settled a bit more firmly on what a
Quasi-mind is; then on what a perfect Sign is; then if the two really are
one. Once we have some agreement on *that* perhaps we can move on to a more
concrete experiment.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument.  However, your point
> about providing multiple terms for the same concept is well-taken.  With
> that in mind, I now see *three *interpretive possibilities for Peirce's
> statement, "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind.  It is the sheet of
> assertion of Existential Graphs."
>
>- A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the Sheet
>of Assertion is an example.
>- A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same, but
>there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
>- Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other
>kinds of perfect Signs; and every 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, list,

Would you please explain why you posted this to the list, especially in
this thread. I cannot see what pertinence it has to the discussion of
quasi-minds?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 6:07 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> I wish to share this article, which I take to be topical given our
> incomplete understanding of Quasi-minds:
>
>
>
> *We worked in a group of three where one played the part of a scoundrel,
> the other one was a hero, and the third one kept a neutral position..*
>
>
>
> *He said he hated the work..*
>
> *The world in those comments was divided into black and white.. *
>
> *praised.. criticized..  That was the principle of the work..*
>
>
>
> *The posts and comments are made to form the opinion of Russian citizens
> regarding certain issues, and as we see it works for other countries, too..*
>
>
>
> *The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a
> real person..*
>
>
>
> *These technologies are unbelievably effective..*
>
>
>
> *She added that she learned how effective the troll farm's work was when
> she saw regular people sharing opinions and information that she knew were
> planted by trolls.*
>
> *"They believed it was their own thoughts, but I saw that those thoughts
> were formed by the propagandists," she said.*
>
> http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-russian-
> troll-factory-20180219-story.html
>
>
>
> *He begins in Letter 13 by affirming that “a third basic drive which could
> mediate the other two is an absolutely unthinkable concept”; *
>
>
>
> *Or, finally, there must exist a power which comes between mind and matter
> and unites the two… Is such a thing conceivable?  Certainly not!  *
>
>
>
> *~* "Aesthetic" for Schiller and Peirce: A Neglected Origin of Pragmatism
>
> Jeffrey Barnou,  *Journal of the History of Ideas*
>
>
>
> Hth,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 19, 2018 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I found three more potentially relevant quotes in an alternate draft of
>> "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (R 193, NEM 4:313-330; 1906).
>> It was a bit of a challenge to ascertain how much of the context I should
>> include in each case, so please let me know off-List if you would like to
>> see anything that comes right before or after any of these excerpts.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>>
>> 8.  Now let us see how the Diagram entrains its consequence. The Diagram
>> sufficiently partakes of the percussivity of a Percept to determine, as its
>> Dynamic, or Middle, Interpretant, a state [of] activity in the Interpreter,
>> mingled with curiosity. As usual, this mixture leads to Experimentation. It
>> is the normal Logical effect; that is to say, it not only happens in the
>> cortex of the human brain, but must plainly happen in every Quasi-mind in
>> which Signs of all kinds have a vitality of their own. (NEM 4:318).
>>
>>
>> 9.  The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only
>> been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the
>> contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and
>> promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of
>> all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the
>> *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside
>> Thought proper) will be a Consistituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being
>> itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better
>> method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of
>> Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. (NEM 4:320)
>>
>>
>> 10.  Logic requires great subtlety of thought, throughout; and especially
>> in distinguishing those characters which belong to the diagram with which
>> one works, but which are not significant features of it considered as the
>> Diagram it is taken for, from those that testify as to the Form
>> represented. For not only may a Diagram have features that are not
>> significant at all, such as its being drawn upon ''laid'' or upon ''wove"
>> paper; not only may it have features that are significant but are not
>> diagrammatically so; but one and the same construction may be, when
>> regarde

[PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S., list,

OK, I'll start the thread by offering the few quotes in *Commens* on
Quasi-mind. Again, I won't be able to join in the discussion until sometime
next week.

Best,

Gary R




1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes,
etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic
nominalism akin to Fichte’s. Not only is thought in the organic world, but
it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances
embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give
“Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within
our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it
may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a
*Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they
are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human
Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It
might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this
fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume -
and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is
only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of
diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it
be incorrect, the utmost *certain* effect will be a danger that our system
may not represent every variety of non-human thought.
1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 283:118 [variant]

… quasi-mind is an object which from whatever standpoint it be examined,
must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of
susceptibility to determination.
1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 195

I almost despair of making clear what I mean by a “quasi-mind;” But I will
try. A *thought* is not *per se* in any mind or quasi-mind. I mean this in
the same sense as I might say that Right and Truth would remain what they
are though they were not embodied, & though nothing were right or true. But
a thought, to gain any active mode of being must be embodied in a Sign. A
thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort of
dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered self
of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking requires
a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a determination
of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign.


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You wrote:

JAS: Hence we seem to be converging at last on classifying the girl's
scream as a genuine Sign, both for her and for the mother, at least from a
certain point of view.  However, I am still not sure whether to treat it as
a Replica of one Sign or of two different Signs.  Ironically, it would
*have *to be the latter if it were a natural/degenerate Sign for the child
and a genuine Sign for the mother.  On the other hand, I am reminded of
Peirce's notion that two Quasi-minds are "welded" when the same Sign is
uttered by one and interpreted by the other (CP 4.551; 1906).  Presumably
the resolution still depends on whether the Sign has the same Dynamic
Object for both of them--the girl's pain, for example.


I
​ think it might be wise to leave it at this for now. I definitely see the
child's and the mother's Signs as two Signs since, again, I see two
different Dynamic Objects. But for now I haven't anything to add beyond
what I've already written, so I'm content to know that our thinking was
able to 'converge', as you wrote, to the extent that it has (is that
convergence an example of Quasi-mind?)​

Speaking of which, I also just reread the *Commens* Dictionary entries on
Quasi-mind and still think we could benefit from a discussion of that
concept, especially as I'm seeing the notion, "welded in the Sign" as it
appears in one of the entries somewhat differently than you seem to be
interpreting it. It seems to me more closely connected to the notion of
"dialogic" than what you've been proposing in analyzing "The Child Learns a
Lesson" case.

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity
of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.
​
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.551
​ at *Commens*.​
​


I should hasten to add that, although I see it as a potentially important
​inquiry
, I would rather postpone
​that discussion of Quasi-mind
as well.
​ Of course if you care to comment on this now, or even begin a new thread,
please do. But for now, I'll let whatever you have to say stand with no
response and hope to join in later.

​JAS:
Thanks for your patience in working through all of this with me.  Should we
revisit the vase scenario next? :-)


Thanks for your patience in return. I would actually at some point like to
revisit the vase scenario but, again, not just now. I like the way we "kept
at" the child/mother case, even  imagining that if I had your, shall we
say, 'probing fortitude', that we might be able to resolve at least some of
those issues on which we have not yet come to full agreement on. In any
event, engaging in dialogue with you is always stimulating, challenging,
and well worth the time and effort put into it. In a word, it always felt
like a joint 'inquiry' and not mere 'debate', and with both of us willing
to modify our views in the light of the other's thinking.

What I'd like to turn to soon is
​
Peirce's late (1907) manuscript, given the title, "Pragmatism" by the
Essential Peirce editors (EP 2:398-434 ).
​ But that could be, I think, a major inquiry, one which, perhaps early in
March, I'd like to introduce in a way which might hopefully encourage
additional participation in our forum. I've been thinking about this for
some time now and drafting notes to myself, excepting passages and ideas
from "Pragmatism" in preparation for beginning a discussion.

So, for now, especially as I'm occupied with other matters needing my
attention, I'll drop off the list for at least the rest of the week,
perhaps longer, and try to find time to re-read "Pragmatism."

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I was about to send an addendum to my previous post when I received your
> reply--for which I am grateful, because it prompted me to hold off a bit
> and reconsider a couple of things.  I agree that we make a good team in
> this discussion, given our opposing proclivities for abstract vs. concrete
> analysis.
>
> As you mentioned in a side note, "it is clear that animals change their
> habits as a consequence of natural signs."  This is just another way of
> s

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

nimals change their habits as a
consequence of natural signs. But that's another topic.

You had earlier suggested that there was but one sign for both the child
and the mother. This you said would almost certainly result in their
respective habit changes. I wrote:

GR. . . these will be very different habits: not touching flames in the
future for the child; not leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the
future for the mother. Again, this stark difference in habit-change
strongly suggests to me two different signs, not one.


Earlier you were questioning if what were happening in the child was
semiosis at all (JAS: is this really an example of Sign-action at all? )
But more recently you've been arguing that it is a degenerate Sign. Now
you've written "that what happens within the child is Sign-action, not
dyadic action/reaction;" but are you saying that only if the child cried
something like "Maman!" and not "Aie!" (which, again, I find tinged with
something *not* natural but influenced by the language she speaks, viz.,
French)? Am I wrong to assume that in any case that you agree that the
child's Sign (genuine or degenerate) and the mother's Sign are two, not one?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 10:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> In your original presentation of this thought experiment, the child was a
> toddler and did not scream "Maman" or any other recognizable word, but
> simply "Aie!"  As such, I took it to be an involuntary reflex, such as any
> of us likely would exclaim when surprised by pain, although as an
> English-speaker I would presumably be more inclined to say something like
> "Ouch!" or perhaps another four-letter expression.  Frankly, I find it
> implausible that the first thing to come out of someone's mouth--especially
> such a young one--upon touching a hot burner would be "Maman."
>
> Be that as it may, further contemplation of this example already led me to
> settle on new tentative answers to my own questions, and I discovered your
> reply upon coming online to post them.  Your points below are well-taken,
> especially once again correctly diagnosing my affinity for the abstract
> over the concrete, a fault that I am unlikely ever to escape completely.
>
> I now agree that what happens within the child is Sign-action, not dyadic
> action/reaction, even if I retain the assumption--which you understandably
> find dubious--that the steps from finger contact to vocal chord vibration
> constitute a series of *dynamical *causes and effects.  The reason is
> because of the potential (and perhaps probable) Habit-change that I
> posited--the girl is capable of learning by experience, and hence acquiring
> the new habit of *not *touching stove burners as the Final Interpretant
> of this particular Sign.  My new hypothesis is that *any *action
> involving a Mind (or Quasi-mind) as *either *utterer *or *interpreter is
> irreducibly semiosic.
>
> I also agree that if the child screams "Maman" it is a *genuine *Sign for
> the mother, as any word *must *be.  That would make the girl its utterer,
> since she would be *intentionally *producing it.  However, if the scream
> is something truly *involuntary*, like I take "Aie!" to be, I am still
> inclined to view it as a natural/degenerate Sign.  My other new hypothesis
> is that *only *a Sign that has Minds (or Quasi-minds) as *both *its
> utterer *and *its interpreter--which may be two temporally sequential
> versions of the *same *Mind (or Quasi-mind)--is *genuine*, the kind that
> exists in Replicas.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 7:10 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
>> questions about the girl's scream.
>>
>> For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic Interpretant
>> produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by a series of
>> dyadic causes?
>> ​. . .
>> when the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do
>> we distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?
>>
>>
>> ​You say it is "an involuntary reflex," while I don't see it as merely
>> that. In my view the dynamic interpretant *is* produced by triadic
>> semiosis

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

You wrote:

I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
questions about the girl's scream.

For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic Interpretant
produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by a series of
dyadic causes?
​. . .
when the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do we
distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?


​You say it is "an involuntary reflex," while I don't see it as merely
that. In my view the dynamic interpretant *is* produced by triadic
semiosis, that is to say that this is an example of something which is more
than an involuntary reflect. I'll try to explain my position.

Say the child screams "Maman!" I don't see how you can abstract her very
human cry (which *may* 'mean', at least in part, "Maman" *whatever* she may
scream), how can you reduce her cry which, as I've just suggested, may
include a deep relationship to her mother (including the very word,
"Maman"), to mere dyadic causes. It seems to me that you have overly
abstracted the whole situation, left out, for prime example, the humanity
(the deep relations to other humans, notably, her mother) involved in the
child's semiosis. I personally have no problem distinguishing her semiosis
from brute reaction. That you seem to suggests to me, again, your
self-acknowledged tendency to look at such things more abstractly than I,
for example, do.

So, in short, it seems to me that you maybe be over-analyzing in an
extremely abstract manner what is *vitally* involved in such an occurrence, *as
if the IO-R-DI had no local, in this case human, residence*. In particular
I find the child's Representamen and especially her Interpretant not to be,
at least not *predominantly*, a 2ns. I think that in a way you've
abstracted the 'life' out of this (albeit, hypothetical) semiosic
situation.

2. For the mother, is it [the scream GR] a Replica (Token) of a genuine
Sign (Type), or a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
.
​ . .​
how do we distinguish a Replica from a natural/degenerate Sinsign?


Whether the child screams "Maman" or "Aie" or whatever, I see the mother
responding--at least principally--to the Replica of a genuine Sign, while
all the intense feeling conveyed in the non-verbal aspects of the Sign (the
harsh, jagged intensity of her cry, "Maman," signaling that something
terribly awful or painful has happened to the child) are present as well,
but especially directed toward her mother. So, is 2ns involved in her
response? Most certainly, as such extreme semiosis is highly complex. But
it is mixed with genuine semiosis in my view.

To abstract "all that" from the semiosic experience of the mother, should
you suggest (as I think you are suggesting) that the child's scream is
*merely* a "natural/degenerate Sinsign" makes me once again think that
perhaps you are enthralled--at least in this hypothetical case--by semiotic
abstraction, especially abstract terminology, and in doing so have
disconnected your analysis from not only "the life of the sign," but from
life more generally--from semiosis as it is lived in all its complexity.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I guess I can boil down the main feedback that I am seeking to two
> questions about the girl's scream.
>
>1. For the child, as an *involuntary *reflex, is it a Dynamic
>Interpretant produced by triadic semiosis, or merely an effect produced by
>a series of dyadic causes?
>2. For the mother, is it a Replica (Token) of a genuine Sign (Type),
>or a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
>
> Obviously I am also seeking explanations for any answers offered.  For #1, 
> when
> the Sign, Object, and Interpretant are all Existents (2ns), how do we
> distinguish Sign-action from brute dynamical action/reaction?  For #2, how
> do we distinguish a Replica from a natural/degenerate Sinsign?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:35 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:
>>
>> JAS: Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels
>> highly conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive)
>> criticism.
>>
>> I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
>> to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly
>> conjectural" that I just can't enough sens

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list

You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:

JAS: Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.

I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly
conjectural" that I just can't enough sense of it to offer a helpful
critique of it. It feels to me almost like a kind of literary exegesis,
rich but somewhat fantastic. You propose several extraordinary interpretive
claims and suggestions (for example, that the child's scream may not be
sign-action at all) which seem, well, strained.

So, I'm going to leave it to others to offer constructive criticism.
Meanwhile, I'll stand by my previous analyses.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
> response.  Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
> mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign.  Upon
> reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of
> the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP
> 2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am
> misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than
> one* Sign.
>
> In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
> "primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a *degenerate 
> *Sign--an
> instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such
> that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns).  As such, I get the sense that
> many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of
> the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves
> from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
> conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*.  Why
> should we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a
> particular neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather
> than as merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects?
> If she effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of
> Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise regarding the flight of a
> bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have some vague notions of possible
> answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear
> explanation.
>
> For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any kind of 
> *deterministic
> *response.  Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts,"
> she rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore
> the child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From
> her standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the
> scream, even if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed
> where we must "look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential
> ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not
> convinced that it is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an
> utterer, the Dynamic Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the
> utterer (as the saying goes) *has in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in
> this case, perhaps the *pain *that the girl is sensing.  The Immediate
> Object is then the combination of attributes of *this particular scream*
> that the mother's Collateral Experience leads her to associate with
> previous *screams of pain or distress* that she has heard, both from this
> child and from others, which likely differentiates them somehow from *other
> kinds* of childish screams.
>
> This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the mother,
> the girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously 
> *cannot
> *be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign
> is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*.  Hence the
> context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual 
> *semiosis--necessarily
> involving Replicas--is quite evident here.
>
> Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
> conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
> In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reje

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:

JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?

I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.

The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again,
as I see it the Dynamic Object for the mother is the child, while those
several characters which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her
immediate object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a
different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their
having *entirely
different* Dynamic Objects.


Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems closer
to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream in the DO.
For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a character) from the
flaming burners led to the child's pain (a character) that grounded her
semiosis, it was the child as DO whose scream (a character for her mother)
grounded her mother's semiosis.

Jon continued:

JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection between the
hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because
the one would not have happened without the other.

Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite regress
going as far back as the child's conception, and probably much further back
than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc, propter hoc version of that
regress. What you point to ("the one would not have happened without the
other") seems to me more like physical than semiotic determination.

JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic Object for
the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the very same Sign?

I do not *at al*l see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are two
signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by the DI of
the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still *two distinct signs*(at
least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least partial agreement.

So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why I think
our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the interpretant
standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign
itself does"  doesn't apply to both signs, but to the child's sign and* not
*to the mother's (as you've been analyzing the semioses).

The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as I see
it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like which will
in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis, additional signs,
etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here. This is not to suggest that
the habits of the mother and the daughter will not lead to perhaps
life-changing habit change. But you yourself have noted that these will be
very different habits: not touching flames in the future for the child; not
leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again,
this stark difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different
signs, not one.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
> to try combining multiple replies into one post.
>
> Gary R.:
>
> 1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
> capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
> much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.
>
> 2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged
> previously, I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these
> kinds of practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In
> this case, I

Self-control and self-criticism, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

This post began as my (hopefully) final note on the theme of reducing the
frequency of posts to the forum.

"To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves." Virginia Woolf


This was the sum total of Gary Fuhrman's blog entry for today.
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/02/of-course/

Of course each person has to decide what kinds of and how much self-control
she wants to develop in any particular context and for her life more
generally.

Woolf's words reminded me of Peirce's comment on the development of
"thoroughly deliberate" conduct.

“If conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of
feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of
self—criticism and of hetero— criticism” (CP 1.574, 1906),


So, interestingly, according to Peirce this ideal of conduct is the result
of *both* self- and other-criticism. Any thoughts on why Peirce included
the idea of "hetero-criticism" in the development of this ideal of conduct?
My own thought at the moment is that this comment prepares for his famously
non-standard definition of esthetics as "the theory of the deliberate
formation of such habits of feeling: (CP 1.574). Putting this in the
context of the normative sciences, in the 1903 Harvard Lectures Peirce had
written:

Supposing, however, that normative science divides into esthetics, ethics,
and logic, then it is easily perceived, from my standpoint, that this
division is governed by the three categories. For Normative Science in
general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends,
esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of
feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those
things whose end is to represent something.


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Kirsti, list,
>
> Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
> to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
> even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
> irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week
> *plus* additional copies.
>
> What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
> sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.
>
> Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
> the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
> myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
> a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
> in that message.
>
> In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
> ". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
> requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary (writing as list moderator)
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM,  wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
>> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
>> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>>
>> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull,
>> so hopeless.
>>
>> Best, Kirsti
>>
>>
>>
>> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>>
>>
>> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>>
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>>> for archiving or reply.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>>
>>>> Deletion is always a possi

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.


Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in
his ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that
extent intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly
triadic action of semiosis" *requires* a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of
degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.


I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not
that of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign
determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's
Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural
signal and the external scream are *Indices *of the hot burner; at least,
that is how I see it at the moment.


I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the
Sign's DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother
as grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate
Object for *her, *the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in
the cry of her child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object
of the mother's Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the
interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as
the Sign itself does" applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the
child.


3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.


Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.


It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may
be using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it
*would* connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially
eager to hear what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very qui

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, list,

For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points. In
response to Edwina, Jon wrote:

1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
"Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
hoped that when we jointly recognized the *internal *triad of [IO-R-II]
some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call *this *(and
*only *this) the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign
*without *a DO.


My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).

John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for a,
shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and the like
have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down
the argument that the action of signs extends even further than life, and
that semiosis as an influence of the future played a role in the shaping of
the physical universe prior to the advent of life, a role for which Deely
coined the term *physiosemiosis."*
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely>*

As suggested above, I think that it was Peirce's view that what Delly
termed "physiosemiosis" not only
"played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the advent
of life" but has played one since and does so today, and not only in the
formation of crystals. But, again, in my view, once the crystal is formed
the (internal) semiosis ends (yes, it continues to have a relation to its
environment, and there will be atomic and sub-atomic activity necessarily
occurring, but I personally have yet to be convinced that such activity
constitutes a form of semiosis, while some physicists have argued that it
does).

Living organisms present a more difficult problem. The work of Stjernfelt
(esp. in *Natural Propositions: The Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of
Dicisigns)*, not to mention the whole thrust of the science of Biosemiotics
holds not only that any living organism, but the organism in relation to
its environment (its Umwelt) is fully involved in complex semiosic
activity. I would tend to strongly agree.


2.  As I noted in my own reply to Gary, I instead view the DI of the child
(the utterer) as an *external Sign* for the mother (the interpreter), and
its DO is still the hot burner.


While I also view the DI of the child as an external Sign for her mother, I
do not see the DO as the hot burner. The mother, say, who was out of the
room for the moment of the accident, hearing her child's scream may not
connect the scream (the Sign) with the stove at all. So then what is the
DO? I think that rather than the hot burner (as Jon holds) that it's the
child herself.

3.  Your mind is indeed an individual manifestation of Mind; but again, I
suspect that Peirce used "Quasi-mind" to accommodate cases that most people
would not normally associate with "mind."


As I've posted now a couple of times, in my opinion the concept
"Quasi-sign" needs much further discussion, perhaps a thread of its own. I
would for now merely suggest that while it no doubt does "accommodate cases
that most people would not normally associate with "mind," that the concept
includes more ordinary cases as well.

4.  If to you "Form has [parameters] and laws and continuity," then you are
not referring to the same thing that Peirce called "Form" when he
contrasted it with Matter in NEM 4:292-300 and EP 2:303-304.


​At times in this discussion as to the meaning of 'Form', while there seems
to me that for Peirce 'Form' *is *1ns, Edwina's analysis of Form seems to
me more related to structure--the forms of the organization of related
elements in a material system, rather than the forms of the elements
themselves. In that physical system the organization would in many if not
all cases have "parameters, laws, and continuity."

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
> talking a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week *plus*
additional copies.

What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.

Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
in that message.

In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."

Best,

Gary (writing as list moderator)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>
> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, so
> hopeless.
>
> Best, Kirsti
>
>
>
> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>
>
> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>
>> Peircers,
>>
>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>> for archiving or reply.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>
>>> Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are
>>> occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about
>>> meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both unPeircean
>>> (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not particularly
>>> well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings or cognizant of
>>> the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many philosophers.
>>>
>>> I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice to
>>> Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the consequences of
>>> his epistemology for modern linguistics (which has been deeply Cartesian in
>>> the main for decades). So when more experienced Peirce scholars discuss his
>>> terms, it can be educational.
>>>
>>> I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before
>>> responding and perhaps responding once a day instead of several times
>>> would/could lead to better responses of more benefit to others.
>>>
>>> To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there is
>>> nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and then delete
>>> them if I am going to. Time-consuming.
>>>
>>> At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep
>>> shooting out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us will
>>> be more likely to read them if they come less frequently. If these are just
>>> personal quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to be on the list. If
>>> they are felt worthy for the entire list, frequency reduction would be
>>> useful. But if not, I won’t say another word on the subject.
>>>
>>> Dan
>>>
>>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

John Sowa wrote: "Since the beginning of February, there have been over 200
emails
on Peirce-L."

Thanks, John, for seconding my idea that it might be important--and even
valuable--for very active participants in the forum to make an attempt to
reduce the frequency of their postings.

I would hope that John's observing that there have "over 200 emails" on the
list in February--and we haven't yet reached the middle of the
month!--ought suggest to all that there may have been of late an all too
rapid exchange of messages to Peirce-l from a very few participants. And I
can't imagine that I am the only reader of these many posts who has noticed
that there has been quite a bit of, shall we say, redundancy of content of
some (many?) posts.

I hope that I've made it clear that I do not want in any way to inhibit
participation on the list. But there ought to be a way in which frequent
contributors to our forum might find their way to practicing some
additional self-discipline as to frequency of posting.

Again, as I first wrote:

GR: I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
*consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they are
but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
contributors) .


In short, such self-discipline could possibly benefit all of us:
participants and lurkers.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 11, 2018 at 11:06 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/10/2018 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> I have recently received a few complaints and two requests to
>> be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
>> unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as
>> list moderator that naturally concerns me.
>>
>
> Since the beginning of February, there have been over 200 emails
> on Peirce-L.  I've been tied up with other work and have only
> had a chance to sample a few snowflakes in this storm.
>
> Fortunately, I direct all Peirce-L notes to a special folder,
> where they can pile up undisturbed.  I don't want to block
> anybody's "way of inquiry", but I second Gary's concerns.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, list,

I'm trying to catch the upshot of your (including others) recently
exceedingly illuminating discussion even given the remaining differences in
viewpoints. So, springboarding off Jon's recent bullet points:

   - The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
   within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.

While I agree that for any *given* Sign that this is correct in some
abstract way. But I am wondering if Edwina isn't suggesting that no single
Sign can be so isolated in the continuum of semiosis (a notion involved in
the concept of Quasi-sign). This is to say that the individual's semiosis
is not discontinuous with that of his environment where all manner of
semiosis is occurring.

And Peirce did offer the determination of semiosis as beginning in the DO,
making a simple diagram not unlike the one Edwina has been offering
(although he didn't include the brackets which, I think, are an essential
addition to the diagram; as I recall he uses only dashes).

Further, as I analyzed it in terms of the child burning her hand in the
fire, the child's DI becomes a sign for her mother. While I'm not sure
whether I agree with Edwina that *only* the II is within the sign, the DI
would seem to be *at least a bridge* to further semiosis, viz., that of her
mother, and much as the DO was to the child's semiosis. Again, isolating
the individual Sign seems problematic to me except in the most abstract of
analyses.

   - A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of Collateral
   Experience and Habits of Interpretation.

This use of Quasi-mind as that which "stores" knowledge is not yet
convincing to me. That is, it seems to me that the concept is perhaps being
overburdened in employing it in that way. An individual no doubt has her
Collateral Experience and Knowledge and Habits of Interpretation, but this
is "stored" in her memory (including sense memory) and externally (for
example, in notes she may make, etc.), and is no doubt continuous with
those signs in the Quasi-mind that involves all the signs she interprets
and uses.

But why burden the idea of Quasi-mind with "all that" memory mentioned
above? Yes for communication to occur a Quasi-mind is essential, and even
one's own thought process takes the form of a dialogue (a Quasi-utterer and
a Quasi-interpreter: "So I says to myself": Peirce notes the common
expression), but one can make too much of this I think. So I would like to
see a further discussion of Quasi-mind. Again, I don't see that Peirce
loads the concept with all that has been recently suggested. He writes:

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be
declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they
must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*.
CP 4.551

A thought is a special variety of sign. All thinking is necessarily a sort
of dialogue, an appeal from the momentary self to the better considered
self of the immediate and of the general future. Now as every thinking
requires a mind, so every sign even if external to all minds must be a
determination of a quasi-mind. The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a
determinable sign. 1906 Letter to Victoria Welby


   - Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
   4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
   2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
   and Entelechy with 3ns.

I agree with Jon that Peirce aligns Form with 1ns and that it might be
prudent to stick with his usage.

Any thoughts?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> Our deeper differences are resurfacing, so we might want to stop here,
> before things get contentious again.  Briefly ...
>
>- The Sign is not "this full semiosic process," it is one Correlate
>within the genuine triadic relation that constitutes it.
>- A Quasi-mind "stores" knowledge as an individual bundle of
>Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation.
>- Peirce was not defining Form or contrasting it with Matter in CP
>4.537; again, I suggest reading (or rereading) NEM 4:292-300, not just EP
>2:303-304, to see how he clearly aligned Form with 1ns, Matter with 2ns,
>and Entelechy with 3ns.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I've gotten several off-list responses to my post on frequency of posting
which messages move me to reiterate "please post as you see fit!" and to
add what I've written here several times in the past, namely, that the best
approach to dealing with posts that you're not interested in is to *just
delete them!*

Of course I would always encourage *more* participation on the list
including more participants. So, lurkers on the list, feel free to chime in
even if you don't want to get involved in an extended discussion. In this
forum "the more the merrier!" But initiate, join in, or leave a discussion
at will!

And thanks to those of you who occasionally (including today) write
off-list in support of my efforts in this sometimes challenging job of
acting as list moderator. It is I who should thank all of you for keeping
Peirce-L alive--both as active participants and observers--when so many
other philosophy and semiotics fora have floundered.

Best,

Gary R (writing, again, as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 2:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> It has always been the 'policy' here that there is no limit on frequency
> or length of posts to Peirce-L and I continue to believe that that's a good
> policy. Certainly the recent flurry of exchanges have been valuable in
> bringing about for some on the list a better understanding of several
> difficult semeiotic issues. One can only approve and applaud that.
>
> Still, I must note that I have recently received a few complaints and two
> requests to be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
> unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as list
> moderator that naturally concerns me.
>
> So, I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
> *consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they
> are but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
> messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
> such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
> reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
> contributors) .
>
> But, again, please post as you see fit!
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Note from List Moderator: Frequency of posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

It has always been the 'policy' here that there is no limit on frequency or
length of posts to Peirce-L and I continue to believe that that's a good
policy. Certainly the recent flurry of exchanges have been valuable in
bringing about for some on the list a better understanding of several
difficult semeiotic issues. One can only approve and applaud that.

Still, I must note that I have recently received a few complaints and two
requests to be removed from the list (I'm not certain if or how many have
unsubscribed themselves) because of "too many emails," and as list
moderator that naturally concerns me.

So, I would like to suggest that frequent contributors to discussions
*consider* holding off on at least some responses (especially when they are
but a sentence or three), posting fewer but perhaps somewhat longer
messages. The benefit--besides there being fewer postings--could be that
such an approach might allow for more time for additional thoughtful
reflection on the matter(s) under consideration (and not only for active
contributors) .

But, again, please post as you see fit!

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

 hearing her
child's cry. I think a complex analysis in terms of sign categories is,
well, pretty much in vain.

ET: Again, my view is that the R is internal, is a general knowledge base -
whether it is physiological, biological or conceptual. So - I disagree with
Jon that the R is the cry of the child...

In my view there are at least two Signs for the child, the external one
(I'm still not entirely clear as to *exactly* how to characterize it--but
there *is* a Sign), and the internal one, although I disagree with you and
agree with Jon that it is not "a general knowledge base," while it,
perhaps, operates* within* one.

Again, for me the child's cry is a Dynamic Interpretant (so part of the
child's Sign), but for the mother the cry is a Sign, a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign. And this final point again brings up for me the interesting idea
of "Signs of SIgns," since the child's Interpretant Sign becomes a
different Sign for her mother (in my view).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 10:06 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I agree that there are multiple Signs involved in Gary R.'s thought
> experiment; the girl's scream is only one of them.  As I said, any
> analysis--even using consistent terminology--will be somewhat arbitrary,
> since semiosis is *continuous*.
>
> While I have gained a much better understanding and appreciation of your
> model in recent days, I still cannot agree with it; mainly because, in my
> reading of Peirce, I have yet to come across a passage where he defines or
> uses "Representamen" as you do, for a "knowledge base."  Instead, he writes
> about the "utterer" and "interpreter" of a Sign, eventually generalizing
> this to a "Quasi-utterer" and a "Quasi-interpreter," which are both
> "Quasi-minds" that become "welded" in the Sign (CP 4.551; 1906) when
> it serves as a medium for communication of an idea or form between them (EP
> 2:391 and EP 2:544n2; 1906).  The process is no different when the two
> Quasi-minds are "the mind of yesterday" and "the mind of tomorrow into
> which yesterday's has grown" (EP 2:388; 1906).
>
> The Representamen, on the other hand, is more like what some have called a
> "sign-vehicle" (cf. CP 1.339; undated), although I am not a fan of that
> particular term.  It is "something which stands to somebody for something
> in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228; c. 1897); something having the
> character "by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental
> effect [its Interpretant], it may stand in place of another thing [its
> Object]" (CP 1.564; c. 1899); "that which represents" (CP 2.273; 1902); and
> "[t]he concrete subject that represents" (CP 1.540; 1903).  "Indeed,
> representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
> sign, or *representamen*, of some kind, *outward or inward*, mediating
> between an object and an interpreting thought" (CP 1.480; c. 1896, emphases
> added).  Furthermore ...
>
> CSP:  The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of
> repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt
> good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or
> any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same
> representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same
> with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs,
> it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A
> representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of
> repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact
> represented." (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903)
>
>
> Not "knowledge bases," but things like proverbs, diagrams, pictures,
> physical signs, symptoms, and weathercocks are all Representamens.  In
> fact, according to Peirce, each of these is the *same *Representamen *whenever
> *it is embodied in a Replica, although I would say that it is part of a
> different *Sign *when the Immediate Object or Immediate Interpretant is
> different.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> As usual - I have a different outline. I think there are multiple Signs
>> involved. I understand 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Jon S, Edwina, Gary f, Helmut, list,

I agree with Jon S that there is value in theoretical as well as practical
(pragmatic) analyses of the Sign and pragmaticism more generally. While, as
I noted in a post of a few days ago, it would seem that we have been
concentrating on the theoretical much more than the practical for the last
several months, while there is surely a place for discussions of both on
the list. Still, I hope Mary's questions and Dan's comments will encourage
forum members to initiate threads on pragmatism which are less theoretical.

But first, thanks for this interesting, albeit perhaps controversial post,
Jeff. You concluded:

JD: Putting the matter in simpler terms, it might be good to ask how inner
and outer apply to signs that stand in relations of similarity to their
objects (e.g., icons), and then take up the question of how it applies to
an individual substantial object, a general conception--and then to
a thinking being like us who sees the world in terms of what is internal to
thought and what is external to thought. The phenomena in our experience of
inner (e.g., subjective) and outer (e.g., objective) is, I take it, being
explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of
these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
greater clarity can be achieved.


I'm interested in this matter of *outer-inner* from several standpoint
including in terms of Peirce's notion of "signs of signs," an expression he
introduces tentatively late in his work on semeiotic in a letter to
Victoria Welby.

I'd also like to discuss further, but not much in this post, the Immediate
Object--which seems, along with the Representamen, to be a continuing bone
of contention for some. I would, however, note that Gary f has already
given us as a springboard for discussion by offering a rather useful quote
of Peirce's from a letter to William James in one of the Lowell threads. I
think that quotation still needs to be further unpacked/analyzed. But, in
addition, in an off-list note Gary f commented:

Gf: Quotes from the Logic Notebook and a couple of other sources. . . make
Peirce’s definitions and actual usage of the term *immediate object* very
clear: it’s the “part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic
object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object, such as
recognizing it as a member of a general class would do).


The IO is that “part of the sign which indicates or represents the dynamic
object” (but does not *predicate* anything of that object)." But, again, I
would suggest as I did earlier that it indicates the *Ground*  of the
Object, not the Object in its fullness, an impossibility. But I can imagine
that some might argue that it indeed does indicates the DO itself, known
through collateral observation.

But for now let me return to my thought-experiment based on Peirce's
example of how we learn, "A child learns a lesson."

So, again, the example (developed a little): A young child told not to
touch the hot stove nevertheless touches it to find out for herself. She
fulls back her hand as she screams in pain at which point her mother,
hearing her scream, rushes to her and quickly puts ice and then ointment on
her fingers.

I would suggest that *something* involved in 'hot stove burners' (the
direct object) might be seen as a sign (or signs, say of heat, etc.) for
some here. What is the putative sign here?

Then the child's mind in relation to the DO (having 'determined' her IO,
'selecting', so to speak, some few out of all the possible
characteristics/attributes of the DO, these being most likely iconic signs)
forms a ground, or basis, of her semiosis, an internal sign, that is, *her*
IO-R-DI. So, what is her Immediate Object? What is her Representamen?

Now her DI would seem to be her scream: that is another sign, an *external*
sign *for her mother* which is (or involves) a DO which, again,
'determines' her internal IO-R-DI, running to the child, etc. What is the
Dynamic Object for her mother.

Her mother's thoughts and actions represent other signs, etc.

I'd like to hear from folk on the list how they might characterize the
Signs and semiosis involved in this example.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 6:41 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> List,
>
>
> Looking at Peirce's account of the distinction between what is internal
> and external--and how the distinction seems to apply in different areas of
> inquiry (e.g., math,, phenomenology, speculative grammar, critical logic,
> metaphysics, etc.)--might shed some light on these matters.
>
>
> Kant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen Discussion

[Gary Richmond]

Mary, list,

I hope that your spouse feels much better soon.

Thanks for this illuminating post! I was drafting one myself, but will now
have to reconsider it in light of your questions. I add just one more
question for now to pair with your "Is it a translation?" What if the
person seeing that word doesn't read English?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Feb 8, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> Dan and Peircers,
>
> I agree with Dan’s proposal to consider “the practical/empirical
> consequences C.S. intended each definition to have.”  I’m not sure I can
> attempt that. The complications shown are interesting but above my pay
> grade. Instead I would like to offer what went through my mind when I first
> read
> vase
>
>
>- Is it an answer to a question,
>- Is it a request by someone pointing to a vase to deal with the/a
>situation occurring with reference to the vase,
>- Is it a word meant to be a word on a sheet of paper? and if so:
>
> is it a clue, a reminder, a label, part of your kid’s homework assignment?
>
>- Is the word meant to be interpreted as written or spoken, for
>example, part o f a sentence written down? Or is it voiced, in which case
>we need to ask about or consider various speech acts, and we can infer
>qualities about the speaker’s physical characteristics among other things
>- Is the word a mistake? Is it a word that was omitted from something?
>Is it part of a word such as vaseline?
>- Is a character in a novel by, let’s say James Joyce, thinking it. Is
>the character thinking it as a word in a disconnected passage, as in an
>epiphany, or is it a word in a disjointed stream of consciousness passage.
>Is the character aware of it, and/or aware of it as a matrial, Is it
>intended to be any or all of these possibilities? Does a reader of a novel
>see/hear or not see/hear the word in a novel. There are so many questions
>- Or, on another hand, is the word under erasure [note: I prefer not
>to discuss Derrida’s concept here]; is it also written but not marked, i.e.
>invisible
>- It is material, so of what material is it made? But if the word is
>not material but a concept is it general or specific?
>- Is it assumed there are no italics, bold…is the font significant,
>and the size? If it were to be true that the font and size were to make a
>possible difference is the word vase on my screen unique to me in my
>situation or not? Does a word vase on my computer have thisness or
>haecceity as a material object
>- If a poem is about a vase and uses the word in different contexts as
>a symbol, can I compare its use as a symbol in another poem by the same, or
>different, author?
>- What if vase is a made up of spaced letters in a square shape?
>- Should I assume that since it isn’t in quote or italics or
>underlined that it is a word that general
>- Is it possible to have a word without a speaker, creator,
>interpreter?
>- Is it translation
>- Is it part of a rhetorical device
>- These could be placed into Peircean definitions
>
> I kept thinking how the word can not be defined as fitting any Peircean
> definition stated or implied in the peirce-list email without a context and
> without a commitment as to its materiality, existence, and use.
>
> Of course my narrative is a construction. Once I saw the word, I thought
> unconsciously as if my thoughts were words I was writing down in a response
> to Peirce-l. Once my awareness of the above occurred I realized I could not
> answer the question.  Then I enjoyed the intellectual activity. I thought
> of the word used in the numerous ways Joyce uses words. I thought of
> various activities/studies I could conduct related to this. This was the
> beginning of amusement.
>
> I do not think that a definitive, singular meaning can be given to
> Peirce’s terms even in a dictionary, as is true of every word over time in
> different contexts. The Oxford English Dictionary thus gives chronological
> definitions with sentences from written Late Middle English to spoken
> English today.
>   ... I have to end here with apologies to take care of a sick spouse.
> Thanks for reading this far!
>
> Mary Libertin
>
>
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2018, at 1:10 PM, Everett, Daniel  wrote:
>
> I am enjoying this exchange and learning a good deal from it. However, it
> seems to me that in a “true” Peircean spirit, one would propose not only
> chapter and verse for how Peirce defined this or that but mainly the
> prac

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen

[Gary Richmond]

And I'd add that the interpretant of 'vase' doesn't have to be the lived
experience, it could be, say, a poetic one. The point being that considered
abstractly, or in some literary context, or in some lived experience, a
rheme *must* be considered "in regard to it's relation to its signified
interpretant."

Yoni Sav <https://hellopoetry.com/yoni-sav/> Apr 2014
Break the vase <https://hellopoetry.com/poem/651606/break-the-vase/>

I sealed myself inside a vase
to keep the world outside
to let me live my life
in happiness and peace
I cemented with my brain
this urn I built from all my pain
To keep my love form leaking out
I sealed in it my broken heart
but now I try to break the clay
show you myself as a whole
and as the pieces fall down
the pain shows back
and I'm afraid
that in the dust
I have lost your trust
when I needed it the most

Now the vase is gone
and I am left
alone

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 8:59 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> For Jon S's survey:
>
>
> vase
>
>
>
> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>
> 1. There is no semiotic context. I'd say that it is a mere example of a
> possible rheme and, as such, useful, perhaps, for some abstract analysis of
> one of the ten categories of signs, only a little less abstract than
> Peirce's "common noun" example.
>
> 2. Either way? I don't see this as necessarily a yes/no question. Again,
> what's the context? Explanation in 3.
>
> 3. Again, lacking a semiosic context there is no interpretant (except,
> perhaps, in some very abstract analysis; but, as it is, it is just an
> example of a rheme, a term, a common noun). When I offered my
> thought-experiment involving a vase there was a context, a living one,
> *my* semiosis experience of one vase in particular, so there was *that *unique
> dynamic object, *my* IO-R-I. See these definitions of rheme (*boldface*
> emphasis added by me):
> 1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far
> as they are determined | EP 2:292 A *Rheme* is a Sign which, *for its
> Interpretant*, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is
> understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any
> rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as
> doing so (emphasis added).
>
> 1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34 *In regard to its relation to its
> signified interpretant*, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an
> Argument. This corresponds to the old division Term, Proposition, &
> Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. [—] A rheme
> is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single word
> except ‘yes’ and ‘no’, which are almost peculiar to modern languages. [—] A
> rhe*me is defined as a sign which is represented in its signified
> interpretant as if it were a character or mark (or as being so).*
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 10:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> With your kind indulgence, I would like to try conducting a little
>> experiment/survey.  Before reading anyone else's replies to this post
>> (including my own), consider the following, and then answer a couple of
>> questions about it.
>>
>>
>> vase
>>
>>
>>
>> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
>> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
>> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>>
>> The point is not to start any arguments about our different analyses, but
>> simply to see what diversity of views we turn out to have.  With that in
>> mind, I also humbly request that we all refrain from commenting on each
>> other's responses here; instead, if you wish to engage in that kind of
>> discussion, please start another thread for it.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIR

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representamen

[Gary Richmond]

For Jon S's survey:


vase



1.  Is the above a Representamen?
2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?

1. There is no semiotic context. I'd say that it is a mere example of a
possible rheme and, as such, useful, perhaps, for some abstract analysis of
one of the ten categories of signs, only a little less abstract than
Peirce's "common noun" example.

2. Either way? I don't see this as necessarily a yes/no question. Again,
what's the context? Explanation in 3.

3. Again, lacking a semiosic context there is no interpretant (except,
perhaps, in some very abstract analysis; but, as it is, it is just an
example of a rheme, a term, a common noun). When I offered my
thought-experiment involving a vase there was a context, a living one, *my*
semiosis experience of one vase in particular, so there was *that *unique
dynamic object, *my* IO-R-I. See these definitions of rheme (*boldface*
emphasis added by me):
1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as
they are determined | EP 2:292 A *Rheme* is a Sign which, *for its
Interpretant*, is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood
as representing such and such a kind of possible Object. Any rheme,
perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing
so (emphasis added).

1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34 *In regard to its relation to its
signified interpretant*, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an
Argument. This corresponds to the old division Term, Proposition, &
Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally. [—] A rheme
is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single word except
‘yes’ and ‘no’, which are almost peculiar to modern languages. [—] A rhe*me
is defined as a sign which is represented in its signified interpretant as
if it were a character or mark (or as being so).*

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 10:13 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> With your kind indulgence, I would like to try conducting a little
> experiment/survey.  Before reading anyone else's replies to this post
> (including my own), consider the following, and then answer a couple of
> questions about it.
>
>
> vase
>
>
>
> 1.  Is the above a Representamen?
> 2.  Either way, briefly explain your answer.
> 3.  If so, what are its Dynamic and Immediate Objects?
>
> The point is not to start any arguments about our different analyses, but
> simply to see what diversity of views we turn out to have.  With that in
> mind, I also humbly request that we all refrain from commenting on each
> other's responses here; instead, if you wish to engage in that kind of
> discussion, please start another thread for it.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally,
because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in
different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading
Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as
well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that
extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2).
There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential
relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it
might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights.

I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that
some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the
terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have
found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me that
there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear
enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be
at all.

I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity,
while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain
key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very
different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in
interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the
effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways.
What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and
Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in
that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on
what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that
self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . .

I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon;
or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is,
I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of
the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both
you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different
ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic
nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear).

So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular
discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in
preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more
sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's
analyses, also very intriguing.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina:
>
> I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
> I fear that it is going to get contentious.  You keep pressing me on where
> to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
> whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly
> that--I do not have a firm opinion yet.  Nevertheless, I continue to find
> your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my
> understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen.
>
> On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns
> need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and
> Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective
> Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make
> abundantly clear.  Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form
> (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and
> entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?),  EP
> 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909).
>
> Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful
> discussion.  Enjoy the sponge cake! :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process.
>> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
>>
>> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of
>> the external stimuli.  I consider that this action of representation
>> belongs to the Interpretant.
>>
>> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the
>> 'memories and habits

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."

I *meant *to say that your emphasis seems to be on latter (the external
sign), mine on the internal (the cognitive sign that 'responds' to that
external sign as immediate object.

Sorry about that!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon S, list,
>
> Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
> than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
> I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
> Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the
> story. You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to
> look at it from 'within'.
>
> But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
> semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
> non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
> whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
> springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
> former, mine the latter.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I
>> think it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
>>
>> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
>> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
>> that direction.
>>
>> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
>> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
>> point you are making about this.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
>>> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
>>> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
>>> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
>>> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>>>  me.
>>>
>>>
>>> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
>>> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
>>> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
>>> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
>>> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place
>>> within the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the
>>> sign (of which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another
>>> analysis). (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this
>>> analysis to consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and
>>> clarify the analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird
>>> although we can take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).
>>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
>>> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
>>> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
>>> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
>>> more sense to me.
>>>
>>>
>>> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
>>> indexi

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, list,

Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half the story.
You seem to me to look at the sign from 'without', while I tend to look at
it from 'within'.

But I'll reflect on all of this. I still am thinking that, for me, human
semiosis might help clarify these matters better than the non-human,
non-cognitive one. I see you as emphasizing the external, existential sign,
whereas I always tend to turn to the cognitive one (as at least
springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your emphasis seems to me to be the
former, mine the latter.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think
> it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
>
> I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
> suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
> that direction.
>
> In a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, the Sign itself is an Existent
> (individual), not a Necessitant (general); so I do not understand what
> point you are making about this.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:30 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Edwina, list,
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
>> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
>> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
>> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
>> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>>  me.
>>
>>
>> Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
>> perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
>> the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
>> with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
>> importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within
>> the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of
>> which it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis).
>> (Btw, I think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to
>> consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the
>> analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can
>> take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
>> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
>> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
>> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
>> more sense to me.
>>
>>
>> But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
>> indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
>> attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP
>>
>> Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?
>>
>> OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
>> potential value imo, at least for me.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>>>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back!

Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be
helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read
my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful. I
think it might be easier to get a 'handle' on this question focusing on
human semiosis (anyhow, I'm finding the 'bird' example 'tricky').

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Welcome back!  I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
> soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
> frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
> non-cognitive example.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation
>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in
>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer
>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis
>> added by me in all cases).
>>
>> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
>>
>> …we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
>> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*
>>
>>
>> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
>>
>> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
>> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A]
>> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that
>> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the
>> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an
>> immediate present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the
>> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*
>>
>>
>> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
>>
>> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
>> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
>> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
>> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of
>> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands
>> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
>> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is
>> here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in
>> everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches
>> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was
>> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which
>> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so
>> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is
>> to have a *like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each
>> instant of the interval a new idea.
>>
>>
>> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
>>
>> …a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
>> that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature
>> of a sign.* [—]
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote:

I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which the loud
sound plays the role of the Representamen?
 me.


Cannot the Sign be "within the bird," Jon? It seems to me that there is
perhaps a "sign of a sign" situation going on here. The IO-R-II is within
the sign which is within the bird (or the person). I think I might agree
with Edwina (if I understand this correctly), that the Sign of central
importance to our analysis, even if it doesn't "*only* take place within
the bird," indeed *does* takes place within the bird and the sign (of which
it is, perhaps, a "sign of a sign"--but that's another analysis). (Btw, I
think that perhaps it's better for the purposes of this analysis to
consider human semiosis as I think this might help simplify and clarify the
analysis because we can't really know the mind of a bird although we can
take a stab at the mind of a man/woman).

Jon wrote:

How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type) in
a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to the
*individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your previous
post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much more sense
to me.


But aren't we *also* concerned, Jon, with individual semiosis? "A *rhematic
indexical sinsign* (such as a cry in the street) is a sign that directs
attention to the object by which it is caused." CSP

Wouldn't this 'work' for *any* bird say in a flock of birds?

OK, hazy thinking for now. But circling around this seems to be of
potential value imo, at least for me.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not
> necessarily within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement
> aside for now.  More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take
> place within the bird?  Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which
> the loud sound plays the role of the Representamen?
>
> How can the Representamen be classified as *general *(Legisign or Type)
> in a scenario where an *individual *sound leads an *individual *bird to
> the *individual *action of flight?  I thought you were saying in your
> previous post that it is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, which makes much
> more sense to me.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
>> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>>
>> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>>
>> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to
>> react and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological
>> system is the IO.
>>
>> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis:
>> which is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>>
>> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>>
>> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
>> stand alone.
>>
>> 
>>
>> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
>> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>>
>> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
>> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
>> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>>
>> ---
>> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in
>> a mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base,
>> both biological and learned, of that bird.
>>
>> --
>>  Edwina
>>
>> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight
>> more differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>>
>> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
>> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; s

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (was Immediate Objects and Phenomena)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon S, list,

At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added
by me in all cases).


1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23

…we apply this word “sign” to *everything recognizable whether to our
outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it
calls up some feeling, effort, or thought**…*


1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38

A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its
interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] sign
which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that thing
itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the other
forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an immediate
present. *The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the deliverance of
past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory.*


1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. *It stands for
that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which
I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to
be understood in a sort of Platonic sense*, very familiar in everyday talk;
I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s
idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at
some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man
continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the
thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a
*like* content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the
interval a new idea.


1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6

…a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. So
that it appears that e*very species of actual cognition is of the nature of
a sign.* [—]


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within the
> birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
>
> A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
>
> The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which causes the bird to react
> and..a version of that loud sound within the bird's neurological system is
> the IO.
>
> What mediates between the tree and the bird? The action of semiosis: which
> is triadic - : O-R-I, or DO-IO-R-II-DI.
>
> The sound - which has affected the bird - is the Dynamic Object.
>
> The Representamen is the action of mediation within the Triad; it doesn't
> stand alone.
>
> 
>
> A deaf bird would see the other bird flee; that would be the DO to that
> deaf bird- the bird's flight.
>
> Then, the deaf bird's IO would be its neurological impression of that
> other flight; mediated by its Representamen of knowledge of that
> adrenalin rush...to its own II and then - its own DI or flight.
>
> ---
> No - I don't consider that the Representamen in these 'bird cases' is in a
> mode of Secondness. It's in a mode of Thirdness - the knowledge base, both
> biological and learned, of that bird.
>
> --
>  Edwina
>
> On Sun 04/02/18 8:42 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
> differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
>
> The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
> mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
> seeing why it could not be a Representamen if the scenario is analyzed in a
> certain way.  Are you positing some kind of discontinuity in the semiosis
> during the chain of events from the falling of the tree, to the loud sound
> that it causes, to the impinging of the propagating sound waves on the
> bird, to its resulting neural pattern, to its flight?  Otherwise, it seems
> to me that each of these could be analyze

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

en
soldiers.

Well, I don't know if any of that helped clarify how I'm seeing things, but
I hope so. On the other hand, in certain matters (e.g., "the sign of a
sign") I remain confused and uncertain. And for me the terminology remains
a morass which I due soon to leave to others to try to sort out.

Still, I think both you and I, Jon, always enter into a discussion such as
this with the, shall I say, good faith hope that we will better understand
each other and the subject of our discussion.

But now I really must stop writing! I've rescheduled my dental appointment
for this afternoon and have much to do in preparation for my operation
tomorrow!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I appreciate you taking another stab at this.  I think that you are
> exactly right about my bent toward abstract analysis being very different
> from your much more concrete, experiential approach.  Perhaps for that very
> reason, I am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediate Objects
> in your thought experiment.  Are we talking about ...
>
>- "vase" as a common noun, or "this vase" as a particular thing?
>- the vase itself as the Sign, or as the Dynamic Object of your
>thought-Signs about it?
>- the vase as (initially) unidentified object, or as (eventually)
>recognized to be a vase?
>
> I am unclear on exactly what Peirce meant by "subjective" in EP 2:410,
> especially since he himself put that word in quotation marks.  As for
> "locating" the Immediate Object, it has to be "within the Sign," but I
> agree that further reflection on what this means is warranted.  In my
> example, does that place it within the statue itself, or within the
> thought-Signs of an observer?  I emphasized the statue's "Qualisignic"
> aspects because Peirce explicitly classified it as a Descriptive Potisign
> (Qualisign), and I was trying to figure out why.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 6:09 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> Thanks for your good wishes regarding my cataract surgery. As I noted
>> earlier, I've pretty much run out of time before the Friday surgery and
>> wanted to respond not only to you and Gary f, which I was able to do a few
>> times recently, but I also wanted to respond to Jeff as I hadn't had that
>> opportunity until today. So that's why I haven't been able, until now, to
>> respond to your most recent post. I had to cancel a dental appt. today,
>> which gave me a little more unexpected time to comment.
>>
>> You wrote: "My main request was to identify the Signs that correspond to
>> the Immediate Objects that you posited.  My understanding of the triadic
>> nature of semiosis is such that something *cannot *be an Immediate
>> Object unless it serves as such *within *a particular Sign."
>> ​​
>>
>> To which I'd add that Peirce holds that both the immediate object and the
>> emotional interpretant are "*subjective*."
>>
>> "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
>> interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective";
>> both, too, appertain to all signs without exception." (EP 2:410; 1907)
>>
>>
>> JS: "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's
>> clue as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in
>> these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is
>> singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective).
>>
>> GR: Firstly, I see no reason to take "Bellucci's clue," and there is much
>> else I do not agree with in his interpretation. Secondly, you seem to leap
>> to a wholly abstract way of analyzing *my* semiosic experience so that
>> for you my 'vase' cannot be 'this vase' that I perceive and make an
>> immediate object in my inner semiosis. It may be the case that at the
>> moment of recognition of the vase *qua* vase that I unconsciously (via
>> memory) take it to be an example of that Collective (general) 'vase'despite
>> its bizarre shape, but it is *this* vase that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

s. It is
not *itself *General: it is its Object which is taken to be General. And
yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of implying a truth of
the kind of "Any S is P"; it only expresses "Some S is P." This makes it
*not *a //*Copulant/Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. This needs to
be borne in mind. (EP 2:486; 1908)


JS: The Dynamic Object of the statue is *general **[it is general because
it is "representing a common soldier," whereas my vase in the unfamiliar
room is a particular vase GR]* presumably the collection (or continuum?) of
soldiers who fell in the Civil War* [but my vase doesn't represent vases in
general, but is a unique example of one (and peculiar in its shape, etc. in
my example), recognized by me (through my memory, etc.) as a vase (and
that's the sum of the generality in it]*; so the Sign *[the statue, its DO
representing something common, and *not* a unique DO as in the case of my
vase]* is a Collective (he introduced this term later).  However, its
Immediate Object is *vague **[where, btw, do you *locate* this immediate
object? Subjectively in that someone is observing it? If not, where? ]*, so
the Sign is a Descriptive *[my immediate object is *not* vague, but is of
*this* unique and peculiar vase--which, btw, may turn out *not* to be a
vase at all, but a piece of sculpture]*; Peirce even said that it expresses
a *particular *proposition (not a *universal *one) *[and I maintain that my
vase expresses no proposition whatsoever, although you disagree]*,
consistent with Bellucci's hypothesis [this statue is *loaded* with
meaning; my vase is not].  But this entails that the statue, as a Sign,
*must *be a Qualisign [do you mean that it* involves* a Qualisign? It seems
to me that what is Qualisignific here would entail not one, but several
Qualisigns], and thus an Icon and a Rheme; as such, it *cannot *be a
proposition.  Yet obviously it is *embodied *as a Sinsign, as all
Qualisigns (and Legisigns) *must *be, and a Sinsign *can *be a Dicisign.
Does the statue, as an embodied Qualisign, turn out to be a Dicent Sinsign
of a peculiar kind?  If so, what are S and P in the particular proposition
that it expresses? *[I don't see at all why you are emphasizing what is
Qualisignic about it.]*

While it's kind of 'fun', I can't say that I find this kind of meta- on top
of meta-analysis, heavy with problematic terminology, very helpful.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Best wishes on your upcoming procedure.  I must admit to being
> disappointed not to receive more feedback from you on my last couple of
> posts, especially regarding my analysis of Peirce's statue example.
>
> "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's clue
> as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in
> these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is
> singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective).  Furthermore,
> I still maintain that when the Athenian says "Socrates" to himself, what he
> is *really *saying to himself is "that is Socrates"; i.e., he is making a
> perceptual judgment, either presenting (as hypothesis) or asserting (as
> fact) a proposition.  It seems to me that only the vague thought of
> (absent) Socrates as generated by the imagination could be a true Rheme.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:59 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Gary f, Jon S, list,
>>
>> Thanks for clarifying your position, Jeff. You wrote:
>>
>> JD: Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would
>> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the
>> immediate object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for
>> the simple reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical
>> analysis of symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses
>> and conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for
>> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear
>> to their objects and interpretants.
>>
>>
>> I agree and have already commented on CP. 4.583 in this thread.
>>
>> Jeff also wrote:
>>
>> JD: . . .my initial impression after reading Bellucci's claims about the
>> imme

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

mportant facets of
his work.

So, and especially as I'm about to have a second cataract operation this
Friday and have much to do before hand, and will be visually challenged for
a few days after, I've decided to drop out of this thread. Perhaps I am
currently less interested in the first two branches of logic, while it is
surely possible that my semeiotic terminology--for principal recent
example, in my recent thought experiments--could use some fine tuning (some
here might think, "To say the least!") so no doubt I'll get back to formal
grammar and critic. But I think that it's time for me to return to my
current principal interests, viz., phenomenology, pragmaticism, and
classification of sciences. In February I hope to introduce a topic in
pragmatism that I've been drafting a message regarding for a while now.
(I'll be reading responses to this post--if any--but this will be my last
message for about a week at least.)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello,
>
>
> Just to be clear about my own views, my initial impression after reading
> Bellucci's claims about the immediate object in his essays was--"that can't
> be right." It is a view that runs counter to the way I've been interpreting
> the classification of signs based on the manner of presentation of the
> immediate object.
>
>
> Having said that, my own views are vague and confused in a number of
> respects. As such, I look to interpretations that are different from my
> own--especially by those who are engaged actively in the research and have
> given the matter considerable thought--as a source of challenge and
> possible light.
>
>
> Turning to the substantive questions about immediate objects, I would
> hesitate to read too much into CP 4.583 about the nature of the immediate
> object and its possible bearing on icons such as qualisigns for the simple
> reason that the EG are designed as a tool for the logical analysis of
> symbols expressed in propositions that function as premisses and
> conclusions of arguments. As such, the EG may not be the best tool for
> shedding light on the character of qualisigns and the relations they bear
> to their objects and interpretants.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Monday, January 29, 2018 3:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
> Lecture 3.14)
>
> Gary f, Jon S, Jeff, list,
>
> Gf: "I’m not challenging the statement that “every sign has an immediate
> object.” I’m just questioning whether we fully understand what that
> statement *means*."
>
> I'm not exactly sure what your meaning could be here. It seems that
> earlier you *were* arguing (and Jeff seemed to agree) that only
> propositions have immediate objects. If you are now "not challenging the
> statement that 'every sign has an immediate object'," then why would the
> "context," as you strongly suggest, make a significant difference except by
> in some way limiting the meaning of 'Sign' in some formal logical
> abstraction of the idea of 'Sign'?
>
> This, or something like it, seems to be the case as I reflect on the
> quotations you just gave and commented on.
>
> Quotation/commentary #1:
>
>
> [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of
> propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition
> can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of
> concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported by
> the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of
> signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no
> logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a
> proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents
> of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906]
>
> This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” *because
> it is a constituent of a proposition.*
>
>
> As I read this quotation, it is not that "every sign has an immediate
> object” *because it is a constituent of a proposition*," but that "no
> sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of signs to w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, list,

So, is there any semiosis in any of the 'experiential content' I wrote
about?  And if there are any signs there at all, will there not then be
immediate objects (what I was mainly trying to get at)? That is, is there
anything like an immediate object in my semiosic experience or the child's?
If so, are you suggesting that it is--or mainly is--propositional? If so, I
can't agree.

Though there are no "pure qualities of feeling" (although sign #1 in the 10
classes is a qualisign: Peirce gives the example, "Red"), however these are
involved in an experience of "Red" or "Hot" (red apple, hot pepper),
*however* they may require another or several more developed sign for their
expression, that is, how the must *necessarily by their nature be involved
in other classes of signs*, are they not yet signs (and all signs will have
Immediate Object)? Do not perceptual judgments give rise to signs? How and
when and in what form to you think?

Even if I were to agree that the rhematic symbol "Vase" is a proposition
(and I don't think that it is) yet Peirce holds that *not all propositions
need be asserted*. And I do not agree "that the mere rheme, "vase," has no
*particular *vase as its Dynamic Object, but a continuum of *possible *
vases"  in the sense that the blank form of the rheme (the continuum of
possible x's) may be filled in by a specific term and *must be* to become a
part of a proposition. Similarly for the semiosis involved in my
'experience' of 'some' vase.

The complex mix of qualisigns (whatever the sign classes, whether they are
considered embodied qualisigns or involved in sinsigns), those qualities
experienced, whatever more complex signs they may finally necessarily be
part of, they *will* have Immediate Objects. This, again, is what I was
trying to get at. However, I must admit that reading through my 'thought
experiments' again, I see how confusing my language may have been. I want
to find Peirce's "how we learn" example, however, before I consider
retracting them. Perhaps I'll discover that I have myself completely
misunderstood Peirce's semeiotic terminology.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 8:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Garys, List:
>
> Maybe I am just completely missing the boat here, or bumping up against
> the limits of my current cognitive apparatus, but I am having a lot of
> trouble translating Gary R.'s thought experiments into my own understanding
> of Peirce's semeiotic terminology.
>
> In "The First Thing I See," what is the Sign of which the "complex mix of
> qualisigns" (the percept?) is posited to be the Immediate Object?  What is
> the corresponding Dynamic Object of that same Sign--the actual vase,
> perhaps?  When you "identify this 'something' to be a vase," how could that
> step *not *correspond to asserting the proposition (the perceptual
> judgment?), "That is a vase" or "I see a vase"?  It seems to me that the
> mere rheme, "vase," has no *particular *vase as its Dynamic Object, but a
> continuum of *possible *vases.  Why would we not then classify as the
> Immediate Object of this rheme the "peculiar" combination of qualities that
> enables us to *recognize *something as a vase?
>
> In "The Child Learns a Lesson," again, what are the Signs whose Immediate
> Objects are "experienced" by the child?  What are their Dynamic Objects?
> Heat and (especially) pain are actual sensations, not pure qualities of
> feeling, and thus Sinsigns, not Qualisigns.  Of course, they start out as
> Dynamic Interpretants--effects produced by prior Signs; likewise the
> withdrawal of the hand and the cry.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:15 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary f, list,
>>
>> You wrote: "your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from
>> mine, because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy . . .I on
>> the other hand take “immediate” to mean “not mediate,” in contrast to the
>> dynamic object, which is *mediately* “present to the mind”
>>
>> It is exceedingly difficult, as Peirce himself noted, to give clear and
>> simple examples of much in semiotics, that is, simple examples of semiosic
>> events, certain facets or aspects of semiosis and semeiotic--

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry C, Gary f, list,

You wrote: "I am not familiar with the notion of "(Partial) signs."

This is actually Gary f's coinage. In a post in this thread Gf offered
three Peirce quotations and commented on them. In his comments he suggested
that in these passages Peirce was saying that only the proposition (or
dicisign) has an Immediate Object.

Quotation/commentary #2:

[[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or
set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in
its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its
Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately
determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals.
This is particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a
Complete Sign. But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of
the nature of their whole; but often in a truncated fashion. ] MS 277,
c.1908]

Gf: A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or
may have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may
therefore be called (Partial) signs, and therefore be said to have
immediate objects because they resemble propositions “in a truncated
fashion.”


Gf: Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "*may* have
Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a
proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every
even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes)
will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis)

As Bellucci and Stjernfelt have argued, the Proposition (Dicisign) has
parts (I agree). Gary further suggest that when Peirce says in the
quotation above that "a Complete Sign has or may have Parts"  that this
sounds like he's referring to the proposition and that these Parts "may
therefore be called (Partial) signs." Again, he (and I believe Jeff) are
taking the position that only Dicisigns have Immediate Objects (although Gf
recently hedged on that assertion, so I'm not clear as to what his current
position on this topic is).

In any even, I commented in reply to his Comment #2 above:

GR: Whatever Peirce means here by "a Complete Sign" (which "*may* have
Parts") and which I, perhaps mistakenly, recall means not just a
proposition, but any Symbol, it does not contradict the idea that every
even, shall we say, "Incomplete Sign" (like most of the 10 sign classes)
will have an immediate object (again, at least in human semiosis).

As you may have gathered, I hold that all signs have Immediate Objects,
this following Peirce (see the several quotes to this effect). I'm not sure
what Peirce means by "Complete Sign" (I think he may mean any of the three
classes of Symbols), but whatever he meant, I coined my own expression,
"Incomplete Sign,"  to include the 7 other classes. That is, whatever
Peirce meant by 'Complete Sign', that it matters not a whit since any one
of the 10 classes will have an "*Immediate object or object as the sign
represents it**, (and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*)."

Gary f has not replied to my response to his three quotation and comments
(today he discussed only the final part of my message on techniques I
employ, making thought experiments or observing my own semioses  "on the
fly"), so I have no idea why he coined the expression "Partial) signs," nor
what he thinks of my response to his comment above nor his two other
comments.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

>
> On Jan 29, 2018, at 4:12 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> A “Complete Sign” here sounds very like a proposition — which has or may
> have Parts which partake of the nature of Complete Signs and may therefore
> be called (Partial) signs,
>
>
> I am not familiar with the notion of  "(Partial) signs”
>
> Could you give an example?  or this a coinage relate to mereology?
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, list,

You wrote: "your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from
mine, because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy . . .I on the
other hand take “immediate” to mean “not mediate,” in contrast to the
dynamic object, which is *mediately* “present to the mind”

It is exceedingly difficult, as Peirce himself noted, to give clear and
simple examples of much in semiotics, that is, simple examples of semiosic
events, certain facets or aspects of semiosis and semeiotic--for example,
the various classes of signs, the immediate object, etc. And it has been
not infrequently noted that Peirce himself didn't offer many examples in
areas in which we might have hoped he would. But, again, it's difficult to
do that both in phenomenology and in certain parts of semiotics.

Differently from how you've characterized 'our views' of the immediate
object', I would suggest that what you've characterized as my "view" or
"concept" of the immediate object is not my view at all, but rather one of
my approaches to researching semiosis in actual experience as well as in
thought experiments. This is to say that what you call my "view" is rather
my one of my ways of examining semiosis as it occurs on the fly, in
existential reality, as process and in human experience of it. That
approach is *necessarily*  temporal. This is to my way of thinking a
legitimate way of examining human semiosis--one which Peirce himself
obviously employed. How else would one ever come to adequate semeiotic
theories? By examining the writings of others on the matter? That may help,
but seems to me insufficient.

Your own view as you presented it seems to me rather abstract, legitimate
in its own way and context. But I think you mischaracterize my view as
suggesting that it is a matter of mere "first impressions," for while I
sometimes begin there (as I do in some--but not all--of my phenomenological
research), that is hardly where I conclude my analysis.

So, in a word, my *concept* of the immediate object cannot be reduced to a
sense of mere "temporal immediacy" as you put it, but is perhaps best
suggested by this quotation, one in my recent list of quotations in which
Peirce states or infers that *all* signs have immediate objects.
1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:407… the *requaesitum* which we have been seeking
is simply that which the sign “stands for,” or the idea of that which it is
calculated to awaken. [—] This *requaesitum* I term the *Object* of the
sign; - the *immediate* object, if it be the idea which the sign is built
upon,


And here one should, of course, take "idea" in that sense in which Peirce
often employs it to mean no mere abstraction but what comes before the mind.

I would not say that your understanding is incorrect, but it is entirely
theoretical. However, if you yourself see it as "quite different" from
mine, I would hope you would consider how abstract your concept is and how
concrete my experimental process is. My own view, as noted, is another
matter and to conflate the two is, I think, unfortunate.

But perhaps we're not as far apart as you'd suggested, and so I'm hoping
that we'll find some middle ground in this matter. But to reduce my view
(you wrote, "what you have in mind") as a matter of some mere sense of mine
of a  "temporal immediacy," when in fact it is not at all my view at all,
but part of my process, is for me at least, not presently very helpful as
we explore this interesting topic.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 6:06 PM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
>
>
> Thanks for those thought experiments! Now I see where the disagreement
> lies: your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from mine,
> because what you have in mind is *temporal* immediacy, so your “immediate
> objects” are pretty close to “first impressions.” I on the other hand take
> “immediate” to mean “not mediate,” in contrast to the dynamic object, which
> is *mediately* “present to the mind” because the sign is mediating the
> determination of the interpretant by the object. Right now it’s difficult
> for me to see how the examples you give in your thought-experiments conform
> to Peirce’s definition of “immediate object,” but I’ll have to sleep on
> that.
>
> This difference in conceptions is the sort of thing I was referring to at
> the end of my post. We don’t agree on what it means to say that “every sign
> has an immediate object” — we don’t know what *that* sign means — if we
> don’t have a common idea of what the object of that sign is.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

uot; in the 10 fold classification of signs is given as
triadic in that classification, so a fortiori, any actual sign had, has,
and/or will have an "*Immediate object or object as the sign represents it**,
(and without this one, a sign would not be a sign*)."


Yet I principally understand semiosis as a consequence of my quotidian
experience of it (naturally now deeply informed by Peirce's semeiotic
science) or in thought experiments. This thought experiment (which I've
made a number of times) I'll call, "The First Thing I See."


I walk into a room I'm not familiar with, sit down, close my eyes, then
turn my head to the right, open my eyes, and the first thing I see is an
object of a peculiar shape (of course I haven't thought of it in these
terms, but it isn't at all immediately clear to me what it is), then in a
moment I recognize it as a 'vase' (a rheme, not a dicisign), albeit a
peculiarly shaped one. In my later analysis I see that I have had at least
two immediate objects set before my mind, a complex mix of qualisigns
(shape, colors, etc.), so, at first not recognizable as "something," and a
rhematic one, as I quickly identify this "something' to be a vase. And it
seems clear enough to me that at that moment of recognition I did not think
a proposition ("That is a vase"), but merely the rheme, 'vase'.


Another thought experiment, this one based on one Peirce himself offers on
how learning occurs, so which I'll call "The Child Learns a Lesson."


Although the toddler has been told by mom to stay away from the stove's
burners, that they're 'hot' and will 'burn' her so that she'll feel 'pain',
yet when mom isn't looking, the child steps up to the stove, experiences
the pain of the burn as she screams "Aie!!!" and immediately withdraws her
hand. Well, while I'm certain some here will argue otherwise, to my way of
thinking there isn't much in the nature of dicisignificance going on in
this situation, especially given that the child has only a few words at her
disposal at this point in her development.


For me there can be little doubt that the child has 'experienced' (although
that is hardly the correct word) at least one and probably several
immediate objects.  And while it is wholly unlikely that they all happened
in an abstract 'instant', they certainly occurred in a fraction of a
second, a 'moment' as Peirce analyzes the minimum of time. And, to boot,
one can see in that moment several semiotic events: the qualisign which is
the heat, the resultant pain (another qualisign), the immediate withdrawing
of her hand (involving now 2ns), and the cry (perhaps involving 3ns as
she's a French girl and has heard mom cry out "Aie!!!" when she herself was
in pain or saw that her daughter was in pain). How complex even the
simplest semiotic event appears to be!


Best,


Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 2:02 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R,
>
> The crucial question here is: What is the Real Object of the term “sign”
> in each of these definitions? In each case, we would have to gather what
> clues we can from the context of the definition (since, as we all know, the
> sign cannot express its object). And when we do, I think it would be wise
> to bear in mind some other general statements Peirce made about “signs,”
> such as this one:
>
> [[ … what the system of existential graphs represents to be true of
> propositions and which must be true of *them*, since every proposition
> can be analytically expressed in existential graphs, equally holds good of
> concepts that are *not* propositional; and this argument is supported by
> the evident truth that no sign of a thing or kind of thing — the ideas of
> signs to which concepts belong — can arise except in a proposition; and no
> logical operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a
> proposition; so that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents
> of propositions. ] CP 4.583, 1906]
>
> This raises the possibility that “every sign has an immediate object” *because
> it is a constituent of a proposition.*
>
> Or consider this statement:
>
> [[ By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or
> set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in
> its turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its
> Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately
> determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals.
> This is particularly intended to define (very imperfect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Jon S, list,

Yes, what I gave are not examples but definitions of "immediate object,"
something I recognized immediately after sending it, but it was too late to
do anything about it because, despite the few seconds delay I have built
into my email system, it had already been sent.

I wonder why Peirce would consistently offer so many definitions which
include the idea that *all* signs have an immediate object if he weren't
convinced that that were so?This one, from 1907, even adds that without an
immediate object "a sign would not be a sign." Pretty definitive language
for him to use, I'd say.

1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15

…all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: *the Immediate
object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign
would not be a sign*); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is
independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR).

As for your "stormy day" example, it's one which analyzes not any other
kind of sign but a proposition. Yes, it would be excellent if Jon or I (or
anyone) could find an example Peirce gives of an immediate object in a sign
other than a proposition. But, as I have looked at the matter over the
years, I would agree with Peirce in the definitions I offered that every
sign (at least those employed in human semiosis) has an immediate object
and that without one "a sign would not be a sign."

​So, like Jon S, I too am likely to remain unconvinced by Bellucci "that,
according to Peirce, only propositions have immediate objects"

Best,

Gary R
​


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 29, 2018 at 10:08 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon et al.,
>
> What you’ve listed here, Gary, are examples of *definitions* of
> “immediate object.” They are not examples of *signs which have* immediate
> objects, still less are they examples of *immediate objects*. I think we
> need to look at those, if we can find them, to clarify what an immediate
> object is.
>
> Here’s one example, from a 1909 letter to William James:
>
> [[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that
> afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This*
> is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but
> whose Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived
> from peeping between the window-curtains.* … I reply, let us suppose:
> ​​
> “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate Object* is the
> notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and
> mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. The *Dynamical
> Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* meteorological
> conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is the *schema* in
> her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the
> different Images of a stormy day. ] EP2:498 ]
>
> I include that last sentence to further emphasize Peirce’s distinction
> between the *character* of a “notion” and the *identity* of it. This
> distinction is essential to the analysis of a Dicisign or a proposition, so
> it is clear that signs of that type must have immediate objects. The
> immediate object of such a sign is, as Peirce explains, the object of an
> Index which is necessarily a part of a Dicisign because it indicates what
> the sign *represents itself* to be about,
>
> Now, can you show us where Peirce gives an example of an immediate object
> of a rheme or icon, or any other sign which is not of a Dicent or
> propositional nature? If so, we can assure ourselves that we are not
> confusing the immediate *object* with the immediate *interpretant* by
> conflating the *identity* of an idea with its *quality*.
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 28-Jan-18 21:15
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
> Lecture 3.14)
>
>
>
> Gary f, Jon S, list,
>
>
>
> I have to agree with Jon S that *every* sign has an immediate object.
> Here are a few examples (taken from the *Commens* Dictionary) to that
> effect.
>
> 1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an
> Instrument for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s)
>
> …*every* sign has *two* objects (emphasis added by GR). It has that
> object which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has
> no other being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative
> Being. . .; and on the other hand there is the Real Object which has
> really determine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Jon S, list,

I have to agree with Jon S that *every* sign has an immediate object. Here
are a few examples (taken from the *Commens* Dictionary) to that effect.
1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument
for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s)

…*every* sign has *two* objects (emphasis added by GR). It has that object
which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no
other being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative
Being. . .; and on the other hand there is the Real Object which has really
determined the sign[,] which I usually call the Dynamical Object. . .
1907 | Pragmatism | EP 2:407

… the *requaesitum* which we have been seeking is simply that which the
sign “stands for,” or the idea of that which it is calculated to awaken. [—]

This *requaesitum* I term the *Object* of the sign; - the *immediate* object,
if it be the idea which the sign is built upon, the *real* object, if it be
that real thing or circumstance upon which that idea is founded, as
on bedrock.
1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:15

…all logicians have distinguished two objects of a sign: *the Immediate
object or object as the sign represents it, (and without this one, a sign
would not be a sign*); the other [the] Real object, or object as it is
independent of any particular idea representing it (emphasis added by GR).
1907 | Pragmatism | MS [R] 318:24-5

The immediate object is the object as the sign represents it: the real
object is that same object as it is, in its own mode of being, independent
of the sign or any other representation. [—] *Every* sign must plainly have
an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign [emphasis
added by GR].
1908-12 | Letters to Lady Welby | CP 8.343

… it is necessary to distinguish the *Immediate Object*, or the Object as
the Sign represents it, from the *Dynamical Object*, or really efficient
but not immediately present Object.
1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495

As to the Object, that may mean *the Object as cognized in the Sign and
therefore an Idea*, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any
particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and
final study would show it to be. *The former I call the Immediate Object*,
the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object that
Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science)
can investigate (Emphasis added by GR).
1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:498

We must distinguish between *the Immediate Object, – i.e., the Object as
represented in the sign*, – and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say rather
the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign
*cannot* express,
which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to find out by
*collateral
experience *(emphasis added by GR).
1910 | Letters to Paul Carus | ILS 284

Then there are 3 divisions that relate to the Object. One according to *the
form under which the Sign presents its Object. This is of course **the
object **as the sign represents it**, i.e. the Immediate Object *(emphasis
added by GR).


Best,


Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 8:47 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
>
>
> You say “Peirce very clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning
> already in 1904 (CP 8.336)--that *every *Sign has an *Immediate *Object.”
> I don’t think it’s that clear at all. CP 8.336, to take your example, does
> not say anything about “every sign.” Moreover, in much of his late semiotic
> Peirce refers to propositions as “complete” signs, while simpler sign types
> are “partial” or “fragmentary”; and it looks to me as if many of his
> references to “signs” in general at this time (and even earlier) are
> references to such complete signs.
>
>
>
> In the Syllabus passage that refers to “primary” and “secondary” objects,
> Peirce is clearly focused on Dicisigns, which are very much like
> propositions, and what Bellucci actually says is that “There is a sense
> in which only propositions and proposition-like signs have immediate
> objects.” (His 2015 paper is a free download and is well worth reading, in
> my opinion.) Reading this part of Peirce’s Speculative Grammar, around
> EP2:276, is described by Peirce himself as “threading our way through a
> maze of abstractions,” but it seems quite plausible to me that the
> “Secondary Object,” being a part of the sign, fits reasonably well Peirce’s
> later definitions of the Immediate Object.
>
>
>
> I think this will need some further looking into. Which I don’t have time
> for right now, partly because I want to read your Additament pie

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

I have to run off to a very busy late afternoon/evening soon, but wanted to
quickly respond to your post. You wrote:

HR: I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to
the word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it
up, and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special".

Well, I'm glad that *that* at least is cleared up. Continuing, you quoted
me:

GR: " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic
sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic
sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental
experiments', etc.)"

Then commented:

HR: I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer
examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn
contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And
biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics
is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I
thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on
biology.

To say as I did that biology (and the other idioscopic sciences) can offer
examples is not for a moment to suggest that that is their principal work.
Hardly! Indeed, it isn't *their* work at all--they can, if they wish more
or less ignore the cenoscopic sciences (although I don't think it's best
practice and rarely happens since both logic and methodology are taken up
in cenoscopy). Rather *it is the work of those working in the idioscopic*
sciences to employ biological and other physical and psychical examples
from the work in those sciences. As for all the sciences, both ceno-and
idioscopic, employing mathematics, well, of course. And the various
sciences do employing the findings of other sciences in their own work when
applicable--no argument there! Continuing, you wrote:

HR: But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of
the boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics? Or has it also to do with
the question in how far life is due to logic? Or logic due to life, or both
due to each other, or both isolated and not due to each other? Well, I
first did not want to quibble on, but now I think that the answer to this
question(s), resp. the belief about the answer would have an influence on
the classification. I do not have a clear opinion about which is due to
which, I only do not believe in the isolation answer possibility.

Some of your questions indeed seem related to classifications of the
sciences, others to logic (perhaps especially theoretical rhetoric and
methodeutic) or to metaphysics.

I haven't any quick answers except to say each of the cenoscopic sciences
have their own work to do while possibly employing principles from sciences
'higher' in the classification of sciences of discover, all of them from
math, logic as semeiotic employing principles from phenomenology, etc..  It
seems to me that idioscopic practitioners may *hope *the work they do, say
in logic, may be of value to the idioscopic/special sciences, while the
idioscopic sciences have their own *special* works, develop their own
methodologies, etc. They most certainly need not be in conflict. Indeed,
one would hope that they would mutually fecundate, even fructify each
other. There is also the real possibility and practice of inter- and
transdisciplinarity.

Best,

Gary R


xx

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 12:33 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
> I think, the presyllable "idio" has had a bad connotation to me due to the
> word "idiot", which was the reason for my quibbling, but I´ve looked it up,
> and it does not only mean "merely self-related", but also "special". Still,
> by the way you put it:
>
> " Similarly, cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic
> sciences which, in turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic
> sciences may work (to exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental
> experiments', etc.)"
>
> I would say, that once maybe biology did nothing more than just offer
> examples. Today, I think, even biology contains chemistry, which in turn
> contains atom and quantum physics, which contains mathematics. And
> biosemiotics? I guess that depends on how you define it. Maybe biosemiotics
> is just offering examples, and analyzing them is semiotics. Well, the way I
> thought it was, was, that biosemiotics is semiotics with emphasis on
> biology.
> But is our argument respectively my error merely about the position of the
> boundary between biosemiotics and semiotics?

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Well, you may disagree with Peirce (and me) that all three are always
present in the phaneron, but, (a) a bedrock of Peirce's phaneroscopy and
(b) has always been my personal experience. I suppose my phaneroscopic
experience is closely linked to my understanding of time as Peirce presents
it (I believe yours is different). As has been argued here repeatedly and
even recently (and not only by me), for Peirce the *instant* is an
abstraction, while the minimum of time is the trichotomic *moment *which
itself involves all three categories.

Having said that, and even while I don't see how one can separate the three
categories except analytically, Peirce often--although hardly always--takes
up his universal categories in relation to his phenomenology and the
practice of that science. I do that as well as a frequent practice.

In any event, I see no reason to change my thinking--which, again, is most
certainly Peirce's (many passages to that effect)--about the omnipresence
of all three categories  in every phenomenon.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 2:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - I would question whether all three categorical modes are
> operative in all phaneronic experience at the same time.
>
> For example, in the case of a rhematic iconic qualisign - let's say that
> 'feeling of redness' or how about 'a feeling of heat' [I just spilled hot
> oil on myself]. No other categorical mode, in this semiosic event, is
> operative other than Firstness.
>
> Now - if I am becoming aware of this triad - then, I am adding both
> Secondness [my physical reaction to that feeling]..and possibly later on in
> the next few seconds, my thoughts [My god, I have burned myself].
>
> But isn't it possible that one never moves beyond that first feeling? Or
> moves beyond that reaction - i.e., never moves into analysis or even
> awareness beyond the muscular reaction?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 25/01/18 1:14 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Stephen, list,
>
> In reference to this passage:
>
> CSP: Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can  possibly think involves
> three kinds of elements​
>
>
> You commented: SR: ". . . the notion that thinking can be limited to **
> things that themselves must somehow be three elements by some sort f
> default ** seems to be out of order or maybe just plain wrong."
>
> I don't understand your confusion here, Stephen, as this passage simply
> points to the fundamental tenet of Peircean phenomenology, namely, that in
> the phanerson--i.e.,whatsover is before some mind--there will always be
> the three categorial elements of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns even if one (or two) may
> be dominant in any given phaneronic experience. Given the context, these
> three may be given different names, for example:
>
> 1896 [c.] | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories
> from within  | CP 1.423 We have already seen clearly that the elements of
> phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought.
>
> Or:
>
> 1885 | One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature  | CP
> 1.377
>
> It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first,
> feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time,
> passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second,
> consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of
> resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic
> consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (both in
> Commens).
>
>
> Again, this triad of universal categories is so basic to Peirce's thinking
> throughout cenoscopic philosophy (but, perhaps, especially in phenomenology
> and logic as semiotics) that I wonder what prompted your question.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>
> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the
>> notion that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must
>> somehow be three element

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, list,

In reference to this passage:

CSP: Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves
three kinds of elements​


You commented: SR: ". . . the notion that thinking can be limited to **
things that themselves must somehow be three elements by some sort f
default ** seems to be out of order or maybe just plain wrong."

I don't understand your confusion here, Stephen, as this passage simply
points to the fundamental tenet of Peircean phenomenology, namely, that in
the phanerson--i.e.,whatsover is before some mind--there will *always* be
the three categorial elements of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns even if one (or two) may
be dominant in any given phaneronic experience. Given the context, these
three may be given different names, for example:

1896 [c.] | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories from
within | CP 1.423 We have already seen clearly that the elements of
phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought.

Or:

1885 | One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature | CP
1.377

It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first,
feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time,
passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second,
consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of
resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic
consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (both in
*Commens*).


Again, this triad of universal categories is so basic to Peirce's thinking
throughout cenoscopic philosophy (but, perhaps, especially in phenomenology
and logic as semiotics) that I wonder what prompted your question.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the notion
> that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must somehow be
> three elements by some sort f default ** seems to be out of order or maybe
> just plain wrong. For example, I am thinking now as I write. No
> numerical sense intrudes. To get to this stage I did not have three
> anythings that I am aware of. If I am simply skirting a context that
> explains this, fine. Par for my course. I miss lots. But if the text stands
> as is, how can thinking which is us puzzling as we go be involved in
> anything but a process that ** cannot ** be characterized as the text
> characterizes it. The only time I know when three enters into thinking is
> when I consciously will it in terms of an actual process that has definable
> stages.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 8:40 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> ​Jeff, Gary f, List,
>>
>>
>> Jeff wrote: "​
>> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on
>> the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those
>> "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena.
>>
>>
>> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
>> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves
>> three kinds of elements​ CSP​
>>
>> ​ (Jeff's emphasis)​
>>
>>
>>
>> ​JD: ​
>> The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think
>> there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term
>> "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally,
>> and this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are
>> currently taking place on the Peirce-L.
>>
>>
>> ​Jeff, your comment is problematic for me for two reasons. 1) In the
>> Peirce quote, "Everything that you can *possibly* think" refers, in my
>> understanding of phenomenology, to everything thing you may* actually*
>> think. This is to say that for the phenomenologist the phenomenon must be
>> before the mind, not *possibly* before the mind (i.e., Peirce is saying
>> that all possible thought when thought will involve 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns).
>>
>>
>> ​2) It seems to me that your leaping to "the classification

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Gary Richmond]

​Jeff, Gary f, List,


Jeff wrote: "​
Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on
the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those
"things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena.


Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves
three kinds of elements​ CSP​

​ (Jeff's emphasis)​



​JD: ​
The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think
there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term
"possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally, and
this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are currently
taking place on the Peirce-L.


​Jeff, your comment is problematic for me for two reasons. 1) In the Peirce
quote, "Everything that you can *possibly* think" refers, in my
understanding of phenomenology, to everything thing you may* actually*
think. This is to say that for the phenomenologist the phenomenon must be
before the mind, not *possibly* before the mind (i.e., Peirce is saying
that all possible thought when thought will involve 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns).


​2) It seems to me that your leaping to "the classification of signs
generally" in you comment quoted just above, you are seemingly conflating
logic as semiotics and phenomenology, a dangerous mixing in my opinion. and
your following comments on descriptives, designatives, and copulatives
clearly moves this notion of "possible" into the semiotic realm (that is,
into a different cenoscopic science).​

​

You also wrote: "
In addition to the public character of the phenomena
​. . . " But for the science of phenomenology, what is 'public' seems to me
but the invitation of the individual phenomenologist to suggest to another
person that she make the same (or similar) observation of the phenomena.
But then that would be another individual having the phenomenological
experience for herself. What is public is what together we can same about
the phenomena we both experienced.


This is quite different from the usual scientific experiment which,
potentially--and, not infrequently, actually--many could experience at the
same time.


So to summarize my points above: 1) In the Peirce snippet above that "
Everything that you can *possibly* think involves three kinds of elements
​" 'possibility' there points, in my opinion, to future actual
phenomenological appearances for an individual. to some "is" a phenomenon
rather than to some "could be" or "may be" phenomena. In short, for
phenomenology itself the phenomenon *must *be before the mind. That one can
later discuss it with others is dependent on their having themselves
experienced the same or similar phenomena.


And, 2) your argument, if I understand it, seemingly for some sort of
*public* phenomenological experience, appears to me (in consideration of
your examples) to conflate two different cenoscopic sciences, viz.
phenomenology and semiotic. Semiotic will most certainly employ the
discoveries of phenomenology, but that's an entirely different matter.


Best,


Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 11:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, Gary R, List,
>
>
> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on
> the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those
> "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena.
>
>
> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves
> three kinds of elements (my emphasis).
>
>
> The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think
> there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term
> "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally, and
> this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are currently
> taking place on the Peirce-L. For instance, it is not obvious to me how
> "possible" applies to the classification of signs as descriptives,
> designatives or copulatives based on the *presentation* of immediate
> objects. Should w

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

You wrote: "Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought
that it was observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such
as semiotics/logic."

I think you have the "observing phenomena" part of idioscopy right but, as
I understand it, not the "without connecting them to cenoscopy" part.
Peirce writes (re: the 1903 Classification):

This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities
of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor
with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present
condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its
idea from Comte's classification; namely, the idea that one science depends
upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such
principles to that other. It turns out that in most cases the divisions are
trichotomic.


Compte's idea, which Peirce embraces, is that sciences higher in the
outline classification offer principles to those lower in it; while
sciences lower in the classification can offer examples for those higher in
the classification. So, mathematics can offer principles to all the other
sciences as being 'first science' in the Classification. Similarly,
cenoscopic sciences can offer principles to ideoscopic sciences which, in
turn, may offer examples with which the cenoscopic sciences may work (to
exemplify those principles, conduct 'mental experiments', etc.)

So, to return to the point at hand, the cenoscopic sciences--phenomenology,
normative science (esthetics, ethics, logic as semeiotic)
metaphysics--offer principles to the idioscopic sciences, both physical and
psychical, while these *may* provide examples for the cenoscopic
sciences--'material' to exemplify the principles discovered.

As I see it, of the three branches of Discovery Science: Mathematics,
Cenoscopy, and Idioscopy, the first and the last will forever need
"updating." I suggested in an earlier post how the advances in the
Idioscopic sciences would necessarily much modify that part of the
Classification, and would now add that much the same is undoubtedly so for
First Science, Mathematics, in our day.

Yet as I see it, Peirce's Cenoscopic philosophy holds its own today while,
iin my opinion, it has not begun to be sufficiently explored nor developed
(with the possible exception of the third branch of the normative sciences,
namely, logic as semiotic).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 5:40 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary List,
> Maybe I have  had the wrong concept about idioscopy: I thought that it was
> observing phenomena without connecting them to cenoscopy such as
> semiotics/logic.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  22. Januar 2018 um 23:24 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
>
> Helmut, list,
>
> You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then,
> just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that
> the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification,
> of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
> semiobiology is idioscopic.
>
> First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field,
> maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic
> analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the
> schema of which is clear enough.
>
> The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches:
> theoretical grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical
> rhetoric). The subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with
> biology except 1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans,
> and 2. what is discovered in the biological sciences may serve as*
> examples* in logic as semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics is
> its own special science.
>
> iii. Logic
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Philosophy:_logic,_or_semiotic>
> (*or* Semiotic *or*Formal Semiotic). *(Study of true and false.)*
>
> *(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory and
> his fallibilism.)*
> 1. Speculative Grammar
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Classes_of_signs>
> (*or* Philosophical *or* Universal Grammar)
> (*or* Stechiology)
> *(Includes the classification of signs).*
> 2. Critic
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Modes_of_inference>
> (*or* Logical Critic, Critical Logic, *or* Logic Proper).
> *(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, list,

You quoted Peirce:

The answers to these questions do not come of themselves. They require the
most laborious study, the most careful and exact examination. The system of
questions does not save that trouble in the least degree. It enormously
increases it by multiplying the questions that are suggested. But it forces
us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic
than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has yielded
such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.


Then asked:


Gf: Why should we take the trouble to engage in the “most laborious study”
required to answer these endless questions? Because, according to Peirce, “it
forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of
logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has
yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.”



Is that really a *hard fact*? Or is it merely Peirce’s opinion that the
conceptions attained in this way are so much clearer than any attained
before? Can it be a *hard fact* — the epitome of Secondness, as described
by Peirce earlier — that one conception is clearer than another? If so,
what does that tell us about the nature of “hard facts”?


Perhaps I am reading this passage somewhat differently from you. It seems
to me that the *hard fact *to which Peirce is referring may be his own
sense that, having made this minute analysis, engaged in this "most
laborious study," that he has *himself* been able to achieve "much clearer
conceptions of the objects of logic than have ever been attained before."

In my opinion, this is in fact (in "hard fact"?) his achievement, perhaps
especially in logic (although in my opinion his achievement in
phenomenology hasn't yet even begun to be fully comprehended let alone
developed).

So, my question: Is Peirce here reflecting on his own phenomenological and
logical achievements as he himself sees them? If so, the "hard fact" is
just a manner of speaking and hasn't necessarily much to do with
phenomenological 2ns at all.

Similarly is he informally using the "singular us" (e.g. "Can you give us
[i.e., 'me'] a hand fellows?") in writing "it forces us along step by step
to much clearer conceptions. . ." to refer to his own disciplined efforts
over nearly a lifetime?

Who else would have (could have! and even to this day) made the minute, in
depth, expansive phenomenological and logical inquiries Peirce made? Peirce
frequently invites his reader (or listener in lectures) to herself do what
he himself has done, a kind of replicating the experiment (or experience).
But who would be willing to engage in such extraordinarily minute logical
investigations today?

And who else could have attained the extraordinary achievements in logic
which he did through these minute methods, for prime example, more or less
single-handedly inventing modern triadic semeiotic (or, as I like to think
of it, trichotomic semeiotic, as involving the categories at almost every
stage of his semeiotic analysis)?

But, this is just a quick guess;  and there may be more to these passages
than I've suggested here involving, as you've suggested, phenomenological
2ns.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 5:53 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> A word or two about the second part of Lowell 3.14, CP 1.543 …
>
>
>
> Whatever “subject of inquiry” we are talking about, it must be something
> “before the mind” in some way, to use the language Peirce uses to introduce
> Phenomenology earlier in Lowell 3. That makes it a Phenomenon; hence it 
> “involves
> three kinds of elements.”
>
>
>
> The “principle of our procedure” in this Phenomenological inquiry seems
> to apply *recursively*, even to the “kinds of elements” themselves. “And
> so we have endless questions, of which I have only given you small scraps.”
>
>
>
> Why should we take the trouble to engage in the “most laborious study”
> required to answer these endless questions? Because, according to Peirce, “it
> forces us along step by step to much clearer conceptions of the objects of
> logic than have ever been attained before. The *hard fact* that it has
> yielded such fruit is the principal argument in its favor.”
>
>
>
> Is that really a *hard fact*? Or is it merely Peirce’s opinion that the
> conceptions attained in this way are so much clearer than any attained
> before? Can it be a *hard fact* — the epitome of Secondness, as described
> by Peirce earlier — that one conception is clearer than another? If so,
> what does that tell us about the nature of “hard facts”?
>
>
>
>

Re: Logic as semeiotic in relation to theoretical and practical psychology, was [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, list,

'Logic' has many meanings for Peirce as for all of us. In the *Commens*
dictionary of Peirce's terms there are about 25 entries having 'logic' or
'logical' in them, many--but not all--concerned with formal logic. The
distinction between two of these terms is of the greatest importance, I
think, in responding to your doubt as to whether or not logic is a science
(it is, and a very large percentage of Peirce's writings deal with it) or a
"dynamic force" (I might not express it in those terms, but I think I see
what you mean).

So, Peirce distinguishes between *Logica Utens*, the logic all reflective
people use and, for the most part, use quite effectively, thank you),
and *Logica
Docens*, the scientific study of logic. And, it's important to keep in
mind, "
​
The *logica docens* is nothing but the perfectionment of [the] *logica
utens*." 1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R]
1147


*Logica Utens*

1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Section II. Why Study Logic? | CP 2.186

Now a person cannot perform the least reasoning without some general ideal
of good reasoning; for reasoning involves deliberate approval of one’s
reasoning; and approval cannot be deliberate unless it is based upon the
comparison of the thing approved with some idea of how such a thing ought
to appear. Every reasoner, then, has some general idea of what good
reasoning is. This constitutes a theory of logic: the scholastics called it
the reasoner’s *logica utens*. Every reasoner whose attention has been
considerably drawn to his inner life must soon become aware of this.

*Logica Docens*

902 | Logic | DPP 2:21; CP 2.204-205

. . . the result of the scientific study. . . is called *logica docens*. [—]

That part of logic. . . *logica docens*, which, setting out with such
assumptions as that every assertion is either true or false, and not both,
and that some propositions may be recognized to be true, studies the
constituent parts of arguments and produces a classification of arguments
such as is above described, is often considered to embrace the whole of
logic; but a more correct designation is Critic (Greek {kritiké}.


And as earlier noted, as Peirce developed it logic is a very much broader
field than critical logic (as central as he always maintains that* that*
critical branch of formal logic is). Still, logic as semeiotic (that
is, *logica
docens*) has three branches, theoretical (speculative) grammar, critic
(just mentioned in the quotation above), and theoretical rhetoric. As
Peirce suggests, many equate critical logic (critic) with the whole of
logic, while for Peirce, theoretical rhetoric (methodeutic, esp. in its
including a pragmatistic theory of inquiry) is the final branch for which
the other two prepare.


Best,


Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 5:08 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Progress. Anyway I have been radically influenced by Roberto Assagioli who
> was a contemporary of Jung and Freud. Indeed Triadic Philosophy advocates
> what emerged from his work -- psychosynthesis -- which is as close as
> anything I know to a triadic form of psychology since it includes as
> fundamental a  higher self which is what I take a  triadic thinker to be in
> touch with. We all hit bumps in life that require skilled others to help
> iron out. Psychosynthesis spawns practitioners who know how to help and how
> to back off in the face of things too serious to deal with. I am reflecting
> on a lifetime of involvement which began when I worked at Riggs in
> Stockbridge when Erik Erikson and David Rappaport were both there. I think
> Pierce is right to reject psychologism as a basis for logic but I am
> inclined to think logic is a term that should be used more and shorn of its
> seemingly specialized provenance. It seems to me Peirce really did have a
> sense that what he was talking about had a universal heft. If anything is
> true these days it is that universal means everyone. Actually, I am not
> sure logic is a science.Isn't it more a dynamic force? Or even a basis of
> whatever rules are needed to keep reality moving along.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 3:47 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen, list,
>>
>> Stephen wrote: "I would say that when psychology functions triadically
>> it has made strides in the direction of logic."
>>
>> I would instead say that the *explication* of the essential triadic
>> nature of logic in the *theoretical* science of *logic as semeiotic* has
>> the potential of being a stimulant towards the development of fresh
>> approaches to research in psycholo

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

You wrote: If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then,
just following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that
the first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification,
of the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
semiobiology is idioscopic.

First, I'm not at all sure what "semiobiology" is (is there such a field,
maybe a Saussurean approach to biology?), but I don't think your linguistic
analysis holds any water for Peirce's classification of sciences, the
schema of which is clear enough.

The cenoscopic science of logic as semiotic has three branches: theoretical
grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic (or theoretical rhetoric). The
subjects of none of these has anything whatsoever to do with biology except
1. its practitioners are biological entities, viz., humans, and 2. what is
discovered in the biological sciences may serve as* examples* in logic as
semeiotics according to Peirce. But biosemiotics is its own special science.

iii. Logic
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Philosophy:_logic,_or_semiotic>
(*or* Semiotic *or*Formal Semiotic). *(Study of true and false.)*

*(The presuppositions of reason are the locus of Peirce's truth theory and
his fallibilism.)*
1. Speculative Grammar
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Classes_of_signs>
(*or* Philosophical *or* Universal Grammar)
(*or* Stechiology)
*(Includes the classification of signs).*
2. Critic
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Modes_of_inference>
(*or* Logical Critic, Critical Logic, *or* Logic Proper).
*(Includes study of the modes of inference: abduction, induction, and
deduction).*
3. Methodeutic
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Pragmatism>
(*or* Speculative Rhetoric,
*or* Universal *or* Philosophical Rhetoric).


*(Is the locus of Peirce's Pragmatism
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce#Pragmatism>, and
includes study of scientific method).*

As I understand it, biosemiotics takes the principles of logic as
semeiotics and uses them in its own, new inquiries leading to fresh
discoveries. This is the kind of thing one would expect a special
(idioscopic) science to do. In my view, biosemiotics has expanded the
subject matter of biology exactly on semeiotic principles.

I would recommend that you study the chart of the Classification of the
Sciences of Discovery near the bottom of this article on Peirce's
classification.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)

Biology--as have all the physical and psychic sciences--has come a very
long way since Peirce's day and a new outline of idioscopy would no doubt
look very different from Peirce's. But one would expect to find
biosemiotics among the special sciences and most certainly not as a
sub-division of the *normative science* of logic as semeiotic.

Best,

Gary  R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
> If biology is idioscopic, and semiotics is cenoscopic, then, just
> following the rules of linguistics, which in my understanding say that the
> first half of a double-word is a restriction, but not a modification, of
> the second half, I would say, that biosemiotics is cenoscopic, and
> semiobiology is idioscopic.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  22. Januar 2018 um 22:15 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
>
> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not
> somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that
> it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps
> mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."
>
> I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special
> (idioscopic) science. This is the *kind* of distinction I just pointed to
> in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too
> see this as obvious and non-controversial.
>
> It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than
> the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics.
> Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to
> use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of
> logic as semeiotic.
>
> And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special
> sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the
> *Commens* dictionary.)
>
> 1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP
> 8.199The  sort of science 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Edwina, list,

Jon wrote: " classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences does not
somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply recognizes that
it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I thought (perhaps
mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial."

I agree that biosemiotics is not a cenoscopic but rather a special
(idioscopic) science. This is the *kind* of distinction I just pointed to
in my note to Stephen (now in a new thread as given another Subject). I too
see this as obvious and non-controversial.

It is not as if the idioscopic sciences were, say, any less important than
the cenoscopic ones: phenomenology, normative science, and metaphysics.
Indeed, the idioscopic (special) science are, one might say, "invited" to
use the findings of those sciences, perhaps most especially the findings of
logic as semeiotic.

And, furthermore, there is nothing keeping researchers in the special
sciences from working in cenoscopy. (The following quotes are from the
*Commens* dictionary.)

1905 | Review of Wilhelm Wundt's Principles of Physiological Psychology | CP
8.199The  sort of science that is founded upon the common experience of all
men was recognized by Jeremy Bentham under the name of *cenoscopy*, in
opposition to *idioscopy*, which discovers new phenomena.
1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The intermediate department [of
heuretic science], called *cenoscopy*, does not attempt to discover new
phenomena but only analyzes those truths that are known and acknowledged by
everybody.
1905-06 [c.] | Monist [R] | MS [R] 1338:7 The third department [of heuretic
science], called *idioscopy*, embraces all those kinds of investigation
which are occupied in bringing to light phenomena previously unknown and
which having discovered these phenomena use the same observational methods
to push the study of them further.


Again, why is any of this controversial?

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 1:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> You keep attributing words to me that I have not said; please stop doing
> that.  For example, classifying biosemiotics under the special sciences
> does not somehow turn it into "a special use of Peirce"; it simply
> recognizes that it does not fall under (cenoscopic) philosophy, which I
> thought (perhaps mistakenly) was obvious and non-controversial.  For my own
> clarification, do you consider biosemiotics to be fundamentally
> *normative*, such that it primarily investigates how biological systems *ought
> *to behave; or *descriptive*, such that it primarily investigates how
> biological systems *actually do* behave?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - you have used those terms before- therefore, it is irrelevant that
>> you haven't used them in the current thread. And I disagree that forbidding
>> such terms as 'unPeircean' and 'more/less legitimate' would block 'the way
>> of inquiry. I consider that their use actually blocks inquiry since it sets
>> up boundaries to the discussion. It tells the other person in the debate:
>> No- I won't consider your view as having any validity because it is
>> 'judged' as 'unPeircean'.
>>
>> As for your other comments - I disagree with your compartmentalization of
>> Peirce. Since, as you note:
>>
>>   Hence the normative science of logic as semeiotic explores how "every
>> intelligence which can learn from experience" (CP 3.428; 1896) ought to
>> go about pursuing truth as "the conformity of a representamen to its
>> object" (CP 5.554, EP 2:380; 1906).  Likewise, "Metaphysics ... endeavors
>> to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena" (CP 2:197; 1903).  "Its business is
>> to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (CP 6.6, EP
>> 2:375; 1906).
>>
>> Then..the fact that biological systems have intelligence and can learn
>> from experience means that Peircean semiosis should not be defined as a
>> 'special science'. And what does 'special science' mean? You seem to
>> consider that it is a 'broad and open' use of Peircean theories. No.
>>
>> That is, in my view, biological systems ARE logical - and biosemiotics
>> certainly wants to 'comprehend the reality of phenomena. Many may consider
>> that logic and metaphysics are the sole domain of the human mind - and
>> certainly, the human mind is focused on these areas as conceptual areas of
>>

Logic as semeiotic in relation to theoretical and practical psychology, was [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Stephen, list,

Stephen wrote: "I would say that when psychology functions triadically it
has made strides in the direction of logic."

I would instead say that the *explication* of the essential triadic nature
of logic in the *theoretical* science of *logic as semeiotic* has the
potential of being a stimulant towards the development of fresh approaches
to research in psychology, at least for those who have studied it and so
can see its possible value. Unfortunately, I would imagine that there are
few such researchers. Michael Shapiro has noted this paucity of students of
Peircean semiotic in a number of fields, for example in his own field,
linguistics, although he personally keeps trying to "spread the word" that
semeiotics could play a significant role in its further development.

But it is important to understand that while logic as semeiotic *is *a
cenoscopic (philosophic) science in Discovery Science, psychology is not.
Rather, it's a science further down in his classification, an idioscopic
(special) science but, for Peirce, still a *discovery* (theoretical, pure
research) science.

However, I think that what you're actually suggesting in your note refers
to a science* not *in discovery science, namely, psychology as a *practical,
or* *applied* science (which Peirce only rarely, if ever, mentions). While
I've taken a few graduate level courses in personality theory, etc., I must
admit that I don't know much about that discipline as it's practiced today.
Still, I would guess that there are even fewer practitioners in practical
psychology who apply Peirce's triadic logic to it than there are in
idioscopic psychology or linguistics.

As you've noted in the past, your own "triadic philosophy" is not
essentially Peircean (and I agree that for the most part that it is
not--while I hasten to add that I have found some philosophical gems among
your aphorisms), such that, for example, your remark quoted at the top of
this message has it backwards from a Peircean standpoint. For Peirce,
discoveries in pure theoretical logic as semeiotic would certainly have
direct applications to idioscopic (special) psychology and practical logic;
and so, it would seem to follow that applications of *those* discoveries
and developments in special psychology and practical logic might well help
improve the practice of applied psychology (but probably not vice versa).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 12:21 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> I find the issue remote from what I sense. Sorry. It seems almost a
> supposition which is my term for something different than what can be
> proved. To speak of logic seems t me to speak of what tends to good. Did
> Peirce believe this? I think he did. I think his explanation about
> inkstands reverts to abstract discussions which are remote. At least to me.
> Bear in mind I have gaps in my apparatus more portentous than Peirce's
> lefthandedness.I would say that when psychology functions triadically it
> has made strides in the direction of logic.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:22 AM,  wrote:
>
>> Stephen, here’s a Peirce quote that illustrates the point Peter is making:
>>
>>
>>
>> [[ A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me alienum
>> puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, “You see
>> your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it was; and
>> so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue
>> my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not
>> come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my
>> inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two
>> places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and
>> physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient
>> causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the
>> same general relation to the functions of the mind. ] CP 7.366, 1902]
>>
>>
>>
>> What I referred to as his “anti-psychologism” is his frequent insistence
>> that the science of logic has nothing to learn from the science of
>> psychology (which was generally understood at the time to be about how
>> *human* minds work (although it did include some experiments on other
>> animals). Frederik Stjernfelt takes a close look at the anti-psychologism
>> of Peirce and other logicians in his book *Natural Propositions*.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Peter Skagestad [mai

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,

Gary f wrote:

[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The
sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words *are *synonymous; there is no need to
make up “a way of seeing "sign" as as synonym with "representamen".”

Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing "Sign" as a
"correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and *not* to mean a function (as
I also suggested in an earlier post) “consisting of sign, object,
interpretant.” This idea of "consisting" leads astray, in my opinion.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM,  wrote:

> Helmut,
>
>
>
> Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even made a
> habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the word, and he did
> not use it to mean “a function,” or as “consisting of sign, object,
> interpretant.” He used it as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation.
> The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents”
> (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words *are* synonymous; there is no
> need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen".”
>
>
>
> I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is reading
> exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off from that, the
> more confused we become.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
> *Sent:* 20-Jan-18 17:34
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> Gary, List,
>
> I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A
> sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this
> kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function,
> consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial
> composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this
> kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other
> things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign
> (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
> interpretant, not only the immediate ones.
>
> 1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional
> composition.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
>  20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
> *Von:* g...@gnusystems.ca
>
>
> John, you wrote,
>
> [[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and
> transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these
> issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his
> terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]
>
> What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
> quotations”?
>
>
>
> The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a
> more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3)
> dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the
> explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter
> to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they
> leave unexplained? Here it is again:
>
> [[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful
> case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact
> sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term
> *representamen*. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The
> truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn
> up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong
> logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will
> only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net ]
> Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> > I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex
>
> > or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
>
> > bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.
>
>
>
> Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devote

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, list,]


Lowell 3.13: "A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation *to* a
Second, called its *Object*,  *for* a Third, called its *Interpretant*,
this triadic relation being such that the Representamen determines its
Interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same Object for
some Interpretant."


I know we've been here before, but I do not yet see how "*the Representamen
determin[ing] its Interpretant to stand **in the same triadic relation** to
**the same Object *(emphasis added)" can be seen as a function,  defined as
"a special relationship where each input has a single output." I don't see
how this gels with the snippet of Peirce's above (quite a characteristic
one, I believe).


Best,


Gary R





[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a
> function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the
> sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].
>
> And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but
> is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself
> and other things too'.
>
> I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the
> 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the
> capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated
> the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into
> effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen,
> this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action.
> The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base
> [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant
> Interpretant.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Gary, List,
> I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A
> sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this
> kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function,
> consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial
> composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this
> kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other
> things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign
> (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
> interpretant, not only the immediate ones.
> 1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional
> composition.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
> Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
>
>
> John, you wrote,
>
> [[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and
> transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these
> issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his
> terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]
>
> What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
> quotations”?
>
>
>
> The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a
> more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3)
> dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the
> explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter
> to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they
> leave unexplained? Here it is again :
>
> [[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful
> case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact
> sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term
> representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The
> truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn
> up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong
> logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will
> only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> > I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in

[PEIRCE-L] Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2018.

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I'm forwarding Kalevi Kull's announcement of Gatherings in Biosemiotics
2018 at Berkeley.

Best,

Gary R

-- Forwarded message --
From: Kalevi Kull 
Date: Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:08 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:9256] GB 18 – Berkeley
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee


Dear colleagues,

just a reminder – Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2018 will take place in
Berkeley, USA, June 17–20.

See http://www.biosemiotics.life

Abstracts - coming week.

Kind regards

Kalevi Kull

-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

John, Edwina, list,

I've nothing to add at the moment,  I too completely agree with the thrust
of John's post. Let's hope that some of those untranscribed manuscripts
will one day yield more relevant material on this topic.

In reading Whitehead years ago I too noted many similarities to Peirce's
thinking. Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing
the thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on
this. But I'm wondering if there has been any more extensive work in this
area?

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> John, list
>
> Thank you so much for your perceptive and articulate post. Of course - I
> strongly agree.
>
> And I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex
> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world. And yes, even in the
> complex adaptive multi-unit systems such as human societies.
>
>  I keep saying that 'plants talk to each other' and we are certainly
> finding out, by research, that they do just that.
>
> However, semiosis is not equivalent to communication - a view that many
> become, I think, entrapped in. My view is that semiosis is morphological;
> that is, it forms matter ...transforming matter from one finite form to
> another finite form - within that semiosic triad.
>
> And of course, this includes the physico-chemical realm where semiosic
> transformation also takes place, albeit at a, [thankfully] slower pace
> - which slow pace maintains the stability of this realm. The biological is
> a dynamic, active, constantly transformative and thus, is a ' productive of
> diversity'  realm.
>
> Again - thanks so much for your post.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 20/01/18 11:19 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> Edwina and Gary R,
>
> I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that
> Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living
> things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby:
>
> CSP, MS 463 (1908)
> > I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else,
> > called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which
> > effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately
> > determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop
> > to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception
> > understood.
>
> I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say more.
> His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human
> mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living
> things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would
> have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy,
> psychology, science, religion, and politics.
>
> Edwina
> > I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual
> > realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my
> > constant reference to 4.551.
>
> Gary
> > I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have
> > (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work,
> > but none of them are much developed).
>
> The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to
> throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas
> seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more
> if they were ready to listen.
>
> For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227:
> > all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say,
> > by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.
>
> That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition
> to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his
> anecdotes about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable
> performances, which implied "scientific intelligence". Although
> he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort
> to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so.
>
> Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must
> have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that
> to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes,
> crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics.
> He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called D

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

ET: Ah, so you are having cataract surgery. I had one eye done about 6
months ago  - and the other one will be done in about two years [odd, but
that's the way it is]. Yes, we are becoming 'bionic men' with various
replacements.


Yes, in a few hundred years or so maybe they'll be able to replace our
brains. As for the cataract surgery, retinal issues are complicating my
surgeries, but they are needed and, probably overdue.

ET: I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual
realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis, since my reading of Peirce is
that his focus was on the whole world as a semiosic activity - and yes, as
a logical activity in the biological world. I won't repeat my constant
reference to 4.551.

I will again have to disagree with you since one quasi-necessarily (I mean
*necessarily*) restricts ones investigations whatever they may be. I do not
see that doing this either "limits" semiotic (or, for that matter, other
scientific) inquiries, while inquiries in theoretical
grammar/critic/methodeutic in "logic as semiotic" were certainly areas
Peirce did voluminous work in; he found that 'restriction' to "theoretical
(formal) logic" essential to his advances in logic as semeiotic as the
third and final normative science. He couldn't have been doing a
"disservice" to himself, could he have?

For example, biosemiosis was a mere suggestion of Peirce's, while the field
itself is a recent development. But, yes, the whole world is perfused with
signs and semiotic activity. But Peirce didn't take his ideas regarding
semiosis in the biological and other realms than the human very far at all,
which is one of the reasons, I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as
much as you have (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through
his work, but none of them are much developed).

ET: I totally agree with you that there is a different Immediate Object for
every individual semiosis 'determined' by some Dynamic Object - which does
indeed, remain the same, oblivious, perhaps to our Interpretant experience
of it. BUT - I do sometimes think that the Dynamic Objects must be affected
by Interpretants;; ;they can't be isolate, since they too, as semiosic
'things' [Signs] must interact with what is external to them.

ET: So- if one plant, as a Dynamic Object, is Interpreted by an other
plant...then, I'd bet that this Other Plant is a Dynamic Object for that
first Dynamic Object..They must affect each other

This is a very interesting topic. It reminded that a while back Charles
Pyle pointed to this book which, I think, would tend to support your
comment above.


Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3792036/Do-tre
es-brains.html#ixzz4KQQRYXsO
-
The Hidden Life of Trees: What They Feel, How They Communicate—Discoveries
from a Secret World

Are trees social beings? In this international bestseller, forester and
author Peter Wohlleben convincingly makes the case that, yes, the forest is
a social network. He draws on groundbreaking scientific discoveries to
describe how trees are like human families: tree parents live together with
their children, communicate with them, support them as they grow, share
nutrients with those who are sick or struggling, and even warn each other
of impending dangers. Wohlleben also shares his deep love of woods and
forests, explaining the amazing processes of life, death, and regeneration
he has observed in his woodland.

https://www.amazon.com/Hidden-Life-Trees-Communicate%C2%97Di
scoveries-Secret/dp/1771642483/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=147403
2405&sr=8-1&keywords=hidden+lives+of+trees

​In response to Charles' post, Gene Halton wrote (in part):

EH: Myecologist Paul Stamets describes ways trees and other plants have
communication through fungal networks. They provide something like a neural
net would for a brain.
  . . .
     Here is a video on fungi where Stamets reports some of his work:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DAw_Zzge49c


Best,

Gary R
​

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - Ah, so you are having cataract surgery. I had one eye done about
> 6 months ago  - and the other one will be done in about two years [odd, but
> that's the way it is]. Yes, we are becoming 'bionic men' with various
> replacements.
>
> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual realm
> is a disservice to Peircean semiosis, since my reading of Peirce is that
> his focus was on the whole world as a semiosic activity - and yes, as a
> logical activity in the biological world

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Thanks for your good wishes for my eye surgery recovery (I have another
coming up soon). How strange to have an entire biological lens replaced
with a plastic one!

Your wrote: "I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree
with much of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what
I view as the rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects should
be limited to symbolic propositions'."

I, on the other hand, have tended to agree with much of Gary f's
interpretation of the 1903 Lowell lectures (although not all of it), but
clearly agree with you that the notion that 'immediate objects should be
limited to symbolic propositions' is a peculiar one. However, I don't
believe this is necessarily Gary f's interpretation, but Bellucci's which
Gary was, I think, merely asking about.

I do not agree with you that limiting a discussion to the human science of
logic as semeiotics constitutes a "disservice to Peircean semiotics" nor
that it denies other kinds of semiotic analysis, for example, as is done in
biosemiotics. But in cenoscopic philosophy, I see no problem and, really,
the importance of at least initially restricting the analysis to the human
use of signs in the *normative* science of Logic as Semeiotic.

As to the specific question being addressed, I would say that there is a
different immediate object for every individual semiosis 'determined' by
some specific 'external object'. It is that dynamic object which remains
the same (e.g. the bird sound), while each immediate object so determined
will be specific to some individual (person or animal).

Best,

Gary R

.

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 2:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Gary R - I hope that your recovery from eye surgery goes well. Don't
> strain yourself and take it slowly.
>
> I hadn't wanted to get into the Lowell debate since I disagree with much
> of Gary F's interpretations, but I do want to comment on what I view as the
> rather bizarre interpretation that 'immediate objects should be limited to
> symbolic propositions'.
>
> That denies the reality of the differentiation of our experience into the
> external and internal realms. As Peirce wrote, - there are these two
> worlds, the internal and the external [1.321]. Since we cannot directly
> experience the external Dynamic Object - and he also wrote that the
> objective world exists 'in itself' quite indifferently to what we think of
> it. Therefore our experience of the external world is only within the
> process of semiosis. This process requires the internalized data from that
> external Dynamic Object - that is -  the Immediate Object.
>
> We would be totally unable to experience anything if we didn't also
> experience this Immediate Object! And that goes for the biological realm as
> well. I think that confining semiosis to human conceptualization [which is
> what Bellucci seems to do]  is a disservice to the nature of Peircean
> semiosis .  Again - since we can't directly experience the external world -
> we do so only via our own internal capacities; namely, via the Immediate
> Object. [see also 8.354 where Peirce specifically refers to the IO as
> internal].
>
> An example would be that I hear a sound. I internalize that sound within
> my capacities to hear it. But, a dog or a cat or a bird has different
> hearing capacities for that very same sound from that same External Dynamic
> Object. For each one of us - that particular internal experience is the
> Immediate Object - each different. But the external Dynamic object is the
> same for all of us - even though our internal Immediate Object is
> different. And - it is not a symbolic interaction for any of us.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri 19/01/18 1:44 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary f, John, list,
>
> I'm recovering from eye surgery so haven't been able to read much in the
> last week or so, so I've only read portions of the article by Bellucci (2.1
> and the his conclusion) and haven't yet found his argument compelling (but
> I'll have to read the entire piece when my sight's better).
>
> On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
>> I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have
>> immediate objects.
>
>
> I don't see why immediate objects should be limited to symbolic
> propositions. It seems to me that rhemes (e.g. common nouns), for example,
> will have immediate objects as these are--as least as I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, John, list,

I'm recovering from eye surgery so haven't been able to read much in the
last week or so, so I've only read portions of the article by Bellucci (2.1
and the his conclusion) and haven't yet found his argument compelling (but
I'll have to read the entire piece when my sight's better).

On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have
> immediate objects.


I don't see why immediate objects should be limited to symbolic
propositions. It seems to me that rhemes (e.g. common nouns), for example,
will have immediate objects as these are--as least as I understand the
immediate object--abstractions of qualities and characters originally known
through collateral observation. So the word 'fire' uttered, for example,
would seem to me to have an immediate object in any semiosis in which it
was involved. Gary f has also also suggested as another example the
Dicisign which is not a symbol.

But why limit it to even these? In Peirce's 10-fold Classification of Signs
every sign has an 'object' component, and this object must, it would seem
to me, be an immediate object. Am I completely missing something here? Can
someone summarize for discussion Bellucci's argument for limiting the
immediate object to symbolic propositions?

1906 [c.] | On the System of Existential Graphs Considered as an Instrument
for the Investigation of Logic |MS [R] 499(s)

…*every sign* has *two* objects. It has that object which it represents
itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of
being represented to be, a mere Representative Being. . . (emphasis added) (
*Commens*)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 7:31 AM,  wrote:

> John,
>
>
>
> It’s a 2015 article, “*Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The
> immediate object of a sign”*,
>
> http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152.
>
> I haven’t seen Bellucci’s book yet.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 17-Jan-18 02:21
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> On 1/16/2018 1:03 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> > I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have
>
> > immediate objects.
>
>
>
> I was searching Bellucci's book.  He makes many comments about
> propositions, but i couldn't find one that says exactly that.
>
>
>
> Could you quote a passage in which he says or implies that.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Congratulations, Jon. I am delighted to see your excellent essay published.
I highly recommend it to list members.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 9:36 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> A couple of months ago, Gary Richmond posted a call for papers from *Signs
> - International Journal of Semiotics*.  In response, I submitted a
> somewhat lengthy essay that I derived from a series of List discussions
> that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 2016 under such
> subject headings as "Peirce's Theory of Thinking" and "Peirce's
> Cosmology."  I am pleased and honored to report that it has now been
> published, and since *Signs* is open-source, it is available to anyone
> online.
>
> https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244
>
>
> Feedback is welcome!
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] International Conference on Semiosis in Communication: Differences and Similarities

[Gary Richmond]

 <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/semiosisc_2018.html>
Welcome

The second edition of the International Conference *Semiosis in
Communication: Differences and Similarities* will be organized by the *National
University of Political Studies and Public Administration*, Romania
(NUPSPA), in participation with *Southeast European Center for Semiotic
Studies* (SEECSS) at New Bulgarian University (NBU), Sofia, Bulgaria,
*Semiotics
and Visual Communication Research Lab* at Cyprus University of
Technology, *Romanian
Association of Semiotic Studies* (ROASS) and under the auspices of the
*International
Association for Semiotic Studies* (IASS-AIS). It will be held in Bucharest,
Romania, from the 14th to the 16th of June, 2018.



This conference explores the role of semiosis in communication. As such,
the conference offers an insight towards the epistemological relations
between semiotics and other approaches to communication coming from
perspectives such as sociology, philosophy of language and communication
theory.

Objects of interdisciplinary knowledge *par excellence*, semiotics and
communication are complementary ways of world mastery, of the *big game*,
just like Solomon Marcus (2011) would say. In a world of global
communication, where each one's life depends increasingly on signs,
language and communication, understanding how we relate and opening
ourselves to otherness, to differences in all their forms and aspects is
becoming more and more relevant. From this perspective, an important
objective of the International Conference *Semiosis in Communication:
Differences and Similarities*is to emphasize the importance of semiotic
queries in the communication sciences.

The conference proceeds in three panels (sessions), each focused on a
theme. In addition, Professors *Susan Petrilli* and *Augusto Ponzio* will
hold a special session as a *honorary guests*. In accordance with the paper
proposals, the preliminary list of suggested sessions will be updated.

Professors *Susan Petrilli* and *Augusto Ponzio* will also give keynote
lectures alongside other keynote speakers.

   - CRC
  - Home <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/semiosisc_2018.html>
  - Organizers <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/organizers.html>
  - Call for papers <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/cfp.html>
  - Keynote address <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/keynote.html>
  - Honorary guests <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/honorary.html>
  - Panels <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/panels.html>
  - Conference program
  <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/program.html>
  - Publication <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/publication.html>
  - Registration & fee <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/fee.html>
  - Venue <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/venue.html>
  - Accomodation & transport
  <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/accomodation.html>
  - Sponsors <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/sponsors.html>
  - Social events <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/social.html>
  - Previous edition
  <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/semiosis2016/semiosisc_2016.html>
      - Contact <http://centrucomunicare.ro/semiosis/contact.html>

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Gary Richmond]

​Jeff, Gary f, list,

Jeff wrote: "1)  In the light of these considerations it is easy to see
that the object of a sign, that to which it virtually at least professes to
be applicable, can itself be only a sign.


2) The immediate object which any sign seeks to represent is itself a sign.
​"​

I take the *Ground* (in early Peirce discussions of semiosis) and the
*Immediate
Objec*t (in 20th century discussions) to be more or less equivalent. The
*Sign* cannot represent all the features of any given Dynamic Object, but
only *something* of it which he initially calls the Sign's Ground, this
being the *abstraction of some quality or character of the Dynamic Object*
which the Sign means to represent. The Dynamic Object call only be known
(and even then often only partially) by *collateral observation* (which can
then provide *collateral knowledge* of what the Sign is representing even
when the Dynamic Object is not present).

1908 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 83

It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate
without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that
the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by
collateral experience. (at *Commens*)


In order for any Dynamic Object to participate in human semiosis it must
itself be "of the nature of a sign" such that the Immediate Object is a
sign just as the Interpretant is a Sign (*it's all Sign*). Peirce makes the
latter clear enough, even suggesting at one point that the Interpretant may
be the same or a somewhat more developed (self-same) sign. But perhaps it's
better understood in this way:

But to say that [the Sign] represents its Object implies that it affects a
mind, and so affects it as, in[some respect, to determine in that mind
something that is mediately due to the Object [i.e., Immediate Object GR]. That
determination of which the immediate cause, or determinant, is the Sign,
and of which the mediate cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant
… 1907 | The Fourth Curiosity | CP 6.347 (at *Commens*)


But what I'm most trying to get at is that these three--Immediate Object,
Representamen, Interpretant Sign--are all of the nature of a Sign and, in
any given case, the same Sign, which yet has the capacity to develop or
grow ("Symbols grow") because of the nature of the Interpretant.

In my way of se*eing it, *one distinguishes them *for the purpose of
analysis. O*ne may, of course, further analyze the Interpretant *qua* sign,
but that in the division of the Object into the Immediate and Dynamic
objects, that the Dynamic Object falls out of semiosis as such. As for the
Interpretant as 'meaning' (as some of Peirce's definitions refer to it) or
"significate effect," that falls outside of the present discussion. But as
regards the latter, I'll end with this quote:

1907 | Pragmatism | CP 5.473

For the proper significate outcome of a sign, I propose the name, the
*interpretant* of the sign. The example of the imperative command shows
that it need not be of a mental mode of being. (*Commens*)

Although in human communication it often is "of a mental mode of being."
Yet, the above quotation will be important to recall both in considering
the varieties of interpretants which Peirce outlines as well as in
consideration of such fields as biosemiotics.


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jan 15, 2018 at 3:16 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, Gary R, List,
>
>
> First a quick comment about the initial remark:
>
>
> GF: "When Peirce gives a phenomenological account of the continuity of
> semiosis, as he does in this part of Lowell 3, it’s even more important
> than usual for the reader of Peirce to draw upon collateral experience of
> semiosis to flesh out the immediate objects of Peirce’s propositions".
>
>
> My understanding of the purpose and limits of phenomenological
> investigation is that the aim is not to produce explanations. If, by
> "account", you mean *descriptions* of the phenomena that are observed,
> then I think we're on the same page. That is, I take the purpose of a
> phenomenological theory to enable us to more exactly describe the
> phenomena so that we'll better be able to carry out the following sorts of
> tasks:
>
>
> 1) *analyze* the phenomena that have been observed;
>
> 2) *correct* for observational *errors*;
>
> 3) determine what kinds of measurements might reasonably be applied to
> the observations;
>
> 4) formulate reasonable hypotheses in light of the results of 1,  2 and 3;
>
> 5) where the goal is to formulate tests, then draw on 1, 2 and 3 to
> de

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Gary f, list,

Jeff's diagram of genuine triadic relations made me think, for some reason
(which I hope will become clear) of Peirce's late outline of the
"Classification of Sciences" (what Beverly Kent calls the "perennial
classification"), and in particular, the last part of his outline of *Discovery
Science*, the third and final part of pure research science,* Idioscopy*,
or the *Special Sciences*, both physical and psychical.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)

III. Idioscopy,
or the Special Sciences.

*About special classes of positive phenomena. Resorts to special experience
or experiments in order to settle theoretical questions.* [?]. Physical. i.
Nomological or General. i. Molar Physics. Dynamics &
Gravitation.
ii. Molecular Physics. Elaterics (elasticity, expansibility[20]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#cite_note-20>)
&
Thermodynamics.
iii. Ethereal Physics. Optics &
Electrics.
ii. Classificatory.
*Peirce in the 1903 Syllabus classification:*[21]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#cite_note-21>
"Classificatory physics seems, at present, as a matter of fact, to be
divided, quite irrationally and most unequally, into i, Crystallography;
ii, Chemistry; iii, Biology." i. Crystallography
ii. Chemistry. 1. Physical.
2. Organic.Aliphatic & Aromatic.

3. Inorganic
*(elements, atomic weights, compounds, periodicity, etc.)*
iii. Biology. 1. Physiology.
2. Anatomy.
iii. Descriptive. Geognosy & Astronomy.
[?]. Psychical. i. Nomological Psychics,
or Psychology. i. Introspectional.
ii. Experimental.
iii. Physiological.
iv. Child.
ii. Classificatory Psychics,
or Ethnology. 1. Special Psychology. 1. Individual Psychology. 2. Psychical
Heredity.
3. Abnormal Psychology. 4. Mob Psychology.
5. Race Psychology. 6. Animal Psychology.
2. Linguistics. 1. Word Linguistics.
2. Grammar ("should be a comparative science of forms of composition"[22]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#cite_note-22>
)
3. Ethnology. 1. Ethnology of Social Developments, customs, laws, religion,
and tradition.
2. Ethnology of Technology.
iii. Descriptive Psychics,
or History. 1. History proper.
2. Biography ("which at present is rather a mass of lies than a science"[23]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classification_of_the_sciences_(Peirce)#cite_note-23>
)
3. Criticism 1. Literary criticism
2. Art criticism (*criticism of military operations, criticism of
architecture, etc.*)
It seems to me that the two branches of the Special Sciences ('special',
btw, because they often require special instruments) can be divided
tricategorially.

classificatory (1ns)
|> nomological (3ns)
descriptive (2ns)

(Peirce remarks that he's uncertain which one of these ought be placed
first):

*Physical Sciences:*
Classificatory Physics
|> Nomological, or General Physics
Descriptive Physics

*Psychical Sciences:*
Classificatory Psychics, or Ethnology
|> Nomological Psychics, or Psychology
Descriptive Psychics, or History

I'm not at all certain about this, but it does not at the moment seem to me
that Jeff's diagram gels with Peirce's outline above, whether or not one
accepts my categorial placement of the three constituents of each of the
two branches of Idioscopy. That is, it seems to me that *nomological,
classificatory, and descriptive* ought parallel each other in the
*classification
of triadic relations* as they do in the three constituents of each of the
two branches of Idioscopy  Again, I'm far from sure about this, but decided
I'd send these preliminary thoughts out to see what Jeff, Gary f, and other
folk might think.

I'd also be interested if anyone has seen the branches of special science
analyzed categorially as I myself haven't found such an analysis. At
present I'm satisfied with my categorial analysis. And, further, in terms
of categorial vectors, I'd analyze these on this research path following
the *vector of determination,* from 2ns through 1ns to 3ns. So (starting at
the bottom of the trikon):

*Research order of physical and psychical sciences:*
secondly, classificatory (1ns) based on characters, etc.;
|> thirdly, nomological (3ns) towards the discovery of laws.
Firstly, descriptive (2ns) as the existential constituent,

Finally, one can't look at the 'content' of these two sciences but see how
far 'physical' and 'psychical' sciences have advanced since Peirce's time.
But of course he predicted that that advance would necessarily have to be.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 2:18 PM, Jeff

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

Gene, Gary f, list,

Gene wrote:

It seems to me that one can also say that some elements of our experience
are primate experience, and also even mammal experience, rather than
specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices need to be
bracketed out in scientific experience as well.


But aren't such primate, mammalian and material 'elements' immediately
*filtered*, so to speak, through our* human being* in order to count as *our
experience, *experience in Peirce's sense in the material under discussion?

So, while it's true that my pain in stubbing my toe is surely mammalian
pain, I immediately, quasi-necessarily turn it into *human* *experience*. I
say to myself "ouch!" (the pain is symbolized), "my right big toe" (the
pain is immediately localized in human terms), etc. Such human
symbolization allows us to not only experience, but also importantly to
reflect on our experience in order to, come to better understandings of the
nature of physical pain, to, for example, discover means to control it
medically for not only humans, but for primates, other mammals, etc.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 3:28 PM,  wrote:

> Gene,
>
>
>
> Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates,
> but now that you’ve said it, I agree.
>
>
>
> The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit
> from the *Avatamsaka Sutra* that I quoted on my blog the other day:
> “There is not a single sentient being who is not fully endowed with the
> knowledge of the enlightened; it is just that because of deluded notions,
> erroneous thinking, and attachments, they are unable to realize it.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but
> gives signs. [Heraclitus] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Eugene Halton [mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu]
> *Sent:* 6-Jan-18 14:13
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
>
> Dear Gary F,
>
>  Your comment concludes:
>
>  "That last sentence takes us to the crux of the challenge of
> Peircean semiotics and Peircean phenomenology: *Experience is our only
> teacher* in science, as he says elsewhere, and all of our experience is
> *human* experience — yet we are tasked to “take away the psychological or
> accidental human element” from our comprehension of the elements of the
> phenomenon, and specifically of semiosic phenomena. Nominalists and others
> will say it can’t be done; Peirce says “Why not?”
>
>
>
>As a quibble, it seems to me that one can also say that some elements
> of our experience are primate experience, and also even mammal experience,
> rather than specifically human experience. And perhaps these prejudices
> need to be bracketed out in scientific experience as well.
>
>  Nietszche said something that may speak to Peirce’s words, though
> perhaps not completely parallel:
>
>  "Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the
> real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any
> case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can
> be only your liberators." (Untimely Meditations III)
>
>  Gene Halton
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Gary Richmond]

 is the difference between living
through an event and imagining or recalling it.


So, if I have grasped you meaning in your comments on the Lowell segment
and your Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*, I would tend to strongly agree with
your analysis of the distinction between genuine and degenerate 2ns.

You closed that stimulating chapter of your book with this observation and
question, one which I'd like to discuss at some point along the way
(perhaps even in a separate thread).

Gf: ‘Experience’ itself is only a word, like other words: how then do you
reach the point where you can judge for yourself whether experience is your
only teacher or not?

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 5:58 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax
> with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the “slight
> glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended
> “merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of
> thirdness which is the sole object of logical study.”
>
>
>
> But before we plunge into that, I’d like to point out a couple of
> questions raised by Peirce’s reference here to the term “reference.”
> Summarizing his previous remarks, he says that “genuine Secondness was
> found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the
> Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness,
> or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full
> Secondness.” He did not use the term “reference” earlier in this lecture,
> but he did use it in the part of the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic
> relations, CP 3.572: “The broadest division of dyadic relations is into
> those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories
> of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which
> can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the
> former kind may advantageously be termed a *reference;* a relation of the
> latter kind, a *dyadic relation proper.*”
>
>
>
> This seems consistent with the identification of “Reference” as
> “Degenerate Secondness” — but what is “advantageous” about using the term
> “reference” in this way? And how is this specialized usage related to the
> ordinary usage of the common noun “reference” rooted in the verb “refer”?
> For instance, when I type the term “cat” to *refer* to the cat who is
> curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and
> word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give
> him his *proper* name) is certainly an “existing individual,” and thus a
> Second, but does the common noun belong to a different “category of being,”
> a First which “is a mere First”? This may seem a trivial question, but it
> is definitely a *semiotic* question, because a word is definitely a sign.
> Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into
> here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I
> approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of *Turning Signs*,
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my
> doubts about it, I haven’t come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign,
> even a symbol like “cat,” as a “First” is not really a problem in the light
> of Peirce’s definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as “First
> Correlate of a triadic relation.” But I’d like to know what other Peirceans
> think on this issue.
>
>
>
> There’s also a connection here with Peirce’s ‘epiphany’ about existential
> graphs in 1906, when he said that:
>
> [[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably recognized,
> as one great class of relations, the class of *references*, as I have
> called them, where one correlate is an existent, and another is a mere
> possibility; yet whenever I have undertaken to develop the logic of
> relations, I have always left these references out of account,
> notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or
> other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me
> any means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I
> discovered in the *verso* of the sheet of Existential Graphs a
> representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a
> *reference* would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut,
> thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control of
> exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ]
>
>
>
> But I think this message is long enough

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Gary Richmond]

Kirsti, list,

Kirsti wrote: "The list has become more and more a US list."

This is not factually the case. Firstly, the full list includes people from
all the continents except Antarctica. Checking over the posts of the past
few months I see the following active participants (these having posted at
least twice, but typically more frequently). These include (I apologize for
any errors in assigning nationality below, and ought note that this is but
a sampling):

Canada: Edwina Taborsky
Hungary: Stephen Jarosek
Germany: Helmut Ralien
Holland: Auke van Breeman
Canada: Gary Fuhrman
South Africa: John Collier
Argentina: Claudio Guerri
Denmark: Soren Brier
Brazil: Vinicius Romanini
Spain: Cassiano Terra Rodriguez
Finland: Kirsti Määttänen

Indeed, some of the more active contributors of late have not been from the
USA and include Gary Fuhrman, Helmut Ralien, Stephen Jarosek, Edwina
Taborsky, Auke van Breeman, and yourself.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Jan 1, 2018 at 5:57 PM,  wrote:

>
>
> Gary f.
>
> Now I truly believe you were sincere with your wishes for a happy new
> year.  Thanks.
>
> We still do disagree. And I do not think the problems can be reduced into
> language problems.  There are more fundamental issues involved.
>
> I am not asking anyone to believe without testing out what I say.  I
> attemp to offer a different way of looking at, and to interpret what CSP
> wrote.  I wish to share somethings I have learned the hard way.  To smooth
> up, a little bit, the way for someones possibly interested.  – As a rule,
> they tend to come outside US.
>
> The list has become more and more a US list.  US vernacular is expected,
> for instance. This I think is a pity.
>
> We do disagree with fundamentals in text analysis and text
> interpretation.  You say it is guess work.  Which I find partially, but
> only minimally, true.  – It is true that by reading a chapter or so does
> not give anyone the, lets say "phaneron" the writer supposedly had, as such
> and with all there is to it.
>
> We do agree in that the first challenge in doing and teaching  text
> interpretation is to make it clear that there is a difference between
> whatever occurs to the mind of the reader and finding out, by a careful
> study, what can with good grouds, be (logically) inferred from the text at
> hand.  (Be it a quote or book or the oevre).
> Text interpretations can be classified into three types (remember: tone,
> token, type by CSP).  Those with strong and logically valid grounds based
> on the text, those with weak grounds  but not disproved by the text, and
> those which have no grounds in the text or even are disproved by the text.
> – This third type I take as just guesses.
> Student often get very ashtonished when I say: Show you proof by using the
> text only.  (Which, of course is made known in the instructions, but do not
> reach the minds of most).
>
> Opinions are offered. "My (strong) opinion is that…"
>
> Such views have been stated in P-list.  Belongin to the type: My
> interpretation is as good of yours, BECAUSE  I have a right to my own
> opinion.  – Well, this presents a most unhappy mix up of civil rights and
> logic.
>
> You asked me to prove my points.  Quite right.  My response was that
> you'll have to search for proof yourself.
>
> Now I trust you and offer you what CSP called "precept" ( so unnoticed
> amongst his conceptual system that it is not included in the idex of his
> writings).
>
> What follows is my invention, derived from Peirce but not offered by him.
> (I did share this with Gary R.  in off-list mails some decades ago,  along
> with the triangular as a diagram for triadicity).
>
> My instructions to the students, at the beginning of my classes include
> three colours of  translucent pens,  yellow,  orange and green.  The text
> I give.  The task is: Construct the question this text offers an anwer.
> Give grounds to the question by using this text only.
>
> Use the yellow pen first to mark the points you first think are essential.
> Then look again and write down the grounds. Note that the question may not
> be the one explicated in the text.
>
> First I gave my students a piece of newpaper science news.  With a little
> pressure on logical grounds and consistency, they came (as a rule) very
> excited.  They found more grave  logical faults than I had noticed.
>
> Then there were questions on what to do when it was impossible to find
> grounds within the text at hand.  – Then I told them that it is logically

[PEIRCE-L] Year end note by list moderato

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I'm afraid the existential crises of health and home mentioned in passing
in my last post will necessarily consume the rest of my year (perhaps
beyond), so I won't be able to answer each of you who responded to my last
post--at least not in what remains of 2017. So just a few words to mark the
passing of the year.

I believe I've already conveyed how much I value this list, but I would
like to add how honored and truly humbled I am to serve as moderator of
Peirce-L. Yet I would principally like to say that I truly believe that
each and every member of this forum, whether active participant or
thoughtful lurker, contributes to it in important ways whether visible or
not. So thank you all!

Finally I'd like to end the year by offering three pragmatic quotations
which I've been reflecting on the last few days and hope that you find some
value in them.


Year's end is neither an end nor a beginning but a going on, with all the
wisdom that experience can instill in us. Hal Borland


Let our New Year's resolution be this: we will be there for one another as
fellow members of humanity, in the finest sense of the word. Goran Persson


And, finally, I leave you with possibly the most famous Peirce quote,
especially appropriate at the turn of the year, I think.


“Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
what you already incline to think. . .” CSP


The corollary Peirce gives to this is, perhaps, even more famous.

So to all a Happy New Year, one full of many good and fruitful things,
including lively philosophical conversation in this forum!

Best wishes,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

Peter, Jeff, list,

Peter, I too found the various viewpoints expressed in this thread
interesting and, taken as a whole, valuable in ways which may go beyond
your initial question. In any case, the discussion certainly in no way
disappointed me either.

By the way, Peter, I do not believe that I am alone in suggesting that
Morris' "pragmatics" rather fully distorts Peirce's pragmatism and has led
to considerable misunderstanding as to what Peirce's views actually were.
Continuing, Jeff wrote:

JD: Peirce provides the resources needed for understanding how a
contemporary Christian, Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, atheist, etc. might be able
to engage in fruitful conversation about the nativity scene with the aim of
seeking to better understand their differing experiences and perspectives
on the world.


I agree, and would be interested in what other Peircean resources, along
with the ones you just pointed to (or at least hinted at) you and others
might imagine contributing to efforts towards bridging the communication
gap currently prominent not only in religion, art and literary criticism,
but in many other fields as well.

One resource which I believe might be productively mined and developed in
consideration of this pursuit of increased intra- and inter-disciplinary
communication is succinctly adumbrated in the quote in my last post.

Methodeutic or philosophical rhetoric . . . studies the principles that
relate signs to each other and to the world:
​​


If Peircean philosophical rhetoric (which includes not only pragmatism, but
what some have seen as the basis for a complete theory of inquiry) can
indeed better show how "signs relate to each other and to the world," it
might be the quintessential branch of logic as semeiotic possibly
contributing means for improving inter-disciplinary communication and
communication generally. For as Peirce continues:

​
"[Philosophical rhetoric's] task is to ascertain the laws by which in every
scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one
thought brings forth another" (CP 2.229).


Peirce explains that by "scientific intelligence" he means "one capable of
learning." Better understanding this branch of semeiotics having the
potential for contributing to "the growth of learning" through, especially
as you wrote, Jeff, "fruitful conversation. . . with the aim of seeking to
better understand. . . differing experience" might prove to be invaluable
in this pursuit of improving communication.

And, again, since Peirce defines a "scientific intelligence" as one
"capable of learning," and since as biosemiotics and related fields have
made amply clear, biological organisms, being most certainly "capable of
learning," then work in those fields (including complex adaptive systems as
well as such fields as social systems research, etc.) might all contribute
to this great goal of improving communication, perhaps contributing to
(dare I say?) what Peirce called the last 'field' where evolution is still
active, namely *the evolution of consciousness*.

Ah, well, no doubt an all too ambitious goal (most certainly for this list
to take up alone!), but in no way a utopian one, at least not in my view.
In any event, and towards the new year, to paraphrase Robert Browning, our
human reach should exceed our grasp.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 8:24 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Peter, Gary R., List,
>
>
> What might a semiotic theory contribute that goes beyond a contemporary
> literary analysis? Not having 20 pages to dig into details, here are some
> ideas that jump to the fore when I reflect on Peirce's account of signs and
> how they grow--focusing first on points from the speculative grammar and
> then moving towards the methodeutic.
>
>
> Consider what is involved in the interpretation of three different kinds
> of signs that are expressed in the nativity scene:
>
>
> 1.  iconic signs--including the various qualisigns-- and their
> attendant feelings and emotions.
>
>
> 2. indexical signs--including the dicisigns one might express--and the
> challenges different interpreters face in trying to ensure that they
> are talking about the same sorts of objects when they refer, for instance,
> to the individual figures in the scene.
>
>
> 3.  symbolic legisigns--including the manifold arguments that the nativity
> scene might be taken to express by the creators or by those viewing the
> scene--raises issues about what is needed for different interpreters to
> evaluate those arguments as good or bad.
>
>
> One point a Peircean

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Well, whether or not much of this discussion has been very helpful to
Peter's sister, there has certainly been considerable interest in
continuing it. While beyond the topic at hand, I think a meta-analysis of
the discussion might prove valuable on other levels than the semiotic one
of the nativity scene (of which more a little later).

But even at the semiotic level it is perhaps helpful to recall that for
Peirce semeiotics is a much broader study than theoretical grammar and
critical logic (the later being what we normally think of as logic, "logic
as logic" in Peirce's phrase). It is completed by a third branch:

Methodeutic or philosophical rhetoric . . . studies the principles that
relate signs to each other and to the world: "Its task is to ascertain the
laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to
another, and especially one thought brings forth another" (CP 2.229).


> An important facet of Peirce's rhetoric is, of course, his pragmatism
involving, among other things, a theory of learning. Perhaps had Peter
stated his question in terms of what Peirce's *pragmatism* might have to
offer to an analysis of the nativity scene, his sister might have gotten
more useful material for her investigation (I thought Gene's analysis
attempted to do this in part, but not everyone agreed). Meanwhile, it would
appear that she did *not *get nothing.

But returning to the possible meta-analysis of the content, I would like to
throw out a few possibly provocative comments.

It seems to me that Peirce's semiotic, when taken in its fullest sense as
including all three of its branches including rhetoric, has in fact
contributed a great deal to the understanding of many issues and problems
of our modern world and even a brief survey of the literature of just this
new century will show that to be the case. Is that really in doubt?

As to the question of what *this* list "owes" Peter's sister or, for that
matter, anyone, I would answer simply, "nothing whatsoever." If it *can* or
does offer something of value to participants and others, well that is all
to the good. Certainly in the present discussion there has been at least
the good faith attempt to respond to Peter's question. But there is no
requirement that list members do anything more than discuss Peirce and
Peirce-related concepts *as best they can* given all manner of constraints
(of time, interest, direction of their own intellectual pursuits, etc.)

As to the notion that there's some *problem* with this forum perhaps being
too "philosophical," one needs to keep in mind that* the three branches of
logic as semeiotic are included in Peirce's cenoscopic philosophy*. And
while he probably contributed the lion's share of his intellectual efforts
to logical pursuits, that not only is pragmatism an important facet of
semeiotic and cenosocpic philosophy, but that cenoscopy also famously
includes phenomenology, theoretical esthetics and ethics, and metaphysics,
and that Peirce contributed to all of these philosophical sciences, more to
some than to others. (I won't comment here on his extensive and original
work in parts of mathematics and certain special sciences as well as the
classification of the sciences included in review science, but his
philosophical work constitutes, I think it's safe to say, the largest part
of it).

So, one gives and gets from this small forum (under 400 members) what
he/she can. And the occasional complaint that the forum be other than it is
seems to me to be empty.  Still, from my couple of decades on it, I have
seen more positive assessment of what goes on here than negative, and while
I have been frustrated at times, I have learned a great deal here over the
years (and many have said the same thing on and off-list).

I consider this to be a kind of intellectual home (Arisbe?) where I can
hang whatever philosophical 'hat; I care to as long as I'm respectful of
others views (and when I've lapsed in this for some reason--for example,
I'm dealing now with the double whammy of having just had a major flood of
my entire apartment at the same time as I'm suffering from a bad case of
bronchitis--I have made a point of apologizing.)

So, I apologize in advance if I seem to be complaining about certain recent
perceived 'complaints' about the list (or, at least, the present
discussion). Truthfully, what I most want to say, perhaps as a possible
motto for the new year, is something Tom Peters, business guru, once wrote:
"Celebrate what you want to see more of."

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> John S., List.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

Peter, Ben, Claudio, Edwina, Auke, list,

I would tend to agree with you, Peter, that Peircean semiotics *may* not
have too much to offer in the analysis of the Nativity scene example; or,
perhaps better, that what it might have to offer is probably not
potentially as valuable as other kinds of analyses.

I would also tend to agree with you that it is probably desirable to end at
least the Peirce-L discussion of this example while, of course, folk are
always free to take the discussion off-list.

Finally, thank you for providing the image of the Trondheim nativity scene.

May we all have a healthy and productive 2018. Here's one of my favorite
New Year's quotes.

And now we welcome the new year. Full of things that have never been.
Rainer Maria Rilke


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Skagestad, Peter 
wrote:

> List,
>
>
> I appreciate Ben's expression of sympathy, but I tend to agree with those
> who have opined that there is just not much to be said, from a Peircean
> point of view, about this analogy.
>
>
> I am not sure of the wisdom of continuing this thread any further, but a
> couple of listers have  requested an image of the Trondheim Nativity scene,
> so here it is, attached.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Peter
> --
> *From:* Ben Novak 
> *Sent:* Friday, December 29, 2017 5:13:43 PM
> *To:* Jerry Rhee
> *Cc:* Auke van Breemen; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes
>
> Dear List:
>
> I am a long-time follower of the discussions on Peirce List, and am most
> grateful for some of the discussions of Peirce's thought, which makes me
> continue to read each entry. However, I have long been wondering why there
> is so little discussion of relating Peirce's  concepts and methodologies to
> concrete examples, or other 20th and even 21st century thinkers.
>
> The current discussion of Peter Skagestad's simple, practical question
> about a nativity scene in Trondheim, has been disappointing. All he asked
> was the relevance of Peirce's semiotics to a presently existing symbolic
> representation.
>
> The general discussion that has ensued seems to confirm that even the most
> frequent and seemingly most expert expositors of Peirce's thought are
> stumped by Skagestad's simple example, with seemingly little to offer in
> the way of helpful analysis to Skagestad's artist sister.
>
> Poor Peter Skagestad finally had to give up on Peirce, noting that only  
> "Gene's
> references to both Pope Francis and G.H. Mead strike me as highly relevant
> to my question, and I will refer my sister to a few quotes from Mead."
>
> If ever there were an example of scholars unable to descend from their
> ivory towers of abstraction to deal with real world examples, this is a
> classic.
>
> Respectfully submitted,
>
> Ben Novak
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 4:01 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Auke, Peter, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Is not “Holy Family as present-day refugees from the Middle East” image
>> enough?
>>
>> At least surprising enough for Google.
>>
>>
>>
>> And ye tell me, friends, that there is to be no dispute about taste and
>> tasting?
>>
>> But all life is a dispute about taste and tasting!
>>
>>
>>
>> Taste: that is weight at the same time, and scales and weigher;
>>
>> and alas for every living thing that would live without dispute about
>> weight and scales and weigher!
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 29, 2017 at 2:29 PM, Auke van Breemen 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peter,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Did you provide an image of what you described in your original question?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have a somewhat unusual question. My sister is writing an Art History
>>> thesis on nativity scenes and their contemporary relevance. An example is
>>> one at a street mission in Trondheim, Norway, depicting the Holy Family a

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

List, Peter, Jon S,

I very much regret an over-generalization I made in one of my posts in this
thread when I wrote " . . I think that rather than 'imparting' "an ability
to empathize with 'the other' " . . . that one needs already to possess
that 'ability' to appreciate the analogy and respond to it. In the USA at
least it would appear that many Christians, esp. of the evangelical
fundamentalist stripe, have lost it (or at least suppress it)."

Jon S also noted that not all evangelicals are fundamentalists.

In any event, Peter's on-list response to my remark prompted me to write
him off-list. He replied that no offense was taken by him and that no
personal apology was needed. But he thought that if there were evangelicals
on the list (and I know that there are) that I might consider an on-list
apology. I asked if I might forward my off-list apology to him as that
apology, and he gave his consent.

off-list

Peter,

I didn't mean to give offense by suggesting that *all* evangelicals have
lost their compassion and decency. I attend Riverside Church in Harlem, a
very social justice oriented church, and some of the pastoral staff and
parishioners there have left their evangelical roots especially because of
the politicizing of religion in recent decades, and especially in the
so-called Trump era. They are all fine people, and I too know many good,
practicing evangelicals who are not members of Riverside Church.

Perhaps I am most sensitive to this because my spouse is African-American,
and some recent events, editorialized in several places including the New
York Times (see, for example, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
black-pastor-southern-baptist-convention_us_596e53d7e4beb19667cc)
suggest to me that at least in the South and South West that politics has
in some pastors and their churches begun to trump (pun intended) compassion
and genuine Christian love (Gene gave the example of the recent Georgia
race, but there are many).

Anyhow, I am a practicing Christian who should not be publicly making such
generalizations as I just did and to which you
​ ​
properly reacted. Please accept my apology. I will make it public if you
wish.

Best always,

Gary


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 3:42 PM, Skagestad, Peter 
wrote:

> Some of my best friends are evangelicals or fundamentalists and thoroughly
> compassionate people. Enough said.  But Gene's references to both Pope
> Francis and G.H. Mead strike me as highly relevant to my question, and I
> will refer my sister to a few quotes from Mead.
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Peter
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 28, 2017 3:11:43 PM
> *To:* Eugene Halton
> *Cc:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes
>
> Gene, Gary R., List:
>
> How one actually responds to this or any other Sign (Dynamic
> Interpretants) will depend on one's peculiar habits of interpretation
> (Final Interpretants)--feeling, action, and thought--as inculcated by one's
> upbringing and subsequently cultivated by one's deliberate self-control and
> self-criticism.  Observing one's different responses to analogous Signs, as
> well as anticipating them in advance as possibilities (Immediate
> Interpretants), can contribute to the latter process as a form of the
> "outward clash" that always confronts us, perhaps calling attention to an
> inconsistency in one's own character.  In a sense, it is not so much our
> initial responses that define us as how we respond to those responses.
>
> As a terminological aside, an evangelical Christian is not necessarily a
> fundamentalist, and a fundamentalist is not necessarily a political and/or
> religious conservative.  Of course, Peirce would almost certainly oppose
> fundamentalism of any stripe, including both the dogmatic and relativist
> varieties.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.LinkedIn.com_in_JonAlanSchmidt&d=DwMFaQ&c=lqHimbpwJeF7VTDNof4ddl8H-RbXeAdbMI2MFE1TXqA&r=FDb_MiuBhz-kalFUhg0uAyMl7SzpVFxovBRZ5FwNBJY&m=aN7jp6iApO3C_w2v5WmgkcfFo_ThmgiB4LsM7iW41uI&s=nCPO-Ac96siInpxbxnaqE1HFu13jkQKMXgtEphNugkE&e=>
> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__twitter.com_JonAlanSchmidt&d=DwMFaQ&c=lqHimbpwJeF7VTDNof4ddl8H-RbXeAdbMI2MFE1TXqA&r=FDb_MiuBhz-kalFUhg0uAyMl7SzpVFxovBRZ5FwNBJY&m=aN7jp6iApO3C_w2v5WmgkcfFo_Th

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Gene, Peter, Jon S, Jon A, list,

Edwina wrote:


Where I would quibble with you, Gary, apart from the fact that such an
analysis has nothing to do with Peircean semiotics - is that one has to, I
think, be careful with analogies. One situation may be similar to another
situation only in part. The danger with an analogy is that once one has
made that first correlation of' X-is-analogous-to-Y'- then, suddenly, one
includes all the other attributes that belong to ONLY Y.


I can't agree with you that such an analysis as Gene's "has nothing to do
with Peircean semiotics." First, as Gene remarked, it was Peirce's view
that "symbols grow," and the symbolic meaning of the nativity* has* grown
and can grow further--at least in some people's minds (including mine).The
Holy Family was, despite your seemingly questioning it, if not quite
"destitute," at least very poor, and no doubt even more so having indeed
traveled to "a foreign land."

And, further, while I might tend to agree with you that "one has to be
careful with analogies,"
I would hold that Gene's analysis most certainly has its Peircean semeiotic
facets, and moreover, that as Jon A wrote (unfortunately, in another thread
he created for no good reason that I can see), there is in Peirce a very
important "logic of analogy," one which John Sowa has also done some
significant work in. See for example his "Analogical Reasoning."
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/analog.htm.

I see that Jon S has addressed this well, so I'll stop here.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 1:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list -
>
> Where I would quibble with you, Gary, apart from the fact that such an
> analysis has nothing to do with Peircean semiotics - is that one has to, I
> think, be careful with analogies. One situation may be similar to another
> situation only in part. The danger with an analogy is that once one has
> made that first correlation of' X-is-analogous-to-Y'- then, suddenly, one
> includes all the other attributes that belong to ONLY Y.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 28/12/17 1:05 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Eugene, Peter, list,
>
> I very much like your analysis, Gene. You wrote:
>
> The implication here is that the experience of the nativity scene, with
> refugees representing today as echoing Jesus as a refugee, imparts in the
> witness an ability to empathize with "the other."
>
> However, I think that rather than 'imparting' "an ability to empathize
> with 'the other' " (although it may do that in some, perhaps few,
> individuals) that one needs already to possess that 'ability' to appreciate
> the analogy and respond to it. In the USA at least it would appear that
> many Christians, esp. of the evangelical fundamentalist stripe, have lost
> it (or at least suppress it).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>
> On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 12:10 PM, Eugene Halton 
> wrote:
>
>> Dear Peter,
>>  Peirce described the way in which symbols can grow over time. And
>> clearly one of the meanings of the symbol of the nativity is the family.
>> Feuerbach called attention to how the holy family symbol is a
>> representation of the earthly family. Marx took it further by claiming that
>> the holy family symbol of the earthly family is also a projection of the
>> bourgeois family in his time.
>>  A year ago Pope Francis adapted the symbol to the refugee situation
>> by including a Maltese fishing boat in the nativity scene at the Vatican, a
>> reference to refugees arriving by boat.
>>  Perhaps George Herbert Mead can have more to say on this than
>> Peirce, in Mead's description of what he termed "the significant symbol."
>> In Mead's significant symbol the other is included reflectively in the
>> meaning of the symbol:
>> "it is through the ability to be the other at same time that he is
>> himself that the symbol becomes significant."
>> (From "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol").
>> The implication here is that the experience of the nativity scene,
>> with refugees representing today as echoing Jesus as a refugee, imparts in
>> the witness an ability to empathize with "the ot

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nativity scenes

[Gary Richmond]

Eugene, Peter, list,

I very much like your analysis, Gene. You wrote:

The implication here is that the experience of the nativity scene, with
refugees representing today as echoing Jesus as a refugee, imparts in the
witness an ability to empathize with "the other."

However, I think that rather than 'imparting' "an ability to empathize with
'the other' " (although it may do that in some, perhaps few, individuals)
that one needs already to possess that 'ability' to appreciate the analogy
and respond to it. In the USA at least it would appear that many
Christians, esp. of the evangelical fundamentalist stripe, have lost it (or
at least suppress it).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 12:10 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> Dear Peter,
>  Peirce described the way in which symbols can grow over time. And
> clearly one of the meanings of the symbol of the nativity is the family.
> Feuerbach called attention to how the holy family symbol is a
> representation of the earthly family. Marx took it further by claiming that
> the holy family symbol of the earthly family is also a projection of the
> bourgeois family in his time.
>  A year ago Pope Francis adapted the symbol to the refugee situation
> by including a Maltese fishing boat in the nativity scene at the Vatican, a
> reference to refugees arriving by boat.
>  Perhaps George Herbert Mead can have more to say on this than Peirce,
> in Mead's description of what he termed "the significant symbol." In Mead's
> significant symbol the other is included reflectively in the meaning of the
> symbol:
> "it is through the ability to be the other at same time that he is himself
> that the symbol becomes significant."
> (From "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol").
> The implication here is that the experience of the nativity scene,
> with refugees representing today as echoing Jesus as a refugee, imparts in
> the witness an ability to empathize with "the other."
>  Gene H
>
>
> On Dec 28, 2017 9:34 AM, "Skagestad, Peter" 
> wrote:
>
>> Listers,
>>
>>
>> I have a somewhat unusual question. My sister is writing an Art History
>> thesis on nativity scenes and their contemporary relevance. An example is
>> one at a street mission in Trondheim, Norway, depicting the Holy Family as
>> present-day refugees from the Middle East. Now the question is what, if
>> anything, might semiotics have to say about such depiction? The answer may
>> be obvious, but it escapes me, at least for the moment. Any suggestions?
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Peter
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Gary f. Jeff, list,

I have found at least some of the parts/whole, classification/composition
discussion not quite to the point of Peirce'comments in this section of
Lowell 3. Gary f's formulation today was, however, helpful for me in
sorting at least some of this out.

Gf: I don’t see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a *part of a
relation*. . .



Generalizing from this [Jeff's] sample, then, I think we can say that
Peirce speaks often enough of *parts of a sign*, but does not speak of *parts
of a relation*. If that’s the case, I think it gives another reason why we
should not say that a sign is a (triadic) relation, but that a *sign
relation* is triadic — and its *correlates* should not be regarded as
* parts*.


I tend to strongly agree with his conclusion.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
>
> Supplement:
> Kirsti, All, to be frank, I think I have lost the overview about this
> whole topic a bit. I was thinking, that classification "is a kind of" and
> composition "is a part of" were two completely different affairs. But on
> the other hand one can say instead of "is a kind of": "is a part of the
> concept of". This is all very complicated.
> Is it so, tat the EGs are about all that can be expressed with the term
> "is", respectively by negations/exclusions and operators, that would be
> existence, identity, and classification. EGs are not about composition
> (parts), is that so?
>
> Kirsti,
> is the term "part" already defined? I think, if it is defined
> geometrically, then a sign does not have parts. If a sign is a function
> that depends on subfunctions, which may be seen as parts, then I think it
> has the parts sign itself, object, interpretant. But, because you cannot
> take a sign apart in reality (the subfunctions cannot exist alone), these
> parts are ideational or virtual ones. But any way you see it, I donot see
> the connection with the continuum problem (line consisting or not of
> points).
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  22. Dezember 2017 um 06:30 Uhr
>  kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> wrote:
> Helmut,
>
> I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I
> did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of
> course, are deeply related. But how?
>
> To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in
> connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.
>
> Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a
> laboratory, but one needs though experiments.
>
> I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the
> question and searching for answers which logically fit with the
> question, is such an experiment.
>
> Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our
> logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.
>
> EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines.
> Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for
> logical thinking.
>
> Comments?
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:
> > Gary, Kirsti, List,
> > I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
> > geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
> > part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
> > meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
> > metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
> > point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
> > part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
> > part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
> > spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
> > geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
> > they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
> > Best,
> > Helmut
> >
> > 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
> > g...@gnusystems.ca
> > wrote:
> >
> > Kirsti, list,
> >
> > Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
> > points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
> > month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
> > according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
> > _point_ before Euclid.
> >
> > Gary f.
> >
> > -Original Message-
> > From: kirst

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, list,

Thanks for the clarification. I think we may be getting closer on these
matters while, as you probably know from past exchanges, I don't subscribe
to your model of semiosis as input -> mediation -> output. To use an
expression you sometimes employ, I see it  as too linear a model of
semiosis. I do understand that you are committed to it.

I am clearer now, I think, on how you're using 'function' here, but I'll
have to reflect on that a bit further. I would note, however, that much as
'determines' can be confusing to those who don't understand Peirce's use of
it as meaning something like 'constrained' in such expressions as "the
object determines (*bestimmt*) the sign, etc." and *not* as causing or
generating the sign, I think that your use of 'function' here might result
in misleading mechanical connotations of 'working' or 'operating'.

As for the Interpretant possibly becoming an object in another semiosis,
well, yes, as virtually *anything* can become the object of a sign. But my
point is that for any chain of interpretants in a *given* semiosis that
these interpretants remain signs of the *selfsame* object. Granted, the
interpretant of such a chain *may* become the *new* object of another, a
different sign, but then the object of which it was sign 'disappears' so to
speak from that new semiosis (that is, vanishes *as* *object of that sign*).
To say this slightly differently, there is now a* new* object which will
have its own sign and interpretants. To suggest otherwise is, as I see it,
at very least confusing. The two semioses are wholly different since their
objects are truly different. And what was an 'interpretant' is no longer
that in the new semiosis.

I'll have to call it a day on list discussion as not one but two sets of
nieces and their husbands are arriving as house guests in the next few
hours and there's much to do before they arrive.

Best,

Gary



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> In clarification, I'd say that within the semiosic triad,  the Object is
> providing input data, the Representamen is providing mediation; the
> Interpretant is providing output conclusion. Essentially, this is the same
> as a Syllogism, where you have a major premiss, minor premiss and
> conclusion.
>
> The format
>
> All M is P/ All S is M and therefore/ All S is P.
>
> I use the term 'function' because my point is that none of these three
> 'parts' of the triad exists 'per se' in that role outside of the semiosic
> process. I don't mean any kind of 'innate function'!
>
> As for my statement that 'the interpretant could function as an object'
> means - not that it functions ONLY as an interpretant ..because an
> interpretant exists only within that triadic interaction. My point is that,
> as a conclusion...it becomes a 'bit of information' which can then initiate
> other triads. You say exactly this - and I'm sorry I wasn't clear enough -
> that the 'interpretant is made the object of a new and different sign'.
>
> An example would be:
>
> 1]  Object [noise]/
>
> mediated by Representamen of my experience/
>
> Interpretant: that's the sound of the key turning the door lock.
>
> This Interpretant meaning could then function - within another triadic
> process - as an Object:
>
> 2] Object [key turning door lock]
>
> mediated by Representamen of my experience
>
> Interpretant: Oh, he's finally home at last.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 15/12/17 11:50 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Gary f, John, List,
>
> Edwina wrote:
>
>
> By giving them a different name [ sign, its object, its interpretant] and
> the use of the term 'its' - the way I see it is that Peirce is pointing out
> that they function, not as separate Subjects but as interactive forms, each
> with a different function,  within one process, the semiosic process. In
> the next instant - that 'interpretant could function as an Object within a
> different triadic process.
>
>
> I might tend to agree with some of this except that I'm not sure I'd say
> that each has "a different function" nor that the "interpretant could
> function as an object."
>
> Peirce says that the interpretant is the same "or perhaps slightly
> developed" sign (if I recall correctly) that it is interpretant of. And
> this int

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Gary f, John, List,

Edwina wrote:


By giving them a different name [ sign, its object, its interpretant] and
the use of the term 'its' - the way I see it is that Peirce is pointing out
that they function, not as separate Subjects but as interactive forms, each
with a different function,  within one process, the semiosic process. In
the next instant - that 'interpretant could function as an Object within a
different triadic process.


I might tend to agree with some of this except that I'm not sure I'd say
that each has "a different function" nor that the "interpretant could
function as an object."

Peirce says that the interpretant is the same "or perhaps slightly
developed" sign (if I recall correctly) that it is interpretant of. And
this interpretant sign will determine a further interpretant ad infinitum .
Thus, in semiosis each and every sign is an interpretant in a chain of
signs/interpretant signs each determined by the same object (infinite
semiosis). This is not the same as saying that the "interpretant could
function as an object." As I see it, this could not happen unless some
interpretant were *made the object* of another--a new and different sign.
Anyhow, that is my understanding of the interpretant in semiosis.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Dec 15, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> List - my few comments are
>
> 1] I don't think that Peirce confined semiosis to 'life', understood as
> biological, but included the physic-chemical realm as well.
>
> 2] And yes, semiosis is a 'process' - a term for which I've been chastised
> on this list for using - but it emphasizes the active interaction that
> takes place within the triad.
>
> 3] I remain concerned about our understanding of Peirce's use of the term
> 'subject'.
>
> "But by “semiosis” I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which
> is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its
> object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any
> way resolvable into actions between pairs."
>
>  As he says, it's an action involving THREE sites. BUT, I don't
> think these three are each, before the semiosic interaction, understandable
> as separate existences, as separate agents - the way we commonly understand
> the grammatical term of 'subject'. By giving them a different name [ sign,
> its object, its interpretant] and the use of the term 'its' - the way I see
> it is that Peirce is pointing out that they function, not as separate
> Subjects but as interactive forms, each with a different function,  within
> one process, the semiosic process. In the next instant - that 'interpretant
> could function as an Object within a different triadic process.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Fri 15/12/17 6:49 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> John,
>
>
>
> Thanks for this, it’s helpful in reducing somewhat the vagueness of
> Peirce’s references to physics and chemistry in Lowell 3.4 — and answering
> the question I posed, which was badly put in the first place. What I was
> trying to “get” was why Peirce would focus on “substances” of this
> particular kind to argue for the reality of Thirdness. There is certainly a
> conceptual connection between Thirdness and life, and the phenomenon of
> chirality doesn’t strike me as especially exemplary of that connection.
>
>
>
> But now I see the historical context these lectures as an earlier stage in
> the gradual shift from conceiving the essence of life as a substance
> (such as “protoplasm” or in this case “active substance”) to conceiving it
> as a process (such as Maturana/Varela’s “autopoiesis” or Kaufmann’s
> “autocatalysis” or Deacon’s “teleogenesis”). Nowadays we all see an
> intimate connection between semiosis and the life process, but we forget
> that Peirce did not introduce the term “semiosis” until 1907. MS 318, where
> he introduced it, is perhaps a better example of what Peirce was driving at
> in Lowell 3.4.
>
> [[ (It is important to understand what I mean by semiosis. All dynamical
> action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, either takes place
> between two subjects,— whether they react equally upon each other, or one
> is agent and the other patient, entirely or partially,— or at any rate is a
> resultant of such actions between pairs. But by “semiosis” I mean, on the
> contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of
> three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
>

Re: Towards welcoming newcomers to Peirce, was, [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Franklin, Gary f, list,

You may be correct as most references to 'meliorism' I found were to James
or Dewey.

Although I wouldn't make too much of it, Mats Bergman wrote a paper,
"Improving Our Habits: Peirce and Meliorism," in which he includes a
definition of 'meliorism' from the Century Dictionary which, he believes,
may be by Peirce.

(1) “[the] improvement of society by regulated practical means: opposed to
the passive principle of both pessimism and optimism”; or (2) “[the]
doctrine that the world is neither the worst nor the best possible, but
that it is capable of improvement: a mean between theoretical pessimism and
optimism”
http://www.helsinki.fi/peirce/MC/papers/Bergman%20-%20Peirce%20and%20Meliorism.pdf


In a footnote he remarks that Francoise Latraverse suggested to that the
second definition especially seems altogether Peircean.

I'm not sure where I got my sense that meliorism was a Peircean concept as
searches of the CP, EP, etc. have not yielded any instances of the word. I
haven't read much James, I must admit, but at one point I was reading a
great deal of Dewey and may have gotten the notion from him

Be that as it may, I think that there is a great deal in Peirce which is
compatible with an attitude and philosophy of meliorism, that, for example,
wherever it is up to us to put our shoulder to some task towards improving
our human lot that we ought do that.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 6:44 AM,  wrote:

> Franklin, I think you’re right about James; as for Peirce’s use of the
> term, all I can find is this bit from the Robin Catalogue:
>
> 953. [First and Second Conversazione]
>
> A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8, with variants.
>
> The three views of knowledge: Epicurean, pessimistic, and melioristic.
> Second conversazione is on the idea of clearness.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>
> *Sent:* 13-Dec-17 22:57
>
> Gary,
>
>
>
> I thought meliorism was a term introduced by William James, not CSP. I
> believe James discusses it in his latter Pragmatism lectures, and
> references his son as providing the term to him. It appears to have the
> same meaning that you say CSP ascribed to it. Did CSP also adopt this term?
> Where does he mention it?
>
>
>
> — Franklin
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2017, at 11:17 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> Mary, list,
>
>
>
> Mary, if you're a clodhopper than I'm a bumpkin. But, of course, quite the
> opposite is the case, so I'm spared for yokeldom!
>
>
>
> More and more I hope that this forum can find ways, as you wrote, to help
> "newcomers to Peirce to feel welcome," and I personally am devising
> strategies to do more of that in the new year. For example, I am working
> with Laureano Battista (a NYC Semiotics Web member/organizer who is also a
> member of this forum), and bouncing off Joe Ransdell's original
> introduction on 'How the Forum Works' (which can be found on the Peirce-L
> page of Arisbe http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM ) to
> develop a perhaps more "user friendly" introduction to the working of this
> forum. I am also planning a few 'pragmaticist' games for the new year (I
> won't say more on that topic yet, but I'll be soliciting help from you and
> others on this idea early in the year).
>
>
>
> But more to the present point, recently, in other threads, several forum
> members offered some very interesting questions which I thought were quite
> promising for further list discussion. I hope that some of those folks will
> start new threads with these questions, some of which I think ought appeal
> to "newcomers to Peirce" as well as to "the usual suspects." I point to
> this matter of creating new threads as it is possible for some very good
> ideas to get 'lost' in a thread introduced for some other purpose. So I
> hope those questions will yet be asked in threads with very specific
> Subject lines.
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
> ML: What attracts me to Peirce is the awe I feel and the depth and breadth
> of his journey to understand and to believe in the movement of semiosis. It
> is makes so much sense. . .
>
>
>
> I agree that a kind of belief "in the movement of semiosis" does make much
> sense, and from my perspective, more sense than any other philosophical
> work since the 19th century (although there's *much* to admire elsewhere,
> inc

Towards welcoming newcomers to Peirce, was, [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Mary, list,

Mary, if you're a clodhopper than I'm a bumpkin. But, of course, quite the
opposite is the case, so I'm spared for yokeldom!

More and more I hope that this forum can find ways, as you wrote, to help
"newcomers to Peirce to feel welcome," and I personally am devising
strategies to do more of that in the new year. For example, I am working
with Laureano Battista (a NYC Semiotics Web member/organizer who is also a
member of this forum), and bouncing off Joe Ransdell's original
introduction on 'How the Forum Works' (which can be found on the Peirce-L
page of Arisbe http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM ) to
develop a perhaps more "user friendly" introduction to the working of this
forum. I am also planning a few 'pragmaticist' games for the new year (I
won't say more on that topic yet, but I'll be soliciting help from you and
others on this idea early in the year).

But more to the present point, recently, in other threads, several forum
members offered some very interesting questions which I thought were quite
promising for further list discussion. I hope that some of those folks will
start new threads with these questions, some of which I think ought appeal
to "newcomers to Peirce" as well as to "the usual suspects." I point to
this matter of creating new threads as it is possible for some very good
ideas to get 'lost' in a thread introduced for some other purpose. So I
hope those questions will yet be asked in threads with very specific
Subject lines.

You wrote:

ML: What attracts me to Peirce is the awe I feel and the depth and breadth
of his journey to understand and to believe in the movement of semiosis. It
is makes so much sense. . .


I agree that a kind of belief "in the movement of semiosis" does make much
sense, and from my perspective, more sense than any other philosophical
work since the 19th century (although there's *much* to admire elsewhere,
including the work of Whitehead, Apel, some of the existentialists, Camus,
Wittgenstein, as well as much contemporary work.) This is why I think some
of the questions recently asked (but not answered) might provoke us to
deeper reflections on how this profound and original philosophy of
pragmaticism (and including all the cenoscopic sciences: phenomenology,
theoretical esthetics/ethics/semiotic, as well as scientific metaphysics)
might contribute something of substance to what Peirce refers to as
meliorism, which is nothing more nor less than the belief that the world we
live in can be made better by our very human, albeit, often sadly, "all too
human" (Nietzsche), efforts. Pragmatism ought to have some very important
to contribute to meliorism, and this was Peirce's belief.

I see a commonality in your work relating Peircean perspectives to
literature to Gene Halton's, and I think literature, as well as art, and
music, etc., are all potentially fruitful directions for semiotics and
pragmatism to be moving into (Gene is also, and perhaps primarily, a
sociologist, and I recommend his books to everyone on this list, as
pragmatism has a great deal to offer that field as well). We have artists
and art theorists, architects, and practitioners and students of many
disciplines on this list, and I hope to find ways of encouraging more of
them to participate actively on the list in 2018. But, again, *lurkers are
prized!*

Meanwhile, the extraordinary work that Gary f has been doing in presenting
the whole of the 1903 Lowell Lectures and, in my view, very useful
commentary (even if one doesn't necessarily agree with all of it) presently
remains my primary focus.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 4:29 PM, Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> I think vector analysis of Gary R and knowledge soup of John S are exactly
> what I needed to be reminded of when I felt the need to focus on the 3
> pronged spoke rather than the triangle. This kind of help allows newcomers
> to Peirce to feel welcome. What attracts me to Peirce is the awe I feel and
> the depth and breadth of his journey to understand and to believe in the
> movement of semiosis. It is makes so much sense even, as he says, “in the
> mind of a clodhopper” like me.
>
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 4:01 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Heh - but I'm not a fan of Hegel or indeed, of any utopian
>> idealism...which 'absolute truth' seems to me, to hover around.
>>
>> I think that one can't get away from the realities of Firstness and
>> Secondness [entropy and diversity]...
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> On Tue 12/12/17 3:38 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>&

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

o, agreed.
But, again, the categories are just "hints and suggestions," so that Peirce
himself will change his mind characterizing some of his trichotomies,
although the later changes always seem to me to be closer to the mark. For
me--and I think for Peirce--tricategorial thinking represents a kind of
heuristic. I certainly am not married to any trichotomies which I have
posited.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 3:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Agreed - we shouldn't seek consensus. Not only is such
> closure unscientific but we are not a large or diverse enough group to
> substantiate a scientifically valid consensus.
>
>  I'm not against the triangle as such - as in, for example, that Lady
> Welby classification triangle of the signs to which you refer. As you say,
> this is a static image and not meant to imagize the process of the
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant triad. My focus on the 'spoke' is only
> to imagize the semiosic O-R-I process as am open and networking
> interaction.
>
> By the way - you write: " first, chance 'sporting' (1ns), then, the
> possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the possibility of a
> evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns).".  Wouldn't you say that before
> the habit-formation emerges, that there have to be incidents in a mode of
> Secondness..which might vanish or might exist long enough to interact with
> each other and form those habits?
>
> I refer to 1.412 [A guess at the Riddle] - where Peirce writes: .." there
> would have come something,.by the principle of Firstness...then by the
> principle of habit there would have been a second flash"...But
> Secondness is of two types. consequently besides flashes genuinely second
> to others, so as to come after them, there will be pairs of flashes, or,
> since time is now supposed to have developed, we had better say pairs of
> states, which are reciprocally second, each member of the pair to the
> other. This is the first germ of spatial extension. These states will
> undergo changes; and habits will be formed of passing from certain states
> to certain others, and of not passing from certain states to certain
> others"...
>
> My reading of the above is that the FLASH [energy into matter?] operates
> within its own Firstness and Thirdness [habit]..but the matter that is
> formed in these flashes exists first, in Secondness since this matter is
> both temporally and spatially existent. Then, these 'states'/bits of matter
> will develop their own habits..and so on.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 12/12/17 2:42 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,
>
> I can't say that I experience the horror that Edwina does with the use of
> the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself
> uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the
> classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an
> analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the
> point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and
> semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any
> particular semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.
>
> But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering movement
> through the categories (which paths of movement I've called categorial
> vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible vectors is in
> play.
>
> [image: Blocked image]
>
> (I have renamed the vector of analysis that of involution, although both
> terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic").
>
> For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in
> the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves
> what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns),
> after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose
> of devising an experimental testing of the hypothesis (3ns), followed by
> the inductive testing itself (2ns). This 'movement through the categories'
> is, in my opinion, best illustrated by a bent arrow either within or
> outside of a triangle. That the process doesn't end there is well
> illustrated by John Sowa's 'Knowledge Soup' diagram.
>
> As I've noted here before, this process vector is the very same one
> Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Mary, Gary f, list,

I can't say that I experience the *horror* that Edwina does with the use of
the triangle for specific analyses and, in point of fact, Peirce himself
uses is for certain purposes (see, for example, the famous diagram of the
classification of signs which he sent to Lady Welby). Admittedly such an
analysis of sign classes is relatively static, but that is perhaps the
point: that for particular purposes of phenomenological, metaphysical, and
semiotic tricategorial analysis (although, perhaps, not in representing any
*particular* semiosis) that the triangle can be helpful.

But more than that, the triangle is quite useful when considering movement
through the categories (which paths of movement I've called categorial
vectors) where a bent arrow shows which of the 6 possible vectors is in
play.

[image: Inline image 3]

(I have renamed the vector of analysis that of *involution*, although both
terms can be found in Peirce's paper, "The Mathematics of Logic").

For example, taking the vector at the top of the diagram, Peirce says in
the N.A. that there are three stages to a discrete inquiry (which involves
what I call the vector of process) which begins with a hypothesis (1ns),
after which the implications of the hypothesis are deduced for the purpose
of devising an experimental testing of the hypothesis (3ns), followed by
the inductive testing itself (2ns). This 'movement through the categories'
is, in my opinion, best illustrated by a bent arrow either within or
outside of a triangle. That the process doesn't end there is well
illustrated by John Sowa's 'Knowledge Soup' diagram.

As I've noted here before, this *process vector* is the very same one
Peirce offers for biological evolution, namely, first, chance 'sporting'
(1ns), then, the possibility of new habit-formation (3ns), and finally the
possibility of a evolutionary, say, structural change (2ns). Again, if you
see the process as triadic, it most certainly doesn't *end* with that
evolutionary adaptation. Yet, for me being able to see the direction of the
several vectors, comparing (as I just did with inquiry and biological
evolution), or contrasting them (for example, contrasting both inquiry and
evolution with the semiotic path (the *vector of determination*) whereas
the object (2ns) determines the representamen (1ns) which determines the
interpretant 3ns) can potentially reveal interesting new relations.

So, I agree with Gary F:

Yes, it’s a long-running debate whether we should use a triangle or a
three-spoke diagram. . . Personally I don’t think it matters much which one
you use, as long as you recognize that relation as triadic.


And yet (1) it is especially important in, for example, considering the ->
representamen -> interpretant path that "you recognize that relation as
triadic" and, in the sense of  infinite semiosis, neither linear nor
arriving at an end point) and (2) for many purposes the three spoked
diagram is indeed. preferable. But for some, especially certain analytical
purposes, the triangle proves quite helpful.

This is one of those areas where I think the decision as to which (the
triangle or the spoke) manner of diagramming a triadic relation is most
useful for her purposes ought be left up to the individual inquirer, that
we ought not insist on what is right or wrong (seek consensus) for others
in this matter.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 12:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Mary, list - I fully agree with you. I have always been horrified - and I
> mean the word - by the use of the triangle to portray the semiosic triad.
> It is, in my view, so completely wrong, for it sets up a closed linear path.
>
> The' node connecting three lines of identity' [1.347] is, in my view, the
> correct image, for as Peirce points out - it clearly shows how such a node
> and its relations is networked almost to infinity with other such formats.
> As you say - it shows the 'openness inherent in triadic relations'.
>
> Edwina -
>
>
>
> On Tue 12/12/17 3:32 PM , Mary Libertin mary.liber...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary, list,
>
> I prefer the use of Peirce’s Icon/index/symbol of a “genuine triadic
> relation”—“a node with three lines of identity” instead of a triangle.
> Ogden popularized the Peircean concept of triangle in an appendix in his
> book “The Meaning of Meaning”, and that triangle has been repeated over and
> over. I believe the node with three lines of identity makes immediate,
> diagrammatic sense and I believe shows forth the openness inherent in
> triadic relations. I’d like to investigate this—its historical context,
> lit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, List,

Indeed you have as much right to say what you want to say here as the
moderator, and similarly, I have a right to disagree with you. As it turns
out, I can't say I disagree with much of anything you've* just* written
(except see further down).

I did disagree with several things you said in your last post (for example,
"I question whether this list should be used for "terminological proposals")
because how the list should or should not "be used" *greatly* concerns me
as moderator and so I spoke of my concerns at some length. I consider
speaking on such matters from time to time as my duty as moderator. Of
course, you can disagree with those remarks as well, but I "dropped"
everything to make them because I thought they were important for you and
other list members to consider as regards what is or is not appropriate to
post here. I thanked Jon for his contribution to the list discussion and to
you for your criticism, and I meant both sincerely.

For now just a few remarks regarding your last post.


MB: There are frequently topics that interest me greatly or with which I
agree or disagree with someone in part or in whole, but I choose not to
comment because I am focused on something else and can not take the time to
join in the discussion. And, maybe I also believe it is the rare argument
to be "won".

Silence is not consensus or disagreement, nor is not participating in a
given discussion any signal of consensus or disagreement.

[And a bit later] I went on the record as I did to just make sure, for me,
if I don't participate in a given thread that it implies nothing other than
I did not participate

I don't believe that I or any participant here suggested anything to the
effect that there is an obligation for any member to join any threaded
discussion. Quite the contrary, in my opinion. I have even recently pointed
to the fact that I agree with Joe Ransdell that often list members may have
an interest in a post or thread, but for a number of personal reasons, may
not--at least then--be able to join in. In my seven years as moderator I
believe I've made this point several times. There is no obligation here but
to try to keep ones remarks Peirce-related and respectful of others even,
and perhaps especially, when you disagree with them.

As for your comment about silence and not actively participating in list
discussions, again I agree with Ransdell that, for example, 'lurkers' are
valuable members of this forum, and I occasionally get off-list messages
telling me that some'silent' member is enjoying and/or learning from a
particular discussion. No one is required to join a discussion, nor once
they've joined it feel obligated to stay in a discussion. People here can
come and go at will.

MB: I chafe when there are suggestions that some form of consensus emerges
from these list discussions, other than between the participants of record.
Lists are not decision-making fora nor adjudication bodies.

Who suggested that this list was meant to be a "decision-making" forum or
"adjudicating" body? Certainly not I. And I argued against seeing Jon's
proposal as attempting such as he made it clear that all he sought to do
was to stimulate discussion.

MB: I encourage participants to agree or disagree as they see fit, come to
whatever agreements they may, but that interaction implies nothing else
other than what the direct participants state.

As I read Peirce, inquiry is dialogic so that of course there will be
agreements and disagreements and even within the individual as her thought
develops, is self-corrected, etc. And* sometimes there is a kind of
agreement which allows the discussion "to move forward." *What's wrong with
that? However, I still don't see why you think there is some desire for
consensus emerging here on *any* matter. {Peirce does argue against the
kind of thinker who never wants a discussion to come to even a tentative
conclusion, who sees philosophical discussion as a kind of never-ending
parlor game, and even offers the pragmatic maxim as part of the cure for
that.)

I would be very interested in why you think that anyone here is making such
an effort toward consensus building on Peirce-L, and examples are always
quite helpful.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Dec 8, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Gary, List,
>
> No, I am not trying to stifle debate, just go on the record as to my own
> position. Gary, you imply it yourself, when you assume I have a *tout
> court* disagreement with what Jon has proposed. I never said such a thing.
>
> There are frequently topics that interest me greatly or with which I agree
> or disagree