Re: Unconscious Components
On 22 Aug 2011, at 21:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 22, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 23:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: PART I On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create reality'. Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the explanation. Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're in it. The arithmetic matrix is real, because it is just a collection of true arithmetical facts. It is the physical and theological which seems real (= lived), and are real in higher order senses, epistemological, sensational, etc. True to who? If I make up a Sims world where donkeys fly, do they represent factual truth? It all seems context dependent to me. It makes truth arbitrary. Couldn't I make an arithmetic matrix where the occupants believe in a different arithmetic than our own? What makes you think that senses are higher order? Because sensible device needs a minimal amount of complexity. There are evidence of complex processing and interactions in sensible being, and I have no clue how sense could be made primary without introducing some kind of non Turing emulable magic. I don't think you can make a different matrix with occupant believing in a different arithmetic. I don't think this makes any sense. If they take different axiom, it means they use a different structure. There are plenty sorts of number system, but the laws of arithmetic does not depend of the subject which consider them. 17 is prime or not, for anybody. This is the Perceptual Relativity Inertial Frame or PRIF. A de facto frame of localized coherence which itself takes on a second order nested or holarchic 1p coherence. We are members of a very very very specific club that is exclusive to entities I don't belong to that club. I didn't sign in. You are saying that you are better than human? I was saying that I do no belong to a club that is a priori exclusive to entities, alluding to your carbon vie of a human being. IF mechanism is true, there is no titanium needle, still less an interiority. Only person have interiority views, and person lives in Platonia. Why can't persons live in bodies/houses/cities? All that's missing is to let go of the illusion that 1p is an illusion 1p is not an illusion. We agree on that. and take it at face value as a legitimate physical phenomenon That is physicalism. Physcialism yes, but with expanded sensorimotive physics. That is coherent with your non-comp, view. But then either you have zombie, or you have to introduce or describe those special non Turing emulable magic somewhere. You have not yet succeeded in explaining what is sensorimotive physics, without alluding explicitly to poetry. I'm not ruling it out, because of course we can't tell 1p consciousness from 3p completely, but, the sense of things being more like us and less like us demands more of an explanation. Darwin + computer science (abstract biology, psychology, etc.) So you are saying that there is no legitimate difference between yourself and a sand dune, other than you have been programmed and conditioned to perceive the sand dune as irrelevant to your survival and reproduction? Really the sand dune is quite an interesting chap with a keen interest in early jazz and architecture. Sure, but not relevant. Why the big threshold between what we think is alive and what isn't? I don't see any threshold. So being dead is just as good as being alive for you, your family, friends, pets. It's all the same. It is not because there are no threshold or frontier between two states that there are no clear case. For example the M set has a fuzzy border, and without arbitrary long zoom you can't decide if a point on the border is in or out of the set. But many points are clearly in and clearly out. I would say a pebble is clearly not alive, and a bird is clearly alive, but the question makes no sense (other than conventional) for a virus or a box of cigarette. With my usual definition, they are alive, because they have a sophisticated reproduction cycle. Why do we care so much about not being dead ourselves? Eating is more fun than being eaten, in general. And why should that be the case if
Re: Unconscious Components
On 22 Aug 2011, at 22:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 22, 1:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Aug 2011, at 15:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: My point is that, by definition of philosophical zombie, they behave like normal and sane human being. It is not walking coma, or catatonic behavior. It is full human behavior. A zombie might write a book on consciousness, or have a diary of his dreams reports. A movie can feature an actress writing a book on consciousness or doing anything else that can be demonstrated audiovisually. How is that not a zombie? The movie lack the counterfactual. If the public shout don't go the cave! to the heroine in a thriller, she will not listen. That can be obscured by making the movie ambiguous. Having the actors suddenly look in the camera and say something like Did you say something? We can't hear you very well in here. When the tension builds the heroine could say to the camera I know what you're thinking, but I'm going in anyways. I think if you give the movie anywhere near the latitude you are giving to arithmetic, you'll see that the threshold between a movie and a UM is much less than between a living organism and a silicon chip. You can make movies interactive with alternate story lines that an audience can vote on, or just pseudointeractive: http://listverse.com/2011/05/24/top-10-william-castle-film-gimmicks/ (#1) If the movie is so much interactive then, it is no more a movie, but a virtual reality. If the entities behave like humans for a long time enough, I will attribute them consciousness. Zombie are different, they behave like you and me. By definition of philosophical zombie, you can't distinguish it from a real human. You can distinguish a human from filmed human, all right? Not without breaking the frame of reference. I can't distinguish a live TV broadcast from a recorded broadcast. It's an audiovisual only frame of reference. To postulate a philosophical zombie, you are saying that nothing about them can be distinguished from a genuine person, which is tautological. If nothing can be distinguished by anyone or any thing at any time, then it is the genuine person, by definition. Not at all. I can conceptually imagine them without having consciousness by definition. Of course with comp this lead to non sense, given that consciousness is not attached to any body, but only to soul living in Platonia. In comp we don't have a mind body problem, only a problem of illusion of bodies. You're just saying 'an apple that is genuine in every possible way, except that it's an orange' and using that argument to say 'then apples can be no different than oranges in any meaningful way and there is no reason why apples cannot be used to make an orange as long as the substitution level is low enough.' The fallacy is that it uses semantics of false exclusion to justify false inclusion. By insisting that my protests that apples and oranges are both fruit but oranges can never be made of apples is just an appeal to the false assumption of substitution level, you disregard any possibility of seeing the simple truth of the relation. I don't disregard that possibility, but comp explains much more. You need the applen and the orange, and non comprehensible link. I need only the apple (to change a bit your analogy). If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie then? I don't see much of a difference. Behaviorally they have no difference with human. Conceptually they are quite different, because they lack consciousness and any private experiences. With comp, such zombies are non sensical, or trivial. Consciousness is related to the abstract relations involved in the most probable computations leading to your actual 3-states. Yes, zombies are non sensical or trivial. It's still just a facade which reflects our human sense rather than the sense of an autonomous logic which transcends programming. Even if it's really fancy programming, it's experience has no connection with us. It's a cypher that only intersects our awareness through it's rear end, upon which we have drawn a face. That is an advantage. Precise and hypothetical. Refutable. True, but it has disadvantages as well. Dissociated and clinical. So you say. Meaningless. (cue 'Supertramp - The Logical Song') So you say. Right. These qualities cannot be proved from 3-p. Meaning and feeling are not literal and existential. If they don't insist for you, then you don't feel them. Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable phenomenon is represented theoretically as numbers) Mathematician can study the effect of set of unknowable things. That is the
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 26, 11:01 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Aug 2011, at 22:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 22, 1:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 21 Aug 2011, at 15:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: My point is that, by definition of philosophical zombie, they behave like normal and sane human being. It is not walking coma, or catatonic behavior. It is full human behavior. A zombie might write a book on consciousness, or have a diary of his dreams reports. A movie can feature an actress writing a book on consciousness or doing anything else that can be demonstrated audiovisually. How is that not a zombie? The movie lack the counterfactual. If the public shout don't go the cave! to the heroine in a thriller, she will not listen. That can be obscured by making the movie ambiguous. Having the actors suddenly look in the camera and say something like Did you say something? We can't hear you very well in here. When the tension builds the heroine could say to the camera I know what you're thinking, but I'm going in anyways. I think if you give the movie anywhere near the latitude you are giving to arithmetic, you'll see that the threshold between a movie and a UM is much less than between a living organism and a silicon chip. You can make movies interactive with alternate story lines that an audience can vote on, or just pseudointeractive: http://listverse.com/2011/05/24/top-10-william-castle-film-gimmicks/ (#1) If the movie is so much interactive then, it is no more a movie, but a virtual reality. If the entities behave like humans for a long time enough, I will attribute them consciousness. That's where I think you are being too promiscuous with consciousness attribution. To me it wouldn't matter how long it takes for me to figure out that it wasn't conscious, once I found out that it was only an interactive movie, I would not continue to extend the presumption that the movie itself is conscious. This thought experiment brings out a relevant detail though in the idea of ventriloquism. Even if a ventriloquist is the best possible ventriloquist, I still do not think that we should attribute consciousness to the dummy (certain horror movies notwithstanding). It's ok to informally group them together as one, since that's how motive works - it's insistence can be read through a prosthetic puppet, mask, cartoon, work of art, etc. If we can read the text, then we can be influenced by the sender's intent. This is the case with software. It is a way for the intelligence of the programmer and groups of programmers to enact their ideas in the form of a machine. Most of the time, it makes no difference to conflate a ventriloquists intelligence with the character they use to impersonate the dummy, the two of them together could be thought of as a single ventriloquist act - but if we are talking about a dummy being it's own ventriloquist, then we are looking at a completely different phenomenon. We watch a movie and relate to it as a vicarious human experience - actors and their actions rather than frames of pixels or film. I could see how you could choose to see a sufficiently interactive film as being practically indistinguishable from a 3p perspective, but I don't see how you could assume that a corresponding 1p experience arises spontaneously. Where? The film? The electronics? The program? It's metaphysical and crazy. My view is crystal clear. The programmers sense and motives are sent through the medium of the theatrical experience to the audience, who receive it as human sense and motive. The text rides on the back of the many electronic production devices and perceptual organs of the viewers, but it is not interpreted by those media at all. No matter how much music you listen to on your iPod, it's never going to intentionally compose it's own songs. The movie doesn't learn to act, and the computer doesn't learn to feel either. They have their own perceptual frames to contend with. The iPod and the computer need to gratify their semiconductor circuits. The movie reel needs to spin, the motor needs to keep cycling, the film strip needs to keep falling into the sprockets, etc. They don't have any appreciation of the contents which we find significant. I think there's a tragic gender relation metaphor in there somewhere. Something about what boys and girls find attractive in each other not being similar to what they value in themselves. Zombie are different, they behave like you and me. By definition of philosophical zombie, you can't distinguish it from a real human. You can distinguish a human from filmed human, all right? Not without breaking the frame of reference. I can't distinguish a live TV broadcast from a recorded broadcast. It's an audiovisual only frame of reference. To postulate a philosophical zombie, you are saying that nothing about them can be distinguished from a genuine person, which is
Re: Unconscious Components
On 20 Aug 2011, at 23:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: PART I On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create reality'. Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the explanation. Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're in it. The arithmetic matrix is real, because it is just a collection of true arithmetical facts. It is the physical and theological which seems real (= lived), and are real in higher order senses, epistemological, sensational, etc. Part of us and whatever it is that we experience as physically real are mathematically agreeing to treat the relationship as if it were physically real. If that's what you're saying there, then I completely get that, and I'm not saying that that is not true. My view adds to that two, I think revolutionary ideas.: 1. The relationships that make up that matrix are comp arithmetic on one side (literally on one side, like a Klein Bottle which is invisible on the interior...sort of like one way matter) and sensorimotive perception on the other (the invisible side is feeling, participation, being). I would call the arithmetic side 'electromagnetism' and 'relativity'. Not enough precise. If you want to interpret your theory in mine (which I borrow from the LUMs), you have to make your vocabulary far more precise. 2. The arithmetic side runs on agreement between numbers - synchronization. The sensorimotive side runs on gaps between agreements. It is already synchronized because is is the vector of orientation (local singularity/monad) for time (change), so it runs on induction. Jumping gaps. Pulling wholes through holes. It's non-comp guesswork, interpretation, and pantomime that changes and evolves. The importance of imitation in learning should strike a chord here. Then, if you identify your little ego with your higher self (which is not usually done in science), you can identify the whole reality as the (internal) thought of God (Arithmetical truth). That's pretty basic, but sure. I think that 'thought' is pretty narrow though. I like 'sense' better because I see thought as a rather recent human development that took off symbiotically with the invention of language and writing. Writing makes one kind of sense, thought another similar one, hearing and seeing, feeling and tasting, knowing and sensing, emotions, etc, all different embodied experiences of order or pattern. I would not limit it to any one of those or even all of those channels. I would not underestimate the power of order to transcend any previous definition of it. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain- mind identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that seeing a needle is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain, and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic. I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle, one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention, etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or visualization of a needle. That is the relative needle, and is one 1-p construct. But the real needle emerges from an infinity of 1-p view of an infinity of such relative 3-p views. This extends Everett in arithmetic. To me those are special infinities arising from the exclusion of the input/output of Sense. You don't need to spin off every possible 1p and 3p universe just to be able to perceive a needle. It's very straight forward; in a universe of nothing but two things (physical or ideal), they each can tell that the other exists. It's a primitive of existence. When you scale that up, you get triangulation, where each 1p is informed by the exterior of the other 2p's and is then able to infer it's
Re: Unconscious Components
On 21 Aug 2011, at 15:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: PART II On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks for explaining. It's interesting but I am more looking at taking the Cartesian approach further, so that rather than reducing experience to gated logics and assuming that it is primitive, the approach that leads to an understanding of awareness is one that seeks to question all forms of patter recognition. The theory of knowledge above is not comp dependent. Indeed it has been used by many to refute comp. But then incompleteness makes the Theatetical definition of knowledge working for machine, and refuting those refutations. it seems more truthful to admit that the fundamentals of experience - our own experience of life in fact, tends to begin and end in an irrational twilight rather than 1+2=3 opinions. Hmm... Both extremes have significance, but I don't think that one is more primitive. At the epistemological level, but for a theory it is better to start from what we understand, or at least agree. If not people stop reading your contribution. Well, even if rational they can stop, in this field. It touches taboo, and if you are not clear, you will attract wishful thinking people only (which can help for money, but nor for genuine progress). That's the hard part about a massive paradigm shift. It doesn't come around more than once in many lifetimes. We have no first hand experience with what it's like so we imagine that it's some far off thing in the past which we have long outgrown, and that surely our most settled points of science are beyond questioning. It would be great to have this theory bridge to our previous worldview, but I'm not personally qualified to do that. If I can't find anyone interested in it who would be qualified, then eventually I might try to do it myself, but really it's better if someone like a modern day Feynman would translate it themselves. Geometrically ordered molecular relations from amorphous mineral deposits, which in turn are re-informed through air and water to become geometrically ordered transparent crystals. If so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true, It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved, inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I can see what that means. Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish to be what it is not. That is part of the truth. Your position seems to place the particular fiction of materiality outside of truth? Yes. I know that this is curious, but matter is outside truth, even outside being. This is really a consequence of comp, but it is shared by Plotinus. In a sense in Plotinus, God and Matter don't exist. They are outside the realm of the relative beings, which belongs to the Noùs, the realm of the (divine) intellect. God exists, to be sure, and matter too, but they are transcendent to the intelligible and the observable. They are invisible, even if it will appears that the universal soul has already a foot in that matter, which can accelerate the fall, and not help the coming back to God. I get that, and I can relate to that, but the idea that the beliefs of a machine should be part of the 'truth' while the physical presence of a block of iron is not part of truth, throws up a yellow flag to me. It seems to make more sense the other way around, at least from a phenomenological perspective rather than a noumenal one. I think that if matter doesn't exist, then the word existence is probably not a word. The wholepoint of Plato, seconded by the UMs and LUMs is that seeming can be a delusion. Then it follows that (seeming can be a delusion) can also be a delusion. All we have is seeming and seeming correlations of seeming. See if this grabs you any more than the SEE diagram. http://s33light.org/post/9169706079 (based on some discussions I had with Stephen last week). In Plotinus, and arguably in the Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato, Matter is where God lose control. It is What God can't determinate. It is God's blindspot. And it has inintelligible properties (the sensible one). I think it's just awareness' blind spot. We feel that matter does not feel us. As opposed to music, which we can believe understands how we feel. That is a play with words. It is more of a metaphorical truth, yes, but we do feel that music can address us in an interior way that gross material substance does not. Matter that has been sculpted into significance, refined as architecture, furniture, automobiles etc - styled with subjective enthusiasm - that turns matter into a text of cultural anthropology, as is music and words. If I was going to have a God, it would be matter as well. Like Aristotle. I don't not follow you on this, but it is coherent with comp. If you want stuffy (ontologically primary) matter, then you need to abandon comp. It doesn't have to be
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/22/2011 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie then? I don't see much of a difference. Behaviorally they have no difference with human. Conceptually they are quite different, because they lack consciousness and any private experiences. With comp, such zombies are non sensical, or trivial. Consciousness is related to the abstract relations involved in the most probable computations leading to your actual 3-states. Hmmm. So could your actual 3-state occur in something inanimate? In other words is the state itself dynamic or static. Static seems to be the concept evoked by states in a Turing machine and observer moments. But then the same computations that lead to your 3-state also lead to the 3-state in something inanimate. Are we to conclude that the inanimate thing then also experiences that state of consciousness (although always the same one). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
Animate? Inanimate? Conceptually we cannot compare identity of * complexities,* because we compare only as much as we know of and that is incomplete. Zombie I consider an artifact for a certain (mental?) fantasy-explanation without basis. Also 'dynamic' or 'static' is in *our view* streamlined into the (human?) image we made up for the world we live(?) in - as we see it. In a World of unlimited complexities (in continuous interchange of relations) we are lost at this moment. Our terms are irrelevant. We 'compute' those characteristics (qualia?) only what we know of. That's our conventional science. Observer? *anyTHING* that responds to relations (also callable: conscious) - like a ballcock, a thermostat, or even G.B.Shaw, or a microbe. Agnostically yours John On Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 2:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/22/2011 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie then? I don't see much of a difference. Behaviorally they have no difference with human. Conceptually they are quite different, because they lack consciousness and any private experiences. With comp, such zombies are non sensical, or trivial. Consciousness is related to the abstract relations involved in the most probable computations leading to your actual 3-states. Hmmm. So could your actual 3-state occur in something inanimate? In other words is the state itself dynamic or static. Static seems to be the concept evoked by states in a Turing machine and observer moments. But then the same computations that lead to your 3-state also lead to the 3-state in something inanimate. Are we to conclude that the inanimate thing then also experiences that state of consciousness (although always the same one). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 22, 1:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 23:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: PART I On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create reality'. Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the explanation. Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're in it. The arithmetic matrix is real, because it is just a collection of true arithmetical facts. It is the physical and theological which seems real (= lived), and are real in higher order senses, epistemological, sensational, etc. True to who? If I make up a Sims world where donkeys fly, do they represent factual truth? It all seems context dependent to me. It makes truth arbitrary. Couldn't I make an arithmetic matrix where the occupants believe in a different arithmetic than our own? What makes you think that senses are higher order? Part of us and whatever it is that we experience as physically real are mathematically agreeing to treat the relationship as if it were physically real. If that's what you're saying there, then I completely get that, and I'm not saying that that is not true. My view adds to that two, I think revolutionary ideas.: 1. The relationships that make up that matrix are comp arithmetic on one side (literally on one side, like a Klein Bottle which is invisible on the interior...sort of like one way matter) and sensorimotive perception on the other (the invisible side is feeling, participation, being). I would call the arithmetic side 'electromagnetism' and 'relativity'. Not enough precise. If you want to interpret your theory in mine (which I borrow from the LUMs), you have to make your vocabulary far more precise. I want to interpret reality in whatever terms that my ideas and your theories can make the most sense out of. 2. The arithmetic side runs on agreement between numbers - synchronization. The sensorimotive side runs on gaps between agreements. It is already synchronized because is is the vector of orientation (local singularity/monad) for time (change), so it runs on induction. Jumping gaps. Pulling wholes through holes. It's non-comp guesswork, interpretation, and pantomime that changes and evolves. The importance of imitation in learning should strike a chord here. Then, if you identify your little ego with your higher self (which is not usually done in science), you can identify the whole reality as the (internal) thought of God (Arithmetical truth). That's pretty basic, but sure. I think that 'thought' is pretty narrow though. I like 'sense' better because I see thought as a rather recent human development that took off symbiotically with the invention of language and writing. Writing makes one kind of sense, thought another similar one, hearing and seeing, feeling and tasting, knowing and sensing, emotions, etc, all different embodied experiences of order or pattern. I would not limit it to any one of those or even all of those channels. I would not underestimate the power of order to transcend any previous definition of it. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain- mind identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that seeing a needle is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain, and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic. I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle, one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention, etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or visualization of a needle. That is the relative needle, and is one 1-p construct. But the real needle emerges
Re: Unconscious Components
PART II On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Thanks for explaining. It's interesting but I am more looking at taking the Cartesian approach further, so that rather than reducing experience to gated logics and assuming that it is primitive, the approach that leads to an understanding of awareness is one that seeks to question all forms of patter recognition. The theory of knowledge above is not comp dependent. Indeed it has been used by many to refute comp. But then incompleteness makes the Theatetical definition of knowledge working for machine, and refuting those refutations. it seems more truthful to admit that the fundamentals of experience - our own experience of life in fact, tends to begin and end in an irrational twilight rather than 1+2=3 opinions. Hmm... Both extremes have significance, but I don't think that one is more primitive. At the epistemological level, but for a theory it is better to start from what we understand, or at least agree. If not people stop reading your contribution. Well, even if rational they can stop, in this field. It touches taboo, and if you are not clear, you will attract wishful thinking people only (which can help for money, but nor for genuine progress). That's the hard part about a massive paradigm shift. It doesn't come around more than once in many lifetimes. We have no first hand experience with what it's like so we imagine that it's some far off thing in the past which we have long outgrown, and that surely our most settled points of science are beyond questioning. It would be great to have this theory bridge to our previous worldview, but I'm not personally qualified to do that. If I can't find anyone interested in it who would be qualified, then eventually I might try to do it myself, but really it's better if someone like a modern day Feynman would translate it themselves. Geometrically ordered molecular relations from amorphous mineral deposits, which in turn are re-informed through air and water to become geometrically ordered transparent crystals. If so, I'm saying that the universe is more than what is true, It is more than that what can be smelled, felt, observed, proved, inferred, prayed, ... OK. But more than what is true? I am not sure I can see what that means. Fiction. Metaphor. The universe is what might be, and it is the wish to be what it is not. That is part of the truth. Your position seems to place the particular fiction of materiality outside of truth? Yes. I know that this is curious, but matter is outside truth, even outside being. This is really a consequence of comp, but it is shared by Plotinus. In a sense in Plotinus, God and Matter don't exist. They are outside the realm of the relative beings, which belongs to the Noùs, the realm of the (divine) intellect. God exists, to be sure, and matter too, but they are transcendent to the intelligible and the observable. They are invisible, even if it will appears that the universal soul has already a foot in that matter, which can accelerate the fall, and not help the coming back to God. I get that, and I can relate to that, but the idea that the beliefs of a machine should be part of the 'truth' while the physical presence of a block of iron is not part of truth, throws up a yellow flag to me. It seems to make more sense the other way around, at least from a phenomenological perspective rather than a noumenal one. I think that if matter doesn't exist, then the word existence is probably not a word. The wholepoint of Plato, seconded by the UMs and LUMs is that seeming can be a delusion. Then it follows that (seeming can be a delusion) can also be a delusion. All we have is seeming and seeming correlations of seeming. See if this grabs you any more than the SEE diagram. http://s33light.org/post/9169706079 (based on some discussions I had with Stephen last week). In Plotinus, and arguably in the Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato, Matter is where God lose control. It is What God can't determinate. It is God's blindspot. And it has inintelligible properties (the sensible one). I think it's just awareness' blind spot. We feel that matter does not feel us. As opposed to music, which we can believe understands how we feel. That is a play with words. It is more of a metaphorical truth, yes, but we do feel that music can address us in an interior way that gross material substance does not. Matter that has been sculpted into significance, refined as architecture, furniture, automobiles etc - styled with subjective enthusiasm - that turns matter into a text of cultural anthropology, as is music and words. If I was going to have a God, it would be matter as well. Like Aristotle. I don't not follow you on this, but it is coherent with comp. If you want stuffy (ontologically primary) matter, then you need to
Re: Unconscious Components
On 20 Aug 2011, at 04:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/19/2011 6:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Perhaps later. See a bit below. Bp is meant for the machine
believes
p when written in the language of the machine. If the machine
is a
theorem prover for arithmetic, Bp is an abbreviation for
beweisbar('p') with beweisbar the arithmetical provability
predicate
of Gödel, and 'p' is for the Gödel number of p (that is a
description
of p in the language of the machine). The # is for any
proposition.
Don't you need some temporality? B means proves, but you use it
an tenseless form also to mean provable and then also to mean
believes. But a machine being emulated by the UD doesn't prove
everything provable at once. It works through them (and takes a
great many steps) and so it does believe everything that is
provable. Does that mean no thread of it's emulation is Loebian
until induction has been proved/believed in that thread?
At some level yes. Human induction rule (which makes them Löbian) is
probably hardwired by our biological history.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Unconscious Components
PART I On Aug 20, 12:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2011, at 03:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create reality'. Only physical realities. But I don't expect anyone to understand what that means, without grasping it by themselves. The UDA is the explanation. Whenever you say these kinds of things, I assume that you're just talking about the arithmetic Matrix seeming real to us because we're in it. Part of us and whatever it is that we experience as physically real are mathematically agreeing to treat the relationship as if it were physically real. If that's what you're saying there, then I completely get that, and I'm not saying that that is not true. My view adds to that two, I think revolutionary ideas.: 1. The relationships that make up that matrix are comp arithmetic on one side (literally on one side, like a Klein Bottle which is invisible on the interior...sort of like one way matter) and sensorimotive perception on the other (the invisible side is feeling, participation, being). I would call the arithmetic side 'electromagnetism' and 'relativity'. 2. The arithmetic side runs on agreement between numbers - synchronization. The sensorimotive side runs on gaps between agreements. It is already synchronized because is is the vector of orientation (local singularity/monad) for time (change), so it runs on induction. Jumping gaps. Pulling wholes through holes. It's non-comp guesswork, interpretation, and pantomime that changes and evolves. The importance of imitation in learning should strike a chord here. Then, if you identify your little ego with your higher self (which is not usually done in science), you can identify the whole reality as the (internal) thought of God (Arithmetical truth). That's pretty basic, but sure. I think that 'thought' is pretty narrow though. I like 'sense' better because I see thought as a rather recent human development that took off symbiotically with the invention of language and writing. Writing makes one kind of sense, thought another similar one, hearing and seeing, feeling and tasting, knowing and sensing, emotions, etc, all different embodied experiences of order or pattern. I would not limit it to any one of those or even all of those channels. I would not underestimate the power of order to transcend any previous definition of it. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-mind identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that seeing a needle is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain, and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic. I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle, one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention, etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or visualization of a needle. That is the relative needle, and is one 1-p construct. But the real needle emerges from an infinity of 1-p view of an infinity of such relative 3-p views. This extends Everett in arithmetic. To me those are special infinities arising from the exclusion of the input/output of Sense. You don't need to spin off every possible 1p and 3p universe just to be able to perceive a needle. It's very straight forward; in a universe of nothing but two things (physical or ideal), they each can tell that the other exists. It's a primitive of existence. When you scale that up, you get triangulation, where each 1p is informed by the exterior of the other 2p's and is then able to infer it's own existence as the dynamically modulating gap between the other two. When you have that kind of an exponential explosion of information within the social network, you also get a rapid decompensation of sense outside of the network. As the nodes become enmeshed in their mutual overlap and underlap, the enmeshment itself casts a shadow that attenuates sensitivity and identification outside of the shared privacies. This
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 18, 9:43 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. OK. I thought you were saying something else, like 'thoughts create reality'. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-mind identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that seeing a needle is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain, and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic. I would say that seeing the image of a needle may indicate one needle, one eye, one set of visual processing related areas of one brain, and an indeterminate number of potential experiences, depending on how the person feels about the needle, what associations they have, how long they look at the needle, what else is competing for their attention, etc. The same can be true if there is no needle, but just a memory or visualization of a needle. Switching the 1p and 3p, An actual titanium-steel needle is not going to see a human being but it may have it's own interiority that is either isomorphic to our image; a metallic alloy sense that greets centuries like weeks and knows things like temperature and pressure - or it could be some crazy 1p reality conjoined with all iron atoms in the cosmos as a single resonant alien contelligence for billions of years. Or door number three.. But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down. (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA) So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality iceberg. It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more outward facing activities. This, for a mechanist just means the level has not been correctly chosen. What if it's not a level, but an evanescent wave of diminishing returns? and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined. I'm stating that electromagnetic is primitive. I think it can be seen that ultimately all physical law, when properly reconciled with 1p and 3p perspective, boils down to electromagnetism. Sensorimotive is the experience of sense (discrimination between pattern variance and invariance or 'change') and the experience of motive (to initiate or respond to change). Sensorimotive is the defining ontology of subjecthood. I think comp makes not one physical things primitive. Maybe you're thinking more in terms of transcendentally primitive (Sense, to me) where as sensorimotive electromagnetism is existentially primitive. but we can only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start connecting things to our brain tissue directly. and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar. Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what you mean precisely by that. Sensorimotive describes the basic dynamic common to all experience, theoretical or actual. It's the half of the cosmos that is unlike matter and space because it is the experience of matter and space, ie, 'energy' (change) over 'time' (change relating to change). Since it is so universal, it encompasses everything from the most literal sequential sense of classical mechanics (S=Δx/Δt) to the most floridly transcendental and transfigurative timelessness. Sensorimotive is motion and emotion, sense and sensation. They are a single set of phenomena, a coherent ontology of evanescent literalism and cumulative significance. That sounds nice, and as far I can make sense of it, the LUMs can too ... cool I don't really get your meaning when you talk about introducing infinities, and only partially get the doctor part of comp. I see how my feelings about what a doctor proposes to do to me is a way of forcing a binary categorization of my idea of the nature of mind/body, but I think that the very binary reduction prejudices the test. Ha ! Yes, sure. It is a trap for materialist. No doubt. That's the goal: showing an impossibility. That is exactly what comp makes possible to do, and it is interesting because it put the finger on the real difficulties faced by the Aristotelians with the mind-body problem. My whole point is that mind
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/19/2011 6:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Switching the 1p and 3p, An actual titanium-steel needle is not going to see a human being but it may have it's own interiority that is either isomorphic to our image; a metallic alloy sense that greets centuries like weeks and knows things like temperature and pressure - or it could be some crazy 1p reality conjoined with all iron atoms in the cosmos as a single resonant alien contelligence for billions of years. Or door number three.. Behind which are even more white rabbits - in frock coats with pocket watches. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/19/2011 6:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Perhaps later. See a bit below. Bp is meant for the machine believes
p when written in the language of the machine. If the machine is a
theorem prover for arithmetic, Bp is an abbreviation for
beweisbar('p') with beweisbar the arithmetical provability predicate
of Gödel, and 'p' is for the Gödel number of p (that is a description
of p in the language of the machine). The # is for any proposition.
Don't you need some temporality? B means proves, but you use it an
tenseless form also to mean provable and then also to mean
believes. But a machine being emulated by the UD doesn't prove
everything provable at once. It works through them (and takes a great
many steps) and so it does believe everything that is provable. Does
that mean no thread of it's emulation is Loebian until induction has
been proved/believed in that thread?
Brent
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Re: Unconscious Components
On 17 Aug 2011, at 06:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 16, 1:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Aug 2011, at 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target reality. I know you say that. reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). No, I say reality is WYSiWYG *and* WY Don't See IWYG also. OK. This is pure Aristotelianism. Science (including music and theology) begun when some human took distance with that idea. Plato's theory is the quasi opposite: what you see is the border of what you might hope for (at the most). Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? I mean you can hope to be true, but you can never know that you are true for sure about anything, except your consciousness. Transcendental realities are transcendental, simply. Physicist relate measurable numbers with measurable numbers. They use an identity thesis which makes those numbers related to their experience. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. Hmm... I can be OK. But here by identity thesis I mean the brain-mind identity thesis? Except the Everettian, most believe that seeing a needle is due to one needle and one brain, and one experience, when comp implies that for one experience there is an infinity of brain, and needle. Comp extends Everett on arithmetic. But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down. (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA) So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality iceberg. It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more outward facing activities. This, for a mechanist just means the level has not been correctly chosen. The private side of each level is presumably different from our own, That does not make sense. Person or subjects have private sides. Not levels. Yes, you're right. I should have said something more like The kinds of private phenomena that can be experienced by subjects on other levels than our own are presumably different. That makes more sense, but I am not sure if I agree. Experiences are hard to compared, especially from one level to another. and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined. I'm stating that electromagnetic is primitive. I think it can be seen that ultimately all physical law, when properly reconciled with 1p and 3p perspective, boils down to electromagnetism. Sensorimotive is the experience of sense (discrimination between pattern variance and invariance or 'change') and the experience of motive (to initiate or respond to change). Sensorimotive is the defining ontology of subjecthood. I think comp makes not one physical things primitive. but we can only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start connecting things to our brain tissue directly. and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar. Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what you mean precisely by that. Sensorimotive describes the basic dynamic common to all experience, theoretical or actual. It's the half of the cosmos that is unlike matter and space because it is the experience of matter and space, ie, 'energy' (change) over 'time' (change relating to change). Since it is so universal, it encompasses everything from the most literal sequential sense of classical mechanics (S=Δx/Δt) to the most floridly transcendental and transfigurative timelessness. Sensorimotive is motion and emotion, sense and sensation. They are a single set of phenomena, a coherent ontology of evanescent literalism and cumulative significance. That sounds nice, and as far I can make sense of it, the LUMs can too ... but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low. I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality. They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there substitution in
Re: Unconscious Components
On 16 Aug 2011, at 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 15, 3:46 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska, I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the self projected outward onto the 'other'. That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture. Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target reality. I know you say that. reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). This is pure Aristotelianism. Science (including music and theology) begun when some human took distance with that idea. Plato's theory is the quasi opposite: what you see is the border of what you might hope for (at the most). Physicist relate measurable numbers with measurable numbers. They use an identity thesis which makes those numbers related to their experience. But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down. (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA) So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality iceberg. That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision. Haha, excellent. Although you could also say that adding irrelevant precision can communicate the irrelevance OF precision in the particular case it's being used. Of course! And that is even true before and after someone (I forget his name) told you that the age of the captain was 42 (or is it 24?). Hmm ... I think it was 42.24, or 24.42, I don't remember. Perhaps 42.2424242424242424... I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence, Nice. but I'm trying to use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other. Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the contrary. Polarization seems simple to me compared to multi-sense perceptual relativism? When you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter. Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful, misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a molecule very well. ? The interference pattern between our PRIF and the target PRIF can be an irrelevant obstacle to our understanding of the contents of the target PRIF. Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo- physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the outside In the physical description. But do you take that description as basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be justified by a non physicalist theory? It's not ultimate, but it is the public description that we can access. OK. The private side of each level is presumably different from our own, That does not make sense. Person or subjects have private sides. Not levels. and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined. but we can only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start connecting things to our brain tissue directly. and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar. Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what you mean precisely by that. but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low. I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality. They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking at the strip as a
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 16, 1:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Aug 2011, at 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target reality. I know you say that. reality is WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). No, I say reality is WYSiWYG *and* WY Don't See IWYG also. This is pure Aristotelianism. Science (including music and theology) begun when some human took distance with that idea. Plato's theory is the quasi opposite: what you see is the border of what you might hope for (at the most). Not sure I understand. Do I hope for this world and therefore it exists to me in a solipsistic way? Physicist relate measurable numbers with measurable numbers. They use an identity thesis which makes those numbers related to their experience. That may be what physicists believe that they do, but probably in reality they use an intuitive feel from numbers and experience which they describe and communicate as an identity thesis, numbers, etc. The actual understanding is an artifact of cognition and feeling. But if the relations are computable the identity thesis break down. (That is not obvious, but follows from UDA) So IF we are digitalisable at SOME level, Plato is right. The measurable numbers of the physicists is only the tip of the reality iceberg. It's not 'we' who are digitizable, it's just some of our more outward facing activities. The private side of each level is presumably different from our own, That does not make sense. Person or subjects have private sides. Not levels. Yes, you're right. I should have said something more like The kinds of private phenomena that can be experienced by subjects on other levels than our own are presumably different. and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, Electromagnetic is not primitive and sensorimotive is not defined. I'm stating that electromagnetic is primitive. I think it can be seen that ultimately all physical law, when properly reconciled with 1p and 3p perspective, boils down to electromagnetism. Sensorimotive is the experience of sense (discrimination between pattern variance and invariance or 'change') and the experience of motive (to initiate or respond to change). Sensorimotive is the defining ontology of subjecthood. but we can only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start connecting things to our brain tissue directly. and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar. Sure, but it can't define your term. It can't help someone to see what you mean precisely by that. Sensorimotive describes the basic dynamic common to all experience, theoretical or actual. It's the half of the cosmos that is unlike matter and space because it is the experience of matter and space, ie, 'energy' (change) over 'time' (change relating to change). Since it is so universal, it encompasses everything from the most literal sequential sense of classical mechanics (S=Δx/Δt) to the most floridly transcendental and transfigurative timelessness. Sensorimotive is motion and emotion, sense and sensation. They are a single set of phenomena, a coherent ontology of evanescent literalism and cumulative significance. but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low. I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality. They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there substitution in one respect is almost possible, but in the opposite respect is almost impossible. Where one point on the loop represents maximum dimorphism between quality and quantity (such as mind and matter: concrete multiplicities) the opposite point (such as I Ching vs binary code: monastic abstractions) represents minimum dimorphism. You mean: I say no to the doctor. It is your right. Your paragraph confirms you have no reason except to introduce infinities which distinguish you from some others type of beings. I don't really get your meaning when you talk about introducing infinities, and only partially get the doctor part of comp. I see how my feelings about what a doctor proposes to do to me is a way of forcing a binary categorization of my idea of the nature of mind/body, but I think that the very binary reduction prejudices the test. My whole point is that mind can be reduced to binary
Re: Unconscious Components
On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 14, 12:05 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Aug 2011, at 21:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacies. That does not justify it. Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska, I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the self projected outward onto the 'other'. That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture. You just repeat it in a more complex way, with even more assumptions, and when you say sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacie, you are the 1004 wonderland. What's 1004? An allusion to an error made by Bruno is Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno: Bruno There is about 1004 muttons in that flock of sheep. Sylvie: You can't say 'about 1004'. You should say 'about 1000'. The four is insignifiant with the use of 'about'. That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision. (Of course Bruno did not accept to be defeated so easily, so he justified himself in adding: The four is *very*significant because I see four muttons nearby. The about was for 1000, because they might be 500 or 1500 muttons. :) I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence, Nice. but I'm trying to use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other. Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the contrary. When you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter. Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful, misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a molecule very well. ? But I not saying you don't intuit something, because it does makes sense in AUDA, except for his reification of a concrete reality, at least if your answer, which does more use the term physical is supposed to answer my question. What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by physically? What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells, organisms, etc. Organism are physical? Are you assuming physicalism? Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo- physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the outside In the physical description. But do you take that description as basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be justified by a non physicalist theory? and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low. It's a holarchy, so that organisms include physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena, but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level awareness even though they contribute to it.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 15, 3:46 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Aug 2011, at 23:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska, I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the self projected outward onto the 'other'. That does not justify it either. The contrary might be true. being embedded in a reality might fail us concerning the big picture. Can you give me an example that supports this? We're embedded in a reality whether we like it or not. I'm saying that the more similar the target reality is to our reality, the better chance we have of imaging or accounting for the phenomena that constitutes the target reality. That is the 1004 fallacy: to add irrelevant precision. Haha, excellent. Although you could also say that adding irrelevant precision can communicate the irrelevance OF precision in the particular case it's being used. I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence, Nice. but I'm trying to use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other. Usually complex notion are metaphorized through simple one. Not the contrary. Polarization seems simple to me compared to multi-sense perceptual relativism? When you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter. Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful, misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a molecule very well. ? The interference pattern between our PRIF and the target PRIF can be an irrelevant obstacle to our understanding of the contents of the target PRIF. Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo- physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the outside In the physical description. But do you take that description as basically ultimate, or are you open that such a description by be justified by a non physicalist theory? It's not ultimate, but it is the public description that we can access. The private side of each level is presumably different from our own, and sensorimotive rather than electromagnetic, but we can only imagine the sensorimotive content, unless possibly if we start connecting things to our brain tissue directly. and sensori-motive on the inside, Which is poetry, according to you. Even poetry has letters, words, syntax, and grammar. but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. You seem to come back to dualism, with a poetical twist. I would be OK with that, except that you are using it to pretend that this would contradict the comp theory, when it would just put the substitution level *very* low. I think it's not completely accurate to say that there is a substitution level where literal quantity becomes figurative quality. They are always facing opposite sides of the mobius strip, but looking at the strip as a circular loop, there are some areas where there substitution in one respect is almost possible, but in the opposite respect is almost impossible. Where one point on the loop represents maximum dimorphism between quality and quantity (such as mind and matter: concrete multiplicities) the opposite point (such as I Ching vs binary code: monastic abstractions) represents minimum dimorphism. It's a holarchy, so that organisms include physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena, but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions. I don't see any problem with this view in the comp theory, unless you reify matter, mind and the link between, which is a way to create a magical sort of mind body problem, and solving with magic, not just poetical, links. Mind and matter are just categories of sense. Sense is the link between them, however there are many categories of sense, only some of which can be described quantitatively. I'm not
Re: Unconscious Components
On 13 Aug 2011, at 21:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacies. That does not justify it. You just repeat it in a more complex way, with even more assumptions, and when you say sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacie, you are the 1004 wonderland. But I not saying you don't intuit something, because it does makes sense in AUDA, except for his reification of a concrete reality, at least if your answer, which does more use the term physical is supposed to answer my question. What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by physically? What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells, organisms, etc. Organism are physical? Are you assuming physicalism? If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical. That's follows from the comp hypothesis. In the sense that the first person is distributed on a non computable structure on which its bodies will rely. It is simpler to say that the mind is 3-Turing emulable, and that 3-matter is not. Well, at least this can be explained to anybody, when we assume that we can survive at some level of digital emulation. The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies. For a mathematician the term topology has precise technical meaning, making such sentence looking weird. But we don't know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition). So, to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call that a fuite en avant (forward-escape). It's not the topology of the physical objects which we can encounter externally which is non Turing emulable, it's the private interior which we can only guess at through out own imagination. It's not a cypher though, it's just metaphorical. Objects cannot tell us what they mean, but through our understanding of what they mean to us, replace objects by south americans, and you will see your sentence already asserts by de Sepulveda for arguing that they have no soul comparable to ours. personally and collectively, we can get a reading through the alchemical prism that may partially correlate to external emulables. It's not necessary to solve the mystery but to acknowledge that mystery is a legitimate primitive phenomena of the cosmos. To make a mystery primitive is automatically an authoritative move. It is like saying dont try to understand. You are a guru, after all. Too bad my job consists to kill all gurus. You are no doing science, but promoting a personal opinion. It is problematic because it excludes entities from the club of conscious entities from appearances. The math alone can create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at least not in a primitively grounded way. It can still be an emerging pattern in the mind, but the experience of it goes beyond what could be achieved or anticipated through pure mathematics. Agree for anticipate, not for achieved. Also you confuse the mathematical reality, and the mathematical tools to explore that reality. It is as different as a finger pointing to the moon and the moon. I am not saying there is a mathematical reality, just that it is different from the mathematical theories. I do believe in the arithmetical reality, to be precise. It's a pattern with one side as quantitative sequential sophistication and the other as qualitative simultaneous simplicity.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 14, 12:05 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 13 Aug 2011, at 21:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacies. That does not justify it. Why not? I'm just saying that if I've never been outside of Nebraska, I will have an exponentially better chance of being able to correctly imagine Kansas than I do of imagining Barcelona. I'm saying that it's because between Nebraska and Kansas there is less cultural-semantic incongruity than between Nebraska and Barcelona. The further you get from what you are and what you know first hand, the more likely that your assumptions about what you don't know will be mistaken, or more precisely, that they will be composed of inverted stereotypes of the self projected outward onto the 'other'. You just repeat it in a more complex way, with even more assumptions, and when you say sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacie, you are the 1004 wonderland. What's 1004? I admit, it's a pretty opaque sentence, but I'm trying to use optical polarization as a handy metaphor for modeling how perceptual-relativity inertial frames interfere with each other. When you look through a polarizing filter, you see moire patterns on other polarizing films which change according to the angle of the filter. Your polarizing sunglasses afford you a degree of privacy, as do the tinted window that you observe, but in addition, there is a fanciful, misdirecting optical phenomenon which is projected on the window. The increased filtering density relates to the misdirection. That's my guess about why we can't guess what it's like for a galaxy or a molecule very well. But I not saying you don't intuit something, because it does makes sense in AUDA, except for his reification of a concrete reality, at least if your answer, which does more use the term physical is supposed to answer my question. What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by physically? What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells, organisms, etc. Organism are physical? Are you assuming physicalism? Organisms I'm saying are multicellular entities. They are physiological-somatic. Cells are bio-chemical. Molecules are chemo- physical. Atoms are physical-quantum. All are electro-magnetic on the outside and sensori-motive on the inside, but they exist and insist on different PRIF scales. It's a holarchy, so that organisms include physiological, biological, chemical, physical, and quantum phenomena, but molecules by themselves do not include physiological level awareness even though they contribute to it. Neurology is one step further - a meta-organism which consolidates the sensorimotive content of the entire body and it's experiences as well as producing teleologies to be enacted through the body's (and brain's) actions. If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical. That's follows from the comp hypothesis. In the sense that the first person is distributed on a non computable structure on which its bodies will rely. It is simpler to say that the mind is 3-Turing emulable, and that 3-matter is not. Well, at least this can be explained to anybody, when we assume that we can survive at some level of digital emulation. The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies. For a mathematician the term topology has precise technical meaning, making such sentence looking weird. Sorry. I just think of a topology as an ideal surface that can me mapped in consistent terms. In this case it could be the intersection of two sets, but set seems abstract to me, whereas a topology implies a concrete fabric. The point being that outside
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 22:05 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 12, 3:41 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: It would be interesting to see how do you know this. Some revelation or something else? I don't know it, I just think that it could be the case. If you can fully and finally reject the proposition that your own experiences could be metaphysical, then you are left with describing what I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. Evgenii experience is in objective terms as a phenomena. Since we find ourselves perceiving the world from the interior of a body, then it's not all that outrageous to hypothesize that this interior-exterior relationship between being a body and an experiencer of bodies might not be a unique invention in the universe, and that the many and fundamentally significant diametrically complimentary qualities of subjective phenomena compared to objective might not be a meaningless coincidence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 22:20 meekerdb said the following: On 8/12/2011 12:37 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.08.2011 20:40 meekerdb said the following: You robot do. It gets tagged with some notes, timestamped, and stuck in the database for further reference and adjustment of learning algorithms. That's it. There's no homunculus who watches it in the Cartesian theater. That it is referenced and used in your cogitation to influence your speech and other actions is what constitutes your being conscious of it. A quote from Jeffrey Gray (p. 110, it is just one of hypotheses in the book, this time on the verge of dualism) (1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells; I don't know what this means. I might agree with it as a metaphor, but I have no idea what the medium of conscious perception refers to. It seems to assume what it purports to explain. Yes, in the book it is just some metaphor to express how qualia functions, the author does not know either what it could mean. (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display; This has the brain inspecting itself. Again it seems metaphorical. It might be a metaphor for my AI robot tagging stuff it puts in its database. This is already not a metaphor but rather an open question. Why evolution has created consciousness when this is just a means for a brain to inspect itself? Presumably this has opened new opportunities as compared with unconscious behavior. Please note that this step (with step 3) gives conscious experience casual power. Evgenii (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual electrochemical medium. Is this close to what you have said? Maybe. Brent Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Fri, Aug 12, 2011 at 2:58 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Just to be clear, I'm interested in a slightly different question which relative to Stathis might be phrased as function of what? If we look at the whole person/robot we talk about behavior, which I think is enough to establish some kind of consciousness, but not necessarily to map each instance of a behavior to a specific conscious thought. People can be thinking different things while performing the same act. So unless we specify same behavior to mean same input/output for all possible input sequences there is room for same behavior and different consciousness. And this same kind of analysis applies to subsets of the brain as well as to the whole person. So in Stathis example of replacing half the brain with a super AI module which has the same input/output relation with the body and the other half of the brain, it is not at all clear to me that the person's consciousness is unchanged. Stathis relies on it being *reported* as unchanged because the speech center is in the other half, but where is the consciousness center? It may be that we're over-idealizing the isolation of the brain. If the super AI half were perfectly isolated except for those input/output channels which we are hypothesizing to be perfectly emulating the dumb brain then Stathis argument would show that what ever change in consciousness might be inside the super AI side it would be undetectable. But in fact the super AI side cannot be perfectly isolated to those channels, even aside from quantum entanglement there are thermal perturbations and radioactivity. This means that the super AI will produce different behavior because it will respond differently under these perturbations. This different behavior will evince its different consciousness. There will be a certain level of engineering tolerance in brain replacement since there is a level of tolerance in the normal brain. We might not notice a change despite a significant physical change such as thousands of neurons dying. So in saying 'yes' to the doctor you should either be ready to assume some difference in consciousness or suppose that the substitution level may encompass a significant part of the Milky Way down to the fundamental particle level. I'd be happy if the new brain didn't change my consciousness any more than getting through a normal day would. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 7:26 am, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. It appeared in stages over many years of thinking about these issues, first in 1987 noticing the underlying four-fold symmetry of popular divination systems; Tarot, I Ching, numerology, and astrology and correlating that with theories of consciousness like Leary's 8- neurocircuit model to arrive at a sort of a nuclear mandala of qualia logic, a kind of wheel of stereotypes: http://www.stationlink.com/mystic/meta4.gif. There are three main patterns to this mandala, one which cycles around the circumference as a progressive narrative, another which emanates from the center as binary symmetry of archetypal opposites, and a third which modulates the spectrum between the other two. As you push out from the center, the pattern becomes less digital-discrete- quantitative and more analog-compact-qualitative, bringing in personality themes and storytelling. I did have some interesting experiences with my own consciousness since then, unintentionally through lack of sleep and obsessive painting and debating with people online which contributed to my thinking on the subject. I guess that I must have applied my nuclear mandala logic to the types of arguments and style of arguments that I ran into, particularly over months debating on an atheist forum. I could see a clear dialectic between the extremism of atheist materialism and the opposite extremism of the new-age spirituality that I had been familiar with already. That led to the mural I collaged together to illustrate the themes of that opposition: http://s33light.org/ACMEOMMM The hypothesis of photon agnosticism (http://s33light.org/fauxton) came around the same time, and although our house was struck by lightning shortly after developing the idea, I'm not sure that there was a revelatory moment at it's inception. I think a general dissatisfaction with the ugly sprawl of the Standard Model in service of the arithmetic of QM led me to suggest an alternative which reconciles mind/body dualism and perception. A simple flip of the topology at the subatomic level seemed to have an appeal for me that reminded me of other times in my life when I had seen a simple underlying pattern which others had not questioned. In kindergarten, I actually was mentioned in the local newspaper because I was the only kid who was able to see the Formal Operation logic of Piaget's cylinder tasks (http://www.jstor.org/pss/748) at age 4 or 5 (rather than the expected 8-10). This is what photon agnosticism seems like to me. I think that I may very well be ahead the curve on this, as I have actively pursued any arguments which could falsify the hypotheisis, debating with physics students and professors. I not only have not found any compelling falsification for the idea, but my conversations with the academics on this has consistently reinforced my perception that the questioning of this assumption of dumb-particle photons is not within the scope of the typical mind, suited as it would be for the purely quantitative approach of contemporary physics. Rather than a spirit of scientific curiosity or polite correction of what my theory had overlooked, I found only seething anger and ad hominem attacks on me personally - my style of writing or debating, my lack of formal training, my iconoclastic attitude, all manner of arguments from authority but nothing remotely addressing the simple question: What evidence do we have that photons physically exist? The irony of course, is that this kind of treatment is exactly what my ACME-OMMM model predicts - that those who are most comfortable with quantitative, literal logics will meet their qualitative, figurative symmetry with blind fanaticism that eclipses the very spirit of the Enlightenment worldview. In atheists and physicists alike I met Inquisitors - sneering sophists devoted to an unquestionable anti- theological orthodoxy. So far in this group I have been quite pleasantly surprised at the higher level of scientific curiosity as well as depth of knowledge. I still don't know whether anyone has really considered that possibility that that my hypothesis might be right, but it has been helpful to me in refining my ideas further (http://www.stationlink.com/art/ SEEmap2.jpg). My entry into physics is really unintentional, so I am completely unqualified to translate my idea into that language. It's really not critical to my TOE, as sense could just occur on the subatomic level instead - it could be quarks that are sensing each other rather than molecules, so I have no major investment in being correct about photons, I just think that there is a chance that the weirdness of QM observations can be attributed entirely to the topological shift at the microcosm being overlooked. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: Unconscious Components
Craig, I'm wondering what would make my internal processes come up with not identical, but similar conclusions to what your theory seems to suggest. I went through your page and could relate to the questions you posed and saw a reflection of my own tendencies to integrate absolutely everything I observe, internally and externally into a category to explain everything. To me, anything I think that sounds new-agey is an internal tell tale that I'm going in the wrong direction. It's just the way my compass is calibrated, but I don't deny its existence. My... intuition? tells me that it is all math, holy math if you will. An abstract class where we, humans and atoms alike, invoke and experience its instantiations. Regarding your thoughts on photon behavior, it seemed to me that you are saying that photons are the quantum entanglement of spacetime. That they don't really travel through a medium, but that they will manifest through the entanglement of a sender and a receiver? On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 10:30 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Aug 13, 7:26 am, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: I cannot exclude this, hence who knows. Still, it would be nicer not only to get the answer but also how it has appeared. It appeared in stages over many years of thinking about these issues, first in 1987 noticing the underlying four-fold symmetry of popular divination systems; Tarot, I Ching, numerology, and astrology and correlating that with theories of consciousness like Leary's 8- neurocircuit model to arrive at a sort of a nuclear mandala of qualia logic, a kind of wheel of stereotypes: http://www.stationlink.com/mystic/meta4.gif. There are three main patterns to this mandala, one which cycles around the circumference as a progressive narrative, another which emanates from the center as binary symmetry of archetypal opposites, and a third which modulates the spectrum between the other two. As you push out from the center, the pattern becomes less digital-discrete- quantitative and more analog-compact-qualitative, bringing in personality themes and storytelling. I did have some interesting experiences with my own consciousness since then, unintentionally through lack of sleep and obsessive painting and debating with people online which contributed to my thinking on the subject. I guess that I must have applied my nuclear mandala logic to the types of arguments and style of arguments that I ran into, particularly over months debating on an atheist forum. I could see a clear dialectic between the extremism of atheist materialism and the opposite extremism of the new-age spirituality that I had been familiar with already. That led to the mural I collaged together to illustrate the themes of that opposition: http://s33light.org/ACMEOMMM The hypothesis of photon agnosticism (http://s33light.org/fauxton) came around the same time, and although our house was struck by lightning shortly after developing the idea, I'm not sure that there was a revelatory moment at it's inception. I think a general dissatisfaction with the ugly sprawl of the Standard Model in service of the arithmetic of QM led me to suggest an alternative which reconciles mind/body dualism and perception. A simple flip of the topology at the subatomic level seemed to have an appeal for me that reminded me of other times in my life when I had seen a simple underlying pattern which others had not questioned. In kindergarten, I actually was mentioned in the local newspaper because I was the only kid who was able to see the Formal Operation logic of Piaget's cylinder tasks (http://www.jstor.org/pss/748) at age 4 or 5 (rather than the expected 8-10). This is what photon agnosticism seems like to me. I think that I may very well be ahead the curve on this, as I have actively pursued any arguments which could falsify the hypotheisis, debating with physics students and professors. I not only have not found any compelling falsification for the idea, but my conversations with the academics on this has consistently reinforced my perception that the questioning of this assumption of dumb-particle photons is not within the scope of the typical mind, suited as it would be for the purely quantitative approach of contemporary physics. Rather than a spirit of scientific curiosity or polite correction of what my theory had overlooked, I found only seething anger and ad hominem attacks on me personally - my style of writing or debating, my lack of formal training, my iconoclastic attitude, all manner of arguments from authority but nothing remotely addressing the simple question: What evidence do we have that photons physically exist? The irony of course, is that this kind of treatment is exactly what my ACME-OMMM model predicts - that those who are most comfortable with quantitative, literal logics will meet their qualitative, figurative symmetry with blind fanaticism that eclipses
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 12, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 14:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 1:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. Consciousness itself leads to conceptual difficulties. Except for the fact that we cannot ignore that it is undeniable, we could never logically conceive of consciousness. Can we logically conceive a reality? Sure, as long as it's a reality within our own perceptual relativity frame of reference. That is too vague for me to comment. I don't know what you are assuming. The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by physically? If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. But we don't know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition). So, to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call that a fuite en avant (forward-escape). The math alone can create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at least not in a primitively grounded way. can create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic, which is what gives the believer not only separation but something of a trump-card privilege over the believed. I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical. In a contest of math v physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of math, But what is the physical? so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought. How to explain that the physical obeys to the arithmetical? How will you explain the role of math in physics? Physics cannot be anticipated from the math alone, Why? I can understand that is true for geography, but why to assert this for physics? What is physics? it can only be reverse engineered from factual physical observations. But what is that? Math can of course be used to build on physics as well (nuclear fission, etc) but it still requires a priori indexes of atomic behaviors which are independent from pure arithmetic. Why? I mean, even if comp is false, why would we a priori reject an explanation, if the goal was not for justifying that sort of silicon racism. It seems to me that you make matter, mind, the relation between awfully mysterious just to justify a segregation among possible entities for personhood. At least you are coherent, you seems to need stuffy matter, like the EM field, then mechanism cannot make sense, unless I am wrong somewhere 'course. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 1:10 pm, Pilar Morales pilarmorales...@gmail.com wrote: Craig, I'm wondering what would make my internal processes come up with not identical, but similar conclusions to what your theory seems to suggest. I love it. That's what I'm looking for, agreement or disagreement that I can agree with. I went through your page and could relate to the questions you posed and saw a reflection of my own tendencies to integrate absolutely everything I observe, internally and externally into a category to explain everything. To me, anything I think that sounds new-agey is an internal tell tale that I'm going in the wrong direction. It's just the way my compass is calibrated, but I don't deny its existence. It's hard for me to get across two seemingly paradoxical motivations I have with this info. On the one hand I feel like I have to really come down hard on the OMMM worldview because I feel like our intelligence, individually and collectively, is at the far extreme of the pendulum swing at this time in our history, and that many of the problems of civilization are a consequence of this extremism. It seems like if I don't take a really critical stance at the problems I see with it, then my ideas will automatically be seen as able to be integrated or dismissed within the prevailing paradigm rather than offer a comprehensive shift from it. On the other hand, I want to make it clear that individually and collectively we NEED this extreme quantitative logical skill as well. I'm not anti-science, I'm saying that science needs to go further and embrace all phenomena that we encounter and not just what can be neatly nailed down. We need to be objective about subjectivity and not be seduced by the sentimental attachment to literalism when understanding processes of metaphor. So yes, it's extremely important that some of us focus exclusively on the their specialty areas of consciousness, but I think the world desperately needs a new general worldview that embraces subjectivity scientifically, without reducing it to mechanism, so that civilization doesn't regress into fundamentalism, and so that we can move forward into an era of post- religion, post-materialism. My... intuition? tells me that it is all math, holy math if you will. An abstract class where we, humans and atoms alike, invoke and experience its instantiations. I agree, holy math is part of it, but I think that profane physics is the other part. Pain and pleasure are not reducible to numbers. Qualia must be experienced first hand or not at all. In the qualitative realm, math is a forensic afterthought that is of limited use, just as New Age intuition is a naive jumping to conclusions that is is of limited use in the quantitative realm. It's still in there though, otherwise anyone could be a math genius. You have to have a feel for numbers, know them intimately, love their patterns rather than fear them, etc. There is subjectivity there too. Regarding your thoughts on photon behavior, it seemed to me that you are saying that photons are the quantum entanglement of spacetime. Close, but I also think that spacetime itself doesn't exist independently of matter and energy. Space is literally nothing but the relation between two material objects and time is nothing but the relation between experiences (energy, events, and experience are more or less the same thing. It's an inter-subjective perception of change from one state to another). That they don't really travel through a medium, but that they will manifest through the entanglement of a sender and a receiver? Right. It's sort of an unimagining of the model we assume when we turn on a radio. We have been taught that there are radio waves in the atmosphere, whereas my model describes an antenna imitating a broadcast tower by tuning into the same metallic mood frequency. You are listening to your ears hearing a speaker amplified antenna which is hearing a radio tower that is broadcasting a microphone that is hearing vocal chords being motivated by a human mind. They are all calling out to each other in their own languages to share the same mathematical invariance, yet the math is meaningless without being listened to in the right way by the right organizations of the right materials. The organization alone is not a radio show. The math is wavy, and it propagates in a wave like pattern terrestrially, but there is no literal wave propagates in space. What I'm thinking then, is that photons are useful figments of mathematics used to describe the logical underpinnings of this process. On the microcosmic level, it could be considered molecular quorum sensing. Like biological quorum sensing only without a chemical substrate; it's just telesemantic, jumping across a vacuum like these words are jumping across the internet, your screen, your eyes, brain, and mind. The message is not a projectile traveling through space, it is sensorimotive process executed electromagnetically across a
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 13, 1:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Aug 2011, at 14:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. How would you justify that? Because the interior of the PRIF is private, and the more morphologically different the target PRIF is, the smaller the bandwidth we have to describe it in our own PRIF's terms. It's signal attenuation by the density of aggregate semantic mismatch, sort of like perceptual polarization by interference between multiple privacies. What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. What do you mean by physically? What kind of materials they are physically composed of. Metal, cells, organisms, etc. If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. So mind is something physical and non Turing emulable. It's both non Turing emulable physical and Turing emulable logical. The intersection of the overlap between the two topologies. But we don't know anything physical which is not either Turing emulable, or recovered by self-indetermination (like in quantum superposition). So, to solve a problem, you are introducing more mystery than there is already. I don't see how this can solve anything. In french we call that a fuite en avant (forward-escape). It's not the topology of the physical objects which we can encounter externally which is non Turing emulable, it's the private interior which we can only guess at through out own imagination. It's not a cypher though, it's just metaphorical. Objects cannot tell us what they mean, but through our understanding of what they mean to us, personally and collectively, we can get a reading through the alchemical prism that may partially correlate to external emulables. It's not necessary to solve the mystery but to acknowledge that mystery is a legitimate primitive phenomena of the cosmos. The math alone can create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics With the comp theory, physics is an emerging pattern in the mind of numbers. A good thing, because I don't take physics for granted, at least not in a primitively grounded way. It can still be an emerging pattern in the mind, but the experience of it goes beyond what could be achieved or anticipated through pure mathematics. It's a pattern with one side as quantitative sequential sophistication and the other as qualitative simultaneous simplicity. can create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic, which is what gives the believer not only separation but something of a trump-card privilege over the believed. I can follow you, but it makes both mind and matter rather magical. It's not magical but it explains the existence of the feeling of, or desire for magical. It's the potential of teleology to actualize itself, defined by and in contradistinction to, the inertial of teleonomy to limit teleological actualization. In a contest of math v physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of math, But what is the physical? Physical is the tails side of the coin of awareness. Awareness and experience inside out. It's like your two universal machines except that they are the same machine twisted into a Mobius strip, meeting itself through the mutual ignorance of objectification rather than through mathematical correspondence - scrambled through the maximal decoherence and mystery to slow down the inevitable rush toward re- singularity so that every part must fight to find it's place in the whole. so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought. How to explain that the physical obeys to the arithmetical? How will you explain the role of math in physics? Our perception obeys mathematical laws when it examines physical external phenomena. That is how physical objects are rendered as separate from hallucinations which are dynamic, fluid, self referential, metaphorical, and non-mathematical. Physics is mathematical...to us. Our experiences may very well be mathematical to the universe (which is a comp friendly thought, right?) but to try to execute our own mathematical sense as if it were universally mathematical I think fails because we are missing the perspectives outside of our minds. We need help from the work that has already been done by our cells and genes to prop up a true artificial consciousness,
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12/08/2011, at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Sure, muscles will contract for any old material that can conduct an electric current. A muscle doesn't require a high level conversation with the brain's cells to react. We can move in our sleep when we aren't subjectively conscious of it. But can the muscles be made to contract through electrical stimulation in such a way that you can have an intelligent conversation with them? In a normal person the brain does the complex calculations which produce intelligible language from the vocal cords. Can the same calculations be done by computer stimulating the vocal cords or is there something the computer just won't be able to do? If so, where will its language deficiencies be, and what is the specific mathematical problem the brain can solve but the computer can't? If the computer can't copy human behaviour due to lacking human consciousness that is equivalent to saying that there are non-computable mathematics in the brain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 11 Aug 2011, at 14:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 1:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. Consciousness itself leads to conceptual difficulties. Except for the fact that we cannot ignore that it is undeniable, we could never logically conceive of consciousness. Can we logically conceive a reality? What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 11 Aug 2011, at 08:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/11/2011 1:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? There is no test, it is just assumed for the purpose of the thought experiment that the component lacks the special sauce required for consciousness. We could even say that the component works by magic to avoid discussions about technical difficulties, and the thought experiment is unaffected. The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. What special sauce? Why is it ok to assume that consciousness is something special that can only occur is special circumstances? Why not consider that possibility that it is just as primitive as mass, charge and spin? That would be a category mistake. Mass, charge and spin refer to measurable observable, even apparently related by laws. Consciousness is an attribute of person, which are higher order entity, in most theories. Why do we need to work so hard to dismiss the direct evidence of our 1st person experience? Nobody needs to do that. It has been a tradition to avoid it in science, perhaps related to the Vienna Circle and positivism, and going back to the Aristotle substancialism, but today genuine scientist recognize there is a problem there. Why not just accept that it is real and then wonder why materialist theories have no room whatsoever in them for it? The materialist have a theory, which is the Mechanist theory. The problem is that they take the theory of mind part of mechanism, and few seems to see that the the mechanist theory has also its necessary theory of matter, making the mechanist theory of mind and matter testable. Physicalist use a naive form of mechanism to hide the mind- body problem, when mechanism just provide a tool to formulate it more precisely. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 12, 4:21 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 12/08/2011, at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Sure, muscles will contract for any old material that can conduct an electric current. A muscle doesn't require a high level conversation with the brain's cells to react. We can move in our sleep when we aren't subjectively conscious of it. But can the muscles be made to contract through electrical stimulation in such a way that you can have an intelligent conversation with them? You might be able to have an intelligent conversation about glucose or tensile strength electronically, but it need not have anything to do with making them contract. Nervous tissue is a special case of biological tissue in that it's purpose is to make it's own cellular experience transparent in favor of refining and telling the stories of other tissues and their stories of their environment. A muscle cell isn't necessarily interested in or capable of non-muscular conversation. In a normal person the brain does the complex calculations which produce intelligible language from the vocal cords. If my hypothesis is correct, the brain and the vocal chords work together to some degree. It uses sensory feedback from the vocal chords in real time to modulate it's motive efforts to speak. Can the same calculations be done by computer stimulating the vocal cords or is there something the computer just won't be able to do? My guess is that a computer would have to be entrained to the real life vocal chords of the particular person's body in order to get close to perfect fluidity, and that may require 'cooperation' from the nervous tissues related to the vocal chords. Absent those, the tissues themselves would have to be hacked into with artificial neurology. If so, where will its language deficiencies be, and what is the specific mathematical problem the brain can solve but the computer can't? If the computer can't copy human behaviour due to lacking human consciousness that is equivalent to saying that there are non- computable mathematics in the brain. To produce human speech, the computer need not have human consciousness (awareness of the awarenesses of the human organism as a whole), it just needs awareness of the larynx and the speech centers of the brain. If you want the computer to be able to understand the meaning of what it's saying, then you are talking about replacing the entire prefrontal cortex, in which case, it depends on what you replace it with as to the extent to which it's understanding resembles ours. If you replace the neurological community which handles speech articulation only, you might be able to do it well enough that we, the user, can use it (probably would have to be entrained from the cognitive side as well - the brain would have to discover the implant and learn how to use it), but that doesn't mean that on the level of the community of the brain and nervous system there is no difference. That fact becomes monumentally important when you consider replacing not just the neurology that you use but the neurology that you actually identify with personally as you. Even with just the artificial larynx driver, you may very well be able to tell the difference in the sound of your own voice, and others may also. It may feel different to speak, and some unanticipated differences such as swallowing, clearing your throat, noticing a sore throat before it gets serious, etc may arise. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 12, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 14:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 1:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. Consciousness itself leads to conceptual difficulties. Except for the fact that we cannot ignore that it is undeniable, we could never logically conceive of consciousness. Can we logically conceive a reality? Sure, as long as it's a reality within our own perceptual relativity frame of reference. The further our imaginary reality is from our own PRIF, the less likely that it could reflect the concrete experiences that would occur there if that reality were manifested physically. What can be shown is that each of two universal machines put in front of each other can develop a true and incommunicable belief in a reality. I think that's consciousness. It is an instinctive belief in a reality. Self-consciousness is that same belief but with a belief in a separation between the believer and the believed. I think it depends on what the machines actually are physically as to what they will be able to believe or develop. If you execute the machine in silicon, you're going to have a polite glass sculpture of belief, not a fierce, viscerally passionate belief. The math alone can create a correspondence as-if it were true, but only the physics can create the conditions of true through experience in spite of logic, which is what gives the believer not only separation but something of a trump-card privilege over the believed. In a contest of math v physics, I think the physical can generate novelties in advance of math, so that the arithmetic is an analytical afterthought. Physics cannot be anticipated from the math alone, it can only be reverse engineered from factual physical observations. Math can of course be used to build on physics as well (nuclear fission, etc) but it still requires a priori indexes of atomic behaviors which are independent from pure arithmetic. Craig Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 12, 5:05 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Aug 2011, at 08:55, Stephen P. King wrote: What special sauce? Why is it ok to assume that consciousness is something special that can only occur is special circumstances? Why not consider that possibility that it is just as primitive as mass, charge and spin? That would be a category mistake. Mass, charge and spin refer to measurable observable, even apparently related by laws. Consciousness is an attribute of person, which are higher order entity, in most theories. 'Higher order' is conceptual. Consciousness can still be a primitive, as it is observable, in exquisite detail and consistency to the subject themselves. Whether the threshold for the observation of consciousness occurs at the person level, or the organism, cell, molecule, or atom does not impact it's irreducibility. Whatever the level, it can be considered a primitive if it is not experienced at a lower level, which unfortunately is not easy to confirm without doing some wet work in the brain. Think of it like 'life' itself. Whether or not a cell or organism is still alive is a primitive. If you zoom in on the microcosm, that continuum of vitality blurs into molecular function, but on the macro level, the observation of irrevocable death is an ordinary and valid phenomenon. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 11.08.2011 22:46 meekerdb said the following: On 8/11/2011 1:04 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? I'd say You do, there's no separate person to follow it, it just This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. IS. On the other hand, in terms of engineering a robot, I'd put this narrative into long-term memory (disk?) in some kind of easily It is not a big deal to save two two-dimensional images from retina. It should be possible even to construct from them a three-dimensional image. The question is what happens next? It is the same question, who gets this 3D-image. searched database. Then when some problem came up that wasn't covered by existing modules, the robot would search this database for possible relevant situations in the past. So it would be part of the learning algorithm. Evgeny -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 00:00 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 11, 4:04 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? Just as an image is an agreement of regions of color and contrast, consciousness is an agreement of regions of multi-sensory images An agreement between what? What agrees with what and what consciousness makes to this end? (both live and remembered). Who follows the narrative is the part of the nervous system which perceives not sounds or colors, but narratives and personalities. The cortex is a sense organ of meaning, archetype, and symbol. It's an interior world though, not of discrete objects in space but of entangled subjects in time. Experiential phenomena which, like the great red spot on Jupiter, persists and insists as a pattern. In the case of the self it is both a pattern and a different pattern within it's own pattern recognition. By the way, why you say that vision is a narrative in 2D? I feel myself in 3D. Well, the time is also there, so even 4D. Vision is really pseudo 3D if you think about it. It's just two 2D images that you read as a single 3D text - which is why perspective I agree that my retina obtains two two-dimensional images. I do not see them however. I experience a 3D world that is constructed by my brain and it happens unconsciously. I cannot influence this, I cannot actually even experience 2D images. If I see a picture for example, my brain still constructs some 3D world that then I experience. Hence, I do not know what you experience, but I live in a 3D world, not in pseudo 3D world. and trompe l'oeil can fool our perception. Our tactile sense would be more of a 3D sense I think. All sense occurs in the context of time by definition, since sense the experience of change or difference in a physical phenomenon (experience is the interiority of energy). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/12/2011 11:00 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.08.2011 22:46 meekerdb said the following: On 8/11/2011 1:04 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? I'd say You do, there's no separate person to follow it, it just This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. IS. On the other hand, in terms of engineering a robot, I'd put this narrative into long-term memory (disk?) in some kind of easily It is not a big deal to save two two-dimensional images from retina. It should be possible even to construct from them a three-dimensional image. The question is what happens next? It is the same question, who gets this 3D-image. You robot do. It gets tagged with some notes, timestamped, and stuck in the database for further reference and adjustment of learning algorithms. That's it. There's no homunculus who watches it in the Cartesian theater. That it is referenced and used in your cogitation to influence your speech and other actions is what constitutes your being conscious of it. Brent searched database. Then when some problem came up that wasn't covered by existing modules, the robot would search this database for possible relevant situations in the past. So it would be part of the learning algorithm. Evgeny -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 12, 2:00 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. If you consider that the world, the body, and the brain all might have an interior topology, then it's not so mysterious. The self is what the interior of the brain feels like, a person is what the self feels inside of a body, and a lifetime is what the inside of the world feels like to a person. Within a lifetime, other lifetimes and perceptual frames of references are contacted indirectly as exterior phenomena, having discrete objective characteristics. The interior topology is an ontological set complement. It does not operate by the conventions of existence, it operates through the sensorimotive-semantic entanglements of insistence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 20:40 meekerdb said the following: On 8/12/2011 11:00 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.08.2011 22:46 meekerdb said the following: On 8/11/2011 1:04 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? I'd say You do, there's no separate person to follow it, it just This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. IS. On the other hand, in terms of engineering a robot, I'd put this narrative into long-term memory (disk?) in some kind of easily It is not a big deal to save two two-dimensional images from retina. It should be possible even to construct from them a three-dimensional image. The question is what happens next? It is the same question, who gets this 3D-image. You robot do. It gets tagged with some notes, timestamped, and stuck in the database for further reference and adjustment of learning algorithms. That's it. There's no homunculus who watches it in the Cartesian theater. That it is referenced and used in your cogitation to influence your speech and other actions is what constitutes your being conscious of it. A quote from Jeffrey Gray (p. 110, it is just one of hypotheses in the book, this time on the verge of dualism) (1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells; (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display; (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual electrochemical medium. Is this close to what you have said? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 12.08.2011 20:47 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 12, 2:00 pm, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. If you consider that the world, the body, and the brain all might have an interior topology, then it's not so mysterious. The self is what the interior of the brain feels like, a person is what the self feels inside of a body, and a lifetime is what the inside of the world feels like to a person. Within a lifetime, other lifetimes and perceptual frames of references are contacted indirectly as exterior phenomena, having discrete objective characteristics. The interior topology is an ontological set complement. It does not operate by the conventions of existence, it operates through the sensorimotive-semantic entanglements of insistence. It would be interesting to see how do you know this. Some revelation or something else? Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 12, 3:41 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: It would be interesting to see how do you know this. Some revelation or something else? I don't know it, I just think that it could be the case. If you can fully and finally reject the proposition that your own experiences could be metaphysical, then you are left with describing what experience is in objective terms as a phenomena. Since we find ourselves perceiving the world from the interior of a body, then it's not all that outrageous to hypothesize that this interior-exterior relationship between being a body and an experiencer of bodies might not be a unique invention in the universe, and that the many and fundamentally significant diametrically complimentary qualities of subjective phenomena compared to objective might not be a meaningless coincidence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/12/2011 12:37 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 12.08.2011 20:40 meekerdb said the following: On 8/12/2011 11:00 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.08.2011 22:46 meekerdb said the following: On 8/11/2011 1:04 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? I'd say You do, there's no separate person to follow it, it just This the point that I do not understand. The question is here more what exactly is the observer in my body. Presumably it is the brain. Then it first constructs the world that I observe, than it observes the constructed world. It is completely unclear though, how it happens. IS. On the other hand, in terms of engineering a robot, I'd put this narrative into long-term memory (disk?) in some kind of easily It is not a big deal to save two two-dimensional images from retina. It should be possible even to construct from them a three-dimensional image. The question is what happens next? It is the same question, who gets this 3D-image. You robot do. It gets tagged with some notes, timestamped, and stuck in the database for further reference and adjustment of learning algorithms. That's it. There's no homunculus who watches it in the Cartesian theater. That it is referenced and used in your cogitation to influence your speech and other actions is what constitutes your being conscious of it. A quote from Jeffrey Gray (p. 110, it is just one of hypotheses in the book, this time on the verge of dualism) (1) the unconscious brain constructs a display in a medium, that of conscious perception, fundamentally different from its usual medium of electrochemical activity in and between nerve cells; I don't know what this means. I might agree with it as a metaphor, but I have no idea what the medium of conscious perception refers to. It seems to assume what it purports to explain. (2) it inspects the conscious constructed display; This has the brain inspecting itself. Again it seems metaphorical. It might be a metaphor for my AI robot tagging stuff it puts in its database. (3) it uses the results of the display to change the working of its usual electrochemical medium. Is this close to what you have said? Maybe. Brent Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 1:14 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/10/2011 8:20 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen Your just confusing things. It's a hypothetical. Craig holds that only organic kinds of things can be conscious, so hypothetically one could make a functionally identical (input/output) component that was not conscious. Brent umm, no, he does not. He is arguing against the idea everything is a clockwork machine that can be reduced to a finite statement. My point is that we do not have an objective test of consciousness or unconsciousness, so we at best are speculating about that consciousness is or is not. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? There is no test, it is just assumed for the purpose of the thought experiment that the component lacks the special sauce required for consciousness. We could even say that the component works by magic to avoid discussions about technical difficulties, and the thought experiment is unaffected. The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. What special sauce? Why is it ok to assume that consciousness is something special that can only occur is special circumstances? Why not consider that possibility that it is just as primitive as mass, charge and spin? Why do we need to work so hard to dismiss the direct evidence of our 1st person experience? Why not just accept that it is real and then wonder why materialist theories have no room whatsoever in them for it? The specific question I'm asking is whether it is possible to separate consciousness from behaviour. Is it possible to make a brain component that from the engineering point of view functions perfectly when installed but does not contribute the same consciousness to the brain? You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 1:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/10/2011 8:20 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen Your just confusing things. It's a hypothetical. Craig holds that only organic kinds of things can be conscious, so hypothetically one could make a functionally identical (input/output) component that was not conscious. Not exactly. I'm saying that what we mean by conscious is a special case of biological awareness. It's not that something inorganic cannot be 'conscious' in another way, it's that it won't feel like we feel because it has never lived as an animal. A computer made of silicon can reproduce i/o to some extent, just as a telephone can reproduce human i/o to some extent, but our ability to infer a human presence behind a voice on a telephone or a program running a chip is just our inference. This is what sensory awareness does - it's a kind of ventriloquism in reverse, jumping the gaps between protocol junctions to try infer sensible characteristics about the source. Conscious cannot meaningfully be described as a binary distinction from non-conscious in this context. It's a qualitative range. I'm saying that you need R, G, and B pixels on a monitor to get the color image of human consciousness and that inorganic matter appears to only be able to provide blue pixels. Yes, you can watch a program in blue pixels only, but it's not the same thing as full color, regardless of how many pixels and how fine a resolution there is. You cannot make a single red pixel out of blue. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 1:14 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. Consciousness itself leads to conceptual difficulties. Except for the fact that we cannot ignore that it is undeniable, we could never logically conceive of consciousness. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 3:25 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The specific question I'm asking is whether it is possible to separate consciousness from behaviour. To which I have responded repeatedly, consciousness and behavior are not useful terms. If you insist upon using them then the best way to consider their relation is as a Venn diagram of intersecting open sets. They can neither be separated completely nor conflated completely. Is it possible to make a brain component that from the engineering point of view functions perfectly when installed but does not contribute the same consciousness to the brain? There is no engineering point of view which is relevant, unless it's genetic engineering. To replace a living community with a machine is failure from the beginning. It's like saying if you replaced YouTube with something which functions perfectly but has no users. The content comes from users, so sooner or later people are going to notice that nobody can put up any new videos. You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? What do you mean by function? Is yellow a function? Is irony or comedy a function? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 10:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? What do you mean by function? Is yellow a function? Is irony or comedy a function? On the one hand there is the third person observable behaviour of the neurons: they fire in a certain sequence and ultimately they cause muscle contraction. On the other hand there is that which can only be experienced by the first person. Can these be separated, so that neurons can be made which cause the muscles to contract in the same sequence when substituted into the brain but lack the subjective qualities of normal neurons? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 10:22 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 10:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? What do you mean by function? Is yellow a function? Is irony or comedy a function? On the one hand there is the third person observable behaviour of the neurons: they fire in a certain sequence and ultimately they cause muscle contraction.? I would say that technically they don't cause muscle contraction, because muscles can and do contract by themselves under the right biochemical conditions (potassium imbalance, etc). It's not just the sequence, it's the physical presence of something that is 'firing' that the proteins of the muscle imitates in it's own language. As we know, frog legs can be contracted from a wire 'firing', so it's not just an abstract sequence, it's a concrete physical event. On the other hand there is that which can only be experienced by the first person. Can these be separated, so that neurons can be made which cause the muscles to contract in the same sequence when substituted into the brain but lack the subjective qualities of normal neurons Sure, muscles will contract for any old material that can conduct an electric current. A muscle doesn't require a high level conversation with the brain's cells to react. We can move in our sleep when we aren't subjectively conscious of it. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 12:25 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? There is no test, it is just assumed for the purpose of the thought experiment that the component lacks the special sauce required for consciousness. We could even say that the component works by magic to avoid discussions about technical difficulties, and the thought experiment is unaffected. The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. What special sauce? Why is it ok to assume that consciousness is something special that can only occur is special circumstances? Why not consider that possibility that it is just as primitive as mass, charge and spin? Why do we need to work so hard to dismiss the direct evidence of our 1st person experience? Why not just accept that it is real and then wonder why materialist theories have no room whatsoever in them for it? The specific question I'm asking is whether it is possible to separate consciousness from behaviour. Is it possible to make a brain component that from the engineering point of view functions perfectly when installed but does not contribute the same consciousness to the brain? You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? Just to be clear, I'm interested in a slightly different question which relative to Stathis might be phrased as function of what? If we look at the whole person/robot we talk about behavior, which I think is enough to establish some kind of consciousness, but not necessarily to map each instance of a behavior to a specific conscious thought. People can be thinking different things while performing the same act. So unless we specify same behavior to mean same input/output for all possible input sequences there is room for same behavior and different consciousness. And this same kind of analysis applies to subsets of the brain as well as to the whole person. So in Stathis example of replacing half the brain with a super AI module which has the same input/output relation with the body and the other half of the brain, it is not at all clear to me that the person's consciousness is unchanged. Stathis relies on it being *reported* as unchanged because the speech center is in the other half, but where is the consciousness center? It may be that we're over-idealizing the isolation of the brain. If the super AI half were perfectly isolated except for those input/output channels which we are hypothesizing to be perfectly emulating the dumb brain then Stathis argument would show that what ever change in consciousness might be inside the super AI side it would be undetectable. But in fact the super AI side cannot be perfectly isolated to those channels, even aside from quantum entanglement there are thermal perturbations and radioactivity. This means that the super AI will produce different behavior because it will respond differently under these perturbations. This different behavior will evince its different consciousness. So in saying 'yes' to the doctor you should either be ready to assume some difference in consciousness or suppose that the substitution level may encompass a significant part of the Milky Way down to the fundamental particle level. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 11.08.2011 09:25 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: ... The specific question I'm asking is whether it is possible to separate consciousness from behaviour. Is it possible to make a brain component that from the engineering point of view functions perfectly when installed but does not contribute the same consciousness to the brain? You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? It is tricky to prove consciousness from behavior. Yet, it seems sometimes to be possible under some mild assumptions. To this end I will briefly describe below an experiment that has been done to prove that a monkey has conscious visual perception (p. 69 in Jeffrey Gray, Consciousness: Creeping on the hard problem). By the way, I have found the original paper that he cites (pdf seems to be freely available): N K Logothetis, Single units and conscious vision. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1692419/ The experiment is based on binocular rivalry. When each eye sees a different image, then brain cannot merge them into a consistent view. Rather a person experience in such a case either the first image or the second and the images changes periodically. Let me put it this way, the images on retina in both eyes are constant and different, but we experience not two images at once but rather they change periodically. An assumption. If someone experiences binocular rivalry, then he/she has conscious visual perception. The question is then how to prove that a monkey experience binocular rivalry. This has been done for example by training a monkey to press correctly different levels when it sees different images. As a whole it is tricky but looks reasonable. Well, this was just an idea and there is some more stuff in the paper. Clearly one can develop a robot that will claim that it experiences binocular rivalry. Yet, this is in my view an another problem. Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 12:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.08.2011 09:25 Stathis Papaioannou said the following: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: ... The specific question I'm asking is whether it is possible to separate consciousness from behaviour. Is it possible to make a brain component that from the engineering point of view functions perfectly when installed but does not contribute the same consciousness to the brain? You will note that there is no claim here about any theory of consciousness: it could be intrinsic to matter, it could come from tiny black holes inside cells, it could be generated on the fly by God. Whatever it is, can it be separated from function? It is tricky to prove consciousness from behavior. Yet, it seems sometimes to be possible under some mild assumptions. To this end I will briefly describe below an experiment that has been done to prove that a monkey has conscious visual perception (p. 69 in Jeffrey Gray, Consciousness: Creeping on the hard problem). By the way, I have found the original paper that he cites (pdf seems to be freely available): N K Logothetis, Single units and conscious vision. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1692419/ The experiment is based on binocular rivalry. When each eye sees a different image, then brain cannot merge them into a consistent view. Rather a person experience in such a case either the first image or the second and the images changes periodically. Let me put it this way, the images on retina in both eyes are constant and different, but we experience not two images at once but rather they change periodically. An assumption. If someone experiences binocular rivalry, then he/she has conscious visual perception. The question is then how to prove that a monkey experience binocular rivalry. This has been done for example by training a monkey to press correctly different levels when it sees different images. As a whole it is tricky but looks reasonable. Well, this was just an idea and there is some more stuff in the paper. Clearly one can develop a robot that will claim that it experiences binocular rivalry. Yet, this is in my view an another problem. Evgenii http://blog.rudnyi.ru Very interesting. I wonder if one sees the other image by blind sight? I would expect so. This could be tested in the same way blindsight is detected in split-brain subjects. Then you have the problem: Is there just one consciousness; or is there just one that can access speech? I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 3:13 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. I think consciousness of perception is just perception of perception. What the retina does to the outside world, the visual cortex does to the retina, and the rest of the cortex does to the visual areas of the cortex. We watch the watchers who watch our body watch it's world - visually, aurally, kinesthetically, etc. Vision is a neurological narrative in two dimensions (x2). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 12:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 3:13 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. I think consciousness of perception is just perception of perception. Oh, OK. Just so you have good explanation. Brent What the retina does to the outside world, the visual cortex does to the retina, and the rest of the cortex does to the visual areas of the cortex. We watch the watchers who watch our body watch it's world - visually, aurally, kinesthetically, etc. Vision is a neurological narrative in two dimensions (x2). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 12:25 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 3:13 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. I think consciousness of perception is just perception of perception. What the retina does to the outside world, the visual cortex does to the retina, and the rest of the cortex does to the visual areas of the cortex. We watch the watchers who watch our body watch it's world - visually, aurally, kinesthetically, etc. Vision is a neurological narrative in two dimensions (x2). Craig That's pretty much Antonio Damasio's model of consciousness. Except that it's not passive perception, it's creating a coherent model from the different perceptions. That's why the binocular conflict is resolved just by seeing one image or the other. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 3:44 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: That's pretty much Antonio Damasio's model of consciousness. Except that it's not passive perception, it's creating a coherent model from the different perceptions. That's why the binocular conflict is resolved just by seeing one image or the other. I see perception as both active and passive in both sensory and motive directions. Not so much a coherent model as revealing coherence through the blind gaps in sensitivity which invite participatory coordination and interpretation. Perceptions are prioritized and consolidated through conflict at each level. The subject literally is the thread that sews perception together. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 11.08.2011 21:25 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 11, 3:13 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. I think consciousness of perception is just perception of perception. What the retina does to the outside world, the visual cortex does to the retina, and the rest of the cortex does to the visual areas of the cortex. We watch the watchers who watch our body watch it's world - visually, aurally, kinesthetically, etc. Vision is a neurological narrative in two dimensions (x2). I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? By the way, why you say that vision is a narrative in 2D? I feel myself in 3D. Well, the time is also there, so even 4D. Evgeny -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 1:04 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.08.2011 21:25 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 11, 3:13 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think consciousness of perception is a narrative story the brain makes up for the purpose of memory and future cogitation. That's why we have few conscious memories prior to learning language. I think consciousness of perception is just perception of perception. What the retina does to the outside world, the visual cortex does to the retina, and the rest of the cortex does to the visual areas of the cortex. We watch the watchers who watch our body watch it's world - visually, aurally, kinesthetically, etc. Vision is a neurological narrative in two dimensions (x2). I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? I'd say You do, there's no separate person to follow it, it just IS. On the other hand, in terms of engineering a robot, I'd put this narrative into long-term memory (disk?) in some kind of easily searched database. Then when some problem came up that wasn't covered by existing modules, the robot would search this database for possible relevant situations in the past. So it would be part of the learning algorithm. By the way, why you say that vision is a narrative in 2D? I feel myself in 3D. Well, the time is also there, so even 4D. Right. As I said, perception is constructive, not passive. Brent Evgeny -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 4:04 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: I would say now that consciousness is conscious perception. The main problem in my view though is who follows the narrative. Does your theory answer such a question? Just as an image is an agreement of regions of color and contrast, consciousness is an agreement of regions of multi-sensory images (both live and remembered). Who follows the narrative is the part of the nervous system which perceives not sounds or colors, but narratives and personalities. The cortex is a sense organ of meaning, archetype, and symbol. It's an interior world though, not of discrete objects in space but of entangled subjects in time. Experiential phenomena which, like the great red spot on Jupiter, persists and insists as a pattern. In the case of the self it is both a pattern and a different pattern within it's own pattern recognition. By the way, why you say that vision is a narrative in 2D? I feel myself in 3D. Well, the time is also there, so even 4D. Vision is really pseudo 3D if you think about it. It's just two 2D images that you read as a single 3D text - which is why perspective and trompe l'oeil can fool our perception. Our tactile sense would be more of a 3D sense I think. All sense occurs in the context of time by definition, since sense the experience of change or difference in a physical phenomenon (experience is the interiority of energy). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 4:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Right. As I said, perception is constructive, not passive. True, but 'we' aren't the ones doing the constructively. Something like visual sense is presented to us so that we receive it passively, even though on the visual level images are being resolved actively and on the associative level it is being recognized actively. The part of the psyche that is 'us', has a narrow band of meta-perceptual conflicts to resolve - ie, which streams of sensorimotive phenomena to pay attention to, which ones to try to alter, pursue, etc. We may be no more special than any other subjective body within the psyche but we are in the executive position over the efferent nerves of the entire body, and therefore have political significance if nothing else, compared to a subordinate entity such as our visual processing or hormone secreting neighbors. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/11/2011 3:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 4:46 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: Right. As I said, perception is constructive, not passive. True, but 'we' aren't the ones doing the constructively. Something like visual sense is presented to us so that we receive it passively, even though on the visual level images are being resolved actively and on the associative level it is being recognized actively. You write as if 'you' is just your conscious thoughts and so all the other 99% of the stuff your eyes and brain do isn't you. The part of the psyche that is 'us', has a narrow band of meta-perceptual conflicts to resolve - ie, which streams of sensorimotive phenomena to pay attention to, which ones to try to alter, pursue, etc. We may be no more special than any other subjective body within the psyche but we are in the executive position over the efferent nerves of the entire body, and therefore have political significance if nothing else, compared to a subordinate entity such as our visual processing or hormone secreting neighbors. So you is just a homunculus sitting in the Cartesian theater. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Aug 11, 8:37 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/11/2011 3:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 11, 4:46 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: Right. As I said, perception is constructive, not passive. True, but 'we' aren't the ones doing the constructively. Something like visual sense is presented to us so that we receive it passively, even though on the visual level images are being resolved actively and on the associative level it is being recognized actively. You write as if 'you' is just your conscious thoughts and so all the other 99% of the stuff your eyes and brain do isn't you. The scope of 'you' is really semantic. Your entire life could be considered 'you'. If we're talking about perception, there does seem to be a natural dialectic between perceiver and perceived during sober adult waking consciousness, but it seems to be a distinction which is dependent upon our attention to it. A dream, for instance, has more of a range of personal and impersonal subjectivity smeared within the psyche. The part of the psyche that is 'us', has a narrow band of meta-perceptual conflicts to resolve - ie, which streams of sensorimotive phenomena to pay attention to, which ones to try to alter, pursue, etc. We may be no more special than any other subjective body within the psyche but we are in the executive position over the efferent nerves of the entire body, and therefore have political significance if nothing else, compared to a subordinate entity such as our visual processing or hormone secreting neighbors. So you is just a homunculus sitting in the Cartesian theater. I'd say we're more the owner of the theater. The homunculus is just an employee, like the projectionist. The brain is the entire shopping mall that the theater is in, and the body could be the surrounding town, but the selection of movies, actors, and directors does not necessarily originate locally. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/10/2011 10:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Aug 10, 9:55 am, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. Suppose your right hemisphere is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at its boundaries but has a qualitatively different consciousness. To me this is like saying 'suppose the Eastern United States is replaced with a machine that is functionally identical at it's boundaries but has a qualitatively different culture. The left half of your left visual field will then look different, by definition if the visual qualia are different. But your left hemisphere receives the usual signals through the corpus callosum, The diplomatic relations with Europe will then be different, by definition if the diplomatic culture is different. But the Western U.S. receives the usual traffic across the Mississippi River, so you state via the speech centres in that hemisphere that everything looks exactly the same. so the Eastern media reports the news that the diplomatic situation with Europe has not changed. In other words you can't notice any change in your consciousness due to the functionally identical replacement. I would say that if you continue to behave normally and you notice no change in your consciousness then there *is* no difference in your consciousness. In other words Americans can't notice any change in their culture due to the functionally identical replacement. You would say that if the US continues to behave normally and it notices no change in it's culture then there *is* no difference in it's culture. Can you see why that's a rather oversimplified and misleading thought experiment? If you replace a civilization of living organisms with a machine, you have changed it's culture already. The intelligence of the system isn't limited to the physical relations between the neurons, it's millions of nodes of sensitivity all corroborating experiences about the interior and exterior worlds. Not a good analogy since the US is not conscious as a single entity. Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On 8/10/2011 8:20 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? Onward! Stephen Your just confusing things. It's a hypothetical. Craig holds that only organic kinds of things can be conscious, so hypothetically one could make a functionally identical (input/output) component that was not conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Unconscious Components
On Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Please explain what would you think would happen if you replaced part of your brain with an unconscious component that interacted normally with the surrounding neurons. Would you say I feel different or would you say I feel exactly the same as before? Hi Stathis, Exactly how would we know that that component was unconscious? What is the test? There is no test, it is just assumed for the purpose of the thought experiment that the component lacks the special sauce required for consciousness. We could even say that the component works by magic to avoid discussions about technical difficulties, and the thought experiment is unaffected. The conclusion is that such a device is impossible because it leads to conceptual difficulties. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
