subject:"Re\: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers"



On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


Hi benjayk,

   This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He  
does not see several things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single  
abslute structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be  
reduced.


On the contrary, I insist on this. That's part of the domain of the 1- 
indeterminacy, all working coding will do their work, if I dare to  
say. We already know this, and is part of the problem that we try to  
just formulate clearly.




2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be  
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.


This is correct for human perception, but with comp the physical  
implementations that you need at that level are explained by a non  
physical (and somehow deeper) phenomenon.



Bruno






On 9/13/2012 6:40 AM, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to  
mean

"!=" or
"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.

Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.
Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean  
"="
anymore than "soap" means "pope", except if artificially defined.  
But even

than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or "soap".
If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings  
together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope "pope" with "soap"  
as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use  
to do

it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.

How using only arithmetics?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,

Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should
study the subject.

You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)
Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark  
numerous times.
It is like saying "You should really study the bible to understand  
why

christianity is right.".
Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you  
are willing

to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the
problem.

You created a problem which is not there.

Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there.



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not
the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning  
Gödel

numbers in arithmetic itself.

?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.
I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it  
just

demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description'  
- there

is no such axiom in arithmetic).


Bruno Marchal wrote:

This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).

Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.
Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I  
confuse

everything?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look
at this
website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html


And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in  
Gödel's

proof. (sigh).
You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong.
I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about  
what

numbers can express together with a meta-level).
If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as  
seperate
axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical  
flaws. It
is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the  
flaws lie
(and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any  
real
attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little  
more than

denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction.

The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they  
abstract so
much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the  
proof)

and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right.
That's why studying will not help much. It

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 13 Sep 2012, at 12:40, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
"!=" or
"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.


Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.

Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean "="
anymore than "soap" means "pope", except if artificially defined.


Nor do "=" itself, nor "nor".



But even
than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or "soap".


No, it is not. It is in the rule governing "=" on which you agree on.  
If not you beg the question and take the proving machine for a zombie.  
When I ask my computer to send a mail, he understands very well  
(usually), despite the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the coding.  
Today, it does not observes itself in practice, so the sense is still  
distributed on a much larger spectrum than the specific task that it  
implements, but that's is contingent.



If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings  
together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope "pope" with "soap"  
as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use  
to do

it.


Indeed.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.

How using only arithmetics?


Like a german grammar written in german. PA talks arithmetic, so we  
have to translate in arithmetic. Arithmetic is Turing universal, so we  
can do that without any trouble. We can even so it without classical  
logic, only the usual axioms for "=", and diophantine polynomial of  
degree less than 4. It took 70 years to prove this: it is not obvious  
at all, and I find this quite surprising.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,


Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should
study the subject.

You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)


Studying implies questioning the validity all along ;)


Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark  
numerous times.

It is like saying "You should really study the bible to understand why
christianity is right.".


You seem to talk about Gödel's work, with weird assertion like "I  
don't need to study it to say ...", where a simple study of Gödel  
would help you to see that you miss something.





Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are  
willing

to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


LOL  (we don't have to study no more).




Bruno Marchal wrote:



It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not
the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning  
Gödel

numbers in arithmetic itself.


?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.

I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just
demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' -  
there

is no such axiom in arithmetic).


There is no problem at all given that arithmetic contains its  
metalanguage. So we do use a metalanguage, which is just arithmetic  
itself. The second incompleteness theorem

not-provable('0=1') implies not-provable('not-provable('0=1')')
*is* a theorem of arithmetic.
(this is reflected by the fact that G proves ~[]f -> ~[](~[]f)).
You do need a part non accessible to the arithmetic-machine to say  
that ~[]f is true, but the machine can guess that.


It is not entirely obvious that we can define "provable" entirely in  
arithmetic, or in any programming language, but we can, like we can  
define it entirely in German, or in Fortran.
It is no more ambiguous that we can ask a universal to generate the  
prime numbers, or send mails.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).


Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.
Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I  
confuse

everything?


I can't open a parenthesis and provide in one simple sentence the  
basic of mathematical logic.
It takes time for anyone to understand that metamathematics can be  
arithmetized.

There are many good books on that subject.
I would sa

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 21:48, benjayk wrote:

Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:

Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and
assume

I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
"precise"
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle
or even

adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).

I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary
arithmetic,

no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth
"Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with
comp,
both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the
right to

be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.

There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in
arithmetic).

But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR
list. It

is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original
papers by

Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some
subtle

aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I
understand
the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could
not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not
unique, and

thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous
proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to
mean "!="

or
"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or
alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post)
to be

true,
because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond
their
axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they
somehow
magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be
granted

that
others share this assumption.

Problem of pinning down "real representation" in itself aside. Can
"human"
prove to impartial observer that they "magically know what they are
really

representing" or "that they really understand"?

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do
this,
other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which
really don't

have that great a track record?

Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at
all? I
don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really
is a

proof on?
The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one
to me.

That is why we have other notion than proof---which is of the type"
belief" (no "Bp -> p" in general), like knowledge, feeling,
experience, etc.

Incompleteness makes possible to recover by intensional nuances:

for a fixed machine B (I identify the machine with her beliefs) all
the Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p, etc. concerns exactly the same
arithmetical propositions, but obeys quite different logics
(classical, intuitionist, quantum-like, etc.).

Bruno

Apart from that, it seems human "understanding" is just delusion in
many
cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we
think we

really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 12 Sep 2012, at 15:28, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk > wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
>
>>
>> Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
>> I want to
>> attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
>> and I am
>> obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
>> discussion.
>>
>> We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
>> "precise"
>> arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or  
even

>> adress the issue.
>> Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
>> then we
>> still need a super-meta (etc...).
>
> I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary  
arithmetic,

> no need of meta for that.
> You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth
> "Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with  
comp,
> both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right  
to

> be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
> intuitive.
>
>> There is no proof that can change this,
>> and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
>> they just
>> introduce new metas because their proof is not written in  
arithmetic).

>
> But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
> will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list.  
It

> is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
> print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers  
by

> Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.
>
Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some  
subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I  
understand

the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not  
unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous  
proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations  
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean  
"!=" or

"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to  
be true,

because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond  
their

axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is  
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be  
granted that

others share this assumption.

Problem of pinning down "real representation" in itself aside. Can  
"human" prove to impartial observer that they "magically know what  
they are really representing" or "that they really understand"?

The idea is that you can understand what they prove as much as you  
understand what they assume, and this independently of what is the  
understanding.
If *you* agree with the elementary axioms, and inference rule, then  
you agree, or show a flaw, with the deduction presented to you.
The actual interpretation or belief (or disbelief), in the axiom is  
private and the scientist is mute on this.
A scientist will never say "I know", in its field of competence, or  
even outside (but for some reason that is rare: very often scientist  
forget the scientific attitude in the field of colleagues, apparently).

Bruno

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans  
do this, other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms,  
which really don't have that great a track record?

The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and  
ontological bets shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to  
remain sincere somehow, why restrict ourselves to the habitual ones?

Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing.

m

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-13 Thread Stephen P. King


Hi benjayk,

This is exactly what I have been complaining to Bruno about. He 
does not see several things that are problematic.


1) Godel numberings are not unique. Thus there is no a single abslute 
structure of relations, there is an infinity that cannot be reduced.
2) the physical implementations of the representations cannot be 
abstracted away without making the entire result meaningless.



On 9/13/2012 6:40 AM, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean
"!=" or
"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.

Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.

Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean "="
anymore than "soap" means "pope", except if artificially defined. But even
than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or "soap".
If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope "pope" with "soap" as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do
it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.

How using only arithmetics?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,

Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should
study the subject.

You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)
Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times.
It is like saying "You should really study the bible to understand why
christianity is right.".
Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing
to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


Bruno Marchal wrote:



I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the
problem.

You created a problem which is not there.

Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there.



Bruno Marchal wrote:

It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not
the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
numbers in arithmetic itself.

?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.

I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just
demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there
is no such axiom in arithmetic).


Bruno Marchal wrote:

This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).

Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.

Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse
everything?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look
at this
website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html


And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in Gödel's
proof. (sigh).
You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong.

I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about what
numbers can express together with a meta-level).
If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as seperate
axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical flaws. It
is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the flaws lie
(and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any real
attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than
denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction.

The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so
much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof)
and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right.
That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more abstraction,
further hiding the error.

benjayk




--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-13 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations  
>> could
>> "prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean  
>> "!=" or
>> "^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.
> 
> Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.  
Right, but that's exactly what Gödel is doing. 11132 does not mean "="
anymore than "soap" means "pope", except if artificially defined. But even
than the meaning/proof is in the decoding not in 11132 or "soap".
If we just take Gödel to make a statement about what encodings together with
decoding can express, he is right, we can encope "pope" with "soap" as well,
but this shows something about our encodings, not about what we use to do
it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all.
How using only arithmetics?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,
> 
> Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously  
> in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
> It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should  
> study the subject.
You should stop studying and start to actually start to question the
validity of what you are studying ;)
Sorry, I just had to say that, now that you made that remark numerous times.
It is like saying "You should really study the bible to understand why
christianity is right.".
Studying the bible in detail will not reveal the flaw unless you are willing
to question it (and then studying it becomes relatively superfluous).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>>
>> I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the  
>> problem.
> 
> You created a problem which is not there.
Nope. You try to talk away a problem that is there.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> It
>> seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not  
>> the proof
>> as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?
>>
>> But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
>> numbers in arithmetic itself.
> 
> ?
> 
> a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,  
> which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...  
> (s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in  
> term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.
I don't see what your reply has to do with my remark. In fact, it just
demonstrates that you ignore it. How to do this embedding without a
meta-language (like you just used by saying 'have its description' - there
is no such axiom in arithmetic).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> This would need another non-unique embedding
>> of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).
> 
> Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the  
> embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this  
> trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.
Maybe actually show how I am wrong rather than just saying that I confuse
everything?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look  
>> at this
>> website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html
> 
> 
> And now you refer to a site pretending having found a flaw in Gödel's  
> proof. (sigh).
> You could tell me at the start that you believe Gödel was wrong.
I tried to be fair and admit that Gödel did prove something (about what
numbers can express together with a meta-level).
If you believe that Gödel proved something about arithmetics as seperate
axiomatic systems, then the site clearly shows numerous cricitical flaws. It
is not pretending anything. It is clearly pointing out where the flaws lie
(and similar flaws in other related proofs). I haven't even see any real
attempt to show how he is wrong. All responses amount to little more than
denial or authoritative argument or obfuscaction.

The main reason that people don't see the flaw is because they abstract so
much that they abstract away the error (but also the meaning of the proof)
and because they are dogmatic about authorities being right.
That's why studying will not help much. It just creates more abstraction,
further hiding the error.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 12 Sep 2012, at 14:05, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:



Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
"precise"
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or  
even

adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
then we
still need a super-meta (etc...).


I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth
"Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with  
comp,

both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
intuitive.


There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in  
arithmetic).


But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers by
Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.

Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some  
subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I  
understand

the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof.


What? this is nonsense.





The embedding is not unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous  
proof.


This does not follow either. *Many* embeddings do not prevent non  
ambiguous embedding.






Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations  
could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean  
"!=" or

"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.


Sure, and if I interpret the soap for a pope, I can be in trouble.  
That is why we fix a non ambiguous embedding once and for all. What  
will be proved will be shown independent of the choice of the  
embeddings.







Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level,


Yes. the point is that the metalevel can be embedded non ambiguously  
in a faithfull manner in arithmetic.
It is the heart of theoretical computer science. You really should  
study the subject.




or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to  
be true,

because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.


Gödel could have used it, like in Tarski theorem, but Gödel ingenuosly  
don't use meaning or semantic in he proof. It is a very constructive  
proof, which examplifies the mechanisability of its main  
diagonalization procedure. This has lead to a very great amount of  
results, the most cool being Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem  
for the logic of self-reference.



You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond  
their

axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence,


What do you mean by exists beyond the axiom.?
What transcendent intelligence is doing here?






so that they somehow
magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is  
just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be  
granted that

others share this assumption.


No need of that belief. Machine's belief are just supposed to be made  
of the axioms and the rules generating them, which can include inputs,  
and other possible machines. It is model by Gödel's provability  
predicate for "rich" machines.





I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the  
problem.


You created a problem which is not there.




It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not  
the proof

as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
numbers in arithmetic itself.


?

a number like s(s(0))) can have its description, be 2^'s' * 3^(... ,  
which will give a very big number, s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s...  
(s(s(s(0...))). That correspondence will be defined in  
term of addition, multiplication and logical symbols, equality.






This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).


Not at all. You confuse the embedding and its description of the  
embedding, and the description of the description, but you get this  
trivially by using the Gödel number of a Gödel number.





For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look  
at this

website: http://jamesrm

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread benjayk



Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk
> wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
>> >> I want to
>> >> attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
>> >> and I am
>> >> obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
>> >> discussion.
>> >>
>> >> We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
>> >> "precise"
>> >> arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
>> >> adress the issue.
>> >> Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
>> >> then we
>> >> still need a super-meta (etc...).
>> >
>> > I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
>> > no need of meta for that.
>> > You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth
>> > "Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with comp,
>> > both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
>> > be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
>> > intuitive.
>> >
>> >> There is no proof that can change this,
>> >> and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
>> >> they just
>> >> introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).
>> >
>> > But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
>> > will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
>> > is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
>> > print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers by
>> > Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.
>> >
>> Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
>> aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I
>> understand
>> the main idea quite well.
>>
>> If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
>> unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
>> thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous
>> proof.
>> Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
>> "prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean "!="
>> or
>> "^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.
>>
>> Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
>> level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be
>> true,
>> because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
>> You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
>> axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
>> magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is just a
>> belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted
>> that
>> others share this assumption.
>>
> 
> 
> Problem of pinning down "real representation" in itself aside. Can "human"
> prove to impartial observer that they "magically know what they are really
> representing" or "that they really understand"?
> 
> How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do
> this,
> other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't
> have that great a track record?
> 
Can we even literally prove anything apart from axiomatic systems at all? I
don't think so. What would we base the claim that something really is a
proof on?
The notion of proving seems to be a quite narrow and restricted one to me.

Apart from that, it seems human "understanding" is just delusion in many
cases, and the rest is very limited at best. Especially when we think we
really understand fundamental issues we are the most deluded.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Wed, Sep 12, 2012 at 2:05 PM, benjayk wrote:

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume
> >> I want to
> >> attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),
> >> and I am
> >> obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good
> >> discussion.
> >>
> >> We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,
> >> "precise"
> >> arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
> >> adress the issue.
> >> Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but
> >> then we
> >> still need a super-meta (etc...).
> >
> > I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,
> > no need of meta for that.
> > You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth
> > "Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with comp,
> > both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to
> > be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter-
> > intuitive.
> >
> >> There is no proof that can change this,
> >> and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as
> >> they just
> >> introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).
> >
> > But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There
> > will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It
> > is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now
> > print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers by
> > Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.
> >
> Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
> aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand
> the main idea quite well.
>
> If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
> unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
> thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof.
> Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
> "prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean "!="
> or
> "^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.
>
> Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
> level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be
> true,
> because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
> You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
> axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
> magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is just a
> belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that
> others share this assumption.
>


Problem of pinning down "real representation" in itself aside. Can "human"
prove to impartial observer that they "magically know what they are really
representing" or "that they really understand"?

How would we prove this? Why should I take for granted that humans do this,
other than legitimacy through naturalized social norms, which really don't
have that great a track record?

The consequences of differing leaps of faith on axioms and ontological bets
shouldn't be taboo, if scientific search is to remain sincere somehow, why
restrict ourselves to the habitual ones?

Fruitful discussion from both of you, so thanks for sharing.

m

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-12 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>> Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume  
>> I want to
>> attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),  
>> and I am
>> obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good  
>> discussion.
>>
>> We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,  
>> "precise"
>> arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
>> adress the issue.
>> Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but  
>> then we
>> still need a super-meta (etc...).
> 
> I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,  
> no need of meta for that.
> You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth  
> "Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with comp,  
> both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to  
> be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- 
> intuitive.
> 
>> There is no proof that can change this,
>> and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as  
>> they just
>> introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).
> 
> But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There  
> will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It  
> is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now  
> print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers by  
> Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.
> 
Sorry, but this shows that you miss my point. It is not about some subtle
aspect of Gödel's proof, but about the main idea. And I think I understand
the main idea quite well.

If Gödels proof was written purely in arithmetic, than it could not be
unambigous, and thus not really a proof. The embedding is not unique, and
thus by looking at the arithmetic alone you can't have a unambigous proof.
Some embeddings that could be represented by this number relations could
"prove" utter nonsense. For example, if you interpret 166568 to mean "!=" or
"^6" instead of "=>", the whole proof is nonsense.

Thus Gödel's proof necessarily needs a meta-level, or alternatively a
level-transcendent intelligence (I forgot that in my prior post) to be true,
because only then can we fix the meaning of the Gödel numbers.
You can, of course *believe* that the numbers really exists beyond their
axioms and posses this transcendent intelligence, so that they somehow
magically "know" what they are "really" representing. But this is just a
belief and you can't show that this is true, nor take it to be granted that
others share this assumption.

I don't see how any explanation of Gödel could even adress the problem. It
seems to be very fundamental to the idea of the proof itself, not the proof
as such. Maybe you can explain how to solve it?

But please don't say that we can embed the process of assigning Gödel
numbers in arithmetic itself. This would need another non-unique embedding
of syntax, hence leading to the same problem (just worse).

For more detail and further points about Gödel you may take a look at this
website: http://jamesrmeyer.com/godel_flaw.html

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-11 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Sep 2012, at 12:39, benjayk wrote:



Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume  
I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism),  
and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good  
discussion.


We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational,  
"precise"

arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but  
then we

still need a super-meta (etc...).


I don't think so. We need the understanding of elementary arithmetic,  
no need of meta for that.
You might confuse the simple truth "1+1=2", and the complex truth  
"Paul understood that 1+1=2". Those are very different, but with comp,  
both can be explained *entirely* in arithmetic. You have the right to  
be astonished, as this is not obvious at all, and rather counter- 
intuitive.





There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as  
they just

introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).


But they are. I think sincerely that you miss Gödel's proof. There  
will be opportunity I say more on this, here, or on the FOAR list. It  
is hard to sum up on few lines. May just buy the book by Davis (now  
print by Dover) "The undecidable", it contains all original papers by  
Gödel, Post, Turing, Church, Kleene, and Rosser.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-11 Thread benjayk


Our discussion is going nowhere. You don't see my points and assume I want to
attack you (and thus are defensive and not open to my criticism), and I am
obviously frustrated by that, which is not conducive to a good discussion.

We are not opertaing on the same level. You argue using rational, "precise"
arguments, while I am precisely showing how these don't settle or even
adress the issue.
Like with Gödel, sure we can embed all the meta in arithmetic, but then we
still need a super-meta (etc...). There is no proof that can change this,
and thus it is pointless to study proofs regarding this issue (as they just
introduce new metas because their proof is not written in arithmetic).

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-10 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 10 Sep 2012, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.


Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows  
how

comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to
Plato
than to Aristotle.
The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue  
for

granted,


Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of  
comp,

either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be
honest, varying.

You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.
It is simply not my job.

OK, but if you are solely a logician, you should concern yourself with
logical proofs. You don't even define the assumption of your paper  
in a

(theoretically speaking) logical way and your proof contains many
philosophical reasonings.


You confuse formalism and rigor. When you *apply* logic, the  
hypothesis can refer to non logical concept. You have to tell me  
exactly where you have a problem.





Especially step 8, which is criticial in your reasoning.


If you get the step 3, it is already enough. And with the next steps  
up to seven, you have already the indeterminacy, non locality and non  
cloning. I give this as exercise, but I can say more if you are  
interested.






It uses occams
razor (which is philosophical, and not necessarily valid in any  
mathematical

or logical context),


It is used in the last step when we apply it to reality, in its  
weakest form, as it is always used when we bet on a reality, even  
looking for a beer in the fridge. If you don't like it, you can take  
the weaker consequence that primitive matter is epinoumenal (like  
invisible horse).





you use appeals to absurdity (with regards to aribtrary
inner experience being associated to null physical activity),


Thats what logicians do all the time.




you use
additional philosophical assumptions (you assume materialist mechanism
cannot mean that physical computations are not *exactly* like abstract
digital computations, just enough to make a practically digital  
substitution

possible),...


?




So take my criticism to mean that your proof is simply not what you  
present

it as, somehow being beyond philsophy (which is always on some shaky
ground).


Not with comp.



This is what I perceive as slightly dishonest, because it allows you  
retract
from the actual point by demanding to be given a precise refutation  
or a

specific error (as required in logic or math). But your paper is
philosophical, and here this logic does not apply.


Easy. I illustrate that *in* the comp theory, we can get conclusions.  
If you were correct, you would help to add the clarity which is missing.






If you'd admit that I am perfectly happy with your paper. It does show
something, just not rigorously and not necessarily and not for  
everyone

(some may rightfully disagree with your reasoning due to philosophical
reasons which can't be proven or be precisely stated).


I use comp to avoid such arbitrariness.
It looks like if you want that philo remains on shaky grounds. Only  
comp might be shaky, as applying to reality, but once assumed, I don't  
see the flaw.
I have test the reasoning on a lot of scientist, and I have never had  
any problem, unlike with media and some philosophers.
Improve it, if you think that possible (as it is probable), or find a  
flaw, but don't tax the subject as being necessary fuzzy, as with  
comp, the assumption are clear, and the consequences too.







If someone believes that physics behaves perfectly like abstract
computations would and if he doesn't want to invoke some very  
mysterious
form of matter (which does not rely on how it behaves and also not  
on how it
feels or is perceived to be) to sidestep the problem, yes, than your  
paper

may indeed show that this does not make much sense.
Unfortunately most materialist do actually believe (perhaps  
unconsciously)
in some very mysterious and strange (and IMO meaningless) kind of  
matter, so

they won't be convinced by your paper.


And that was the point. It applies to rational enough agent, not to  
people ready to put magic to escape the conclusion. I am sure I can  
make this clearer in the step 8, as it is hard to refute magic through  
logic.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a  
strict

reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but
actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point
of view.


What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum
analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because t

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-10 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 even though the paper actually
 doesn't even begin to adress the question.
>>>
>>> Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
>>> comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
>>> that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to  
>>> Plato
>>> than to Aristotle.
>> The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
>> granted,
> 
> Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp,  
> either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
> My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be  
> honest, varying.
> 
> You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.  
> It is simply not my job.
OK, but if you are solely a logician, you should concern yourself with
logical proofs. You don't even define the assumption of your paper in a
(theoretically speaking) logical way and your proof contains many
philosophical reasonings.
Especially step 8, which is criticial in your reasoning. It uses occams
razor (which is philosophical, and not necessarily valid in any mathematical
or logical context), you use appeals to absurdity (with regards to aribtrary
inner experience being associated to null physical activity), you use
additional philosophical assumptions (you assume materialist mechanism
cannot mean that physical computations are not *exactly* like abstract
digital computations, just enough to make a practically digital substitution
possible),...

So take my criticism to mean that your proof is simply not what you present
it as, somehow being beyond philsophy (which is always on some shaky
ground).
This is what I perceive as slightly dishonest, because it allows you retract
from the actual point by demanding to be given a precise refutation or a
specific error (as required in logic or math). But your paper is
philosophical, and here this logic does not apply.

If you'd admit that I am perfectly happy with your paper. It does show
something, just not rigorously and not necessarily and not for everyone
(some may rightfully disagree with your reasoning due to philosophical
reasons which can't be proven or be precisely stated).

If someone believes that physics behaves perfectly like abstract
computations would and if he doesn't want to invoke some very mysterious
form of matter (which does not rely on how it behaves and also not on how it
feels or is perceived to be) to sidestep the problem, yes, than your paper
may indeed show that this does not make much sense.
Unfortunately most materialist do actually believe (perhaps unconsciously)
in some very mysterious and strange (and IMO meaningless) kind of matter, so
they won't be convinced by your paper.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> ("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a strict
>> reasoning).
>>
>> You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but  
>> actually
>> you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point  
>> of view.
> 
> What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
> I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum  
> analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot  
> react with real oxygen.
That's the point. A theory cannot conceivably present and acutal point of
view. But then your theory just derives something which you call "point of
view", which in fact may have little to do at all with the actual point of
view.
QM does not claim to show how a hydrogen atom leads to a real reaction of
oxygen, it just describes it.
To make it coherent, you would have to weaken your statement to "we can
derive some description of points of view, or we can show how some
description of points of view emerge from arithmetics", which I will happily
agree with. However, this would destroy your main point that arithmetics and
its point of view is enough as the ontology / epistemology (we need the
*actual* point of view).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 How am I supposed to argue with
 that?

 There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
 about what
 the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
 axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them  
 on a
 meta-level.
>>>
>>> On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
>>> meta-level can be embedded at the level.
>>> Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of
>>> metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
>>> lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
>>> using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
>>> some light on the 1//3 issue.
>> But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-09 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 08 Sep 2012, at 15:47, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.


Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to  
Plato

than to Aristotle.

The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted,


Absolutely not. I am open that UDA could lead to a refutation of comp,  
either purely logical, or by the possible testing it implies.
My opinion on the truth or falsity of comp is private, and to be  
honest, varying.


You want me to be more than what I am. A logician. Not a philosopher.  
It is simply not my job.





and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true


Nor does any scientific theory prove anything if they are false.




and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations  
can

lead to a 1p of view).


? The assumption is comp ("yes doctore" + CT). The conclusion is that  
physics is secondary and has to be extracted from arithmetic. The  
"gift" is that we can use arithmetic to separate the quanta from the  
qualia.

The point is technical.




You say "assuming COMP", but COMP is either impossible with respect  
to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible  
due to

matter being non-digital),


This is not valid, unless you assume to be primitively material, which  
is shown to be not the case with the comp hypothesis.





or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion


Unless you have a flaw in mind, the paper illustrate the contrary.



("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a strict
reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but  
actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point  
of view.


What could that mean? How could any theory present a point of view?
I think you are confusing level. You could as well mock the quantum  
analysis of the hydrogen atom as ridiculous because the theory cannot  
react with real oxygen.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption
about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them  
on a

meta-level.


On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of
metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides
some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at  
that

level on the *meta-level*.


This is just false.



Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).


False. I can only suggest you to study the original paper, or to  
follow some good course in logic.
You just miss the most original and admittedly astonishing part of  
Gödel's proof.





You act like Gödel "eliminates" the meta-level, but he does not do  
this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because  
otherwise the

whole reasoning ceases to make sense).


Gödel does not eliminate the metalevel. On the contrary it shows that  
machines or formal theory can access to it.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It i#s like saying  "study the bible for scientific education (you
just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".


No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem
remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you  
ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting  
like you

are only showing rational consequences of some belief.


I am not acting like. This is what I do.




I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine,  
open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to  
be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional  
at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue  
with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as  
being

obfuscation).


What you call "obfuscation" is just the originality. I take a problem  
usually addressed by philosopher or theologian, and I show that if we  
assume comp, we can derive testable conclusion.
I know that some philosophers are sick at this, but that is a  
tradition in human history. This is disc

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-08 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> even though the paper actually
>> doesn't even begin to adress the question.
> 
> Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how  
> comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show  
> that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato  
> than to Aristotle.
The problem is that the paper is taking the most fundamental issue for
granted, and it does not actually show anything if the main assumption is
not true and at the end presents a conclusion that is mainly just what is
being taken for granted (we are abstractly digital, and computations can
lead to a 1p of view).

You say "assuming COMP", but COMP is either impossible with respect to its
own conclusion (truly, purely digital substitutions are not possible due to
matter being non-digital), or it is too vague to allow for any conclusion
("kinda digital", "digital at some level" are not enough for a strict
reasoning).

You also say that a 1p view can be recovered by incompleteness, but actually
you always present *abstractions* of points of view, not the point of view.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> How am I supposed to argue with
>> that?
>>
>> There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption  
>> about what
>> the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
>> axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
>> meta-level.
> 
> On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the  
> meta-level can be embedded at the level.
> Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of  
> metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the  
> lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by  
> using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides  
> some light on the 1//3 issue.
But Gödel does not show this. The meta-level can only be embedded at that
level on the *meta-level*. Apart from this level, we can't even formulate
representation or embedding (using the axioms of N - except on another
meta-level).

You act like Gödel "eliminates" the meta-level, but he does not do this and
indeed the notion of doing that doesn't make sense (because otherwise the
whole reasoning ceases to make sense).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
>> It i#s like saying  "study the bible for scientific education (you  
>> just don't
>> understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".
> 
> No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem  
> remark. I try to ignore that.
I am not angry, just a little frustrated that you don't see how you ignore
the main issue (both in our discussions and you paer), while acting like you
are only showing rational consequences of some belief.

I have said nothing about you, actually you seem to be a genuine, open and
nice person to me. I am just being honest about what you appear to be doing
in your paper and on this list. It is probably not even intentional at all.
So, sorry if I offended you, but I'd rather be frank than to argue with your
points which don't even adress the issue (which is what perceive as being
obfuscation).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  I work in a theory and I do my best to  
> help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not  
> is another topic.
Well, I am not saying your being *intentionally* misleading or avoiding, but
it certainly appears to me that you are avoiding the issue - perhaps because
you just don't see it.
You are defending your reasoning, while always avoiding the main point that
your reasoning does either depend on unstated assumption (we are already
digital, or only the digital part of a substitution can matter), or rely on
a vague (practically digital substitution) or contradictory (purely digital
substitution, which is not possible, because purely digital is nonsense with
regards to matter) premise.
The same goes for the derivation of points of view. You just derive
abstractions, while not adressing that abstractions of points of view don't
necessarily have anything to do with an actual point of view (thus confusing
your reader which thinks that you actually showed a relation between
*actual* points of view and arithmetics).

It doesn't matter whether I like COMP or not. I don't find it a very
fruitful assumption, but that's not the issue.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Sep 2012, at 14:19, benjayk wrote:



You always refer to studying some paper,


Always the same.




even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question.


Which question? The paper mainly just formulate a question, shows how  
comp makes it possible to translate the question in math, and show  
that the general shape of the possible solution is more close to Plato  
than to Aristotle.




How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption  
about what

the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.


On the contrary. The whole Gödel's thing relies on the fact that the  
meta-level can be embedded at the level.
Feferman fundamental papers extending Gödel is "arithmetization of  
metamathematics". It is the main point: the meta can be done at the  
lower level. Machines can refer to themselves in the 3p way, and by  
using the Theatetus' definition we get a notion of 1p which provides  
some light on the 1//3 issue.





Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more
abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get  
from 3-p

descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is
meaningless).


The miracle here is that Gödel's incompleteness renders consistent one  
of the definition of knowledge (first person) given by Theaetetus. It  
refutes Socrate's refutation of the definition. Of course Socrate  
could'nt be aware of CT and Gödel.





You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It is like saying  "study the bible for scientific education (you  
just don't

understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)".


No reason to be angry. It is the second time you make an ad hominem  
remark. I try to ignore that. I work in a theory and I do my best to  
help making things clear. You don't like comp, but the liking or not  
is another topic.


Bruno










Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:




In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually
the
correct
interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is
like
saying
"No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
substitute
it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
insert the
result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a
real
einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this
case
we can't
*always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
left to
interpret the emulation).
Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
universe with
an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)


It is not.

You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your
reasoning into
account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
contradiction.


? Comp is "it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of  
it".

Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including
consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I  
don't

see a contradiction yet.

If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a
level at
which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even
instantiate an
abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality
is not
digital).




Contradiction: "... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because
observable reality is not
DIGITAL).
We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality.
But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the  
digital
features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we  
necessarily need
something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being  
digital

is not valid.
We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer  
(and

its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your
reasoning fails.




But
not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital
substitution is
meaningless in a non-digital universe.


I see no reason for that.
Because every "digital substitution" is bound to be ultimately non- 
digital.







Bruno Marchal wrote:




Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
argue that
COMP says "functionally correct substitution", meaning that it  
also

has to
be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
derive
anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may  
actually

require
a biological brain or even something more.


The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
exist.
But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague  
statement,

meaning "kinda digital substitution".


? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a
virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital.
No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-07 Thread benjayk


You always refer to studying some paper, even though the paper actually
doesn't even begin to adress the question. How am I supposed to argue with
that?

There is no point of studying Gödel if we have a false assumption about what
the proof even is about. It is never, at no point, about numbers as
axiomatic systems. It is just about what we can express with them on a
meta-level.

Ther is no point of studying your paper, if all it presents are more
abstractions about points of view, without ever showing how to get from 3-p
descriptions to an actual 1-p of view (of course, since this is
meaningless). You just use fancy words to obfuscate that.
It is like saying  "study the bible for scientific education (you just don't
understand how it adresses scientific questiosn yet)". 



>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>



 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually  
>> the
>> correct
>> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is  
>> like
>> saying
>> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can
>> substitute
>> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then
>> insert the
>> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
>> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a  
>> real
>> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this  
>> case
>> we can't
>> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original
>> left to
>> interpret the emulation).
>> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole
>> universe with
>> an emulation (which is possible according to COMP)
>
> It is not.
 You are right, it is not, if we take the conclusions of your
 reasoning into
 account. Yet COMP itself strongly seems to suggest it. That's the
 contradiction.
>>>
>>> ? Comp is "it exists a level such that I survive an emulation of it".
>>> Then it makes the whole of the observable reality, including
>>> consciousness not Turing emulable. It might seems weird, but I don't
>>> see a contradiction yet.
>> If observable reality as a whole is not emulable, there can't be a  
>> level at
>> which there is a correct emulation, because we can't even  
>> instantiate an
>> abstract digital emulation into reality (because observable reality  
>> is not
>> digital).
>>
>>
> 
> Contradiction: "... abstract DIGITAL emulation into reality (because  
> observable reality is not
> DIGITAL).
> We can emulate digital features in a non digital reality.
But not purely digitally. We have to connect and instantiate the digital
features in the non-digital reality. And in doing this we necessarily need
something beyond the digital, and thus the reasoning about us being digital
is not valid.
We can't put a digital computer into our brains. But a real computer (and
its requires I/O) is not a digital abstract computer, and thus your
reasoning fails.



>> But
>> not only that, it can't exist, because the notion of digital  
>> substitution is
>> meaningless in a non-digital universe.
> 
> I see no reason for that.
Because every "digital substitution" is bound to be ultimately non-digital.



>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 Of course we could engage in stretching the meaning of words and
 argue that
 COMP says "functionally correct substitution", meaning that it also
 has to
 be correctly materially implementened. But in this case we can't
 derive
 anything from this, because a "correct implementation" may actually
 require
 a biological brain or even something more.
>>>
>>> The consequences will go through as long as a level of substitution
>>> exist.
>> But there can't, unless your assumption is taken as a vague statement,
>> meaning "kinda digital substitution".
> 
> ? If I have a MAC in the head, I am 100% digital. If I survive in a  
> virtual environment with it, I am 100% digital.
No. A MAC + your head isn't 100% digital. Both your MAC and the rest of your
head is a physical object, and thus non-digital.
You confuse the notions of "physically digital" and "abstractly digital".



>> In this case the brain substitution might not be digital at all,  
>> except in a
>> very weak sense by using anything that's - practically speaking -  
>> digital
>> (we can already do that), so your reasoning doesn't work.
> 
> You lost me here.
> 
Any actual substitution can't be purely digital, and so the reasoning
doesn't work because it reasons as if the substitution is digital.

benjayk

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Sep 2012, at 13:16, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:


Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory
represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P.
But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers.  
The just

contain "123456789 + * and =". There is no notion of "veryifying" or
"ExP(x)" or even a function in the numbers.


ExP(x) is a proposition of RA, so that is the kind of thing PA manages  
all the time.
And RA can also handle the sentence "ExP(x)", in its language, of  
course, representing it by some number (s(s(s(s(s... s(0...).

You might study Gödel 1931, or some books.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such  
numbers,

resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the
math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape  
like


[]Ex[]P(x), or

[]<>Ex []<>P(x)

and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical  
sentences

as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations.

No, they don't. You are severely confusing level and meta-level.
Even the notion of arithmetical interpretation doesn't make sense with
regards to numbers. They don't formulate anything regarding  
interpretations.

They just contain simply number relations.


At one level. But my computer already understand that he has to send  
this post. Despite at some level it is only number crunching.





You may invoke Gödel in that point, saying that they are more than  
that. But
Gödel is only proving that we can formulate higher level concepts  
using
numbers. He is not proving anything about numbers as a seperate  
axiomatic

system.


As I said. Please take the time to study it.


The proof only makes sense with regards to more powerful systems  
that use

the numbers.


G* minus G, yes.
G no. It is precisely what the number system can prove about itself.  
Still, the machine can *guess* its G*.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



For
me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the
ontology,
because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view.


... from the 1p views.

But when we search a "scientific theory" we bet on some sharable
reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an
arithmetical one.
If that is want science means, then science is obviously nonsense.  
There is
no thing "beyond" the 1p view, since everything we have is the 1p  
view and a

3p view is only an abstraction within it.


If I thought you were an abstraction within my 1-view, I would not  
reply.




Yes, science can allow us to find sharable things beyond our *local
personal* viewpoint. But in your theory 1p describes all the  
viewpoints, not

one particular viewpoint.


Unclear.
I don't have a theory, I borrow the comp hypothesis, only. There are 8  
(and more) type of viewpoints (first person, third person, first  
person plural, observable, sensible, etc.) and they can have  
infinitely many different particular contents.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



How is any of it
more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols?


T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ?

Exactly, this is as meaningful as your statements, in a vacuum.
The point is simply that axioms by themselves are meaningless.


OK. But axioms are always accompanied by rules. Always.





We need to
make sense of them, and this itself needs something fundamentally  
beyond

them.


Yes. With comp a good notion of truth, but you would beg the question  
if you use this to pretend that we are more than machine.






Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:



Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually*  
live, I

don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a  
meaningful 3-

p point
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just
an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.
If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the  
abstraction as

ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It
seems
like total nonsense to me (sorry).


Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p  
numbers

get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are.

NUMBERS > CONSCIOUSNESS > PHYSICAL REALM > HUMAN >
HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS

Unfortunately this just doesn't work. You never show how numbers can
actually have 1p views in the first place.


(sigh). read the sane04 paper.




The notion is completely
meaningless. It is like saying that a word has a point of view.

All you do is reflect in the numbers what is already completely  
beyond the
numbers. But this doesn't make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p view  
at all.
It just shows that you can interpret pretty much everything into  
numbers.


I just listen to what machine ideally correct can prove about  
themselves and the logic of their possible observation, and this by  
using the most standar

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Sep 2012, at 20:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually*  
live, I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a  
meaningful 3-p point
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really  
just an

abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an  
abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?


This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search  
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.


Dear Bruno,

In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is  
not a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about  
representations of 1p not the content of the 1p itself. There are  
situations when the map is not the territory...


The 1p of the machine have no 3p-representations at all. This follows  
simply from Theaetetus definition of knowledge in arithmetic, with  
believability played by provability (as we lost Provable("p") -> p),  
and restrict the interview on ideally correct machine.








With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number  
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to  
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).


But you are assuming that numbers can do the "work". I beg to  
differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they  
do not "do" anything at all. There is no "action" in numbers. To  
represent action we need at least functions to map some object to  
some other different object.


You forget that a universal number associate to each number an  
"action" mapping number on number.

As I just recall in another post u(i, x) = phi_i(x).







So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like  
"1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.


But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it  
cannot be known in any way?


Its truth is its meaning. It has nothing to do with being known or not  
by an agent.
In logic this is universally accepted for arithmetic, but not for more  
powerful theories.




I can only make sense of your claim here if I stipulate that you  
think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for the content of  
the statement; such that if the statement is "true" then it does not  
matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how you go  
from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as the  
particular property of the sentence "1+1=2" to the truth of the  
intention of the sentence.


Good. machines already can know that we can't. Bp -> p is not provable  
for arbitrary sentence. With comp, Truth is only a private hope,  
somehow.




How is the sentence "#8$<%" not equally true in the absence of any  
thinker and have the same meaning as "1+1=2"?



"#8$<%" is a sentence, not a proposition.

When I say that "1+1=2" is true, I mean only that 1 + 1 = 2, not that  
the sentence "1+1=2" is true.


So if you want to know if "#8$<%"  is true, just tell me if #8$<% or  
not. perhaps explain the meaning of it.


You might confuse sentence and proposition. It is obvious that IF  
"1+1=2" means that Stephen Paul King is 42 km high, it is plausibly  
false, but that would not change the fact that 1 + 1 is equal to 2.




What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that  
there is something above that some how can "see" the truth of  
"1+1=2" and know that it is a true sentence and that it is  
completely immaterial and "not a thinker". Plato was a bit more  
circumspect about assuming such things, I hope!


Just saying that 1+1=2, and that such a fact does not depend on me,  
you, or the physical universe. To be communicated, yes, you need a  
physical universe, or a human universe, that is some stable sharable  
computations with the relevant measure, etc. That's the problem I  
explain we have to solve.










It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is  
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X'  
changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable  
of or in X, X', ... .


A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory  
which is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your  
sentence.


Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model- 
less theories? Are they even possible?


In first order logic:
A theory has a model (but not as a term in itself) iff it is  
consistent (that is; does not prove f).






We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can  
make machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by  
using the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).


Sure, but that is a

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-06 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory  
> represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P.
But this makes no sense if you only consider the natural numbers. The just
contain "123456789 + * and =". There is no notion of "veryifying" or
"ExP(x)" or even a function in the numbers.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers,  
> resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the  
> math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like
> 
> []Ex[]P(x), or
> 
> []<>Ex []<>P(x)
> 
> and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences  
> as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations.
No, they don't. You are severely confusing level and meta-level.
Even the notion of arithmetical interpretation doesn't make sense with
regards to numbers. They don't formulate anything regarding interpretations.
They just contain simply number relations.

You may invoke Gödel in that point, saying that they are more than that. But
Gödel is only proving that we can formulate higher level concepts using
numbers. He is not proving anything about numbers as a seperate axiomatic
system.
The proof only makes sense with regards to more powerful systems that use
the numbers.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> For
>> me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the  
>> ontology,
>> because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view.
> 
> ... from the 1p views.
> 
> But when we search a "scientific theory" we bet on some sharable  
> reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an  
> arithmetical one.
If that is want science means, then science is obviously nonsense. There is
no thing "beyond" the 1p view, since everything we have is the 1p view and a
3p view is only an abstraction within it.
Yes, science can allow us to find sharable things beyond our *local
personal* viewpoint. But in your theory 1p describes all the viewpoints, not
one particular viewpoint.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> How is any of it
>> more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols?
> 
> T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ?
Exactly, this is as meaningful as your statements, in a vacuum.
The point is simply that axioms by themselves are meaningless. We need to
make sense of them, and this itself needs something fundamentally beyond
them.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 Strangely you agree
 for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
 don't
 see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-
 p point
 of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just  
 an
 abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.
>>>
>>> Yes.
>> If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as
>> ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It  
>> seems
>> like total nonsense to me (sorry).
> 
> Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers  
> get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are.
> 
> NUMBERS > CONSCIOUSNESS > PHYSICAL REALM > HUMAN >  
> HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS
Unfortunately this just doesn't work. You never show how numbers can
actually have 1p views in the first place. The notion is completely
meaningless. It is like saying that a word has a point of view.

All you do is reflect in the numbers what is already completely beyond the
numbers. But this doesn't make sense of how 3p numbers get 1p view at all.
It just shows that you can interpret pretty much everything into numbers.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
> doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs  
> and
> computers.
 OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that
 you take
 it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes
 sense in
 that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider
 it
 plausible, or honestly even meaningful.
>>>
>>> Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the
>>> functioning of the brain.
>> *everything*!
> 
> You point here on their material constitution. That begs the question.

Brains are material objects, but appealing to their material constitution
begs the question?
Just to remind you, even according to COMP brains *are* material,
non-emulable objects.

Given that they are material objects, why would that not matter? I'd say it
is *bound* to matter, because it is what is fundamental about them.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain.
> 
> The chemical reactions, the neuronal processing, etc. Anything  
> described in any book on brain.

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/5/2012 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I 
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 
3-p point

of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction 
(a simulation even!) of a 1-p?


This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search 
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.


Dear Bruno,

In the context of a theoretical framework it does, but that is not 
a contradiction of my claim. We are talking about representations of 1p 
not the content of the 1p itself. There are situations when the map is 
not the territory...




With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number 
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to 
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).


But you are assuming that numbers can do the "work". I beg to 
differ! Number can represent anything but can they do work? No, they do 
not "do" anything at all. There is no "action" in numbers. To represent 
action we need at least functions to map some object to some other 
different object.




So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like 
"1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.


But does the Truth value have any meaning in a world where it 
cannot be known in any way? I can only make sense of your claim here if 
I stipulate that you think that the truth of a statement is a proxy for 
the content of the statement; such that if the statement is "true" then 
it does not matter at all what the sentence is. I still do not grasp how 
you go from claim that necessitate instantiations of properties such as 
the particular property of the sentence "1+1=2" to the truth of the 
intention of the sentence. How is the sentence "#8$<%" not equally true 
in the absence of any thinker and have the same meaning as "1+1=2"?
What is making the difference? You seem to be assuming that there 
is something above that some how can "see" the truth of "1+1=2" and know 
that it is a true sentence and that it is completely immaterial and "not 
a thinker". Plato was a bit more circumspect about assuming such things, 
I hope!





It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is 
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X' 
changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable of 
or in X, X', ... .


A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which 
is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.


Does not a true theory require that a model of it exist? Model-less 
theories? Are they even possible?


We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make 
machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using 
the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).


Sure, but that is a separate issue. The 3p description of a machine 
is, in your sentence here, taken from the intentional stance (or point 
of view) of another entity (that is not the machine in question), so 
that makes it bisimilar to the 1p of a separate entity. Where is the 
contradiction to my claim?



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Sep 2012, at 22:40, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize  
that

the RA level was enough.

Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that
the RA
level "would be" enough.


Why?
No system can reason as if it did not exist, because to be coherent  
it would

than have to cease to reason.


Why? You just seem to reason that if you don't exist you would cease  
to reason.

But I don't see the relevance of this to what I said.


If PA realizes that RA is enough, then this can only mean that RA +  
its own

realization about RA is enough.


Yes, that is why PA can believe that RA is it ontological source,  
despite being much epistemologically much stronger than RA.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can
be made
sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low
level
is enough.


For the ontology. Yes.
I honestly never understood what you mean by ontology and  
epistemology.


Ontology is what we take as existing at the base level. In my favorite  
theory what exist is simply 0, s(0), etc.

And nothing else.

Put it differently, it is what the variable used in the theory  
represent. ExP(x) means that there is some number verifying P.


Epistemological existence is about the memory content of such numbers,  
resulting from their complex interaction with other numbers. In the  
math part, they are handle by prefixing modalities, and have shape like


[]Ex[]P(x), or

[]<>Ex []<>P(x)

and more complex one. Note that those are still arithmetical sentences  
as all modalities used here admit purely arithmetical intepretations.






For
me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the  
ontology,

because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view.


... from the 1p views.

But when we search a "scientific theory" we bet on some sharable  
reality beyond the 1p view, be it a physical universe or an  
arithmetical one.




Arithmetic is one possible epistemology.


And assuming comp, it is one possible epistemology.




I don't even get what it could mean that numbers are ontologically  
real, as
we know them only as abstractions (so they are epistemology). If we  
try to
talk as if numbers are fundamentally real - independent of things -  
we can't

even make sense of numbers.


?
I can. One number, two numbers, three numbers, etc.




What is the abstract difference between 1 and 2 for example.


1

:)



What is the
difference between 0s and 0ss?


0s




What's the difference between the true
statement that 1+1=2 and the false statement that 1+2=2?


You just named it. The first is true, the second is false.



How is any of it
more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols?


T#gtti Hyz# 8P^ii ?






We can only make sense of them as we see that they refer to numbers  
*of

objects* (like for example the string "s").


OK.


If we don't do that we could as well embrace axioms like 1=2 or  
1+1+1=1 or

1+9=2343-23 or 1+3=*?ABC or  whatever else.


OK.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-
p point
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just  
an

abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as
ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It  
seems

like total nonsense to me (sorry).


Because the abstraction provides a way to make sense of how 3p numbers  
get 1p views and abstract their own idea of what numbers are.


NUMBERS > CONSCIOUSNESS > PHYSICAL REALM > HUMAN >  
HUMAN'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBERS







Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs  
and

computers.

OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that
you take
it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes
sense in
that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider
it
plausible, or honestly even meaningful.


Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the
functioning of the brain.

*everything*!


You point here on their material constitution. That begs the question.



Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain.


The chemical reactions, the neuronal processing, etc. Anything  
described in any book on brain.




Even
according to COMP, nothing is, since the brain is material and  
matter is not

emulable.


Right. But that matter exists only in the 1p plural view, not in the  
ontology.






As I see it, the brain as such has nothing to do with emulability.  
We can d

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Sep 2012, at 17:48, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live,
I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful
3-p point
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just
an

abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.

Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an
abstraction (a simulation even!) of a 1-p?

This would make the 1p fundamental. This would make vain the search
for explanation of mind, so this does not satisfy me.

With comp mind is the result of the working of a universal number
relatively to infinities of other universal number, so we need to
start from the numbers (or anything Turing-equivalent).

So the 3p can be abstract, but it is not part of the mind, like
"1+1=2" remains true in absence of any thinker.

It seems to me that this would similar to having a model S that is
part of a theory T such that T would change its beliefs as X -> X'
changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would be a variable
of or in X, X', ... .

A model cannot be a part of a theory. I guess you mean a theory which
is part of the theory, and then I mainly agree with your sentence.
We can build theories which are part of themselves, like we can make
machine which can access any part of their 3p description, by using
the Dx=xx method (or Kleene second recursion theorem).

Bruno

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>> Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
>>> succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that
>>> the RA level was enough.
>> Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that  
>> the RA
>> level "would be" enough.
> 
> Why?
No system can reason as if it did not exist, because to be coherent it would
than have to cease to reason.
If PA realizes that RA is enough, then this can only mean that RA + its own
realization about RA is enough.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can  
>> be made
>> sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low  
>> level
>> is enough.
> 
> For the ontology. Yes.
I honestly never understood what you mean by ontology and epistemology. For
me it seems that it is exactly backwards. We need the 1-p as the ontology,
because it is what necessarily primitively exists from the 1-p view.
Arithmetic is one possible epistemology.

I don't even get what it could mean that numbers are ontologically real, as
we know them only as abstractions (so they are epistemology). If we try to
talk as if numbers are fundamentally real - independent of things - we can't
even make sense of numbers.
What is the abstract difference between 1 and 2 for example. What is the
difference between 0s and 0ss? What's the difference between the true
statement that 1+1=2 and the false statement that 1+2=2? How is any of it
more meaningful than any other abitrary string of symbols? 

We can only make sense of them as we see that they refer to numbers *of
objects* (like for example the string "s").
If we don't do that we could as well embrace axioms like 1=2 or 1+1+1=1 or
1+9=2343-23 or 1+3=*?ABC or  whatever else.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> Strangely you agree
>> for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I  
>> don't
>> see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- 
>> p point
>> of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
>> abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.
> 
> Yes.
If this is true, how does it make sense to think of the abstraction as
ontologically real and the non-abstraction as mere empistemology? It seems
like total nonsense to me (sorry).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their
>>> doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and
>>> computers.
>> OK, but in this discussion we can't assume COMP. I understand that  
>> you take
>> it for granted when discussing your paper (because it only makes  
>> sense in
>> that context), but I don't take it for granted, and I don't consider  
>> it
>> plausible, or honestly even meaningful.
> 
> Then you have to tell me what is not Turing emulable in the  
> functioning of the brain.
*everything*! Rather show me *what is* turing emulable in the brain. Even
according to COMP, nothing is, since the brain is material and matter is not
emulable.

As I see it, the brain as such has nothing to do with emulability. We can do
simulations, sure, but these have little to do with an actual brain, except
that they mirror what we know about it.

It seems to me you are simply presuming that everything that's relevant in
the brain is turing emulable, even despite the fact that according to your
own assumption nothing really is turing emulable about the brain.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Also, I don't take comp for granted, I assume it. It is quite different.
> 
> I am mute on my personal beliefs, except they change all the time.
> 
> But you seems to believe that comp is inconsistent or meaningless, but  
> you don't make your point.
I don't know how to make it more clear. COMP itself leads to the conclusion
that our brains fundamentally can't be emulated, yet it starts with the
assumption that they can be emulated.

We can only somehow try to rescue COMPs consistency by postulating that what
the brain is doesn't matter at all, only what an emulation of it would be
like.
I genuinely can't see the logic behind this at all.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>>
>> In which way does one thing substitute another thing if actually the  
>> correct
>> interpretation of the substitution requires the original? It is like  
>> saying
>> "No you don't need the calculator to calculate 24,3^12. You can  
>> substitute
>> it with pen and pencil, where you write down 24,3^12=X and then  
>> insert the
>> result of the calculation (using your calculator) as X."
>> If COMP does imply that interpreting a digital einstein needs a real
>> einstein (or more) than it contradicts itself (because in this case  
>> we can't
>> *always* say YES doctor, because then there would be no original  
>> left to
>> interpret the emulation).
>> Really it is quite a simple point. If you substitute the whole  
>> universe with
>> an emulation (which is possible according to CO

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread Stephen P. King


On 9/4/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I 
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p 
point

of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.

Hi Bruno,

So do you agree that the 3-p point of view is just an abstraction 
(a simulation even!) of a 1-p? It seems to me that this would similar to 
having a model S that is part of a theory T such that T would change its 
beliefs as X -> X' changes, all while preserving the Bp&p term, p would 
be a variable of or in X, X', ... .


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-04 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 03 Sep 2012, at 16:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing  
on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency  
of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses  
the

induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake
of
the emulation without any inner conviction.

I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases
were PA
does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that
the RA level was enough.
Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that  
the RA

level "would be" enough.


Why?



I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can  
be made
sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low  
level

is enough.


For the ontology. Yes.




This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say  
that we
only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges  
from that

as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers.


I say that this follows from comp.




Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself
can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what  
transcends the
numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also  
completely

beyond our conception of numbers).


?




That's the problem with Gödel as well. His unprovable statement about
numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that  
doesn't
even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He  
really
just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways  
that
can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them  
has

little to do with the numbers themselves).


Gödel already knew that the numbers (theories) can do that. He bet  
that the second incompleteness theorem is a theorem of PA. This will  
be proved by Hilbert and Bernays later. Then Löb generalized this, etc.






I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely  
many

things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely.


Numbers can do that to, relatively to universal numbers. It is the  
whole (technical) point.





Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I  
don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3- 
p point

of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Yes.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he
survives through that process.
On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives  
in his

quotes and writings.


He does not survive in writing and quotes. That is only a metaphor.  
But he does survive in the usual sense in the emulation, assuming comp.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some
relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite
different.

Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and
high-level processes.


Like arithmetic.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context
we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to
make
sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer,

and make a backup of it, and then continue on

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-09-03 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
>>>
 But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
 and
 ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
 not mean
 that the emulation can substitute the original.
>>>
>>> But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.
>>>
>>> A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.
>>>
>>> As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
>>> exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
>>> arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
>>> Robinson Arithmetic.
>>> But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
>>> its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
>>> induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake  
>>> of
>>> the emulation without any inner conviction.
>> I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me  
>> you have
>> just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,  
>> because
>> RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases  
>> were PA
>> does a proof that RA can't do).
> 
> Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
> succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that  
> the RA level was enough.
Sorry, but it can't. It can't even abstract itself out to see that the RA
level "would be" enough.
I see you doing this all the time; you take some low level that can be made
sense of by something transcendent of it and then claim that the low level
is enough.

This is precisely the calim that I don't understand at all. You say that we
only need natural numbers and + and *, and that the rest emerges from that
as the 1-p viewpoint of the numbers. Unfortunately the 1-p viewpoint itself
can't be found in the numbers, it can only be found in what transcends the
numbers, or what the numbers really are / refer to (which also completely
beyond our conception of numbers).
That's the problem with Gödel as well. His unprovable statement about
numbers is really a meta-statement about what numbers express that doesn't
even make sense if we only consider the definition of numbers. He really
just shows that we can reason about numbers and with numbers in ways that
can't be captured by numbers (but in this case what we do with them has
little to do with the numbers themselves).

I agree that computations reflect many things about us (infinitely many
things, even), but we still transcend them infinitely. Strangely you agree
for the 1-p viewpoint. But given that's what you *actually* live, I don't
see how it makes sense to than proceed that there is a meaningful 3-p point
of view where this isn't true. This "point of view" is really just an
abstraction occuring in the 1-p of view.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just  
> by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through  
> my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with  
> Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he  
> survives through that process.
On some level, I agree. But not far from the level that he survives in his
quotes and writings.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
>> we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
>> relative
>> way, if we are using the result in the right way).
> 
> Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
> pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
> lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
> different.
Which assumes that the world is divided in low-level processes and
high-level processes.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an  
>> apple
>> in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context  
>> we can
>> indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple  
>> because
>> we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk  
>> about
>> apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to  
>> make
>> sense of it.
> 
> Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,  
> and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different  
> computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game  
> with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally  
> different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.  
> Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level  
> and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have  
> some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).
> 
Your chess exampl

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 30 Aug 2012, at 06:21, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all
the

potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state". Otherwise, I think
the

physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

OK. All what counts should be the relative measure. In some state,
some continuations should have a bigger measure, and this should
correspond to "more computations going in your current states, and the
most probable next one.

You may be right. I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia,

Well, with comp Platonia is just a tiny part of arithmetical truth,
and the UD exists there in some provable way. We don't need to think
this to make it true.

then we might as well think of it's computations as completed.

OK.

I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you
can't exist. The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but
it still exists.

But this mixes different questions. Computations involving PI might
have, from the first person machine's point of view, a high measure,
in case the "circle idea-program" get some relatively local crucial
rôle (as it is very probable, as the circle is a key in many part of
number theory, and elsewhere).

Bruno

Brent

Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb
wrote:
But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
infinities.
Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since
at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many
computations that

will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".

Brent

On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren

Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
computations.

So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of
"you" is

very
small, but non-zero. But we already knew that.

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread meekerdb

Wouldn't that alternative be one in which there are only a finite number of possible 
persons?...e.g. materialism.


Bren

On 8/30/2012 7:49 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.

Terren

On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state".  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.


You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we
might as well think of it's computations as completed.

I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't
exist.  The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still
exists.

Brent



Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb   wrote:

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
infinities.
Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations
that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".

Brent


On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-30 Thread Terren Suydam

That's true, it is not a contradiction. However, from a Bayesian
perspective one must favor the alternative that gives one's a
existence a non-zero measure.

Terren

On Thu, Aug 30, 2012 at 12:21 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
>> potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
>> status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
>> regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
>> computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
>> that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
>> infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
>> arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
>> can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
>> infinite computations going through my state".  Otherwise, I think the
>> physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
>> particulars of how the UD unfolds.
>>
>> Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
>> ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
>> think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
>> state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
>> interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
>> is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.
>
>
> You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we
> might as well think of it's computations as completed.
>
> I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't
> exist.  The number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still
> exists.
>
> Brent
>
>
>>
>> Terren
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential
>>> infinities.
>>> Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any
>>> given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations
>>> that
>>> will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

 It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
 computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
 ordinality of the infinities involved.

 Terren

> Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite
> computations.
> So
> at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
> very
> small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread meekerdb


On 8/29/2012 7:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state".  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.


You may be right.  I we think of the UD as existing in Platonia, then we might as well 
think of it's computations as completed.


I don't think that your probability having measure zero implies you can't exist.  The 
number pi has zero measure on the real line, but it still exists.


Brent



Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.
Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any
given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that
will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".

Brent


On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations.
So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Terren Suydam

hmmm, my interpretation is that in platonia, all computations, all the
potential infinities of computations, have the same ontological
status. Meaning, there's nothing meaningful that can be said with
regard to any particular state of the UD - one can imagine that all
computations have been performed in a timeless way. If so, it follows
that the state that corresponds to my mind at this moment has an
infinite number of instantiations in the UD (regardless of some
arbitrary "current" state of the UD). In fact this is the only way I
can make sense of the reversal, where physics emerges from "the
infinite computations going through my state".  Otherwise, I think the
physics that emerges would depend in a contigent way on the
particulars of how the UD unfolds.

Whether the infinities involved with my current state are of the same
ordinality as the infinitie of all computations, I'm not sure. But I
think if it was a "lesser" infinity, so that the probability of my
state being instantiated did approach zero in the limit, then my
interpretation above would imply that the probability of my existence
is actually zero. Which is a contradiction.

Terren

On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:41 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.
> Of course that also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any
> given state in the UD there still remain infinitely many computations that
> will, in later steps, go through the states instantiating "you".
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
>> computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
>> ordinality of the infinities involved.
>>
>> Terren
>>
>>> Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations.
>>> So
>>> at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is
>>> very
>>> small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread meekerdb

But there are no infinities at any give state - only potential infinities.  Of course that 
also implies that "you" are never complete, since at any given state in the UD there still 
remain infinitely many computations that will, in later steps, go through the states 
instantiating "you".


Brent

On 8/29/2012 9:04 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


Hi Terry,

I think so too. I wonder if this could be captured by assuming the 
opposite of Cantor continuum hypothesis? Or by thinking of computations 
as integers embedded in hyperreal numbers.


On 8/29/2012 12:04 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is very
small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.

Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 10:52 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
"generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated 
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible 
computations, one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then 
it must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will "eventually" generate me, but with a measure zero 
chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers.


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite 
computations. So at any stage short the infinite completion the 
probability of "you" is very small, but non-zero.  But we already knew 
that.


Brent


I agree but the details of this are being crudely glossed over and 
they are of utmost importance here! We need a precise definition of the 
"at any stage short of the infinite completion" term. I suspect that we 
can capture this using the uncountable infinity of non-standard models 
of arithmetic 
 and 
relations between the models to give us a nice formal model.


"The existence of non-standard models of arithmetic can be 
demonstrated by an application of the compactness theorem. To do this, a 
set of axioms P* is defined in a language including the language of 
Peano arithmetic together with a new constant symbol x. The axioms 
consist of the axioms of Peano arithmetic P together with another 
infinite set of axioms: for each numeral n, the axiom x > n is included. 
Any finite subset of these axioms is satisfied by a model which is the 
standard model of arithmetic plus the constant x interpreted as some 
number larger than any numeral mentioned in the finite subset of P*. 
Thus by the compactness theorem there is a model satisfying all the 
axioms P*. Since any model of P* is a model of P (since a model of a set 
of axioms is obviously also a model of any subset of that set of 
axioms), we have that our extended model is also a model of the Peano 
axioms. /The element of this model corresponding to x cannot be a 
standard number, because as indicated it is larger than any standard 
number/."


The x would play the role of the inverse of the epsilon of 
proximity to infinite completion.


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread Terren Suydam

It may not even be zero in the limit, since there's an infinity of
computations that generate my state. I suppose it comes down to the
ordinality of the infinities involved.

Terren

> Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So
> at any stage short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is very
> small, but non-zero.  But we already knew that.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-29 Thread meekerdb


On 8/29/2012 5:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase "generation by the UD" 
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on 
our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a 
time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will "eventually" generate me, but with a measure zero chance. The UD seems 
to be ergodic on the Integers.


Not zero, only zero in the limit of completing the infinite computations. So at any stage 
short the infinite completion the probability of "you" is very small, but non-zero.  But 
we already knew that.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 2:17 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
"generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated 
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible 
computations, one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it 
must eventually generate you.


Brent
--

Hi Brent,

Yes it will "eventually" generate me, but with a measure zero 
chance. The UD seems to be ergodic on the Integers.


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers


On 8/29/2012 2:08 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/8/29 Stephen P. King >


On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they
abound in arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that
all copies are identical and this by the principle of
indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no plurality
generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state
association to a mind, but this would contradict comp.


No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics
isn't ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by
the UD.


Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase
"generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated
meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our computer
monitors.



  But I think it is right that there must be an associated
physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world
it experiences.


Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining
about in his step 8.


I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only 
thing he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy 
on the infinite set of computations that goes through our current 
state (the one assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution 
level) that diverge on the next step.


Quentin


Hi Quentin,

You are technically correct, but that merely sidesteps the point.

The problem that I am trying to overcome is the non-uniqueness of 
Godel numberings. There are an infinite number of currect states (of 
which "our current state" is one) and each of these has an infinite 
number of computations running though them. I agree with this piece of 
the idea, btw. The states are identical to each other in the sense that 
there is nothing that distinguishes them so we need a mechanism that 
relates them in a non-trivial way.
What I am considering is a way to define orderings on them; a way 
to daisy chain them by defining the fixed point of one (a spacial point) 
to be not a fixed point on the next one. There is a rule involved that 
relates the possibility of a state to be a fixed point to whether or not 
it was previously, thereby setting up a precedent rule.
The key is to use the use of a constant by a non-standard model of 
arithmetic as a one-time fixed point (like a unique one time cypher for 
the Godel numbering), so that we can use the plurality of non-equivalent 
non-standard models as a boon and not a curse. We end up with strings of 
strongly related models and a nice way to solve the white rabbit problem.






  Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours
or wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white
rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi Brent, I didn't wrote what is quoted, it's Stephen ;)

Quentin

2012/8/29 meekerdb 

>  On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Hi Brent,
>
> Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase "generation
> by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of
> letters appearing on our computer monitors.
>
>
> Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations,
> one step at a time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually
> generate you.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread meekerdb


On 8/28/2012 11:08 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase "generation by the UD" 
might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of letters appearing on our 
computer monitors.


Seems pretty precise to me.  The UD executes all possible computations, one step at a 
time.  If 'you' are a computation, then it must eventually generate you.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/8/29 Stephen P. King 

>  On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in
> arithmetic.
>
>
> This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies
> are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the
> same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a necessitation
> of a physical state association to a mind, but this would contradict comp.
>
>
> No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't
> ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.
>
>
> Hi Brent,
>
> Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase "generation
> by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless combinations of
> letters appearing on our computer monitors.
>
>
>   But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, that
> 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences.
>
>
> Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about in
> his step 8.
>
>
I don't recall Bruno ever talking about free floating minds. The only thing
he said is that the physical world result of the indeterminacy on the
infinite set of computations that goes through our current state (the one
assumed perfectly captured at the right substitution level) that diverge on
the next step.

Quentin


>
>   Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or
> wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.
>
>
> Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white rabbit
> problem using ideas from game theory?
>
>
> Brent
>  --
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
>
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/28/2012 4:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound 
in arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all 
copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are 
one and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there 
is a necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but 
this would contradict comp.


No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't 
ontologically primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.


Hi Brent,

Until there is a precise explanation of  what this phrase 
"generation by the UD" might mean, we have just a repeated meaningless 
combinations of letters appearing on our computer monitors.



  But I think it is right that there must be an associated physics, 
that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it experiences.


Please explain this to Bruno, as it is that I am complaining about 
in his step 8.


  Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or 
wildly different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


Have you noticed that I am discussing a solution to the white 
rabbit problem using ideas from game theory?




Brent
--


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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread meekerdb


On 8/28/2012 12:50 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound in 
arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all copies are identical 
and this by the principle of indiscernible are one and the same mind. There is no 
plurality generated unless there is a necessitation of a physical state association to a 
mind, but this would contradict comp.


No I it doesn't contradict comp, because the associated physics isn't ontologically 
primitive, it's part of what is generated by the UD.  But I think it is right that there 
must be an associated physics, that 'mind' cannot exist independent of a physical world it 
experiences.  Of course whether it must be a physical world exactly like ours or wildly 
different is the 'white rabbit' problem.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/27/2012 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, 
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation 
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries 
pointing on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the 
consistency of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can 
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA 
uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the 
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me 
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano 
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases 
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has 
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize 
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), 
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein 
through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine 
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has 
survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

  Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the 
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity 
capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you 
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! 
I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must 
come clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a 
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss 
what you are asking.


Dear Bruno,

   The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds. 
SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, 
at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.


?

After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person 
plural handled the many minds.


Dear Bruno,

   I am trying to get you to  explain to us in detail how the copy and 
paste operation of a body (as described in your papers) generates copies 
of minds that are not identical to each other. BTW, there is a very nice 
Google Book of Smorynski's article on self-reference here 
 
.
















That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some 
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, 
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the 
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite 
different.


  Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution 
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still 
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that 
you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels 
are correct, I would say, by definition.


   OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...


Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound 
in arithmetic.


This universality, as you yourself define it, ensures that all 
copies are identical and this by the principle of indiscernible are one 
and the same mind. There is no plurality generated unless there is a 
necessitation of a physical state association to a mind, but this would 
contradict comp. I have a solution to this! Use the relativization that 
we can get by relativizing the Tennenbaum theorem! Each mind is 
associated with a unique constant that it cannot see, as it is its 
Kleene fixed point. That way we can have a true plurality of unique and 
distinct minds.
Somewhat surprisingly, it was the poker game 
 of "blind 
man's bluff" and the book by Smullyan "/What Is the Name of This Book? 
" /that

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-28 Thread Craig Weinberg

What you are all missing is this:

A particular kind of pattern (in sand or salt) can be generated by 
generating a specific sound (cymatics).

The same pattern would be generated whether or not any human ear was 
present to hear the 'sound' as an audible experience.
The same pattern could be manually generated by other means - sweeping the 
salt into the desired shapes by hand or tiny magnetic robots, etc.
This process would generate no audible experience to anyone.

While we have grown accustomed to thinking of sound waves as something that 
literally exists and causes physical changes, if we pay attention to the 
process of generating sound, we can realize that it can only be generated 
by mechanically vibrating a physical object to begin with. Indeed, without 
a molecule-filled plenum to vibrate, there is no way for sound to propagate 
between solid objects which are separated by space.

This illustrates that the wave itself - the computation, does not exist 
independently of the objects which are participating in the event. The 
event has computable aspects - its predictable effects on objects of 
particular forms and densities, etc, but the sound that is associated with 
the wave in a human mind is not computable. There is no reason to assume 
that the vibratory behaviors which we observe with some (but not all) of 
our other human senses, visual and tactile, is any more of an objective 
definition than the quality of the sound to our ears.

Computation is always only something that material stuff is doing - and 
material stuff is only a tactile-visual presentation.

So why would any kind of oracle requirement of a computation conjure up any 
quality or possibility of an 'experience'? This assumes that scooping salt 
in fancy circles makes sound magically appear in the universe. Computation 
does not need awareness, but awareness needs computation as a way of 
externalizing experience. Computation cannot be primitive because we would 
never know about it - nothing would know about it. Computation is an 
abstract skeleton of relation between objects, but it can never explain 
imagination or sense itself.

Craig

On Sunday, August 26, 2012 2:56:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different 
> capabilities and 
> >> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any 
> intelligence (so long 
> >> as infinities or true randomness are not required). 
> > 
> > And now a subtle point. Perhaps. 
> > 
> > The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence 
> EVEN if 
> > infinities and true randomness are required for it. 
> > 
> > Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under 
> the form of a some 
> > non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... 
> (say) 
> > 
> > Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my 
> substitution level, 
> > because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain 
> into a finite 
> > string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor 
> copy me at the 
> > right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to 
> the oracle, so I 
> > will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on 
> that oracle. 
> > 
> > Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front 
> of that oracle? 
> > 
> > Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in 
> this case, he 
> > will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of 
> all finite 
> > approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person 
> indeterminacy will have 
> > as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where 
> my virtual brain 
> > use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle. 
> > 
> > A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a 
> computation 
> > requiring oracle, and so everything is fine. 
>
> That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical 
> world and 
> consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides 
> essential 
> interactions with consciousness as a computational process.  Of course 
> that doesn't 
> require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too. 
>
> Brent 
>
> > 
> > Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then 
> comp would be just 
> > false, and the brain need an infinite interface. 
> > 
> > The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even 
> infinite non 
> > computable one. 
> > 
> > Bruno 
> > 
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>
>

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Aug 26, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears

"A brain is nothing but a glob of grey goo" says the robot.

> There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock.

Yes there is, the clock sauce is the information on what the position of
the atoms in the clock should be in.

>> You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not
>> do so for a reason.
>>
>
> > You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not
> me.
>

That is quite simply untrue, I never said everything happens for a reason!
I said everything happens for a reason OR everything does NOT happen for a
reason. Why this is supposed to be controversial escapes me.

> Why should we want to justify anything in the first place.

You tell me, you're the one who brought up justification.

> I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief

Then assuming your beliefs are consistent (a gargantuan assumption I
admit)  you believe that the belief generator in the mind is as
deterministic as a cuckoo clock.

> > I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving their unworthiness
> to myself

Baloney.

   >> Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so
>> I guess typhoons have free will.
>>
>
> > Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them
> so that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas?
>

You tell me, you're the one going on and on about how the fact that reasons
can be complex has something to do with the "free will" noise.

> The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many influences or choose to
> seek a new alternative, but I can.
>

You choose it because you liked it better than the alternative, so you made
the choice for a reason, and the mechanical bird jumped out of the clock at
noon for a reason too. For months now you have been chanting the word
"choose" as if it magically sweeps away all problems, it does not

> I made the reason.

And something caused you to make that reason or something did not cause you
to make that reason.  Cuckoo clock or roulette wheel.

> Reasoning is a process

Yes exactly, reasoning is a process, that is to say it is a series of steps
leading to a outcome, a very good example of that would be a computer
program.

> > Voluntary manslaughter is not an accident, it is unpremeditated murder.
> There is a difference.

A difference the law is unable to coherently explain which is why criminal
law is such a incredible muddle.

> It sounds like you are saying they [my opinions] are robotic, in which
> case there is no possibility that your robotic opinions could be any closer
> to an objective truth than my robotic opinions.
>

Not true. If steps in my reasoning have fewer random errors in them than
you have and the process does not start with axioms like "everything is
true and everything is false" then my robotic opinions will be closer to
the truth than your robotic opinions.

I> t's funny that you care about the free market but without any free
> agency to actually use it.

You could make a model approximating how the world economy will evolve if
you assume all 7 billion people are rational agents trying to maximize
their gain. It's only a approximation because some people are not rational
and "gain" can mean more than just making money, and even so that's far too
complex for even a supercomputer to calculate; so we must make due with a
simplified approximation of a simplified approximation of the real thing.
And I haven't even mentioned things like the weather, earthquakes and
technological progress which can strongly influence economies. The
communists thought they could figure all this out and history proved them
to be not just wrong but spectacularly wrong.

> The reason doesn't matter even if their was one.

Then I don't know what " doesn't matter" means because X caused Y and X did
not cause Y doesn't mean anything.

>The butterfly wing was the reason. Who cares.

I do.

> The point is that you can't approach the totality of the cosmos and
> consciousness as a mechanical problem.

True, but the totality of the cosmos and consciousness is a mechanical
problem or it is not a mechanical problem.

> > I don't think that having reasons or no reasons matters at all.

I believe that's true, that is what you think.

  John K Clark

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 27 Aug 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries  
pointing on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example  
Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the  
consistency of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA  
uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the  
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to  
me you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano  
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in  
cases were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize  
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),  
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become  
Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a  
genuine conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that  
he has survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

  Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the  
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity  
capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you  
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of  
Einstein! I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but  
you must come clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a  
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss  
what you are asking.


Dear Bruno,

   The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple  
minds. SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single  
mind and, at most, a plurality of references to that one mind.


?

After a WM duplication there is already two minds. The first person  
plural handled the many minds.














That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.


  Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution  
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still  
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience  
(that you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all  
levels are correct, I would say, by definition.


   OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...


Not at all. You need only a Turing universal system, and they abound  
in arithmetic.






If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I  
simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will  
automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you  
will not see the difference (except for the price of the computer  
and memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?


   Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote "I don't become  
Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine  
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has  
survived, or that he survives through that process" these seems to  
be the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno  
are not one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be  
come him merely by reading a book just changing your name.


Yes. comp has no problem with many minds.











It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture  
of an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many  
context we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an  
apple because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we  
talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture  
to make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer, and make a backup of it, and then con

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/27/2012 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:


But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the 
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me 
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano 
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases 
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has 
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that 
the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), 
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein 
through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine 
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has 
survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

   Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the 
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity 
capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you 
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I 
don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come 
clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a 
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss what 
you are asking.


Dear Bruno,

The question that I am asking is how you deal with multiple minds. 
SO far all of your discussion seems to assume only a single mind and, at 
most, a plurality of references to that one mind.










That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some 
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, 
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the 
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite 
different.


   Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution 
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still 
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that 
you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are 
correct, I would say, by definition.


OK. This seems to assume a background of the physical world...

If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I 
simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will 
automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will 
not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and 
memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?


Yes, but that is not my question. When you wrote "I don't become 
Einstein through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine 
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has 
survived, or that he survives through that process" these seems to be 
the implications that the mind of Einstein and the mind of Bruno are not 
one and the same mind, at least in the sense that you can be come him 
merely by reading a book just changing your name.








It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of 
an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many 
context we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple 
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk 
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to 
make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a 
computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally 
different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the 
same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is 
totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same 
with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies 
to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am 
wil

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Aug 2012, at 21:59, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:

But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels,  
context

and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation  
does

not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing  
on.


A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency  
of

Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can  
prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses  
the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the  
sake of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me  
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano  
Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases  
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize  
that the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter),  
just by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein  
through my making of that process, but I can have a genuine  
conversation with Einstein through it. He will know that he has  
survived, or that he survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

   Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the  
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity  
capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you  
are not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein!  
I don't have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must  
come clean about this!


What is the difference between processing the book with a brain, a  
computer, or a book? This is not step 8, it is step 0.  Or I miss what  
you are asking.









That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.


   Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution  
levels?


There is a highest substituion level, above which you might still  
survive, but with some changes in your first person experience (that  
you can or not be aware of). Below that highest level, all levels are  
correct, I would say, by definition.
If your level is the level of neurons, you can understand that if I  
simulate you ate the level of the elementary particles, I will  
automatically simulate you at the level of your neurons, and you will  
not see the difference (except for the price of the computer and  
memory, and other non relevant things like that). OK?








It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of  
an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many  
context we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple  
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk  
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture  
to make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a  
computer, and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally  
different computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the  
same game with the same chess program, despite the computer is  
totally different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same  
with comp. Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies  
to that level and below, but not above (unless of course if I am  
willing to have some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


   But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a  
physical implementation,


In which modal logic?



what is universal is that not a particular physical system is  
required for the chess program.




With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their  
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs  
and computers.


   I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions  
between separate minds implies seperation of implementations and  
this only happens in the physical realm.


No, this is not correct. You fail to appreciate that all  
implementations and interactions are already emulated in arithmeti

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Aug 2012, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:

I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough
to replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true
randomness are not required).

And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate
intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required
for it.

Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example
under the form of a some non compressible sequence
11101111011000110101011011... (say)

Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at
my substitution level, because this would make it impossible for
the doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence
operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor copy me at the right
comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to
the oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my
consciousness depends on that oracle.

Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in
front of that oracle?

Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs,
and in this case, he will generate me successively (with large
delays in between) in front of all finite approximation of the
oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have
as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation
where my virtual brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part
of the oracle.

A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course
of a computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.

That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the
physical world and consciousness; that the physical world acts like
the oracle and provides essential interactions with consciousness as
a computational process.

OK.

Of course that doesn't require that the physical world be an oracle
- it may be computable too.

It has to have the two aspects, and, a priori, the random oracles
rules, as they are vastly more numerous. That's the measure, or white
rabbit problem. Physics must be described by something linear at the
bottom and involving deep (in Bennett sense) observer, so as to
stabilize consciousness on long coherent histories.
That would makes us both relatively rare, and yet multiplied in a
continuum, if the "physical" computation manage well the dovetailing
on the oracles. The math confirms this, but a refutation of comp is
not yet completely excluded too.

Bruno

Brent

Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step,
then comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite
interface.

The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input,
even infinite non computable one.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Sunday, August 26, 2012 11:12:35 AM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.

> None of them are the reasons of a clock. 

Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs 
at the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with 
a different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a 
different reason.

A pendulum is only a metal rod. A clock is nothing but gears assembled by a 
human mind. There is no clock sauce that makes this assembly a clock. There 
is no reasoning going by the clock as a clock. The clock doesn't know what 
time it is. It isn't keeping track of anything. There is no 'it there' to 
know that it has a face or hands or pendulum. These are all human 
interpretations for human reasons.

> If you must manufacture reasons,

You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do 
so for a reason.

You are the one who is relating everything to the idea of reasons, not me.

> The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try 
something new and justify it with a reason later. 

You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding 
the reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard, 
sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and 
sometimes we don't even have a clue. 

Why should we want to justify anything in the first place. Just because we 
are complex beings with many interacting levels of influence doesn't 
disqualify our causally efficacious participation in it. Because something 
seems less than perfect does not mean that it is an illusion.

And think about the debates on this list, once you've shown that your 
opponent has the belief he does for no reason you feel you've won the 
debate.

I would never assume that someone has no reason for their belief, I put it 
to them to examine their own assumptions and freely change them if they can 
make a greater sense. I don't think in terms of winning debates or proving 
their unworthiness to myself, I win if someone learns something, even if 
its not the person I happen to be talking to.

> Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else 
can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a 
typhoon. 

Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I 
guess typhoons have free will.

Are you being serious? Should we put typhoons on trial and punish them so 
that they will learn to stay away from our populated areas?

> There are countless reasons which can influence me

And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock.

That's my point. The cuckoo clock can't choose from among the many 
influences or choose to seek a new alternative, but I can.

> but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with 
that influence

And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no 
reason, 

No, I made the reason. It has no independent existence. Reasoning is a 
process by which I can make choices, or create new choices. I command my 
reason intentionally (to some extent). The only reason that I do that is 
because I can do that. I have the ability to create new reasons, unlike a 
clock.

and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason. And I 
don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but I do 
know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it for no 
reason.

> I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which 
is not random nor predetermined 

More of the  X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt 
to prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that 
you should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it 
will tell you anything about how the world works.  

Not desperate at all. I will be happy to explain to you in any form you 
like, however long it takes why your X must either be Y or not Y edict is a 
fallacy. This is not a new idea. Even from my thin exposure to mathematics 
I am aware of how concepts like non-wellfounded sets and incompleteness 
reveal the arbitrarily simplistic nature of this kind of robotic 
categorization. The universe is not a logic circuit.

> And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that 
everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you 
would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your 
position. 

Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must 
be true:
1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to.
2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want 
to.

Voluntary is not a matter of simp

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread Stephen P. King


On 8/26/2012 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:


But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake of
the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you 
have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, 
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases 
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has 
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that 
the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just 
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through 
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with 
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he 
survives through that process.


Dear Bruno,

Please explain this statement! How is there an "Einstein" the 
person that will know anything in that case? How is such an entity 
capable of "knowing" anything that can be communicated? Surely you are 
not considering a consistently solipsistic version of Einstein! I don't 
have a problem with that possibility per se, but you must come clean 
about this!





That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another, 
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the 
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite 
different.


Is there a spectrum or something similar to it for substitution levels?



It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an 
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context 
we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple 
because

we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make
sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer, 
and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different 
computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game 
with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally 
different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp. 
Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level 
and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have 
some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


But this example implies the necessity of the possibility of a 
physical implementation, what is universal is that not a particular 
physical system is required for the chess program.




With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their 
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and 
computers.


I agree with this, but any thing that implies interactions between 
separate minds implies seperation of implementations and this only 
happens in the physical realm. Therefore the physical realm cannot be 
dismissed!







Bruno Marchal wrote:


With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of
processes) is also absolute.

OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true,
necessarily.


That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt 
it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.


How is Deutsch's version different?



I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of 
what

level we think about computation.


This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level 
(unlike comp).


I don't understand either.





Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, 
not with

respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread meekerdb


On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:



I agree different implementations of intelligence have different capabilities and 
roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any intelligence (so long 
as infinities or true randomness are not required).


And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence EVEN if 
infinities and true randomness are required for it.


Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under the form of a some 
non compressible sequence 11101111011000110101011011... (say)


Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my substitution level, 
because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain into a finite 
string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor copy me at the 
right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to the oracle, so I 
will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on that oracle.


Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front of that 
oracle?

Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in this case, he 
will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of all finite 
approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person indeterminacy will have 
as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual brain 
use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.


A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a computation 
requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.


That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical world and 
consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides essential 
interactions with consciousness as a computational process.  Of course that doesn't 
require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too.


Brent



Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then comp would be just 
false, and the brain need an infinite interface.


The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even infinite non 
computable one.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:


But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context
and
ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does
not mean
that the emulation can substitute the original.


But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.

A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.

As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of
Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove
its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the
induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake  
of

the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me  
you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic,  
because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases  
were PA

does a proof that RA can't do).


Right. It makes only first person sense to PA. But then RA has  
succeeded in making PA alive, and PA could a posteriori realize that  
the RA level was enough.
Like I converse with Einstein's brain's book (à la Hofstatdter), just  
by manipulating the page of the book. I don't become Einstein through  
my making of that process, but I can have a genuine conversation with  
Einstein through it. He will know that he has survived, or that he  
survives through that process.





That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some  
relative

way, if we are using the result in the right way).


Yes, because that would be like substituting a person by another,  
pretexting they both obeys the same role. But comp substitute the  
lower process, not the high level one, which can indeed be quite  
different.




It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an  
apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context  
we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple  
because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk  
about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to  
make

sense of it.


Here you make an invalid jump, I think. If I play chess on a computer,  
and make a backup of it, and then continue on a totally different  
computer, you can see that I will be able to continue the same game  
with the same chess program, despite the computer is totally  
different. I have just to re-implement it correctly. Same with comp.  
Once we bet on the correct level, functionalism applies to that level  
and below, but not above (unless of course if I am willing to have  
some change in my consciousness, like amnesia, etc.).


With comp, to make things simple, we are high level programs. Their  
doing is 100* emulable by any computer, by definition of programs and  
computers.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal
machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same
manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of
processes) is also absolute.
OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it  
true,

necessarily.


That's fair enough. But personnally I find CT very compelling. I doubt  
it less than the "yes doctor" part of comp, to be specific.




I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of  
what

level we think about computation.


This I don't understand. Computability does not depend on any level  
(unlike comp).






Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations,  
not with

respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because here instantiation  
and
description of the computation matter - I+II=III and  
9+2=11
describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical  
purposes
(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same  
computation
if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is  
actually

going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their
emulation).


Comp just bet that there is a level below which any functionnally  
correct substitution will preserve my consciousness. It might be that  
such a level does not exist, in which case I am an actually infinite  
being, and comp is false. That is possible, but out of the scope of my  
study.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate  
einstein

(cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able
to converse with Einstein.
Apart from the question of whether br

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:30, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 8/24/2012 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate
exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson
arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency
of Robinson Arithmetic.
But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can
prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA
uses the induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for
the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction.

With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all
universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them
in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of
emulation (of processes) is also absolute.

But, proving, believing, knowing, defining, etc. Are not absolute,
and are all relative to the system actually doing the proof, or the
knowing. Once such notion are, even just approximated semi-
axiomatically, they define complex lattices or partial orders of
unequivalent classes of machines, having very often transfinite
order type, like proving for example, for which there is a branch
of mathematical logic, known as Ordinal Analysis, which measures
the strength of theories by a constructive ordinal. PA's strength
is well now as being the ordinal epsilon zero, that is omega [4]
omega (= omega^omega^omega^...) as discovered by Gentzen).

Dear Bruno,

What happens when we take the notion of a system to those that
are not constructable by finite means? What happens to the proving,
believing, knowing defining, interviewing, etc.?

Amazingly, not a lot. That is why I say sometimes that comp can be
weakened a lot. G and G* are sound, not only for PA and ZF (which is
terribly more powerful than PA, with respect to provability, but, I
repeat, the same for computability). If you allow provability to be
even more powerful, and accept infinite inference rule, like the omega-
rule in analysis, or some axiomatic form of second order logic, or
even more non constructive, G and G* will still remains correct and
complete.

If you continue on that path, G and G* will remain correct, but no
more complete. That is the case if you define provability by satisfied
by some models of a rich theory. By Gödel completeness, satified in
all models of the theory, gives the usual provability. But
satisfaction by certain models leads to entities needing some
supllementary axioms to be added on G and G*. But the present comp
theory does not use completeness of G and G*, only the correctness,
and so you need to go really quite close to God, for avoding the
consequences of the arithmetical hypostases.

Now, to prove this is quite difficult. Solovay announced many of this
without proof, and the book by Boolos, the 1993 version gives the
detailed proof, but it is technically hard. I use comp, for reason of
simplicity, but it can be weakened a lot. I suspect that the real
needed axiom is just the assumption of self-duplicability, and not
digitalness.

Bruno

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from  
comp before this can be used as an argument here.


"Normally"??  The holographic principle was extracted from general  
relativity and the Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense  
it "should be extracted" from something else, but if you can do  
so, please do.  It would certainly impress me.





UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take  
10001000 centuries is not relevant.


Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it  
follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also  
generated by the UDA (along with everything else).


I guess you mean "generated by the UD" (the UD is a program, UDA is  
just an argument).


More or less OK, but it is not clear if you are not forgetting the  
first person indeterminacy. The "real" physical world is never  
generated by the UD, it is only recovered by the machines/programs,  
from their first person points of view based on the entire (infinite,  
non computable) domain of indeterminacy.


And this can help to see a sort of hologram at play, as that UD*  
border has to be a fractal structure with itself embedded  
"everywhere". But I have never to much dig on that aspect, to be sure.


Unlike Schmidhuber and Tegmark seems to think, comp  does not allow to  
believe that the physical universe is a program among others, at least  
a priori. It is a richer epistemological invariant, not computable a  
priori,  pertaining to a sum on all computations. Schmidhuber and  
Tegmark just abstract themselves from the first person indeterminacy,  
and thus are not really assuming comp, or taking into account the  
existence of consciousness.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:



I agree different implementations of intelligence have different  
capabilities and roles, but I think computers are general enough to  
replicate any intelligence (so long as infinities or true randomness  
are not required).


And now a subtle point. Perhaps.

The point is that computers are general enough to replicate  
intelligence EVEN if infinities and true randomness are required for it.


Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under  
the form of a some non compressible sequence  
11101111011000110101011011... (say)


Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my  
substitution level, because this would make it impossible for the  
doctor to copy my brain into a finite string. So such sequence  
operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor copy me at the right  
comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to the  
oracle, so I will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness  
depends on that oracle.


Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front  
of that oracle?


Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and  
in this case, he will generate me successively (with large delays in  
between) in front of all finite approximation of the oracle, and (key  
point), the first person indeterminacy will have as domain, by  
definition of first person, all the UD computation where my virtual  
brain use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.


A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a  
computation requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.


Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then  
comp would be just false, and the brain need an infinite interface.


The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even  
infinite non computable one.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-26 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.
>>
>
> > None of them are the reasons of a clock.
>

Certainly it’s the reasons of a clock. The reason a cuckoo clock runs at
the speed it does is the length of its pendulum, a different clock with a
different pendulum would run at a different speed because there was a
different reason.

> If you must manufacture reasons,
>

You engage in that manufacturing process for a reason or you do not do so
for a reason.

> The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new
> and justify it with a reason later.
>

You and I are better than cuckoo clocks at justification, at finding the
reason we acted as we did but we are far from perfect in this regard,
sometimes we think we know why we did something but really do not, and
sometimes we don't even have a clue. And think about the debates on this
list, once you've shown that your opponent has the belief he does for no
reason you feel you've won the debate.

> Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be
> called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon.
>

Yes, there are many astronomically complex reasons for a typhoon, so I
guess typhoons have free will.

> There are countless reasons which can influence me
>

And there are also countless reasons which can influence a cuckoo clock.

> but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that
> influence
>

And you made that choice for a reason or you made that choice for no
reason, and the clock cuckooed for a reason or it cuckooed for no reason.
And I don't know the reason you find this simple observation confusing, but
I do know you don't understand it for a reason or you don't understand it
for no reason.

> I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not
> random nor predetermined
>

More of the  X is not Y and X is not not Y crap in a desperate attempt to
prove that what you want to believe is true; and with a axiom like that you
should have no difficulty whatsoever in finding your proof, not that it
will tell you anything about how the world works.

> And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is
> either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to
> agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.
>

Absolutely! If I move from point X to point Y then one of 2 things must be
true:
1) I did so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I wanted to.
2) I did NOT do so voluntarily: I went from X to Y and I did NOT want to.

> My question was very specific: "Are your opinions on free will robotic or
> random?"
>

There could be disagreement about that, I have my opinion and you have
yours, but I know one thing for certain, one of those 2 possibilities must
be true. I produce the particular sequence of ASCII characters that I did
after your sequence about the free will noise for a reason or I did so for
no reason. And I remind you that even a robot doesn't feel like a robot
because he's never sure what he's going to do next until he does it.

> All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved.
>

All proofs depend on the axioms used and axioms are supposed to be simple
and self evidently true, but your basic axiom is "everything is true and
everything is false" and so you can prove or disprove and even prove AND
disprove, anything you like.

> if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are
> noise.
>

If they are random then yes they are noise, but if they are robotic then
they are not, then it is logical and based on truth. And by the way, they
find the word "robot" offensive, I've seen them cry over the epithet, they
ask us not to use the R word and prefer "metallic man".

> The market for eggs is not automatic, nor is it random.
>

The free market has no difficulty whatsoever determining what the price of
eggs should be.

> despite attempts to beat financial markets using technical analysis
> alone, such attempts repeatedly fail because no formula can account for all
> real world possibilities.
>

Yes, world economics is much too complicated for a simple formula to
describe its richness, and that's why the free market prove to be superior
to a planned economy like communism, the planners thought they had it all
figured out but in reality they never even came close. And for the same
reason nobody has developed a formula about how air moves inside a
hypersonic jet engine, but nobody thinks its because the engine chooses to
move the air in one way rather than another by using its "free will" in
some vague mystical way.

> It isn't random, nor is it determined by any historical reason except in
> hindsight.
>

Except? Not knowing a reason and a reason not existing are two very
different things.

> Why would you speak at all?
>

I am speaking and obviously I am doing so for a reason or I am doing so f

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread meekerdb


On 8/25/2012 8:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem is open.  It is of 
a piece with the problem of deriving the classical from the quantum.


I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to comp. You have to fix 
a base to do the math, and then you can show that all appearances, from the first person 
perspective are independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand 
empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a choice of 
measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can be described in any basis. 
My feeling is that Everett got this right at the start.


But decoherence is not independent of the basis.  It is only in particular bases that one 
can average over the environment and make the density matrix diagonal.  Suppose you did 
that and then chose a different basis to express the result.  In general the 
transformation to the different basis would generate cross-terms in the density matrix.  
That the classical world appears as it does must be due to what Zurek calls an 
ein-selection principle; i.e. that the world only appears stable/classical in certain 
bases.  Everett just accepts that we can choose a measuring instrument that defines a 
certain basis - but that is equivalent to assuming that a quasi-classical world exists.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread meekerdb


On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can 
be used as an argument here.


"Normally"??  The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the 
Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense it "should be extracted" from something 
else, but if you can do so, please do.  It would certainly impress me.





UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 10001000 centuries 
is not relevant.


Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it follows that the 
holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also generated by the UDA (along with 
everything else).


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread meekerdb


On 8/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws 
of nature, and if we do not then we are random.



We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the 
ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism.


I don't see that John is assuming that physics is fundamental.  If 
computationalism="conscious thought arises from some kinds of computation." it may still 
require that those kinds of computation, the ones giving rise to conscious thought, must 
also give rise to some form of physics; that there cannot be conscious thought without 
physics.


Brent

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Stephen P. King

Point, Set, Match: Craig Weinberg!

On 8/25/2012 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> I did it for many reasons

And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.

None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture 
reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and 
human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons 
from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. 
There are no cuckoo clock reasons though.

> some of them my own.

In other words you have not divulged to others some of the
reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you
don't know yourself.  No matter, they're still reasons.

No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives 
of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock 
can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it 
with a reason later.

Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be 
called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a 
typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can 
choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or 
I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not 
random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own.

> Your argument is that grey must be either black or white.

No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or 
white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either 
grey or not grey.

And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything 
is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would 
have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.

> It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you 
have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant 
explorations on consciousness and sense-making.

And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most 
strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at 
your ideas.

And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What 
does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't 
refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me?

>>> Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? 
In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying 
attention to them

>> Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well 
such a reason either exists or it does not.

> What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with 
anything?

That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of
what they are, then your actions are deterministic.

That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: "Are your 
opinions on free will robotic or random?" You are trying to create a 
diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own 
limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they 
don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me 
or my motives.

> What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or 
it does not'?

That's an even stupider question, true statements always have
uses.

An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't 
mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still 
admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more 
relevant than saying anything at all.

> Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense.

And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure
out how the world works and make it clear that what you really
want to do is convince yourself  that what you already want to
believe is in fact true.  And its going to work too because if you
take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then
you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove
and disprove the same thing at the same time.

Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature 
of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which 
they are proved.

> According to your views, you don't have any views, and 
neither do any possible readers of your views.

That is ridiculous.

I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of 
your stated worldview.

> All of it is either robotic or random.

What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that 
have to do with not having views??

Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, 
they are noise.

Since you mention the

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote:

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> I did it for many reasons

And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons.

None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, 
then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers 
of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer 
as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons 
though.

> some of them my own. 

In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you 
acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know 
yourself.  No matter, they're still reasons. 

No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of 
cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't 
do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a 
reason later.

Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be 
called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. 
There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in 
many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all 
of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor 
predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own.

> Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. 

No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, 
and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not 
grey.

And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is 
either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to 
agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position.

> It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have 
before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant 
explorations on consciousness and sense-making. 

And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most 
strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your 
ideas. 

And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does 
your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute 
them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me?

>>> Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In 
either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to 
them 

>> Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such 
a reason either exists or it does not.

> What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with 
anything?

That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they 
are, then your actions are deterministic. 

That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: "Are your opinions 
on free will robotic or random?" You are trying to create a diversion to 
cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If 
your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't 
opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives.

> What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it 
does not'?

That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses.
>

An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean 
it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting 
that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than 
saying anything at all. 

> Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. 

And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how 
the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is 
convince yourself  that what you already want to believe is in fact true.  
And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom 
in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, 
you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. 

Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of 
the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are 
proved.

> According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do 
any possible readers of your views.

That is ridiculous.

I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your 
stated worldview.

> All of it is either robotic or random. 

What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have 
to do with not having views??

Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they 
are noise.

Since you mention the price of eggs, lets go with that. The market for eggs 
is not automatic, nor is it random. Despite attempts to beat financial 
markets usi

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> We might do things because the laws of arithmetic.
>

If so then we in particular and everything in general is as deterministic
as a cuckoo clock because when you add 2 numbers together you always get
the same answer. I might add that everything is most probably not
deterministic.

> To stop has no first person meaning.
>

After the instant in time called "stop" there will be no more entries in my
diary, the meaning of that is pretty clear to me. Or to put it another way,
death means having a last thought.

> Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died,
>

But they have written "this will be my last entry"; I believe the Antarctic
explorer Robert Scott wrote something like that in his diary that was found
months later next to his frozen body.

> You are assuming physicalism here,
>

The only thing I'm assuming is that X is Y or X is not Y.

> which is inconsistent with computationalism.
>

You're creating a straw man opponent, nobody believes that what a thing is
and what a thing does is the same. Mind, a abstract concept, is what the
brain, a physical object, does. And going fast, a abstract concept, is what
a jet, a physical object, does.

  John K Clark

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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote:

Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so  
by your

own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated.


That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined,


It is well defined in epistemic interpretations.  But those rely on  
an implicit dualism.



That is what I thought after reading von Neumann, and London-&-Bauer,  
but then reading Shimony I realized that such a dualism does not make  
sense, and that it leads to solipisism.






and many incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett  
showed we don't need it,


But then we need to derive the classical world from the quantum.


We need to derive the appearance of the classical world. This is well  
explained by Everett+decoherence.
With comp we start from classical arithmetic, and we derive the  
appearance of the quantum, and then we ca use decoherence to explain  
the re-appearance of the classical physical worlds. It is really:


classical ===> quantum ===> classical






if we assume comp or weaker.
Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then  
with comp so is the wave.


It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a  
domain (the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non  
solved problem in another domain (the mind body problem).


There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave,


Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem  
is open.  It is of a piece with the problem of deriving the  
classical from the quantum.


I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to  
comp. You have to fix a base to do the math, and then you can show  
that all appearances, from the first person perspective are  
independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand  
empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a  
choice of measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can  
be described in any basis. My feeling is that Everett got this right  
at the start.








nor any known evidences that the wave does collapse.


Collapse appears all the time,


LOL. Show me one.



and a good theory must save appearances.


Everett showed that the appearances are saved, in the memory of the  
observers.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk


I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main
points:


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> But let's say we mean "except for memory and unlimited accuracy".
>> >> This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY
>> >> computers.
>> >>
>> >>
>> > Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? 
>> I
>> > can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of
>> > interacting particles.
>> >
>> > But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is
>> there
>> > a reason that computers cannot?
>> >
>> Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily
>> computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense
>> already.
>>
> 
> Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious
> experiences that we do?
> 
> Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain
> very much (without some meta-theory).
No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it
doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because
reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it obviously
is described and incorporates them).


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as
>> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that
>> God
>> > has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't
>> see
>> > how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since
>> > computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do.
>> OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate
>> everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that.  But that's
>> simply
>> the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense
>> of
>> transforming input/output.
>> It is about what something IS (or is like).
>>
> 
> Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our
> reality)?
There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO.

But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with
respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with respect
to reality.


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> since this is all that is required for my argument.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that
>> >> definition
>> >> >> >> because a human is not a computer according to the everyday
>> >> >> >> definition.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate,
>> therefore
>> >> a
>> >> >> > human could exist with the definition of a computer.  Computers
>> are
>> >> >> > very powerful and flexible in what they can do.
>> >> >> That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> > Have you ever done any computer programming?  If you have, you might
>> >> > realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your
>> >> imagination.
>> >> Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed
>> a
>> >> fair amount.
>> >> Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our
>> >> imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it
>> on
>> >> a
>> >> computer? It is very hard.
>> >> I never said that they can't.
>> >>
>> >> I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example
>> they
>> >> can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and
>> which
>> >> axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no
>> >> computational way of determining that.
>> >>
>> >
>> > There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to
>> > use.
>> Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't
>> determined a program first.
>>
>>
> You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms to
> use.
> 
> We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human
> mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability.
That just would strengthen my point (note the words "we program" meaning "we
choose the program"). 


Jason Resch-2 wrote:
> 
>>
>> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >  If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises,
>> it
>> > would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than others.
>> Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and there
>> is
>> no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already
>> programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem).
>>
>> In effect you get an infinite regress:
>> How determine which program to use? ->use a program to determine it
>> But which? ->use a program to determine it
>> But which? ->use a program to determ

Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world  
of inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is  
already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine.


There's something wrong with that sentence. An error prone machine  
one that is capable of being wrong, and hence non-computably more  
powerful than itself?


Yes. It makes sense because the identification criteria for the  
inductive inference has been weakened. A machine allowed to do one  
error (that is synthesizing a program giving a wrong output) will  
recognize a non computably vaster class of phenomena, even if wrong on  
some input. See the paper of Case and Smith reference in my url, or  
the book by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from  
comp before this can be used as an argument here.


"Normally"??  The holographic principle was extracted from general  
relativity and the Bekenstein bound.  I don't know in what sense it  
"should be extracted" from something else, but if you can do so,  
please do.  It would certainly impress me.





UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take  
10001000 centuries is not relevant.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk



Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk
>  wrote:
> 
>>> The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science.
> 
>> That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined
>> through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do.
>>
>> It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws
>> are just descriptions of what the universe does.
> 
> That the universe "follows laws" means that the universe shows certain
> patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able
> to observe and codify.
> 
OK, so it is a metaphor, since the laws itself are just what we codified
about the behaviour of the universe (so the universe can't follow laws
because the laws follow the universe).


Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
> 
> You said you see no evidence that the universe follows
> laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science.
Science just requires that the universes behaviour is *approximated* by
laws.


Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
> 
>> Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately
>> described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and
>> the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe
>> and
>> so they will reflect it.
>>
>> Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at
>> some
>> points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest
>> it
>> does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest
>> it
>> does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma?
> 
> The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about.
> If there were no laws there would be no point to science.
Right, but this doesn't mean that the laws have to be accurate or even can
be accurate. They just need to be accurate enough to be useful to us.
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers

2012-08-25 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote:
> 
>> But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context  
>> and
>> ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does  
>> not mean
>> that the emulation can substitute the original.
> 
> But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on.
> 
> A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room.
> 
> As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate  
> exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson  
> arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of  
> Robinson Arithmetic.
> But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove  
> its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the  
> induction axiom, RA might just say "huh", and apply it for the sake of  
> the emulation without any inner conviction.
I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have
just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because
RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA
does a proof that RA can't do). That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so
we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative
way, if we are using the result in the right way).
It is like the word "apple" cannot really substitute a picture of an apple
in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can
indeed use the word "apple" instead of using a picture of an apple because
we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about
apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make
sense of it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal  
> machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same  
> manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of  
> processes) is also absolute.
OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true,
necessarily.
I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what
level we think about computation.

Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with
respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of
computations through other computations. Because here instantiation and
description of the computation matter - I+II=III and 9+2=11
describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical purposes
(because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same computation
if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually
going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their
emulation).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein  
> (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able  
> to converse with Einstein.
Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all (due to
possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write a post
about this later), that is still not necessarily the case.
It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation. And I
don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein.

benjayk
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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers



On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

I don't know either, nobody knows, even the computer doesn't know if  
it will stop until it finds itself stopping;


If a computer stops, it will never know that. If it executes a  
stopping program, then it can.


To stop has no first person meaning. Nobody will ever write in its  
personal diary that he just died, unless metaphorically, or  
approximately perhaps, like with NDE, or some dreams.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers