On 13 June 2012 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*The question "why am I David" is twofold:*
*
*
*- One aspect is "trivial" and admit the same explanation as "why am I in W
and not in M" in the WM-duplication. Here comp can explain that there is no
answer possible to that question (first person indete
On 12 Jun 2012, at 22:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
par
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
>> machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
>> the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
>> particular machine.
>>
>
> But is that not
On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time.
On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not
enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal
machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of
On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
> If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
> of the theory.
>
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces such a
knower. But
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simul
On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
> seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
> will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
> elementary reason that suc
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
> arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that
> they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time", and can
> only be used as a metaphor.
o)
Bruno
On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote:
I’ve just read the following paper :
http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt
%20final.pdf
which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into
decrepitude
that seems to follow from the quantum theory
On 09 Jun 2012, at 22:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as
to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that
your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not
deciding
On 09 Jun 2012, at 15:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list)
can also be
used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that
personal
identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might
What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?
>
> And it is this ...
> Existence that multiplied itself
> For sheer delight of being
> And plunged into numberless trillions of forms
> So that it might
> Find
> Itself
> Innumerably (Aurobindo)
>
>
>
>
>
>
&
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your
annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world
where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from s
On 6/9/2012 2:44 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what if
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be
> used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal
> identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might be a "God" playing a
> trick to himself, notabl
forms
So that it might
Find
Itself
Innumerably (Aurobindo)
Bruno
On 08 Jun 2012, at 01:11, Nick Prince wrote:
I’ve just read the following paper :
http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt
%20final.pdf
which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
>
> I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
> seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
> what ifs. But I think I see a couple of
On 08 Jun 2012, at 19:30, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the
(absence of)
first person view?
I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
experiences based on
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of un
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should
/istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt
> > %20final.pdf
>
> > which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
> > that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
> > Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the ground
On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of)
> first person view?
I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
experiences based on now being in the neighborhood of D (which result
in "tor
s to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death
branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch. Under normal
QTI circumstances, if we were Schrödinger’s cat we would come across
the (3p) node (L= Lives, D= Dies):
gues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
> that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
> Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the grounds that any death
> branch would be preceded by an unconsciousness branch. Under normal
> QT
I’ve just read the following paper :
http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt%20final.pdf
which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the
oved than than the space case, but
> theoretically it should be similar.
>
> I'm not at all sure how you might refute QTI using this, but please elaborate.
>
> Cheers
>
>
Hi Russell
Is teleportation through (space)time not just the same as Bruno's UDA
argument where a delay i
-list
Sent: Wed, Nov 16, 2011 3:41 am
Subject: Re: Amnesia, dissociation and personal identity (was: QTI, Cul de sacs
and di...
In principle, yes. What you are talking about is "quantum erasure". It
hould even be possible to do it without forgetting the current
orldline (in which cas
e how you might refute QTI using this, but please elaborate.
Cheers
On Mon, Nov 14, 2011 at 03:11:59PM -0500, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
> This may be off-topic, but taking on a fanciful, notion; is there a means,
> in principle, for somebody biologically alive, to physically go into other
On 14 Nov 2011, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
This may be off-topic, but taking on a fanciful, notion; is there a
means, in principle, for somebody biologically alive, to physically
go into other world-lines?
With the QM theory: no.
But Steven Weinberg has shown that if QM is slight
This may be off-topic, but taking on a fanciful, notion; is there a means,
in principle, for somebody biologically alive, to physically go into other
world-lines? I am using the Hugh Everett the 3rd's conception of other
worlds/universes. I am, just as a thought, trying to negate the Quantum
On 07 Nov 2011, at 23:08, John Mikes wrote:
To Qentin: "DEATH" an excellent vaiation for immoprtality. I always
emphasize that ETERNITY is NOT a "time" indicator, can most likely
be timeless ("POOF" it is over).
To Bruno:
we wrote already about your 2c question "WHO ARE WE?" and you
ans
. With light pressure I mean that we can confront
people with deep things, even if they are not immediatly thankful for it
(like daring to question deeply ingrained and cherished beliefs, which are
subtly destructive).
Ultimately, I have no worries about anybody. It might be a very long and
rough ri
On 08 Nov 2011, at 20:56, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I would rather call this consciousness.
Indeed I agree with Dan that it is quite accurate to say that there
is no
person in the sense that experience is not personal, it doesn't
"belong" to
anyone (but it is very intimate with
e really are, and so fear becomes just a tool to sense whether there is an
actually imminent danger, not something that is constantly (whether
obviously or subtly) determining the way we live our lifes.
benjayk
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On 07 Nov 2011, at 21:02, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But if you realize that there has never been a person to begin with,
But this contradicts immediately my present consciousness feeling. I
am currently in the state of wanting to drink water, so I am pretty
sure that there exis
ness that corresponded to that person at that time.
benjayk
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ective evidence that you are conscious, or that I am
conscious, or that a fetus is conscious. It is not measurable, but it is
still there, even if some materialist tend to deny that (which shows how far
we are removed from ourselves and reality, we actually ignore that which is
undoubtably and obv
To Qentin: "DEATH" an excellent vaiation for immoprtality. I always
emphasize that ETERNITY is NOT a "time" indicator, can most likely be
timeless ("POOF" it is over).
To Bruno:
we wrote already about your 2c question "WHO ARE WE?" and you answered
something like "Gods".
That may be a cheap shot,
On 11/7/2011 12:02 PM, benjayk wrote:
I think we only fear the elimination of personhood because we confuse being
conscious as an ego with being conscious. We somehow think that if we in the
state of feeling to be a seperate individual cease to exist, we as conscious
beings cease to exist, which
a big change of perspective, and we fear that as we fear the
unknown in general.
benjayk
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On 11/7/2011 9:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
>
> How great was that?
I don't know. Being a fetus might be a peaceful experience, or like sleep.
But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was,
So what's your evidence that there is *any* experience of "being a
ight be a peaceful experience, or like sleep.
But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was, since
what we are is beyond particular experiences (it is experiencing itself).
Even when I feel absolutely terrible I still am beyond all, I just don't
realize it. The very f
great burden is lifted from you. Unfortunately this
realization is rare, since it requires one to not buy into the dominant
collective delusion and deeply ingrained feelings of fear towards death of
self.
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
>> Neither
>> experientally, nor logically or scien
On 06 Nov 2011, at 12:29, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/11/6 Bruno Marchal
Quentin,
On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
benjayk:
On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion a
2011/11/6 Bruno Marchal
> Quentin,
>
> On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> benjayk:
>> On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
>> consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
>> construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" any
Quentin,
On 30 Oct 2011, at 23:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
benjayk:
On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the "I" is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual "I" anywhere. It
seems
very relevant to know
Hi Dan,
On 03 Nov 2011, at 03:08, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or
On 11/3/2011 7:07 AM, benjayk wrote:
There is no difference, as there is no your and mine consciousness.
Consciousness can not be owned, and can not be divided into pieces. There is
just consciousness.
It is very easily experientally confirmable: Do you ever experience anything
other than this co
;> have another consciousness. There is no evidence for this at all.
> >>
> >> We can speak of your consciousness and my consciousness on a relative
> >> level,
> >> meaning one particular expression of consciousness and another
> particular
> >>
nction, and there are contexts
>> where
>> this distinction makes little or no sense, like when we die or when we
>> are
>> in objectless and perceptionless meditation.
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > what is *preserved*
2 wrote:
> >
> > When you take drug and "forget"... you then remember when the effects
> > stop,
> > proving you still have your memory.
> That's beside the point. What's important is that we can experience total
> memory loss, while still being there. Why
What's important is that we can experience total
memory loss, while still being there. Why would it be important whether you
later concretely remember something or not? That seem irrelevant to the
continuity of experience.
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>
> A person who w
On 11/2/2011 7:08 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or computational
Hey there,
I don't often post on this board, but I follow it quite frequently,
and perhaps I might inject a 'fresh voice' to rescue this thread of a
cul-de-sac of its own. It's essentially buddhist in nature rather than
mathematical or computational, so forgive me if I appear presumptuous,
or off
On 1 November 2011 21:07, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> > This is where I am coming from:
> >
> > I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
> > between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
On Oct 27, 12:10 am, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 04:00:56PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> > QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> > I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> > differentiation works – especially in relation to QT
On 11/2/2011 11:45 AM, benjayk wrote:
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/1 benjayk
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group
ence
> to continue consistently. This is also not true, we can experience things
> that are totally disconnected from all memories we have, yet still it is
> the
> I (not the "I") that experiences it. For example on a drug trip, you can
> literally forget every trace of w
continue consistently. This is also not true, we can experience things
that are totally disconnected from all memories we have, yet still it is the
I (not the "I") that experiences it. For example on a drug trip, you can
literally forget every trace of what your life was like, in terms of
On Tue, Nov 1, 2011 at 5:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2011/11/1 benjayk
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > 2011/10/30 benjayk
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
>> >> >> >
On 11/1/2011 3:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What do you mean by "consciousness" ? I don't care about "eternal" not me... it's the
*same* thing as death. When talking about dying, what's important is the person who die,
if something is left who doesn't know that it was that person... what does i
On 11/1/2011 2:07 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
This is where I am coming from:
I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
to notice). So assu
On 11/1/2011 1:07 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
[BM]
I don't think I understand it any better than you do. But ISTM we need a
quantum theory
of consciousness in order to write eqns like (3) above. In the standard theory
it implies
that there is some experience of both system states at the same time.
> >>
> >> How would you call this, if not immortality?
> >
> >
> > Death.
> >
> You would call eternal existence of consciousness "death"?
What do you mean by "consciousness" ? I don't care about "eternal" not
me
On Tue, Nov 01, 2011 at 01:07:31PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> This is where I am coming from:
>
> I accept decoherence as the mechanism for suppressing interference
> between universes and that this happens very quickly (no time for us
> to notice). So assuming the everett interpretation, there
[BM]
> I don't think I understand it any better than you do. But ISTM we need a
> quantum theory
> of consciousness in order to write eqns like (3) above. In the standard
> theory it implies
> that there is some experience of both system states at the same time. A
> change of basis
> changes
imagination,
>> or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
>> didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).
>>
>> On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
>> consciousness, considering that t
On 31 Oct 2011, at 23:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/31/2011 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when
we measure a superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the
superposition state, but this differentiate the consciousness/
memor
On 10/31/2011 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when we measure a
superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the superposition state, but this
differentiate the consciousness/memory of the machine, and she can feel the split.
On 31 Oct 2011, at 18:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger count
On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishwrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you
On 30 Oct 2011, at 10:34, benjayk wrote:
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very
On 31 Oct 2011, at 06:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die
and someone else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But
this objection shows a lack of understanding of consciousness
On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >> My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
> >> Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you
> >> remain i
requires that
there be distinguished variables in which the density matrix becomes
diagonal - the "pointer basis".
If reality is discrete. If, not matrix might never become diagonal,
and in that case QTI follows, and first person, from their first
person view cannot be annihilated. With m
On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
superposition.
- Show quoted text -
I thought that in the e
On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone
else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a
lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple
instantiations
On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
> My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
> Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
> superposition.
>
>
> - Show quoted text -
I thought that in the everett interpretation everything w
with our experience and
> observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination,
> or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
> didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why shoul
perience can indeed
> survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined "I" experiences it
> or not?
>
> How would you call this, if not immortality?
Death.
> Actually eternal youth seems
> closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would
l this, if not immortality? Actually eternal youth seems
closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be more
properly termed "eternal existing" or "not-quite-mortality". If we are cut
off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - no
> apparatus with non ideal systems then you can use something like the
> alternate evolutions to model the situation
>
OK, this is different from the usual thought experiment. You have
engineered a cul de sac here. A QTI enthusiast will point out that
macroscopic devices working perfectly
On 29 Oct 2011, at 20:07, Nick Prince wrote:
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
wrote:
Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type
multiverses
here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
thin
systems then you can use something like the
alternate evolutions to model the situation
exp(-iHt/hbar)(|s1>|a0>)=|s1>(a|a0> + b|a1> + c|a2>)
exp(-iHt/hbar)(|s2>|a0>)=|s2>(a|a0> + c|a1> + b|a2>)
which I gave originally. with these forms the cat can't kno
2011/10/30 benjayk
>
>
> Nick Prince-2 wrote:
> >
> >
> > This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
> >
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gst&q=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
> > where I suggest that very o
ople consider this possiblity of immortality, as it both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.
benjayk
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On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 03:44:46PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
>
> [NP]
> > > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> > >
[NP]
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> > are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
> > t
>[SPK]
From what I can tell, cul de sac's would have 3p consequences that
> would have an effect on the distribution of branches. Maybe we should
> consider what effect the 'rest of the universe' has on the 1p of the cat.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
[NP]
Had a think but still not sure what you m
On Oct 27, 11:52 am, benjayk wrote:
> Jason Resch-2 wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
> > wrote:
>
> >> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> >> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> >> di
On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 09:17:17AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
> Hi Stathis
>
> Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> are the on
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses
On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> > here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> > thinking about QM type 3 multiverses
On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
> Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
> here, in which case I agree. What I was doing in my analysis was
> thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
> are the only variety for the moment
On Oct 29, 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince
> wrote:
>
> > QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> > I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> > differentiation works – especially in relatio
On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince wrote:
> QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
>
> I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
> differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
> standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs
Thanks Bruno for being so patient with me and taking the time to
carefully answer my queries.
Nick
On Oct 28, 3:42 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Oct 2011, at 01:56, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
> > [BM]
> > The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmeti
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