Re: Church's Thesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 May 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 10:49:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 May 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.
>> 
>> 
>> You know that?
>> 
>> 
>> I just say that CTT (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism 
>> (like YHWH ). 
> 
> CT, or CTT if you prefer, is refutable. I am not sure YHWH is refutable, 
> although to prove this would require some thorough research. The 8 universal 
> machine hypostases are embedded in the neoplatonist zephirots, as I have 
> discovered recently. The neoplatonist christians, jews, and muslims are very 
> close to the (Löbian) universal machine. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Better to ignore it.
> 
> Have you understood the simple proof of incompleteness that I gave? CTT 
> changes everything. It is the important part of Digital Mechanism, if only to 
> define “digital” in a mathematically precise way.
> 
> We can ignore it, because we could just define “computable” by 
> Turing-computable, or lambda-calculable, … but this is dishonest, and makes 
> sense only if we assume CTT.
> 
> Then, there are tuns of evidences for CT, and none against it. There are 
> evidence comping from the empirical reality, and very deep theoretical 
> evidences too.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> At least in 3 ways "against":
> 
> 1. The domain of interactions (π calculus vs. λ calculus) exposes the limits 
> of CTT.
> 
> 2. The domain of experiences (aka qualia) does as well.
> 
> 3. The domain of materials: Material computing  exploits unconventional 
> physical substrates and/or unconventional computational models to perform 
> physical computation in a non-silicon and/or non-Turing paradigm.
> https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html
>  
> 
> 
> 
> The Interactive Nature of Computing:
> Refuting the Strong Church-Turing Thesis
> Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
> Brown University
> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf
> 
> The classical view of computing positions computation as a closed-box
> transformation of inputs (rational numbers or finite strings) to outputs. 
> According to the interactive view of computing, computation is an ongoing 
> interactive process rather than a function-based transformation of an input 
> to an output. Specifically, communication with the outside world happens 
> during the computation, not before or after it. This approach radically 
> changes our understanding of what is computation and how it is modeled. The 
> acceptance of interaction as a new paradigm is hindered by the Strong 
> Church-Turing Thesis (SCT), the widespread belief that Turing Machines (TMs) 
> capture all computation, so models of computation more expressive than TMs 
> are impossible. In this paper, we show that SCT reinterprets the original 
> Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) in a way that Turing never intended; its commonly 
> assumed equivalence to the original is a myth. We identify and analyze the 
> historical reasons for the widespread belief in SCT. Only by accepting that 
> it is false can we begin to adopt interaction as an alternative paradigm of 
> computation. We present Persistent Turing Machines (PTMs), that extend TMs to 
> capture sequential interaction. PTMs allow us to formulate the Sequential 
> Interaction Thesis, going beyond the expressiveness of TMs and of the CTT. 
> The paradigm shift to interaction provides an alternative understanding of 
> the nature of computing that better reflects the services provided by today’s 
> computing technology.
> 
> The Church-Turing Thesis: Breaking the Myth
> Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
> pdf @ 
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221652812_The_Church-Turing_Thesis_Breaking_the_Myth
> 
> According to the interactive view of computation, communication happens 
> during the computation, not before or after it. This approach, distinct from 
> concurrency theory and the theory of computation, represents a paradigm shift 
> that changes our understanding of what is computation and how it is modeled. 
> Interaction machines extend Turing machines with interaction to capture the 
> behavior of concurrent systems, promising to bridge these two fields. This 
> promise is hindered by the widespread belief, incorrectly known as the 
> Church-Turing thesis, that no model of computation more expressive than 
> Turing machines can exist. Yet Turing’s original thesis only refers to the 
> computation of functions and explicitly excludes other computational 
> paradigms such as interaction. In this paper, we identify and analyze 

Re: Church's Thesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 10:49:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 May 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.*
>>
>>
>>
>> You know that?
>>
>
>
> I just say that *CTT* (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism 
> (like YHWH ). 
>
>
> CT, or CTT if you prefer, is refutable. I am not sure YHWH is refutable, 
> although to prove this would require some thorough research. The 8 
> universal machine hypostases are embedded in the neoplatonist zephirots, as 
> I have discovered recently. The neoplatonist christians, jews, and muslims 
> are very close to the (Löbian) universal machine. 
>
>
>
> Better to ignore it.
>
>
> Have you understood the simple proof of incompleteness that I gave? CTT 
> changes everything. It is the important part of Digital Mechanism, if only 
> to define “digital” in a mathematically precise way.
>
> We can ignore it, because we could just define “computable” by 
> Turing-computable, or lambda-calculable, … but this is dishonest, and makes 
> sense only if we assume CTT.
>
> Then, there are tuns of evidences for CT, and none against it. There are 
> evidence comping from the empirical reality, and very deep theoretical 
> evidences too.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


At least in 3 ways "against":

1. The domain of *interactions* (π calculus vs. λ calculus) exposes the 
limits of CTT.

2. The domain of *experiences *(aka *qualia*) does as well.

3. The domain of *materials*: Material computing  exploits unconventional 
physical substrates and/or unconventional computational models to perform 
physical computation in a non-silicon and/or non-Turing paradigm.
https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html


*The Interactive Nature of Computing:*
*Refuting the Strong Church-Turing Thesis*
Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
Brown University
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf

The classical view of computing positions computation as a closed-box
transformation of inputs (rational numbers or finite strings) to outputs. 
According to the interactive view of computing, computation is an ongoing 
interactive process rather than a function-based transformation of an input 
to an output. Specifically, communication with the outside world happens 
during the computation, not before or after it. This approach radically 
changes our understanding of what is computation and how it is modeled. The 
acceptance of interaction as a new paradigm is hindered by the Strong 
Church-Turing Thesis (SCT), the widespread belief that Turing Machines 
(TMs) capture all computation, so models of computation more expressive 
than TMs are impossible. In this paper, we show that SCT reinterprets the 
original Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) in a way that Turing never intended; 
its commonly assumed equivalence to the original is a myth. We identify and 
analyze the historical reasons for the widespread belief in SCT. Only by 
accepting that it is false can we begin to adopt interaction as an 
alternative paradigm of computation. We present Persistent Turing Machines 
(PTMs), that extend TMs to capture sequential interaction. PTMs allow us to 
formulate the Sequential Interaction Thesis, going beyond the 
expressiveness of TMs and of the CTT. The paradigm shift to interaction 
provides an alternative understanding of the nature of computing that 
better reflects the services provided by today’s computing technology.

*The Church-Turing Thesis: Breaking the Myth*
Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
pdf @ 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221652812_The_Church-Turing_Thesis_Breaking_the_Myth

According to the interactive view of computation, communication happens 
during the computation, not before or after it. This approach, distinct 
from concurrency theory and the theory of computation, represents a 
paradigm shift that changes our understanding of what is computation and 
how it is modeled. Interaction machines extend Turing machines with 
interaction to capture the behavior of concurrent systems, promising to 
bridge these two fields. This promise is hindered by the widespread belief, 
incorrectly known as the Church-Turing thesis, that no model of computation 
more expressive than Turing machines can exist. Yet Turing’s original 
thesis only refers to the computation of functions and explicitly excludes 
other computational paradigms such as interaction. In this paper, we 
identify and analyze the historical reasons for this widespread belief. 
Only by accepting that it is false can we begin to properly investigate 
formal models of interaction machines. We conclude the paper by presenting 
one such model, Persistent Turing Machines (PTMs). PTMs capture sequential 

Re: Church's Thesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 May 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.
> 
> 
> You know that?
> 
> 
> I just say that CTT (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism (like 
> YHWH ). 

CT, or CTT if you prefer, is refutable. I am not sure YHWH is refutable, 
although to prove this would require some thorough research. The 8 universal 
machine hypostases are embedded in the neoplatonist zephirots, as I have 
discovered recently. The neoplatonist christians, jews, and muslims are very 
close to the (Löbian) universal machine. 


> 
> Better to ignore it.

Have you understood the simple proof of incompleteness that I gave? CTT changes 
everything. It is the important part of Digital Mechanism, if only to define 
“digital” in a mathematically precise way.

We can ignore it, because we could just define “computable” by 
Turing-computable, or lambda-calculable, … but this is dishonest, and makes 
sense only if we assume CTT.

Then, there are tuns of evidences for CT, and none against it. There are 
evidence comping from the empirical reality, and very deep theoretical 
evidences too.

Bruno





> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Church's Thesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.*
>
>
>
> You know that?
>


I just say that *CTT* (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism 
(like YHWH ). 

Better to ignore it.


@philipthrift

 

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Church's Thesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:
> 
> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.


You know that?



> 
> 
> 
> Is the church-Turing thesis true?
> Carol E. Cleland
> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC 
> 
> The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to 
> computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the general notion of 
> an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo Church in the 
> 1930''s. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to the number 
> theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no number 
> theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine but could 
> be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. Since that 
> time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared in the 
> literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application which have 
> been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; (2) all 
> functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I provide an 
> analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike Turing''s, is 
> based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, directions and 
> methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane procedures can 
> be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing machine procedures 
> can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane procedures differ from 
> Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., the former, but not the 
> latter, generate causal processes. I apply my analysis to all three of the 
> above mentioned interpretations of the Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the 
> thesis is (i) clearly false under interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least 
> some possible worlds (perhaps even in the actual world) under interpretation 
> (2), and (iii) very much open to question under interpretation (1)
> 
> cf http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf 
> 
> 


That type of refutation is proposed by the universal machine too, but with 
mechanism, this does not violate the Church Turing thesis. So, to argue against 
the classical usual Church’s thesis, by proposing an formal procedure is bound 
to fail, or to admit interpretation involving the first person of the machine, 
which in this case does not violate CT. The paper fail to give a computable 
function not Turing emulable.

Tha auhor is not aware that CT is formulated here in the extensional version, 
in term of set of computable function from N to N. But the extensional CT 
entails an intensional version, which asserts that not only all universal 
numbers compute the same class of functions, but that they can imitate the 
manner in which the computations are done. For example, you can write a Fortan 
program emulating a pattern of the game of life, itself emulating a von Neumann 
extended boolean graph, itself emulating the the 10^1000 x 10^1000 
Heseinberg-Dirac-Feynman matrix emulating our galactic quantum field emulating 
each of us right.

People confuse computation, and the ten thousand higher level notion, to begin 
with provability, which has deep relation with computability but are 
importantly quite different notions (computability is universal, absolute, but 
provability is relative and has no universal predicate, making G, G* 
extraordinary as they axiomatic the propositional level of what is true and 
what machine can prove about their provability for a very large class of 
entities (the Löbian entities). 




Church was anticipated by Emil Post in the 1920s, and by Babbage I as I argue 
in my long text, as Babbage is said to have been more sorry for the non 
understanding of its functional language than for the non understanding of its 
universal machine, which makes me think that he got the point he saw their deep 
mathematical equivalence.

There are empirical evidences for CT: the fact that anyone trying to violate it 
did not succeed, the fact that very different definition of “intuitively 
computable” have all lead to the same class of functions, the fact that some of 
those definition occurred with different motivation (like Shoenfinkel’s 
discovery of the combinators), but led again to the same class. The fact that a 
quantum computer cannot violate CT, etc.

And there is one hyper-strong theoretical evidence for CT, which is that the 
set of of those functions computed by digital number, executed by universal 
number, is close for Cantor’s transendental diagonal procedure. At fist sight 
that seems impossible, especially after Gödel proved his incompleteness 
theorem, showing that provability cannot be "universal “ (complete) using that 
diagonal technic.

Where is the error in the following reasoning?  If there 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 30 Sep 2018, at 08:37, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 29 Sep 2018, at 02:38, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> But you do not seem to go the additional step of saying that mathematical 
> objects, numbers and so on, are objects that actually exist (which would 
> be a form of platonism).
 
 I use “exist” in the same sense as “it exist a number x such that x + 7 = 
 8”. 
>>> 
>>> That is precisely why you need to study the philosophy of mathematics.
>> 
>> I love, but that is not relevant here, at least before to study the science.
>> 
>>> It might teach you not to confuse the use of the existential quantifier 
>>> with an ontology.
>> 
>> You call confusion what is simply the definition to start with.
> 
> You can't define cats to be the same as dogs!


And where did I do that? If you care to look more closely to what I say, I 
think you will on the contrary, see a lot of cautiousness  used in the 
identification. In the math part, no identification is provided without a 
representation theorem. 




> 
>> You do seem playing rhetorical semantical game to avoid studying a theory.
> 
> The linguistic games are all yours.


Please, if you miss a point, just ask. Vague negative generality will not help 
any one.



> 
> 
>> By definition: the ontology is given by the the things you NEED to assume, 
>> because no theories at all can explain their existence.
> 
> Ontology is the science of being in general, embracing such things as the 
> nature of existence and the categorical structure of reality. This is not an 
> area in which there is universal agreement among philosophers (or 
> mathematicians), so it is perfectly respectable to disagree with your 
> particular view.

I am a scientist. There is no disagreement. You understand or miss the point. 
The “disagreement” are handle by accepting that we are working in different 
theories. 

I do not offer any particular view. I state theories, theorems and facts. 

I have defined my use of the term “ontology”. It concerns the primitive terms 
of the basic theory. Primitive means that we consider them to be irreducible, 
but in our case (Mechanism) this is up to Turing-equivalence.

So, with mechanism, eventually we come up with the idea that the ontology 
contains only numbers, or combinators, or lambda terms, etc. Any Turing 
complete theory would work. 



> 
>> With mechanism, that ONLY number exists is a consequence of the belief that 
>> a physical universe exist,
> 
> I am glad that you see that numbers only exist because the universe exists!

Of course.

But that does not means that the universe or any physical things (like space, 
time, particles, …) needs to be assumed as part of the ontology (in the sense 
above).





> 
>> and that I reline live in that universe when the constituents of the brain 
>> are permuted in some functional way.
>> 
>> So, what you call confusion is the result of work. 
>> 
>> I guess you call it a confusion because it informs your favorite ontology (a 
>> physical world perhaps?).
>> 
>> Let us do science first, and discuss philosophy after. I know that doing 
>> science in metaphysics and theology is not common, but that is what the 
>> mechanist assumption makes possible to do, and that is what I have done 
>> (which obviously do not please to many philosophers, like they were not 
>> pleased when Newton invaded their territory too).
>> 
>> Also, when you do a critics, you must make it in a much more precise way. If 
>> you really think there is a confusion somewhere, you need to explain it in 
>> detail so that everyone see what you mean.
> 
> I think that the confusion you display between an existential quantifier in 
> mathematics and an ontology is perfectly clear to everyone.

I think you are not trying to understand what I say. If you believe that  I am 
mistaken anywhere, you need to say where precisely. You are just using vague 
philosophical remark to convince your self that you don’t need to do the 
homework, it seems to me.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 29 Sep 2018, at 02:38, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


But you do not seem to go the additional step of saying that 
mathematical objects, numbers and so on, are objects that actually 
exist (which would be a form of platonism).


I use “exist” in the same sense as “it exist a number x such that x 
+ 7 = 8”.


That is precisely why you need to study the philosophy of mathematics.


I love, but that is not relevant here, at least before to study the 
science.


It might teach you not to confuse the use of the existential 
quantifier with an ontology.


You call confusion what is simply the definition to start with.


You can't define cats to be the same as dogs!


You do seem playing rhetorical semantical game to avoid studying a theory.


The linguistic games are all yours.


By definition: the ontology is given by the the things you NEED to 
assume, because no theories at all can explain their existence.


Ontology is the science of being in general, embracing such things as 
the nature of existence and the categorical structure of reality. This 
is not an area in which there is universal agreement among philosophers 
(or mathematicians), so it is perfectly respectable to disagree with 
your particular view.


With mechanism, that ONLY number exists is a consequence of the belief 
that a physical universe exist,


I am glad that you see that numbers only exist because the universe exists!

and that I reline live in that universe when the constituents of the 
brain are permuted in some functional way.


So, what you call confusion is the result of work.

I guess you call it a confusion because it informs your favorite 
ontology (a physical world perhaps?).


Let us do science first, and discuss philosophy after. I know that 
doing science in metaphysics and theology is not common, but that is 
what the mechanist assumption makes possible to do, and that is what I 
have done (which obviously do not please to many philosophers, like 
they were not pleased when Newton invaded their territory too).


Also, when you do a critics, you must make it in a much more precise 
way. If you really think there is a confusion somewhere, you need to 
explain it in detail so that everyone see what you mean.


I think that the confusion you display between an existential quantifier 
in mathematics and an ontology is perfectly clear to everyone.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 3:55:37 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 2:30:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 20:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> My claim: Synthetic biology changes the definition of "program”. 
>>
>>
>>
>> If that is true, it would be a rather bad news for synthetic biology.
>>
>> Program/machine is the most solid mathematical epistemic notion, because 
>> it has that “miraculous” Church’s thesis. This lacks for provability, 
>> definability, representability, etc.
>>
>> So, I doubt very much that synthetic biology needs to change the notion 
>> of program.
>>
>> You might explain why you think so. You might explain what is synthetic 
>> biology too.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>>>
>>> If I have a synbio (synthetic biology) program for a life form that 
>>> could attack a disease, if it is just transformed into a simulation that 
>>> runs in a MacBook, it me does no good. But it could via a 
>>> biocompiler/assembler be transformed to an object that "runs" inside me.
>>>
>>>
>  
>
>
>
> I don't think *any* notion is "solid" (or fixed) - and that includes in 
> particular what a program/machine is, or any definition of provability, etc.
>
> Sartre: Existence precedes essence.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence_precedes_essence
>
> Rorty: The world does not speak. Only we do.
>
> 
> http://neamathisi.com/new-learning/chapter-7-knowledge-and-learning/richard-rorty-on-truth-and-language
>
>
> To see what synthetic biology is, check out synthetic biology textbooks:
>
>  https://www.google.com/search?q=synthetic+biology+books
>
> To see what it is doing, check out the conferences: 
> https://2018.synbiobeta.com/
>
> The outputs of biocompilers/assemblers - a synbio program is transformed 
> into a living object - is more than transforming it into a MacBook machine 
> language abject.
>

^
[ edit ]
  object

Maybe a Freudian slip? :)

- pt

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 29 Sep 2018, at 02:38, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> But you do not seem to go the additional step of saying that mathematical 
>>> objects, numbers and so on, are objects that actually exist (which would be 
>>> a form of platonism).
>> 
>> I use “exist” in the same sense as “it exist a number x such that x + 7 = 
>> 8”. 
> 
> That is precisely why you need to study the philosophy of mathematics.

I love, but that is not relevant here, at least before to study the science.



> It might teach you not to confuse the use of the existential quantifier with 
> an ontology.


You call confusion what is simply the definition to start with.

You do seem playing rhetorical semantical game to avoid studying a theory.

By definition: the ontology is given by the the things you NEED to assume, 
because no theories at all can explain their existence.

With mechanism, that ONLY number exists is a consequence of the belief that a 
physical universe exist, and that I reline live in that universe when the 
constituents of the brain are permuted in some functional way.

So, what you call confusion is the result of work. 

I guess you call it a confusion because it informs your favorite ontology (a 
physical world perhaps?).

Let us do science first, and discuss philosophy after. I know that doing 
science in metaphysics and theology is not common, but that is what the 
mechanist assumption makes possible to do, and that is what I have done (which 
obviously do not please to many philosophers, like they were not pleased when 
Newton invaded their territory too).

Also, when you do a critics, you must make it in a much more precise way. If 
you really think there is a confusion somewhere, you need to explain it in 
detail so that everyone see what you mean.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 22:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/28/2018 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> It's not something outside mathematics that is true
>> 
>> OK.
>> 
>> 
>>> in the sense that ice is cold.
>> 
>> 
>> That is also a belief by some machine, and it might be recovered in their 
>> phenomenology, in arithmetic.
>> 
>> We cannot discuss in the abstract. Doing metaphysics with the scientific 
>> method as for theory and means of verifying empirically the theory.
>> 
>> The mechanist theory predicts both matter and consciousness.
> 
> The question is whether it predicts that ice is cold. 

It should do it indirectly, yes. But it is the role of physics to explain, 
this, not metaphysics. Metaphysics must explain why there are things like ice 
and cold. 

Current physics explains this, but with many dubious assumptions, and fail to 
miss to predict what when we take ice in the hand, we feel it cold. 

Physics works only because it use an identity link, which unfortunately 
requires actual infinities to make sense.

My work expose a problem in metaphysics, and the beginning of a testable 
solution. 




> It not at all impressive to say it predicts that a some machine will believe 
> something like "ice is cold" when it also predicts some machine will also 
> believe "ice is hot" and another that "ice is friendly" and that "ice is 
> quadratic" and so on.

Exactly. But that is the problem with physics. Metaphysics seems to solve that 
problem by imposing a quantum measure, without introducing in an ad hoc manner 
just to fit the observation.

You are right, but your critics applies to physicalism, not Mechanism.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> 
>> Materialist theory assume matter, with some magical attribute, and miss 
>> consciousness. So …
>> 
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 20:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:20:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 
 I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
 theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject 
 of programming language theory (PLT).
 
 Any entry point is OK.
 
 https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books 
 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory 
 
 
 
 Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
 into mathematica logic.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic 
>>> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but 
>>> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or 
>>> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
>>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
>>> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>>> 
>>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
>>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
>>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
>>> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
>>> type debates: It will just evolve.
>>> 
>>> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
>>> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature.
>> 
>> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
>> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
>> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
>> 
>> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
>> conceivable as being primary.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
>> 
>> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
>> other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains 
>> a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such 
>> a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece 
>> of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely 
>> many computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of 
>> the argument presented in the SANE papers.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
>>> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
>> 
>> Yes indeed. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).
>> 
>> 
>> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be 
>> any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity 
>> axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like 
>> Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll 
>> missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for 
>> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to 
>> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and 
>> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a 
>> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal 
>> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is 
>> not sharable (qualia).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for real 
>> randomness and retrodependency 
>> 
>> 
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/ 
>> 
>>  
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> then quantum programming is just another programming.
>> 
>> (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


But you do not seem to go the additional step of saying that 
mathematical objects, numbers and so on, are objects that actually 
exist (which would be a form of platonism).


I use “exist” in the same sense as “it exist a number x such that x + 
7 = 8”.


That is precisely why you need to study the philosophy of mathematics. 
It might teach you not to confuse the use of the existential quantifier 
with an ontology.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/28/2018 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It's not something outside mathematics that is true


OK.



in the sense that ice is cold.



That is also a belief by some machine, and it might be recovered in 
their phenomenology, in arithmetic.


We cannot discuss in the abstract. Doing metaphysics with the 
scientific method as for theory and means of verifying empirically the 
theory.


The mechanist theory predicts both matter and consciousness.


The question is whether it predicts that ice is cold.  It not at all 
impressive to say it predicts that a some machine will believe something 
like "ice is cold" when it also predicts some machine will also believe 
"ice is hot" and another that "ice is friendly" and that "ice is 
quadratic" and so on.


Brent


Materialist theory assume matter, with some magical attribute, and 
miss consciousness. So …




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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:20:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>>> programming language theory (*PLT*).
>>>
>>> Any entry point is OK.
>>>
>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
>>>
>>>
>>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go 
>>> back into mathematica logic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and 
>>> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even 
>>> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, 
>>> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
>>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
>>> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>>>
>>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
>>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
>>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
>> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
>> type debates: It will just evolve.
>>
>> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
>> math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic 
>> nature*. 
>>
>>
>> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
>> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
>> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
>>
>>
>> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
>> conceivable as being primary.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
>>
>>
>> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines 
>> (and other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which 
>> contains a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is 
>> that such a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind 
>> and a piece of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic 
>> on infinitely many computations. That is already deducible from the first 
>> seven steps of the argument presented in the SANE papers.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
>> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
>>
>>
>> Yes indeed. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also 
>> used).
>>
>>
>>
>> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could 
>> be any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an 
>> infinity axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, 
>> like Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is 
>> stilll missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for 
>> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to 
>> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and 
>> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a 
>> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal 
>> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is 
>> not sharable (qualia).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for *real 
> randomness and retrodependency* 
>
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/
>  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/
>
> then quantum programming is just another programming.
>
> (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
> randomness and retrodependency.)
>
>
> But programs live in the material world in the following sense: *A 
> simulation is not a synthesis.*
>
>
> ?
>
> Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely 
> mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of 
> arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. 
>
> (I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>>> programming language theory (PLT).
>>> 
>>> Any entry point is OK.
>>> 
>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books 
>>> 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
>>> into mathematica logic.
>> 
>> 
>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic 
>> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but 
>> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or 
>> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical 
>> logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of 
>> works would have to be done before.
>> 
>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed 
>> combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non 
>> constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
>> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
>> type debates: It will just evolve.
>> 
>> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
>> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature.
> 
> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
> 
> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
> conceivable as being primary.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
> 
> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
> other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains 
> a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such 
> a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece of 
> matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely many 
> computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of the 
> argument presented in the SANE papers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
>> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
> 
> Yes indeed. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).
> 
> 
> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be 
> any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity 
> axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like Tegmark 
> did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll missing 
> the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for philosophers, is 
> that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to incompleteness. That 
> is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and weak logics) possible/ 
> Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a lot of structure in the 
> internal view of arithmetic possible for universal machine, including the 
> separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is not sharable (qualia).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for real 
> randomness and retrodependency 
> 
> 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/
>  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/
> 
> then quantum programming is just another programming.
> 
> (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
> randomness and retrodependency.)
> 
> 
> But programs live in the material world in the following sense: A simulation 
> is not a synthesis.

?

Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely 
mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of 
arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. 

(I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an interpretation 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>> programming language theory (*PLT*).
>>
>> Any entry point is OK.
>>
>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
>>
>>
>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go 
>> back into mathematica logic.
>>
>>
>>
>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and 
>> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even 
>> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, 
>> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
>> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>>
>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
> type debates: It will just evolve.
>
> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
> math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic nature*. 
>
>
>
> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
>
>
> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
> conceivable as being primary.
>
>
>
>
> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
>
>
> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
> other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which 
> contains a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is 
> that such a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind 
> and a piece of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic 
> on infinitely many computations. That is already deducible from the first 
> seven steps of the argument presented in the SANE papers.
>
>
>
>
>
> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
>
>
> Yes indeed. 
>
>
>
>
> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also 
> used).
>
>
>
> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be 
> any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an 
> infinity axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, 
> like Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is 
> stilll missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for 
> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to 
> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and 
> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a 
> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal 
> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is 
> not sharable (qualia).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>


On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for *real 
randomness and retrodependency* 


https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/

 
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/

then quantum programming is just another programming.

(It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
randomness and retrodependency.)


But programs live in the material world in the following sense: *A 
simulation is not a synthesis.*

If I have a synbio (synthetic biology) program for a life form that could 
attack a disease, if it is just transformed into a simulation that runs in 
a MacBook, it me does no good. But it could via a biocompiler/assembler be 
transformed to an object that "runs" inside me.



- pt

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/27/2018 9:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> 
>>> But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour 
>>> metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.
>>> 
>>> Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.
>> 
>> It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what is 
>> meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few statements 
>> about realism from your recent post -- included here:
>> 
>> "Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."
>> 
>> "All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using 
>> it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we 
>> accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."
>> 
>> "Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
>> already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in 
>> arithmetic"
>> 
>> 
>> My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism. 
>> This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
>> scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
>> theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following: 
>> (1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
>> description of the world that are literally true.
>> (2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, and 
>> the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.
>> 
>> One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the so-called 
>> 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is capable of 
>> explaining why a predictively successful theory is predictively successful, 
>> whereas the success of a theory would be miraculous if scientific realism 
>> were not true.
>> 
>> Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
>> mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: scientific theories 
>> are truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, so the 
>> theoretical terms in theories have factual reference -- the unobservable 
>> entities they posit populate the world -- form the 'furniture' of reality.
>> 
>> The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
>> mathematics, gives the following definitions:
>> 
>> "There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
>> Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of mathematics is 
>> the realm of objects that exist independent of the mind, conventions, and 
>> language of the mathematician. Most advocates of this view hold that 
>> mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, points, sets, etc. -- are 
>> abstract, eternal, and do not enter into causal relationships with material 
>> objects. Because of this, realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
>> "Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
>> mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
>> language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to be close 
>> to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)
>> 
>> "There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
>> Consider the following statement:
>> 
>> 'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'
>> 
>> "The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. But what 
>> does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, and 'prime 
>> number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this sentence reflects 
>> its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there exists', then the sentence 
>> entails that both the number 1,000,000 and a greater prime number exist. For 
>> the realist-in-truth-value, this existence is objective, and so we are led 
>> to realism-in-ontology. In sum, if one is a realist-in-truth-value, then 
>> realism-in-ontology is the result of taking mathematical assertions at face 
>> value."
>> 
>> Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in the Philosophy of 
>> Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of course, there are probably more 
>> nuances in the understanding of mathematical realism than there are 
>> philosophers of mathematics.
>> 
>> 
>> Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say "realism or 
>> platonism", and refer to "an independently existing mathematical realm". In 
>> Western philosophy at least, that is what realism in mathematics means -- 
>> although things might be different in Gallic philosophy.
>> 
>> It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is entirely 
>> from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
>> 'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that case, 
>> that you make no reference to 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour 
>> metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.
>> 
>> Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.
> 
> It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what is 
> meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few statements 
> about realism from your recent post -- included here:
> 
> "Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."
> 
> "All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using it 
> in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we accept 
> the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."
> 
> "Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
> already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in 
> arithmetic"
> 
> 
> My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism.

That is doing philosophy (of science) before doing the science. You need to 
understand that I am a scientist. What I do does not ask for any philosophy, 
just understanding. In science, there is no agreement or disagreement, but 
understanding or no understanding. That is a point that some people do not 
grasp, and it is normal, as we used “philosophical terms (to ease the 
understanding, especially for those who does not do the math).  I will still 
comments, but the idea is that such philosophy should be done only after a good 
understanding of the “scientific theory” (the metaphysics or theology of 
numbers).



> This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
> scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
> theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following: 
> (1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
> description of the world


That is what we cannot do? The idea that there is a world, or not, is part of 
the inquiry when we do metaphysics with the scientific method. The very notion 
of world cannot be used. 
I can be OK, by enlarging probably the sense for “world” (the logician large 
definition is an element of a set).



> that are literally true.

Same problem for the notion of “true”. Here, with Mechanism, we can use Tarski 
theory of truth. Eventually, the only notion of truth which plays a role will 
be the notion of arithmetical truth, and even this one will eventually be 
limited to sigma_1-truth (which id definable by Peano arithmetic).



> (2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, and the 
> entities postulated by those theories usually exist.

Same problem here. The notion of “existence” will be refine a lot through the 
Mechanist hypothesis. The ontological existence is given by the “use” of the 
existential quantifier in the base theory (combinators or Robinson Q theory, 
for example, but a diophantine polynomial equation is as good). All other 
existence will appear to be phenomenological, and mathematically are the 
existential quantifiers in the modal logis extracted from incompleteness. But 
that is for the second part, when we translate the UDA (Universal Dovetailer 
Argument) in arithmetic.



> 
> One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the so-called 
> 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is capable of 
> explaining why a predictively successful theory is predictively successful, 
> whereas the success of a theory would be miraculous if scientific realism 
> were not true.

Unfortunately that is not true, and use a brain-mind identity thesis which 
cannot work with Mechanism. We can “attach” a mind or a person to a computer, 
but a computer cannot attach its mind to a computer, only to an infinity of 
computer (in arithmetic).



> 
> Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
> mind-independent structure;

If by world we mean the arithmetical reality, or the sigma_1 arithmetical 
reality, then I am OK with this, but the physical reality will appear to be 
more “mind-dependent”. Mind refers here to the mind of all universal 
machine/number, not to the human mind. The physical reality can be explained to 
be largely independent of the human mind, but not independent of the mind of 
*all* universal numbers.




> and a semantic component: scientific theories are truth-conditioned 
> descriptions of their intended domain, so the theoretical terms in theories 
> have factual reference -- the unobservable entities they posit populate the 
> world -- form the 'furniture' of reality.
> 
> The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
> mathematics, gives the following definitions:
> 
> "There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
> Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of mathematics 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Sep 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/27/2018 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 03:31, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
> On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.
 
 It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which does 
 not make sense. 
 
 The real question is “have you grasped now?”
 
>> I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have 
>> (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
>> True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and 
>> show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine 
>> verifying the existence of this.
> 
> This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your 
> usual "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.
 
 The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who get a 
 digital heart, and later, a digital brain”?
>>> 
>>> My daughter can marry whomsoever she pleases.
>> 
>> Even a p-zombie?
> 
> How would you know?

I would not know, but a non computationalist would claim this, which is the 
reason of my question, indeed.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability theory 
>> and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>> programming language theory (PLT).
>> 
>> Any entry point is OK.
>> 
>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books 
>> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
>> into mathematica logic.
> 
> 
> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic 
> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but 
> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or 
> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical 
> logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of 
> works would have to be done before.
> 
> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed 
> combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non 
> constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
> type debates: It will just evolve.
> 
> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature.

And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the quantum 
indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a universal machine 
is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.




> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,

Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly conceivable 
as being primary.




> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.

Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains a 
theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such a 
theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece of 
matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely many 
computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of the 
argument presented in the SANE papers.




> 
> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.

Yes indeed. 




> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).


That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be any 
extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity axiom, 
like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like Tegmark did at 
the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll missing the FPI 
and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for philosophers, is that 
Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to incompleteness. That is nice, 
because there are *many* modal logics (and weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, 
simply thanks to computer science, put a lot of structure in the internal view 
of arithmetic possible for universal machine, including the separation of what 
is shamble (quanta) and what is not sharable (qualia).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
>  
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 12:03:35 AM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: Brent Meeker >
>
>
> On 9/27/2018 9:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal >
>
>
> But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour 
> metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.
>
> Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.
>
>
> It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what is 
> meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few 
> statements about realism from your recent post -- included here:
>
> "Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."
>
> "All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using 
> it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we 
> accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."
>
> "Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
> already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in 
> arithmetic"
>
>
> My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism. 
> This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
> scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
> theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following: 
> (1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
> description of the world that are literally true.
> (2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, and 
> the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.
>
> One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the so-called 
> 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is capable of 
> explaining why a predictively successful theory is predictively successful, 
> whereas the success of a theory would be miraculous if scientific realism 
> were not true.
>
> Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
> mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: scientific theories 
> are truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, so the 
> theoretical terms in theories have factual reference -- the unobservable 
> entities they posit populate the world -- form the 'furniture' of reality.
>
> The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
> mathematics, gives the following definitions:
>
> "There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
> Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of mathematics is 
> the realm of objects that exist independent of the mind, conventions, and 
> language of the mathematician. Most advocates of this view hold that 
> mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, points, sets, etc. -- are 
> abstract, eternal, and do not enter into causal relationships with material 
> objects. Because of this, realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
> "Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
> mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
> language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to be 
> close to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)
>
> "There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
> Consider the following statement:
>
> 'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'
>
> "The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. But 
> what does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, and 'prime 
> number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this sentence reflects 
> its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there exists', then the sentence 
> entails that both the number 1,000,000 and a greater prime number exist. 
> For the realist-in-truth-value, this existence is objective, and so we are 
> led to realism-in-ontology. In sum, if one is a realist-in-truth-value, 
> then realism-in-ontology is the result of taking mathematical assertions at 
> face value."
>
> Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in the Philosophy of 
> Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of course, there are probably 
> more nuances in the understanding of mathematical realism than there are 
> philosophers of mathematics.
>
>
> Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say "realism 
> or platonism", and refer to "an independently existing mathematical realm". 
> In Western philosophy at least, that is what realism in mathematics means 
> -- although things might be different in Gallic philosophy.
>
> It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is entirely 
> from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
> 'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that case, 
> that you make no reference to mathematical objects. You claim that the 
> truth of propositions such as '2+2=4' is independent 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


On 9/27/2018 9:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in 
pour metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.


Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.


It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of 
what is meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a 
few statements about realism from your recent post -- included here:


"Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."

"All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still 
using it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply 
that we accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."


"Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I 
thought I already told you), this would mean that you reject the use 
of (A v ~A) in arithmetic"



My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific 
realism. This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the 
basic idea of scientific realism is a cluster of views about the 
nature of scientific theories and theorizing. A common core might be 
the following:
(1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
description of the world that are literally true.
(2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, 
and the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.


One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the 
so-called 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is 
capable of explaining why a predictively successful theory is 
predictively successful, whereas the success of a theory would be 
miraculous if scientific realism were not true.


Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a 
definite mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: 
scientific theories are truth-conditioned descriptions of their 
intended domain, so the theoretical terms in theories have factual 
reference -- the unobservable entities they posit populate the world 
-- form the 'furniture' of reality.


The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy 
of mathematics, gives the following definitions:


"There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics. Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter 
of mathematics is the realm of objects that exist independent of the 
mind, conventions, and language of the mathematician. Most advocates 
of this view hold that mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, 
points, sets, etc. -- are abstract, eternal, and do not enter into 
causal relationships with material objects. Because of this, 
realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
"Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to 
be close to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)


"There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
Consider the following statement:


    'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'

"The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. 
But what does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, 
and 'prime number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this 
sentence reflects its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there 
exists', then the sentence entails that both the number 1,000,000 and 
a greater prime number exist. For the realist-in-truth-value, this 
existence is objective, and so we are led to realism-in-ontology. In 
sum, if one is a realist-in-truth-value, then realism-in-ontology is 
the result of taking mathematical assertions at face value."


Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in 
the Philosophy of Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of 
course, there are probably more nuances in the understanding of 
mathematical realism than there are philosophers of mathematics.



Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say 
"realism or platonism", and refer to "an independently existing 
mathematical realm". In Western philosophy at least, that is what 
realism in mathematics means -- although things might be different in 
Gallic philosophy.


It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is 
entirely from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that 
case, that you make no reference to mathematical objects. You claim 
that the truth of propositions such as '2+2=4' is independent of the 
mind, language, and conventions of arithmetic, as in the definition 
of 'realist-in-truth-value' above. But you do not seem to go the 
additional step of 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/27/2018 9:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in 
pour metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.


Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.


It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of 
what is meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a 
few statements about realism from your recent post -- included here:


"Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."

"All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still 
using it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply 
that we accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."


"Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought 
I already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v 
~A) in arithmetic"



My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific 
realism. This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the 
basic idea of scientific realism is a cluster of views about the 
nature of scientific theories and theorizing. A common core might be 
the following:
(1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
description of the world that are literally true.
(2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, 
and the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.


One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the 
so-called 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is 
capable of explaining why a predictively successful theory is 
predictively successful, whereas the success of a theory would be 
miraculous if scientific realism were not true.


Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a 
definite mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: 
scientific theories are truth-conditioned descriptions of their 
intended domain, so the theoretical terms in theories have factual 
reference -- the unobservable entities they posit populate the world 
-- form the 'furniture' of reality.


The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy 
of mathematics, gives the following definitions:


"There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics. Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter 
of mathematics is the realm of objects that exist independent of the 
mind, conventions, and language of the mathematician. Most advocates 
of this view hold that mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, 
points, sets, etc. -- are abstract, eternal, and do not enter into 
causal relationships with material objects. Because of this, 
realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
"Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to be 
close to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)


"There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
Consider the following statement:


    'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'

"The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. But 
what does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, and 
'prime number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this 
sentence reflects its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there 
exists', then the sentence entails that both the number 1,000,000 and 
a greater prime number exist. For the realist-in-truth-value, this 
existence is objective, and so we are led to realism-in-ontology. In 
sum, if one is a realist-in-truth-value, then realism-in-ontology is 
the result of taking mathematical assertions at face value."


Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of course, 
there are probably more nuances in the understanding of mathematical 
realism than there are philosophers of mathematics.



Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say 
"realism or platonism", and refer to "an independently existing 
mathematical realm". In Western philosophy at least, that is what 
realism in mathematics means -- although things might be different in 
Gallic philosophy.


It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is 
entirely from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that 
case, that you make no reference to mathematical objects. You claim 
that the truth of propositions such as '2+2=4' is independent of the 
mind, language, and conventions of arithmetic, as in the definition of 
'realist-in-truth-value' above. But you do not seem to go the 
additional step of saying that mathematical objects, numbers and so 
on, 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in 
pour metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.


Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.


It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what 
is meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few 
statements about realism from your recent post -- included here:


"Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."

"All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still 
using it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply 
that we accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."


"Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) 
in arithmetic"



My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism. 
This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following:
(1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
description of the world that are literally true.
(2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, 
and the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.


One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the 
so-called 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is 
capable of explaining why a predictively successful theory is 
predictively successful, whereas the success of a theory would be 
miraculous if scientific realism were not true.


Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: scientific 
theories are truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, so 
the theoretical terms in theories have factual reference -- the 
unobservable entities they posit populate the world -- form the 
'furniture' of reality.


The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
mathematics, gives the following definitions:


"There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of 
mathematics. Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of 
mathematics is the realm of objects that exist independent of the mind, 
conventions, and language of the mathematician. Most advocates of this 
view hold that mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, points, sets, 
etc. -- are abstract, eternal, and do not enter into causal 
relationships with material objects. Because of this, 
realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
"Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to be 
close to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)


"There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
Consider the following statement:


    'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'

"The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. But 
what does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, and 
'prime number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this sentence 
reflects its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there exists', then 
the sentence entails that both the number 1,000,000 and a greater prime 
number exist. For the realist-in-truth-value, this existence is 
objective, and so we are led to realism-in-ontology. In sum, if one is a 
realist-in-truth-value, then realism-in-ontology is the result of taking 
mathematical assertions at face value."


Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in the Philosophy 
of Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of course, there are 
probably more nuances in the understanding of mathematical realism than 
there are philosophers of mathematics.



Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say 
"realism or platonism", and refer to "an independently existing 
mathematical realm". In Western philosophy at least, that is what 
realism in mathematics means -- although things might be different in 
Gallic philosophy.


It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is 
entirely from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that case, 
that you make no reference to mathematical objects. You claim that the 
truth of propositions such as '2+2=4' is independent of the mind, 
language, and conventions of arithmetic, as in the definition of 
'realist-in-truth-value' above. But you do not seem to go the additional 
step of saying that mathematical objects, numbers and so on, are objects 
that actually exist (which would 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/27/2018 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Sep 2018, at 03:31, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.


It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which 
does not make sense.


The real question is “have you grasped now?”

I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I 
have (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, 
indubitable, and show how the modes of self-reference makes any 
universal machine verifying the existence of this.


This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is 
your usual "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies 
identity.


The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who 
get a digital heart, and later, a digital brain”?


My daughter can marry whomsoever she pleases.


Even a p-zombie?


How would you know?

Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
> programming language theory (*PLT*).
>
> Any entry point is OK.
>
> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
>
>
> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
> into mathematica logic.
>
>
>
> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and 
> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even 
> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, 
> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>
> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
(materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
type debates: It will just evolve.

For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic nature*. 
But matter includes both informationality and experientiality, the latter 
seemingly missing from arithmetic.

>From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic. It could be 
interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).

- pt
 

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 26, 2018 at 11:46:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Sep 2018, at 21:20, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
 On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 
 
 On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 >> Mind is what a brain does
  
 >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
 There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
 for some pair of legs to be doing it.
 
 Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
 to do it.
>>> 
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>> 
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain 
>>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>> 
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a 
>>> mistake in my argument, without using your ontological commitment 
>>> (which would beg the question).
>>> 
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning 
>>> based purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>> 
>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>> 
>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>> 
>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a 
>>> materialism (one greater than physicalism) that is based on 
>>> experientiality (qualitative states and language) in addition to 
>>> informationality, may be.”
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. 
>> Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they 
>> are logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to 
>> arithmetic “seen from inside”.
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort 
>> of knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical 
>> appearance from that theory of consciousness.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>  ] to 
>> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
>> 
>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

ithmetic.


> 
> 
>> I did put arithmetical realism to avoid infinite tergiversation about 2+2=4, 
>> like some local people did already.
>> 
>> 
>>>> But if this were true, you would have told us since long.
>>> 
>>> I tell you this quite regularly.
>> 
>> But you put in “arithmetical realism” something which is not there.
> 
> It is there, you know. Without that, your whole enterprise collapses.


Where?





> 
>> Sometimes I add “2+2=4” independently of me. May be you believe that when 
>> you die 2+2=4 will cease to be true. That would not make sense, because it 
>> would a category error. The arithmetical proposition do not presuppose time 
>> or anything like that.
> 
> No, they merely presuppose definitions and axioms. They do not presuppose an 
> independently existing "arithmetical realm”.


What do you mean by “presupposing an axiom” if you don’t believe the axioms are 
satisfied by some structure/model/reality?



> 
> 
> 
> 
>>>> Also, you talk in term of a theory being true or false,
>>> 
>>> Once again, do not put words into my mouth.
>> 
>> Oh, but what I say, I deduce or infer from what you say. 
> 
> Oh!, I see! It is OK for you to deduce or infer things from what I say, but 
> it is not OK for me to do the same?


You were inferring, not deducing. 



> 
> 
> 
>>> What is epistemological inconsistency? I do not assume anything other than 
>>> the existence of an external world whose existence is independent of you, 
>>> me, or anyone else.
>> 
>> Yes, I saw that. But then Mechanism is false, and as you accept arithmetical 
>> realism (and even Church’s thesis, without which “string AI” is not 
>> definable), the point is that you have to say no to the doctor (or find  
>>an error in my derivation).
> 
> Yes, I maintain that mechanism is false. Who said that I accept arithmetical 
> realism?

To say that mechanism is false consists in claiming that either the 
Church-Turing is false, or that accepting a brain transplant at any level 
generate an inanimate corpse, or a p-zombie. (A “philosophical zombie”, i.e. 
someone behaving like a conscious person, but lacking consciousness).




> -- I thought I had denied that many times. Church's thesis does not require 
> arithmetical realism.

It does. I use the Church-Turing thesis of Post, Kleene, Church, Turing, etc. 
(not to be confused with some intuitionist variants of it). You need it because 
to show the closure of the set of partial recursive functions, we use the idea 
that a program code for a total computable function or a non total computable 
function.




> Nothing requires arithmetical realism, except your thesis.

All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using it in 
a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we accept the 
excluded middle principle in arithmetic.



> One is perfectly free to reject arithmetical realism -- science does not 
> thereby collapse.

Not using the excluded middle principle makes the proof constructive, and it is 
always nice if we can avoid its use, but few mathematician would say that only 
constructive proofs should be used. Today, the only place we have to use 
constructive OR is when we build a machine or a program. 




> Arithmetical realism is the error in your derivation.

Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I already 
told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in arithmetic, 
which is the place where only a few number of mathematician would claim it is 
an error. Indeed, Gödel did prove that both Peano arithmetic and Heyting 
Arithmetic are equiconsistent, and inter-translatable (by the famous “double 
negation” translation).

The proof given above that there exist irrational numbers x and y such that x^y 
is rational is a simple three lines proof. That result can be proved without (A 
v ~A), but it is many pages long, and use highly non elementary method (like 
elliptic curves, modular functors, complex analysis, …). 

Arithmetical realism is needed with mechanism, because we are lead to the fact 
that Mechanism, if true, is necessarily NOT constructive (not intuitionist). No 
machine can ever know which machine she is. That is also the reason why I 
insist that Mechanism belongs to theology? We can only hope to be a machine and 
hope the surgeon choose a right level of substitution.

If this is your only critics, it cannot work, or you put a large part of math 
and physics in the trash.

Bruno







> 
> Bruce
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

ten to those machines, and they will 
explain to you that if you are yourself a consistent machine at some 
digital level, then physics can be use to test mechanism.


Maybe they will actually explain to me that the so-called "hard problem 
of consciousness" is an illusion.




Stop the ad hominem please.


You don't take kindly to criticism of your ideas, do you Bruno. You see 
every criticism as a direct personal attack.




But most people conceive more easily that QM or GR might be false 
than elementary arithmetic, or the elementary combinator axioms.


Who said anything about arithmetic being false?


You said above hat you don’t assume arithmetic.


You misquote again. I said that I did not believe in arithmetical 
realism or platonism -- an independently existing arithmetical realm. 
Once you take this away, the universal dovetailer can do nothing, and 
your whole metaphysics collapses.



You cannot believe it true if you don’t assume some of its theories.


Arithmetical theorems are only tautologically true -- true by virtue of 
the meaning of the terms involved. One does not need to assume any theories.




Don't you dare tell me what I believe. I can tell you only that I do 
not believe in arithmetical realism, so I do not accept the 
assumptions of mechanism.


Arithmetical realism is just the believe in the axiom above.


Why should one "believe in axioms"? Axioms are just a starting point. 
They are neither true nor false in themselves, so to speak of believing 
in them is a category error.



The “realism” part is basically in the (A v ~A).

Without arithmetical realism, there is no Church Turing thesis, no 
computer science, and no physical theories at all. I mention it only 
because I put *all* the card on the table.


Rubbish. Arithmetic is just a matter of some definitions, axioms, and 
rules of inference. No realism involved.



I did put arithmetical realism to avoid infinite tergiversation about 
2+2=4, like some local people did already.




But if this were true, you would have told us since long.


I tell you this quite regularly.


But you put in “arithmetical realism” something which is not there.


It is there, you know. Without that, your whole enterprise collapses.

Sometimes I add “2+2=4” independently of me. May be you believe that 
when you die 2+2=4 will cease to be true. That would not make sense, 
because it would a category error. The arithmetical proposition do not 
presuppose time or anything like that.


No, they merely presuppose definitions and axioms. They do not 
presuppose an independently existing "arithmetical realm".






Also, you talk in term of a theory being true or false,


Once again, do not put words into my mouth.


Oh, but what I say, I deduce or infer from what you say.


Oh!, I see! It is OK for you to deduce or infer things from what I say, 
but it is not OK for me to do the same?




What is epistemological inconsistency? I do not assume anything other 
than the existence of an external world whose existence is 
independent of you, me, or anyone else.


Yes, I saw that. But then Mechanism is false, and as you accept 
arithmetical realism (and even Church’s thesis, without which “string 
AI” is not definable), the point is that you have to say no to the 
doctor (or find an error in my derivation).


Yes, I maintain that mechanism is false. Who said that I accept 
arithmetical realism? -- I thought I had denied that many times. 
Church's thesis does not require arithmetical realism. Nothing requires 
arithmetical realism, except your thesis. One is perfectly free to 
reject arithmetical realism -- science does not thereby collapse. 
Arithmetical realism is the error in your derivation.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 
 I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
 computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
 predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable 
 sort of knowledge),
>>> 
>>> With that sort of logic
>> 
>> Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
>> hypothesis.
>> 
>>> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
>>> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my 
>>> cat is a dog.
>> 
>> That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
>> already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not 
>> read the papers.
> 
> No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
> similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical.
 
 Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?
>>> 
>>> Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict 
>>> consciousness…."
>> 
>> That quote is too short to make sense.
> 
> I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.

It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which does not 
make sense. 

The real question is “have you grasped now?”



> 
>> I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have 
>> (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
>> True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and 
>> show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine verifying 
>> the existence of this.
> 
> This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your usual 
> "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.

The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who get a digital 
heart, and later, a digital brain”?

No-one says that similarity implies identity, but only that we make the 
hypothesis that there is a level of description where digital similarity 
entails practical survival. 

Nobody defends the idea that this is true (except Clark). 

I just deduce from that that the materialist argument invoking a physical 
universe to get a brain-mind identity thesis is no more valid, and that the 
computationalist has to derive physics from self-reference.

You must study before criticising. 





> 
> 
> Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
> consciousness is not sufficient.
 
 Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.
>>> 
>>> Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say…
>> 
>> Qouting is not enough. You must study and understand the theory before. If 
>> you don’t understand, ask a question.
> 
> If you do not accept quotes of your own words as evidence, then we are in a 
> sorry position……

I don’t accept quote out of the context. I reminded you of the context. You 
seem to be the one talking like he knew some truth. In metaphysics, that makes 
you invalid at the start.






> 
 I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
 informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.
 
> You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative and 
> shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that other people 
> (and cats and dogs) are conscious.
 
 ?
 
 I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
 inconsistent.
 
 I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
 transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the appearances, 
 including the physical appearances, so that we can test.
>>> 
>>> Proof is a formal concept.
>> 
>> Both the notion of informal proof and formal proof are axiomatised in my 
>> work. Indeed they correspond to the modes axiomatised by []p 
>> & p, and []p. The first one is defined in term of arithmetical relations 
>> that the subject concerned cannot formalised (like truth, if you have heard 
>> of Tarski theorem). 
>> 
>>> A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that were 
>>> assumed at the start are true. 
>> 
>> Proof in general does not entails truth.
> 
> I did not say that it did. Read what I say, and do not misquote me
> I said that proof conveys truth only in so far 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, September 26, 2018 at 11:46:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2018, at 21:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> Mind is what a brain does

  

>>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
 *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal 
 except for some pair of legs to be doing it.*

>>>
>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or 
>>> electronic) to do it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>>
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody 
>>> doubt that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human 
>>> brain 
>>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>>
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the 
>>> arithmetical reality emulates all computations. No need of any more 
>>> assumption than Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>>
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation 
>>> or hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a 
>>> mistake 
>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would 
>>> beg 
>>> the question).
>>>
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning 
>> based 
>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>
>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>
>>
>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>  
>>
>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>>
>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>
>>
>>
>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>
>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may 
>> be.”
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers 
>> which shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and 
>> Mechanism. Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, 
>> but they are logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced 
>> to 
>> arithmetic “seen from inside”.
>>
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
>> through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
>> basically 
>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort 
>> of 
>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical 
>> appearance 
>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to 
> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
>
> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
> Computationalism*:
>
>
>  
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ
>  
>
>
> By Pure Computationalism [ 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I 
> mean that everything
>
>
> Which everything? 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Sep 2018, at 21:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>>  
>>> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
>>> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.
>>> 
>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
>>> to do it.
>> 
>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>> 
>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>> 
>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>> 
>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a 
>> mistake in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which 
>> would beg the question).
>> 
>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning 
>> based purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>> 
>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>> 
>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>> 
>> 
>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>> 
>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may 
>> be.”
> 
> 
> 
> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. 
> Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they 
> are logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to 
> arithmetic “seen from inside”.
> 
> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort 
> of knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical 
> appearance from that theory of consciousness.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>  ] to 
> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
> 
> I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic 
> Computationalism:
> 
> 
>  
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> By Pure Computationalism 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:36:48 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> Elementary arithmetic, such as 2+2=4, is tautologically true. In other 
> words, if is true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved. It has no 
> ontological content outside itself. So arithmetic is used in physics, but 
> that does not mean that anyone necessarily assumes arithmetic realism, or 
> platonism. Mathematics is used because it is useful, not because it is true 
> in any sense other than tautologically.
>
> Arithmetic (and, indeed, all of mathematics) can be regarded as a formal 
> system, with a number of defined symbols and rules of inference. Any 
> sequence of the allowed symbols can be written down. Any such sequence is a 
> theorem if it can be derived from the basic axioms using the allowed rules 
> of inference. If it cannot be so derived, it is not a theorem. The status 
> of some sequences of symbols may be undecidable; and some sequences may be 
> true for other reasons, even though they are not theorems. There is little 
> else to mathematics than this.
>
> Bruce
>

When the subject of 'what is mathematics' comes up, I say now "It's a genre 
of fiction, maybe the most useful one." In the context of what's true, like 
the recent Michael Atiyah proof (or many say not-proof) of the Riemann 
Hypothesis, and in another case of the abc conjecture [ 
https://www.quantamagazine.org/titans-of-mathematics-clash-over-epic-proof-of-abc-conjecture-20180920/
 
], I say "If it isn't formalized in and proven in Coq yet, it's not true."

Take 2+2=4. A proof in Coq: [ 
https://brilliant.org/discussions/thread/2-2-4-in-coq/ ].

This is  "What's true in mathematics is just what some computer outputs."

And that's that. :)

- pt



 

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 24 Sep 2018, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and 
non definable sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic


Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
hypothesis.



I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; 
so my cat is a dog.


That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the 
work already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that 
you have not read the papers.


No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some 
superficial similarity between things and then conclude that they 
are identical.


Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?


Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict 
consciousness…."


That quote is too short to make sense.


I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.

I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have 
(semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, 
and show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine 
verifying the existence of this.


This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your 
usual "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.



Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
consciousness is not sufficient.


Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.


Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say…


Qouting is not enough. You must study and understand the theory 
before. If you don’t understand, ask a question.


If you do not accept quotes of your own words as evidence, then we are 
in a sorry position..


I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first 
derive informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.


You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative 
and shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that 
other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious.


?

I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof 
is inconsistent.


I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the 
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.


Proof is a formal concept.


Both the notion of informal proof and formal proof are axiomatised in 
my work. Indeed they correspond to the modes axiomatised by []p & p, 
and []p. The first one is defined in term of arithmetical relations 
that the subject concerned cannot formalised (like truth, if you have 
heard of Tarski theorem).


A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that 
were assumed at the start are true.


Proof in general does not entails truth.


I did not say that it did. Read what I say, and do not misquote me
I said that proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms are true. 
Proof, of itself, does not demonstrate independent truth.


That is the whole point of the Löb’s formula. No Löbian thjeorie or 
machine can prove []p -> p in general, unless and only unless they 
have proof p.


Perhaps you mean that only if p is true, independently.


Your proof assumes arithmetical realism (platonism).


Yes, that means it assumes that classical logic can be applied in 
elementary arithmetic. That is presupposed in *all* papers in the 
physics literature, and elsewhere.


Now you are getting ridiculous. Elementary arithmetic, such as 2+2=4, is 
tautologically true. In other words, if is true by virtue of the meaning 
of the terms involved. It has no ontological content outside itself. So 
arithmetic is used in physics, but that does not mean that anyone 
necessarily assumes arithmetic realism, or platonism. Mathematics is 
used because it is useful, not because it is true in any sense other 
than tautologically.


Arithmetic (and, indeed, all of mathematics) can be regarded as a formal 
system, with a number of defined symbols and rules of inference. Any 
sequence of the allowed symbols can be written down. Any such sequence 
is a theorem if it can be derived from the basic axioms using the 
allowed rules of inference. If it cannot be so derived, it is not a 
theorem. The status of some sequences of symbols may be undecidable; and 
some sequences may be true for other 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 12:01:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal 
>>> except for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>>
>>
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or 
>> electronic) to do it.
>>
>>
>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>
>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody 
>> doubt that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human 
>> brain 
>> or some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>
>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the 
>> arithmetical reality emulates all computations. No need of any more 
>> assumption than Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>
>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation 
>> or hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a 
>> mistake 
>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would 
>> beg 
>> the question).
>>
>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>
>
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
>
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>
>
>
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may 
> be.”
>
>
>
>
> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. 
> Many 
> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
> “seen from inside”.
>
> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
> predict 
> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical 
> appearance 
> from that theory of consciousness.
>
> Bruno
>
>
 That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
 https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to 
 summarize in my own words the Goff view.

 I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
 Computationalism*:


  
 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ
  


 By Pure Computationalism [ 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I 
 mean that everything


 Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?




 can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
 basically) alone.

 Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
 (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Sep 2018, at 15:35, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>  
>> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
>> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
>> some pair of legs to be doing it.
>> 
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
>> to do it.
> 
> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
> 
> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
> 
> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
> 
> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would 
> beg the question).
> 
> Up to now, you have failed to that.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
> 
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
> 
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
> 
>  
> 
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
> 
> 
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
> 
> 
> 
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
> 
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may 
> be.”
 
 
 
 That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
 shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. 
 Many believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
 logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
 “seen from inside”.
 
 I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
 computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
 consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
 knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
 from that theory of consciousness.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
 https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
  ] to 
 summarize in my own words the Goff view.
 
 I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic Computationalism:
 
 
  
 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
  
 
 
 By Pure Computationalism [ 
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems 
  ] I mean 
 that everything
>>> 
>>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 can be 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 25, 2018 at 7:12:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>
>>  
>>
> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>
>
> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
> to do it.
>
>
> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>
> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>
> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the 
> arithmetical reality emulates all computations. No need of any more 
> assumption than Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>
> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation 
> or hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would 
> beg 
> the question).
>
> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
 against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
 purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)

 Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:


 https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
  

 via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714

 (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)



 My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:

 "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
 language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
 (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
 (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”




 That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
 shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. 
 Many 
 believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
 logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
 “seen from inside”.

 I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
 computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
 consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
 knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
 from that theory of consciousness.

 Bruno


>>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to 
>>> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
>>>
>>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
>>> Computationalism*:
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
>>> that everything
>>>
>>>
>>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>>> basically) alone.
>>>
>>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>>>
>>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can 
>>> add nuances later. 
>>>
>>> But with computationalism, 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Sep 2018, at 07:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
> 
> >> Mind is what a brain does
>  
> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
> some pair of legs to be doing it.
> 
> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
> do it.
 
 Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
 
 Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
 that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
 some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
 
 What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
 reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
 Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
 
 But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
 hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
 counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
 ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
 in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
 the question).
 
 Up to now, you have failed to that.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
 against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
 purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
 
 Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
 
 https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
  
 
  
 
 via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
 
 
 (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
 
 
 
 My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
 
 "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
 language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
 (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
 (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>>> “seen from inside”.
>>> 
>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>>  ] to summarize 
>>> in my own words the Goff view.
>>> 
>>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic Computationalism:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems 
>>>  ] I mean 
>>> that everything
>> 
>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>>> basically) alone.
>>> 
>>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>>> Strawson) , even if computation 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Sep 2018, at 05:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/23/2018 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some transformation), 
>> and derive from that, constructively, the appearances, including the 
>> physical appearances, so that we can test.
> 
> But the physical appearances you derive are very thin on the ground.


What do you mean?

The physical appearances needs non Turing emulable magic with physicalism. It 
is probably not a coincidence that materialism has given rise to appeal to non 
mechanist religion. You need a magical god to get a magical creation.

I am the skeptical here, not on physics, but on the ontological commitment done 
by the metaphysical materialist.

It is OK, but then you need to abandon the idea that we can survive with a 
digital brain/body transplant.

And you might tell me which non mechanist theory of mind you favour.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Sep 2018, at 02:25, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
>> predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort 
>> of knowledge),
> 
> With that sort of logic
 
 Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some hypothesis.
 
> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my 
> cat is a dog.
 
 That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
 already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not 
 read the papers.
>>> 
>>> No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
>>> similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical.
>> 
>> Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?
> 
> Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict 
> consciousness…."

That quote is too short to make sense.

I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have (semi-) 
exiomatize consciousness as
True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and show 
how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine verifying the 
existence of this. 




> 
>>> Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
>>> consciousness is not sufficient.
>> 
>> Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.
> 
> Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say…


Qouting is not enough. You must study and understand the theory before. If you 
don’t understand, ask a question.




> 
>> I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
>> informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.
>> 
>>> You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative and 
>>> shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that other people 
>>> (and cats and dogs) are conscious.
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
>> inconsistent.
>> 
>> I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some transformation), 
>> and derive from that, constructively, the appearances, including the 
>> physical appearances, so that we can test.
> 
> Proof is a formal concept.

Both the notion of informal proof and formal proof are axiomatised in my work. 
Indeed they correspond to the modes axiomatised by []p & p, and []p. The first 
one is defined in term of arithmetical relations that the subject concerned 
cannot formalised (like truth, if you have heard of Tarski theorem). 




> A proof conveys truth only in so far as the axioms/assumptions that were 
> assumed at the start are true.

Proof in general does not entails truth. That is the whole point of the Löb’s 
formula. No Löbian thjeorie or machine can prove []p -> p in general, unless 
and only unless they have proof p.




> Your proof assumes arithmetical realism (platonism).

Yes, that means it assumes that classical logic can be applied in elementary 
arithmetic. That is presupposed in *all* papers in the physics literature, and 
elsewhere.

This is just to avoid some form of ultra-finitisme. (I put all the cards on the 
table).




> I do not accept that arithmetical realism is true. Therefore your proof is 
> irrelevant.
> 

Which arithmetical formula you believe to be neither true, nor false.

But since then, my work has been shown valid in hey thing arithmetic. It is 
just more complex.




>> I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version.
> 
> If I do not accept the starting point, then studying the long version of your 
> argument is not going to convince me.


Well, if you believe that the body is not Turing emulable, you might tell me 
what is not Turing emulable, nor FPI-recoverable.

This makes QM wrong, and in fact all know physical theory wrong. It makes 
Drawin theory of evolution wrong.

My hypothesis is basically Diderot definition of rationalism. Not invocation of 
supernatural influence, nor of actual infinities. Oracle (à la Turing) are 
permitted though.





> 
>> I don’t claim any truth.
> 
> Good. The conclusions of formal proofs are true only in so far as the 
> premises are true. You can't prove the truth of arithmetical realism.


I cannot prove that x + 0 = 0.

With mechanism, I have deduced the “theory of everything (that is of quanta and 
qulaia and their relations).

And the theory is any first order definition of a 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 10:55:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:




 On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
 wrote:

 >> Mind is what a brain does
>
>  
>
 >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>

 Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
 to do it.


 Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 

 Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
 that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
 some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 

 What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
 reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
 Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.

 But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
 hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
 counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
 ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
 in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
 the question).

 Up to now, you have failed to that.

 Bruno



>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
>>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>>
>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>>  
>>>
>>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>>>
>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>>
>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>>> “seen from inside”.
>>>
>>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to 
>> summarize in my own words the Goff view.
>>
>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
>> Computationalism*:
>>
>>
>>  
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>>
>>
>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
>> that everything
>>
>>
>> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>> basically) alone.
>>
>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>>
>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
>>
>>
>>
>> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can 
>> add nuances later. 
>>
>> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in 
>> some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are consistent 
>> with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here:
>>
>> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
>> International System Administration and Network 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/23/2018 8:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the 
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.


But the physical appearances you derive are very thin on the ground.

Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non 
definable sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic


Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
hypothesis.



I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so 
my cat is a dog.


That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the 
work already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you 
have not read the papers.


No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some 
superficial similarity between things and then conclude that they are 
identical.


Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?


Quoting from above: "...the logic of self-reference basically predict 
consciousness"


Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
consciousness is not sufficient.


Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.


Sufficient to explain consciousness. I quote what you say...

I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.


You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative 
and shows the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that 
other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious.


?

I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
inconsistent.


I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some 
transformation), and derive from that, constructively, the 
appearances, including the physical appearances, so that we can test.


Proof is a formal concept. A proof conveys truth only in so far as the 
axioms/assumptions that were assumed at the start are true. Your proof 
assumes arithmetical realism (platonism). I do not accept that 
arithmetical realism is true. Therefore your proof is irrelevant.



I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version.


If I do not accept the starting point, then studying the long version of 
your argument is not going to convince me.



I don’t claim any truth.


Good. The conclusions of formal proofs are true only in so far as the 
premises are true. You can't prove the truth of arithmetical realism.


I give a proof, showing that the physical science are reduced to 
arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and 
the proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover programs 
for each modes (including the physical) at the propositional level.


So if we do not assume that mechanism is true then your proofs are 
valueless.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 23, 2018 at 11:50 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>>it's true I am confused I don't understand, but anybody who thinks they
>> understand gibberish is a fool.
>>
>
> *> To me and probably to many others it seems obvious that the Helsinki
> man can expect to end up either in Moscow or Washington after the
> duplication. *
>

Before you me or anybody else can say what the Helsinki man should expect
to see tomorrow we need to agree on exactly what "the Helsinki man
tomorrow" means, and the most important person who needs to agree and the
person who should make the definition is the Helsinki man today. After that
we can debate what "the Helsinki man tomorrow" will or will not see;
otherwise we're just spinning our wheels.


> *> Can you perhaps step outside of the argument and speculate as to why
> there should be such disagreement, why you imagine some people would think
> it is obvious when you think it is not only not obvious, but ridiculous? *


Probably because it's all so far outside of normal everyday experience. For
technological (not scientific) reasons people duplicating machines don't
exist yet and thus somebody can live their entire life just fine and never
think deeply about any of this stuff even once. And although logically
consistent this stuff is certainly weird and counterintuitive so it's easy
to just dismiss it. Or say it's all so theoretical and abstract that it's
of no more importance than debating how many angels can dance on the head
of a pin; and that may be true today but in less than 80 years (maybe less
than 20) resolving this matter in your mind will be of enormous practical
value. It will become a matter of survival not abstract philosophy.

As for me I think if logic takes me to a place that is counterintuitive
then my intuition must have been wrong, it wouldn't be the first time. And
I think resolving this matter in my mind is rather important even today,
that's why I signed up with Alcor.

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 
 
 On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > 
 wrote:
 
 >> Mind is what a brain does
  
 >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
 There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
 some pair of legs to be doing it.
 
 Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
 do it.
>>> 
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>> 
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt that 
>>> to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or some 
>>> electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>> 
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>>> the question).
>>> 
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument against 
>>> a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based purely on 
>>> numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>> 
>>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>> 
>>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>> 
>>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which shows 
>> that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>> “seen from inside”.
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>> from that theory of consciousness.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
>> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 
>>  ] to summarize 
>> in my own words the Goff view.
>> 
>> I elaborate further in my previous post here on Realistic Computationalism:
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> By Pure Computationalism [ 
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems 
>>  ] I mean 
>> that everything
> 
> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
>> basically) alone.
>> 
>> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
>> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
>> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>> 
>> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
> 
> 
> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can add 
> nuances later. 
> 
> But with computationalism, neither materialism 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 13:10, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
 
 I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
 computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
 consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
 knowledge),
>>> 
>>> With that sort of logic
>> 
>> Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some hypothesis.
>> 
>>> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
>>> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my cat 
>>> is a dog.
>> 
>> That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
>> already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not 
>> read the papers.
> 
> No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
> similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical.

Could you be specific? Did you read my papers?





> Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
> consciousness is not sufficient.


Sufficient for what? I think you attribute me things I do not say.

I start from a precise hypothesis, then all what I say is first derive 
informally, and then formally, using rather standard definition.









> You have to show me a logic that has a coherent internal narrative and shows 
> the signs of consciousness that I use to conclude that other people (and cats 
> and dogs) are conscious.


?

I will only give you a proof that any machine claiming such a proof is 
inconsistent.

I assume mechanism (the invariant of consciousness fr some transformation), and 
derive from that, constructively, the appearances, including the physical 
appearances, so that we can test.

I don’t think you have studied my papers, or my long version. 

I don’t claim any truth. I give a proof, showing that the physical science are 
reduced to arithmetic, once we assume the mechanist thesis in metaphysics, and 
the proof is constructive, so I do provide the theorem prover programs for each 
modes (including the physical) at the propositional level.

It is computer science. Universal machine have a theology, and those believing 
in enough induction axioms have a pretty good knowledge of that theology, even 
if they cannot really believe it (all that for logical reason).

My PhD is in computer science and mathematical logic. Not only I prove 
everything I say, but I prove it entirely using no more than few identity rules 
and

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Have you follow the combinators thread? 

I can use also only elementary arithmetic. It is more demanding as it takes the 
full first order predicate calculus/logic + the “non logical” axioms:

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

(Of course, I make detour through the meta-level, where I use the induction 
axiom, like any mathematcian, but in the metaphysics, everything is eventually 
derived from those seven axioms, or those two combinatory formula.

You do seem to have some prejudice, because in the matter of rigorous in this 
field, I am not sure any one has made so many people to verify all points. And 
yet, I have discovered some error later, and made the correction reverified.

Now, in this field, there is a tradition of use of authoritative arguments, and 
of people cling not know the truth, and things like that. I do not, I extract a 
theory both by an intuitive reasoning and then by a full formalisation in 
arithmetic with induction, and then without induction for the ontology.




> Mere similarity is not enough -- that is the cat=dog fallacy.


I don’t use any “similarity”. I assume that there is a level of description of 
my body such that I would survive, in the clinical, and personal, usual sense. 
It is the digital version of Descartes rationalism. It is not my theory. I have 
a theorem instead.



> Consciousness is a first person experience -- you cannot have first person 
> experience of a self-referential logic.

Most logic are not self-referential. I guess you meant theory or machine, then 
you are just asserting that you believe that Mechanism is false.

I do not do such kind of philosophy/religion. 

I put my hypothesis on the table (Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis + “yes 
doctor for some level n”).

Then I deduce, first intuitively (so that you get quickly the picture, 
including that physics will be a sum on infinitely many computations supporting 
machine and seen from their self-referential modes)






> You cannot prove that logic is consciousness any more than you can prove, by 
> logic alone, that other people are conscious.


Excellent! (But I have never asserted anything like that, and this really show 
you have not yet begin to read any thing I 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 23 Sep 2018 at 5:19 pm, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 3:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > *Given the definition of the first person*, [...]  *By the definition
>> of the first person notion* [...]
>>
>
> You act as if you've given a robust definition of "the first person" that
> doesn't fall apart into logical contradictions at the first use of a people
> copying machine, or even with nothing more than the passage of time. But
> you never have. For example, you'll say things like "the first person"
> means the conscious being experiencing Helsinki today and then try to
> predict what "the first person" will experience tomorrow. But even if we
> forget about people copying machines and stay put in Helsinki if that's
> your definition of "the first person" then "the first person" will not
> exist at all tomorrow because tomorrow nobody will be experiencing Helsinki
> today.
>
> And then you will say the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow could not have
> predicted that he would be doing that today, and that's true but only
> because today the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow does not exist so he's
> unable to do ANYTHING, and that includes making predictions.  I've made
> this point many times before of course and each time your only defence is
> I'm "just playing with words", an odd defence from somebody who claims to
> be a logician.
>
> I don't have the problem that Bruno has because I define "the Helsinki
> man" as anyone who remembers being the Helsinki man today, but if Bruno
> accepted my definition and followed its logical consequences he'd have to
> conclude that the Helsinki man will see 2 cities not one and saw them both
> at the exact same time. And this conclusion could be proven by interviewing
> both the Moscow man and the Washington man provided that before any copying
> was done the Helsinki man himself agreed on the definition of "the Helsinki
> man". Yes if you asked the Washington or Moscow man how many cities they
> saw they would say only one, but that is the wrong question to ask. The
> correct question to ask is "How many cities do you think the Helsinki man
> ended up seeing at the same time?". If they are logical and truthful they
> will answer "I don't have enough information to answer that but If the
> experiment went as planned and my brother really is in that other city then
> the Helsinki man ended up seeing 2 cities at exactly the same time".
>
> *>That is pseudo-religion. You talk like a member of the clergy.*
>
>
> And you talk as if you hadn't repeated verbatim that same schoolboy insult
> 6.02*10^23 times before. By your next post I wouldn't be surprised if the
> tally reached (6.02*10^23) +1
>
> > *Handwaving and insults just confirms that you have decided to not
>> understand.*
>>
>
> Speaking of hand waving, nobody can explain who exactly is supposed to
> make the prediction, or who or what the prediction is about, and even after
> the event is over there is no way even in principle to know if the
> prediction turned out to be correct or not. So it's true I am confused I
> don't understand, but anybody who thinks they understand gibberish is a
> fool.
>

To me and probably to many others it seems obvious that the Helsinki man
can expect to end up either in Moscow or Washington after the duplication.
Can you perhaps step outside of the argument and speculate as to why there
should be such disagreement, why you imagine some people would think it is
obvious when you think it is not only not obvious, but ridiculous?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 3:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *Given the definition of the first person*, [...]  *By the definition of
> the first person notion* [...]
>

You act as if you've given a robust definition of "the first person" that
doesn't fall apart into logical contradictions at the first use of a people
copying machine, or even with nothing more than the passage of time. But
you never have. For example, you'll say things like "the first person"
means the conscious being experiencing Helsinki today and then try to
predict what "the first person" will experience tomorrow. But even if we
forget about people copying machines and stay put in Helsinki if that's
your definition of "the first person" then "the first person" will not
exist at all tomorrow because tomorrow nobody will be experiencing Helsinki
today.

And then you will say the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow could not have
predicted that he would be doing that today, and that's true but only
because today the man experiencing Moscow tomorrow does not exist so he's
unable to do ANYTHING, and that includes making predictions.  I've made
this point many times before of course and each time your only defence is
I'm "just playing with words", an odd defence from somebody who claims to
be a logician.

I don't have the problem that Bruno has because I define "the Helsinki man"
as anyone who remembers being the Helsinki man today, but if Bruno accepted
my definition and followed its logical consequences he'd have to conclude
that the Helsinki man will see 2 cities not one and saw them both at the
exact same time. And this conclusion could be proven by interviewing both
the Moscow man and the Washington man provided that before any copying was
done the Helsinki man himself agreed on the definition of "the Helsinki
man". Yes if you asked the Washington or Moscow man how many cities they
saw they would say only one, but that is the wrong question to ask. The
correct question to ask is "How many cities do you think the Helsinki man
ended up seeing at the same time?". If they are logical and truthful they
will answer "I don't have enough information to answer that but If the
experiment went as planned and my brother really is in that other city then
the Helsinki man ended up seeing 2 cities at exactly the same time".

*>That is pseudo-religion. You talk like a member of the clergy.*


And you talk as if you hadn't repeated verbatim that same schoolboy insult
6.02*10^23 times before. By your next post I wouldn't be surprised if the
tally reached (6.02*10^23) +1

> *Handwaving and insults just confirms that you have decided to not
> understand.*
>

Speaking of hand waving, nobody can explain who exactly is supposed to make
the prediction, or who or what the prediction is about, and even after the
event is over there is no way even in principle to know if the prediction
turned out to be correct or not. So it's true I am confused I don't
understand, but anybody who thinks they understand gibberish is a fool.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 4:41:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Sep 2018, at 09:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> Mind is what a brain does

  

>>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
 *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
 for some pair of legs to be doing it.*

>>>
>>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) 
>>> to do it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>>
>>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
>>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>>
>>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>>
>>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>>> the question).
>>>
>>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
>> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
>> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>>
>> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>>
>>
>> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>>  
>>
>> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>>
>> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>>
>>
>>
>> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>>
>> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
>> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
>> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
>> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
>> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
>> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
>> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
>> “seen from inside”.
>>
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
>> from that theory of consciousness.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
> That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's [ 
> https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize 
> in my own words the Goff view.
>
> I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic 
> Computationalism*:
>
>
>  
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 
>
>
> By Pure Computationalism [ 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
> that everything
>
>
> Which everything? What are your basic metaphysical assumption?
>
>
>
>
> can be seen as computation with quantitative information (numbers, 
> basically) alone.
>
> Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
> (pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
> Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 
>
> But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).
>
>
>
> At this stage materialism and physicalism can be identified, and we can 
> add nuances later. 
>
> But with computationalism, neither materialism (even weak, the belief in 
> some matter not reducible to something else) nor physicalism are consistent 
> with Mechanism. A short argument can be find here:
>
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th 
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, 
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> (sane04)
>
>
> More details are given here:
>
> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. 
> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, 
through computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which 
basically predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non 
definable sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic


Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some 
hypothesis.



I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so 
my cat is a dog.


That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work 
already done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have 
not read the papers.


No, you use exactly this logic all the time. You find some superficial 
similarity between things and then conclude that they are identical. 
Showing that the logic of self reference has some similarities with 
consciousness is not sufficient. You have to show me a logic that has a 
coherent internal narrative and shows the signs of consciousness that I 
use to conclude that other people (and cats and dogs) are conscious. 
Mere similarity is not enough -- that is the cat=dog fallacy. 
Consciousness is a first person experience -- you cannot have first 
person experience of a self-referential logic. You cannot prove that 
logic is consciousness any more than you can prove, by logic alone, that 
other people are conscious.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Sep 2018, at 08:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
>> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
>> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
>> knowledge),
> 
> With that sort of logic

Only standard classical logic is used in the derivation. + some hypothesis.


> I can prove that my cat is a dog:
> My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my cat is 
> a dog.

That is invalid in all logic. I was not arguing, just remind the work already 
done. The proof is longer, OBVIOUSLY. It shows that you have not read the 
papers.

Bruno





> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 23, 2018 at 1:28:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except 
>>> for some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>>
>>
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
>> do it.
>>
>>
>> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>>
>> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
>> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
>> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>>
>> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
>> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
>> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>>
>> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
>> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
>> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
>> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
>> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
>> the question).
>>
>> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument 
> against a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based 
> purely on numbers, combinators, etc.)
>
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
>
>
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
>
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
>
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
>
>
>
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
>
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
> (one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
> (qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”
>
>
>
>
> That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which 
> shows that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many 
> believe that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are 
> logically incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic 
> “seen from inside”.
>
> I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
> computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict 
> consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of 
> knowledge), but with the price of forcing to drive the physical appearance 
> from that theory of consciousness.
>
> Bruno
>
>
That was my reply in a tweet to Goff's 
[ https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714 ] to summarize 
in my own words the Goff view.

I elaborate further in my previous post here on *Realistic Computationalism*
:



 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/ZDKbxJuQYt4/Z7C1ePCzAwAJ 


By Pure Computationalism 
[ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems ] I mean 
that everything can be seen as computation with quantitative information 
(numbers, basically) alone.

Given Goff's definition of physicalism, physicalism is consistent with 
(pure) computationalism. But it's not sufficient for consciousness (Goff, 
Strawson) , even if computation is extended to hypercomputation. 

But then materialism > physicalism (i-states + e-states > i-states).

- pt
 

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through 
computer science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically 
predict consciousness (indubitable, non provable and non definable 
sort of knowledge),


With that sort of logic I can prove that my cat is a dog:
My cat has four legs and a tail; dogs have four legs and a tail; so my 
cat is a dog.


Bruce

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 Sep 2018, at 11:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>  
>> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
>> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
>> some pair of legs to be doing it.
>> 
>> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to do 
>> it.
> 
> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
> 
> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt that 
> to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or some 
> electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
> 
> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than Church 
> thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
> 
> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a counter-argument. 
> The most you can do, if you really want to take your ontology for granted, is 
> to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake in my argument, without 
> using your ontological commitment (which would beg the question).
> 
> Up to now, you have failed to that.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument against a 
> purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based purely on 
> numbers, combinators, etc.)
> 
> Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:
> 
> https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
>  
> 
> via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714
> 
> (In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)
> 
> 
> 
> My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:
> 
> "Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
> language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism (one 
> greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality (qualitative 
> states and language) in addition to informationality, may be.”



That is short. You might elaborate. I can refer you to my papers which shows 
that you cannot have both materialism/physicalism and Mechanism. Many believe 
that materialism and mechanism go well together, but they are logically 
incompatible. With mechanism, physics is reduced to arithmetic “seen from 
inside”.

I would say that mechanism explains rather well consciousness, through computer 
science and the logic of self-reference ((which basically predict consciousness 
(indubitable, non provable and non definable sort of knowledge), but with the 
price of forcing to drive the physical appearance from that theory of 
consciousness.

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> - pt
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, September 22, 2018 at 2:48:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> >> Mind is what a brain does
>>
>>  
>>
> >*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
>> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
>> some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>>
>
> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to 
> do it.
>
>
> Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 
>
> Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt 
> that to have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or 
> some electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 
>
> What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical 
> reality emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than 
> Church thesis and the very elementary arithmetic.
>
> But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
> hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a 
> counter-argument. The most you can do, if you really want to take your 
> ontology for granted, is to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake 
> in my argument, without using your ontological commitment (which would beg 
> the question).
>
> Up to now, you have failed to that.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
It still seems to me that consciousness itself could be an argument against 
a purely information-based ontology. ("Information" meaning based purely on 
numbers, combinators, etc.)

Philip Goff and Michael Shermer discussed basically this:

https://scottbarrykaufman.com/podcast/solving-the-mysteries-of-consciousness-free-will-and-god-with-michael-shermer-and-philip-goff/
 

via  https://twitter.com/Philip_Goff/status/1043053992916467714

(In there there is an about 1 hour podcast.)



My summary (fits in a tweet) of Goff:

"Physicalism, based on pure informationality (quantitative states and 
language} is not sufficient to explain consciousness,  but a materialism 
(one greater than physicalism) that is based on experientiality 
(qualitative states and language) in addition to informationality, may be."



- pt

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> >> Mind is what a brain does
>  
> >And walking and running is what the legs do. 
> There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for some 
> pair of legs to be doing it.
> 
> Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to do 
> it.

Assuming your ontological commitment, but that is pseudo-religion. 

Or equivalently: you confuse matter and primitive matter. Nobody doubt that to 
have human or biological consciousness, we need a human brain or some 
electronic device, but that is irrelevant. 

What has been proved, (see Kleene’s 1952 book) is that the arithmetical reality 
emulates all computations. No need of any more assumption than Church thesis 
and the very elementary arithmetic.

But an ontological physical reality is only metaphysical speculation or 
hypothesis, and in our setting it is invalid to use it as a counter-argument. 
The most you can do, if you really want to take your ontology for granted, is 
to reject Digital Mechanism or to find a mistake in my argument, without using 
your ontological commitment (which would beg the question).

Up to now, you have failed to that.

Bruno







> 
> John K Clark
>  
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

John,

I don’t see any argument. Just distracting statements, not even trying to hide 
your ontological commitment.

That is pseudo-religion. You talk like a member of the clergy.

Given the definition of the first person, the first person indeterminacy is 
probably made clearer with the iterated duplication experiment. Imagine you bet 
the definite history describing the decimal of PI (in the alphabet {W, M}. Any 
schoolboy I asked on this understand that at the first iteration, one of the 
copy will admit that his statement was wrong, although the other copy will 
assert that he was confirmed. For some that is enough to prove that in 
Helsinki, the guy should have been more cautious. But apparently you need more, 
so, we can look at the second iteration, (like I have described previously: the 
two copies come back in Helsinki, by plane say, and do the duplication again. 
Now, only one of four copies assert having been confirmed, and then again, and 
only 1/8, then 1/16, then 1/32, etc. This decrease as 1/2^n. 
A simple argument shows that whatever precise history is predicted, it can be 
confirmed only by 1/2^n. In fact the “computable stories” can even been shown 
to be negligible in the limit. So, even those who correct their prediction will 
end up into a negligible minority. By the definition of the first person 
notion, this shows that no prediction will be assessed by the vast majority of 
copies, and most copies will agree that they have been unable to predict the 
outcome (first person self-localization), and this explains what the first 
person indeterminacy means, in case you still miss it.

Handwaving and insults just confirms that you have decided to not understand.

Bruno




> On 21 Sep 2018, at 19:43, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 7:05 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>If physics is not involved then neither is time or space, so nothing about 
> >>the "machine" changes, and without change a calculation can not be made.
> 
> >See my answer in previous post.
> 
> In my experience reading your stuff twice brings no additional clarity. 
> 
> >you cannot invoke your personal metaphysics.
> 
> If  a mechanic can't fix the engine in his car without "invoking personal 
> metaphysics" then there is nothing metaphysical about it. It's just physical.
>  
> >if you assume Aristotle’s [.]
> 
> How very interesting! I believe this is the first time you've ever mentioned 
> the ancient Greeks, why didn't you do that before?  
> 
> > I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in all 
> > textbook of logic.
> 
> Assuming logic textbooks exist did anything exist before logic textbooks 
> existed ? And if logic is more fundamental why is it that a physical machine 
> can simulate logic but logic can't simulate a physical machine?
> 
> >>Maybe there is some way other than a Turing Machine to perform a 
> >>calculation,
> 
> >That is ambiguous.
> 
> Maybe a Turing Machine can't find the answer to all nondeterministic 
> polynomial time problems in polynomial time but some other physical method 
> can, I doubt it but maybe. It's probably the greatest unsolved problem in 
> mathematics. Does P=NP? Most think the answer is no but nobody can prove it. 
> Intuitively you'd think in general it must be harder to write a book than 
> read a book and harder to write a proof than check a proof, but then again 
> these days it sometimes takes the entire mathematical community years to 
> check a proof before they conclude its valid so maybe not.
>  
> >>but whatever that way is you can be certain it involves change, and that 
> >>means its physical.
> 
> >No. We need only the local change
> 
> If you're talking about locality then you're implicitly assuming the 
> existence of time and space, and they are physical concepts.
>  
> > in the memory of the machine.
> 
> Memory is physical. It turns out that theoretically you can perform a 
> calculation without using energy but If you don't have a infinite memory then 
> at some point you're going to have to erase the scratchpad stuff you used to 
> make the calculation. And in 1961 Landauer proved it takes a minimum amount 
> of energy to erase one bit of information and he told us exactly how much 
> that is; its Boltzmann's constant times the temperature of the memory in 
> degrees Kelvin times the natural logarithm of 2. Landauer's results are 
> rooted in the Second Law Of Thermodynamics and if I could pick one thing that 
> I think physicists would still consider to be true a thousand years from now 
> it would be the second law.
> 
> Landauer's limit on the minimum it takes to erase one bit of information is a 
> very small amount of energy (.0172 electron volts) but if the amount of space 
> needed to store one bit of information keeps shrinking then in 10 or 15 years 
> computer engineers are going have to take it into consideration. Some early 
> designs for nanocomputers ignored it and 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 7:20 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>> Mind is what a brain does
>
>
>
>*And walking and running is what the legs do. *
> *There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for
> some pair of legs to be doing it.*
>

Right, there is no thinking without a brain (biological or electronic) to
do it.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 7:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>If physics is not involved then neither is time or space, so nothing
>> about the "machine" changes, and without change a calculation can not be
>> made.
>
>
> *>See my answer in previous post.*
>

In my experience reading your stuff twice brings no additional clarity.

*>you cannot invoke your personal metaphysics.*
>

If  a mechanic can't fix the engine in his car without "invoking personal
metaphysics" then there is nothing metaphysical about it. It's just
physical.


> >if you assume Aristotle’s [.]
>

How very interesting! I believe this is the first time you've ever
mentioned the ancient Greeks, why didn't you do that before?

> *I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in
> all textbook of logic.*
>

Assuming logic textbooks exist did anything exist before logic textbooks
existed ? And if logic is more fundamental why is it that a physical
machine can simulate logic but logic can't simulate a physical machine?

>>Maybe there is some way other than a Turing Machine to perform a
>> calculation,
>
>
> *>That is ambiguous.*
>

Maybe a Turing Machine can't find the answer to all nondeterministic
polynomial time problems in polynomial time but some other physical method
can, I doubt it but maybe. It's probably the greatest unsolved problem in
mathematics. Does P=NP? Most think the answer is no but nobody can prove
it. Intuitively you'd think in general it must be harder to write a book
than read a book and harder to write a proof than check a proof, but then
again these days it sometimes takes the entire mathematical community years
to check a proof before they conclude its valid so maybe not.


> >>but whatever that way is you can be certain it involves change, and
>> that means its physical.
>
>
> >*No. We need only the local change*
>

If you're talking about locality then you're implicitly assuming the
existence of time and space, and they are physical concepts.


> *> in the memory of the machine.*
>

Memory is physical. It turns out that theoretically you can perform a
calculation without using energy but If you don't have a infinite memory
then at some point you're going to have to erase the scratchpad stuff you
used to make the calculation. And in 1961 Landauer proved it takes a
minimum amount of energy to erase one bit of information and he told us
exactly how much that is; its Boltzmann's constant times the temperature of
the memory in degrees Kelvin times the natural logarithm of 2. Landauer's
results are rooted in the Second Law Of Thermodynamics and if I could pick
one thing that I think physicists would still consider to be true a
thousand years from now it would be the second law.

Landauer's limit on the minimum it takes to erase one bit of information is
a very small amount of energy (.0172 electron volts) but if the amount of
space needed to store one bit of information keeps shrinking then in 10 or
15 years computer engineers are going have to take it into consideration.
Some early designs for nanocomputers ignored it and thus if they had been
built they would have given off so much heat they would have acted more
like bombs than computers.  But you can mitigate the number of bits you
need to erase by computing the scratchpad memory backwards (if you have a
reversable computer) and restoring it to its original state without erasing
any information or using any energy. Nobody has bothered to make a
reversible computer because  computers are still so big Landauer's limit is
not a significant engineering consideration, but someday it will be.


> *>Usually computational changes is defined by finite sequence,*
>

Finite sequences never change.


> >  they are defined by [...]
>

Bruno, you can't define your way to the truth or toward reality.

>>nobody but you knows what the hell "the God of Physicalism or Primary
>> Matter” means
>
>
> > *It means a notion of matter that we assume to be obtained only by
> assumption. It is called sometimes “the second God of Aristotle”.*
>

After all these years why did you wait till now to refer to God or the
ancient Greeks? That did it that convinced me, anybody who can do that must
be right. If only you'd done it years ago!

>>>*You did.*
>

> >>A yet more goddamn personal pronouns! Well OK maybe so, maybe
> Mr.You knows what Bruno means by "You" in a world that contains "you"
> duplicating machines, but John certainly does not.
>
> *>We can see that, but that contradict the fact that you agree*[...]
>

I think the H-guy survived but I do NOT agree that we agree! Maybe we agree
maybe we don't, I have no idea.because nobody including you knows what you
mean by "the H-guy".


> > [...] *the H-guy survived the duplication.*
>

I know exactly what I mean whenever I write "the H-guy" and my meaning has
remained constant from day one of this endless debate, but if you have any
meaning at all for the term it changes in every other sentence.


> > 1*4 years old kid 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Sep 2018, at 23:14, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/19/2018 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Sep 2018, at 03:44, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/18/2018 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t.
 
 
 I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in all 
 textbook of logic.
>>> 
>>> But you need to connect that meaning to the very different meaning of 
>>> exists = "you can kick it and it kicks back”.
>> 
>> 
>> That is a bit unclear. 
> 
> What's unclear about you can kick it and it kicks back?  That's the kind of 
> definition that can be ostensive (although not via email).
> 
>> 
>> To give precision, I use “Exist” in the sense of first order logic, and the 
>> different sense of “exist” emerges, or can be defined in the different modal 
>> logic imposed by Gödel II.
>> 
>> So, the ontic existence = the usual number existence, or the “E” of first 
>> order arithmetic.
>> 
>> Then you have  the 8 variants of existence:   [i]Ex[i]P(x)  with [0]p = 
>> []p, [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & <>t, etc.
> 
> What's "etc" mean?

The eight hypostases:

[0]p = p (truth)
[1]p = []p (provable intelligible) [2]p (true intelligible)
[3]p = []p & p (soul, knowability, first person)
[4]p = []p & <>t  (provable intelligible matter, observable) [5]p = []p & <>t  
(true intelligible matter, observable)
[6]p = []p & <>t & p (provable sensible matter) [7]p = []p & <>t & p (true 
sensible matter).

For more see any of may paper on this (most are),or ask any question.

There are many other, the quantum logics (given by [4] … [7]- are graded into 
[]^m p & <>^n p (with n bigger than m, they all gives a quantum logic).


> 
>> 
>> To be sure, for matter, you have still other nuances, as observation is 
>> “quantised” which means that we need the []<>p translation (it makes the 
>> experience repeatable, brought symmetry below the substitution level, and 
>> provide the quantum logics where we expected it by the thought experiences.
> 
> Yes, I understand quantifiers.  But you are quantifying over a domain of 
> numbers, so "exists" only means there is a number that satisfies some 
> predicate.

Yes. But they get different meaning for a subject/machine through the mode 
used, but indeed, even such existence are number existence, but unknowingly for 
the subject. It is true that []p <-> p, but no machine can know that for 
itself. That would lead to the 1p-3p confusion.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, September 19, 2018 at 3:33:20 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 12:51 AM Brent Meeker  > :
>
> "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
>> body?"
>
>
> From the same place we got the idea that "fast" is distinct from "racing 
> car" and "red" is distinct from "tomato". Mind is what a brain does.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>

And walking and running is what the legs do. 

There is no "walking" like some Platonic immaterial universal except for 
some pair of legs to be doing it.


- pt

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/19/2018 1:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Sep 2018, at 03:44, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/18/2018 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t.



I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given 
in all textbook of logic.


But you need to connect that meaning to the very different meaning of 
exists = "you can kick it and it kicks back”.



That is a bit unclear.


What's unclear about you can kick it and it kicks back?  That's the kind 
of definition that can be ostensive (although not via email).




To give precision, I use “Exist” in the sense of first order logic, 
and the different sense of “exist” emerges, or can be defined in the 
different modal logic imposed by Gödel II.


So, the ontic existence = the usual number existence, or the “E” of 
first order arithmetic.


Then you have  the 8 variants of existence: [i]Ex[i]P(x)  with [0]p = 
[]p, [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & <>t, etc.


What's "etc" mean?



To be sure, for matter, you have still other nuances, as observation 
is “quantised” which means that we need the []<>p translation (it 
makes the experience repeatable, brought symmetry below the 
substitution level, and provide the quantum logics where we expected 
it by the thought experiences.


Yes, I understand quantifiers.  But you are quantifying over a domain of 
numbers, so "exists" only means there is a number that satisfies some 
predicate.


Brent



Bruno







Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 12:51 AM Brent Meeker  :

"How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the
> body?"


>From the same place we got the idea that "fast" is distinct from "racing
car" and "red" is distinct from "tomato". Mind is what a brain does.

John K Clark




>

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 11:51:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/18/2018 1:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html :
>
>  
> "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
> body? Why did this *bad idea* enter our culture?"
>
>
> [At] some point in prehistory, our ancestors got into the habit of 
> pursuing projects of social cooperation by making marks and noises at each 
> other so as to organize themselves, he said. "That turned out to be a 
> fruitful survival mechanism." Eventually our ancestors developed social 
> norms—such as if you grunted "p" you had to grunt "q," or else explain why 
> you didn't grunt "q"—which we call following the laws of logic and making 
> valid inferences, he added.
>
> There was doubtless a genetic mutation somewhere in the background that 
> allowed this neat adaptive trick, he said. But "once that you've seen that 
> a certain neurological twist was necessary to get the process of using 
> marks and noises instead of force as methods of enforcing social 
> cooperation, you have given the only answer that there is to be given to 
> the question, 'What is the relation between the mind and the rest of 
> nature?'"
>
>
> *The "mind" simply is the ability to engage in linguistic behavior,* he 
> said. "If you can talk about things, you can also think about things. But 
> you don't talk about things because you have first thought about things. 
> You didn't have any thoughts before you had language to think the thoughts 
> with."
>
>
> I can imagine things like a play or a diagram without language.  My dog 
> clearly has thoughts about things and even dreams.  Octopuses have 
> curiosity.  Rorty is kinda right but too simplistic.  He seems to write 
> polemics instead of philosophy.
>
> Brent
>
 

Do dogs think about their thoughts?

The above was from a talk he gave  (about 2 years before his 
death)  filtered through a Stanford News writer.

But the "philosophy" is from his (well-known to today's philosophers) 1979 
book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature *which I would assume anyone with 
an interest in philosophy in the past 30 years has read.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature

- pt

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Sep 2018, at 04:32, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:
 >It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split.
 
 If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't, 
 then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that 
 what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2 
 brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains 
 starts to be arranged differently, such as would happen the instant the 
 doors were opened and they saw different things, that 2 minds emerge where 
 only 1 was before. 
>>> 
>>> Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  
>>> But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is 
>>> impossible to exactly duplicate a brain. 
>> 
>> If by brain you mean the physical object, then indeed it is not 100% 
>> duplicable.
> 
> Then one would not expect the Doctor to be 100% successful.
> 
>> With mechanism, all physical object are actual infinities. Luckily that does 
>> not exist,
> 
> What does not exist?  infinities?

Indeed. The theory is either Classical Logic +

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Or simply

1) Kxy = x
2) Sxyz = xz(yz)

And nothing else. No axiom of infinity. Like Judson Webb analyses correctly; 
Mechanism is a finitism.
Of course, the Löbian machine inside arithmetic will “invent” infinity, and it 
will be a powerful tool for figuring out what happens, but at some point, if 
they bet on computationalism, they will discard it at the ontic level.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> except as an appearances due to the first person indeterminacy on the 
>> arithmetical truth. That is why all modal nuances are so important in this 
>> context. It is the mechanist non cloning theorem. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will 
>>> eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational 
>>> difference.  But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to 
>>> suppose "the split" will be "felt”.
>> 
>> All right,
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Sep 2018, at 03:44, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2018 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t.
>> 
>> 
>> I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in all 
>> textbook of logic.
> 
> But you need to connect that meaning to the very different meaning of exists 
> = "you can kick it and it kicks back”.


That is a bit unclear. 

To give precision, I use “Exist” in the sense of first order logic, and the 
different sense of “exist” emerges, or can be defined in the different modal 
logic imposed by Gödel II.

So, the ontic existence = the usual number existence, or the “E” of first order 
arithmetic.

Then you have  the 8 variants of existence:   [i]Ex[i]P(x)  with [0]p = 
[]p, [1]p = []p & p, [2]p = []p & <>t, etc.

To be sure, for matter, you have still other nuances, as observation is 
“quantised” which means that we need the []<>p translation (it makes the 
experience repeatable, brought symmetry below the substitution level, and 
provide the quantum logics where we expected it by the thought experiences.

Bruno





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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Sep 2018, at 22:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:04:25 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> >Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  But 
> >they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible 
> >to exactly duplicate a brain. 
> 
> Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object, but mind is 
> not a physical object and if mind works on digital principles, and I think it 
> must, then mind could theoretically be duplicated exactly. If the duplication 
> was not perfect, if it was way way off then it COULD feel the split, the copy 
> would say to itself, "something just changed, I feel very differently than I 
> did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the change because 
> imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than the original not 
> better. 
>  
> > So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will 
> > eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational 
> > difference. 
> 
> That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a event without 
> a cause) if your talking about intelligence, consciousness or self 
> determination. It's as if on rare and random times for no reason whatsoever a 
> Turing Machine prints a 0 when the rules say it should have printed a 1. 
>  
> > But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the 
> > split" will be "felt".
> 
> I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near perfectly.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html :
> 
>  
> "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
> body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?”

That is like Searle who identify mind and brain, which is a category mistake. 
No first person notion can be identify with anything entirely 3p (third person) 
describable.

I have also a problem with your definition of matter you gave in a previous 
post. It described what can be emulated directly in language like ADA (with 
coding, decoding, transport of information). But ADA can be simulated eaxctlin 
by arithmetic, making matter appearing in arithmetic, which is a bit of 
nonsense. The appearance of matter can appear, from the 1p view of the entities 
run by the arithmetical relation.

You might study my papers. They show (constructively) why we cannot have both 
computationalisme (aka digital mechanism) and any form off primitive matter or 
physicalism. Digital mechanism shows why and how to derive physics from 
arithmetic.





> 
> 
> [At] some point in prehistory, our ancestors got into the habit of pursuing 
> projects of social cooperation by making marks and noises at each other so as 
> to organize themselves, he said. "That turned out to be a fruitful survival 
> mechanism." Eventually our ancestors developed social norms—such as if you 
> grunted "p" you had to grunt "q," or else explain why you didn't grunt 
> "q"—which we call following the laws of logic and making valid inferences, he 
> added.
> 
> There was doubtless a genetic mutation somewhere in the background that 
> allowed this neat adaptive trick, he said. But "once that you've seen that a 
> certain neurological twist was necessary to get the process of using marks 
> and noises instead of force as methods of enforcing social cooperation, you 
> have given the only answer that there is to be given to the question, 'What 
> is the relation between the mind and the rest of nature?'"
> 
> 
> 
> The "mind" simply is the ability to engage in linguistic behavior, he said. 
> "If you can talk about things, you can also think about things. But you don't 
> talk about things because you have first thought about things. You didn't 
> have any thoughts before you had language to think the thoughts with."
> 
> 

That is a confusion between “a mind” and “some 3p describable symptom of the 
presence of some mind”.

I think that consciousness precedes mind, which precedes thought, which 
precedes language, unless you put the body in the language (we are biochemical 
words implemented in a 4D “programming language” in that case. But then physics 
becomes the linguistic of numbers. To get qualia, it is better to not do that 
move, and use a theology of machine which is actually independent of language 
and formal system. See my papers for more on this.

Bruno








> 
> - pt
>  
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Sep 2018, at 19:03, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> >Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  But 
> >they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible 
> >to exactly duplicate a brain. 
> 
> Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object, but mind is 
> not a physical object and if mind works on digital principles, and I think it 
> must, then mind could theoretically be duplicated exactly. If the duplication 
> was not perfect, if it was way way off then it COULD feel the split, the copy 
> would say to itself, "something just changed, I feel very differently than I 
> did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the change because 
> imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than the original not 
> better. 
>  
> > So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will 
> > eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational 
> > difference. 
> 
> That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a event without 
> a cause) if your talking about intelligence, consciousness or self 
> determination. It's as if on rare and random times for no reason whatsoever a 
> Turing Machine prints a 0 when the rules say it should have printed a 1. 
>  
> > But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the 
> > split" will be "felt".
> 
> I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near perfectly.

Good. That entails easily the FPI (First Person Indeterminacy).

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/18/2018 1:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:04:25 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker > wrote:

/>Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably
psuedo-classical objects.  But they can't be strictly
classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible to exactly
duplicate a brain. /


Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object,
but mind is not a physical object and if mind works on digital
principles, and I think it must, then mind could theoretically be
duplicated exactly. If the duplication was not perfect, if it was
way way off then it COULD feel the split, the copy would say to
itself, "something just changed, I feel very differently than I
did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the change
because imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than
the original not better.

/> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level
and that will eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some
classical/computational difference. /


That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a
event without a cause) if your talking about intelligence,
consciousness or self determination. It's as if on rare and random
times for no reason whatsoever a Turing Machine prints a 0 when
the rules say it should have printed a 1.

> /But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to
suppose "the split" will be "felt".
/


I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near
perfectly.

John K Clark






https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html :

"How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from 
the body? Why did this *bad idea* enter our culture?"



[At] some point in prehistory, our ancestors got into the habit of 
pursuing projects of social cooperation by making marks and noises at 
each other so as to organize themselves, he said. "That turned out to 
be a fruitful survival mechanism." Eventually our ancestors developed 
social norms—such as if you grunted "p" you had to grunt "q," or else 
explain why you didn't grunt "q"—which we call following the laws of 
logic and making valid inferences, he added.


There was doubtless a genetic mutation somewhere in the background 
that allowed this neat adaptive trick, he said. But "once that you've 
seen that a certain neurological twist was necessary to get the 
process of using marks and noises instead of force as methods of 
enforcing social cooperation, you have given the only answer that 
there is to be given to the question, 'What is the relation between 
the mind and the rest of nature?'"



*The "mind" simply is the ability to engage in linguistic behavior,* 
he said. "If you can talk about things, you can also think about 
things. But you don't talk about things because you have first thought 
about things. You didn't have any thoughts before you had language to 
think the thoughts with."




I can imagine things like a play or a diagram without language.  My dog 
clearly has thoughts about things and even dreams.  Octopuses have 
curiosity.  Rorty is kinda right but too simplistic.  He seems to write 
polemics instead of philosophy.


Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/18/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 18 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:


/>It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split. /


If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it 
can't, then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully 
duplicated that what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. 
So although there are 2 brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when 
the matter in the 2 brains starts to be arranged differently, such 
as would happen the instant the doors were opened and they saw 
different things, that 2 minds emerge where only 1 was before.


Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical 
objects.  But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely 
that it is impossible to exactly duplicate a brain.


If by brain you mean the physical object, then indeed it is not 100% 
duplicable.


Then one would not expect the Doctor to be 100% successful.

With mechanism, all physical object are actual infinities. Luckily 
that does not exist,


What does not exist?  infinities?

Brent

except as an appearances due to the first person indeterminacy on the 
arithmetical truth. That is why all modal nuances are so important in 
this context. It is the mechanist non cloning theorem.






So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that 
will eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some 
classical/computational difference.  But no matter how great the 
difference there's no reason to suppose "the split" will be "felt”.


All right,


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/18/2018 4:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t.



I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in 
all textbook of logic.


But you need to connect that meaning to the very different meaning of 
exists = "you can kick it and it kicks back".


Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 18, 2018 at 12:04:25 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> * >Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical 
>> objects.  But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it 
>> is impossible to exactly duplicate a brain.  *
>>
>
> Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object, but mind 
> is not a physical object and if mind works on digital principles, and I 
> think it must, then mind could theoretically be duplicated exactly. If the 
> duplication was not perfect, if it was way way off then it COULD feel the 
> split, the copy would say to itself, "something just changed, I feel very 
> differently than I did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the 
> change because imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than the 
> original not better. 
>  
>
>> *> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that 
>> will eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational 
>> difference. *
>>
>
> That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a event 
> without a cause) if your talking about intelligence, consciousness or self 
> determination. It's as if on rare and random times for no reason whatsoever 
> a Turing Machine prints a 0 when the rules say it should have printed a 1.  
>  
>
>> > 
>> *But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the 
>> split" will be "felt".*
>>
>
> I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near perfectly.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>


https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html :

 
"How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
body? Why did this *bad idea* enter our culture?"


[At] some point in prehistory, our ancestors got into the habit of pursuing 
projects of social cooperation by making marks and noises at each other so 
as to organize themselves, he said. "That turned out to be a fruitful 
survival mechanism." Eventually our ancestors developed social norms—such 
as if you grunted "p" you had to grunt "q," or else explain why you didn't 
grunt "q"—which we call following the laws of logic and making valid 
inferences, he added.

There was doubtless a genetic mutation somewhere in the background that 
allowed this neat adaptive trick, he said. But "once that you've seen that 
a certain neurological twist was necessary to get the process of using 
marks and noises instead of force as methods of enforcing social 
cooperation, you have given the only answer that there is to be given to 
the question, 'What is the relation between the mind and the rest of 
nature?'"


*The "mind" simply is the ability to engage in linguistic behavior,* he 
said. "If you can talk about things, you can also think about things. But 
you don't talk about things because you have first thought about things. 
You didn't have any thoughts before you had language to think the thoughts 
with."

- pt

>  
>

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Sep 18, 2018 at 12:52 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

* >Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.
> But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is
> impossible to exactly duplicate a brain.  *
>

Brains can't be duplicated exactly nor can any physical object, but mind is
not a physical object and if mind works on digital principles, and I think
it must, then mind could theoretically be duplicated exactly. If the
duplication was not perfect, if it was way way off then it COULD feel the
split, the copy would say to itself, "something just changed, I feel very
differently than I did 2 seconds ago", and he probably wouldn't like the
change because imprecise copies are usually (but not always) worse than the
original not better.


> *> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will
> eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational
> difference. *
>

That's true but I don't see the relevance of randomness (aka a event
without a cause) if your talking about intelligence, consciousness or self
determination. It's as if on rare and random times for no reason whatsoever
a Turing Machine prints a 0 when the rules say it should have printed a 1.


> >
> *But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the
> split" will be "felt".*
>

I agree, provided the digital data was copied perfectly or near perfectly.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> >It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split.
>> 
>> If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't, 
>> then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that what 
>> the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2 brains 
>> there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains starts to 
>> be arranged differently, such as would happen the instant the doors were 
>> opened and they saw different things, that 2 minds emerge where only 1 was 
>> before. 
> 
> Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  But 
> they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is impossible to 
> exactly duplicate a brain. 

If by brain you mean the physical object, then indeed it is not 100% 
duplicable. With mechanism, all physical object are actual infinities. Luckily 
that does not exist, except as an appearances due to the first person 
indeterminacy on the arithmetical truth. That is why all modal nuances are so 
important in this context. It is the mechanist non cloning theorem. 





> So there will be a quick diveregence at the quantum level and that will 
> eventually (30sec ?) be amplified to some classical/computational difference. 
>  But no matter how great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the 
> split" will be "felt”.

All right,


Bruno



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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Sep 2018, at 19:21, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 5:04 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>that says you should look for the simplest explanation and that is not 
> >>induction. Induction is not about explanations. Every animal with a nervous 
> >>system employs induction, even snails.
> 
> > Yes, even jumping spider. That is why they are Löbian any universal machine 
> > believing in enough induction is potentially Löbian).
> 
> Jumping spiders can perform induction but they can't perform deduction,


Explicitly? Indeed. But the functioning of a brain, or any Turing universal 
machine can be seen as part of a deductive system. 




> but some Turing Machines can perform BOTH induction AND deduction. So what 
> you and you alone call  "Lobian Machines" are just a subset of Turing 
> Machines consisting of less powerful members. 


Other call it Gödelian machine or theory. I used GPodel-Löbian for long, and 
use Löbian as it is short, and it pints of the fact that such system have a 
provability logic entirely formalised, at the propositional logic, by the  Löb 
formula ([]([]p -> p)->[]p). Doing induction is not enough. The induction must 
be sufficiently strong. Induction on sigma_0 formula, when added to Robison 
Arithmetic, does not lead to Löbianity. You need to add the axiom for the 
exponential function, or accept an induction at least on sigma_1 formula (like 
the theory PrL of Smorynski). Peano arithmetic use full induction (on all 
formula).




>   
> 
> >>Machines are made of matter as is our brains, 
>  
> >Not the digital machine we are talking about.
> 
> If it's not physical then it's not a machine.


Then Turing machine are no more machine.

Changing the vocabulary used by all will not help.




> If physics is not involved then neither is time or space, so nothing about 
> the "machine" changes, and without change a calculation can not be made.

See my answer in previous post. A program in Ada makes a lot of changes when 
run, be it in arithmetic or in a physical reality.
Yu could add that matter need to be blessed with Holy water. I mean that when 
we do metaphysics seriously, you cannot invoke your personal metaphysics.



> The integer 7 is timeless and will remain a prime number here there and 
> everywhere, and for that very reason it is unable to perform a calculation. 
> But a computer microchip, just like the physical tape on a Turing MACHINE, 
> can and does change and hence can perform calculations.   

Can perform physical calculations, but again that would beg the question if you 
assume Aristotle’s criteria of reality (what we see).




> 
>  >>Peano arithmetic can be run on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set 
> Theory, but neither is a machine because neither is made of matter.  
> 
> >Assuming that matter exist,
> 
> I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don’t.


I use “exists” as a quantifier in some theory. The axioms are given in all 
textbook of logic.

It would be cool if you could avoid personal remark.





> 
> > yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so can run any other digital 
> > machine, but that does not imply that something else cannot run a machine,
> 
> Maybe there is some way other than a Turing Machine to perform a calculation,

That is ambiguous. I could mean “maybe Church’s thesis is wrong”, as it could 
only mean that some computations are better described at some high level, like 
it would be a nonsense to try t grasp how Deep Blue has win a Chess game from 
its “trace” at the boolean level of the (physical) machine running it.




> but whatever that way is you can be certain it involves change, and that 
> means its physical.

No. We need only the local change in the memory of the machine. I can explain 
all details, but you can also see how the theory of Turing machine can be 
explicitly arithmetise in the chapter 4 of Davis book. It is done already, 
quasi-explicitly (Gödel missed only the Church’s thesis) in Gödel’s 1931 paper.




> Mathematicians like to brag that their subject is timeless and universal, but 
> when you're talking about computation that is not a advantage it is a 
> crippling handicap. 


You just show that you have never study any book on computability.

Usually computational changes is defined by finite sequence, and they are 
defined by the usual use of exponentiation of prime factors in (unique) dnumber 
decomposition.

The only problem is that in RA we don’t have the exponential, nor induction, 
which forced Gödel to use the Chinese Lemma. But that works well.



>   
>  
> > No need to invoke the God  of Physicalism or Primary Matter,
> 
> And that's a good thing because nobody but you knows what the hell "the God 
> of Physicalism or Primary Matter” means


It means a notion of matter that we assume to be obtained only by assumption. 
It is called sometimes “the second God of Aristotle”. It is called, in the 
materialist era, simply 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/17/2018 10:21 AM, John Clark wrote:


/>It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split. /


If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it 
can't, then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully 
duplicated that what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So 
although there are 2 brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when the 
matter in the 2 brains starts to be arranged differently, such as 
would happen the instant the doors were opened and they saw different 
things, that 2 minds emerge where only 1 was before.


Is that even relevant.  Brains are presumably psuedo-classical objects.  
But they can't be strictly classical, so it seems likely that it is 
impossible to exactly duplicate a brain.  So there will be a quick 
diveregence at the quantum level and that will eventually (30sec ?) be 
amplified to some classical/computational difference. But no matter how 
great the difference there's no reason to suppose "the split" will be 
"felt".


Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 5:04 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>that says you should look for the simplest explanation and that is not
>> induction. Induction is not about explanations. Every animal with a nervous
>> system employs induction, even snails.
>
>
> *> Yes, even jumping spider. That is why they are Löbian any universal
> machine believing in enough induction is potentially Löbian).*
>

Jumping spiders can perform induction but they can't perform deduction, but
some Turing Machines can perform BOTH induction AND deduction. So what you
and you alone call  "Lobian Machines" are just a subset of Turing Machines
consisting of less powerful members.

>>Machines are made of matter as is our brains,
>
>
>
> *>Not the digital machine we are talking about.*
>

If it's not physical then it's not a machine. If physics is not involved
then neither is time or space, so nothing about the "machine" changes, and
without change a calculation can not be made. The integer 7 is timeless and
will remain a prime number here there and everywhere, and for that very
reason it is unable to perform a calculation. But a computer microchip,
just like the physical tape on a Turing MACHINE, can and does change and
hence can perform calculations.

 >>Peano arithmetic can be run on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set
>> Theory, but neither is a machine because neither is made of matter.
>
>
> *>Assuming that matter exist,*
>

I don't think you know what you mean by "exist", I certainly don't.

> *yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so can run any other digital
> machine, but that does not imply that something else cannot run a machine,*
>

Maybe there is some way other than a Turing Machine to perform a
calculation, but whatever that way is you can be certain it involves
change, and that means its physical. Mathematicians like to brag that their
subject is timeless and universal, but when you're talking about
computation that is not a advantage it is a crippling handicap.


> > *No need to invoke the God  of Physicalism or Primary Matter,*
>

And that's a good thing because nobody but you knows what the hell "the God
of Physicalism or Primary Matter" means and I'm not at all sure you do
either.

>>John neither agrees nor disagrees because it was never made clear what
>> the personal pronoun "you" means in a world with "you" duplicating
>> machines,
>
>
> >*You did.*
>

A yet more goddamn personal pronouns! Well OK maybe so, maybe
Mr.You knows what Bruno means by "You" in a world that contains "you"
duplicating machines, but John certainly does not.

>>all Bruno will say is it's unique and the duplicating machine can't
>> duplicate it for some reason never specified.
>
>
> >*I have explained  the distinction between 1p you and 3p you. Which one
> are you talking about?*
>

Why ask John to explain Bruno's silly homemade peepee slang? John has not
the foggiest idea which "the 1p" Bruno is talking about.

>*The 3p-you is duplicable, the 1p-you is duplicable in the 3p perspective,
> but the 1p-you is NOT duplicable from its 1p-perspective. *
>

So right at the start of your "proof" you assume the very thing you're
attempting to prove, namely there is something unique about consciousness,
and that a matter duplicating machine can NOT (your capitalization)
duplicate whatever that something is. I am certainly not a world class
mathematician but even I could prove the Riemann conjecture if at the start
of my "proof" I am allowed to use the axiom that the Riemann conjecture is
true.


> *>It can be duplicated, but it cannot feel the split. *
>

If a brain can't feel the split when its duplicated, and I agree it can't,
then EVERYTHING (my capitalization) was so successfully duplicated that
what the 2 brains were doing, mind, was identical. So although there are 2
brains there is only 1 mind. It is only when the matter in the 2 brains
starts to be arranged differently, such as would happen the instant the
doors were opened and they saw different things, that 2 minds emerge where
only 1 was before.

>>Just like a human a computer can prove that it s consistent if and only
>> if it is inconsistent. So if humans are "Löbian machines" then so is my
>> iMac.
>
>
> *> No. You need a Löbian theory/machine. You need to give induction axioms
> to the IMAC.*
>

Induction is easy deduction is hard. Many millions of species can perform
induction but only a dozen or so can do even primitive deduction and none
are as good at it as humans are or even come close.

> You confuse computing and proving. Those are not equivalent notion.
>

If a computer (aka a Turing Machine) starts with certain axioms and legal
ways those axioms can be manipulated (aka computed) and it ends up with a
theorem then that theorem has been proven. That doesn't necessarily mean
the theorem is true because the axioms could be wrong, but if you're
confident the axioms are reasonable and the legal rules to manipulate them
are logical then you should be equally confident 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Sep 2018, at 17:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/12/2018 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Assuming that matter exist, yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so 
>> can run any other digital machine, but that does not imply that something 
>> else cannot run a machine, and indeed “run” has been defined first in 
>> between any two universal machine. What you call “run” is the particular 
>> case of physical implementation, and the existence of the appearance of 
>> those physical implementations is well explained in arithmetic.
> 
> No, it is not.  You can only claim that because you identify "appear" with 
> “provable"

You mean with probable?

Provable(p)  is the “[]p”

Probable with Probability 1 is not at all provable(p) but provable(p) & 
consistent(p), that is []p & <>t. And p is a halting computation (a sigma-1 
proposition).



> and there are infinitely many provable propositions in arithmetic so among 
> them must be those corresponding to the computations we think instantiate 
> minds. 

You confuse two levels/ The computation are realised in arithmetic, 
independently of this being proved or not. The proof appears only the mind of 
the (Löbian) number, in virtue of the computations which are independent of 
their mind. That follows from the mechanist hypothesis.




> But it is no explanation of what we experience to point to an infinite set 
> and say, "Well it must be in there because your experience is a member of 
> that set.”


You could demolish Born by telling him that it is of no value to say that the 
squared wave tel us that the solution is given by this distribution of 
probability. 

Deutsch made a similar point against Schmidhuber, or against Tegmark, and I 
agree with Deutsch. The physical reality is not a computation among others, 
although some approximation can exist. Quite the contrary, mechanism explain 
quanta (and qualia) from incompleteness and the greek standard definition of 
belief, knowledge and matter, which are also motivated by the first person 
indeterminacy, and the reduction of the mind body problem to a derivation of 
matter from a theory of mind (here the theory of mind is what I called 
theology, and is the mathematical theory G*).

Bruno




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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/12/2018 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming that matter exist, yes, matter appearance is Turing 
universal, so can run any other digital machine, but that does not 
imply that something else cannot run a machine, and indeed “run” has 
been defined first in between any two universal machine. What you call 
“run” is the particular case of physical implementation, and the 
existence of the appearance of those physical implementations is well 
explained in arithmetic.


No, it is not.  You can only claim that because you identify "appear" 
with "provable" and there are infinitely many provable propositions in 
arithmetic so among them must be those corresponding to the computations 
we think instantiate minds.  But it is no explanation of what we 
experience to point to an infinite set and say, "Well it must be in 
there because your experience is a member of that set."


Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/12/2018 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Sep 2018, at 19:38, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 9/11/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can the universal Diophantine equation emulate a hypercomputer?


Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this list 
more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is coherent 
with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes doctor, the first 
person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive 
reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from 
machine theology or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the 
physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum like 
to cast light on the origin of the measure on the computation/sigma_1 sentences.

Naah.

Please, elaborate. Once you grasp that mechanism entails we are emulated in 
infinitely many computations in arithmetic, I don’t see how any of this can be 
avoided.

Understanding something isn't the same as believing it.


Yes, you can always add invisible horse. Understanding something and 
disbelieving it is fraud, or mockery of Occam razor.





I understand that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.


So you believe in Sherlock Holmes, for example as a hero of fiction novel.




If you believe that there is something like a physical universe, or a any god 
or ontology, capable of selecting a computation in arithmetic, you need to 
explain what it is, and how it does that trick.

I don't believe there are computations in arithmetic, because I don't believe 
arithmetic exists.

“Arithmetic exists “ is ambiguous. Do you mean a theory or the model?


Indeed.  The theory is like a story that more than one model satisfies.  
So which model do you think exists and in what sense?...just in the 
sense of fitting the story?


  


The question is more, do you believe that 45 is odd? Do you believe in prime 
numbers?  Do you believe in equation?


Yes, just like I believe Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.



Did you take your kids out fo school when they are taught elementary arithmetic?


No.  I let them read Sherlock Holmes too.

Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 21:25, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:59 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
> >>pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
> >>continuously, eventually it always fails.
>  
> >? You seem to confuse mathematical induction, and adductive inference.
> 
> I assume you mean abductive inference,

Indeed.


> but that says you should look for the simplest explanation and that is not 
> induction. Induction is not about explanations. Every animal with a nervous 
> system employs induction, even snails.

Yes, even jumping spider. That is why they are Löbian (any universal machine 
believing in enough induction is potentially Löbian).


> Evolution has programmed snails to assume things usually continue,  when they 
> don't continue, such as a sudden change in the light level or in background 
> noise then danger often follows so precautions need to be taken, like 
> withdrawing into its shell. The snail has no explanation as to why something 
> changed it just knows that something did and that's usually not a good sign. 
> 
>> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but 
>> >>you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" 
>> >>or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
>> 
>> >?
>> ! 
> I have given a lot of example. Peano arithmetic is a Löbian machine. 
> Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory is a Löbian Machine,
> 
> Machines are made of matter as is our brains, 

Not the digital machine we are talking about. I use machine in the sense of 
Turing, not in the sense of Size or Von Neuman physical machine. Von Neumann 
used the term “machine” in both sense according to what he was working on.




>  Peano arithmetic can be run on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, 
> but neither is a machine because neither is made of matter.  

Assuming that matter exist, yes, matter appearance is Turing universal, so can 
run any other digital machine, but that does not imply that something else 
cannot run a machine, and indeed “run” has been defined first in between any 
two universal machine. What you call “run” is the particular case of physical 
implementation, and the existence of the appearance of those physical 
implementations is well explained in arithmetic. No need to invoke the God  of 
Physicalism or Primary Matter, which is not compatible with the 
Computationalist Theory of Mind.





> 
> > Here is another definition: [...]
> 
> I'm not interested, definitions are a dime a dozen, you're never going to 
> define your way to the truth. If you want to understand something you got to 
> figure out how to build it, at least in principle.

> 
>  >>Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
> 
> > No, you have agreed on each definition. 
> 
> John neither agrees nor disagrees because it was never made clear what the 
> personal pronoun "you" means in a world with "you" duplicating machines, 


You did. 




> all Bruno will say is it's unique and the duplicating machine can't duplicate 
> it for some reason never specified.


I have explained  the distinction between 1p you and 3p you. Which one are you 
talking about?
The 3p-you is duplicable, the 1p-you is duplicable in the 3p perspective, but 
the 1p-you is NOT duplicable from its 1p-perspective. It can be duplicated, but 
it cannot feel the split. That is why we not aware of the quantum superposition 
or the infinitely many arithmetical multiplication.






> And thus Bruno simply stated at the start of the "proof" the very thing Bruno 
> was trying to prove.

?



> Both know this is true because Bruno is totally unable to state the idea 
> without copious personal pronouns

> and continues to use those pronouns  exactly as Bruno always has as if the 
> existence of a personal pronoun duplicating machine made no difference and it 
> was all business as usual.   
>> >>> The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,
>>  
> 
> >>The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is 
> >>the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far 
> >>more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed 
> >>exactly how to make one.
> 
> >Yes, it did that too, but that does not change the fact that his recovery 
> >was in pure mathematics at first. Then later it has been shown to be in 
> >already pure arithmetic.
> 
> Both Church and Turing independently proved the Halting Problem didn't always 
> have a solution but Turing's accomplishment was greater because unlike Church 
> he proved it has significance for the physical world. I'm not alone in this, 
> Gödel also felt that Turing's discovery was more profound than Church's.
> 
> 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 19:38, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/11/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Can the universal Diophantine equation emulate a hypercomputer?
>>> 
 Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this 
 list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is 
 coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes 
 doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to 
 a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the 
 laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you 
 prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite 
 modest, is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the 
 measure on the computation/sigma_1 sentences.
>>> 
>>> Naah.
>> 
>> Please, elaborate. Once you grasp that mechanism entails we are emulated in 
>> infinitely many computations in arithmetic, I don’t see how any of this can 
>> be avoided.
> 
> Understanding something isn't the same as believing it. 


Yes, you can always add invisible horse. Understanding something and 
disbelieving it is fraud, or mockery of Occam razor.




> I understand that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.


So you believe in Sherlock Holmes, for example as a hero of fiction novel.



> 
>> If you believe that there is something like a physical universe, or a any 
>> god or ontology, capable of selecting a computation in arithmetic, you need 
>> to explain what it is, and how it does that trick.
> 
> I don't believe there are computations in arithmetic, because I don't believe 
> arithmetic exists.

“Arithmetic exists “ is ambiguous. Do you mean a theory or the model? 

The question is more, do you believe that 45 is odd? Do you believe in prime 
numbers?  Do you believe in equation?

Did you take your kids out fo school when they are taught elementary 
arithmetic? 

 Suspect you are joking, only.

Bruno





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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:59 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually
>> works pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never
>> works continuously, eventually it always fails.
>
>

>*? You seem to confuse mathematical induction, and adductive inference.*
>

I assume you mean abductive inference, but that says you should look for
the simplest explanation and that is not induction. Induction is not about
explanations. Every animal with a nervous system employs induction, even
snails. Evolution has programmed snails to assume things usually continue,
when they don't continue, such as a sudden change in the light level or in
background noise then danger often follows so precautions need to be taken,
like withdrawing into its shell. The snail has no explanation as to why
something changed it just knows that something did and that's usually not a
good sign.

>>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but
>>> you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine"
>>> or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
>>
>>
>> >*?*
>>
> !
>
> *I have given a lot of example. Peano arithmetic is a Löbian machine.
> Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory is a Löbian Machine,*
>

Machines are made of matter as is our brains,  Peano arithmetic can be run
on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, but neither is a machine
because neither is made of matter.

> *Here is another definition*: [...]
>

I'm not interested, definitions are a dime a dozen, you're never going to
define your way to the truth. If you want to understand something you got
to figure out how to build it, at least in principle.

 >>Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal
>> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>
>
> *No, you have agreed on each definition. *
>

John neither agrees nor disagrees because it was never made clear what the
personal pronoun "you" means in a world with "you" duplicating machines,
all Bruno will say is it's unique and the duplicating machine can't
duplicate it for some reason never specified. And thus Bruno simply stated
at the start of the "proof" the very thing Bruno was trying to prove. Both
know this is true because Bruno is totally unable to state the idea without
copious personal pronouns and continues to use those pronouns  exactly as
Bruno always has as if the existence of a personal pronoun duplicating
machine made no difference and it was all business as usual.

> >>> *The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,*
>>
>>
>
> >>The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as
>> is the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far
>> more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed
>> exactly how to make one.
>
>
> *>Yes, it did that too, but that does not change the fact that his
> recovery was in pure mathematics at first. Then later it has been shown to
> be in already pure arithmetic.*
>

Both Church and Turing independently proved the Halting Problem didn't
always have a solution but Turing's accomplishment was greater because
unlike Church he proved it has significance for the physical world. I'm not
alone in this, Gödel also felt that Turing's discovery was more profound
than Church's.

http://www.cs.umd.edu/~gasarch/BLOGPAPERS/soareturing.pdf

> *Universal machine have important logical limitation, and Löbian machine
have the same limitation, but are aware of those limitation,*

I see no reason why Turing's proof couldn't be encoded to run on a Turing
Machine and the conclusion recorded on the tape, so if you asked the
machine to prove that it was consistent it wouldn't even try just would
just tell you that was a stupid command.

> *I recall to you that by machine theology I just meant the modal logic
> G*. It is the logic of the true proposition that a machine can or cannot
> prove about itself.*
>

Just like a human a computer can prove that it s consistent if and only if
it is inconsistent. So if humans are "Löbian machines" then so is my iMac.

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/11/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can the universal Diophantine equation emulate a hypercomputer?

Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in 
this list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical 
reality. That is coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the 
YD part (the yes doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism 
is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive reduction of the mind-body 
problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from machine theology 
or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the physics 
deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum 
like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the 
computation/sigma_1 sentences.


Naah.


Please, elaborate. Once you grasp that mechanism entails we are 
emulated in infinitely many computations in arithmetic, I don’t see 
how any of this can be avoided.


Understanding something isn't the same as believing it.  I understand 
that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.


If you believe that there is something like a physical universe, or a 
any god or ontology, capable of selecting a computation in arithmetic, 
you need to explain what it is, and how it does that trick.


I don't believe there are computations in arithmetic, because I don't 
believe arithmetic exists.


Brent

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:06:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the 
>> physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism.
>> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us 
>> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not 
>> rulable in real time by any classical computer.
>> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this 
>> list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is 
>> coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes 
>> doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to 
>> a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the 
>> laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you 
>> prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, 
>> is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure 
>> on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to 
>> derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute 
>> mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>  
>
> I still think we just don't know what *computation* completely means in 
> the material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). 
> In particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an 
> analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in 
> [2]).
>
>
> The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion 
> ever defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a 
> look on your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard 
> notion of computations, which show very often that the authors have not 
> grasped Church’s thesis.
> Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral 
> on the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what 
> I am interested in explaining. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
> [1]  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/
> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini
>
> - Philip Thrift
>
>
>
I don't know whether the "unconventionalists"  (e.g. at the UCNC 
conferences [ http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp ]) are misunderstanding the CT, 
but it is a thesis "reformulated" by some (at least in terms of questioning 
what computation means).

One of the references in [2] above:


“Computation without Representation,” Philosophical Studies, 137.2 (2008), 
pp. 205–241.
[ http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Computation_without_Representation.pdf ]

- pt


 

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:10, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/10/2018 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 21:51, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>>>  
>>> >It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
>>> >“sufficiently rich theory”.
>>> 
>>> There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.
>>> 
>>> > There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.
>>> 
>>> And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a 
>>> perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a 
>>> Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that 
>>> doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such 
>>> a thing could in principle exist.
>>>  
>>> >Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently 
>>> >strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian 
>>> >machine.
>>> 
>>> In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
>>> pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
>>> continuously, eventually it always fails.
>>> 
>>> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but 
>>> >>you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian 
>>> >>machine" or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing 
>>> >>Machine can’t.
>>> 
>>> >?
>>> ! 
>>> 
>>> >That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,
>>> 
>>> Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
>>> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>>>  
>>> > The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,
>>> 
>>> The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is 
>>> the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far 
>>> more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed 
>>> exactly how to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that 
>>> with my Clark Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.
>>>  
>>> > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and 
>>> > Löbian god
>>> 
>>> Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology  
>>> tell me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you 
>>> seriously?
>>>  
>>> >A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own 
>>> >universality.
>>> 
>>> I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no Turing 
>>> Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any sort, 
>>> or anything else for that matter, can prove its own consistency unless it 
>>> is inconsistent. 
>>> 
>>> > Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?
>>> 
>>> Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can 
>>> solve the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't 
>>> lift it.
>>> 
>>> >>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology" 
>>> >>were not decidable? 
>>> 
>>> >Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would 
>>> >be far more complex. 
>>> 
>>> I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of 
>>> your homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the theology".
>>> 
>>> > Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first 
>>> > order level.
>>> 
>>> And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of 
>>> machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk. 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed widely is 
>>> in terms of relativistic computers (which probably most think are forever 
>>> merely fictional).
>>> 
>>> Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398 
>>> 
>>> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783=rep1=pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> We examine the current status of the physical version of the Church-Turing 
>>> Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments in spacetime theory. 
>>> This also amounts to investigating the status of hypercomputation in view 
>>> of latest results on spacetime. We agree with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. 
>>> Lupacchini, Machines, logic and quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 
>>> 6 (3) (2000) 265–283] that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but 
>>> rather a conjecture of a 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the physical 
> Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism.
> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us 
> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not 
> rulable in real time by any classical computer.
> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this list 
> more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is coherent 
> with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes doctor, the first 
> person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive 
> reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from 
> machine theology or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the 
> physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum 
> like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the computation/sigma_1 
> sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to derive Gleason theorem, though, 
> but that is just complicated. To refute mechanism, we should have a proof 
> that such measure does not exist.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I still think we just don't know what computation completely means in the 
> material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). In 
> particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an 
> analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in 
> [2]).

The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion ever 
defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a look on 
your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard notion of 
computations, which show very often that the authors have not grasped Church’s 
thesis.
Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral on 
the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what I am 
interested in explaining. 

Bruno


> 
> 
> 
> [1]  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/
> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini
> 
> - Philip Thrift
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the 
> physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism.
> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us 
> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not 
> rulable in real time by any classical computer.
> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this 
> list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is 
> coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes 
> doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to 
> a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the 
> laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you 
> prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, 
> is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure 
> on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to 
> derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute 
> mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  

I still think we just don't know what *computation* completely means in the 
material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). In 
particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an 
analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in 
[2]).



[1]  
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini

- Philip Thrift

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/10/2018 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 9 Sep 2018, at 21:51, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:

>>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine"
except you.

>/It is just a more precise version of what popular books
described by “sufficiently rich theory”./


There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.

/> There are many definition, but they are all equivalent./


And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to
define a perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they
exist, I can define a Clark Machine as a machine that can solve
the halting problem but that doesn't mean I have the any idea how
to make one or can even show that such a thing could in principle
exist.

/>Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with
sufficiently strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)
 constitute a Löbian machine. /


In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that
usually works pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works
perfectly and never works continuously, eventually it always fails.

>>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of
his machines but you have never given the slightest hint
of how to build a "Löbian machine" or even clearly
explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t. 



>/?/

!

>/That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,/


Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall
personal pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire
bunch.

> /The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,/


The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to
construct as is the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting
Problem, but Turing did far more than dream up a magical
universal calculating machine, he showed exactly how to make one.
But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that with my Clark
Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.

/> and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian
machine, and Löbian god/


Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the
theology  tell me, have you ever wondered why so manypeople
fail to take you seriously?

/>A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of
proving its own universality./


I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but
no Turing Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no
machine of any sort, or anything else for that matter, can prove
its own consistency unless it is inconsistent.

> Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?


Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if
God can solve the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so
heavy He can't lift it.

>>How would things be different if "the propositional part
of the theology" were not decidable? 



>/Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine
theology would be far more complex.
/


Idon't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is
more of your homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional
part of the theology".

> /Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at
the first order level./


And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the
theology of machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby
talk.

John K Clark




The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed 
widely is in terms of *relativistic computers* (which probably most 
think are forever merely fictional).



  Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier


https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783=rep1=pdf


/We examine the current status of the physical version of the 
Church-Turing Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments 
in spacetime theory. This also amounts to investigating the status of 
hypercomputation in view of latest results on spacetime. We agree 
with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. Lupacchini, Machines, logic and 
quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (3) (2000) 265–283] 
that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but rather a 
conjecture of a combination of theoretical physics, mathematics and, 
in some sense, cosmology. Since the idea of computability is 
intimately connected with the nature of time, relevance of spacetime 
theory seems to be unquestionable. We will see that recent 
developments in 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Sep 2018, at 21:51, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal > 
> wrote:
> 
> >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>  
> >It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
> >“sufficiently rich theory”.
> 
> There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.
> 
> > There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.
> 
> And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a 
> perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a 
> Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that 
> doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such a 
> thing could in principle exist.
>  
> >Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently 
> >strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian machine.
> 
> In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
> pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
> continuously, eventually it always fails.
> 
> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but you 
> >>have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" or 
> >>even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
> 
> >?
> ! 
> 
> >That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,
> 
> Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>  
> > The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,
> 
> The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is the 
> Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far more 
> than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed exactly how 
> to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that with my Clark 
> Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.
>  
> > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and 
> > Löbian god
> 
> Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology  tell 
> me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you seriously?
>  
> >A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own 
> >universality.
> 
> I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no Turing 
> Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any sort, or 
> anything else for that matter, can prove its own consistency unless it is 
> inconsistent. 
> 
> > Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?
> 
> Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can solve 
> the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't lift it.
> 
> >>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology" 
> >>were not decidable? 
> 
> >Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would be 
> >far more complex. 
> 
> I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of your 
> homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the theology".
> 
> > Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first order 
> > level.
> 
> And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of 
> machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed widely is 
> in terms of relativistic computers (which probably most think are forever 
> merely fictional).
> 
> Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398
> 
> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783=rep1=pdf
> 
> 
> 
> We examine the current status of the physical version of the Church-Turing 
> Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments in spacetime theory. 
> This also amounts to investigating the status of hypercomputation in view of 
> latest results on spacetime. We agree with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. 
> Lupacchini, Machines, logic and quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 
> (3) (2000) 265–283] that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but 
> rather a conjecture of a combination of theoretical physics, mathematics and, 
> in some sense, cosmology. Since the idea of computability is intimately 
> connected with the nature of time, relevance of spacetime theory seems to be 
> unquestionable. We will see that recent developments in spacetime theory show 
> that temporal developments may exhibit features that traditionally seemed 
> impossible or absurd. We will see that recent results point in the direction 
> that the possibility of artificial systems computing non-Turing computable 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Sep 2018, at 17:03, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>  
> >It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
> >“sufficiently rich theory”.
> 
> There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.

Let us talk on ideas, not on people.

Take any Turing universal theory/machine, like Robinson arithmetic:

Classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Or Combinator theory: i.e. axiom of identity +

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Both those theories/machines are Turing-complete/universal. They determine an 
entire Universal dovetailing. 
But none of them is Löbian. They are NOT “sufficiently rich”. But both becomes 
Löbian (verify and prove Löb’s formula []([]p->p)->[]p, and this obeys to the 
machine theology G*) once you add the induction axioms, i.e. the infinitely 
many axioms of induction: that is, with A an arbitrary formula (in the 
respective domain), the axioms:

If A(0) and if (n)(A(n) -> A(s(n))) then (n)A(n)

Or

If A(K) and A(S), and if (x)(A(x) & A(y) ->. A(xy)), then (x)A(x).




> 
> > There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.
> 
> And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a 
> perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a 
> Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that 
> doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such a 
> thing could in principle exist.

Sure.



>  
> >Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently 
> >strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian machine.
> 
> In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
> pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
> continuously, eventually it always fails.


?

You seem to confuse mathematical induction, and adductive inference.



> 
> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but you 
> >>have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" or 
> >>even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
> 
> >?
> ! 

I have given a lot of example. Peano arithmetic is a Löbian machine. 
Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory is a Löbian Machine, all humans, as as as they are 
arithmetically correct, are Löbian machine. I gave other examples in my long 
text, and two examples are given above. You can define a Löbian machine by any 
theory or machine on which Löb’s theorem is applicable (and then it can be 
shown that they will be aware of this). 

Here is another definition:

A machine is Turing universal iff for all sigma_1 proposition p -> []p is true.
A machine is Löbian iff for all sigma_1 proposition p -> []p is provable by the 
machine.




> 
> >That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,
> 
> Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.

No, you have agreed on each definition. You agreed that both the W-man and the 
H-man are honorable H-man survivor, and you did manage to take into account the 
first person/third person in some context (like in Everett).. It is you critic 
of step 3 which nobody understand. You are the only one person in the world 
that I know having taken so much time to get that extremely easy, if not 
obvious point. You did grasp it at repetition, and just adding something like 
it was obvious, but then never answer the step 4.





>  
> > The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,
> 
> The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is the 
> Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far more 
> than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed exactly how 
> to make one.

Yes, it did that too, but that does not change the fact that his recovery was 
in pure mathematics at first. Then later it has been shown to be in already 
pure arithmetic.



> But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that with my Clark Machine and 
> you can't do that with your Löbian machine.

Nobody ever pretended anything like that. Universal machine suffer intrinsic 
limitation (which Brough all the incompleteness nuance on G* which build the 
machine theology), and the only difference with the Löbian machine is that they 
know this: they prove their incompleteness theorem, like Gödel foresaw already 
at the end of his 1931 paper (but that will be proved by Hilbert and Bernays in 
1937 for the first time, and extended in 1955 by Löb in an important way).




>  
> > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and 
> > Löbian god
> 
> Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>>
>>  
>
> >*It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
>> “sufficiently rich theory”.*
>>
>
> There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.
>
> *> There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.*
>>
>
> And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a 
> perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a 
> Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that 
> doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such 
> a thing could in principle exist.
>  
>
>> *>Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently 
>> strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian 
>> machine. *
>>
>
> In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
> pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
> continuously, eventually it always fails.
>
> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but 
>>> you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" 
>>> or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t. 
>>
>>
>> >*?*
>>
> ! 
>
> >*That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,*
>>
>
> Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>  
>
>> > *The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,*
>>
>
> The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is 
> the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far 
> more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed 
> exactly how to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that 
> with my Clark Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.
>  
>
>> * > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, 
>> and Löbian god*
>>
>
> Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology  
> tell me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you 
> seriously? 
>  
>
>> *>A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its 
>> own universality.*
>>
>
> I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no 
> Turing Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any 
> sort, or anything else for that matter, can prove its own 
> consistency unless it is inconsistent. 
>
> > Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?
>>
>
> Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can 
> solve the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't 
> lift it.
>
> >>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the 
>>> theology" were not decidable? 
>>
>>
>> >
>> *Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology 
>> would be far more complex. *
>>
>
> I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of 
> your homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the 
> theology". 
>
> > *Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first 
>> order level.*
>>
>
> And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of 
> machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk. 
>
> John K Clark
>



The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed widely is 
in terms of *relativistic computers* (which probably most think are forever 
merely fictional).

Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier


https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783=rep1=pdf


*We examine the current status of the physical version of the Church-Turing 
Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments in spacetime theory. 
This also amounts to investigating the status of hypercomputation in view 
of latest results on spacetime. We agree with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. 
Lupacchini, Machines, logic and quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 
6 (3) (2000) 265–283] that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but 
rather a conjecture of a combination of theoretical physics, mathematics 
and, in some sense, cosmology. Since the idea of computability is 
intimately connected with the nature of time, relevance of spacetime theory 
seems to be unquestionable. We will see that recent developments in 
spacetime theory show that temporal developments may exhibit features that 
traditionally seemed impossible or absurd. We will see that recent results 
point in the direction that the possibility of artificial systems computing 
non-Turing computable functions may be consistent with 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>
>

>*It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by
> “sufficiently rich theory”.*
>

There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.

*> There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.*
>

And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a
perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a
Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that
doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such
a thing could in principle exist.


> *>Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently
> strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian
> machine. *
>

In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works
pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works
continuously, eventually it always fails.

>>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but
>> you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine"
>> or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
>
>
> >*?*
>
!

>*That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,*
>

Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal
pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.


> > *The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,*
>

The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is
the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far
more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed
exactly how to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that
with my Clark Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.


> * > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and
> Löbian god*
>

Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology 
tell me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you
seriously?


> *>A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own
> universality.*
>

I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no Turing
Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any sort,
or anything else for that matter, can prove its own consistency unless it
is inconsistent.

> Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?
>

Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can
solve the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't
lift it.

>>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology"
>> were not decidable?
>
>
> >
> *Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would
> be far more complex. *
>

I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of
your homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the
theology".

> *Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first
> order level.*
>

And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of
machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Sep 2018, at 01:12, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > A function is computable if we can explain to a dumb (but docile) human 
> > being how to compute it, on any of its argument.
> 
> And some functions (the Sine function for example)


We talk only about functions from N to N. The computable real functions 
requires a good understanding first of the computable functions from subset of 
N to N?




> can be proven to be computable and some functions (the Busy Beaver function 
> for example) can be proven to be non-computable) but there is no general way 
> to know if any given function is computable or not.


>From its code, indeed. That is Rice theorem, and I have just proven it in this 
>thread.



>  
> > Each f_n is computable (by definition!) and so each f_n(n) can be computed, 
> > and adding one is certainly computable, so, the only thing which can be NOT 
> > computable is the bijection itself. This means that the f_i, although 
> > enumerable, are not recursively enumerable.
> If a universal language exist, then it cannot compute the enumeration of all 
> computable function from N to N.
> 
> The Ackermann function is not primitive recursive  and yet it is computable, 
> like the Busy Beaver the numbers soon become huge (although finite) but 
> unlike the Busy Beaver a Turing Machine can always calculate them. 

No problem with this. I avoid using the primitive recursive functions.



>  
> > Then the Löbian machine are those universal machine which knows that they 
> > are universal, and so get acquainted with the consequences (the infinite, 
> > the non provable, the non observable, …).
> 
> Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.

It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
“sufficiently rich theory”.

There are many definition, but they are all equivalent. Any Turing complete 
theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently strong induction axiom (like 
sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian machine. Distinguished feature; their 
provability predicate verifies Löb’s formula: []([]p->p)->[]p. 

Easy exercice, show that Löbian machine obeys to Gödel’s second Gödel’s theorem 
<>t -> ~[]<>t.





> Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but you 
> have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" or 
> even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.

? That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis, or, if you 
don’t want to do philosophy of mind, just read the mathematical part. The 
notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct, and the mathematical reality is 
full of example of Löbian machine, and Löbian god (mathematical object which 
are not Turing emilable but having still a notion of belief associated with 
them which still obeys the Löb’s formula.



> Can it tell if any given function is computable?  Can it find the 8000th Busy 
> Beaver number? Can it even find the 5th?


A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own 
universality. Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do? I don’t 
like such sentence as it assumes that I would have something like that, but 
that is simply not the case. I study Mechanism. No machine can ever decide if 
any code is a code of  a total computable function, nor compute a non 
computable function.



> 
> >Here there is a second miracle, which is that the propositional part of the 
> >theology is decidable!
> 
> Homemade gibberish. 

?


> How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology" 
> were not decidable? 


Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would be 
far more complex. Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at 
the first order level. G and G* are decidable, but qG (provable machine’ logic 
of belief/proof  with quantifier) is PI_2 complete (and thus highly 
undecidable), and qG* (true machine’s logic  of belief/proof* with quantifier) 
is PI_1 complete in the oracle of truth. 

Bruno





> 
> John K Clark
> 
> John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> A function is computable if we can explain to a dumb (but docile) human
> being how to compute it, on any of its argument.
>

And some functions (the Sine function for example) can be proven to be
computable and some functions (the Busy Beaver function for example) can be
proven to be non-computable) but there is no general way to know if any
given function is computable or not.


> > *Each f_n is computable (by definition!) and so each f_n(n) can be
> computed, and adding one is certainly computable, so, the only thing which
> can be NOT computable is the bijection itself. This means that the f_i,
> although enumerable, are not recursively enumerable.*
>
*If a universal language exist, then it cannot compute the enumeration of
> all computable function from N to N.*
>

The Ackermann function is not primitive recursive  and yet it is computable,
like the Busy Beaver the numbers soon become huge (although finite) but
unlike the Busy Beaver a Turing Machine can always calculate them.


> > Then the Löbian machine are those universal machine which knows that
> they are universal, and so get acquainted with the consequences (the
> infinite, the non provable, the non observable, …).
>

Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you. Turing
explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but you have
never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine" or even
clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can't. Can it
tell if any given function is computable?  Can it find the 8000th Busy
Beaver number? Can it even find the 5th?

*>Here there is a second miracle, which is that the propositional part of
> the theology is decidable!*
>

Homemade gibberish.  How would things be different if "the propositional
part of the theology" were not decidable?

John K Clark

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Aug 2018, at 20:02, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, August 25, 2018 at 9:11:47 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 2:21 AM > wrote:
>  
> >I plan to study Cantor's theorem on the Internet and compare it with your 
> >proof.
> 
> Every time Bruno useless a personal pronoun in the "proof" that involves 
> people duplicating machines ask yourself what exactly is the referent. If you 
> can figure it out let me know because I can't and neither can Bruno.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> Thanks. I'll keep that in mind when I study Cantor's theorem, by Cantor and 
> Bruno. I've always been fascinated with the levels of infinity discovered by 
> great mathematicians, whom I hold in the highest esteem. AG 


OK Grayson. 

So why is Church’s thesis a miracle?

Are you OK with this what follows?

If a set is enumerable (which means that there is some bijection between that 
set and N) then any of its subset is finite or enumerable. OK? That follows 
from the fact that a subset cannot have more elements than the set it is a 
subset from. That is intuitively obvious, but unfortunately our intuition of 
infinie sets has often been shown inconsistent, so today some definition of 
sets are provided, and in that setting the fact alluded above becomes a 
consequence of a well known theorem in set theory (Cantor-Bernstein-Schrceder 
theorem).
I don’t want to delve into set theories. Later I can explain why I prefer to 
put set theory, analysis, and physics in the psychological tool of the 
universal machine.

So, why Church’s thesis is a miracle? Read what follow at ease. Study it. Ask 
*any* question.

A function is computable if we can explain to a dumb (but docile) human being 
how to compute it, on any of its argument. This assumes some universal language 
in which we can describe how to compute the functions. 

A weakening of Church’s thesis is that such a universal language exist. Church 
thesis itself was “lambda calculus” is a universal language, (and thus in which 
we can define and compute all computable functions from N to N.)

This means that each computable function will have some code, or program, our 
description of how to compute them, and this entails that the set of computable 
functions from N to N is enumerable.

This means that there is a bijection between them and N.

This means there is a sequence, denoted by f_i, of all computable functions 
from N to N, f_0, f_1, f_2, f_3, …

Now consider the function g defined by g(n) = f_n(n) + 1.   (f_n(n) means f_n 
applied to n)

That function cannot be computable! 

If it is, it would be in the list, and there would be a number k such that g = 
f_k. 

But then g(k) = f_k(k) =  f_k(k) + 1, and again, as all f_k are function from N 
to N, f_k(k) is a number that we can subtract on both sides, so we get 0 = 1. 
Contradiction. That function g cannot be computable.

Now, g(n) is f_n(n) + 1. Each f_n is computable (by definition!) and so each 
f_n(n) can be computed, and adding one is certainly computable, so, the only 
thing which can be NOT computable is the bijection itself. 

This means that the f_i, although enumerable, are not recursively enumerable. 
If a universal language exist, then it cannot compute the enumeration of all 
computable function from N to N.

But is there a universal language? 

When Church said that lambda calculus can compute all computable functions, 
Kleene thought he would quickly refute that pretension to universality for 
computability, by a simple diagonalisation. That failed, and invented the 
expression “Church’s thesis”, and an ardent enthusiast of it. He saw also that 
it entails incompleteness.

The only possibility which remains consistent with the diagonalisation above is 
that the language will describe more objects than the computable functions from 
N to N.

Take any universal programming language. They are truly universal with respect 
to computability if we assume Church’s thesis. 

But here we *can* enumerate the functions from N to N in that language, except 
for a little problem which will be soon clear. We get an enumeration of such 
functions, by enumerating the programs lexicographically. In that case we get 
an algorithmic sequence of the one we denoted phi_i (in the standard 
literature). 

What happens with g defined by phi_n(n) + 1 ? Now, it is thoroughly 
programmable, because the phi_i  can be algorithmically generated by  the 
lexicographical algorithm: we do have the language! As I said, as we dispose of 
the language we can enumerate them mechanically, computably.

So, in this case, g does belong to the phi_i, and thus there is a number k such 
that g = phi_k.

And what happens if we apply g on k, i.e. phi_k on k?

Well, we get that phi_k(k) = phi_k(k) + 1, but we are saved from the 
contradiction, because phi_k(k) will never stop. phi_k(k) is no more a number, 
and we can’t subtract that  on both sides of the equation. What happened is 
that we crash the computer. 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, August 25, 2018 at 9:11:47 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 2:21 AM > wrote:
>  
>
>> *>I plan to study Cantor's theorem on the Internet and compare it with 
>> your proof.*
>
>
> Every time Bruno useless a personal pronoun in the "proof" that involves 
> people duplicating machines ask yourself what exactly is the referent. If 
> you can figure it out let me know because I can't and neither can Bruno. 
>
> John K Clark
>

*Thanks. I'll keep that in mind when I study Cantor's theorem, by Cantor 
and Bruno. I've always been fascinated with the levels of infinity 
discovered by great mathematicians, whom I hold in the highest esteem. AG *

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Aug 25, 2018 at 2:21 AM  wrote:


> *>I plan to study Cantor's theorem on the Internet and compare it with you
> proof.*


Every time Bruno useless a personal pronoun in the "proof" that involves
people duplicating machines ask yourself what exactly is the referent. If
you can figure it out let me know because I can't and neither can Bruno.

John K Clark

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Aug 2018, at 08:21, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 7:02:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Grayson, 
> 
> Let me explain you something crazy but absolutely important to understand 
> about the set of all computable function from N to N. 
> 
> It is true that later, we will be able to identify that with the computable 
> real numbers, but that is another story. 
> 
> So what is a computable function from N to N? 
> 
> It is a function from N to N, i.e. an association to each natural numbers to 
> some other or not natural number. 
> 
> If you include "or not a natural number", you have a range R (or possibly 
> domain),
> the real numbers, which is not what you assert as the definition of the 
> function at hand.


It is, and you should deduce that I meant : some [other or not] natural number. 
I meant that a function can send a natural number on itself. Sorry, I should 
have added comma. I talk only about functions from N to N.



> Incidentally, I am traveling by car for a few days, so it will take some time 
> to study your latest posts. I plan to study Cantor's theorem on the Internet 
> and compare it with you proof. AG

OK. I would suggest you try to understand my proof, and IF you don’t understand 
it, then you can look at other proofs. But the proof I gave should be clear 
enough, unless you have some problem with the notation. You can ask question. 
Take all your time, but Monday I will probably finish this thread, and people 
should understand what is magic and appear with a slightly subtler use of the 
diagonalisation, which led not only to the discovery of the universal machine, 
but also to the fact that they are beyond all theories: there is no way to get 
a complete unifying theory of them. That will make also more remarkable that 
their “theology” appears to be decidable (algorithmic) at the propositional 
level. That is why we can already derive the logic of the physical proposition 
and compare with nature, as I have done in part.
Normally, at some point, you will understand how arithmetic admits an internal 
“many-dreams” interpretations, and how the laws of physics did appear from the 
(relative) number’s point of view.

Don’t read post while driving your car, it is dangerous, especially 
mathematical post (friendly suggestion).

Bruno



> 
> The notion admits generalisation, like the function from N x N to N, that is, 
> the function with many variables. 
> 
> But what means computable? 
> 
> It means you can explain, in a finite time, how to compute its values and 
> this in a finite time for each value. 
> 
> You can explain to who? 
> 
> To the dumbest people in the room. OK, we will come back on this one, but at 
> first the notion of computable seems to be epistemological, and depends on 
> the ability of the subject. How could we dream to define mathematically that 
> notion. 
> 
> Gödel already used a version of Cantor Diagonal to show that all theories 
> (rich enough to axiomatise elementary arithmetic) are essentially 
> undecidable, and that there were no universal provability predicate. And 
> Traski, but also Gödel proves a similar result for the undefinability of 
> truth. 
> 
> So how to hope for this? If only a Miracle! 
> 
> Let me show you the miracle. Probably not in one post. First I will show you 
> that the class or set or collection of the computable  functions is NOT 
> computable, and in fact it does not admit a universal computable function! No 
> universal machine in that class and for this class! 
> 
> Take a rest, and then we start. If you understand this, you will understand 
> something which I think is truly amazing. 
> 
> I need somme lemma. 
> 
> Take an alphabet, A = {a, b}. You can build words with the element of the 
> alphabet, like a, b aa, ab, … aabbabbaabbb, etc. Let A* be the set of all 
> finite words on A. 
> 
> As long as the alphabet is finite, the set of words will be enumerable. OK? I 
> mean there is a bijection (a one-one and onto function) from the set of words 
> and N. To see it, it is enough to order them lexicographically: that is by 
> length, and alphabetically for those who have the same length. 
> 
> That gives for {a, b}, with 0 on the empty word. 
> 
> 1- a 
> 2)  b 
> 3) aa 
> 4) ab 
> 5)  ba 
> 6) bb 
> 7) aaa 
> 8) aab 
> ... 
> 
> So we can enumerate the finite words. BTW, this shows immediately that the 
> rational numbers are enumerable, just enumerate their description in English, 
> like#one#on#two, or thirty#five#on#twenty#four, … 
> 
> Usually the diagonal is used to show that something is impossible. Take A** 
> the set of infinite words! 
> 
> It can be shown easily (but I will pass) that there is a bijection between 
> A** and the real number, and the set of subset of N, and the set of functions 
> of N to N (or to any finite non empty set). 
> 
> Let me just show, or remind, you how the Cantor diagonal shows that there is 
> no bijection between N and A**, with 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, August 23, 2018 at 7:02:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Grayson, 
>
> Let me explain you something crazy but absolutely important to understand 
> about the set of all computable function from N to N. 
>
> It is true that later, we will be able to identify that with the 
> computable real numbers, but that is another story. 
>
> So what is a computable function from N to N? 
>
> It is a function from N to N, i.e. an association to each natural numbers 
> to some other or not natural number. 
>

*If you include "or not a natural number", you have a range R (or possibly 
domain), the real numbers, which is not what you assert as the definition 
of the function at hand. Incidentally, I am traveling by car for a few 
days, so it will take some time to study your latest posts. I plan to study 
Cantor's theorem on the Internet and compare it with you proof. AG*

>
> The notion admits generalisation, like the function from N x N to N, that 
> is, the function with many variables. 
>
> But what means computable? 
>
> It means you can explain, in a finite time, how to compute its values and 
> this in a finite time for each value. 
>
> You can explain to who? 
>
> To the dumbest people in the room. OK, we will come back on this one, but 
> at first the notion of computable seems to be epistemological, and depends 
> on the ability of the subject. How could we dream to define mathematically 
> that notion. 
>
> Gödel already used a version of Cantor Diagonal to show that all theories 
> (rich enough to axiomatise elementary arithmetic) are essentially 
> undecidable, and that there were no universal provability predicate. And 
> Traski, but also Gödel proves a similar result for the undefinability of 
> truth. 
>
> So how to hope for this? If only a Miracle! 
>
> Let me show you the miracle. Probably not in one post. First I will show 
> you that the class or set or collection of the computable  functions is NOT 
> computable, and in fact it does not admit a universal computable function! 
> No universal machine in that class and for this class! 
>
> Take a rest, and then we start. If you understand this, you will 
> understand something which I think is truly amazing. 
>
> I need somme lemma. 
>
> Take an alphabet, A = {a, b}. You can build words with the element of the 
> alphabet, like a, b aa, ab, … aabbabbaabbb, etc. Let A* be the set of all 
> finite words on A. 
>
> As long as the alphabet is finite, the set of words will be enumerable. 
> OK? I mean there is a bijection (a one-one and onto function) from the set 
> of words and N. To see it, it is enough to order them lexicographically: 
> that is by length, and alphabetically for those who have the same length. 
>
> That gives for {a, b}, with 0 on the empty word. 
>
> 1- a 
> 2)  b 
> 3) aa 
> 4) ab 
> 5)  ba 
> 6) bb 
> 7) aaa 
> 8) aab 
> ... 
>
> So we can enumerate the finite words. BTW, this shows immediately that the 
> rational numbers are enumerable, just enumerate their description in 
> English, like#one#on#two, or thirty#five#on#twenty#four, … 
>
> Usually the diagonal is used to show that something is impossible. Take 
> A** the set of infinite words! 
>
> It can be shown easily (but I will pass) that there is a bijection between 
> A** and the real number, and the set of subset of N, and the set of 
> functions of N to N (or to any finite non empty set). 
>
> Let me just show, or remind, you how the Cantor diagonal shows that there 
> is no bijection between N and A**, with A = {0, 1}. 
>
> If there was a bijection between N and the set of all infinite sequence, 
> you would have a matrix like 
>
> 0  -0100111010.. 
> 1   -   1101100… 
> .2  -   1011011... 
> … 
>
> That  is, for all i 
>
> i   -   a_i1 a_i2  a_i3 … 
>
> But once that bijection is supposed to exist, it is easy to find a 
> sequence of one and zero which is not in the sequence: it is the diagonal 
> sequence: 
>
> (flip_00)(flip_11)(flip_22)(flip a_33)(flip a_44)(flip a_55) ... 
>
> It is the diagonal in the correspondence above, but where each 0 have flip 
> to 1, and each 1 have flip to zero (by subtracting them from 1). 
>
> That sequence cannot be in the list above, because if that was the case it 
> would correspond to number k, 
> And (a_kk) would be equal to flip (a_kk). CQFD. OK? 
>
> Do you see that, Grayson? 
>
> I have to go. Sorry. It is easier on on board with the chalk.But you have 
> to understand the passage above, so tell me if it is OK. 
>
> I guess some have an idea of the miracle I am talking about, but perhaps 
> they don’t realise the true nature of the creative bomb here. The term 
> “miracle” comes from Gödel, and refer to the fact that despite the set of 
> computable functions from N to N is not computable, the set of all 
> computable  functions from subset (including N!) of N to N, will be 
> computable, but then at the price of non