Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences. I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences. The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE. Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with possible brains. But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are just number relations. It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge. I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable as a way to model consciousness. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Well, you can invite him to make his point. I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the future. The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity of comp. In fact the first person []p p is also a non algorithmic entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion between []p and []p p, or []p in G and []p in G*. I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take non-computational first person properties as being associated with computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is non-computational then comp is false, since the production of non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that production. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) because some are not aware of the difference between []p p and []p. I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense. then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the truth of comp. It is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality. I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically necessary is an act of faith, I think that it is inescapable empirically and rationally. I would not say that I have faith in that or that
Re: Video of VCR
On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with possible brains. It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Well, you can invite him to make his point. The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity of comp. In fact the first person []p p is also a non algorithmic entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion between []p and []p p, or []p in G and []p in G*. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding - the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth - cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) because some are not aware of the difference between []p p and []p. then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the truth of comp. It is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality. If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved. The point is that mechanism can be disproved. The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self- confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please give them. That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem. Those are not related. Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations? I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might. But all machines as a
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte He seems to be saying I don't like it when people imagine that being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they can justify it rationally. Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over many lifetimes. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding - the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth - cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self- confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please give them. Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations? He seems to be saying I don't like it when people imagine that being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like. Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know where they come from, and where we return. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. Good for them. I guess they don't look inward or are not interested in the search of truth. And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they can justify it rationally. Yet some of what they justify is not merely justified within their own experience or belief, but veridically in intersubjective experience over many lifetimes. That too, from passing from the arithmetical []p (and []p p) to the non arithmetical []p p (and []p p p), with p sigma_1. I almost only translated what you said in arithmetical terms, and it works very well, as this entials your insitence that sense is not formalizable in arithmetic. (It also refute your statement that this fact refutes comp). Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. If we allow mechanism to be true by faith, I don't see how any argument within mechanism can be used to prove that mechanism cannot be disproved. The arguments against Penrose seem to me pure unscientific bigotry: Theorems of the Gödel and Turing kind are not at odds with the computationalist vision, but with a kind of grandiose self-confidence that human thought has some kind of magical quality which resists rational description. The picture of the human mind sketched by the computationalist thesis accepts the limitations placed on us by Gödel, and predicts that human abilities are limited by computational restrictions of the kind that Penrose and others find so unacceptable. - Geoffrey LaForte Well, if you have evidence that we don't have those limitations, please give them. That's what I'm giving. I saw someone's exhibit at the consciousness convention a few weeks ago which included a musical translation of Wiles proof - a proof which he says would not be possible for a computer to produce, given the negative answer of Hilbert's 10th problem. Are you able to solve and decide all diophantine equations? I can't, but Wiles proves that humanity as a whole might. He seems to be saying I don't like it when people imagine that being human can ever be an advantage over being a machine. Machines must be equal or superior to humans because of the thesis that I like. Being a machine is an advantage, for reproduction and use of information redundancies. Instead of terraforming the neighborhoods we can adapt ourselves in much more ways. We have more clothes, and ultimately we know where they come from, and where we return. You're saying that we are identical to machines on one hand but that if we are machines we will be able to be and do things that we could not do now. That says to me that you are 1) intuiting properties of non-machines that are not discoverable by math, and 2) attributing those properties to us because it is natural to assume that humans are not machines. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. But there are a lot of humans who seem quite satisfied. They actively resist dissatisfaction and protect their beliefs, true or not. Good for them. I guess they don't look inward or are
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences. The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. Universal machine are always unsatisfied, and are born to evolve. There is a transfinite of path possible. And Gôdel completeness is what machine discover themselves quickly, they can justify it rationally. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough. I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But that's is tautological in your non-comp theory. It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can generate qualia by itself. Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p with her []p p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation with truth. I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p p. They are all just steps in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin without comprimising the authenticity of the performance. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig straw-idiot. Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin without comprimising the authenticity of the performance. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig straw-idiot. But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical. The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical. So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp, some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what seems like tautology. PGC Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 7:56:53 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tuesday, May 13, 2014 9:43:16 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Denying your premiss is as simple as referring to the differing frequency range, envelope, timbre, spectrum of any two instruments; and therefore different tonal characteristics and limits (different musical colors or effects on listeners). All you are proving is that, from some relative pov, musical blue is not the same as musical red. No, I'm saying that the blue pov can't play red like the red pov can play red. It's about how music can be used to refer to the aesthetic identity of the musician, and how that reference can only be authentic in the actual instance of the musician or musical instrument that plays it. A piano concerto that is called 'the piano concerto that celebrates the particular pianist playing this concerto' cannot be played by a violinist or a violin without comprimising the authenticity of the performance. Doesn't say a thing about reality or proving machine is automated map. Unless Craig uses his personalized language and symbols to make things mean whatever he wants; then indeed, Craig could prove this kind of thing to himself, I guess. PGC No, I'm using regular old English language, and regular logic, albeit logic that requires seeing authenticity as being a real and significant influence in nature. Anyone who was looking at my argument with an unbiased, scientific attitude would have to go beyond the hand waving objections of 'personal language', blah blah blah. I guess PGC could prove his objections exempt from reasoned examination to himself though, using his Craig straw-idiot. But I agree. As stated, no two instruments are identical, no two musicians are identical, no two povs on their combination are identical. Then how could instruments and musicians be reduced to identical arithmetic units? As far as I can tell, a yes for irreducible differences is a no to computationalism. The authenticity would be preserved given some comp background, simply because no two differing programs, environments, numbers etc. are identical. But you could make a program that emulates the identical environments, programs, numbers, etc. That's what Church-Turing means if extended to the Absolute. That is computationalism. So yes, on authenticity; but that is exactly why regardless of MSR, comp, some physical universe, I don't see what you show or prove beyond what seems like tautology. I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Craig PGC Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote style=margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To
Re: Video of VCR
On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive- timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough. I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But that's is tautological in your non-comp theory. It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can generate qualia by itself. Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p with her []p p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation with truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 12, 2014 1:50:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 May 2014, at 03:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: We don't know that. It could be the case that all detections used by the abstraction of the universal machine are done by the sensory substrate in which the machine-program is instantiated. The machine is only an automated map as far as I can tell. To make it more than that, the computations must take place within sensory-motive-timespace-energy-mass. I will wait for you to prove this statement. I think my example of the violin being unable to play the song about how piano music sounds might work. I would not be surprised if it could be formalized into a proof, except that you would need to invent new formal symbols for qualia (or use mine). If authenticity is allowed as an axiom, then it can be proved. If it is denied, then it is begging the question to try to prove authenticity within a formal system in which authenticity is specifically disallowed. Nor with 0, s(0), s(s(0)), yes logic is not enough. I guess you mean that logic + elementary arithmetic is not enough. But that's is tautological in your non-comp theory. It's not a theory that I'm imposing though, its an observation. As sure as I can be that 5-2=3, I can also be sure that no quantitative function can generate qualia by itself. Yes, but as observation the machine already say so. And you are right, we agree on this, but when you disqualify the machine, you confuse her []p with her []p p. You confuse her body clothe with its possible relation with truth. I don't think the machine has a []p or a []p p. They are all just steps in an Escher staircase, leading to anywhere or nowhere, but never somewhere. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not sense?) Deriving sentence, syntactically. without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. ? I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. ? If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. Where are other levels coming from? Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc. Why would they by able to make errors? For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false proposition like I am inconsistent, and others are superficial, like a programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions). In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as error. Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed through sense experience. I don't know what is sense. It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything. You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of primordial sense. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. You are not trying to understand. I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. OK. (Roughly speaking). What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what awareness is about - Why. people agreed that awareness should obey a formula like []A - [] []A (for introspective belief: if I believe A then I believe that I believe A). which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self- reference but with presence itself. This is prose. You cannot pretend that my sun-in-law is a zombie with prose. You make a strong statement, but you don't argue for it: you just repeat in different way axioms equivalent to that effect. This is not arguing, and then you attack the very idea of argumentation and logic, making it impossible for me and you to progress on this. I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any sort of mechanism, OK. But I showed to you that once that statement is made precise, we can show that machines already argue like that. That gives a counter- example. You don't admit this, because you reject precision and logic, but then you can argue for anything, and we don't progress. It is the whole of science which makes problem to you. Not
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 8, 2014 9:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 May 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not sense?) Deriving sentence, syntactically. Doesn't sentence have to make sense? without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. ? Because it is getting along fine without it. I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. ? All logic is a kind of sense, but sense is not a kind of logic. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. Where are other levels coming from? Interaction with other machine, introspection, etc. Why would interactions entail a separate, fallible kind of logic? Why would they by able to make errors? For many reason. Some are deep like the incompleteness phenomenon, which makes consistent that the consistent machine asserts consistent but false proposition like I am inconsistent, and others are superficial, like a programs badly implemented in arithmetic (the UD emulates all programs, including programs with bugs, and asserting false propositions). In fact, it has been shown that some machines can get genuine new computational power by believing false irrefutable sentences. It's not clear that there can be any difference between true and false without sense, especially if we are saying that the UD plows ahead regardless of incoherence. Saying I am inconsistent would not be an error, it would simply be yet another inevitable thing that will be said eventually. If the UD cannot tell the difference between programs that make sense and programs that don't, then why would any program generated by the UD be any more sensitive? The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as error. Ideal machine can prove the existence of non ideal machines in arithmetic. How do you know that the ideal machine that proves the existence of non-ideal machines is really ideal? What makes ideal machines fall into non-ideal states? There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed through sense experience. I don't know what is sense. It is participatory aesthetic phenomena. Sensory-motive participation. Nested presence and representation. It looks like a gap of the god. It seems to explain everything. Sure, that's the whole idea: to explain everything. Computationalism tries to do the same thing only with computation instead of sense. You have not yet explain how to derive arithmetic from your sense theory, still less anything which could help us to make sense of your notion of primordial sense. Arithmetic is derived from insensitivity or reduction of sense. Representation is a function of inter-qualitative distance. It is profound because all qualia share the same distance, which can be expressed most precisely as arithmetic, but the qualia itself is not contained within or projected through arithmetic. Primordial sense is the boundaryless container of containment - but specifically it is sensory-motive presence. Arithmetic, as well as all forms and functions, including space, time, subjectivity, etc are all containers which divide the primordial sense into novel palettes of local sense experience. It could seem contradictory to say that it is boundaryless but that it is also sensory-motive, but that is because the intellect wants to begin from zero rather than everything. The
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 5, 2014 9:12:45 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. That seems to be a no. So if things don't exist independently of sensory experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it? Yes, Uranus existed before Herschel - Uranus existed before any biological phenomenon was present on Earth, but that does not mean that the universe is devoid of sensory experience before that. It does not mean that matter is something other than a sensory experience. We use a light bulb to create light locally, but that does not mean that light is produced only by bulbs or that all light is reducible to the activity of light bulbs. The view of Pansensitivity that I have is completely indifferent to biology or human existence. It's indifferent to all possible forms and functions also. The idea is that beneath every 'p' there must first be an a priori aesthetic (sensory) context and an a priori motive to alter that context. The consequence of the sensemotivesense^2 relation is minimally necessary for any number, logical proposition, statement, 'thing', etc. Before anything can be said to 'exist' there must first be a capacity to 1) discern a difference between existence and non-existence, 2) make such a difference, and 3) *appreciate* having made the difference. I consider these three aspects to be different from each other in one sense and parts of the same primordial/irreducible identity in another. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 8:53:54 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If that were true and logic is a means of deriving (deriving what if not sense?) without sense, then computation would not need/want to develop sense. I would say that logic seeks to derive sensible information using minimal sense, but it all still goes back ultimately to sensed interactions. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. Where are other levels coming from? Why would they by able to make errors? The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. You're smuggling in reality to prop up the theory. Of course real technology can make 'mistakes', because in reality logic is not primordial - sense is. If an ideal machine produced an ideal simulation of an altimeter, I see no reason to allow that there could be any such thing as error. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. Again, that's in reality. Sure, we need to formalize logic...because it doesn't entirely permeate reality. Logic must be discerned and developed through sense experience. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. You are not trying to understand. I'm trying to explain so that you (or others) might understand. What you are saying is that low level mechanism is derived automatically but that does not prevent high level mechanism from developing interpretations. What I am saying is that these considerations are irrelevant to what awareness is about - which is nothing to do with complexity or interpretation or self-reference but with presence itself. I am explaining why aesthetic experience cannot originate from any sort of mechanism, and why all mechanisms rely on more primitive sensory and motivational contexts. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from axioms? Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned. Yes, the sun in law is a doll, but there is still low level sense going on to keep the simulation going. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic
Re: Video of VCR
On 05 May 2014, at 21:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. Then substitute art by mean. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. That does not follow. Logic don't use sense, but the machine or the theory can use it at another level. The physical lwas does not make error, nut an altimeter in a plane can be wrong when referring to the plane altitude. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. It is still needed when you communicate to others. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. You are not trying to understand. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from axioms? Apparently ... in your theory. You are the one saying that my sun in law is a zombie, death as far as his consciousness is concerned. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it is the theories that should change. No. It is like god. We can talk about it without referring to it to assert a proposition, when we want make a rational communication, which was what we were talking about. Of course in daily life, we don't do rational communication all of the time. You change the subject, and confuse level of discourse. []p does not refer to sense, but []p p does, for example. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? If you agree on logic and 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something to question. On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is of the type verifiable. That's how science work. Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the key. There are other lamps...other keys. Craig I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I insist a lot. Bruno You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who is writing them? I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How can you doubt it? How will you define sequence without mentioning some function from N (the set of natural numbers) to some set? With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'. Again, I remind you that simple means simple in the 3p sharable sense, not simple in the 1p personal experiential sense. Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p. All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason why all scientists
Re: Video of VCR
On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? If you agree on logic and 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention. Not at all. More in the math thread, but you might need to reread all posts. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something to question. On the contrary I did ask people to question anything I say, which is of the type verifiable. That's how science work. Then it is not a question of supremacy. Only a good lamp to search the key. There are other lamps...other keys. Yes, that's the point. Bruno Craig I stop when you attribute to me the contrary on point On which I insist a lot. Bruno You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who is writing them? I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How can
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, May 5, 2014 10:26:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 May 2014, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, May 3, 2014 3:53:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2014, at 23:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? If you agree on logic and 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x Then you can study how to define sequence in that theory. Only because you have an a priori expectation of sequence which can be inferred. Otherwise nothing is defined and you have only unrelated statements. You need sense to draw them together and match your intuition. No. Logic is the art of making derivation without sense. There is no art without sense. If logic could be accomplished without sense then it would be impossible to make an error in logic. There would be no need to formalize logic because it would be inescapable in every state of consciousness. That isn't what we see though. In fact, logic is very tenuous and requires a particularly sober intellect which is focused on modeling concepts in an impersonal sense. That is even why so many people think that a machine which can reason is just doing syntactical manipulation without understanding, and at the low level, that's correct. A derivation, in a formal theory, is valid or non valid, independently of any of its possible interpretation (all those terms are well defined). Syntactical manipulation is still sense, it just has relatively limited aesthetic qualities. Gödel is the fist who did that. He invented the Gödel beta function, based on a generalization of a famous chinese lemma, about set of modular equations in arithmetic. Eventually (not easy exercice) you can define from the axiom and the chine lemma a representation of the exponential function, and with its you can define a sequence in arithmetic by using the unique factorization of the natural numbers. But eventually means that you must follow a sequence of steps to do your defining. You smuggle the expectation for sequence in from the start. Hmm, ... I will not insist here, as this will be the object to the next post in the math thread. It is not the existence of arithmetic, it is the existence of 0, s(0), etc. + the basic relation that you can derive from the axioms. Derive requires sequence and sense. Not at all. Does that mean that dead people would be good at deriving relations from axioms? It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is a bit imprecise. I can define sequence in *any* turing complete language, and they are all equivalent for computationalism. You can define a notion of sequence as primitive, instead of numbers, yes. That is the case for LISP, somehow, which is close to combinators and lambda calculus. Yo have never provide any theory, so I can't figure what you talk about. The theory is that logic and arithmetic are particular continuations of sense, not the other way around. Sense is a vague term. Not two human being understand it in the same way. It is a bit like God. Important notion, but hardly usable in theories. If theories can't use sense, and sense is important, then surely it is the theories that should change. Before arithmetic can exist, there must exist a sense of expectation for counting. Counting includes a sense of recursive steps as well as sequence, comparison, memory, change, digits, etc. It cannot be primitive as it is a manipulation of attention. Not at all. More in the math thread, but you might need to reread all posts. Sounds like a dodge. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Video of VCR
On 3 May 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. That seems to be a no. So if things don't exist independently of sensory experience, where do they come from when we first observe them? Did the planet Uranus not exist before William Herschell observed it? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How will you define sequence without mentioning some function from N (the set of natural numbers) to some set? Again, I remind you that simple means simple in the 3p sharable sense, not simple in the 1p personal experiential sense. All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them. Something like expectation might already have a different meaning for spiders, for different humans, etc. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 1, 2014 7:21:19 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of words, You think that we were born with words? many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning at all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words, and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words, including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501 On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 1, 2014 9:07:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? I'm not sure what mind is. I understand that nothing can exist independently of sensory experience, including mathematical truths. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, May 2, 2014 11:15:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2014, at 20:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. To define, is a reasonable precise sense, expectations, sequence, identity, position, or motivation (which I doubt is a simple notion) you need arithmetic. How can arithmetic exist without sequence and then define sequence? It is the same capacity to reason which tells me that 5-3=2 which tells me that sequence can exist without arithmetic but arithmetic cannot exist without sequence. It is, I think, your unwillingness to study a bit of math and logic which prevents you from seeing this. Just the opposite. It is your unwillingness to question the supremacy of math and logic which prevents you from even seeing that there is something to question. You get a lot about the numbers with few axioms written in first order language. I don't see why any axioms would be possible. Where do they come from? Who is writing them? I doubt you can define expectation of sequence in such a simple way. How can you doubt it? How will you define sequence without mentioning some function from N (the set of natural numbers) to some set? With rhythmic patterns and pointing - the way that everyone learns to count. A horse can understand sequence without a formal definition derived from set theory. What you are saying sounds to me like 'you cannot make an apple unless you ask an apple pie how to do it'. Again, I remind you that simple means simple in the 3p sharable sense, not simple in the 1p personal experiential sense. Why is that not an arbitrary bias? If I don't allow the possibility of 3p without 1p, then simplicity can only be 1p. All scientists agree on the arithmetic axioms, If that's true, its an argument from authority, and it could be the reason why all scientists fail to solve the hard problem. (which is exactly my argument). and I have to almost lie to myself to fake me into doubting them. I can't remember what it was like before I learned arithmetic, but I can still understand that we all live for years without those notions. There is at least one culture today that has no arithmetic. Something like expectation might already have a different meaning for spiders, for different humans, etc. Either way, it is undeniably more primitive than arithmetic in my view. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
I say that human beings (first-person) experience reality only in terms of words, many words with some measure of meaning and some without any meaning at all. Even the physics you mentioned are conveyed to the public as words, and the math that is conveyed between physicists is expressed in words, including Robinson's 1,2,3... arithmetic. You see some words, particularly mathematical and physical terms, have special properties that are in some measure truthful...Richard Ruquist 20140501 On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 2 May 2014 04:42, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Friday, April 18, 2014 3:23:13 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Saying that elementary arithmetic is the minimum that we have to start doesn't make sense to me. Elementary arithmetic depends on many less complex expectations of sequence, identity, position, motivation, etc. I keep repeating this but I don't think that you are willing to consider it scientifically. Do you believe that mathematical truths are true independent of mind? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Apr 2014, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: What generates Platonia? Nothing generates Platonia, although addition and multiplication can generate the comp-relevant part of platonia, that is the UD or equivalent. Elementary arithmetic cannot be justified by anything less complex (in Turing or logical sense). It is the minimum that we have to assume to start. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to generate consciousness. It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain only make that consciousness relatively manifestable. The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, which is provably false for machine. Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior remains invariant. It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is no going back. Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are infinitely many going back possible. It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from ordinary human experience. To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to understand how to be myself to be a dodge. By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at some inadequate level. You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is not water. I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too. If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of absurdity, error, and catastrophe. To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, without adding anything to X. If not, you are just advertizing another theory. I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans make terrible slaves. OK, so you agree that we can enslave my
Re: Video of VCR
On 15 Apr 2014, at 19:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is arguably creative, and that is why Emil Post used the term creative to describe them. They can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity. What you say is not more than: machine are not clever, they are machine. It is only your same begging of the question. I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no argument. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to generate consciousness. It does not generate consciousness, which exists in Platonia. The brain only make that consciousness relatively manifestable. What generates Platonia? The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. I don't argue that my sun-in-law is conscious. I argue only that your argument that he is not conscious is not valid, nor even existing. It is based on your assumption that formal things cannot yield informal things, which is provably false for machine. I do not assume that formal things cannot yield informal things, I assume that informal things take on a formal appearance from a distance, which means that a copy of a formal thing can only copy a superficial part of the total informal (as the total informal is ultimately 'prime' as well as 'primeness'). Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior remains invariant. It has nothing to do with carbon. If his original brain is dead, there is no going back. Repeating statements does not prove them. Of course with comp there are infinitely many going back possible. Another area where comp refers to a theoretical universe in which nobody actually lives. ... Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 16, 2014 4:46:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Apr 2014, at 21:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from ordinary human experience. To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. I'm using a lot of genetic and neurochemical technology also, but I would still find the suggestion that I should study microbiology in order to understand how to be myself to be a dodge. By definition of comp, you are not a dodge when you get an artificial brain, or an artificial kidney, heart, whatever, unless you are copied at some inadequate level. Yes, but that's because comp cannot conceive of a brain as being different from a kidney, heart, etc, but in reality, of course, the difference between a person's brain and anything else in the universe is of the highest possible significance, while the difference between kidneys, hearts etc is irrelevant except with respect to function. If we put on the blinders of comp, we fail to see that consciousness entails personal presence above all other functions, and that presence is not a function or configuration of numbers at all. You keep saying that, and I keep explaining that I do know exactly what you mean, but that in fact I have no confusion at all between the difference between saying 'comp should be ruled out' and 'comp is not proved'. I know the difference and I still say comp should be ruled out, and for good reason. The reason is not one that is understandable to your sun in law though, just as the shadow of water doesn't understand why it is not water. I will skip the irrelevant metaphors too. Too, bad, they are probably the only way that we can understand the reality of nature. If you start from comp, there is no possibility of refuting it. That is the nature of computation - consistency, and consistency to the point of absurdity, error, and catastrophe. To refute X, you have to start from X and get a contrdiction, I am starting from X. As soon as we come to aesthetic experience, we get a contradiction. without adding anything to X. If not, you are just advertizing another theory. I think my argument is pretty straightforward. If computation can exist without consciousness, then there is no room in computationalism for consciousness. All computations can be performed unconsciously, if any can be. I think that we can pretty well figure it out by the differences between automatic systems and human resources. Machines make perfect slaves, humans make terrible slaves. OK, so you agree that we can enslave my sun-in-law. Nice! Sure. What good is a machine that is not a slave? Well, thanks for the warning. Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Universal number are complete with respect of recursiveness, and this is arguably creative, Creative how? and that is why Emil Post used the term creative to describe them. They can refute all normative theories that we can do about them. So recursiveness or recursive enumerability suggests creativity. We don't know that recursiveness suggests creativity, or if it does, that may be only in response to the creativity of our inquiry. What you say is not more than: machine are not clever, they are machine. It is only your same begging of the question. Machines are clever, but they have no understanding, no presence...not because they are machines, but because machines are maps with no territory. I conclude from this, and after this long exchange that you have just no argument. I have the same conclusion about your argument. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 2:26:21 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, relatively to some universal number or system. I agree that a local person needs representation to localize their experience, but that does not mean that universal numbers are not also representations for conditioning the primordial (sensory) presence. Numbers are not creative, they are recursive. Numbers can extend the creativity of an existing substrate to the extent that the substrate is intrinsically creative. Craig Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. I appreciate the intervention. Bruno On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My point is that comp is testable. Comp makes theology an experimental science. In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories. Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently of being useful. It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences. X1*. You just don't study, I will pass also the commentary which just show that you have not study, probably because you believe that if qualia are informal a theory about them has to be informal. But that is wrong. As much as we can make a crisp theory on fuzzy set, the p arithmetical hypostases provides forma logics concerning informal, intuitive and non definable objects. hich is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience. ? If comp is true, we will never ever know it. We can test it only if it is false, by finding a physical phenomenon which violates the comp consequences in physics. We could know if comp is true by having someone be uploaded to a new brain and then uploaded back into their old brain. Ah! So if my sun in law get his original carbon back, he would be conscious again? And even retrospectively so, as you agree his behavior remains invariant. It seems like I just gave a perfectly legitimate, clear, and common sense challenge, to which your response has no relation. You're talking about remote and obscure technologies, but I'm using a simple example from ordinary human experience. To talk with me you are using that very technology. It is hardly remote, and I guess you find it obscure because you don't study it. But *you*, on the contrary, pretends to have a general argument, not based on your theory, that comp has to be false, or that my sun-law has to be a doll. But I have not yet seen it. In each case you refer implicitly or explicitly to your theory. I just gave you the argument. Since a computer voice can say 'baby' without feeling like it has lips or a voicebox or lungs, then we should
Re: Video of VCR
On Tuesday, April 15, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Apr 2014, at 21:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? consciousness is generated by computation is misleading, especially in the Aristotelian era. How will people understand that consciousness generates the appearance of matter, without any matter, if they visualize consciousness as a brain product. I don't even say that the brain is Turing emulable, comp only asks for a level of description of the brain so that I would genuinely survive or experience if a simulation of my brain (which by itself might be a non Turing emulable object) at that level. We're not talking about what people will understand though, we're talking about the basic claim of comp. The brain is only involved because you bring it in to allow Church-Turing to build Frankensun. If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. Not really. You reason in the aristotelian picture, where brain are real object, etc. The classical comp picture is a priori very different, you have a 3p ocean of computations in arithmetic, and a consciousness particularization process made in play by natural coherence conditions among some infinite sets of computations. I make no claims at all on the objectivity of brains, I only am reading back to you what your position seems to be to me. If you introduce the brain's presumed partial Turing emulability into the discussion, then I presume you do so to argue that emulability supports the sufficiency of computation to generate consciousness. The ability of computation to generate consciousness is the sole aspect of computationalism/digital functionalism that I disagree with (and all of the consequences of it). If you are not saying that comp generates consciousness, then I'm not sure what you have been arguing all this time. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? Because it implies very strong constraints on the physical reality. My point is that comp is testable. Comp makes theology an experimental science. In science, we never prove anything. We collect evidence and try theories. You're the one who keeps demanding proof of the unprovable from me. I don't ask for proof, only sense. Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. That is the computational metaphor, and it is another topic. Comp implies that such metaphor is always wrong both for mind and matter, independently of being useful. Well, comp would have to imply that or else admit that it was a false theory. It has nothing to do with qualia though. The presence of aesthetic phenomena, including intention and care, has no place in AUDA as far as I can tell, which would run monotonously regardless of the consequences. X1*. You just don't study, How can I justify what seems to produce nothing of interest to me. A chef might be curious to see how plastic fruit is made, but he need not be interested in it professionally. I will pass also the commentary which just show that you have not study, probably because you believe that if qualia are informal a theory about them has to be informal. To the contrary, I am very interested in a formal theory about qualia, except that the formalisms probably need to be turned inside out in most
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. Proof? Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. That rebuttal doesn't convince me that I should doubt my reasoning. It sounds like you're just saying that my argument offends you. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation Comp does not say consciousness is generated by computation. I have insisted on this many times. In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. What does the brain being Turing emulable mean in this context other than that consciousness is generated by computation? If sun in law is not a doll, and if he has a brain that is being emulated by a Turing machine, then that means that the computation of the machine is generating his consciousness. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. If you assume rather than prove digital functional substitution for consciousness, then how can the conclusion that consciousness emerges from arithmetic be something other than tautology? Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. It doesn't surprise me very much, as I would expect that formal, linguistically based interactions could be automated to an impressive degree. It has
Re: Video of VCR
continued On Sunday, April 13, 2014 12:44:37 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: and say that it is computation which is more likely derived from awareness rather than the other way around, and therefore computation in and of itself cannot necessarily contain/generate/ produce/lead to awareness/sense/ Do you agree with 0+1=1? Do you agree with 0+2=2? Yes, but so what? So perhaps you agree that is true for any number n, and so you agree on Ax (0 + x = x). And what comp says, is that with few axioms more, of that type, we can extract a compelling theory which explains matter and consciousness in a testable way. What is the testable way of explaining consciousness? I agree with B and P are associated with lips, or that blue + red = purple. I believe in the extraordinary consistency of mathematics, but I do not think that sets it apart from sense or gives it the power to make sense experiences on its own. You argue, like me and the machine, that comp is not provable, if true. ~[]comp. We agree on this since the beginning, but you still talk like if I was pretending the contrary. It is your confusion between ~[]comp (we cannot prove comp) and your string statement []~comp (I know that your sun in law is a zombie). It is the second one that I challenge you to prove. Proof may not be the proper expectation. By Occam's razor we can see that the computer need not feel that it has lips in order to make a 'B' sound come out of a speaker. The speaker functions as mouth, lips, lungs, and voicebox but it has no connection to those things or their experiences. The sun in law is designed from the outside in to mimic external behaviors. Why would internal experiences match our expectations? Why should there be any internal experiences on that level at all? If arithmetic truth is conscious, then comp is circular. Proof? Note that I was saying that it does not make much sense to say that the arithmetical truth is conscious, although I cannot exclude it. Open problem say. But comp is not circular as you illustrate by not attributing consciousness to my sun in law. I don't see where there is room for doubt. If you say A contains X then saying that 'X is contained by A' is a tautology. Nothing is explained, you have just moved dualism down to the level where arithmetic arbitrary contains unexplained non-arithmetic qualities. I understand that in the math you are talking about, you see indications that such non-arithmetic qualities must be present, and I don't doubt that numbers present a kind of negative rendition of those qualities by their absence, but I don't think that ultimately amounts to a support for comp. But for the millionth time; I am NOT arguing that comp is true or supported. You defend again ~[]comp, which is a theorem in comp. Since the start I repeat and repeat again that you are CORRECT on this point. All what I say, is that you cannot deduce validly []~comp from ~[]comp. From your non seeing something you cannot pretend the non existence of something. and I repeat that I agree you are correct in saying that it cannot be proved logically, but I am saying that nothing about consciousness is logical to begin with, so the expectation of that kind of deduction working for consciousness is not valid. There is no argument for why I can move my fingers just by moving them, but it is nonetheless as true as any truth can possibly be. You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged I have never said that. You symmetrize again. By aligning the defense of comp I do not defend comp. You are defending non-comp. But I have not yet seen an argument. The argument is that the map is not the territory. The map is not always the territory, but the map can be plunged in the territory, I think only metaphorically and there will be a fixed point, that is a point of the map whose position will be equal to the position of the location it refers too. Something similar happens with universal number transfiormation, there are fixed point, some syntactical-like (reproduction), some semantical (self-reference). I think self-reference can appear figuratively, as when a doll talks about itself. I don't reduce sophisticated AI to a doll talking to itself, since interactivity adds an order of magnitude more depth, but the principle is the same. We can be fooled by the doll, but the doll can't fool itself into thinking it is alive. B and P sound can be reproduced electronically without reproducing any feeling of lips and speaking behind it. If you build a machine based on the reproduction, then we cannot presume that anything not explicitly observed is being
Re: Video of VCR
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 8:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just took Bruno by his word of I'll just say if I see an argument or not. and felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that sort of weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard to not answer false attribution. Ok, it's undecidable whether he ever will see the points or the fallacies. But one can mistake some appearance of progress with fresh syntax of the day. I don't think his position changed or moved one iota in past two years regarding just the possibility of subject/step 0. The latest posts prove this again and again. Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the machine by the []p p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and the 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of the machines. That is a fine way to see it, but I doubt Brouwer would confuse his own intuitive notions with problems/resolutions to true generation of consciousness and concepts of that sort. The logical appearance of the person is Truth - person - machine/theories/ideas or put it differently: p - []p p - []p ( p?) Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, relatively to some universal number or system. He never acknowledged that he lacks a frame in some third person sense, or limits for the primitives to his explanations. So he could continue forever trivially, S4Grzetting you to the end of time with fancy color explosion of syntax/semantics after you state some limit of machine or some flaw in reasoning. Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. I appreciate the intervention. I see how that it's a tricky question, but I wouldn't be surprised if you just turned around and walked away from these games that are not even that funny; well, except for Craig = Brouwer and you = Hilbert []p (I'm not so sure Brouwer would be ok with Craig; much less Hilbert with you!) kind of stuff. PGC Bruno On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from
Re: Video of VCR
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive participation and move our legs by ourselves. and just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude interventions. and for this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the training in scientific argumentation. There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. Rhetoric. You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an argument. Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your ideas on sense. Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself as his equal confronting him, mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, because why else would you seek this validation? Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome: you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, which is also unconvincing as of today. Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, including Bruno, to spoon feed you. Craig Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive participation and move our legs by ourselves. and just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude interventions. and for this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the training in scientific argumentation. There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. Rhetoric. You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an argument. Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your ideas on sense. Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are others not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that what I'm saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'. As long as others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting together a new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is resisting it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas being discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other. Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself as his equal confronting him, mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, because why else would you seek this validation? I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea - either for Bruno or someone else. Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome: Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc. you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, which is also unconvincing as of today. If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view predicts. Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, including Bruno, to spoon feed you. How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me? I'm not looking for input from Bruno, I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately fails and how it can be inverted to find a new solution that makes more sense. Craig blockquote class=gmail_quote s ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 4:17 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Sunday, April 13, 2014 9:32:19 AM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: We know that we cannot make our legs stand by arguing with them or proving that standing can occur, we must exercise direct sensory-motive participation and move our legs by ourselves. and just assume this if you want, but your phenomenology does not need this. Comp mighty be false, but you need far better argument, You demand that the subtlest, most delicate truth in the universe kneel down to the vending machine of comp and bash it open with a brick. That's not the way that it works. The machine gets nothing from me. Not a single coin. I know that it has nothing without our patronage, and gives nothing back but its own mindless rules, empty images, plastic music, and rude interventions. and for this much more humility and study the worlds of many others and the training in scientific argumentation. There is little humility in comp. I see it as an ideology which feigns politeness but actually buries consciousness alive. Rhetoric. You can answer this, but in my reply, I will just say if I see or not an argument. Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? How about: can't you see this isn't going anywhere? Bruno is repeating himself, while you enjoy, as the only one here, your own rhetoric variations, repeating the same content and biases over and over in linguistic strings, with only minor differences in use of metaphor and empty, albeit sometimes amusing expressions and figures of speech, that don't constitute a serious argument or proposal of ontology framing your ideas on sense. Being the only one here doesn't bother me (even if it did, there are others not on this list who understand my ideas), and I don't care that what I'm saying doesn't fulfill your expectations of 'going anywhere'. As long as others can see the conversations, they can judge who is putting together a new idea of consciousness, physics, and information, and who is resisting it based on bias. The conversation is a commercial for the ideas being discussed even if one side does not recapitulate to the other. Your zeal in seeking validation from Bruno by presenting yourself as his equal confronting him, mirrors perhaps the doubt you have concerning your own thoughts, which is good indication of your intention to seek and test, because why else would you seek this validation? I'm not seeking validation, I'm seeking an awakening to a new idea - either for Bruno or someone else. Then again, we are all each other's equals, so why force this with monster discussions of details of details, when we know the outcome: Discussing the details yields new examples, new connections, etc. you will not consider comp as possibility or example and improvise linguistic tricks for the problems that come up in the edifice of your work on logical and mathematical levels, by putting aesthetics on a pedestal, which is also unconvincing as of today. If you put logical and mathematical levels on a pedestal, then the aesthetic is undervalued proportionately. Your bias is exactly what my view predicts. Instead of taking the problems, criticisms arising here as some personal thing, take what you can learn or leave it; your work needs to overcome its limits and problems, and you won't get it done by forcing anybody here, including Bruno, to spoon feed you. How am I forcing Bruno to do anything, much less spoon feed me? Simple: by abusing cordiality, professionalism, distance, and politeness that you would never reciprocate because people here other than yours truly, especially Bruno, take your ideas at face value; even when you trample views that are not your own as nonsense, instead of taking more distanced, professional perspective. Take it easy, man... because nobody has or should have infinite credit and you will increasingly look like spam/nuisance if you keep it up; and people will increasingly switch off or ignore you; quite contrary to your intentions of awakening new ideas. Especially if you continue this obvious falsity of dismissing possible worldviews outright with linguistic play of unconvincing arguments and evidence. The fact that you need to state my ideas are appreciated elsewhere reflects a defensiveness, rather than an awakening. I'm not looking for input from Bruno, Then stop addressing him in this fashion, perhaps? I'm looking to explain why comp ultimately fails and how it can be inverted to find a new solution that makes more sense. This, even if you succeeded, would still make sense ultimately dependent and determined by comp. But I don't have Bruno's patience and refuse, right here and now to be drawn into
Re: Video of VCR
On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. Proof? Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. You will not convince me that my sun in law *has to be* a zombie or a doll with argument like that, which mocks completely what I have done. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation Comp does not say consciousness is generated by computation. I have insisted on this many times. In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? That my sun in law might not be a zombie/doll. Comp assumes that the brain is Turing emulable at some level of description. In my work, comp is an assumption, but usually comp is seen as a consequence of other theories, and is usually an implicit theory of all materialist (and that is a problem for them, as UDA shows that comp does not marry well with materialism). By materialism, as usual I mean the weak sense: the doctrine which asserts the primitive existence of matter (or time, space, energy, ...). UDA assumes consciousness as subject matter of the inquiry, and assumes that it is invariant for digital functional substitution done at some level, and it explains from that assumption that both consciousness and matter emerges from arithmetic. Then AUDA (the arithmetical UDA) shows, by applying an idea of Theaetetus on Gödel's predicate of probability, how to make the derivation, and derives the propositional physics, (the logic of the observable) making comp + Theaetetus is testable. we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error. Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces consciousness. Not at all. I always says that a machine can instantiate consciousness, or make a first person able to manifest its consciousness, but avoid an expression like computation of brain produces consciousness. Those expression confuses implicitlky the machine []p and the non-machine (except in God's eye) []p p. Like in the hunting of the snark, you want the sentence first, and the trial after. Well, that is still better than the NDAA, which evacuates the trial completely ... The trial can only be started if we have sufficient technology to trade brains and trade back. As far as I can tell, all other testing would rely only on measuring whether the imposter can fool a judge - which is irrelevant as far as actually authenticating sentience. ? If comp is true, we will
Re: Video of VCR
On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just took Bruno by his word of I'll just say if I see an argument or not. and felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 13 Apr 2014, at 19:43, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: If you guys want to argue to infinity these similar points (all really particular too at both end, of course), than sure: my apologies. I just took Bruno by his word of I'll just say if I see an argument or not. and felt that was better than to have this thread keep ballooning with nobody else in the discussion or seeming to follow anymore. But if that was not a genuine point, fine. I stand corrected. PGC On the contrary, and I wish I could have read your comment before answering Craig. I might have avoiding answering it but I have that sort of weakness in believing he might see some point. It is also hard to not answer false attribution. Craig is quite correct compared to the first person associated to the machine by the []p p definition, and it reminds me that comp is, and has to be, counter-intuitive. It is a mini Brouwer-Hilbert debate, with Brouwer played by Craig, and the 1p of the machine (S4Grz, []p p), and Hilbert (me, or the []p of the machines. The logical appearance of the person is Truth - person - machine/theories/ideas or put it differently: p - []p p - []p ( p?) Craig illustrates well that consciousness is in the true part, not in the representation, but you need both to have a local particular person, relatively to some universal number or system. Now this made him into a trivial step zero stopper, and I can be tired of the accumulation of word play, and the begging questions. I appreciate the intervention. Bruno On Sun, Apr 13, 2014 at 7:22 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Apr 2014, at 00:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can sense not be allowed to represent itself in your court of argument? That is a very good idea. That is quite close to what happens with the definition by Theatetus of (rational) knowledge by saying that is a (rational) belief (finitely 3p describable) which is also true (something not definable in general, but well known in many situations). That truth might not be computable (like in self-multiplication), nor definable (like in Peano Arithmetic or by Löbian machines), and that is why we use the truth (p) to represent itself, in the definition of know(p) by []p p. That describes a knower (it obeys S4), and explains the existence of the fixed point, the locus where the beliefs are incorrigible, and correctly so, from that necessarily existing point of view. It explains the existence of proposition which will be trivially true from the first person perspective, yet impossible to communicate rationally to another machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Saturday, April 12, 2014 2:24:03 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2014, at 20:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. Proof? Reasoning. Comp has to begin without consciousness to explain anything. If comp begins with consciousness then you are saying that consciousness creates itself...which is fine, but it doesn't need computation then. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation Comp does not say consciousness is generated by computation. I have insisted on this many times. In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind The Wikipedia definition agrees with me. If you are not saying that consciousness is a form of computation or product of computation, then it seems to me you have made comp too weak of an assertion. What do you say that comp asserts? we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, Comp is a theory. There are no reason to say comp is consciousness, no more than to say that F=GmM/r^2 has some mass. category error. Comp is a theory, but it is a theory that computation is what produces consciousness. I read below, and I do not see argument. Only rhetorical tricks, including attribution of many things I have never said. Bruno otherwise we aren't saying anything. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from that. You do an error in logic. That's all. The error in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, Then truth = sense, as I said. It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. But is is a cosmic or universal form of sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, even making them delusion. I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not take concepts like 1 and = for granted, but sees them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially visual and tactile). and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit
Re: Video of VCR
On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from that. You do an error in logic. That's all. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, Then truth = sense, as I said. But is is a cosmic or universal form of sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, even making them delusion. and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof those assumption is inconsistent. I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. You are the one saying that comp is false. I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am agnostic, and you are atheist. You pretend to know that my sun in law is a doll. 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the theory is about. No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with yours. The results as such does not disagree, given that your theory is close to the machine first person phenomenology. I just patiently try to make you understand a mistake, that's all. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. It does not. You need only to agree that 0+x = x, etc. My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To just define capacity, detect, compare ... you need to assume things like 0+x=x. To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to be conscious? Arithmetical truth can be said conscious, except that it is not a person, and it is more the container and limiter of the consciousness differentiating flux of of the universal numbers. 4) You take sense for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more computer science and logic. We can just turn that around and say you take arithmetic for granted, and you object to elementary sense. But all scientist take arithmetic for granted, nine take sense for granted in the 3p sense of scientific theories (but cognitive
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 11, 2014 12:16:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2014, at 20:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. It does not. *you* rule it out. You make less sense. If it doesn't rule it out, then comp is circular. For the statement that comp makes consciousness is generated by computation we have to assume first that comp is not already consciousness itself, otherwise we aren't saying anything. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non- comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. Not at all, because I don't conclude in either comp or not-comp from that. You do an error in logic. That's all. The error in logic is necessary to locate consciousness. Your calling it an error *is* the conclusion that makes comp seem possible. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, Then truth = sense, as I said. It isn't though. Blue isn't truth or non-truth. Truth is a quality of cognitive experience, but cognitive experience is not generated by truth. But is is a cosmic or universal form of sense, and you have to related it to the brain and flesh in some ways, even making them delusion. I'm not relating it to the brain or flesh at all. You have to stop thinking of sense as implying physical matter. I compare logically that 1+1=2 either makes sense because there is an unconscious property of truth which we can detect consciously, or that 1+1=2 makes sense because it re-acquaints us with a quality of coherence that we are compelled to accept. I think if it was the former, then it would be impossible to ever get a math problem wrong, and people would come out of the womb doing calculus instead of sucking their thumb. The latter makes more sense to me, because it does not take concepts like 1 and = for granted, but sees them as generalized stereotypes which are common in certain kinds of perception (especially visual and tactile). and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. truth = first person is just an open problem in comp theology. Not sure what you mean by that, or how it relates. I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, There is no logical truth. It is always arithmetical truth. Either way my point is the same. You are only allowing arguments that begin with a truth that is square when my argument requires that we admit that the square is sitting in a larger circle. you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. No, I make assumption, where you are the one pretending having a proof those assumption is inconsistent. I'm saying proof is likely impossible and irrelevant. It's about what makes more sense. I am OK with both ~[]comp and ~[]~comp. You are the one saying that comp is false. I am not the one saying that ~comp is false. If ~comp is true, then comp is false. You seem to have difficulties here. With respect to comp I am agnostic, and you are atheist. You pretend to know that my sun in law is a doll.
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, April 10, 2014 6:42:08 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: Craig, I have already commented that type of non-argument. Once we get closer to a refutation of your attempt to show that your argument against comp is not valid, you vindicate being illogical, I don't vindicate being illogical, I vindicate being more logical about factoring in the limitations of logic in modeling the deeper aspects of nature and consciousness. Logically we must not presume to rely on logic alone to argue the nature of awareness, from which logic seems to arise. so I am not sure that repeating my argument can help. I will just sum up: 1) You keep talking like if the situation was symmetrical. You defending ~comp, and me defending comp. But that is not the case. I am nowhere defending the idea that comp is true. I am agnostic on this. I think that you are pseudo-agnostic on it, and have admitted as much on occasion, but that's ok with me either way. I am not convince by your argument against comp, that's all. That is the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. Part of my argument though is that being convinced is not a realistic expectation of any argument about consciousness. My argument is that it can only ever be about how much sense it makes relatively speaking, and that the comp argument unfairly rules out immeasurable aesthetic qualities from the start. My argument predicts the bias of comp in predicting the bias of non-comp, so in that aspect we are symmetric. 2) you confuse truth and first person sense, all the time. I'm not confused, I'm flat out denying that truth can ever be anything other than sense, and I'm denying that sense has to be first person. It's an explicit part of my conjecture. I can be OK with this, for some theory which assumes non-comp, but not for an argument, which should be independent of any theory, against ~comp. If you use your theory to refute comp, you beg the question. By constraining the terms of the argument to disallow aesthetic sense to transcend logical truth, you beg the question. We are symmetric here too. 3) You confuse levels in theories. You seem to infer that a theory can only talk about syntax and formal objects, because a theory is itself a formal object, but that is a confusion between a theory, and what the theory is about. No, you're projecting that confusion on me because my results disagree with yours. I understand that the number 4 or the expression x are not intended to relate literally to the figures 4 or x, and I understand that your view of arithmetic assumes a correspondence to Platonic entities. My view though is that no such entities can arise from anything other than the capacity to detect, feel, compare, control, etc. To give arithmetic entities experiential potentials makes comp beg the question from the start. How is arithmetic truth not conscious from the start, in order to produce machines that find themselves to be conscious? 4) You take sense for granted, and you object to elementary arithmetic. Again, why not, in your theory, but again, that beg the question as an argument refuting comp. Here I can only suggest you to study a bit more computer science and logic. We can just turn that around and say you take arithmetic for granted, and you object to elementary sense. You are saying that the assumptions of comp cannot be challenged unless we first agree not to challenge the assumptions of comp with new assumptions. 5) Your assumption are unclear. It is still not clear if you assume or not a physical reality, I assume sensory-motive interaction. Physicality and realism are a set of qualities which potentially arise through modulations of sensitive/insensitive interaction. or how are handled the subject's references to the physical Cf David Nyman. It is not clear how you address the mind/body problem. I address it by putting the entire universe in the gap between mind and body. Perceptual relativity creates mind-like and body-like qualities to represent distance between categories of experience. 6) Stathis' point: what in the brain/body would be responsible for its non Turing emulability. The same thing that is responsible for consciousness. In my view, it is backward to begin from a brain and say why won't a copy of this be conscious. Instead we must begin with a life experience and ask why we would assume it can be reduced to the functions of an object. It is only if we buy into our 1p sense of realism for 3p objects completely that we could make that assumption. Saying that my sun-in-law is a zombie/doll is based on your non-comp, it is not an argument for non-comp. Begging question again. My non-comp leads to the conclusion that comp cannot be defeated by argument, so it is circular to demand that it must be. Feeling cannot be proved, but that does not mean it is not more real than logic or theory. Feeling doesn't
Re: Video of VCR
On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? To make more sense of everything. Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but that is what is debated, and you beg the question again. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can prove everything. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky. The decision to say yes to the doctor. What would a UM say to the doctor? The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other direction. That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder what is 3-I there to do? Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p p, which obeys a quite different logic. The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another machine. The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any possible justification. That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the machine. Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting. But the point is that logical does not mean anything per se. The 3p and the 1p have different and opposed logics. It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today). I justify it with all of the examples you keep ignoring - blindsight, synesthesia, the separation of i/o devices from CPUs, the map-territory distinction, the conflict between generic/ universal systems and proprietary histories, the model of information as a reduction of qualia, the lack of need for geometry in binary systems, etc. I don't see anything that positively supports qualia arising from computation, other than the pathetic fallacy. You don't have to see that. The counter-example shows you invalid. That's all. You confuse again []~comp, which you defend, and ~[]comp, on which we both agree, as comp - ~[]comp. and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring. It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the one conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should conflate them. Not sure what you mean or how it relates. All your argument shows that the 3p machine cannot think, and I agree with them. A body, or a description or a number cannot think indeed, only a (first) person can. But comp does not say that a machine can think, only that it can manifest the thinking of a person. With comp, my body and brain are just natural machine that we get at birth.
Re: Video of VCR
On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Another part 2 On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics. It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across sensory experiences. For the 1p. Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny that science has any ability to handle such question, but comp, even if wrong, provides the counter-example. You deny it from your theory, but that is trivial and beg the question. Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. You confuse p and []p p. No, I deny p altogether. Then you can prove that 0=1. The p has to be added, the machines already know this. They appear before logic and cognition. At which level, in what sense of before? I need a theory to make sense of such terms. In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not logic without sense. In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in this discussion. You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But more sense is not an argument, especially in this context. More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic. Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be illogical as this point, you make my point. How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and what I derive from the assumption. But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start. Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular reasoning. Confusion between []~comp and ~[]comp. It would be circular if I was defending the truth of comp, but I am just showing that your argument beg the question. Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that regard? A voice mail machine does not seem to implement a universal machine believing in some induction principles, like PA, ZF. We don't know that the voice mail machine lacks PA and ZF induction principles, This is ridiculous. any more that I know that machines can't be zombies. Even if that were true though, I see no reason to presume that the extra functionality added through PA or ZF need result in any aesthetic phenomena flying around. The point is that you argue for the contrary, but don't present an argument independent of your non-comp assumption, making it circular. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 4:58:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2014, at 21:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? To make more sense of everything. Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. For the 1p. You will tell me that is all what count in your theory, but that is what is debated, and you beg the question again. You are the one who is saying that sense making is limited to 1p. How is that begging the question to ask you to clarify your contradiction that comp makes sense beyond 1p, but that sense making is limited to 1p at the same time. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. ... some analysis of machine function made by the machine. Sure. In my view, machines reflect a particular range of sensible relations, so that they do indeed tap into what I would call a 'meta-theroetical' library, but that library is a generic reflection that can be used to impersonate sense, but not experience it. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. You confuse false and non-valid. Non-valid does not entail false, but it remains non valid, and thus is not an argument, even if you were correct in the conclusion. You might guess this, because that type of argument can prove everything. What we are used to thinking of as valid or non-valid has to more deeply considered when it comes to consciousness. We cannot argue with the method that we use to move our fingers or taste coffee. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. I am interested in consciousness too, and ask for a good theory, not one which makes it into a primitive falling from the sky. If its primitive, it doesn't fall from the sky, the sky falls from it. The decision to say yes to the doctor. What would a UM say to the doctor? The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other direction. That sounds like it is the 1-I doing the deciding...which makes me wonder what is 3-I there to do? Your body, or your Gödel number, that is a description at the right substitution level. It is the []p, for the case of the ideally correct machine, as opposed to the 1p Theaetetus' []p p, which obeys a quite different logic. It sounds like the 3-I is just an address. The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another machine. The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any possible justification. That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the machine. Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. It depends. If the method of inquiry is logical and the response is logical, there is no reason to expect that there is anything beyond logic in between, even if it is not the logic that we are expecting. But the point is that logical does not mean anything per se. The 3p and the 1p have different and opposed logics. Logical means representation by cognitive functions rather than aesthetic contents. If you wanted, for instance, to make a cell phone that auto-rotates its screen, you have to use some hardware; an acceleration sensor or mercury switch. Such a sensor has no substitution level as no logical instructions can locate the actual phone's orientation on Earth. No virtual sensor can work to inform the user of the real phone. It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence That is the statement I am quite skeptical
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 9, 2014 5:42:18 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2014, at 22:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Another part 2 On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics. It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across sensory experiences. For the 1p. Anything beyond 1p is begging the question. We can't know if truth extends beyond the nested collective 1p. Of course, by denying any independent 3p, you just deny that science has any ability to handle such question, but comp, even if wrong, provides the counter-example. You deny it from your theory, but that is trivial and beg the question. There may indeed be advantages to studying theories that are wrong rather than studying realities that might be impossible to model theoretically, but that doesn't deny science from stretching to fit the new reality. Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. You confuse p and []p p. No, I deny p altogether. Then you can prove that 0=1. The p has to be added, the machines already know this. I can suggest that 'prove', '0', '=', and '1' are all sensible conditions which can be expanded or contracted to suit the intended context. 0 can be 'almost 1' in some context, or it can be the opposite of 1 in another context, or it can be an irreducible part of a continuum in another context. They appear before logic and cognition. At which level, in what sense of before? I need a theory to make sense of such terms. In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not logic without sense. In your theory. That begs the question. You can't use your theory in this discussion. The only thing that I'm interested in discussing is my theory. It's my theory that makes comp invalid, why would you try to censor it? You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But more sense is not an argument, especially in this context. More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic. Logic is applied in argument, about anything. Again, if you need to be illogical as this point, you make my point. Logic cannot be applied to aesthetic experience. It is false that it can be applied to anything and it is false that pointing this out makes my point illogical. How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and what I derive from the assumption. But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start. Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular reasoning. Confusion between []~comp and ~[]comp. It would be circular if I was defending the truth of comp, but I am just showing that your argument beg the question. Even if my argument seems to beg the question from a 3p logical perspective, it doesn't matter because the argument assumes from the start that 3p logic is not necessary or sufficient to address consciousness. Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that regard? A voice mail machine does not seem to implement a universal machine believing in some induction principles, like PA, ZF. We don't know that the voice mail machine lacks PA and ZF induction principles, This is ridiculous. That's what I say about your sun in law.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Yes. Nice. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? To make more sense of everything. Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. If 1p is the sense maker, and comp makes no sense from the 1p, then comp makes no sense. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. But this is based on arithmetic. Ah, you are confusing the arithmetic with the sensible conditions that the arithmetic is pointing to. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, Yes, I have no problem with the idea that some analysis of machine function would point outside of computation. and cannot be used to refute logically comp. Why not? Aren't you just jumping to a conclusion like 'since there are drive through restaurants, it means that we cannot assume that cars are not hungry'. I am not denying non-comp. Not at all. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first. In my theory, 1 = 1 is reflects a particular set of mathematical expectations. I don't make any claims on the contents of arithmetic, only on the nature of what arithmetic derives from. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people get from Godel. We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We don't need Gödel for this. even better The truth does not require argumentation value. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. Some things may be true but not arguable, so that an invalid argument can still point us to a valid truth - i.e. a metaphor. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. You're interested in what makes a good theory, but I'm interested in understanding consciousness. Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like consistency (~[]f, t), which entails the consistency of its negation: t - []f. Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = the 3p notion of self). How is I a 3p notion of self? It is not. Only here. (raise eyebrow) I was just saying that I was using I in the 3p sense of the self. In that case, the I is given by the body or the code of the entity saying I (by definition). The decision to say yes to the
Re: Video of VCR
Another part 2 On Sunday, April 6, 2014 1:13:09 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It is a valuation of a statement. A semantics. It doesn't have to be a statement. Truth is a quality of congruence across sensory experiences. Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. You confuse p and []p p. No, I deny p altogether. They appear before logic and cognition. At which level, in what sense of before? I need a theory to make sense of such terms. In the sense of there being a possibility of sense without logic but not logic without sense. You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But more sense is not an argument, especially in this context. More sense is better than an argument. Arguments are limited to logic. Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then you put yourself out of the dialog. Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses to see all of the light. and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to rotate yourself). I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. This is worst than don't ask. It is: let us be irrational. Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit ourselves to the rationality of strict logic. = give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my prejudice against machine; Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my prejudice against consciousness. UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when you assume computationalism. It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in law, and other possible machines, ability to manifest personal consciousness. It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not be manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is manifestation itself. Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required before logic. Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies. No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy. Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason about consciousness. You make my point, again. It be useful to reason about consciousness to a point, but it doesn't go all the way, Hmm... OK. Incompleteness valid this. :) and it doesn't know why it can't go all the way. Surely incompleteness validates this. No. the machine can be aware of its own incompleteness and understand why it doesn't go all the way, but also why this makes the possible outside productive and very rich. How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume, and what I derive from the assumption. But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start. Comp is invalid at the start because it loses nothing when we assume that all function can be reduced to logic and hidden logic. Computation works as a map of maps, and need have no territory that is presented aesthetically, either theoretically or empirically. The jump from map to territory is reverse engineered from the very expectations of our own awareness, making comp more likely to be a figment of circular reasoning. I am happy you admit being less certain, on this, and my sun in law who read your posts told me that
Re: Video of VCR
On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Yes. Nice. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. But then why are we discussing? Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. But this is based on arithmetic. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, and cannot be used to refute logically comp. I am not denying non-comp. Not at all. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/ arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people get from Godel. We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We don't need Gödel for this. The truth does not require argumentation value. Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but sometimes it is. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory with more justification. That is a very contextual questions, depending on many things. Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like consistency (~[]f, t), which entails the consistency of its negation: t - []f. Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = the 3p notion of self). How is I a 3p notion of self? It is not. Only here. I was just saying that I was using I in the 3p sense of the self. In that case, the I is given by the body or the code of the entity saying I (by definition). The decision to say yes to the doctor. What would a UM say to the doctor? The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the other direction. The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another machine. The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any possible justification. That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the machine. Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry. As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical. It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today). and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring. It concerns both the 1p,
Re: Video of VCR
On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not apply it to refute comp. Comp can't be refuted logically. Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted logically, arithmetically, and empirically. It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in bias of logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego have their biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical thinking have an agenda which undersignifies its competition. You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to be illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter. You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were talking about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports the limits of logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that standard if my view is true. Incompleteness does not supports the limit of logics, but the limits of theories and machines. Then it shows how theories and machines can access to those limitations and how they can transcend them in some local sense, and exploit them to nuance their view on themselves. Ideally correct and simple machines do have already a rich and complex theology, including a physics. We have to listen to them, before judging them, I think. (Here I gave the programs). How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the table, but here you put a gun on the table. Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It acts like it is following laws but it cheats and then blames something else. At least I'm telling you it's a gun, you've convinced yourself that your gun is just a polite hypothesis. Confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. I don't pretend that my assumption are true. And sometimes you do, forgetting that you have put ~comp in your assumption, and so that you beg the question when using your theory to refute comp. In your last post, it seemed to me you progress on it, but the progress seem fragile here. The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part of common sense, and war or violence. It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense that it cannot parse the germ of sense, You are right, it cannot. But from this it does not follow that machines, which are not purely logical, as they have a non trivial arithmetical (non logical) components, cannot parse the germ of sense. You still believe that arithmetic comes from logic? which is absolutely unprecedented. Identity is not just uncommon, but the opposite - unrepeatable, proprietary, anti-mechnical. There is no choice at all. There is the illusion of logic and the reality of having to carve some kind of genuine sanity out of this thing, moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us permission, we lose the moment. I can relate, but you don't provide an argument why machines or number cannot relate too. You keep thinking in term of simple logic, or simple non universal machine, but then you miss the key notion which makes computationalism consistent with know facts, including the experience of consciousness. That does not prove comp, but that disprove your type of argument against comp. Your theory is don't ask, but I realize also don't argue. Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact that it doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a logical machine. It is comp which ultimately makes asking and arguing irrelevant, but it does so like a vampire - obligating us to invite us in..be fair to the imposter and let him take your brain. Comp insists that you have the right to say no to the doctor. But your type of philosophy would entail a segregation among people with and without prostheses. Tell me, can my sun-in-law vote? That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but that is not an argument against comp. (And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course). It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory. That is trivial then. If it comes down to choosing between the certainty of life and awareness as you know it and taking a gamble on logic and computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If we aren't being faced with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would we gamble with our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer? It will not be like that. It will be more like 2060 working artificial hippocampus, 2090 artificial limbic
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse ~[]comp and []~comp. I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Yes. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. We don't have to abandon logic, but
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not apply it to refute comp. Comp can't be refuted logically. Sorry, but the whole point is that it might be. It can be refuted logically, arithmetically, and empirically. It's a mirage. It seems like it could be refuted, but the built in bias of logic overlooks the stacked deck. Just as emotions and ego have their biases that warp our thinking, so too does logical thinking have an agenda which undersignifies its competition. You are so wrong here that I have to pause. You talk in a way which empties the dialog of any sense. You tell me in advance you need to be illogical to refute my agnosticism in the matter. You don't have to be 'illogical', you just have to transcend strict logic...break the fourth wall...use some of that courage you were talking about. All that I am saying is that incompleteness supports the limits of logic, so that we cannot presume to hold sense to that standard if my view is true. How could that conversation have sense? I put my hypotheses on the table, but here you put a gun on the table. Haha, yes, that's the thing, sense is tyrannical and violent. It acts like it is following laws but it cheats and then blames something else. At least I'm telling you it's a gun, you've convinced yourself that your gun is just a polite hypothesis. The choice is between logic, which is basically the most common part of common sense, and war or violence. It's precisely because logic is the most common part of common sense that it cannot parse the germ of sense, which is absolutely unprecedented. Identity is not just uncommon, but the opposite - unrepeatable, proprietary, anti-mechnical. There is no choice at all. There is the illusion of logic and the reality of having to carve some kind of genuine sanity out of this thing, moment by moment. If we wait for logic to give us permission, we lose the moment. Your theory is don't ask, but I realize also don't argue. Asking and arguing is great, but you can't get away from the fact that it doesn't make sense for the one who asks and argues to be a logical machine. It is comp which ultimately makes asking and arguing irrelevant, but it does so like a vampire - obligating us to invite us in..be fair to the imposter and let him take your brain. That might be correct, and provable in your non-comp theory, but that is not an argument against comp. (And this is no more an argument in favor of comp of course). It is an argument against comp in my non-comp theory. If it comes down to choosing between the certainty of life and awareness as you know it and taking a gamble on logic and computation, do you say yes to the farmer? If we aren't being faced with death with a mad doctor as our only hope, would we gamble with our lives? Would a machine say yes to the farmer? Randomness comes up in comp predictions? Yes. At step seven, as the UD will notably dovetail on all normal differentiation, on a continuum. The iterated WM self-duplication is a part of UD*. What becomes random, and why? Are you OK with step 3 of the UDA? I don't think so. Teleportation? No, the FPI. The fact that you cannot predict, in your personal diary, what you will write tomorrow, when you will be copied and sent at two different places simultaneously (or not). Nothing like that is going to happen. There aren't going to be any copies of me. Sociopaths and actors refute comp. Blindsight refutes comp. Keyboard passwords refute comp. Sports refute comp. etc. You do have a problem with logic. Maybe I do, because I don't see how that follows. When I list examples, you change the subject every time. I am just saying that you have not prove that comp is false. Telling me that I have not proved comp will not do the work, as comp implies that no such proof can ever exist. It's not a matter of proof, because proof has nothing to do with consciousness. It is a matter of what makes more sense overall. That is wishful thinking. It is your right. I have no problem with non-comp, but I do have problem with people using any theory pretending to refute something, and actually unable to do it. I'm refuting the metatheory that comp's refutability is related to its truth. I'm suggesting that specifically, comp is a theoretical construct which brilliantly reduces a theory of consciousness to simple elements, but that this is actually not related directly to consciousness, just as the shadow of a swimming pool is not full of water, even though it moves like water and reflects light like water. There is no problem working in different incompatible theories. But
Re: Video of VCR
On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse ~[]comp and []~comp. I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue this means you say []~comp is true. Or that you confuse, like you did already truth and knowledge, but in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of comp. just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition, which is... not much. Why? All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? You are the only one who deny a theory here. I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type let us abandon logic and ..., which is like God told me ..., and has zero argumentative value. Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like consistency (~[]f, t), which entails the consistency of its negation: t - []f. Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = the 3p notion of self). But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the use of
Re: Video of VCR
On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse ~[]comp and []~comp. All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this many times. As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like consistency (~[]f, t), which entails the consistency of its negation: t - []f. But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. Not valid by what epistemology though? Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but then made explicit. It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness comes from logic. Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. You make my point. You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness by the standard of logic, I never said that, on the contrary. even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. On the contrary. I justify why the machine has no amputation of sense to do. It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it explicit. I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown for them)
Re: Video of VCR
On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. Not valid by what epistemology though? Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but then made explicit. It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness comes from logic. Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. You make my point. It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it explicit. I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown for them) machines/numbers. But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why. But comp explains why. I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the mathematics accessible to the machine. and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to rotate yourself). I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. This is worst than don't ask. It is: let us be irrational. Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required before logic. Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies. Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not apply it to refute comp. You really do make my point. I did a reductio ad absurdum of your proposition. My chance! You defend the absurdum. What could I ever add to that? Now, instead of the numbers, I could have taken many other things, which are just
Re: Video of VCR
On 01 Apr 2014, at 22:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: Logic obeys its own incorrigibility also. Logic cannot be doubted logically. I would say that it is the contrary. Logic + numbers leads to doubts and science only make the doubt greater, augmenting the possibilities, and freedom degrees. t - []f The machine already says it at the (local) 3p-self level: if 3-I is consistent, then it is consistent that 3-I is inconsistent. '---That does not apply to me!' echoes the 1-p. Yeah, life is not easy at the very start, in the arithmetical reality. Well, perhaps it would be more easy then there would be less fun? There could be an eternal non ending conflict between security and liberty, in the 3p/1p arithmetical reality. The 1p and 3p realities/ persons never agree/fit completely, even in the ideal correct case of simple solitary(Löbian) machines. For the 3p, self-consistency is not self-attributable and is doubtable, for the 1p it is trivial. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in the context of a sense making experience. Did I ever said the contrary? Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense making and sense experience. It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical representation. Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes everything (including, but not limited to numbers). You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some work). Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a gift by Santa Klaus. And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence of Santa Klaus. Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or defining autonomous intent. I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to explain qualia and awareness. It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect predictions. But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. Not valid by what epistemology though? Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but then made explicit. It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness comes from logic. Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. You make my point. You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness by the standard of logic, even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it explicit. I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown for them) machines/numbers. Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that your view is wrong. But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why. But comp explains why. Then show me a new color. You
Re: Video of VCR
On 25 March 2014 02:59, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you are living, you already understand what living is. Are you telling me a potato plant - which is undeniably alive - understands what living is? If so, this seems to either elevate potatoes to conscious beings, or else to reduce the meaning of understand to something trivial. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 23 Mar 2014, at 19:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. It depends on the theory we assume. You don't see the double standard there? You, again, talk like if our point was symmetrical. It is not. I do not say that non-comp is wrong. You *do* say that comp is wrong. You can assume non-comp, and make your theory and prediction. You might even use your theory to find a valid argument against comp, but it has not to rely on the non-comp assumption, or you beg the question. Note that the Löb formula (the main axiom of G, in which all points of view are defined in arithmetic, or in arithmetical terms) is a form of begging the question, and might be seen as a form of placebo, which makes my sympathy for your consciousness has to beg the question. But of course, that rings like a confirmation of comp. Note that this has to be taken with some grain of salt, but it is clear that the Löb theorem shows that machines can prove by a curious technic of begging the question. Indeed if PA proves []p - p, for some proposition p, then PA will always prove p. PA obeys to the Löb rule: ([]p - p) p ([]p - p) p PA knows that, as PA can prove []([]p - p) - []p. (Löb's formula, the main axiom of G and G*). I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp. The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. But we have never disagree on that. The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match, You never mention one without either begging the question, or confusing some points of view. and indeed are counter-factual. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. No, that self-consciousness. That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'. Yes. That is why there is awareness/consciousness and self-awareness/ self-consciousness. In the first both the 1-I and 3-I are implicit, and in the second, it is explicit, the machine sees it. Currently, I think consciousness appears at the Sigma_1 complete, or Turing universal, level. Self-consciousness appears at the Löbian level. I would say. It is the difference between RA and PA. The main difference is that although each time RA proves p, RA will soon or later proves []p, yet RA will fail to notice or justify that fact,, RA will not prove []p
Re: Video of VCR
On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. It depends on the theory we assume. I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter- intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. No, that self-consciousness. And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p p to the usual scientific and 3p []p. I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way. The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion. It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type of explanation. You use sense to forbid the study of some theory. You justify don't ask by invoking a private feature. It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and prejudice toward this possibility interesting. I am open to the possibility, so you are wrong. But I wait for evidences or justification, but the way you proceed confirms it is only a prejudice, which unfortunately makes you not studying the domain. So you are just stucking yourself in some (negative) personal opinion. That is hardly convincing. Sorry. You introduce many relevant differences and nuances, but apply them only to humans, and forget them despite I try to explain that machines already do these distinctions. But you don't listen to them invoking that you have already made your opinion, so ... well, you build your own mental prison. Bruno Craig Bruno Craig ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 23, 2014 4:49:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Mar 2014, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. It depends on the theory we assume. You don't see the double standard there? I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? Because it does not justify at all why comp has to be wrong. It justifies only that comp might be wrong, and is unbelievable, but this is already derivable from comp. The fact that there may be no way to justify that comp has to be wrong does not mean that comp is in fact not wrong. The fact that it is unbelievable is not as persuasive as the numerous specific examples where our expectations from comp do not match, and indeed are counter-factual. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. No, that self-consciousness. That would be knowledge of the self. You don't need to know that you are 'you' to know that there is an experience 'here'. And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p p to the usual scientific and 3p []p. I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way. The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion. It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. I said that your use of sense is like the use of god, in the gap-god type of explanation. You use sense to forbid the study of some theory. You justify don't ask by invoking a private feature. I don't forbid the study of anything. I applaud AI research, including Strong AI Singularity variety. I'm not one of those who sees interviews with Kurzweil or Moravec (who I met once, btw), and says 'Deluded fools'. To the contrary, I think it's a little sad maybe that they will probably not see their ideas fulfilled, but as long as they are not demanding people to say Yes to the doctor, I have no problem. My problem is if we want to discover the deep truth about awareness, we need the most perfect form of what I call a philosophical vacuum to begin with. We
Re: Video of VCR
Continued... On Saturday, March 22, 2014 4:54:41 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 21, 2014 4:44:20 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Mar 2014, at 02:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think logic can study reality, only truncated maps of maps of reality. Whatever is reality, it might not depend on what you think it is, or is not. Of course, but it might not depend on logic or computation either. I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. Not to me, and I don't take anything for granted. I assume comp, and this includes elementary arithmetic, enough to explain Church's thesis. I don't take arithmetic for granted. Then you have no tools to assert non-comp. Why not? I assert sense. Computation need not even exist in theory. Computation arises intentionally as an organizational feature - just as it does on Earth: to keep track of things and events. Question begging. If an explanation falls out of the hypothesis, why is it question begging? What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Again, you talk like Brouwer, the founder of intuitionism (and a solipsist!), also a great guy in topology. Well, the easiest way to attribute a person to a machine (theaetetus) provides S4Grz, (the logic of []p p) which talks like Brouwer too, and identify somehow truth and knowledge, and makes consciousness out of any 3p description. Truth and knowledge, []p p...these things are meaningless to me. All I care about is what cares. Truth and knowledge care for nothing. I was beginning to suspect this. But then why still argue? Because consciousness is what cares. Truth or knowledge of consciousness only can make sense of this. Consciousness includes knowledge of itself by definition. And you are right on this, again. It *is* a theorem of comp. I hope you try to follow the modal thread, as it will help you to put sense on that last sentence. But there is some amount of work to do, and you have to be willing to change your mode of arguing, going from your []p p to the usual scientific and 3p []p. I think that it's you who should try paddling away from the shallow waters of modal logic and truth and surf the big waves of sense. Why do you judge something shallow, and at the same time confess not studying this. It makes you look rather foolish, and wipe o I'm not trying to be an expert in sailing to China from Italy. I'm trying to show whoever is interested that there is another continent or two in the way. The other continents has been found, and you don't need to invoke sense other than at the metalevel. If not, what you do is the persisting hulman error to invoke God in science. It cannot work.It makes science into pseudo-religion. It has nothing to do with God or religion for me. It's about grounding physics and mathematics in aesthetic sense. This does help explain ideas of God and religion, but that is completely optional. I find your fear and prejudice toward this possibility interesting. Craig Bruno Craig ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 19 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures, ? The argument against zombies presume equality for equal behavior. Your theory single out the living. I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced histories and generic information. A chance! (comp too) Our histories just so happen to follow the biologicalzoologicalanthropological branch, but I would not expect any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic information. My fault, perhaps. I suppose people to get well the 1p and 3p person notion, at step 2 of the UDA already. Then I indulge myself in shortening, like saying that a machine can think (be conscious), where I always mean it in the sense of comp: that is the bet, or act of faith, in a level of description of mybody so that a digital emulation would preserve my first person experience, with the normal probabilities conserved. But the proprietary experience is NOT generic information. (except perhaps in some God's eyes, but not hereby). That would be a confusion between []p and []p p. UDA illustrates the difference in some intuitive way, and just arithmetic justify how correct machine *already* knows the difference, once they have the introspective ability []A - [][]A, like PA, ZF, and many other theories/machines/numbers. but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent. Behavior is not apparent. Why not? For a 3p unknown creature, we have to be cautious in denying first- personality and consciousness, but by default we can stay trivially agnostic. If we can suspect computations indeed somewhere, like a mobile for example, then why not enlarge the opening to such an attribution, indeed. Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/ computation, with no improvement on bridging it. On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts nor the papers. The gap is still there. But with comp it acquires 8 mathematical descriptions, some explicit in terms of the Z* \ Z, X* \ X, inheritated from the Gödel-Solovay gap G* \ G. The gap vanishes only in the outer God's point of view (Arithmetical truth), and curiously enough, in the first person point of view (the inner God, the soul). Your sense fits well the machine's soul (S4Grz, []p p, the inner God, the soul). Math offers no first person theory of computation, I offer you a counter-example on a plate. More precisely, a theory of the soul (and matter) based on computations (motivated by the computationalist assumption). You just ignore it, or refute it with straw man argument, or begging the question. nor third person theory of qualia, For qualia, you get them in X1* \ X1. it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) No, you are wrong here: it is not devoid of the aesthetic content, unless the theory is shown wrong, but the basic theory of knowledge used is independent of comp, and it applies to many arithmetical non- machine entities (like PI_1 complete set, which are like some kind of little
Re: Video of VCR
On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures, ? The argument against zombies presume equality for equal behavior. Your theory single out the living. but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent. Behavior is not apparent. Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/ computation, with no improvement on bridging it. On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts nor the papers. Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, God has to make sense too. That is a reason more to not invoke sense in a scientific explanation. You just make your case worst. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the question, or play with words. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? By the tension between []p and []p p. It explains why the comp truth is counter-intuitive fpr the machine. You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily No, I have just to assume comp. and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Yes, we have to that, but that is the case when we attribute 1p to others. Comp explains why the machine is wrong about comp, from the 1p view. And the machine can understand, and find by itself, that explanation. Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness? I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving
Re: Video of VCR
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures, ? The argument against zombies presume equality for equal behavior. Your theory single out the living. I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced histories and generic information. Our histories just so happen to follow the biologicalzoologicalanthropological branch, but I would not expect any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic information. but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent. Behavior is not apparent. Why not? Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, with no improvement on bridging it. On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts nor the papers. The gap is still there. Math offers no first person theory of computation, nor third person theory of qualia, it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) with the idea of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps). Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, God has to make sense too. That is a reason more to not invoke sense in a scientific explanation. You just make your case worst. Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the question, or play with words. CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic qualities. It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary novelty, etc. It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for the truth. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? By the tension between []p and []p p. It explains why the comp truth is counter-intuitive fpr the machine. If we have opposite intuitions, and we are both machines, how can you claim that comp would be counter-intuitive to one of us and not the other? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily No, I have just to assume comp. But if comp is counter-intuitive to me, then it must be counter-intuitive to you - but clearly it is not counter-intuitive to you because you are able to assume comp. You are calling on a super-intuitive
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Did I ever say something bad about mirror? You're saying they don't compute. Nice you defend this as a compliment! Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The mirror does not pretend to compute. The expression a mirror compute does not make much sense. There is category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression. I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they are. Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that mirror have not the ability of universal computation. I thought that you are agnostic about comp. ? Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working theory. I am agnostic indeed. How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? That expression does not make sense. Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies? Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous. Even the Dx = Fxx method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. Straw man. Bruno Craig Craig Bruno Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:19:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Did I ever say something bad about mirror? You're saying they don't compute. Nice you defend this as a compliment! Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The mirror does not pretend to compute. Why not? Any computation which can be output optically can be mirrored. There could be a Turing test in which any computation seen in a mirror that cannot be distinguished from a backward computation on a screen must be considered good enough. The expression a mirror compute does not make much sense. There is category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression. I don't think it is any more of a category error made by comp in attributing feelings to behaviors. Anyways, my example is not a mirror, it is a VCR+camera, as seen in the video. In the video, we see the tape responding visibly to each intrusion on it's 'computation'. If you had a virtual machine that responded in that same way to environmental conditions, would you not say that is evidence of computationalism? I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they are. Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that mirror have not the ability of universal computation. I thought that you are agnostic about comp. ? Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working theory. I am agnostic indeed. If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? That expression does not make sense. Suppose I say that mirrors work because they simulate optical environments, and are in fact universal machines...but again, this 'mirror' example is a straw man. The example I'm working with is the VCR+camera. Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies? Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous. I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. Even the Dx = Fxx method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. Straw man. I don't think that it is. It seems to me a particularly equivalent example. If you
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:37:39 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science theoretical sense. How do you know though? I don't know. I assume it. Then try not assuming it? This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. Where you confuse []p and []p p. Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different logic, even when the machine is always correct. The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it exists, even if relatively. I'm fine with an umbilical cord with truth, but why would there be any aesthetic phenomena or sense associated with it? I can see why sense would invent truth, but I cannot see why or how truth would invent sense. Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs. OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and you speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more interesting than assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from a non comp theory of machines. Go for it. I present it only as a counter-example. I don't think that there is any sense there on that level. It's an example of how low level continuity across microphenomenal coincidence can be misattributed as having high level, phenomenal significance. There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply. I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie. Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me. That's like me saying show me the flavor of strawberry that the machine tastes. The whole point is that there is a sub-computational level which can't be detected by computation, but which is responsible for computation. Keep in mind that with comp, a material object like a mirror does not really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience among infinitely many: it is a wave of possible computations (arithmetical relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable *experience*. I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p. By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act like you and me. We're talking about the VCS though, not a mirror. As you can see in the video, it does indeed act like you and me, squealing and squirming when we treat it harshly. My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie, mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a chef, actually. He makes money with his nose. We might think he can discuss it, but he may just be imitating the deep syntax of data he knows nothing about. His discussion is
Re: Video of VCR
On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. You have a lot of things to learn. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/ bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can discuss this anymore. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:17:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. You have a lot of things to learn. That seems like an odd response to what I see as a fairly uncontroversial assertion. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:31:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 18:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: I don't think it needs to be an experience to compute though. In real life it does need to be an experience, because I think that it is the experience which underlies all computation and arithmetic rather than the other way around. In the hypothetical universe of comp though, I see no place for 'experience' at all. Computations within comp need not be felt or seen, only stored and processed. Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, infinitely many bodies). Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, with no improvement on bridging it. Then by assuming sense, sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, unless you mean God, God has to make sense too. but then you are not doing a theory, and if your god does not allow my sun in law to play genuinely his role in the spectacle, I am not sure I can discuss this anymore. His genuine role is not in the spectacle, it is in the intangible processing of meaningless data. Your theory seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about pointing out the mistake of comp. You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's understanding of incompleteness. This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your view is not? You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his understanding of incompleteness? Anyway, I have not seen any theory, nor valid argument. Sorry. Maybe that's what 1p machines say when they are infected with the comp virus ;) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in presuming equality with living creatures, but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which computation is not apparent. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science theoretical sense. There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self- reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply. Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? No. If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity stuff. The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self- reference, but lacks the main part: the computations itself. How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from the laws of addition + multiplication. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. Bruno Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2014 09:09, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? Perhaps seeing itself is not enough: I don't even think there is any seeing here, as I am sure you did not. Even if there is seeing, that would not been enough, but there is no seeing here. I mean: no reason to attribute any seeing. it may have to be able to adjust its behaviour incorporating its own image in a feedback loop, or something. Exactly. In any case, it makes more sense that self-awareness should develop as a result of some such complex behaviour than because the VCR is made out of meat. Sure. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
Craig, Depends on what you mean by 'self-awareness'. Do you mean awareness that you are a separate 'thing' in the world with special attributes? Or do you mean the self monitoring awareness of your actual functions as you perform them? These are two very different meanings of self-awareness. Edgar On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:17:47 AM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Craig Bruno Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 7:20:19 AM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Depends on what you mean by 'self-awareness'. Do you mean awareness that you are a separate 'thing' in the world with special attributes? Or do you mean the self monitoring awareness of your actual functions as you perform them? These are two very different meanings of self-awareness. Difference meanings, but the common component is the basic capacity to detect that what is doing the detecting is part of what is being detected, and that there is an appreciation of intrinsic significance in that awareness. Craig Edgar On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:17:47 AM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science theoretical sense. How do you know though? This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs. There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply. I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie. Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p. Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? No. Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;) If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity stuff. Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used against my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively here to your objections to sub-computationalism. Craig The VCR just singles out one aspect of digital machine self-reference, but lacks the main part: the computations itself. How would those initial conditions appears? You can derive them from the laws of addition + multiplication. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Did I ever say something bad about mirror? I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that mirror have not the ability of universal computation. Even the Dx = Fxx method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. Craig Bruno Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 Mar 2014, at 14:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:40:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Mar 2014, at 23:09, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? The computational reason is that there is no computation at all there. There is no self-representation, no introspection in the computer science theoretical sense. How do you know though? I don't know. I assume it. This is the same argument that I give for machines, except I am saying that there is no introspection in the sense of aesthetic phenomenal sense. Where you confuse []p and []p p. Before Gödel, it was thought they would obey the same logic, when the machine is correct. But after Gödel, we know that they obey different logic, even when the machine is always correct. The aesthetics phenomenal sense comes from the machine keeping its umbilical chord with truth, which is natural for her to do, as it exists, even if relatively. Maybe the VCR is just very young compared to the machines that you are used to considering as capable of self-representation - indeed the jumpy screen artifacts correlate perfectly with the events that are impacting the VCR's body. Notice how each operation performed on the 'VCS' (VCR + Camera System) generates a unique vocabulary of responses on the screen. Why not assume that these are intelligent cries which reflect specific mechanical emotions. If we reproduced the experiment on a variety of similar devices, we could probably deduce a mathematical schema - a language through which VCS' talk about themselves and their environment. We could interview them and see whether they follow computationalist expectations for UMs or LUMs. OK, but why would they not. You speculate on some analog machines, and you speculate on an analog theory of mind. That might be more interesting than assuming sense. You would make a theory of sense from a non comp theory of machines. Go for it. There is an interesting analogy, as the computational self-reference leads to similar fixed points, but the analogy stops there. The VCR is like a mirror, with some dynamical delay similar to a computer self-reference, but it lacks the computations. Simply. I think that you would have to be telepathic to say with certainty that it lacks computations, just as I would have to be telepathic to 'know' that a machine is not a p-zombie. Oh, but if there are computations, I apologize. just show them to me. Keep in mind that with comp, a material object like a mirror does not really exist, it is a map of your most probable future experience among infinitely many: it is a wave of possible computations (arithmetical relations, in our base). It is a common and sharable *experience*. Your argument is that the VCS is a an m-zombie. A mechanical zombie which only seems to respond to its own condition as if it were a machine's 1p. By definition, a zombie acts like you and me. The mirror does not act like you and me. My sun in law does. He can discuss with you on consciousness, zombie, mind, brain, philosophy and also gastronomy, he works himself as a chef, actually. He makes money with his nose. But let me think, when was my last discussion on culinary art with a mirror, hmm ? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? No. Not when you have ruled out their right to compute from the start ;) You can compute with a ruler, a compass, but with a mirror you can do only simple symmetries, and dilations. Now, with many mirrors, it is different, especially if you can make them transparent and reflecting by a switch, then you can made them computing, by placing them in the right places. With quantum semi-mirror you can do quantum computations. If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? The VCR lacks the numbers, the digital information. It lack retrievable memories, and well, the whole universality/Löbianity stuff. Maybe its just very quiet about it. Any argument that you have used against my objections to computationalism can be used as effectively here to your objections to sub-computationalism. Well, if sub-computationalism is correct, then computationalism is correct. It is just that one mirror does not compute much more than addition or multiplication, but it can't do both, and lacks the ability of a universal machine. There is a notion, in computer science, of sub-universality, and sub- creativity, which is indeed where I think
Re: Video of VCR
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? The mirror does not compute. How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? Did I ever say something bad about mirror? You're saying they don't compute. Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they are. Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that mirror have not the ability of universal computation. I thought that you are agnostic about comp. How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal computation though? Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just babies? Even the Dx = Fxx method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. Craig Craig Bruno Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Craig, Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? Edgar On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Video of VCR
On 16 March 2014 09:09, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? Perhaps seeing itself is not enough: it may have to be able to adjust its behaviour incorporating its own image in a feedback loop, or something. In any case, it makes more sense that self-awareness should develop as a result of some such complex behaviour than because the VCR is made out of meat. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
