My position ?
It IS NOT illusory.
How we perceive it IS full of illusions - from our subjective
perspective (see anthropic).
Science of the brain (and wider bodily systems) may explain more of
the illusory perceptions of our minds - deciding to act based on what
we know - but I don't believe it
Hi Carl,
Is free will an illusion? No. But if you want, you can choose to think
so.
Yours,
John
On Thu, Mar 22, 2012 at 7:46 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote:
Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link:
Interesting link to discussions. Mark?
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http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link:
http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/
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Yup interesting but not too dynamic. The past does not the present describe.
Was there a free will one in particular that caught your interest?
Sent laboriously from an iPhone,
Mark
On Mar 22, 2012, at 7:45 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote:
Interesting link to discussions. Mark?
Oh, disregard my last communication...
Sent laboriously from an iPhone,
Mark
On Mar 22, 2012, at 7:46 PM, Carl Thames ctha...@centurytel.net wrote:
Okay, one more time, only this time I'll actually include the link:
http://chronicle.com/article/Is-Free-Will-an-Illusion-/131159/
Moq_Discuss
Hi Mark,
Isn't 'freewill' a conceptually constructed static pattern? And what do you
mean by act as if. Is act as if anything other than pattern that we are
rarely aware of?
Btw, Mark, by what measurement are you judging whether Susan Blackmore is or
isn't a friend of the MoQ?
Yes, what nonsense, everything was already set forth with the Original Idea and
nothing has changed since then. Complete Monistic Intelligent Design babble.
We intuitively act as if we have free will because our intuition is much more
complex and sophisticated than our simple static (and
Here's Susan Blackmore on free will (4:35):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rglQHgMdHuQfeature=related
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Greetings,
I wrote to Daniel Dennett. Post and reply are below...
Marsha
On Oct 1, 2011, at 1:50 PM, Dennett, Daniel C. wrote:
There is no video of my seminar, sad to say. In a sentence, I think that
the only grounds for wanting 'real' randomness (quantum indeterminacy) is
if you
Cheers
Mark
On Sep 16, 2011, at 8:07 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
Mark,
'I' is a conventional designation.
Maybe you should stick to your 'automatic writing' where you can continue to
impress yourself. I am not interested in your further interpretation.
Marsha
[Mark]
I stick with Piraig's MoQ. It is you who are way out in left field.
[Arlo]
Pirsig's MOQ denies any sensible agent, there self in the MOQ is a set of
value patterns, it is not an autonomous agent that creates value, it is a
response to value. If you feel the need to distort the man's idea
Marsha,
Are you speaking in theory? Your posts definitely suggest that you truly
believe it exists. For example every time you use the pronoun I. It is fine
to deal in theories if they can be substantiated. It is better to post on our
realities if they exist.
I could say that nothing
Mark,
I experience only a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent and
impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual
value in the infinite field of Dynamic Quality. The 'self' can best be
represented by the tetralemma formulation.
-
Hi Marsha,
When you start out below with I, what are you pointing at?
Your quotes below are interesting, and I have read many similar philosophical
arguments. When you complain about DMV not being consistent that surprises me
since you subscribe to ever changing patterns. I would think that
Mark,
'I' is a conventional designation.
Maybe you should stick to your 'automatic writing' where you can continue to
impress yourself. I am not interested in your further interpretation.
Marsha
On Sep 16, 2011, at 10:32 PM, 118 wrote:
Hi Marsha,
When you start out below with
[Ham]
Really, Arlo? If you can explain experience in the absence of a
sensible agent, you'll be doing RMP and the rest of us a momentous favor.
[Arlo]
I'm not going to waste time with your disingenous question, Ham. This is
like a flat-earther asking for proof the earth is round. You've
Arlo,
Why don't you do the rest of us a favor and answer Ham's ingenuous
question as he suggested? As soon as you begin attacking Ham on
issues that have nothing of substance and have nothing to do with the
subject, you look like a complete idiot! Such a thing make this forum
look like a teenage
[Mark]
Why don't you do the rest of us a favor and answer Ham's ingenuous question as
he suggested?
[Arlo]
Because I have no interest in a dialogue he has already decided upon. Is that
hard for you to comprehend?
[Mark]
As soon as you begin attacking Ham on issues that have nothing of
On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote:
Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does,
but that is nonsense.
Mark,
I deny the existence of an independent, autonomous self. The
self is a flow of ever-changing, conditionally co-dependent
and impermanent, static patterns of
Hi Ham,
On Sep 14, 2011, at 10:16 PM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Steve (Arlo mentioned) --
On Tues, 9/13/11 at 12:07 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com
wrote:
On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: If the world is composed of
values, then who is doing the
OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake.
Mark
On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
On Sep 15, 2011, at 8:45 PM, 118 wrote:
Sure one can deny the existence of Self like Marsha does,
but that is nonsense.
Mark,
I deny the existence of an
Arlo,
I stick with Piraig's MoQ. It is you who are way out in left field. If you
want to believe you don't exist, be my guest.
If you are only going to converse with those that agree with you, then what the
fuck are you doing addressing me or Ham? You need to be in the Mutual
Admiration
Mark,
The self neither exists, nor doesn't exist, nor both exists doesn't exist,
nor neither exists and doesn't exist.
Marsha
On Sep 16, 2011, at 12:44 AM, 118 wrote:
OK, so you do believe in the existence of Self, my mistake.
Mark
On Sep 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, MarshaV
Pirsig said: But the MOQ can argue that free will exists at all levels with
increasing freedom to make choices as one ascends the levels.
Steve replied:
I posted that quote months ago and am well aware of it. ...It is certainly not
the logical and necessary basis for moral responsibility
Hi Steve (Arlo mentioned) --
On Tues, 9/13/11 at 12:07 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com
wrote:
On p222 of Lila's Child, Bodvar asks: If the world is composed of
values, then who is doing the valuing?
Pirsig's response to Bodvar: This is a subtle slip back into
subject-object
Andre quoted Pirsig on free will in the MOQ (from Lila's Child):
Hugo:
In my view, free will is a term that can only be used of self-conscious
(self reflective) creatures. Will is a term we may use of any organism- of
any autonomous entity- describing the goal involved in autonomy. And free
Hi dmb,
Pirsig's response:
Traditionally, this is the meaning of free will. But the MOQ can argue that
free will exists at all levels with increasing freedom to make choices as one
ascends the levels. At the lowest inorganic level, the freedom is so small
that it can be said that nature
Steve said to dmb:
You seemed to have missed the quotes that add something interesting...
dmb says:
No, I didn't miss those quotes. I merely focused on one particular quote, the
one that utterly defeats your position. Naturally, you breezed right past my
actual without any apparent
Steve:
If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the
individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of
speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that
the individual possesses or does not possess free will. We literally
are our value choices.
Hello Steve,
On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 7:40 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote:
Steve:
If the individual is a figure of speech, then talking about the
individual making choices is a figure of speech about a figure of
speech. At no point does it begin to make any MOQ sense to say that
the
Mark
On Aug 7, 2011, at 9:30 AM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 12:17 PM, 118 ununocti...@gmail.com wrote:
I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally.
We have the choice to Not do something.
Ask someone with Tourette's
Ms. Albahari's project is to examine self/non-self, but she offers a way of
looking at the issue that is very interesting. She addresses the self in terms
of 'self' and 'sense of self'. She happens to offers free-will as an example
of the way the problem can be approached.
...Let
I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally.
We have the choice to Not do something. From the variety of impulses
that come to mind, we discard all of those which do not seem
appropriate at the time. This is freedom from irrationality.
Rational positive choice is sq and
On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 12:17 PM, 118 ununocti...@gmail.com wrote:
I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally.
We have the choice to Not do something.
Ask someone with Tourette's about free won't.
Moq_Discuss mailing list
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[Mark]
I would say that Free-Will is only the ability to act irrationally.
We have the choice to Not do something. From the variety of impulses
that come to mind, we discard all of those which do not seem
appropriate at the time. This is freedom from irrationality.
The first last sentences
For your information:
http://bigthink.com/ideas/24120
Antonio Damasio:
Yeah, exactly, yeah and that we are... we are in fact this hodgepodge of
non-conscious and conscious processes with some part of our consciousness
trying to ride herd over this mess of non-conscious processes and
Hi Craig,
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 3:17 AM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
[Steve]
Dynamic Quality is what gets you off the hot stove before you ever _decide_
to
get off the hot stove...This is THE paradigmatic example
Pirsig uses to show what it means to follow DQ. I submit that this is
what
Hi Ian,
On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 3:35 AM, Ian Glendinning
ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote:
Steve,
Much earlier in this debate dmb and Steve were looking at recent Sam
Harris position on free-will ...
DMB said,
[The] neurological determinism of [Sam Harris] is new to me and I
think it's just
Ian said to Steve:
I'm a big fan of Sam Harris too, but his recent stuff he was touting round the
speaking circuit based on his latest book was ill informed on the brain-science
aspects, where he is no expert. His reductionism was too greedy to coin a
Dennett term.
Steve replied:
Harris
Hi Ian, dmb,
dmb says:
It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term free will means
something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about
the MOQ's conception of one's freedom.
Steve:
This is a lie. I haven't insisted on any particular definition of free
dmb said to Ian:
It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term free will means
something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about
the MOQ's conception of one's freedom.
Steve replied:
This is a lie. ... what I have been doing is arguing that the capacity to
[Steve]
Dynamic Quality is what gets you off the hot stove before you ever _decide_ to
get off the hot stove...This is THE paradigmatic example
Pirsig uses to show what it means to follow DQ. I submit that this is
what we ought to think about in unpacking to the extent that one
follows
Steve,
Much earlier in this debate dmb and Steve were looking at recent Sam
Harris position on free-will ...
DMB said,
[The] neurological determinism of [Sam Harris] is new to me and I
think it's just awful. Patricia Churchland, of all people, has
criticized him for crude reductionism. She was
Instead of asking Do humans have free will?,
why not try using reverse-reverse engineering to answer the question?
Assume you are an all-powerful creator, how would you create an entity with
free will?
You would give it life, consciousness, perception, memory, et al.
Is there any characteristic
dmb says:
If you deny free will, then by definition you are a determinist. If you then
deny determinism too, then you are simply incoherent. Call me a dick if you
like, but this is a real criticism and you have not answered it, as far as I
can tell.
Steve:
How can you say that I haven't
Steve:
Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood
when you use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in
this forum would think you were defending the capacity to respond to
dynamic quality when you say people have free will? How is that
shorthand
: Re: [MD] Free Will
Strange, Ron, I don't remember dmb's explanation addressing compatibilism.
Actually, I don't remember dmb presenting being much of an explanation
either.
On Jul 31, 2011, at 12:19 PM, X Acto wrote:
Steve:
Why use a term when you can be nearly
Steve said:
Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you
use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum would
think you were defending the capacity to respond to dynamic quality when you
say people have free will? How is that shorthand
On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 4:45 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Steve said:
Why use a term when you can be nearly guaranteed to be misunderstood when you
use it? Who outside of the handful of people participating in this forum
would think you were defending the capacity to
On Sun, Jul 31, 2011 at 1:37 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote:
... Steve claims that it is a meaningless topic of discussion, similar
to locke.
Yet the fact remains it is a relevent topic of discussion regardless.
Especially
when we are speaking about a moral Philosophy it remains a
Steve said:
...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made.
John replied:
Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether
it's possible to choose, to freely decide. ...I believe individuality is
itself a choice, and thus we don't make choices,
Dmb,
I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again.
Marsha:
Three questions:
Have you dropped the words 'free-will' and 'determinism'?
If you are using new words please define them clearly?
Please clearly explain the reformulation as you understand?
If you are not
Come on, dmb, how about answering the questions instead of conflating Steve and
Sam Harris...
Marsha
On Jul 26, 2011, at 11:49 AM, MarshaV wrote:
Dmb,
I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again.
Marsha:
Three questions:
Have you dropped the words
Dmb,
Let me add one more question:
If you think within the MoQ that free-will and determinism have new
definitions, please offer them...
Many thanks,
Marsha
On Jul 26, 2011, at 11:49 AM, MarshaV wrote:
Dmb,
I asked you these question previously, but I'll try again.
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 10:53 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Steve said:
...Sure, but the free will question is about HOW choices are made.
John replied:
Is it? I thought it was *whether* choice was made or even possible. Whether
it's possible to choose, to freely
dmb said:
... One of the biggest problems in this months-long thread is that Steve keeps
trying to make Sam Harris's determinism compatible with the MOQ's reformulation
and the result is not pretty.
Steve:
That's just another of your attempts to misrepresent my position rather than
engaging
Hi Steve,
Some month ago you said:
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 8:36 PM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.comwrote:
Hi John,
I'm packing for a short trip, but quickly...
You concede that free will is redundant, but below in response to my
claim that we don't choose our values but rather we
Happy Independence Day Steve! about 3 weeks late...
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:58 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.comwrote:
Steve:
To my knowledge Pirsig never talks about responsibility, but he does
talk about freedom. In fact in his preface to ZAMM he describes
freedom as merely
Ho Dan:
And
Harris does seem to be missing out on the most vital ingredient...
Dynamic Quality. But so does pragmatism, from what I understand. That
is RMP's great insight, is it not?
Yes yes and more yes. I believe what we are exploring, is the relation of
dynamic to free. See, to my
Hi All --
Rose and I were away on a relaxing vacation in the Berkshires for a few
days,
while you folks stretched this topic into yet another week. There were 176
messages in my e-mail box when we returned today, at least half of them on
the Free Will dilemma. It's enough to make a grown
In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the
extent that one's behavior is CONTROLLED by static patterns of quality
it is without choice. But to the extent that one FOLLOWS Dynamic
Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (Pirsig)
[Dan]
When we FOLLOW static
On 7/13/11 8:59 AM, Ham Priday hampd...@verizon.net wrote:
snip
This is not what the Creator had in mind. And it's not what Mr. Pirsig
wanted to say in so many words, hence the euphemism to the extent that one
follows. But let's not mince words or fudge meanings when it comes to
Hello everyone
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 1:30 PM, craig...@comcast.net wrote:
In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the
extent that one's behavior is CONTROLLED by static patterns of quality
it is without choice. But to the extent that one FOLLOWS Dynamic
Quality,
Hi DMB
This I agree with
DMB I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of
preference, because that switch denies the central premise of
scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out
of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for
evolved
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 8:28 PM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote:
Steve:
If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE
our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our
values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a
third
dmb said:
...That's WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because
that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the
law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level -
and even less so for evolved creatures like us.
Steve said:
If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our
values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values.
...If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our
values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are
dmb says:
Yep. Steve is operating as if any word that has ever been associated with SOM
is permanently and irreversibly infected with some metaphysical disease - and
he does so regardless of how the terms are actually being used or qualified
or put into an entirely different metaphysical
Hi dmb,
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:15 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Steve keeps saying that it makes no sense to say we choose our values because
we ARE our values. But this seems to assume that there are no conflicts
between our values, as if we can follow biological
Hello everyone
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 9:15 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
dmb said:
...That's WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because
that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes
the law-like mechanical obedience
Dan responded to Steve:
[Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism
gets replaced
by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do
we follow sq?
[Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive
options, hence my observation
On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
Dan responded to Steve:
[Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism
gets replaced
by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do
we follow sq?
[Dan] It appears from reading this that
Not sure
I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking
to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling
it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary
philosophers).
And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ.
Not sure one
Oh and by the way,
well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the
point I did make.
Ian
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote:
On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
Dan responded to Steve:
[Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free
Ian,
I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason
has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that
a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question
to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess
Thanks Marsha,
If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say,
let Steve speak.
(Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual -
church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless your
objective is insanity. There but for the grace
On Jul 11, 2011, at 6:04 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote:
Thanks Marsha,
If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say,
let Steve speak.
(Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual -
church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning
ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote:
Not sure
I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking
to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling
it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by
Hi Steve,
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:16 PM, Steven Peterson
peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning
ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote:
Not sure
I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking
to make objective definitions and
Pirsig in Lila:
It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can have
Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something is to
dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession
involved, it's Quality that dominates and
Dan said to Steve:
.., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and
causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I
noticed.
dmb says:
I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the
traditional version of
Hi Dan,
Dan:
Within the framework of the MOQ, it is not an exclusive, either/or
proposition but rather both. From a static quality, conventional point
of view, both free will and determinism are seen as correct. From a
Dynamic point of view, both free will and determinism are illusions,
the
Hi dmb,
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Dan said to Steve:
.., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and
causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I
noticed.
dmb says:
I don't
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:20 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Pirsig in Lila:
It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can
have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something
is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality.
Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM:
No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified
concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses
and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient
above
Hello everyone
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning
ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote:
Dan responded to Steve:
[Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism
gets replaced
by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do
we follow sq?
dmb said to Steve:
You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then
you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict
each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein
the static patterns are the causal
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Dan said to Steve:
.., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and
causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I
noticed.
dmb says:
I don't know if
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello everyone
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning
ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote:
Dan responded to Steve:
[Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism
gets replaced
by the
Hello everyone
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Dan said to Steve:
.., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and
causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I
noticed.
dmb says:
I
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
dmb said to Steve:
You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But
then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements
contradict each other. Like I said, this looks
Dan:
But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked.
Steve:
Right. This is dennett's point as well. If actions didn't have predictable
results, freedom to choose would be pointless.
Dan comments:
The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not
Hi dmb,
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:37 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote:
Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM:
No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified
concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the
Steve:
If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE
our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our
values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a
third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make
sense as
Steve:
I am doing my best to
help you understand the MOQ, but if you don't read carefully you will
continue to struggle to get a grip on what Pirsig is saying.
Ron:
I just despise this use of rhetorical strategy its infantile..
...If anything is meaningless its this tripe..
/
Moq_Discuss
Dan:
To the extent one follows the undefined, they are free. This is very
powerful stuff. How does a person go about following that which is not
this, not that?
Ron:
Well thats why I favor better-ness for we follow dynamic quality
when we choose to wing-it, when we put the nava-computer away
on
On Sun, Jul 10, 2011 at 12:24 AM, X Acto xa...@rocketmail.com wrote:
Steve replied to Dave:
I don't disagree with Pirsig or the dictionary as far as the classic
dilemma.
I disagree with how YOU think this dilemma could possibly still come up in the
MOQ while Pirsig specifically says this
Hi Dan,
Dan:
I think Steve is taking the quote out of context here by stating the
dilemma doesn't come up. From LILA:
...
In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the
extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality
it is without choice. But to
Ron said to Steve:
Bob specifically states that when we follow Dynamic Quality we are free. He
states that natural selection aka evolution is dynamic quality at work,..
What you, Steve, seem to insist on, is that free-will or dynamic quality as
re-named by Pirsig's MoQ, can not be or should
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