hese are just discontinuities in space and matter.
We become one melded person. Ultimately, there are objective facts
about which body is where, which memories and other mental attributes
are attached to which body, but there are no objective facts about
personal identity.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
th Washington and Moscow that is like the MWI.
It is generally accepted that you can't tell which is the case from
experience. If you think they are different then you would have a
proof or disproof of the MWI. Is that what you claim?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message becau
On 28 September 2013 14:27, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 12:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>> > Teleportation thought experiments are also about what you can expect to
>> > see.
>
>
> And I have no objection to thought experiments of t
way round?
>
> Well enough. I don't have the answer. All I'm prepared to say is we are
> still confronted by mystery. "PIP" seems to me to be more impressionistic
> than theoretical. Comp still seems to struggle with qualia and zombies. I
> suspect we still await t
gt; derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology
> without the benefit of QM and relativity.
Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually
works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its
observable behaviour without also
d.
>> On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
>> wrote:
>> On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz wrote:
>> > Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
>> > absurdity of philosophical zombies.
>>
>> The
hild.
I tend to agree with Bruno that the idea is trivially obvious, and yet
you and others such as John Clark disagree. In these cases I think the
problem must be that the two disagreeing parties have different
notions in mind. The same occurs in discussions about free will.
--
Stathis Papaioa
of the original neurons were present. If you
assume it is possible that the prosthesis reproduces the I/O behaviour
but not the qualia you get a contradiction, and a contradiction is
worse than a crazy quandary.
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google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List"
> On 3 Oct 2013, at 11:12 am, chris peck wrote:
>
> Hi Liz
>
> >> Is there something wrong with quantum indeterminacy?
>
> Apart from the fact the MWI removes it? And that that is the point of MWI?
> And that probability questions in MWI are notoriously thorny?
>
> This is why I resort to t
On 3 October 2013 10:33, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>> Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
>>> the brain's behaviour
t his behaviour does not change and he does not
notice that his qualia change.
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I
On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
>
> The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
> in consciousness. The 1%
On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I
>
> On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> You seem to be agreeing with Craig that ea
list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>>> The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
>>>> functional equivale
it is possible to have an arbitrarily large change
in consciousness and yet the subject would be unable, under any
circumstances, to notice a change, nor would any change be externally
observable.
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--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
t computable.
>> Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
>> brain contain a hypercomputer.
>
>
> OK.
>
> Bruno
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t; description of a function is not the same thing as participating in an
> experience.
This is effectively a test for consciousness: if the entity can
perform the type of task you postulate requires aesthetic sensibility,
it must have aesthetic sensibility.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You r
mics here have been
> offering.
>
> All the best
When I toss a coin, I expect to see either heads or tails but not
both, and in fact I see heads or tails but not both. In a multiverse,
versions of me will see both heads and tails. Should I therefore
conclude that I don't live in a mu
group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
> .
> To post to this group, send email to
> everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> Fo
> thi
> By the way I know at least 2 people that got institutionalised with
> schizophrenia as a direct outcome of dependent pot smoking. That's the only
> thing either of them ever did anyway
>
>
> 2 people is not a statistics, and when the statistics are done properly,
&g
There's no point thinking
> "why me?" or "what bad luck", since your experiencing this, and indeed
> everything, is inevitable. But then I console myself by thinking that any
> human-level qualitative interpretation of this level of reality is
> mistaken, a kind
ain it causally, and the
higher levels of complexity are functionally independent of the lower
levels and have "autonomous causal powers". This seems to me no different
than claiming that pattern of billiard balls ten interactions down is
independent of the original pattern.
--
Stathis P
could just talk about the preceding causing what follows, the actual
time involved doesn't matter.
--
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#x27;t think that you are willing to consider it
> scientifically.
>
Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind?
--
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ire the actual brain matter, and not just a
simulation, to generate the consciousness.
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On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes
>>
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>
On 11 May 2014 08:58, LizR wrote:
> On 10 May 2014 23:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
&
On 11 May 2014 10:54, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 5:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 1
On 11 May 2014 18:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 10 May 2014, at 13:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>> On 10 Ma
ss if you want to say that consciousness is
Turing emulable (which I think is an incoherent statement, but it's in the
end just semantics), then you can, given all we know about physics and
chemistry.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
verything was exactly the same, how is this different to each of
is waking up as ourselves? In other words, what possible evidence, either
subjective or objective, could count either for or against this
transformation having happened?
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because
I have partly agreed with you in this thread that consciousness is not
Turing emulable. Worse than that in fact, the question of consciousness
being Turing emulable is meaningless, since it refers to an algorithm
describing behaviour, and consciousness is not behaviour. However,
consciousness is
anyway even if my tomorrow self seems to persist; however, I do
care if I die.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On 15 May 2014 07:12, LizR wrote:
> On 15 May 2014 06:03, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>>> Under Daniel Kolak's open
>>> individualism<http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_individualism> there
ver
time. Nevertheless, it is an important illusion for me and I make efforts
to ensure that the illusion continues.
> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 15 May 2014 04:33, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>>> But that's
can't go around duplicating
ourselves, meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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On 16 May 2014 01:59, meekerdb wrote:
> On 5/14/2014 11:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...
=scholarr&ei=B2V1U7eNHI_ZkQXQ0YEI&ved=0CCwQgAMoADAA
(Going to the above URL gives the entire paper rather than an abstract)
But while the atoms in the neuronal DNA are relatively stable over time,
the rest of the matter in a neuron turns over continuously.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 May 2014, at 03:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 16 May 2014 11:02, Russell Standish
>
> > wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 12:10:20PM +1200, LizR wrote:
>> >
>> > I
make a digital copy
of your biological brain, but a biological copy would work just fine, and
"really be you".
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
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the copy would be conscious in the same way as you.
Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also you,
but whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the philosophy of
personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not everyone agrees. Derek
Partfit's book "R
On 1 July 2014 03:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Jun 2014, at 02:14, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR
t; --
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localised it still needs to be implemented in a physical substrate.
In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time
> and space that are generated by mind.
>
> I think.
>
> Telmo.
>
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you ar
On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 5:58 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>
>>> Suppose just for
>>> the sake of argument that non-physical computations did not exist, how
>>> would our physical world
On 26 April 2017 at 09:22, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 4/25/2017 6:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 5:58 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> >>
>>>> Suppose ju
hould be a
>> physical universe - rather it speculates that the UD will necessarily
>> produce not only thread of consciouness but also a physics for
>> consciousness to relate to. But that's why I thing the "reversal" is a
>> cheat. The physics is necessary
Will a quantum
> computer, if and when we develop one? I really don't know - obviously we
> living things *are* physical systems that are either directly capable of
> conscious experience or are used as "interfaces" by entities that are. I
> see no reason to feel that *only*
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word quark". Joyce invented the
> word, although certainly not the concept.
>
I bet more people know who Molly Bloom is than could explain what a quark
is.
> --
Stathis Papaioannou
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"Everything List&
ed bachelor". Even an omnipotent God
could not make free will exist.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
> --
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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To unsubscribe from this group and stop rece
; It's OK not to have an explicit definition, but even the intuitive notion
> of free will leads either to triviality (free will is when I do what I want
> to do) or nonsense (free will is not compatible with my behaviour being
> either determined or random).
>
--
Stathis Papaioan
on "W v M" was the best prediction
>
>
> How on earth can W or M be the best prediction, or any prediction at
> all,
>
> if even AFTER the conclusion of the experiment you STILL can't say if the
> one and only one correct answer was W or if it was M? Fo
On Sun, 23 Jul 2017 at 11:57 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 22, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >>
>>> If "he" knows "he" will be duplicated and if "he" is not a idiot "he"
>>> will know not to ask wh
And try replacing the 4 uses of the personal pronoun "you" in the
> short sentence I quote above with "
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ".
>
> Personal pronouns simply can't be used in the casual way we do in everyday
> life if personal pronoun duplicating machine
out to be incorrect. Not that
predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do with the sense of
self.
> On 24 July 2017 at 12:05, John Clark wrote:
>
On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 7:42 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>> Each copy that comes out of the transporter would cont
On Tue, 25 Jul 2017 at 7:12 am, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> The original would argue as follows: I have gone through the teleporter
>> multiple times, and about half the time I have come out in city A and
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 12:29 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 11:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote
>
> >
>> Are you completely dismissing the idea of probability?
>>
>
> No
> ,
> b
> ut I am
>
> completely dismis
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 3:26 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 11:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> both had a equal continuous feeling of self *after* they walked out of
>>> the teleporter, so to ask the ONE* before* he walked in
On Wed, 26 Jul 2017 at 11:16 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>> >>
>>> If after "you" walk into the duplicator at A "you" remain one when "you"
>>> walk out at B and a
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 2:52 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 2:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>> If you were to use a teleporter at A that you knew would destroy the
>> original and make a single copy at B, from what you have
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 7:18 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> >
>> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would
>> be satisfied that you survive,
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
> >
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 10:49 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>> >
>> You have said multiple times that if there is more than one copy of you
>> then the idea if using personal pronouns when discussing the future i
told that the copies in Moscow are totally identical, and will never
>> differentiated.
>>
>
> Then there are only 2 people not 1000.
>
>
>
> Exactly.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> >
>> In that case, there is only two first person experiences
>&
On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 8:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 27 Jul 2017, at 12:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 27 Jul 2017 at 6:18 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 26 Jul 2017, at 22:26, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017
On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 12:08 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
>> behaviour,
>>
>
>
> Absolutely true.
>
On Fri, 28 Jul 2017 at 4:45 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 6:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> I would say the probability of ending up in Washington is 1000 times as
>> high, even if the 1000 copies never differentiate.
>
>
> I
gt;
>
>> >
>> the same person as I am now, projected into the future,
>>
>
> It won't be exactly the same person,
> Stathis Papaioannou
> of tomorrow will have all of "your" memories but in addition will have
> other memories that "y
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 3:35 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 3:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> There is the possibility of differentiation even if it doesn't occur. If
>> you know you have been duplicated into 1000 red cubicles and
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 4:13 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 12:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>> >>
>>> You're free to act as you like. I wouldn't behave that way but there is
>>> no disputing matters of tas
On Sat, 29 Jul 2017 at 6:07 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 2:48 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> In the next few moments in the multiverse multiple parallel copies of me
>> will continue writing this email
>>
>
> If they are
ow and half
the time in Washington, and they couldn't predict which city it would be.
So the next time they went into the machine they would take roubles as well
as dollars, to cover both possibilities. Refusing to make provisions for
the future on the grounds that pronouns have
On Mon, 31 Jul 2017 at 12:03 pm, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 30, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> If the experiment is repeated many times all the copies will say that, in
>> their recollection, about half the time they ended up in Moscow and half
>&g
icator repeatedly, in
expectation of more rewards. You can say to the rat, "personal pronouns
have no meaning when there are multiple copies of you, and therefore it is
nonsensical to predict that you will get the reward", but the rat won't
care, and I think most humans won't
On Tue, 1 Aug 2017 at 11:25 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
You can say to the rat, "personal pronouns have no meaning when there are
>> multiple copies of you, and therefore it is nonsensical to predict that you
>> will get t
On Wed, 2 Aug 2017 at 1:01 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 11:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> The rat's bet is that it will end up with the reward when it enters the
>> duplicator,
>>
>
> If it's after the rat
On Thu, 3 Aug 2017 at 1:46 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 1, 2017 at 12:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> If it's after the rat
>>> enters the duplicator
>>> then there are 2 of them, which *one* gets
eing befuddled by the underlying details of the experiment.
Stathis Papaioannou
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On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 2:50 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> I already know a rat will try to solve a maze to get food so I'll take
>> that part of the bet, but I'm not sure what "
>> proportion of the number of attempts
>> " means
On Sat, 5 Aug 2017 at 4:26 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 3, 2017 at 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> You seem to agree that it's obvious the duplicating machine won't make a
>> difference.
>
>
> Sometimes it doe
On Sun, 6 Aug 2017 at 3:23 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>
>>> >>
>>> Without the duplicating machine after it's all over you can say
>>> "Yesterday I shouldn't
its
and not even God can tell the observer which event he will end up seeing.
So although for practical purposes under both types of physics the decay
event is random, with a many worlds physics it is logically mandated
randomness, while in the single world case it is not. And perhaps it is
th
>
>> We can prove: IF digital mechanism THEN there is that unpredictability
>>
>
> Nobody can predict it because knows what it is they're being asked to
> predict. Nobody knows what "it" is.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
> --
> You received this me
t know what you're
> arguing in favor of and you're wasting your time and ours.
>
The two questions are not equivalent. Question 2) implies that there will
be a unique individual who remembers being me, whereas in fact there will
be two of them. Question 2) therefore includes a false
On Fri, 11 Aug 2017 at 4:44 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 11:36 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>>> I've asked the following question 4 times and you've refused to answer 4
>>> times but I'm going to ask for a fifth t
On 11 August 2017 at 10:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
>> propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there will be multiple copies
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 3:35 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
>> propositions.
>
>
> If all meaning is beaten
On 12 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 6:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >>
>>> Let me ask you
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
>>> equ
nowledge that he can gain at
> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is
> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that
> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.
The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental pr
On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wro
On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellet
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 1:01 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 9:43 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
> >
>> Before the duplication SP bet that "I will see W".
>>
>
> And that's the problem right there. The above is about
On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4:52 pm, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 1:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>> First person experience is i
On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett
wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 August 2017 at 08:48, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 12:04 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 4
On 13 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
>> You call yourself "I" and I call myself "I", simultaneously, and we don't
>> fight over who deserves the title, because that is ho
On 13 August 2017 at 16:48, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 13/08/2017 10:01 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 13 Aug 2017 at 9:19 am, Bruce Kellett <
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>> On 13/08/2017 9:05 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On
On Mon, 14 Aug 2017 at 1:56 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>
>>> >>
>>> Pronouns work fine today because nobody has yet made a "I" duplicating
>>> machine, but when
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