Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? JM On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism refutes mechanism) Now, MECH implies NON MAT can be made constructive. This means MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general sense of number). Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the arithmetical electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false. But only in our universe, right. In some other universe couldn't electrons actually weigh 2kg? Not really. If we prove that electrons (assuming we can defined them in the physics extracted from comp) weigh 2 kg, then they have 2 kg in all possible universes. If there is an 1,9 kg electron in some universe, that could be used as a counter-example showing that the proof was not valid, or that comp is false. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote: And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the reasoning. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Brent, thanks for the paper recommendations! I will have a look at them. Cheers, Günther Brent Meeker wrote: Günther Greindl wrote: Hello Brent, That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings good that you address this topic, I have also wondered a lot about how superposition/MWI/decoherence transfer to the macroscopic arena. Although I am not so quick to discard splitting of macroscopic objects. For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? It does in mathematical formalism. But the different splits are still very close together and so classically they don't make any observable difference - since you aren't a pure state in QM the mixture is still you. Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? Because in that case the split gets amplified enough to make a noticeable difference in you (and other large macroscopic things like instruments). And the experiments of Zeilinger Et al (Superposition of Fullerenes) do suggest that there is no scale at which superpositions stop. You mean this paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402146 ? I thought it showed that any large warm body, even one as small as C70 would exhibit decoherence just from it's own interchange of IR photons. We are only not aware of the other persons/objects due to decoherence. Right. Decoherence makes superpositions inaccessible. But my point was that you, as a large classical object, are continually being entangled with your environment by interactions via photons, etc. This makes it impossible to separate out the strands of your superpositions, but in most cases it also ensures that the strands stay close together along the classical path and so the whole bundle can be regarded as a single classical object, you. Only when micrscopic QM events get amplified to create a classical difference will there be an observable split of you, e.g. into the you who saw up and the you who saw down. Can you recommend a paper which addresses this question (of macroscopic object splitting)? There's a very good review article by Schlosshauer: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312059 I should qualify all the above by saying that it's how most physicist think things will work out - but they haven't really been worked on yet. It isn't exactly clear how the classical arises from the quantum - it has it's own white rabbit problem http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3376 http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9412067 Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote: Bruno, I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism? Thanks for quoting the entire sentence, before I was misunderstanding myself! Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism refutes mechanism) Now, MECH implies NON MAT can be made constructive. This means MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general sense of number). Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the arithmetical electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false. Now assuming comp we discover the physics in the inverse way of the empiricists, we discover the multiverse before the universe, the interference of sub-level histories, before the histories, the logic of the observable before the observation, etc. The point, (of course I am thinking to Kory) is that I try to explain a reasoning which shows that the (DIGITAL) MECH hypothesis, can, thanks to digital be transformed into a scientific (meaning Popper- refutable) inquiry. A bit like John Bell succeed to show that the Einstein Podolski Rosen was not the product of a senile physician doing philosophy in its old days). It is science. At least this is what the construction is supposed to explain (and its translation in arithmetic is supposed to pave the way of a concretization of the idea). The MECH is a venerable old philosophical idea. The reason and tools making it a science is due to Babbage, Post Turing Kleene Church Markov and Co. extraordinary discovery of the universal machine. Nature discovered it before us, for example we are such machine, but enlightening comes when a universal machine begin to suspect its own universality, and discovers the everything and its many (related) sub-structure inside herself. Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which (let's assume) refutes mechanism, If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p). I guess you meant refutes materialism. One main point is that physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental refutation of comp. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi m.a. if mechanism is true, then the physical universe appears to be the border of the universal machine ignorance. The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine dreams. I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis. It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of digital machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism refutes mechanism) Now, MECH implies NON MAT can be made constructive. This means MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general sense of number). Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the arithmetical electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false. *But only in /our/ universe, right. In some other universe couldn't electrons actually weigh 2kg?* --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which (let's assume) refutes mechanism, If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p). I guess you meant refutes materialism. One main point is that physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental refutation of comp. leads inescapably to a mathematical structure in logic-space which actually constitutes the physical universe. Yes. (for technical reasons on which I should perhaps not insist, I am far from sure it makes sense to say it is a mathematical structure, but mathematical structures can approximate it.) And thus we can justify and explain the physical laws without any reference to matter. My point is modest (although perhaps radical). It is that IF we assume mechanism, THEN we HAVE TO explain the physical laws without any reference to matter, energy, time, space. Those things are of second order, emerging eventually in normal dreams by numbers' dream. But the math is there and we can already begin the comparison. (This is the more difficult arithmetical UDA). With comp we can only refer to numbers, and what numbers says about numbers, etc. Is that it or are their other implications? The physics we get is multiplied by two. It explains why the apple falls of the tree, and why it hurts (in case *you* are below the tree ...). It explains both the origin of the sharable and doubtable quanta, and the private, non doubtable and non sharable qualia, and how they are related. It gives a pretty coherent picture which is more akin to Plato than to Aristotle. But the key point is that it makes mechanism a testable theory. That picture is testable. Somehow QM already confirms some weird consequences of comp, like its many realties/histories interfering statistically. This relation can be made more precise, but the thought experiment show only the *necessity* of explaining physics through number relations and the way (universal) numbers reflect those relations. Bruno Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi m.a. if mechanism is true, then the physical universe appears to be the border of the universal machine ignorance. The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine dreams. I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis. It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of digital machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno, I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism? Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: *So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which (let's assume) refutes mechanism, * If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p). I guess you meant refutes materialism. One main point is that physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental refutation of comp. Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi m.a. if mechanism is true, then the physical universe appears to be the border of the universal machine ignorance. The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine dreams. I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis. It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. _*And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it.*_ You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of digital machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote: nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position quite accurately :-) Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree as the MGA thread progresses. :) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of equations? Gosh. m.a. * Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: *Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? * That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of life force, sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary for life. I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is, Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things that can count as a physical substrate. But that's just a restatement of the position that needs to be defended. When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's descriptions of the life-force. I agree 99% with you, and I have myself in my papers and in this list compared very often materialism with vitalism. In generally I do that after the seventh step of the UDA. At that step people should understand that, in case a concrete UD is executed integrally (infinite task) in our material universe, then, to predict what a pen will do if we drop it, we have to look at the entire set of possible computations going through our current state (when in from of that pen) OK? Now, are you aware that the MGA is just an argument to logically show that the material invocation, cannot indeed be used to contradict of weaken the consequence of those 7 steps? No need (for you!) of MGA, if you have already the (correct) intuition that using materialism just cannot work. The use of matter is indeed akin to the (fraudulous) use of God for explaining the existence of the universe. That explain nothing. But we do have a very strong intuition that matter does exist, and it is not so simple (and indeed quite subtle) to precisely show that primitive or fundamental matter is a red herring both for the mind and the body part of the mind-body problem. OK? I will begin by a step 0, for the MGA, where I sum up what should be completely clear before beginning the MGA itself. I have also to explain what the MGA does not. For example the MGA does not prove the inexistence of matter, it proves only to irrelevance of the notion of matter concerning again both mind and body, consciousness and physics. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote: So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous aether Yes. If you mean matter by fundamental matter. It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC shows it). It means that the idea that there are fundamental stuffy material things constituting the observable reality is an illusion. The content of physics is not necessarily wrong, it is the fundamental status of physics (in the real TOE) which is questioned by the comp hypothesis. (By *real* TOE, I mean a TOE which does not eliminate consciousness). and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions of space and time? I think so indeed, but my translations of Kant contradict each other. So I am not 100% sure. Note also tat in the comp frame: subjective will admit good mathematical approximations, from personal memory to godel-lob provability logics. I mean we can have objective talk on the subjective. And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of equations? Frankly you are a big quick here. The point is to make this precise enough so we can test comp experimentally. Gosh. I agree. But feel free to put your finger on what could be wrong in the argument, and keep in mind the premisses can be eventually shown to be false. It is not philosophy, it is applied logic (and arithmetic/ computer science + a minimal amount of cognitive science). I am not defending a position, just showing it follows from a position (the digital mechanist or comp position). Bruno M. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi m.a. On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote: Dear Bruno, Needless to say I feel honored that you've taken the time to answer my naive questions. Naive questions I love. But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the phrase highlighted below. Exactly what feature of the fundamental status of physics is questioned by comp? Its fundamentality. Since Aristotle's success it seems some scientists believe in a fundamental physical universe. The laws of physics who be the fundamental base from which all laws and patterns should be derived. The idea is: physics explains chemistry which explains biology which explains psychology which explains consciousness. I am just saying that if the brain functions like a computer, then this Aristotelian picture is just wrong. If I tell you what is true, you will (if your are sane) believe it is crackpot, that is why I prefer to insist on the reasoning. But roughly speaking, if mechanism is true, then the physical universe appears to be the border of the universal machine ignorance. The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine dreams. I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis. Is it just the insistence on a substrate of matter? If all the laws of physics (in the real TOE) can be generated (duplicated) by pure mathematics, isn't the distinction a trivial semantic one solved by one sweep of Occam's razor? Do you view the idea of matter as somehow inhibiting the pace of scientific discovery or as the basis of a dangerous, quasi-mystical, pseudo-religious cult? Just curious. It is not like that. It is far deeper. It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of digital machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 17 Nov 2008, at 00:29, Michael Rosefield wrote: If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. I guess you are talking about the QM splitting, and not the comp- splitting. In both case it is better to talk about consciousness differentiation instead of real universe spliiting. The idea is that the state ME X (up + down) is the same state as M X up + ME X down, when I am on the side of a particlle in the state UP + DOWN. Only if I observe it, my memory will differentiate into ME(seeing UP) X up + ME(seeing down) X down, where ME(seeing up) represents the state of ME with my memory of have seen the particle with spin UP, and X represents the usual tensor product. This is what is predicted by QM-without collapse. The QM + collapse says that the state ME(seeing UP) X up + ME(seeing down) X down colapse into ME(seeing UP) X up, or ME(seeing down) X down, with some probability. Such a collapse does contradict the wave equation, and for each precise proposition of a physical collapse, experiments exists which have refuted it. The collapse makes also no sense in special and general relativity, and is pure non sense in quantum cosmology. All this, of course is not relevant, given that QM without collapse uses the comp hypothesis (or some weakenings) which forces to derive the SWE from the superposition states inherent to the arithmetical computationalist dovetailing. Quantum Mechanicians still presuppose a material world (be it a multiverse), but this just cannot work (by UDA+MGA). Soon I will explain MGA on the list. I have yet to be sure people really understand why it is needed. Bruno Marchal Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there could be a 'connective-tissue' of undecohered universes containing weird brains-in-superposition; these aren't consciousness, but perhaps we get a bit of bleed-through from the edges. Or is that just too darned uninformed and ridiculous...? 2008/11/16 Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote: But does un-implemented mean not implemented in any language? This is a vague question depending of the context. If you have find a beautiful algorithm, and your boss asks you if you have implemented it, well, if you have not implemente, there is a sense to say the algorithm is un-implemented relatively to you and to your boss. Of course you can tell your boss that the algorithm is implemented an infinity of times in Plato Heaven (or in the standard model of arithmetic), but he will probably not be satisfied with that answer. But all possible implementations is a logical concept that exists only in platonia - so what is the distinction between implemented and un-implemented computations. I was discussing with Kory, where we were meaning un-implemented by not implemented in the material world, assuming there is one, or for those who grasp UDA (including MGA): un-implemented means un- implemented relatively to the most probable computations executed (mathematically) by the UDA (interpreted in any model of arithmetic: the running is itself a mathematical object). Brent, have you understand the seven first step of UDA? Then you shorld understand that the only correct way to predict, in principle, any experiment (like dropping a pen) consists in putting a measure on uncertainty on the set of all computations going through your state of mind when you are doing the experiment, and seeing what happens in the majority of computational histories. All right? Don't worry if you don't like that, you will still have plenty of reason to criticize the proof by objecting on MGA. the UDA-without MGA is the easy part. MGA is far more subtle and complex. The complexity stems from philosophy of mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon
On 15 Nov 2008, at 15:57, John Mikes wrote: Dear Gordon Tsai, you wrote: ...How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system?... I am the 'heretic' who denies that we 'can'. Whatever we think as 'outside', is within our own thinking, no matter how we imagine to transcend our limitations. Bruno writes very smart things, I enjoy reading them, but 'with a grain of salt' that it is Brunoism, not binding in the limits to my imagination. I am not brunoîst, whatver that means. Please be careful with term like that, because some could believe there is a religion or worst, a philosophy, proposed by a certain bruno. Keep in mind I am just a studborn reasoner, trying to share a proof that IF you can survive with an artifial digital brain, even just in principle, whatever you decide the brain or the universe is, then Plato is right, and Aristotle is wrong: meaning the physical world emerge from elementary arithmetic. The physical world is not the fundamental background reality. The fundamental theory is number theory/computer science/mathematical logic. IIf you want, all what I have done, is to take one half of atheism (mechanism) and show it incompatible with one other half of atheism (materialism). That's all. I have no position, no theories, no ideas, really. Just an argument. There is no brunoism. There is a proof which is either correct, or wrong. And up to today, all the many (serious) scientists who have study the proof have not find any error, and it is academically received, except by some philosopher and other pseudo- religious people from literature and media. It is a proof, like the proof that the square root of 2 cannot be equal to the ratio of two integers. Once you understand it, you understand we have to live with that for ever, or to change the meaning of our words (like the square root of two is the ratio of two generalized integers, why not, if you can make sense of it?). Bruno Marchal Sometimes I get startled by his strong arguments, sometimes I have the OK, but... response. I started on the list more than 10 years ago. Welcome to the place of free spirits John Mikes On 11/13/08, Gordon Tsai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno: I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It's like chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as 'self- observing 'ideal' machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain- building. Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from that, and by this move created modern science including theology as the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, both scientist and theologian get back to it. Of course poets and mystics know better And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument (hereafter MGA). It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic, or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same than mine: we don't need a material bottom. Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position. The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or not a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when directly implemented in arithmetic, or do you mean something different when you say the existence of mathematical physical universe? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement - I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's correct. If it exists, we have to explain how it wins the measure of uncertainty battle on all other programs which reach also your mind computational state in the universal deplyment. All right? (this follows from step seven). Do you mean that if mathematical physicalism is true, we need to offer a mathematical-physicalist solution to the white rabbit problem? I agree with that. And in fact, I don't claim to have a full solution to the white rabbit problem. However, I think the logical / philosophical arguments against the materialist's conception of matter are so strong, and the replacement of that conception with the concept of mathematical facts-of-the-matter is so fruitful, that the acceptance of mathematical physicalism is justified, even without a full solution to the white rabbit problem. Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. I would say some mathematical facts. I see your point, although someday later I might want to defend the position that I don't really need the word some. For that reason I am not sure you will appreciate the MGA, because you clearly seem to be aware we don't need material stuff. I'm interested to learn how similar the MGA is to my own reasons for accepting what I'm calling mathematical physicalism. It may turn out to be functionally identical to one of the arguments I've been using (in my head). Or it may be a complementary argument that I've never thought of. Or it may turn out that I don't find the argument persuasive, which may in turn indicate that what I'm calling mathematical physicalism isn't actually identical to your position. Or I might just think there's an easier or better way to get the same conclusion. In any case, I think it would be fruitful. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of life force, sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary for life. I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is, Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things that can count as a physical substrate. But that's just a restatement of the position that needs to be defended. When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's descriptions of the life-force. I agree 99% with you, and I have myself in my papers and in this list compared very often materialism with vitalism. In generally I do that after the seventh step of the UDA. At that step people should understand that, in case a concrete UD is executed integrally (infinite task) in our material universe, then, to predict what a pen will do if we drop it, we have to look at the entire set of possible computations going through our current state (when in from of that pen) OK? Now, are you aware that the MGA is just an argument to logically show that the material invocation, cannot indeed be used to contradict of weaken the consequence of those 7 steps? No need (for you!) of MGA, if you have already the (correct) intuition that using materialism just cannot work. The use of matter is indeed akin to the (fraudulous) use of God for explaining the existence of the universe. That explain nothing. But we do have a very strong intuition that matter does exist, and it is not so simple (and indeed quite subtle) to precisely show that primitive or fundamental matter is a red herring both for the mind and the body part of the mind-body problem. OK? I will begin by a step 0, for the MGA, where I sum up what should be completely clear before beginning the MGA itself. I have also to explain what the MGA does not. For example the MGA does not prove the inexistence of matter, it proves only to irrelevance of the notion of matter concerning again both mind and body, consciousness and physics. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote: But all possible implementations is a logical concept that exists only in platonia - Any program for the universal dovetailer like this one GEN DU implements all computations in our (apparently) material world we are sharing now. so what is the distinction between implemented and un-implemented computations. Suppose I am inviting you on the planet mars. We have to take a digital teleporter though (I can afford a two place tickets for a conventional rocket, sorry). So we are read and cut on the planet earth, and the information read is send on mars. There, I am reconstituted, and you, well, bad luck but the reconstitution-machine just break down. In that case, I am implemented on the planet mars, and you are not. Implementation is a relative notion. A program P is implemented on a universal machine M when P is translated in the language of the machine M, and when M is trigged so that it evaluates or executes the program P, on earth or in platonia. Implementation is a purely mathematical notion for the theoretical computer scientist. For the physicist, or the business man, it is true that the word is sometimes used in the sense of concretely implemented in a real machine in front of us. But note that the UD has been implemented and executed, for a few days, concretely on a Macintosh Computer in 1991. That is the key of the whole construction. The deployment of the UD is a precise concretisable object. This is made possible by the Godel's miracle, or Church's thesis. It is the only place in math were an epistemological notion (computation) admit a universal definition. Godel did not believe in Chuch thesis for a long time, and after he begin to accept it, he called it a miracle, because it is indeed hard to believe in it, when you are aware of Cantor's proof and the power of diagonalisation. As said Godel, it is amazing that Church thesis can survive to diagonalization. This is the hidden difficulty of the step seven. I thionk Tom Caylor grasped it through his redaing of the Cutland book. The notion of computation is highly non trivial. Computer (universal computing machine) are highly non trivial mathematical object (implemented or not here or there). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a sculptor to allow the statue to interact with the outside world. Similarly, if we claim that the vibrating atoms in the block of marble implement a computation, say calculating the product of two numbers, we need to build a computer to do the computation in a conventional way in order to work out what the mapping is. This would also apply if the putative computation were conscious and we wanted to interact with it. But what if we *don't* require that we interact with the computation: that is, what if the computation is of a self-contained virtual world with conscious beings? In that case, working out the mapping explicitly would allow us to observe what's going on in this world, but there's no reason why the consciousness of its inhabitants should be contingent on this occurring. You are right. It is an important point which works well for the DU computations. We don't have to be able to interact with the conscious entity, for them to be conscious. Now I would not use that for a material stone because there is no evidence that a stone computes, except very little programs for a few seconds. Strictly speaking, a mechanist has to admit that he does not know what a stone is, nor if that really exist. A stone can only be a stable pattern of his computational histories. Here the arguments could be unclear due to the fact that they are interpreted differently according to where we are in the reasoning. Let me sum up by saying that I agree with your logical point, but I think that to take a stone as an illustration for a computing entity could be problematical, at some point, for those who believe religiously in ... fundamental primitive stones. I let you know that I am working on MGA 0. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when implemented either directly in arithmetic, or in a mathematical physical universe itself implemented in arithmetic (or fortran, whatever). I think your point is just the same than mine: we don't need a material bottom. Yes. We may end up disagreeing about certain details (as any two philosophers will), but we seem to both hold the same basic position. I have no position (just an argument). Years ago, in a moment of weakness I have mentionned my perpetually oscillating positions, from hoping comp true (false) and believing it is false (true), the bad days, and the goods days hoping it true (false) and wanting it true (false). I mean even my taste is oscillating. But I think nobody should really care about things like that. as a professional, if you want, I care only on the sharable deductive results which is mainly that you can't have both mind and matter both computable. And the related: If MECH is true, then MAT is false. NOT MAT or NOT MEC. Read my post to John Mikes, which has been sent probably when you wrote your's. I am not a philosopher. If you really want to classify me, just say that I am a (neoneoplatonist) theologian (with or without grain of salt). I just take the opportunity of comp to transform philosophical problems into mathematical problems (nobody has to believe in the assumption, nor believe I believe them). The question for the existence of mathematical physical universe (your mathematical physicalism) is an open one. I'm a little bit confused by this, coming on the heels of your previous paragraph. Do you believe it's an open question whether or not a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when directly implemented in arithmetic, or do you mean something different when you say the existence of mathematical physical universe? In any case, I take a strong stance on the former statement - I think we have enough reason right now to conclude that it's correct. I guess you mean, ASSUMING COMP, and after the UDA-MGA proof. Then, the use of word is delicate, and can be understood only through the understanding of the argument, really. I can make a cautious try. You cannot implement a person in arithmetic, because they are all already implemented in arithmetic. You can' do that for the same reason you cannot make, by yourself, 17 a prime number. 17 is already prime, and persons are already implemented. Now, you can apparently implement arithmetic in our most probable computational histories, note the s. I say apparently because it is an empirical fact. It is enough to implement a computer like the one in front of you right now. And you can implement a person, by yourself in a computer, except you have to solve the AI problem or to implement the universal dovetalier (and then be patient, and not to demanding because you will not been able to extract the people from the universal computation). Now, even in the lucky case you implement a person on a computer, the consciousness of that person will noy been exclusively related to the computer in front of view which executes the person. from the person point of view, she will feel executed by an infinity of programs, inddeed all those already implemented in arithmetic. Give me a bit of time, and I will try to make this clear in MGA 0. This should be understandbale if yopu really 1) grasp the seven steps, and 2) abandon materialism (through MGA or not). The UDA says something about physics, that simple mathematicalism does not say, and it is related to the fact that the UD existence relies on Church thesis, like physics (and more) will be related to incompleteness and the mathematical structure of universal machine ignorance. You seem to forget or to be unaware that, a priori, nowhere in the deployment, does a physical structure arise. Physical structures arise in the memories of universal machine, and emerge, in a relative or conditional way, from a non computable (a priori) set of computable functions executions. Mathematical physicalism seems to invoke a program which would emulate somehow that sum on all computations; this seems impossible. But I agree that some facts are with you, it is a mystery (still too much non computable rabbits with comp). Yet if you are correct, then it means that your consciousness is defined by that the whole execution of that little programs. Comp is false, or is true but makes the whole universe my brain. Comp would be true in the weaker sense. Now, even if you are correct, it has to be justified completely from the comp hypothesis. If it
Re: QTI euthanasia
Günther Greindl wrote: Hello Brent, That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings good that you address this topic, I have also wondered a lot about how superposition/MWI/decoherence transfer to the macroscopic arena. Although I am not so quick to discard splitting of macroscopic objects. For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? It does in mathematical formalism. But the different splits are still very close together and so classically they don't make any observable difference - since you aren't a pure state in QM the mixture is still you. Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? Because in that case the split gets amplified enough to make a noticeable difference in you (and other large macroscopic things like instruments). And the experiments of Zeilinger Et al (Superposition of Fullerenes) do suggest that there is no scale at which superpositions stop. You mean this paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0402146 ? I thought it showed that any large warm body, even one as small as C70 would exhibit decoherence just from it's own interchange of IR photons. We are only not aware of the other persons/objects due to decoherence. Right. Decoherence makes superpositions inaccessible. But my point was that you, as a large classical object, are continually being entangled with your environment by interactions via photons, etc. This makes it impossible to separate out the strands of your superpositions, but in most cases it also ensures that the strands stay close together along the classical path and so the whole bundle can be regarded as a single classical object, you. Only when micrscopic QM events get amplified to create a classical difference will there be an observable split of you, e.g. into the you who saw up and the you who saw down. Can you recommend a paper which addresses this question (of macroscopic object splitting)? There's a very good review article by Schlosshauer: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312059 I should qualify all the above by saying that it's how most physicist think things will work out - but they haven't really been worked on yet. It isn't exactly clear how the classical arises from the quantum - it has it's own white rabbit problem http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3376 http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9412067 Brent Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/16 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, because that's the one I actually understand. It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a sculptor to allow the statue to interact with the outside world. Similarly, if we claim that the vibrating atoms in the block of marble implement a computation, say calculating the product of two numbers, we need to build a computer to do the computation in a conventional way in order to work out what the mapping is. This would also apply if the putative computation were conscious and we wanted to interact with it. But what if we *don't* require that we interact with the computation: that is, what if the computation is of a self-contained virtual world with conscious beings? In that case, working out the mapping explicitly would allow us to observe what's going on in this world, but there's no reason why the consciousness of its inhabitants should be contingent on this occurring. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/16 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be one-to-one (which is possible since a stone or other physical object has many microscopic states). I don't see why the mapping can't be one(physical-state)-to-many(computation-states). This wouldn't work if you actually tried to keep track of the computation - in that case you would need some sort of index variable - but that isn't a problem if you don't require that the computation interact with the world at the level of substrate of its implementation. If the mapping is something like: computation-state1---map1physical-state0 computation-state2---map2physical-state0 computation-state3---map3physical-state0 ... then the inverse mapping, physical-state0---1map---computation-state1 physical-state0---2map---computation-state2 physical-state0---3map---computation-state3 ... has to implicitly provide it's own order. So for the physical-state0 to implement the computation there would have to be another index variable, like time, to order the inverse mapping. Then it would really be physical-state0@ t=1---1map---computation-state1 physical-state0@ t=2---2map---computation-state2 physical-state0@ t=3---3map---computation-state3 ... Right? Brent. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? That's certainly the prevailing intuition. My position is that that intuition is incorrect, and that it bears a deep similarity to the (once prevailing) vitalist's intuition that some kind of life force, sufficiently different than inanimate matter, is necessary for life. I'm arguing that mathematical facts-of-the-matter all by themselves fulfill the requirements that the materialist's substrate is supposed to fulfill. The materialists disagree, but then the burden is on them to explain exactly what qualities this substrate needs to have, and why mathematical facts-of-the-matter don't fit the bill. I've never heard a non-question-begging response. What I've heard a lot of is, Mathematical facts-of-the-matter just aren't the kinds of things that can count as a physical substrate. But that's just a restatement of the position that needs to be defended. When the materialists try to describe what kind of thing *would* fit the bill, I find the descriptions as confusing as the vitalist's descriptions of the life-force. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote:
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness,
racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a
certain direction on the character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing
whether you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it -
you start off with physicalism and end up with some kind of
neoplatonism. Of course, you could still argue that you need some
kind of physical seed, but again what I take from this is that since
you can perform as much abstraction on the substrate as you like, it
doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be completely nothing.
My simplistic version works like this:
'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything'
Hmmm... You go to far. Since the failure of logicism, we know that yoy
will be unable to recover even the natural number from nothing, or
even from logic. To have the number, and thus the programs and the
computations, you need at least ... the numbers.
That is why elementary arithmetic is a good starting ontology. Without
the (natural) numbers, you don't get them, and with them, you can get
everything. And if comp is true, you get them with the right measure,
meaning it is just a mathematical problem to derive the SWE, from
which you can derive F= MA, and all the physical laws.
===
Stathis wrote also:
'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything'
Just what I was saying!
OK, I guess you were meaning by nothing: nothing physical. Of course
this is not nothing at all. We have to postulate the numbers without
which there is no notion of computations.
Even the UD, seen extensionally as a function, is the empty function
from nothing to nothing, given that it has no inputs and no outputs.
Set theoretically it belongs to nothing^nothing, which gives the set
{nothing}, which is a singleton, not an empty set. Of course, the
deployment is not particularly interesting when viewed extensionnaly.
It is then equivalent with the program BEGIN DO NOTHING REPEAT END.
The interest of the UD appears when viewed intensionnaly: it creates
and executes all programs, in all programming language.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Kory, nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position quite accurately :-) Cheers, Günther Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may be descriptions of beings who have built their own computers (which would ultimately be made out of gliders and so on). In that mundane sense, those beings perform computations and implement programs within that world. Even if those beings accepted what I'm calling Mathematical Physicalism, they could still talk about un-implemented programs, but they'd just mean unimplemented by us in this particular world. The same goes for existence and non-existence. As a Mathematical Physicalist, I believe that everything exists (at least, everything that's mathematically describable). But it's still convenient to say things like Unicorns don't exist, by which I just mean that they (probably) don't exist in my particular world. (And by my particular world, I really mean the cloud of worlds represented by all my possible future states and all my possible past states. And so on.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there could be a 'connective-tissue' of undecohered universes containing weird brains-in-superposition; these aren't consciousness, but perhaps we get a bit of bleed-through from the edges. Or is that just too darned uninformed and ridiculous...? 2008/11/16 Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
*I wonder whether my selves, after a split, retain their memories from the world before the split or now have all the memories appropriate to the self in the new universe. Theoretically of course, they wouldn't know the difference, but it seems strange to think that we might perceive entirely new sets of lifetime memories from Planck-second to Planck-second as we move through the cloud of possible universes. (Or do I have it completely wrong?) marty a. * Michael Rosefield wrote: If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there could be a 'connective-tissue' of undecohered universes containing weird brains-in-superposition; these aren't consciousness, but perhaps we get a bit of bleed-through from the edges. Or is that just too darned uninformed and ridiculous...? 2008/11/16 Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Surely the split is from a single history to multiple histories consistent with the original? Sure, you could say we move from identity to identity at random, but that is unlikely under QM and should be similarly improbable from any other metatheory. 2008/11/17 m.a. [EMAIL PROTECTED] *I wonder whether my selves, after a split, retain their memories from the world before the split or now have all the memories appropriate to the self in the new universe. Theoretically of course, they wouldn't know the difference, but it seems strange to think that we might perceive entirely new sets of lifetime memories from Planck-second to Planck-second as we move through the cloud of possible universes. (Or do I have it completely wrong?) marty a. * Michael Rosefield wrote: If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there could be a 'connective-tissue' of undecohered universes containing weird brains-in-superposition; these aren't consciousness, but perhaps we get a bit of bleed-through from the edges. Or is that just too darned uninformed and ridiculous...? 2008/11/16 Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] For instance, you don't have to perform a QM-experiment with explicit setup, looking around is enough - photons hit your eyes with different polarizations; why should no splitting occur here? Why only in the case where you perform an up/down-amplification experiment? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. This would contradict the linearity of the tensor product together with the linearity of the evolution of the wave. I think. I don't see this. For a non-materialist it seems that an un- implemented idea or program is an incoherent concept. An un- implemented idea or algorithm makes sense. For example a description of an algorithm A in natural language. Then an implementation of A in the universal language U consists in a formal string X such that if U is given X, UX, and run, the UX behaves like A was supposed to define, except for the unexpected bugs. implementation always means implementation in some language, But does un-implemented mean not implemented in any language? be it immaterial combinators or material hardware. With comp, the point is that material hardware needs itself to be implemented in arithmetic, except here it is not so much a direct implementation (unless Kory's, and Jason's mathematical physicalsim is true) but more like an emergence from all computations (and thus on all possible implementations But all possible implementations is a logical concept that exists only in platonia - so what is the distinction between implemented and un-implemented computations. Brent of all computations in the universal deployment). It is an open problem if the physics which emerge from all computations can be itself capture by one computations. I doubt it. If it exists, then it must have the shape of a sepical Universal Dovetailer, like a quantum Universal Dovetailer (why not, but for me this is very speculative). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this: 'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything' 2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is different than bare mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in order for the dust to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the role that physical existence is supposed to play. Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt the need to jump start the universe he wanted by performing the initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be jump-started. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is different than bare mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in order for the dust to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the role that physical existence is supposed to play. But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? The computation is realised in the mapping, a Platonic object, with the nature or even existence of the physical state being irrelevant. Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt the need to jump start the universe he wanted by performing the initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be jump-started. Yes, I guess he just added that part because it fit better with the story. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing whether you're in the 'stone reality' or some abstraction from it - you start off with physicalism and end up with some kind of neoplatonism. Of course, you could still argue that you need some kind of physical seed, but again what I take from this is that since you can perform as much abstraction on the substrate as you like, it doesn't matter how small it is - it can even be completely nothing. My simplistic version works like this: 'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything' Just what I was saying! -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]: 'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything' Just what I was saying! I was about to say that... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon
Dear Gordon Tsai, you wrote: ...How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system?... I am the 'heretic' who denies that we 'can'. Whatever we think as 'outside', is within our own thinking, no matter how we imagine to transcend our limitations. Bruno writes very smart things, I enjoy reading them, but 'with a grain of salt' that it is Brunoism, not binding in the limits to my imagination. Sometimes I get startled by his strong arguments, sometimes I have the OK, but... response. I started on the list more than 10 years ago. Welcome to the place of free spirits John Mikes On 11/13/08, Gordon Tsai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno: I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain 'the outside view' of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It's like chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as 'self-observing 'ideal' machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from that, and by this move created modern science including theology as the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, both scientist and theologian get back to it. Of course poets and mystics know better And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument (hereafter MGA). It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). I believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- experiments. MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like UDA, but it is deeply different. I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses it with other type of criticism of comp. It's easy for me to sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so you're usually preaching to the choir with me. You see! My point is that, I can imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? m.a. * Kory Heath wrote Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, At time T, is this cell on or off? For any cell at any time T, there's a mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on or off. My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're all you need for consciousness, and they're all you need for what materialists call physical reality. We can perform acts of computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, because that's the one I actually understand. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other physical systems, or to other mathematical objects, and eventually to any physicality you want. Just consider that it's completely irrelevant whether you start off with the platonic maths world or the physical world. If this seems unclear or silly, well, I am very drunk -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/16 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, because that's the one I actually understand. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be one-to-one (which is possible since a stone or other physical object has many microscopic states). If the mapping is something like: computation-state1---map1physical-state0 computation-state2---map2physical-state0 computation-state3---map3physical-state0 ... then the inverse mapping, physical-state0---1map---computation-state1 physical-state0---2map---computation-state2 physical-state0---3map---computation-state3 ... has to implicitly provide it's own order. So for the physical-state0 to implement the computation there would have to be another index variable, like time, to order the inverse mapping. Then it would really be physical-state0@ t=1---1map---computation-state1 physical-state0@ t=2---2map---computation-state2 physical-state0@ t=3---3map---computation-state3 ... Right? Brent. I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped onto a physical state should lead to the belief that (say) those mappings somehow support consciousnesses. I'm not very comfortable with the idea that a stone implements all computations. It may in fact be the case that those views are functionally equivalent to my suggestion that mathematical facts of the matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for the materialist, but I'm sticking with the latter formulation, because that's the one I actually understand. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could also post it on your homepage, for easier reference. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
I've always thought - and this might just be betraying my lack of understanding - that these are simply two sides of the same coin: we can't distinguish between these quantum events, so we can consider ourselves as either being a classical being 'above' a sea of quantum noise, or as being a bundle of identical consciousnesses generated in many different interacting universes. In the 1st interpretation, we don't split. In the second we do, but the split doesn't change us. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/14 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Kory Heath wrote: Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Kory Heath wrote: In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this room one second from now. If I'm about to step into a teleporter that's going to obliterate me and make a perfect copy of me in a distant blue room, how can it not be sensible to ask - in that mundane, everyday sense - What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now? It's sensible to ask because in fact there is no teleporter or duplicator or simulator that can provide the continuity of experiences that is Kory. So the model in which your consciousness is a single unified thing works. But there are hypothetical cases in which it doesn't make sense, or at least its sense is somewhat arbitrary. If something like the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is correct, then this kind of duplication is actually happening to me all the time. But I should still be able to ask a question like, What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now?, and the answer should still be I expect to still be sitting at this computer, typing this email. If the many-worlds theory simply disallows me from making statements like that, then there's something wrong with the many- worlds theory. But if the many-worlds theory *allows* me to make statements like that, then in that same sense, I should be able to ask What am I about to experience? when I step into a duplicating machine. I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. On the other hand, I think it's probably not that hard to duplicate a lot of your brain function, enough to instantiate a consciousness that at least thinks it's Kory and fools Kory's friends. But would such an approximate Kory create the ambiguity in the history of Korys that is inherent in Bruno's argument? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. You cannot use decoherence to introduce a collapse of the wave function. The MW is just the SWE. If Kory looks at a spin of particle in the superposition state (up + down), the swe gives Kory seeing up + Kory seeing down. Decoherence explains only why none Korys can be aware of their superposition. The many-world is just literal QM without collapse, that is, it is the SWE. The tightness of the Feynman bundle explains the normality (shortness) of the most probable paths. It explains why in most universe quantum white rabbit are rare. I will not insist because it is out of the MGA topic on which, as I said to Tholerus, I will (try to) concentrate May be you could search more detalied explanations on this that I have already given, and others have given, on the FOR-list. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. You are right. reasoning with thought experiments asks for possibilities in principle, not for possibilities in practice. This is important to understand for the MGA (as it is for UDA). best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read French only with difficulty and this unfortunately is probably also the case for many other list members. Perhaps if you do this you could also post it on your homepage, for easier reference. Nice to tell me. Sometimes I got the feeling I have no more things to explain to you. And thanks for the suggestion, I will, I certainly should, do that. (I am very lazy when it comes to make change on my webpage I must say) Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Hi Bruno, a very cool series of posts. I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to hear your version. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious? Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same impression with the discussion about zombie. For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad absurdo which will follow). But now we can redefined, or even just *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation) without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background. For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term as material implementation, but a non materialist can still believe in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of sort of quasi-material implementation: this would mean for him/her implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations. So we agree that a computation is not conscious. That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have to make the notion of person a bit more precise) Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Indeed, most computer programmer used the term implementation followed by in Fortran (or java, lisp, etc.). A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program) x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are machine capable of implementing all machines. (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like arithmetic implement all universal machines whose dreams (sharable first person stories) cohere into physical histories which then locally implement these universal machine into person. To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only if you take matter fro granted. I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, asap. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of me. I am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no consciousness... -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. You cannot use decoherence to introduce a collapse of the wave function. The MW is just the SWE. If Kory looks at a spin of particle in the superposition state (up + down), the swe gives Kory seeing up + Kory seeing down. Which is an example of amplifying (since otherwise Kory couldn't see it) a microscopic event. Decoherence explains only why none Korys can be aware of their superposition. The many-world is just literal QM without collapse, that is, it is the SWE. The tightness of the Feynman bundle explains the normality (shortness) of the most probable paths. It explains why in most universe quantum white rabbit are rare. That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings that are 'within' the fuzz, but I think these are far below the substitution level envisioned for your teleporter thought experiment. Brent I will not insist because it is out of the MGA topic on which, as I said to Tholerus, I will (try to) concentrate May be you could search more detalied explanations on this that I have already given, and others have given, on the FOR-list. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. You are right. reasoning with thought experiments asks for possibilities in principle, not for possibilities in practice. This is important to understand for the MGA (as it is for UDA). best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Thanks Günther. A long time ago Russell asks me to explain the UDA, and I have made the first presentation of it into steps for the everything-list. It was UDA in 15 steps, and it has converge to 7 steps, and that has helped a bit. I have also made on the list (with Joel, George and others) a pure one post- one step presentation, in 11 steps, which as been useful (at least for me). Probably MGA can benefit too from a step by step presentation, if only because post- mail fits with this procedure. I hope people will be candid enough to interrupt at the first unclarity. Steps are questions, and when we agree on the answer we can proceed. Soon with zombie and other daemons ! (yes the zombie question is a subproblem of MGA). Bruno On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:16, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, a very cool series of posts. I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to hear your version. Cheers, Günther http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious? Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same impression with the discussion about zombie. For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad absurdo which will follow). But now we can redefined, or even just *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation) without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background. For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term as material implementation, but a non materialist can still believe in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of sort of quasi-material implementation: this would mean for him/her implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations. I don't see this. For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist there can be no such distinction as implemented or not implemented. But then what can it mean to refer to an implementation relative to the most probable computations? Brent So we agree that a computation is not conscious. That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have to make the notion of person a bit more precise) Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Indeed, most computer programmer used the term implementation followed by in Fortran (or java, lisp, etc.). A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program) x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are machine capable of implementing all machines. (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like arithmetic implement all universal machines whose dreams (sharable first person stories) cohere into physical histories which then locally implement these universal machine into person. To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only if you take matter fro granted. I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, asap. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote: Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist). If you want a concrete example of a zombie, you can just think of me. I am an entity that have all the appearance of a human, but I have no consciousness... You are very *clever* ! (And I say this against my religion which forbids me to judge things like that). And you may be a zombie, that would perhaps explain how you can be an ultrafinitist. (joke?). I hope you will follow the MGA thread. The opinion of a zombie could be appreciate (joke?). Your last two posts were lovely. See if it is sufficiently new and if not collect and try to publish maybe. (At least collect the ideas. Such logic are useful for the study of the perceptible field. With comp we have to retrieve them or similar from the Z and X logic/hypostasis. The diameter of the thick bord is related to the ignorance hole from which emerge the parallel computations/realities, as seen from inside. Sure it has to be not too sick for eliminating the rabbits. it could also be related to the quantum h) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Fri, 2008-11-14 at 10:46 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings that are 'within' the fuzz, but I think these are far below the substitution level envisioned for your teleporter thought experiment. I think you've hit on an area that is sufficiently ill-understood by a layman like me to warrant further elaboration. It seems to me there is a strong similarity here with statistical mechanics. If I might speak loosely, there are a large number of quantum states that correspond to microstates of the system, while being Kory is a macrostate. Most microstate trajectories stay within the boundaries of a single macrostate trajectory. But sometimes the microstate trajectories can diverge enough, due to an amplification process, to cause the macrostate trajectory to divide into two. (This of course leaves out definitions of all the above, but I hope you get the gist of it.) To me this makes much more intuitive sense than using words like universes splitting into copies, or even many worlds. Part of my difficulty in grasping some of the discussion here is that we tend to speak of aggregrate objects consisting of many particles, yet refer to quantum properties of individual particles when discussing superposition, etc. I get the single particle stuff fairly well, but it's the transition to large systems of particles that have an aggregate identity of me that I think is sometimes glossed over. In statistical mechanics, aggregates have properties and behavior (like temperature, pressure, and density) that don't exist in single particle systems. Likewise, macroscopic objects have independent identities (macrostates) that persist even when their component particles go through many changes at the atomic level. I'm almost to the point where I understand how decoherence causes the above to be true... -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Nov 13, 2008, at 10:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Ok. I wanted to try putting things in terms of the MWI rather than a more extreme version of many-worlds like Bruno's, since a lot more people accept the MWI. But of course, I can make the point I'm making without talking about the MWI. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. In a previous post, you wrote that someday we'll be able to build robots that really do exhibit conscious behavior. (I agree.) If we can do that, we can also dispense with the robot bodies and just make software that exhibits conscious behavior. When that happens, I will believe that this manufactured person (let's call him Fred) is as conscious as I am. It will be a trivial matter to teleport Fred or make multiple copies of him. Therefore, in the sense that matters to this conversation, we do know that teleportation is physically possible in this universe. If I'm understanding you correctly, you're arguing that it's ok to talk about what Fred should expect to experience one second from now as long as we don't make multiple copies of him. But if we tell Fred that we're about to duplicate him, and put one copy of him in a (virtual) red room and one in a (virtual) blue room, it doesn't make any sense for him to ask, What am I about to experience? I'm arguing that it is still a sensible question, and that You're going to find yourself in a red room or in a blue room is (one) sensible answer. Of course, we have to strip this answer of the metaphysical baggage that makes it *sound* like we're implying that one or the other of the two copies must be the real Fred. I think we can say Fred is going to find himself in a red room or in a blue room, while fully acknowledging that, from the third-person point of view, both copies are Fred (or whatever other way we choose to say it). It's similar to the way that we keep using the word I, even though we don't believe in a soul or a unified consciousness. If you agree with the last paragraph, then we've pretty much been arguing about nothing. If you don't, I'd be interested to hear why. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite right to refer to persons represented by unperformed computations. But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying to say. Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, At time T, is this cell on or off? For any cell at any time T, there's a mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on or off. My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're all you need for consciousness, and they're all you need for what materialists call physical reality. We can perform acts of computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this position. For instance: Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. Or All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious. Or even just Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious. Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is Mathematical Physicalism. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or computers or whatever) perform in our world. So it's still not quite right to refer to persons represented by unperformed computations. But I still want some concise way of correctly saying what I'm trying to say. Imagine an infinite two-dimensional lattice filled with the binary digits of PI. (Start with any cell and fill in the digits of PI in an outwardly-expanding square spiral.) Imagine the rules of Conway's Life. We can point to any cell in this infinite lattice, and ask, At time T, is this cell on or off? For any cell at any time T, there's a mathematical fact-of-the-matter about whether or not that cell is on or off. My essential position is that these mathematical facts-of-the-matter play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. If, within that mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI, there are patterns of bits (i.e. patterns of mathematical facts) that describe conscious persons, I claim that those persons are in fact conscious (and necessarily so), because those mathematical facts are as real as anything gets. They're all you need for consciousness, and they're all you need for what materialists call physical reality. We can perform acts of computation in our world in order to view some of those mathematical facts, but those acts of computation don't create consciousness. That's not an argument. It's just a position statement. All I'm looking for at the moment is a good one-sentence summary of this position. For instance: Mathematical facts play the role that physical existence is supposed to play for materialists. Or All persons described by mathematical facts are necessarily conscious. Or even just Collections of mathematical facts can be conscious. Incidentally, I'd also like a name for this position. My top pick is Mathematical Physicalism. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is different than bare mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in order for the dust to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the role that physical existence is supposed to play. Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt the need to jump start the universe he wanted by performing the initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be jump-started. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/13 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. Yes indeed, that's the problem. I can discuss almost any of these strange ideas (comp, many worlds, duplication thought experiments) and most people are willing to at least consider them. But tell them the world is just a dream, running on no hardware at all, and they say that's crazy. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from that, and by this move created modern science including theology as the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, both scientist and theologian get back to it. Of course poets and mystics know better And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument (hereafter MGA). It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). I believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- experiments. MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like UDA, but it is deeply different. I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses it with other type of criticism of comp. It's easy for me to sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so you're usually preaching to the choir with me. You see! My point is that, I can imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok, that makes sense *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that. Dennett, like many naturalist is not aware that the notion of matter is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and Malebranche). Today people thought about the consciousness problem, when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not progressed at all in the hard problem of matter, on the contrary, modern physics (quantum physics) makes the problem of matter even harder (which in a sense *constitutes* a progress of course). The QM many worlds saves the idea that matter is something objective, but even the many worlds does not explain what matter is, and if it is, at all. Dennett gives a good criteria of what could be an explanation of intelligence or consciousness. It has to be something relating NON- INTELLIGENT (or non-conscious) entity in such a way it explains intelligence or consciousness. This is the basic idea behind Putnam's functionalism, or even computationalism (which is the belief that functionalism is true at least at some level of description of oneself). So, why does Dennett not ask the same for an explanation of matter. Matter should be explained without any use of the word matter, and so it should be explained by relating only ... non material entities. But nobody asks for that. Why? Because we are hardwired for not doubting matter. We take for granted that matter is made of ... matter. Now, physics, if you look at it,
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno: I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside view’ of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing ‘ideal’ machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside’ (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody’s home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from that, and by this move created modern science including theology as the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, both scientist and theologian get back to it. Of course poets and mystics know better And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument (hereafter MGA). It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). I believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- experiments. MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like UDA, but it is deeply different. I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses it with other type of criticism of comp. It's easy for me to sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so you're usually preaching to the choir with me. You see! My point is that, I can imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok, that makes sense *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that. Dennett, like many naturalist is not aware that the notion of matter is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and Malebranche). Today people thought about the consciousness problem, when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not progressed at all in the hard problem of matter, on the contrary, modern physics (quantum physics
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious? Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they already agree with the conclusion. You're right. I do already accept the conclusion. But it's my impression that almost no one else in the world does. I suspect that there are others on this list who do, but even then, I'm not sure they represent a majority. (Should I start an informal poll? How many people on this list believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious?) My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the consequences of that conclusion after you accept it. Obviously, there's nothing wrong with focusing on the issues that interest you most. But for the world-at-large, the primary issue is *why* we should accept in the first place that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious. As I said earlier, I've never seen it laid out convincingly. (At least, not in the one language I can read. :) I'm aware that exploring the consequences of the conclusion can lend support to the conclusion itself. For instance, if you can show that something like quantum physics emerges from the idea that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious, that counts as evidence. But that's a hard road to go. Arguments involving Godel, Loebian machines, etc., go over my head, and will go over most other people's heads as well. Dennett, like many naturalist is not aware that the notion of matter is not obvious at all. For what it's worth, Dennett made some interesting comments about this somewhere. (Maybe in Dennett and His Critics, but I can't remember for sure.) He basically said that, in his capacity as a professional philosopher, he's chosen to focus on the issue of how persons represented by implemented computations can be conscious. (He didn't put it that way, but I think that's a good way of saying it.) When it comes to ontology, he's essentially a layperson. He's willing to accept the standard naturalist ontology (and the standard view of impelmentation) so that he can focus on his philosophical specialty. He even indicated that he has some private opinions about ontology, but he doesn't feel qualified enough to air those opinions in public. For all we know, he *is* aware that the notion of matter is not obvious at all. It's just not the issue he's chosen to focus on. My point is that one can read Dennett as if he were entirely agnostic about the question of whether persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious. Almost everything he says about consciousness still makes sense without the assumption of matter, even if he himself does assume it. Now I feel guilty. There is just no presentations of the MGA in English. The MGA appears the first time in my 1988 paper, written in french. [snip] In this list, I have always suggest people to read the Maudlins paper 1989, which develops a similar argument. I don't know French, and I've never tracked down Maudlin's paper. I've only read previous threads on this list, like this one: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/567c5ffde76c70a/780e5a48fb33724e?hl=enlnk=gstq=olympia#780e5a48fb33724e I don't really grasp the argument presented in that thread, so (therefore) I don't find it very convincing. Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Kory Heath wrote: Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Kory Heath wrote: In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this room one second from now. If I'm about to step into a teleporter that's going to obliterate me and make a perfect copy of me in a distant blue room, how can it not be sensible to ask - in that mundane, everyday sense - What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now? It's sensible to ask because in fact there is no teleporter or duplicator or simulator that can provide the continuity of experiences that is Kory. So the model in which your consciousness is a single unified thing works. But there are hypothetical cases in which it doesn't make sense, or at least its sense is somewhat arbitrary. If something like the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is correct, then this kind of duplication is actually happening to me all the time. But I should still be able to ask a question like, What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now?, and the answer should still be I expect to still be sitting at this computer, typing this email. If the many-worlds theory simply disallows me from making statements like that, then there's something wrong with the many- worlds theory. But if the many-worlds theory *allows* me to make statements like that, then in that same sense, I should be able to ask What am I about to experience? when I step into a duplicating machine. I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into significantly different Korys because your interaction with the environment keeps the Kory part of the wave function continuously decohered. So in a Feynman path-integral picture, you are a very tight bundle of paths centered around the classical path. Only if some microscopic split gets amplified and affects you do you split. I doubt that it will ever be possible to build a teleporter. Lawrence Krauss wrote about the problem in The Physics of Star Trek. I'm not sure what it would mean for Bruno's argument if a teleporter were shown to be strictly impossible; after all it's just a thought experiment. On the other hand, I think it's probably not that hard to duplicate a lot of your brain function, enough to instantiate a consciousness that at least thinks it's Kory and fools Kory's friends. But would such an approximate Kory create the ambiguity in the history of Korys that is inherent in Bruno's argument? Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 11 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation. http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/9412/9412067v2.pdf Brent If Dowker and Kent were right, in that pdf, it would mean QM itself is already in contradiction with the aristotelian conception of the physical universe. I would not have dared to a such incredible confirmation of comp. But I am not convince by Dowker and Brent critics, except on some point about Omnès. In my opinion Everett + Gleason + Feynman already solve the quantum white rabbit problem, and so beautifully, that I always take this is as an evidence that the comp physics will be mainly QM. Again, if Dowker and Kent were correct, and if they were not using the conscience/matter identity principle at the start, their argument would lead that comp has to give rise to a correction of QM, or abandonned. But I doubt it, and I don't think many have accepted Kent reasoning. See Wallace papers for a more correct analysis, imo. IF even QM has still white rabbits, this is a case in favor of comp, where the white rabbits cannot be hunted away even by postulating any theory. They have to be hunted away from pure computer science, in a purely internal way. That pure QM does not solve all problems, in particular the mind-body problem, should be obvious. All my point is that Everett needs comp, and he does not take comp seriously enough. Indeed, if comp is true, and if QM is true, QM has to be justified from comp without postulating a universe. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 11 Nov 2008, at 22:44, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. I don't consider myself or any observer glued to any single reality, yet I still believe coherent realities exist. See below. How does the computability of the universe relate to the evacuation of white rabbits? In the sense that if the white rabbits are computable, then it is hard to see why to call them white rabbits at all. In the worst case they will be called complex unknown, like the shape of the clouds, or far away galaxies ... If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1- inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable things. I think we are in general agreement regarding the idea that a first person experience belongs to many (perhaps infinite) computational histories. First person experience belongs to many (necessarily infinite) computational histories (from UDA), but OK. I think the confusion may have come down to language, in particular how we defined universe. I see now you take universe to mean the perceived environment that appears as a first person experience to observers. I also see how this collection of possible histories can be incomputable/unknowable. Whereas, I was defining universe to mean a single consistent computational/mathematical history which may implement computations that form first person experiences. Hmmm... Such a universe cannot exist, unless you are willing to call the Universal Deployment itself a universe. Then OK, and the universe is a tiny part Arithmetical Truth. A computation is enough to have a consciousness, once
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/12 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. This is what I try to clarify too. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) Which gives you perhaps a bit of time to study other's proposal. Of course if it is just a question of taste, I can' help you. Kory, I give you on plate a complete detailed, obviously a bit long and not so simple, argument which shows, or is supposed to show, that if mechanism is true there is no primary material universe, and you ask for a more tasty argument? I give you the blue pill, and you ask for ... what, marmelade, chocolate? (Sorry Kim Jones, I fall into simple sarcasm (again)) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. I believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- experiments. I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. It's easy for me to sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so you're usually preaching to the choir with me. My point is that, I can imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok, that makes sense *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that. I guess what it comes down to is that the Movie Graph Argument on its own doesn't seem fully convincing to me. But it's quite possible that I don't fully understand that argument. (I have my own reasons for believing that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, and sometimes I think some of them are functionally equivalent to the MGA, but I'm not sure.) Where is the clearest statement of the MGA? -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Hi Brent, On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap between computer science and computer's computer science ... Physics is the fixed point of universal machine self observation. That would be a very impressive result if you could prove it - and you could prove that there is no other empirically equivalent model. I will try to explain, as simply as possible, that this has been proved. Indeed by UDA[1...8]. I've long been of the opinion that space and time are constructs. I also think the integers and arithmetic are constructs. But so far I understand your thesis to be that physics consists of certain relations among experiences regarded as mental events. You can say so, although this is already a simplification. Useful to give an idea to the layman, but also capable of making rise to non genuine objection for the expert. I will not try to un-simplify your point, if I can say, and I will interpret it favorably. This solves the mind-body problem by making the body a construct of the mind. So far, so good. OK. OK. (well, to be sure, consciousness remains to be explained, but consciousness will be explained by the gap between G and G*, but this is locally out of the current topic). Further, you hold that these relations are Turing computable and so exist in Platonia as a subset of all arithmetic. If by these relations you mean those related to my mind, then I am OK. I like this better than Tegmark's idea of our physics as a subset of all mathematics because your idea is more specific and leads to questions that may be answerable. I don't think it is a question of liking, but ... I share your liking. Remember that I pretend that all what I say is a direct consequence of the (digital) mechanist assumption. And then it is Church thesis which makes such an approach so robust. Nobody can know my opinion on the matter. (Except that once I said I don't know). But I still see some problems: First, it doesn't eliminate the possibility that some other subset of Platonia, e.g. geometry or topology, might also provide a representation of our physics. In fact, given that our knowledge of physics is imprecise, it seems likely that there are infinitely many subsets of Platonia that are models of our physics. No. To predict first person experiences, we have to integrate (sum on, taking into account of) ALL the representations occurring in the universal deployment. Ontologically, we have all computations. The UD generates, by dovetailing all those computations. Your next state is determined by a measure of uncertainty bearing on all computations going through your present state. What is obvious for the naturalist, i.e. the fact that your next state is determined by your present state by a simple computational equation (like SWE), is NOT obvious for the digital mechanist. There is already a continuum of (infinite) computations---involving white rabbits, white noise, and all computational and non computational beings--- going through your current state. If a physics emerges from that, it is just an open problem if that physics is computational or not, actually we just don't know yet if that physics even exists or not (with comp). What we know, is that IF a physics emerges THEN it takes into account, and sum up, infinities of computations. This follows by taking steps 5, 6 and 7, and 8 (when not executing the UD). Of course you can argue that even a non-computable model of physics may be approximated by a computable model to an adequate degree. But this just pushes the question off to what is adequate and it does not warrant rejecting materialism as explicated by Peter. The rejection of materialism is really step 8 (the movie graph). It explains why we don't have to run the UD, and why we can rely on the natural UD determined by all true (and provable, here) sentence of even just Robinson Arithmetic. Your current state of mind, and indeed the state of mind of all possible Loebian machines (far richer than Robinson Arithmetic) occurs in all finite or enumerable approximations of any possible model of physics rich enough to generate your states. But, mainly because you cannot be aware of the delay done by the UD, you, from your first person point of view, are living in the infinite union of all those finite approximations. Again: there is no reason a priori why they have to be computable (and giving the subdovetailing on the reals, they have to posses uncomputable aspects when we look at ourself below our level of substitution. Second, is the problem of finding the fixed point, or distinguishing the
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal skrev: On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote: Many physicists think that an ultimate theory would be discrete, This is highly implausible, assuming comp. I know that if we want quantize gravitation, then space and time should be quantized, but then I hope other things will remain continuous, like the statistics (hoping it is enough). But for the reason above, the first persons cannot escape the feeling or the appearances of continua (assuming mech.). You do not need anything continuous. When you look at a movie, you are shown 24 pictures every second, but you feel like it is a continuous movie. But in reality it is just 24 discrete events every second. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable things. The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the theory of mind/numbers. Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the seven step of the thought experiment/experience? Don't hesitate to ask again if this does not help, I feel I miss what you don't understand. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation. http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/9412/9412067v2.pdf Brent But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable things. The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the theory of mind/numbers. Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the seven step of the thought experiment/experience? Don't hesitate to ask again if this does not help, I feel I miss what you don't understand. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. I don't consider myself or any observer glued to any single reality, yet I still believe coherent realities exist. See below. How does the computability of the universe relate to the evacuation of white rabbits? If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable things. I think we are in general agreement regarding the idea that a first person experience belongs to many (perhaps infinite) computational histories. I think the confusion may have come down to language, in particular how we defined universe. I see now you take universe to mean the perceived environment that appears as a first person experience to observers. I also see how this collection of possible histories can be incomputable/unknowable. Whereas, I was defining universe to mean a single consistent computational/mathematical history which may implement computations that form first person experiences. These first person view points, by mechanism, would not be unique to any particular history, but belong to all histories which implement the same computations. Individual histories, as I see it, may or may not be computable, but both can implement computational histories/information patterns that are the basis of consciousness. To me the non-existence of white rabbits might be explained by the much higher frequency of histories that have simple rules, and randomized initial states. A mathematical object is defined out there where the initial condition is this universe exactly as it is now, only a giant white rabbit is standing before you, but such mathematical objects that start at such a highly ordered state that contains all life on
Re: QTI euthanasia
John, I meant loosely a universe conceivable by anyone (that might conceivably exist [?]), not limited to human conceptions. Jason On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 1:30 PM, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jason, I don't have anything against your question just pick one expression from your post: ---...or are there other conceivable universes...-- Are you meaning that conceivable (for us?) includes 'inconceivable' (for us) as well, or would you rather restrict your 'list' to such universes that are within the restrictions of our human concepts? John M On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 11:34 AM, Jason Resch [EMAIL PROTECTED]wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Thanks, Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- inline: 347.png
Re: QTI euthanasia
Le 09-nov.-08, à 20:29, Brent Meeker a écrit : You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap between computer science and computer's computer science ... Physics is the fixed point of universal machine self observation. That would be a very impressive result if you could prove it - and you could prove that there is no other empirically equivalent model. As I said, you don't get yet the whole point. UDA+MGA *is* the proof. You seem very near though. I will come back on this and on your post and Kory's one, once I am a little less busy. Probably the day after tomorrow. But UDA (including MGA) is really presented (at least) as a definite proof that IF I am a digitalisable machine (whatever I am beside that) THEN there is no more choice in the matter: Physics is the fixed point of universal machine introspection, and any verifiable empîrical model which would contradict the unique comp-physics would give an empirical reason to believe that comp is false. This is what I try to say in the list since the beginning. I am, for sure, open to the idea that there is an error in the proof, but up to now, I have heard only of rumors (mainly made by some dogmatic materialist who seems never to have really studied the argument). The proof is easy, because it is non constructive. The interview with the lobian machine makes it constructive. This is more technical and actually it is not needed to get the proof. It is needed only to derive explicitly physics from comp. The logic Z1* gives already the logic of the observable propositions, and Z1*, that very special non classical logic, is confirmed up to now by the empirical work (quantum physics). Best regards, Bruno PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Up to now, the apparent emulability of Everett Universe, and its lack of first person rabbits does contradict comp. But again, this moves is shown technically weak once we take incompleteness seriously into account in the picture. This is also why it is hard for me not to mention the technical part. Without that part, I would have stop to assume comp since a long time! I know that I am saying something terribly counter-intuitive, especially after 1500 years of Aristotelianism in the science of matter. We will come back on this asap. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of logical possibility. Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to state my position would be that I think the standard conception of philosophical zombie is incoherent. I tend to use the terms logically impossible and incoherent interchangeably, but that's probably sloppy philosophizing. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations and variant, if only that for example ...)? It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do you see what I mean? Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that (for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about zombies. And in fact, they're correct - zombie is a technical term that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to *physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave identically to conscious things but aren't conscious. So the technical term zombie carries along with it the baggage of physical existence. That baggage could be eliminated - maybe you could convince Dennett that computations don't have to be implemented in order to be conscious - but you couldn't do it simply by suggesting that unimplemented computations should count as zombies. In actual fact, I think the real burden is on the people who believe that a computation needs to be implemented in order to be conscious. But now we're just playing what Dennett calls burden tennis. They can just say that the burden lies on us to show why the burden lies on them. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. I'm not sure what counts as an accidental zombie. Do you mean something like the following: I can write a very short computer program that accepts ascii characters as input, and then spews out a random series of characters as output, and then accepts more input, etc. It's logically possible for me to have a conversation with this program in which the program just happens (by accident) to pass the Turing Test with flying colors. Is this what you mean by an accidental zombie? If so, it's important to understand that this is not a zombie at all by Dennett's definition (unless I've really misunderstood Dennett). A zombie is something that's physically indistinguishable from a physical conscious entity and yet isn't conscious. That program might be accidentally behaving as if it were conscious, but if you had the proper instruments to examine it physically, you would be able to conclude exactly that: it's a random number generator that's accidentally behaving as though it were conscious. Dennett would claim that a random number generator that passes a Turing Test is logically possible (but extraordinarily unlikely), and he'd happily claim that it's not conscious. He'd claim that zombies are something different, and that they're logically impossible. (He's also used words like unimaginable and incoherent.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
2008/11/9 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that (for instance) you would have to implement a cellular automata in order for creatures within it to be conscious. If you were to argue that they do therefore believe in zombies of a certain type, they would just say that that's not what they mean when they talk about zombies. And in fact, they're correct - zombie is a technical term that philosophers have invented, and by their definition it refers to *physical* things (or *implemented* computations) that behave identically to conscious things but aren't conscious. Bruno, as I understand him, does not believe that you need a basic physical world in order to implement a computation; rather, it is the computation that gives rise to the physical world. This is in step 8 of the UDA, probably the most counterintuitive and most difficult to grasp part of the argument. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something the same as creating it? Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or finite pieces of computations). How can we decide these entities (what makes them entities?) are or are not conscious? We just cannot decide. I understand that up to the map of our personal ignorance = physical things How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail phyisical things? Well, this is really the point of the whole reasoning. UDA(1...7) + UDA.8 I think now that if you have grasped up to step 6. It is really step 7 which explain why the laws of physics have to emerge from computer science or number theory. Imagine that in our physical universe (assumed, if only to get the contradiction) a real concrete UD is running. This makes intuitive sense. I have implemented in 1991 a UD, and it has run for two weeks. The UD has no inputs and no outputs. It just runs, and simulate all possible programs on all possible inputs with all possible (piece of) oracles. The existence of this UD is not something obvious, but it does exist, and is even constructible, if we accept Church Thesis. With Church thesis, even a DU written in FORTRAN, and dovetailing only on the fortran programs will generates all the program in LISP, but also in all not yet invented languages, and runs them. OK? I assume here also (in step 7) that our physical universe is robust enough to let the UD run forever. If you grasp up to step 6, then you should understand that if you decide here and now to do any physical experiment, like sending a photon on a mirror, or like observing an apple in a tree, the only real and correct way to predict or evaluate what will happen, is NO MORE to use the physical laws of your universe, but to look at all the computational histories generated through by the UD up to your actual state of mind (this exists because we assume comp). And what will happen is what happen in most of those stories. OK? So, even, without the Movie Graph Argument, if such a concrete UD exists, if no white rabbits appears and if the photon bounce, or the apple falls on the ground, you can deduce that the physical laws' describe those more common histories. At this point a mechanist who want to stay naturalist and keep a physical lawful universe can decide that such a universe just cannot run the UD, nor a too big portion of it. This would indeed evacuate the comp white rabbits, and reinstate a sense to physical law. But then MGA, UDA step 8, shows that such a move don't work. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Bruno Marchal wrote: Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker: On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote: I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both locations simultaneously. Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as its first premise, then it is possible to instantiate a consciousness within a computer. Therefore instead of a physical teleportation from Brussels to Washington and Moscow instead we will have a digital transfer. This will allow the experimenter to have complete control over the input each mind receives and guarantee identical content of experience. A volunteer in Brussels has her brain frozen and scanned at the necessary substitution level and the results are loaded into a computer with the appropriate simulation software that can accurately model her brain's functions, therefore from her perspective, her consciousness continues onward from the time her brain was frozen. To implement the teleportation, the simulation in the computer in Brussels is paused, and a snapshot of the current state is sent over the Internet to two computers, one in Washington and the other in Moscow, each of these computers has the same simulation software and upon receipt, resume the simulation of the brain where it left off in Brussels. The question is: if the sensory input is pre-fabricated and identical in both computers, are there two minds, or simply two implementations of the same mind? If you believe there are two minds, consider the following additional steps. Only one mind, belonging to two relative histories (among an infinity). Since it was established that the experimenter can teleport minds by pausing a simulation, sending their content over the network, and resuming it elsewhere, then what happens if the experimenter wants to teleport the Washington mind to Moscow, and the Moscow mind to Washington? Assume that both computers were preset to run the simulation for X number of CPU instructions before pausing the simulation and transferring the state, such that the states are exactly the same when each is sent. Further assume that the harddrive space on the computers is limited, so as they receive the brain state, they overwrite their original save. During this procedure, the computers in Washington and Moscow each receive the other's brain state, however, it is exactly the same as the one they already had. Therefore the overwriting is a no-op. After the transfer is complete, each computer resumes the simulation. Now is Moscow's mind on the Washington computer? If so how did a no-op (overwriting the file with the same bits) accomplish the teleportation, if not, what makes the teleportation fail? What happens in the case where the Washington and Moscow computer shutdown for some period of time (5 minutes for example) and then ONLY the Moscow computer is turned back on. Did a virtual teleportation occur between Washington and Moscow to allow the consciousness that was in Washington to continue? If not, then would a physical transfer of the data from Washington to Moscow have saved its consciousness, and if so, what happened to the Moscow consciousness? The above thought experiments led me to conclude that both computers implement the same mind and are the same mind, despite having different explanations. Rigth. Turning off one of the computers in either Washington or Moscow, therefore, does not end the consciousness. Yes. Per the conclusions put forth in the UDA, the volunteer in Brussels would say she has a 1/2 chance of ending up in the Washington computer and 1/2 chance of ending up in the Moscow computer. Therefore, if you told her 15 minutes after the teleportation the computer in Washington will be shut off forever she should expect a 1/2 chance of dying. This seems to be a contradiction, as there is a virtual teleportation from Washington to Moscow which saves the consciousness in Washington from oblivion. So her chances of death are 0, not 1/2, which is only explainable if we assume that her mind is subjectively in both places after the first teleport from Brussels, and so long as a simulation of her mind exists somewhere she will never die. And an infinity of those simulations exists, a-spatially and a- temporally, in arithmetic, (or in the standard model of arithmetic) which entails comp-immortality (need step 8!). Actually a mind is never really located somewhere. Location is a construct of the mind. A (relative) body is what makes it possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to some history/computation-from-inside. The movie graph argument (the 8th of UDA) justifies the necessity of this, but just meditation on the phantom limbs can
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something the same as creating it? Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or finite pieces of computations). How can we decide these entities (what makes them entities?) are or are not conscious? We just cannot decide. I understand that up to the map of our personal ignorance = physical things How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail phyisical things? Well, this is really the point of the whole reasoning. UDA(1...7) + UDA.8 I think now that if you have grasped up to step 6. It is really step 7 which explain why the laws of physics have to emerge from computer science or number theory. Imagine that in our physical universe (assumed, if only to get the contradiction) a real concrete UD is running. This makes intuitive sense. I have implemented in 1991 a UD, and it has run for two weeks. The UD has no inputs and no outputs. It just runs, and simulate all possible programs on all possible inputs with all possible (piece of) oracles. The existence of this UD is not something obvious, but it does exist, and is even constructible, if we accept Church Thesis. With Church thesis, even a DU written in FORTRAN, and dovetailing only on the fortran programs will generates all the program in LISP, but also in all not yet invented languages, and runs them. OK? I assume here also (in step 7) that our physical universe is robust enough to let the UD run forever. If you grasp up to step 6, then you should understand that if you decide here and now to do any physical experiment, like sending a photon on a mirror, or like observing an apple in a tree, the only real and correct way to predict or evaluate what will happen, is NO MORE to use the physical laws of your universe, but to look at all the computational histories generated through by the UD up to your actual state of mind (this exists because we assume comp). And what will happen is what happen in most of those stories. OK? No. That seems to me to be assuming what you want to prove. It's assuming that computations instantiate universes and there is a probability measure proportional to their number in the UD. I look at it the other way around. IF I look at the computational histories generated by the UD and measure probabilities by their number and that accurately predicts what I observe - then that will be evidence that computations instantiate this universe (and all others). So, even, without the Movie Graph Argument, if such a concrete UD exists, if no white rabbits appears and if the photon bounce, or the apple falls on the ground, you can deduce that the physical laws' describe those more common histories. Right - but that's three conditionals. At this point a mechanist who want to stay naturalist and keep a physical lawful universe can decide that such a universe just cannot run the UD, nor a too big portion of it. This would indeed evacuate the comp white rabbits, and reinstate a sense to physical law. But then MGA, UDA step 8, shows that such a move don't work. Yes, I think I understand that part. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that, like your Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number generator but just happened to behave as if it were conscious. Ok. That works just as well for me. I'm not sure where you would draw the line between the accidentally convincing conversation and the accidentally behaving robot to say one was a philosophical zombie and the other wasn't. I wouldn't. I would say that neither of them are philosophical zombies at all. And I'm pretty sure that that would be Dennett's position. Since the concept is just a hypothetical it's a question of semantics. I agree. But the semantics are important when it comes to communicating with other philosophers. My only point at the beginning of this thread was that Bruno would be getting himself into hot water with other philosophers by claiming that unimplemented computations describing conscious beings should count as zombies, because that's a misuse of the established term. OK. It's just that the usual definition in strictly in terms of behavior and doesn't consider inner workings. But the inner workings are part of the behavior, and I'm pretty sure that the usual definition of philosophical zombie includes these inner workings. My own view is that someday we will understand a lot about the inner workings of brains; enough that we can tell what someone is thinking by monitoring the firing of neurons and that we will be able to build robots that really do exhibit conscious behavior (although see John McCarthy's website for why we shouldn't do this). When we've reached this state of knowledge, questions about qualia and what is consciousness will be seen to be the wrong questions. They will be like asking where is life located in an animal. As far as I understand it, this is exactly Dennett's position. Let's imagine we know enough about the inner working of brains to examine a brain and tell what that person is thinking, feeling, etc. Imagine that we certainly know enough to examine a brain and confirm that it is *not* just a random-number generator that's accidentally seeming to be conscious. We can look at a brain and tell that it really is responding to the words that are being spoken to it, etc. Let's say that we actually do examine some particular brain, and confirm that it's meeting all of our physical criteria of consciousness. Do you think it's logically possible for that brain to *not* be conscious? If you don't believe that, then you, like Dennett (and me), don't believe in the logical possibility of zombies. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that, like your Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number generator but just happened to behave as if it were conscious. Ok. That works just as well for me. I'm not sure where you would draw the line between the accidentally convincing conversation and the accidentally behaving robot to say one was a philosophical zombie and the other wasn't. I wouldn't. I would say that neither of them are philosophical zombies at all. And I'm pretty sure that that would be Dennett's position. Since the concept is just a hypothetical it's a question of semantics. I agree. But the semantics are important when it comes to communicating with other philosophers. My only point at the beginning of this thread was that Bruno would be getting himself into hot water with other philosophers by claiming that unimplemented computations describing conscious beings should count as zombies, because that's a misuse of the established term. OK. It's just that the usual definition in strictly in terms of behavior and doesn't consider inner workings. But the inner workings are part of the behavior, and I'm pretty sure that the usual definition of philosophical zombie includes these inner workings. My own view is that someday we will understand a lot about the inner workings of brains; enough that we can tell what someone is thinking by monitoring the firing of neurons and that we will be able to build robots that really do exhibit conscious behavior (although see John McCarthy's website for why we shouldn't do this). When we've reached this state of knowledge, questions about qualia and what is consciousness will be seen to be the wrong questions. They will be like asking where is life located in an animal. As far as I understand it, this is exactly Dennett's position. Let's imagine we know enough about the inner working of brains to examine a brain and tell what that person is thinking, feeling, etc. Imagine that we certainly know enough to examine a brain and confirm that it is *not* just a random-number generator that's accidentally seeming to be conscious. We can look at a brain and tell that it really is responding to the words that are being spoken to it, etc. Let's say that we actually do examine some particular brain, and confirm that it's meeting all of our physical criteria of consciousness. Do you think it's logically possible for that brain to *not* be conscious? If you don't believe that, then you, like Dennett (and me), don't believe in the logical possibility of zombies. I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of logical possibility. I don't think logic makes anything impossible except A and ~A; which is a failure of expression. So I tend to just say impossible or sometimes nomologically impossible. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Bruno, I can agree for all computational states of some (universal) machine. If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much general. Imo. I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states - depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the difference would then only be that with phys the states where not turing emulable. that 17 is not a prime number. Those are false statements, but assuming comp, your consciousness of the statement 17 is not a prime number will supervene on the TRUE statement that some machine have access the state corresponding to your belief that 17 is not prime. The true arithmetical statement on which consciousness will have to supervene are just description of computation under the form : the machine XXX has got the state YYY from the input RRR. Ok thanks - this is clear now. Maudlin assume PHYS and thus concludes there is a problem with MECH. I assume MECH and thus conclude there is a problem with PHYS. But the reasoning are equivalent. Yes, that is how I understood it. All right? It seems to me you have everything to understand the seven steps of the UDA. You are OK with 1...7. My point was that if you don't believe in arithmetical (as a particular case of philosophical) zombie, the the Movie Graph Argument is not needed. If you don't believe in what I would call physical zombie, and yet believe in primary physical things, then the MGA is needed (step 8). All right? I understand Step 8 as showing that if one accepts COMP, one has to associate conscious experience with abstract computations, not with physical implementations - by appeal to a thought experiment, which leaves me a bit queasy; but I tend to agree. I still do not understand what an arithmetical zombie should be - do you mean a computational state which would not be conscious? Now if I don't believe in arithmetical zombies, why would I not need step 8 to exclude the physical universe? I could dispute that arithemetics by itself without physical implementation has no consequence whatever, for instance. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Jason, Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new world/reality. I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in that context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you will stay here (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in expecting your next observer moment work this way. From a third person perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not experience all 3 locations at once. I think this is where I disagree, you _do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations. I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We come from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but it does not seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics *has to* be extracted from probability/credibility measure on computations. This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a 4- dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future states to the present. The vast majority of information within our brain state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of birth to death. This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current content of their experience. You are right. But when you look for the true reason why apples appear to fall on the ground. UDA(+AGF, that is 1...8) explains why the comp correct way to predict the behavior of the apple consists in looking in the universal deployment, and then looking at all computations going through your actual states (the one you have (by comp) once you observet the apple before dropping it), and, looking at the normal most probable stories/computations going through that state. Hmm... perhaps you have a problem with the UD? It does not just generate OM (Observer Moment). The DU generates all third person observer moments (as instantaneous state of universal self- observing machine) by generating all the stories (singular computations) going through that state. There is a continuum (from a first person pov) of such stories. The first person moment are different modalities. I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has access to as a means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones memories are not in the content of ones OM at any one time. You are right, but not at the level needed to understand why and how, assuming comp, we *have* to explain why apples falls from pure (mathematical) computer science. (or perhaps you are and there is a misunderstanding, to be sure). The reasoning should show comp testable. So we have to take into account all computations going through each observer moment to have normal relative expected values. A bit like already with QM and Everett. I think the importance of a particular computational history in defining an observer moment is not as important as memory/ communication isolation. You are right if your goal is to discover who you really are. But not if your goal is to understand why we have to derive Schoedinger Equation from computer science and number theory. It makes comp testable, and it provide a fundamental theory which does not eliminate the person. On the contrary it explains how person creates reality by history sharing. Somehow the
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think that's logically impossible.) -- Kory I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. But I don't know that Bruno allows that there is such a category as nomological, distinct from logical. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is implemented in some physical way. Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem in physics, he says). In the standard view, believing in philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think that's logically impossible.) It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of what you have already understand. I should do exams or things like that :) Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny, part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind states, through all possible computations, containing notably relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of histories. It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains description of our third person current conversation, including everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc. In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply the physical Universe exist. But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- materialist or substantialist explanation of matter. Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation for QM. I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a vast hierarchy of weakening of comp. To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing, with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron relatively to your measurements). Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations and variant, if only that for example ...)? It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do you see what I mean? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is implemented in some physical way. Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem in physics, he says). In the standard view, believing in philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think that's logically impossible.) It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of what you have already understand. I should do exams or things like that :) Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny, part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind states, through all possible computations, containing notably relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of histories. It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains description of our third person current conversation, including everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc. It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something the same as creating it? How can we decide these entities (what makes them entities?) are or are not conscious? In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply the physical Universe exist. But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- materialist or substantialist explanation of matter. Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation for QM. I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a vast hierarchy of weakening of comp. To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing, with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron relatively to your measurements). I understand that up to the map of our personal ignorance = physical things How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail phyisical things? Brent Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations and variant, if only that for example ...)? It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do you see what I mean? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno, Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all programs, or the equations of string theory defining all true solutions, etc. Therefore I would say the apparent physical universe is a timeless object that exists purely within math, and that our consciousness is formed by computations of processes that take place through one of the dimensions of the universe (time). I also believe there is no single mathematical object to which we can say we exist in, our certainty of which universe we can exist in changes all the time depending on the content of our OM. For example, when not thinking about the color of my tooth brush, and when not directly perceiving it, I exist in all universes where it is possible for my OM to exist, some of which my toothbrush is green, others red, or blue. Only when I stop and recall what color it is do I limit which universes I can belong to. Does your opinion differ in this regard? I am not sure if you believe in the actual existence of shareable physical (mathematical) universes or only in the dreams, which only occasionally give the appearance of shared histories. This to me sounds like the comp equivalent of Boltzmann brains, which I think would be less frequent than brains evolving through the full history of mathematical objects or computational universes. Regarding zombies, I think there can be outwardly appearing accidental zombies (from a third person view) that can appear conscious in certain circumstances but I don't think its possible to have two identical computational histories and only ascribe consciousness to one of them. Jason P.S. I apologize for the difficult to understand and half completed sentences that appeared in my previous post, I was writing notes of thoughts as they were coming to me and forgot to clean them up before sending out the message. On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Jason, Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new world/reality. I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in that context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you will stay here (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in expecting your next observer moment work this way. From a third person perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not experience all 3 locations at once. I think this is where I disagree, you _do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations. I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We come from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but it does not seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics *has to* be extracted from probability/credibility measure on computations. This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a 4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future states to the present. The vast majority of information within our brain state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of birth to death. This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current content of their experience. You are right. But when you look for the true reason why apples
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Hello Bruno, More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. Thus I can conceive zombies. Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not inconceivable. Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. Ok, I agree with that. and here you clarify: If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin* - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and step 8 false - physicalism true? do you mean because we could than program AIs which would behave correctly but would not be conscious? So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing between numbers. Ok, I'm with you. So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this very discussion we have here and now. Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but mentality. For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non existence of zombie. Ok. What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in line with a plenitude-like theory? False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for instance or whatever...) I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie come about? Can you give an example? Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in) such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ - maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as causing a problem for _comp_ If you define the zombies as having a material body, then it is I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does not have mental states, but X has mental states. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Isn't a zombie equivalent to, say, a spreadsheet that doesn't really perform the proper calculations, but produces all the right answers for all the data and functions you happen to put in? It seems like such an elaborate con-job is far more inefficient and intensive (and pointlessly so) once you put it in a rich enough environment. As someone probably once said, the quickest way to simulate the universe accurately is to be the universe. For me, consciousness is all about the simplification and unification of experience/assessment/action into higher and higher abstractions - to deal with a complicated world we have to make stories about it, and to deal with other people doing the same thing we have to make extremely complicated and self-referential stories. Consciousness is just the top layer, and sometimes done after-the-fact, simply because the machinery doesn't know not to. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/6 Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hello Bruno, More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. Thus I can conceive zombies. Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not inconceivable. Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. Ok, I agree with that. and here you clarify: If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin* - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and step 8 false - physicalism true? do you mean because we could than program AIs which would behave correctly but would not be conscious? So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing between numbers. Ok, I'm with you. So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this very discussion we have here and now. Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but mentality. For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non existence of zombie. Ok. What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in line with a plenitude-like theory? False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for instance or whatever...) I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie come about? Can you give an example? Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in) such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ - maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as causing a problem for _comp_ If you define the zombies as having a material body, then it is I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does not have mental states, but X has mental states. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Jason, Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new world/reality. I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in that context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you will stay here (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in expecting your next observer moment work this way. From a third person perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not experience all 3 locations at once. I think this is where I disagree, you _do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations. This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a 4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future states to the present. The vast majority of information within our brain state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of birth to death. This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current content of their experience. I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has access to as a means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones memories are not in the content of ones OM at any one time. Jason I think the importance of a particular computational history in defining an observer moment is not as important as memory/communication isolation. The Universal Dovetailer shares a single computational history as one well-defined short program, and it implements all possible observer moments. Yet would not all OM's it generates be considered the same since they share a single computational history? I think it is better to track the flow of information that goes (Experiencingo ne moment because of no communication from the future tothe past, and very low bandwidth rate from the past to the present) Surely if I was duplicated to 100 locations (only one of which was Moscow), I could wager $1 that I will not appear in Moscow, and 99 of my copies will be richer but One OM that travels across all OM's, the UD? ...Share computational history, same program, it is jsut that the information doesn't get linked between them. If you get this, I guess you are ready to understand step 7. I would be pleased to know if you get the step 7. If everyone agree with step 7, we can proceed to step 8, which is a bit more difficult. In my older presentations (like my PhD thesis), I always begin with step 8, and I call it the Movie Graph Argument. The older UDA was only 1...7. Only 1...7 shows that comp transform physics into a computer science probability calculus. The Movie Graph Argument singles out the difficulty to attach mind to matter, or consciousness to physical activity, oncer we *assume* the comp hyp. It is the Movie Graph Argument which shows that we don't have to run the UD in a concrete way. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think that's logically impossible.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Günther, unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to pose a question (to Bruno): Which is why I think philosophical zombies are impossible. I also think they are impossible, and you (Bruno) have already hinted once that you do not think them impossible, I don't think them impossible because I have seen such zombies! Indeed I have seen a false policeman on some road, they are for slowing down some cars. I don't attribute consciousness to cartoon policeman, so that they are zombies, at least when I am a failed by them. More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. Thus I can conceive zombies. Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. I criticize sometimes Bohm Quantum mechanics by invoking the fact that the wave without particles is full of zombies. and here you clarify: If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. Which arithemetical truths would correspond to philosophical zombies? I don't get this. This is different. If I am a digital machine, the complete description and even emulation of the computations leading to my mental state, at the right level (which exists once we assume the comp hyp of course) is entirely encoded into prove of statement like the machine described by the number 43554500901655 (say) on imput 4545665450098987 (say) go to the state 67567689043. Such a description constitute a provable arithmetical truth (it is a typical Sigma_1 truth, actually a Sigma_0 truth, meaning just it decidable. So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing between numbers. So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this very discussion we have here and now. For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non existence of zombie. I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie come about? Can you give an example? Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. If you define the zombies as having a material body, then it is different (again we should then better define zombie). But this move is irrelevant *after* the MGA. Best regards, Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
Le 03-nov.-08, à 08:32, Brent Meeker a écrit : I have reservations about #6: Consciousness is a process, but it depends on a context. That is why I use the notion of generalized brain. I take into account the possible need of a context. The argument would break only if you stipulate that the context cannot be captured digitally, but this would make the generalized brain non turing emulable, and this would mean comp is false. Recall that my point is that comp implies something, not that comp is true. In the argument as to whether a stone is a computer, even a universal computer, the error is in ignoring that the computation in a computer has an interpretation which the programmer provides. I don't see the relevance of this concerning the step #6. I have never written nor indeed believed that a stone can be a computer. If he can provide this interpretation to the processes within a stone, then indeed it would be a computer; but in general he can't. I agree with this, but I don't see the relevance. I think consciousness is similar; it is a process but it only has an interpretation as a *conscious* process within a context of perception and action within a world. In step six, the context is taken into account. Your argument will go through only if you think that the context is both needed integrally and is not turing emulable, But then comp is false. Also consciousness makes sense only, strictly speaking, for the subject. If some direct access to a world was needed throughout, then even the experience of dream becomes impossible. Which is why I think philosophical zombies are impossible. If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. But then, when you imagine reproducing someone's consciousness, in a computer and simulating all the input/output, i.e. all the context, then you have created a separate world in which there is a consciousness in the context of *that* world. But it doesn't follow that it is a consciousness in this world. To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not turing-emulable. But then comp is false. The identification of things that happen in the computer as He experiences this. depend on our interpretation of the computer program. There is no inherent, ding-an-sich consciousness. Here I disagree. This would entail that if you beat a child in a way such that nobody knows, then the child does not suffer. Your step #6 can be saved by supposing that a robot is constructed so that the duplicated consciousness lives in the context of our world, but this does not support the extension to the UD in step #7. To identify some program the UD is generating as reproducing someone's consciousness requires an interpretation. With comp the universal machine is the interpreter. Again you are telling me that comp is false. But an interpretation is a mapping between the program states and the real world states - so it presumes a real world. Then dreaming cannot be a conscious experience. But since the work of Laberge and Hearne, all brain physiologist accept this. I am afraid you put something magical (non Turing emulable) in the world and in consciousness. This makes us non digital machine or entity. I have several problems with step #8. What are consistent 1-histories? This is needed for the AUDA (arithmetical translation of the UDA). The movie graph just explain that comp makes it impossible to attach consciousness to the physical activity of the running UD. It explains why we don't have to run the UD. Digital machines cannot distinguish physical computations from arithmetical computations. Can they be characterized without reference to nomological consistency? The reduction to Platonia seems almost like a reduction argument against comp. This is certainly possible, but up to now, nobody has been able to get a contradiction. In the seventies, some people pretend that I have refute comp by showing it entails many-worlds. At least since Everett-Feynman-Deutsch, people have abandon this idea (that many worlds = contradiction). Except that comp was the assumption that one physical process can be replaced by another that instantiates the same physical relations. No, comp implicates the notion of me or of my consciousness. Comp is just the assumption that my consciousness is unchanged when my (generalized) brain is substituted by digital devices at some level of description. I don't see how it follows from that there need not be an instantiation at all and we can just assume that the timeless existence in Platonia is equivalent. Well, it comes from the impossibility to attach consciopusness to the exclusively physical: that is the point of the movie graph argument (also entailed by Maudlin's Olympia argument). You
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not turing-emulable. But then comp is false. Bruno, I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining I or world, but I was hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain this. In particular I do not follow how only one of I or the world can be computable, why not both? Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds and all possible Is? Thanks, Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 11:10 AM, Jason Resch [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not turing-emulable. But then comp is false. Bruno, I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining I or world, but I was hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain this. In particular I do not follow how only one of I or the world can be computable, why not both? Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds and all possible Is? Thanks, Jason Minor correction: I meant Universal Dovetailer not the UDA. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not turing-emulable. But then comp is false. Bruno, I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is so, perhaps I don't know how you are defining I or world, but I was hoping you could point me to a paper of yours or a past post which explain this. In particular I do not follow how only one of I or the world can be computable, why not both? Does the UDA not enumerate all possible worlds and all possible Is? Jason, People, Well I apologize because I have send the draft (brouillon) of my answer to Brent by error on the list. I intended to send it to my home computer so that I can make corrections before. But's ok. Here I was recalling the definition of generalized brain: the portion of the universe that you have to emulate digitally for surviving in a comp teleportation. Some people indeed want to make consciousness supervening on the brain + some context (the world), and see that as an objection to the uda. but that is why I put such context in the generalized brain, and the argument still go through, unless that generalized brainis supposed to be not turing emulable. The thought experiment per se is harder to perform (how to put the moon in the teleportation box for those who put the moon as part of their context-brain!), but when the DU is introduced we see that the bigness of whatever is taken as a context is not relevant, as far as it is computable. COMP assumes that such a digital relatively relevant descriptive portion of universe exists (by definition), so if you put the moon or the entire cosmos in the definition of your brain, we are still under the comp assumption. Unless, of course, the moon or the context or world is assumed to be non turing emulable. In that case comp is false, because you are saying that -my real generalized brain (by definition the things on which your consciousness supervenes here and now) is equal to my organic brain in my skull + my body + the moon + the cat, and then you add - and my cat is non turing emulable, then of course comp is false, your generalized brain is not turing emulable (it works only the non turing emulable cat). This is simple logic (any difficulty here can only be explained by my poor english or something like that. Please tell me if you grasp what I try to say here. It is not particularly deep). The point of all this is that we can reason *despite* we cannot define I or the world. Comp is just the bet that the I, the I that I feel, can be recovered by a third person I description, whatever it is, under the condition of belonging to the computable things locally. Brent seems to pretend that he is able to distinguish real and virtual reality. (Note that in a post to Brett Hall, I explain tat we *can* do that in a relative way, but it takes a long time, and we have to survive through it before, and also it works only statistically. Indeed quantum evidence gives, from a comp pov, such an evidence, I mean that we are in number matrix). What do you think of step six? Do you think you die, in step six? I use the generalized brain explicitly for preventing the move, for objecting the derivation, consciousness supervenes on brain + context. Brent, what if I send you regularly on mars by teletransportation, assuming you are a fidel tourist of my Mars-teleportation company. yet during the year 2007 (but not 2008), due to budget restriction, I fail you, and send you to virtual mars. And then again on real mars after in 2008 (better year!). You think this scenario is impossible in practice? If the comp level of substitution exist, I can fail you for any finite period of time, even without intervening directly on your brain memories (I need some high budget too for this of course). Sorry if I am unclear, but feel free all to ask for any clarifications, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
But I do think the nature of conscious qualia, as an abstract system, is interesting and non-trivial. Each person is their own universe - there is something more to feelings than just a neuron lighting up, they are part of an integrated dynamic. 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] Michael Rosefield wrote: I think there's so many different questions involved in this topic it's going to be hard to sort them out. There's 'what produces our sense of self', 'how can continuity of identity be quantified', 'at what point do differentiated substrates produce different consciousnesses', 'can the nature of consciousness be captured through snapshots of mental activity, or only through a dynamic interpretation taken over a period of time?'... and it's far too late for me to attempt to unravel all that! My feeling, though, is that once you've managed to assign some informational entity as being a conscious mind, then you could track it through time. But notice that everything you say about paths and variables and measure, apply to any system. Saying it is a conscious process doesn't change anything. My guess is that eventually we'll be able to create AI/robots that seem as intelligent and conscious as, for example, dogs seem. We'll also be able to partially map brains so that we can say that when these neurons do this the person is thinking thus and so. Once we have this degree of understanding and control, questions about consciousness will no longer seem relevant. They'll be like the questions that philosophers asked about life before we understood the molecular functions of living systems. They would ask:Where is the life? Is a virus alive? How does life get passed from parent to child? The questions won't get answered; they'll just be seen as the wrong questions. Brent One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having solved it. --- Carl Ludwig Siegel If you tweaked some physical variables, then much like a monte carlo simulation you could see potential paths it could follow. Given enough variables and tweaking, you might be able to fully populate the state-space according to what question we're asking, and it would seem to me to be all about measure theory. Of course, this doesn't say anything yet about any characteristics of the conscious mind itself, which is undoubtedly of importance. 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] What are you calling the process when you've made two copies of it? Bretn Michael Rosefield wrote: But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external input, then we can draw an extradimensional state-space in which the degrees of uncertainty correspond to new variables. If we can try and place bounds on the uncertainty then we can certainly produce a kind of probability mapping as to future states of the process. 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Kory Heath wrote: On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think this problem is misconceived as being about probability of survival. In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into a teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the other end changed - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits, etc., it doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, what's the probability that that person is me? It seems more correct to ask something like what percentage of 'me' is that person? And in fact, this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that we have to accept some spectrum of cases between the collection of molecules that came out is 100% me and the collection of molecules that came out is 0% me. The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to) when we start talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter, am obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's 100% me and out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the best way to view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe that I'm about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's hard for me not to think about this situation in terms of probability - to think that I'm more
Re: QTI euthanasia
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me... You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply have the mistaken notion that your name is Kory? If your earliest childhood memories were replaced by Bruno's, would you cease to exist? I think I cannot be me without *my* memories... I equate memories and me. If not what is me, if I'm still me without my memories ? But surely you don't require *all* your memories just to be you. And what about false memories? What if you had just one memory that was false of you but true of Bruno? You have no doubt forgotten many things from your childhood, so, as measured by information, you are quite different from the person you were then. You are implying that identity doesn't exist. What I'd say is that the only thing I'm sure of in this world is the 'I'.. the particular 'I' that is me. So no someone with the memories of the childhood of Bruno and my current memories is not me... only because my current memories are not consistent with Bruno's childhood, it follows than they couldn't be my current memories. If my memories are erased and my body still live, I think it's equivalent to have killed me... I'm (the 'I' that is currently me) dead for all practical purpose. Now you would say that I'm dying as time goes by because being different than a second ago... but my memories still carries the same 'I'... and 'I' is living in time and not an instantaneous data. I don't believe identity is an illusion... and I need more than what if to disprove it. And if my grandma had b... her name would be grandpa. If consciousness is information and feeling being an 'I' (and also a particular 'I') I think that is a false intuition. I don't believe that you directly feel being Quentin Anciaux, it is a memory and an inference made up of many bits of information. You are not feeling it at every moment, but only when you think about Who I am. at which time an appropriate name and life history comes to mind. Brent It is not an intuition, it is an assumption Your feeling being a particular I is an assumption? How can a feeling be an assumption? Isn't it a perception or at most the interpretation of a perception? Brent Ok, but it is the only perception that I'm sure of, only because 'I' is needed to perceive. Regards, Quentin (that can be false, sure)... Is counsciousness information ?.= yes ? Is this information finite ? (should be... what could be infinite length *information* ?) Regards, Quentin is information and indeed a finite length information... then one bit of difference and I'm not me... anything else but me. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker: On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote: I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both locations simultaneously. Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as its first premise, then it is possible to instantiate a consciousness within a computer. Therefore instead of a physical teleportation from Brussels to Washington and Moscow instead we will have a digital transfer. This will allow the experimenter to have complete control over the input each mind receives and guarantee identical content of experience. A volunteer in Brussels has her brain frozen and scanned at the necessary substitution level and the results are loaded into a computer with the appropriate simulation software that can accurately model her brain's functions, therefore from her perspective, her consciousness continues onward from the time her brain was frozen. To implement the teleportation, the simulation in the computer in Brussels is paused, and a snapshot of the current state is sent over the Internet to two computers, one in Washington and the other in Moscow, each of these computers has the same simulation software and upon receipt, resume the simulation of the brain where it left off in Brussels. The question is: if the sensory input is pre-fabricated and identical in both computers, are there two minds, or simply two implementations of the same mind? If you believe there are two minds, consider the following additional steps. Only one mind, belonging to two relative histories (among an infinity). Since it was established that the experimenter can teleport minds by pausing a simulation, sending their content over the network, and resuming it elsewhere, then what happens if the experimenter wants to teleport the Washington mind to Moscow, and the Moscow mind to Washington? Assume that both computers were preset to run the simulation for X number of CPU instructions before pausing the simulation and transferring the state, such that the states are exactly the same when each is sent. Further assume that the harddrive space on the computers is limited, so as they receive the brain state, they overwrite their original save. During this procedure, the computers in Washington and Moscow each receive the other's brain state, however, it is exactly the same as the one they already had. Therefore the overwriting is a no-op. After the transfer is complete, each computer resumes the simulation. Now is Moscow's mind on the Washington computer? If so how did a no-op (overwriting the file with the same bits) accomplish the teleportation, if not, what makes the teleportation fail? What happens in the case where the Washington and Moscow computer shutdown for some period of time (5 minutes for example) and then ONLY the Moscow computer is turned back on. Did a virtual teleportation occur between Washington and Moscow to allow the consciousness that was in Washington to continue? If not, then would a physical transfer of the data from Washington to Moscow have saved its consciousness, and if so, what happened to the Moscow consciousness? The above thought experiments led me to conclude that both computers implement the same mind and are the same mind, despite having different explanations. Rigth. Turning off one of the computers in either Washington or Moscow, therefore, does not end the consciousness. Yes. Per the conclusions put forth in the UDA, the volunteer in Brussels would say she has a 1/2 chance of ending up in the Washington computer and 1/2 chance of ending up in the Moscow computer. Therefore, if you told her 15 minutes after the teleportation the computer in Washington will be shut off forever she should expect a 1/2 chance of dying. This seems to be a contradiction, as there is a virtual teleportation from Washington to Moscow which saves the consciousness in Washington from oblivion. So her chances of death are 0, not 1/2, which is only explainable if we assume that her mind is subjectively in both places after the first teleport from Brussels, and so long as a simulation of her mind exists somewhere she will never die. And an infinity of those simulations exists, a-spatially and a- temporally, in arithmetic, (or in the standard model of arithmetic) which entails comp-immortality (need step 8!). Actually a mind is never really located somewhere. Location is a construct of the mind. A (relative) body is what makes it possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to some history/computation-from-inside. The movie graph argument (the 8th of UDA) justifies the necessity of this, but just meditation on the phantom limbs can help. The pain is not in the limb (given the absence
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 01 Nov 2008, at 13:11, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I think I cannot be me without *my* memories... I equate memories and me. If not what is me, if I'm still me without my memories ? Yes. You can write in the euthanasia letter that you would like the doctor to kill you if after an accident you are left without memories, and this show that you are the once deciding who you are eventually. I can imagine an obsessive pianist asking for euthanasia in case he loses some finger in a accident. I don't use thought experiment with amnesia in 1...8, they are a bit more frightening for some people (nearest to the prestige than simulacron III actually), but although our memories are very important for our histories and continuations, our identity does not (globally) rely on them. It is not important for the understanding that physics come from math/ computer science, but I do think we are more (semantically) and less (syntactically) than we are used and programmed to think (for normal darwinian reasons). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
