Re: The One
On 08 Jan 2014, at 18:53, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Jan 2014, at 20:05, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Mon, Jan 6, 2014 at 6:31 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Dear Stephen, On 03 Jan 2014, at 20:21, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I do not understand something. OK. (good!) Your idea It is not an idea, but a result in an hypothetical context (or theoretical context). seems to me to be a very sophisticated and yat sneaky way of reintroducing Newton/Laplacean absolute time and/or Leibnitz' Pre-established Harmony. It is only a remind of elementary arithmetic. The music 0, s0, ss0, sss0, 0, s0, ss0, sss0, ... You can see it as an elementary block digital time. If you want. And then all other times are relative indexicals, including the physical and subjective times. Bruno, I think I (perhaps naively) understand what you mean. My understanding is that, if comp is true, then the relationship between comp and the physical laws we observe is not a simple one. Even QM would be at a high level of abstraction in relation to raw reality. In this case, the recursive definition of integers would be the simplest possible expression of a fundamental building block that is responsible for time -- although the time we experience is a much more complex phenomena. It makes sense to me that time is strongly related to recursivity (maybe because of a CS background). I imagine moments being copied forward and changed in some fashion. Would you agree with these intuitions? Yes. But recursivity relies on the ordering 0, s0, ss0, ... which is admitted in the axioms, and so is a notion of time more primitive than the recursive definition by themselves. Ok, I follow you up to here... Another notion of time, which is still rather primitive is the time step of the computations implemented by the UD (or arithmetic) like the phi_344(76)^1, phi_344(76)^2, phi_344(76)^3, phi_344(76)^4, phi_344(76)^5, phi_344(76)^6, phi_344(76)^7, ... (with phi_i(j)-n = the nth step of the computation of program i on input j. It is different from the UD steps, because the UD dovetails, and can execute billions of steps between phi_344(76)^6 and phi_344(76)^7 for example. But those times have no direct link with the observed time from inside, which emerges from the logic of the first person points of view. The logic of Bp p, and Bp Dt p, have some canonical temporal significations. Your time is eventually defined by the set of your continuation. It can happen that phi_i(j)^n is lived by you statistically after some phi_i(j)^m with m n, a priori. ...but this is more mysterious to me. What should I read to understand this phi business? I have explained this to Liz, but some revision might be in need, if only for some others. I will do that someday. Today is a busy day. Meanwhile the classical book on this subject is the book by Rogers. A good book is by Cutland: Rogers: http://www.amazon.com/Theory-Recursive-Functions-Effective-Computability/dp/0262680521 Cutland: http://www.amazon.com/Computability-Introduction-Recursive-Function-Theory/dp/0521294657/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_z The basic idea is very simple. take a computer programming language. You can put all the (one variable) program in lexicographical order P_0, P_1, P_2, P_3, phi_i is just the function computed by P_i. By universality, phi_i gives an enumeration (with repetition) of all computable functions. By dovetailing on the initial segment of the computations, you get the UD which implements all programs. More later, Bruno Telmo. Bruno I recall reading how much Einstein himself loved the idea and was loath to give it up, thus motivating his quest for a classical grand unified field theory. Physics has moved on... After Aristotle Physics has also moved on ... I think Einstein was right on QM, and wrong on GR, in the sense that GR has to be justified by the quantum, before, perhaps justifying the quantum by the digital seen from inside. You recently wrote: The only time needed for the notion of computation is the successor relation on the non negative integers. It is not a physical time, as it is only the standard ordering of the natural numbers: 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. So, the 3p outer structure is very simple, conceptually, as it is given by the standard structure, known to be very complex, mathematically, of the additive/multiplicative (and hybrids of course) structure of the numbers (or any object-of-talk of a universal numbers). That is indeed a quite static structure (and usually we don't attribute consciousness to that type of thing, but salvia makes some (1p alas) point against this). Let me try to clarify how I am confused by this claim. OK. How many different versions of the integers exist? AFAIK, there can be only One and
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 08 Jan 2014, at 18:57, Telmo Menezes wrote: In case you haven't seen it... http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? Will take a look. It is weird indeed. Especially coming from someone who pleaded that the brain works classically. It seems more physicalist that his own MUH makes possible. Hmm... it looks like non- comp stuff. He does not even cite Everett there. Not clear what is meant by matter in that frame. Bruno Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings... But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* collapse might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Nature of Truth
On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:11, John Mikes wrote: Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), It is that one. Bp p means that p is believed (by some machine) and that it is the case that p. or 2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)? No. That would be equivalent with Bp. Bruno (none of the two may be 'true'). JM On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote: On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs. ? I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never know as such. Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds with different events (and even different physics) it seems that true belief is not a very useful concept. It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp p (true belief) obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic) despite G* knows that it is the same machine, having the same action. The machine just dont know that, although it can infer it from comp + a sort of faith in herself. Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true. neither Bp nor Bp p is a priori related to probability. For this you need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp p, though, and indeed a physics appears already there, but that is a sort of anomaly (which confirms what I took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but the machine agrees with him). Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the corresponding certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We need to extract the logic, and the probability different from 1 are handled by the mathematics, and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The probability bears on the accessible worlds. The interesting concept is the probability of future events relative to one's current state. That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp Dt (or Bp Dt p, or actually Bp p). This gives the relevant notion of relative consistency together with some temporal interpretation. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Nazi History of the Muslim Brotherhood
On 20 Aug 2013, at 14:13, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Also I believe that 9/11 was a good thing, That's gross. albeit it would have been better if Bin Laden had focusses only on legitimate military targets like the White House, the US Congress, the Senate and the Pentagon. My bag of evidences that 9/11 is a false flag has grown bigger than the bag of evidences that Bin Laden is the responsible one. The main evidence for the false flag is the total lack of seriousness of the NIST official report. I am afraid the war on terror is as much fear selling than the war on drugs. Bruno Citeren Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net: The Nazi history of the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jk4a3Kk6-Y Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Nature of Truth
On 09 Jan 2014, at 05:55, meekerdb wrote: Bruno writes Bp p, where Bp ambiguously means Proves p (Beweisbar?) and Believes p. What is ambiguous? I said that I limit the interview to Platonist *correct* machine, believing in arithmetic or in recursively enumerable extension of arithmetic. And the fact that the machine cannot prove Bp - p for all p, suggest that provability obeys to the axioms I gave for belief, and not for knowledge (where Bp-p is not just true but believed as well). Believes p and P is then a belief that is true. OK. That's correct. I put scare quotes around true because I think it just means is a consequence of some (Peano's) axioms, which is not necessarily the same as expresses a fact. At the meta-level (G*), that is true, but the machine does not know that, and for correct machine, this change nothing. We have Bp - p (as a theorem of G*, not of G). Bruno Brent On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno and Brent: did you agree whether TRUE BELIEF means in your sentences 1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or 2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)? (none of the two may be 'true'). JM On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote: On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs. ? I answered no to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those beliefs are true, but this you can never know as such. Since your theory to an infinite number of semi-classical worlds with different events (and even different physics) it seems that true belief is not a very useful concept. It is, because by incompleteness, we will have that Bp p (true belief) obeys a different logic (an epistemic intuitionist logic) despite G* knows that it is the same machine, having the same action. The machine just dont know that, although it can infer it from comp + a sort of faith in herself. Every belief is going to have probability zero of being true. neither Bp nor Bp p is a priori related to probability. For this you need []p - p, which is ocrrect for Bp p, though, and indeed a physics appears already there, but that is a sort of anomaly (which confirms what I took as an anomaly in Plotinus, but the machine agrees with him). Now, Bp, when present in the nuances, gives the logic of the corresponding certainty, so it is trivially a probability one. We need to extract the logic, and the probability different from 1 are handled by the mathematics, and is related to the Dp (not Bp). The probability bears on the accessible worlds. The interesting concept is the probability of future events relative to one's current state. That's exactly why we need to go from Bp to Bp Dt (or Bp Dt p, or actually Bp p). This gives the relevant notion of relative consistency together with some temporal interpretation. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On his web site Max Tegmark says something like for every 10 serious papers I publish, I allow myself one crazy one - this may be the latest crazy one, meaning that it's highly speculative and shouldn't be expected to synch with his other papers (crazy or otherwise). (Or then again, this may be one of the sensible ones...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings... But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* collapse might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fukushima myth
In any case, they are _your_ straw Horsemen 2014/1/5, LizR lizj...@gmail.com: On 6 January 2014 09:55, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Don´t try to convince hyperinformed idiots. they will consume the information that they choose to believe. For the new analphabets, consumers of the internet fantasies and myts, what formerly was called spirits are now energies. And Nuclear energy is the worst of all with the three other horsemen of the Apocalypse: Oil, Capitalism and Church. Don´t try to whitewash their evils. the want them as evils in perpetual fight against the Mother Earth, and nothing more. Or, else, they will hang you What are you talking about? Sounds like the Straw Horsemen of the Apocalypse to me :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fukushima myth
2014/1/5, LizR lizj...@gmail.com: The idea would seem to be, get someone to present an exaggerated claim, show it to be false, then claim that therefore there is no problem. Happens all the time with climate change denial. LizR I have to say something important that no one will believe except you the conspiracy apocalipticists, But it is true as long as Bp - p : We the deniers are extraterrestrials in chargo of drilling the resources of the Earth for our own planet. What is in Roswell is a new model of solar panel that pan-universal ecologist of us tried to give to you to advance your civilization. MUA HAHAHAA HA On 6 January 2014 08:57, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Now the question is, do you believe the opposite of what SNOPES has presented? Also, as global peasants, we have no influence over what the scientists look for on behalf of politicians, their bureaucrats, or the billionaires that pay them. We can have an opinion about being thrown out a window from twenty stories up, but we have no control over gravity-this is known as free will. -Original Message- From: Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, Jan 5, 2014 9:57 am Subject: Fukushima myth http://www.snopes.com/photos/technology/fukushima.asp -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds. The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary quite widely among species Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:26:16 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Brent, I have given my definition of reality previously, but here it is again. For some collection of observers that can communicate, a reality is that which is incontrovertible. In other words, a reality is that which all observers agree. I do not like the idea of an a priori reality as such can be defined arbitrarily to suit one's whim. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:11 AM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Brent, I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something real about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a god's eye view by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a level of substitution so that the Yes, Doctor choice is possible. Notice that you had to put real in scare quotes - because it isn't clear what it means. I think the conclusion is that, in Bruno's MGA, the inert program needs to include a great deal, essentially a whole universe. That doesn't make it wrong, but to me it makes it less interesting. It would be surprising than an inert program could implement consciousness in this world, since it couldn't interact with this world. But if it's conscious within it's own world, then it's just like any other simulation (e.g. The Matrix). Brent On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:40:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit. Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds. Consider that n goes to infinity and that p is the probability of that an observer has experiences that can be matched up with those of another via some diffeomorphism... The probability that the individual experience are completely independent simulations becomes vanishingly small! The actual reality is pure computationally evolving information in the presence of the substrate (what I call ontological energy) of reality. On the other hands the simulated realities in organismic minds manifest to the organisms as classical material worlds which they are not, and these vary quite widely among species Do you consider the computational complexity involved? It has been pointed out, for example by Stephen Wolfram, that faithfully simulating a physical system (such that any number of observers having an experience of that systems could agree that it is the same system) is intractable (or at least NP-Complete). Experience is not a magical process! Its content can be quantified and related to measures of information and algorithmic complexity. Why don't you look into such? Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:26:16 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Brent, I have given my definition of reality previously, but here it is again. For some collection of observers that can communicate, a reality is that which is incontrovertible. In other words, a reality is that which all observers agree. I do not like the idea of an a priori reality as such can be defined arbitrarily to suit one's whim. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:11 AM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/8/2014 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Brent, I agree with you 100%! But that seems to imply that there is something real about the physical. I think that we can obtain a form of realism that does not involve a god's eye view by appealing to the possibility of coherent communication between multiple observers. Observers being defined as intersections of an infinite number of computations, ala Bruno's definition. We do not need an ontologically primitive physical world, we only need a level of substitution so that the Yes, Doctor
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the meta-level). Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings... But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* collapse might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. What is what makes our physical laws unique determined by COMP?' 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the meta-level). Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive, some of which act like you, and on which you can act (c.f. Dr Johnson). That implies that there must be a quasi-classical world in order to support consciousness (at least human-like consciousness). Those all seem like reasonable criteria. I imagine they could be fulfilled by a variety of physical laws (e.g. it probably wouldn't make a huge difference to the existence of human beings if light travelled 10% faster or slower). So presumably comp covers all possible physical laws which create conscious beings... But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations, and is unique (modulo that multiplication by three, as physics appears in three hypostases). And the determination is based on the FPI, and so physics is NOT a priori Turing emulable. The evidence that physics seems computable is a problem for comp, not an evidence for it. Fortunately the *apparent* collapse might be non-computable enough for comp to be correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For
Re: What are wavefunctions?
2014/1/9 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Well, read Bell. I have. It shows how QM violates his inequality. I know, I demonstrated exactly that on this very list using my own language. And Bell knew of course that his inequality was not consistent with Quantum Mechanics, what he didn't know at the time was if his inequality was consistent with reality or if Quantum Mechanics was. That question was answered experimentally a couple of decades after Bell's theoretical work and the winner was Quantum Mechanics; so now we know that at least one of the assumptions that Bell made (realism, locality, high school math works) must be wrong. but Bell's inequality IS violated. Experimentally, Huh? This is a physical idea not a mathematical one, how else could it be proven wrong other than experimentally? But when you look at the many branches, at once [...] Unfortunately my eyesight isn't good enough to allow me to look at many branches of the multiverse at once. to me, the Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence for MW, that is QM-without collapse. To me Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence that reality is not local or not realistic or not either. MWI is not local As I said Liar Clark *even* when presented with evidences will continue till his death to lie... what's the point to discuss with such a guy ? Quentin so it could be correct, and emotionally it is my favorite interpretation, but logically I must admit that it is not the only interpretation that could be correct. Much as I dislike Copenhagen the fact is it's non-realistic so the violation of Bell's inequality is not rule it out. But Einstein's idea that things are realistic and local (and deterministic too although determinism was less important to Einstein than realism or locality) IS ruled out. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:34 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: I think you will find relatively few physicists who expect that any new fundamental theory like quantum gravity will fail to have these [time] symmetries If so then time's arrow, that is to say time's asymmetry, is not the result of the fundamental laws of physics but is a statistical effect that could not be otherwise due to the nature of the initial conditions and the fact that there are just more ways to be disorganized than organized. by far the most popular explanation for macroscopic arrows of time is that it's due to the low-entropy boundary condition at the Big Bang And I have said exactly that approximately 6.02 * 10^23 times. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: All the physicists I know regard the second law of thermodynamics as a statistical, not fundamental, law. Exactly, and because statistics is based on pure logic and not on the trendy physical theory of the day if you asked those same physicists what idea is most likely to still seem valid to the scientific community in a thousand or even a million years they would probably say the second law of thermodynamics. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:41 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote For example, in Life one could define macrostates in terms of the ratio of white to black cells [...] In the Game of Life the number of black cells is always infinite, so I don't see how you can do any ratios. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Well, read Bell. I have. It shows how QM violates his inequality. I know, I demonstrated exactly that on this very list using my own language. And Bell knew of course that his inequality was not consistent with Quantum Mechanics, what he didn't know at the time was if his inequality was consistent with reality or if Quantum Mechanics was. That question was answered experimentally a couple of decades after Bell's theoretical work and the winner was Quantum Mechanics; so now we know that at least one of the assumptions that Bell made (realism, locality, high school math works) must be wrong. but Bell's inequality IS violated. Experimentally, Huh? This is a physical idea not a mathematical one, how else could it be proven wrong other than experimentally? But when you look at the many branches, at once [...] Unfortunately my eyesight isn't good enough to allow me to look at many branches of the multiverse at once. to me, the Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence for MW, that is QM-without collapse. To me Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence that reality is not local or not realistic or not either. MWI is not local so it could be correct, and emotionally it is my favorite interpretation, but logically I must admit that it is not the only interpretation that could be correct. Much as I dislike Copenhagen the fact is it's non-realistic so the violation of Bell's inequality is not rule it out. But Einstein's idea that things are realistic and local (and deterministic too although determinism was less important to Einstein than realism or locality) IS ruled out. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? Terren On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Terren, All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question which is why I didn't answer before... Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered. It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property of reality, as a function somehow of ontological energy. Terren On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Telmo, Thanks for the link but see my new topic A theory of consciousness of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much more reasonable and explanatory. Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: In case you haven't seen it... http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? What is what makes our physical laws unique determined by COMP?' That happens already at the step seven. I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping. Assuming comp, how do you predict exactly, after step six, the experience of dropping a pen in the air? What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground? You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs). To compute the exact probability of the event the pen fall on the ground, you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states. Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one simple law: basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations. Below our substitution level, physics is not given by one computation (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. Almost all means all those validating your first person experience. Then the math shows that the case of probability one, for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic. In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of the phi_i. There is no real (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet relative, conditional) measure on consistent enumerable extensions on all computations (going through your current states). (Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation). Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type first person plural experience. You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention and concentration all UDA steps, as they are all used at once in the step seven. Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Jan 2014, at 12:23, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But with comp the laws of physics are uniquely determined by a statistical sum on an infinity of computations Uniquely determined? That is like saying that The Buckingham Palace is uniquely determined by the statistical sum of a infinity of pieces of lego thrown in the site by infinite B52 bombers. You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. This should be clear from the UD-Argument. Comp makes the primitive universe into a fairy tle, but by doing so, it makes the physics much more solid (indeed physics is deduced from addition and multiplication only, with comp at the meta-level). Bruno 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:53, LizR wrote: On 9 January 2014 11:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/7/2014 10:36 PM, LizR wrote: Max's main lacuna is the nature of consciousness, which he describes as what data feels like when it's being processed - hardly a detailed theory. He starts his Mathematical Universe Hypothesis from the opposite pole to Bruno, so to speak. I wonder if it's possible for a particular mathemathical object to drop out of comp - after all, we do appear to live in a universe with a specific set of laws of physics. Are these the only ones that could be generated by comp (or generated by the existence of conscious beings in Platonia) ? Maybe one needs to somehow intersect comp with the MUH to get the full story! I think to be conscious you need memory and a sense of time passage (although Bruno disputes this when he comes back from a salvia trip). To escape solipism there must be objects your perceive,
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist realm. That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? Terren On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question which is why I didn't answer before... Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered. It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property of reality, as a function somehow of ontological energy. Terren On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Telmo, Thanks for the link but see my new topic A theory of consciousness of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much more reasonable and explanatory. Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: In case you haven't seen it... http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 6:59 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I'm arguing that time is symmetric, Good luck winning that argument when nearly everything we observe, from cosmology to cooking, screams at us that time is NOT symmetric. Not at the quantum level, If so then obviously the quantum level is not the end of the story. it was actually discovered before Bell died that there's a perfectly reasonable explanation for how his inequality can be violated that retains locality and realism. Baloney. If that's the best refutation you can come up with, John Bell and Huw Price have nothing to fear. They have nothing to fear from me or the truth. If retro-causality exists then things are not local and not realistic either, so that possibility has not been ruled out experimentally. But the common sense view that most people, including Einstein, had about reality, that things are realistic and local, CAN be ruled out. And of all the people on the planet John Bell would be the last to disagree that if his inequality is violated then things are not local or not realistic or not either. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! What is what makes our physical laws unique determined by COMP?' That happens already at the step seven. Could you be more specific as to how? I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping. Assuming comp, how do you predict exactly, after step six, the experience of dropping a pen in the air? What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground? I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws. You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs). To compute the exact probability of the event the pen fall on the ground, you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states. How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations? Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one simple law: basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations. It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter. This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not. Below our substitution level, physics is not given by one computation (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. Almost all means all those validating your first person experience. Yes, but not just one physics! The level of substitution is itself induced by and emergent from physical laws, thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for particular physical laws. Then the math shows that the case of probability one, for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic. Not necessarily! It only shows FPI. There are many quantum logics. Which one are you considering? I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of observable operators from AR. It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics is classical and this has always bothered me, given that we have very good evidence that our common universe IS NOT Classical. In fact comp gives a criteria to distinguish geography (which depends on many indexicals) and physics, which appears to be indexical independent. Physics is even independent of the choice of the base of the phi_i. How? What does it depend on? Maybe I do not know your definition of physics... There is no real (ontic) physical reality, but still a *unique* (yet relative, conditional) measure on consistent enumerable extensions on all computations (going through your current states). I agree with this. (Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation). Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type first person plural experience. Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural) problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA. You have to understand all this by yourself. Reread with attention and
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience. You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree. With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit. Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds. Consider that n goes to infinity and that p is the probability of that an observer has experiences that can be matched up with those of another via some diffeomorphism... The probability that the individual
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, I cannot find that post that you reference. COuld you forward to to me privately? On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience. You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree. With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit. Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds. Consider that n goes to infinity and that p is the probability of that an observer has
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, Check out this article by S. Wolfram: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/undecidability-intractability-theoretical-physics.pdf On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience. You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree. With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit. Just because n observers all have the same reality simulation does not mean that is actually true of external reality, so your definition could just refer to agreement on an illusion, which is almost inevitable since almost all of the reality in which we believe we exist is actually a manufactured simulation in our own minds. Consider that n goes to
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:11 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The equations of Newtonian dynamics are time-symmetric, I know. similarly for relativity both SR and GR - I know and quantum mechanics is, too. I know. The only thing in the entirety f physics that isn't based on time symmetric equations is thermodynamics, That and the equations of cosmology. And astrophysics. And meteorology. And [...] John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience. One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist realm. That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? Terren On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question
Re: A Theory of Consciousness
Hi Edgar, Ok, I'll bite :) On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: All, I'll present a brief overview of my theory of consciousness from my book on Reality here. If anyone is interested I can elaborate. To understand consciousness we first must clearly distinguish between consciousness ITSELF and the contents of consciousness that become conscious This seems circular. by appearing within consciousness itself. The nature of consciousness itself, why things seem conscious, I would argue that why things seem conscious can be explained with neuroscience + computer science. The real mystery is why I am conscious. is the subject of Chalmer's 'Hard Problem', whereas the various structures of the contents of consciousness are the so called 'Easy Problems', the subjects of the study of mind. Several theories of mind address consciousness, notably comp (as Liz pointed out) Chalmer's formulation of the Hard Problem is 'How does consciousness arise from a physical brain?' Let's generalized this a little to 'How does consciousness arise from a physical world?' Here you're already making a strong assumption. How do you know it's not the other way round: the physical world arising from consciousness? The key to the solution is understanding that the world is not 'physical' in the sense assumed. It is not a passive clockwork Newtonian world that just sits there waiting to be brought into consciousness by an observer. In fact the notion of observation is intrinsic to reality itself in a manner that reality actively manifests most of the defining attributes of reality on its own and all the conscious observer adds is participation in that process from a particular locus with a particular computational nformation structure. I'll explain how this works though the theory is subtle and requires some work, and there is a lot to it I don't cover here. In ancient times there was an extramission (emission) theory of vision, that objects were seen because the eyes shown light on them. Today we still have the functionally identical emission theory of consciousness, that things become conscious because mind somehow shines consciousness on them. Both theories are wrong. Things are conscious because reality continually SELF-MANIFESTS itself. It continually computes itself into existence, and existence self-manifests. This makes sense to me. I have similar intuitions but I don't feel this is sufficiently rigorous or well-defined (as my intuitions are also not). It is immanent because it is actually real, and actually present, and has actual being. This is what I call Ontological Energy (OE). Ok but I dislike this kind of overloading of terms. Unless you argue that Ontological Energy has some convincing similarities to the well accepted concept of energy. Things are really really real, they are really actually there, and consciousness just opens its 'eyes' and participates in this reality. Rather than the mind shining consciousness onto things, things manifest their actual reality, their actual real presence in reality, to whatever interacts with them, including human brains. So are dreams real? The only thing an individual observer brings to consciousness is an interaction with reality from a particular location, and an interaction with the information contents of consciousness filtered through its own perceptual cognitive structure. Ok. Thus consciousness itself is simply the immanent actual real presence of reality, whereas the information structures of the contents of conscious are due to information computations of the brain interacting with information from external reality. So what you're saying is: stuff is conscious, stuff is complex? This is the best, most convincing theory of consciousness of which I'm aware. But like most of my theories it requires a big paradigm shift in understanding since it's a completely new interpretation of reality. Edgar, I agree with some of what you say here, but I don't understand what the theory is. It feels more like a collection of intuitions. Do you think you could make your theory more explicit and precise? Cheers Telmo. Best, Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, I have some familiarity with Wolframs CA, I played with them myself many years ago, but don't find much that applies to the present discussion, or that sheds much light on reality IMHO... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:53:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, Check out this article by S. Wolfram: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/undecidability-intractability-theoretical-physics.pdf On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Stephen, Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience. You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree. With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality refers to similarities between individual simulated realities, not to the common external reality. Yes, I don't like appeals to authority, explicit or implicit.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 09 Jan 2014, at 17:53, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Well, read Bell. I have. It shows how QM violates his inequality. I know, I demonstrated exactly that on this very list using my own language. And Bell knew of course that his inequality was not consistent with Quantum Mechanics, with Copenhagen QM. what he didn't know at the time was if his inequality was consistent with reality or if Quantum Mechanics was. That question was answered experimentally a couple of decades after Bell's theoretical work and the winner was Quantum Mechanics; Yes. so now we know that at least one of the assumptions that Bell made (realism, locality, high school math works) must be wrong. In Bell realism bears on the unique outcome. It is realism in Copenhagen QM. he does not address the question of locality in the non- collapse theory (which he does not like). but Bell's inequality IS violated. Experimentally, Huh? This is a physical idea not a mathematical one, how else could it be proven wrong other than experimentally? Sometimes it is good to be redundant on what is important :) But when you look at the many branches, at once [...] Unfortunately my eyesight isn't good enough to allow me to look at many branches of the multiverse at once. There is a technic: do QM. Just look at the terms in the solution of shroedinger equation, involving yourself, perhaps with Alice and Bob, etc. to me, the Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence for MW, that is QM-without collapse. To me Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence that reality is not local I am the one here who will tell you that 3p non locality is only a sound made by your lips and nothing else. Einstein was skeptical of the collapse of the wave because it introduce non locality, and non covariance. I think he is right. 3p non locality is telepathy or spooky action at a distance. It does not make sense to me. or not realistic or not either. MWI is not local Proof? The violation of Bell's inequality implies non locality for a realist interpretation of QM+collapse. When collapse never happens, all that occur comes from local interaction and interference, spreading at speed less than c. so it could be correct, and emotionally it is my favorite interpretation, but logically I must admit that it is not the only interpretation that could be correct. Much as I dislike Copenhagen the fact is it's non-realistic so the violation of Bell's inequality is not rule it out. But Einstein's idea that things are realistic and local (and deterministic too although determinism was less important to Einstein than realism or locality) IS ruled out. Proof? Quantum indeterminacy and quantum non locality are pure first person plural illusion (subjective, first person) in Everett. 3p determinism was as much important than 3p locality for Einstein. God does not play dice. He will keep that idea all his life. This is well known. There is few doubt, for me, that, like most cosmologist, he would have preferred many worlds than anything non deterministic or non local. I think (even more so after the reading of Jammer's book on Einstein's religion). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, The article has nothing to do with Cellular automata. It has to do with computational aspects of physical systems. You might find it informative. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I have some familiarity with Wolframs CA, I played with them myself many years ago, but don't find much that applies to the present discussion, or that sheds much light on reality IMHO... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:53:08 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, Check out this article by S. Wolfram: http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/academic/ undecidability-intractability-theoretical-physics.pdf On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, Please see my proximate answer to Terren a little above in which I answer most of your questions on the nature of experience. You will see in that post I note that the computational information universe can be considered to consist of what I call 'Xperience' only (see that post for an explanation). If that is true then every information form in the universe can be considered a 'generic observer' that observes other information forms by computationally interacting with them. So in that sense I agree that since everything in the universe is effectively a generic observer that the universe itself consists entirely of observations and thus could not exist without some generic observers (since generic observers is all that exists in the universe in this view). In other words if ANYthing does exist, it must be a generic observer, thus the universe doesn't exist without it being observed in that sense. So in that sense I think we might agree. With regards your last point. The computational information system of the universe is not dependent on human mathematical concepts since every state is immediately computed from its prior state by what we call the laws of nature, which are the ACTUAL math of reality by which it actively computes itself. Thus the actual math of reality is entirely logically self-consistent and logically complete. However it is true that individual organismic mental simulations can be inconsistent locally if they include false or self-contradictory premises. This includes most of human math, which is based on generalized approximations of actual reality math, and those generalizations introduce the well known problems addressed by Godel, Bruno etc. which DO NOT apply to the actual logico-mathematical system of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:04:39 AM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. One must be careful to distinguish between actual external reality, of which there is only one, This implies that its uniqueness is separable or isolatable from observers and can imply property definiteness independent of measurement. This is contradicted by the general non-commutativity of observables in QM. I try to be sure that my ontology does not contradict empirical facts. For example, position properties and momentum properties of objects cannot be considered as inherent in objects independent of measurement. I am attempting to explain how that uniqueness can to pass using Wheeler's Surprise 20 Questions concept. It allows us a method by which many a priori possible properties can be reduces to a single set that is common to many observers; a nice alternative to the mere postulation of a unique actual external reality. and individual 'realities' which vary widely across individuals and species, and which are all individual mental simulations of the areas of the actual external reality that form their environments. If there are multiple observers and they can communicate then it follows that there must be commonalities in their individual observations. Why not use that? Your alternative seems to be more of an 'act of faith' that our experiences are not some hallucination or simulation. Descartes discusses this in his Meditations and was not imaginative sufficiently to not appeal to an external Deity for an explanation as to why what we experience is not a hallucination or simulation. In my studies of philosophy I have often noticed that all the statements apply only to a single entity; almost never is the consequence of communicating and arriving on agreements between many entities considered. Maybe people that tend toward philosophy also tend to be mentally alienated from other persons... or autistic... Your definition of reality
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:24, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:41 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote For example, in Life one could define macrostates in terms of the ratio of white to black cells [...] In the Game of Life the number of black cells is always infinite, Because you restrict yourself to finite pattern. (Well, it is not a bad idea, to encode a state of mind, but that less sure for a universe of a god or something else). so I don't see how you can do any ratios. You can do local ratios, with suitable definition, and I guess that was Jesse meant. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:29, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. So you commit yourself ontologically (like a pope). It would be more clear if you make this into an hypothesis, and clarify your notion of being, computation, interaction, etc. Bruno Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is capable of experiencing, and what isn't? Terren On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, All human babies are automatically consciousness. They are conscious of whatever input data they have. I don't see the point of your question which is why I didn't answer before... Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 2:42:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered. It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual sense data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in your theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property of reality, as a function somehow of ontological energy. Terren On Jan 8, 2014 1:49 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Telmo, Thanks for the link but see my new topic A theory of consciousness of a few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much more reasonable and explanatory. Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: In case you haven't seen it... http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219 Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something? Cheers, Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: A Theory of Consciousness
Telmo, My theory of consciousness is made considerably clearer in detail in my book on Reality if you want to get the full story :-) The answers to some of your questions: Sure dreams are real, like everything is, but their reality is that they are dreams. Actually mind is continually actively simulating reality whether asleep or awake, It continually goes off on its own predicting what it thinks will happen before it even happens. When we are awake this process is continually corrected by incoming sensory information and brought back on track. During dreams sensory input to the process is minimal and that self-correction process is minimal and the mind is freer to follow directions of its own based on internal priorities. All this is explained in detail in Part IV: Mind and Reality of my book. Ontological energy is NOT any form of physical energy. It's a somewhat deficient term to signify the fact that reality is actually real and actual and actually here, present and happening right now. It is the 'stuff' or 'substance' (entirely logical rather than physical) of actual existence and being, and because it is such that makes the forms and computations that appear within it real and actual. OE is obviously difficult to properly describe. To paraphrase Lao Tse, The ontological energy that can be named is not ontological energy. In fact the ancient concept of Tao was an ancient approach to pretty much the same concept. If you know how to describe this without overloading of terms then take a shot at it... You ask how do I know the physical world (doesn't) arise from consciousness? I don't claim that. I agree the 'physical' world DOES arise from conscousness. That's what I've said all along, if you've been following. The actual external reality is NOT physical, it's computational. It consists entirely of the computational interaction of information forms in OE. All so called physical worlds are how organismic minds simulate their interactions with this information world. Organismic, including human, minds simulate information reality as a physical reality because that makes it easier to compute and interact with and thus function within. All the many ways this happens is described in detail in my book... The only 'physical worlds' are products of organismic minds and occur only within those minds as simulations of the external information reality. Actual fundamental external reality is computationally evolving information in OE only. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:06:49 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Edgar, Ok, I'll bite :) On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: All, I'll present a brief overview of my theory of consciousness from my book on Reality here. If anyone is interested I can elaborate. To understand consciousness we first must clearly distinguish between consciousness ITSELF and the contents of consciousness that become conscious This seems circular. by appearing within consciousness itself. The nature of consciousness itself, why things seem conscious, I would argue that why things seem conscious can be explained with neuroscience + computer science. The real mystery is why I am conscious. is the subject of Chalmer's 'Hard Problem', whereas the various structures of the contents of consciousness are the so called 'Easy Problems', the subjects of the study of mind. Several theories of mind address consciousness, notably comp (as Liz pointed out) Chalmer's formulation of the Hard Problem is 'How does consciousness arise from a physical brain?' Let's generalized this a little to 'How does consciousness arise from a physical world?' Here you're already making a strong assumption. How do you know it's not the other way round: the physical world arising from consciousness? The key to the solution is understanding that the world is not 'physical' in the sense assumed. It is not a passive clockwork Newtonian world that just sits there waiting to be brought into consciousness by an observer. In fact the notion of observation is intrinsic to reality itself in a manner that reality actively manifests most of the defining attributes of reality on its own and all the conscious observer adds is participation in that process from a particular locus with a particular computational nformation structure. I'll explain how this works though the theory is subtle and requires some work, and there is a lot to it I don't cover here. In ancient times there was an extramission (emission) theory of vision, that objects were seen because the eyes shown light on them. Today we still have the functionally identical emission theory of consciousness, that things become conscious because mind somehow shines consciousness on them. Both theories are wrong. Things are
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:11 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The equations of Newtonian dynamics are time-symmetric, I know. similarly for relativity both SR and GR - I know and quantum mechanics is, too. I know. The only thing in the entirety f physics that isn't based on time symmetric equations is thermodynamics, That and the equations of cosmology. And astrophysics. And meteorology. And [...] http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list What equations of cosmology are there besides the equations of general relativity, used to model the entire universe? In general it's true that in some cases scientists use separate equations derived from observation to deal with large-scale phenomena, as in climate modeling. However, it is always assumed that reductionism holds, that the behavior of any large-scale system ultimately emerges statistically from the interaction of all its basic parts evolving according to more fundamental laws (as has been shown to be true of thermodynamic laws in statistical mechanics), even if in some cases it may be too difficult in practice to derive the higher-level equations from the fundamental ones (but it is possible for other cases besides thermodynamics, for example the interactions of certain molecules, normally the domain of chemistry, can be derived from basic quantum rules alone, as with the model of interacting water molecules discussed at http://www.udel.edu/PR/UDaily/2007/mar/water030207.html ). Do you disagree with reductionism in this sense? Are you suggesting that any equations governing higher-level systems are irreducible even in principle to lower-level laws (plus initial conditions or other boundary conditions)? Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:08 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:34 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: I think you will find relatively few physicists who expect that any new fundamental theory like quantum gravity will fail to have these [time] symmetries If so then time's arrow, that is to say time's asymmetry, is not the result of the fundamental laws of physics but is a statistical effect that could not be otherwise due to the nature of the initial conditions and the fact that there are just more ways to be disorganized than organized. But obviously if it's dependent on initial conditions then you can't derive it from logic alone, since it's logically possible that the initial conditions could have been different. And as I've said, there is also the fact that if the laws of physics don't conserve phase space volume, the 2nd law wouldn't hold either. by far the most popular explanation for macroscopic arrows of time is that it's due to the low-entropy boundary condition at the Big Bang And I have said exactly that approximately 6.02 * 10^23 times. OK, but you hadn't said that to *me* before--there are a lot of posts on this list, I don't read all of them. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Hi Edgar, OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level. If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is not computable. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience. One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist realm. That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in biological organisms with complex self monitoring systems associated with their internal mental simulations of the actual computational external reality they exist within. So everything in the universe can be said to Xperience whatever its forms computationally interact with, but only biological information forms can be properly said to EXperience other forms, and then they always internally interprete and embellish that experience as some personal variant of a classical material world, something which does not actually exist expect in their internal mental simulations of the true external information world. So to categorize Xperience as to what is actually occurring we examine the type of forms themselves to see what they actually do rather than trying to impose arbitrary human categories upon them Edgar On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 5:43:43 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism... would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the theoretical
Re: Fukushima myth
I will send David Icke to sort you out. On 10 January 2014 00:34, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: 2014/1/5, LizR lizj...@gmail.com: The idea would seem to be, get someone to present an exaggerated claim, show it to be false, then claim that therefore there is no problem. Happens all the time with climate change denial. LizR I have to say something important that no one will believe except you the conspiracy apocalipticists, But it is true as long as Bp - p : We the deniers are extraterrestrials in chargo of drilling the resources of the Earth for our own planet. What is in Roswell is a new model of solar panel that pan-universal ecologist of us tried to give to you to advance your civilization. MUA HAHAHAA HA On 6 January 2014 08:57, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Now the question is, do you believe the opposite of what SNOPES has presented? Also, as global peasants, we have no influence over what the scientists look for on behalf of politicians, their bureaucrats, or the billionaires that pay them. We can have an opinion about being thrown out a window from twenty stories up, but we have no control over gravity-this is known as free will. -Original Message- From: Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sun, Jan 5, 2014 9:57 am Subject: Fukushima myth http://www.snopes.com/photos/technology/fukushima.asp -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 10 January 2014 03:04, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. That works for me, the only things that are necessarily possible appear to be the rules of logic and arithmetic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! I too made this claim recently. I assumed that an infinity of computations producing all possible experiences would include experiences of different physical laws (e.g. the speed of light 1 km/hr faster). Why wouldn't it? Does comp uniquely determine c? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:24 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 2:41 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote For example, in Life one could define macrostates in terms of the ratio of white to black cells [...] In the Game of Life the number of black cells is always infinite, so I don't see how you can do any ratios. John K Clark Maybe that would be true for some ideal Platonic version of the Game of Life on an infinite board, but any real-world implementation of a cellular automaton involves a finite number of squares--usually this is done with a periodic boundary condition, so squares on the left edge of the finite grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the right edge, and squares on the top edge of the grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the bottom edge. Another alternative would be to imagine you do have an infinite grid, but with a starting state where there are only a finite pattern of black squares surrounded by an infinite number of white squares, then you can expand the size of the simulated grid if the region of black squares approaches its border, so that the grid always remains larger than the region of black squares (you don't have to simulate regions beyond that because any region that's all-white on a given time-step, and doesn't have any black squares on its immediate border, will stay all-white on the next time-step). In either of these cases (though it's easier to analyze the periodic example since the grid size remains constant), the ratio of black squares to white squares on the simulated grid region at any given time is well-defined, so one can use this ratio to define the macrostate. And since the rules of the Game of Life aren't reversible, and many different initial states end up either in an all-white end state or an end-state with mostly white and a few blinking black shapes, I'm pretty sure this would be a case where an entropy defined in terms of these macrostates would tend to decrease from a randomly-chosen initial finite pattern of black squares. Do you disagree? (even if you're not as confident as I am that this would be true for the Game of Life, one could easily define less interesting transition rules where this is obviously the case, like a transition rule that says that only if a black square has a single black neighbor will it remain white, in every other case the square will turn white--hopefully you'd at least agree that in this case, entropy would tend to decrease from a random initial state on a periodic grid). Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to Alberto. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA. What is what makes our physical laws unique determined by COMP?' That happens already at the step seven. Could you be more specific as to how? I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping. Assuming comp, how do you predict exactly, after step six, the experience of dropping a pen in the air? What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground? I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws. It is computation. that are not physical processes at all. To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and mind with non computable attributes. You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs). To compute the exact probability of the event the pen fall on the ground, you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states. How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations? Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon evaporating, it means the measure exists. I also give the math of the measure one. The logic of the certainty case, and it is a quantum logic. Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one simple law: basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations. It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter. Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your theory. This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not. Define universe in the comp theory. Below our substitution level, physics is not given by one computation (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an infinity made of almost all computations. It involves a competition among all universal numbers. Almost all means all those validating your first person experience. Yes, but not just one physics! The level of substitution is itself induced by and emergent from physical laws, Reread step seven. thus cannot be assumed prior to the mechanism that selects for particular physical laws. You are assuming a physical primitive universe. I do not. I am agnostic on this. But don't add an assumption in a reasoning, that is terribly confusing. If you understand the reasoning, and still assume a physical primitive universe, then comp is non valid in your theory. You have to say no to the digitalist doctor. Then the math shows that the case of probability one, for that statistics on first person valid computations obeys a quantum logic. Not necessarily! It only shows FPI. ? There are many quantum logics. Which one are you considering? The one isolated in the UDA and AUDA. I get three of them, actually. I would like to see how you obtain the general non-commutativity of observable operators from AR. It has always seemed to me that you assume that physics
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 11:53 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be to me, the Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence for MW, that is QM-without collapse. To me Bell's inequality experimental violation is a quite strong evidence that reality is not local or not realistic or not either. MWI is not local so it could be correct, and emotionally it is my favorite interpretation, but logically I must admit that it is not the only interpretation that could be correct. Why do you say MWI is not local? Many physicists who advocate the MWI would disagree, like David Deutsch: http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.6223 http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906007 This paper by Mark Rubin presents another defense of locality in the MWI: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0103079 In it he mentions some of the history of defenses of MWI locality: In the Everett interpretation the nonlocal notion of reduction of the wavefunction is eliminated, suggesting that questions of the locality of quantum mechanics might indeed be more easily addressed. On the other hand, while wavefunctions do not suffer reduction in the Everett interpretation, nonlocality nevertheless remains present in many accounts of this formulation. In DeWitt’s (1970) often-quoted description, for example, “every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriads of copies of itself.” Contrary to this viewpoint, others argue (Page, 1982; Tipler, 1986, 2000; Albert and Loewer, 1988; Albert, 1992; Vaidman, 1994, 1998, 1999; Price, 1995; Lockwood, 1996; Deutsch, 1996; Deutsch and Hayden, 2000) that the Everett interpretation can in fact resolve the apparent contradiction between locality and quantum mechanics. In particular, Deutsch and Hayden (2000) apply the Everett interpretation to quantum mechanics in the Heisenberg picture, and show that in EPRB experiments,1 information regarding the correlations between systems is encoded in the Heisenberg-picture operators corresponding to the observables of the systems, and is carried from system to system and from place to place in a local manner. The picture which emerges is not one of measurement-type interactions “splitting the universe” but, rather, producing copies of the observers and observed physical systems which have interacted during the (local) measurement process (Tipler, 1986). Two more by Rubin: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0204024 http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.2673 Conceptually it's not that hard to see how the MWI offers a loophole in Bell's proof--Bell assumed that each spin measurement yielded a single definite outcome, but if you instead imagine that each spin measurement causes the experimenter to split into copies who observe different outcomes and aren't aware of one another, then the universe doesn't have to decide which version of experimenter #1 gets matched up to which version of experimenter #2 until there's been time for signals moving at the speed of light to travel from each experimenter to someone in the middle who can be aware of the results at both locations. If that isn't clear, in post #11 at http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=206291 I gave a sort of toy model of how duplicating the experimenters at different locations and matching them up later can allow for each of the matched pairs to observe Bell inequality violations without any need for nonlocality. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Terren, Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one. I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality. Lastly, it is self-evident that the physical world as we experience it IS computable. How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds? That should be obvious.. Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is computable because it IS being computed. Otherwise it would not exist If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Edgar, OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level. If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is not computable. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience. One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist realm. That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the generic non-organismic level I call this Xperience. In fact in this interpretation the universe can be said to consist of Xperience only. Things and events are a subsidiary distinction both included in the concept of Xperience. To answer your question in this sense a rock does Xperience the interaction of its information forms with other information forms, as do all information forms that make up the universe. When it comes to organismic awareness we have a particular subset of Xperience we call EXperience in which some of the forms that are altered are those in that organism's internal mental simulation of reality. These are functionally no different than feedback forms on modern automobiles etc. that enable these devices to monitor (Xperience) their own states except in biological systems they are enormously more complex and detailed. The working of such biological self-monitoring systems is what we call experience. So organismic EXperience is simply a specialized subset of the all pervasion phenomenon of Xperience that occurs in
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 1/9/2014 9:45 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 6:59 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I'm arguing that time is symmetric, Good luck winning that argument when nearly everything we observe, from cosmology to cooking, screams at us that time is NOT symmetric. Not at the quantum level, If so then obviously the quantum level is not the end of the story. it was actually discovered before Bell died that there's a perfectly reasonable explanation for how his inequality can be violated that retains locality and realism. Baloney. If that's the best refutation you can come up with, John Bell and Huw Price have nothing to fear. They have nothing to fear from me or the truth. If retro-causality exists then things are not local and not realistic either, so that possibility has not been ruled out experimentally. Retro-causality is always present in a deterministic system because boundary conditions can be in the future instead of the past. Newtonian mechanics included retro-causality and was still realistic (in the sense of only one definite result). MWI is the same, deterministic and one definite result - except the definite result includes non-communicating worlds including the observers. Maybe it should be called the hidden worlds theory. Brent But the common sense view that most people, including Einstein, had about reality, that things are realistic and local, CAN be ruled out. And of all the people on the planet John Bell would be the last to disagree that if his inequality is violated then things are not local or not realistic or not either. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 1/9/2014 9:58 AM, John Clark wrote: That and the equations of cosmology. The equations of cosmology, Einsteins or Wheeler-Dewitt, are T-symmetric. You seem to have confused the equations of evolution and the boundary conditions. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Bruno: Sorry but I do not understood point seven when I read it and I do not understand you now. I understand Solomonoff theorem about inductive inference that involve infinite computations and probabilities, but Solomonoff has a selection criteria : the algoritmic complexity theorem uses the algorithmic complexity as the weight or probability of each computation and it has a clear formula for the probability of the next step in a sequence, that is, to make an induction by means of competing computations. The metaphisics of solomonoff say something like: the world is governed by laws as simple as possible compatible with the phenomena observed, but we must take into account unobserved phenomena that may demand more complex algorithms so we apply a decreasing but not null probability to all computations that predict the known facts For a moment I though that yours is a kind of solomonoff inductive inference translated into a numerical mysticism, as substance of things instead as a method of induction or discovery of laws. But I do not see your selection criteria among infinite computations and no procedure, no formula. And moreover, I do not understand your metaphysics. 2014/1/9, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:50, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. Alberto was only missing step seven. You can comment my answer to Alberto. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! See my answer to Alberto, or reread the UDA. What is what makes our physical laws unique determined by COMP?' That happens already at the step seven. Could you be more specific as to how? I assume there that you, here and now, live in a physical universe which run a universal dovetailer, without ever stopping. Assuming comp, how do you predict exactly, after step six, the experience of dropping a pen in the air? What is the probability that you will see falling on the ground? I think that Alberto is considering the character of physical laws, not probability distributions of particular processes that obey such laws. It is computation. that are not physical processes at all. To avoid the consequence that physics is uniquely defined in arithmetic for all universal machine, you need to reify matter and mind with non computable attributes. You believe (because you assume comp and agreed up to step 6) that your next immediate future first person state is determined by the FPI on all the emulations of your actual states appearing in the UD* (the complete execution of the UD). This involves infinitely many computations (that should be an easy exercise in computer science: all functions are implemented by infinitely many programs). To compute the exact probability of the event the pen fall on the ground, you must seek the ratio or proportion of all computation going through your states where you see the pen falling on the grounds, among all computations going through your states. How can we generate probability distributions unless there is an unambiguous measure on the space of possible universes that can obtain from the infinitely many computations? Exactly! probabilities exists only if there is a non ambiguous measure. So if comp is true, and if this does not make the moon evaporating, it means the measure exists. I also give the math of the measure one. The logic of the certainty case, and it is a quantum logic. Computations is an arithmetical notion, and your actual state is given by a relative number, encode locally by the doctor. The entire UD is itself definable in arithmetic. So, in that step seven, if comp is correct or believed by a rational agent, the rational agent had to believe that physics, all physical predictions, is reduced to one simple law: basically a measure on the relative computations. Physics has been reduced, in principle (of course) to a statistical sum on all first person valid relative computations. It has always been my claim that the Doctor can only exist within some subset of universes that have persistence of matter. Then you can deduce from the UDA that comp is incompatible with your theory. This would exclude, for example, universes that do not contain matter or do not persist for more than an instant. AFAIK, nothing in AR acts to partition up the universes into those that contain Doctors and those that do not. Define universe in the comp theory. Below our substitution level, physics is not given by one computation (or one universal numbers). Physics is given by an
Geography
Bruno Marchal: You might confuse geography and physics. The (sigma_1) arithmetic is the same for all, and the laws of physics must be given by the same laws for any universal machine. Comp makes physics invariant for all machine-observers, and entirely determined by the unique measure on all computation, as seen from the 1p view. Richard Ruquist: The geography is important. Do we drive on a unique geography? Are there some things, some properties like charge, mass and energy of electrons and photons that are invariant and essentially do not affect their quantum states. If so, the geography we drive on may be a constant relative to the scale of drive time. Geography may never split due to quantum state superposition. Splitting within a constant geography is rather associated with life, but not photosynthesis. The photosynthesis process somehow estimates and selects the best photon quantum state for optimal processing into sugar, which is a significant constraint on extra worlds in a many world reality. Perhaps that is a metaphor for how the laws of physics may optimize particle interactions. But there is no experimental evidence for such optimization outside of biology. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Edgar, The yes doctor scenario is just a means of discovering whether you'd have faith that a digital copy of yourself, in principle, would still be you enough to perhaps avoid certain death. If you say yes, in principle I could be substituted, then you are betting that comp is true. My question for you is, how could you know what reality math is? Wouldn't the process of discovering the properties of reality math be identical to the processes mathematicians use to discover the properties of human math? At the end of the day it seems like a distinction that makes no difference... especially since it is clear that human math does a remarkable job of capturing the physical laws as we know them. I'm also not sure where your certainty about the fundamental nature of reality comes from... the way you express it leaves little room for doubt, which is an odd stance considering that it's something we would need to take on faith, regardless of what your theory is. It comes across as dogmatic or religious... is that your intent? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one. I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality. Lastly, it is self-evident that the physical world as we experience it IS computable. How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds? That should be obvious.. Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is computable because it IS being computed. Otherwise it would not exist If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Edgar, OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level. If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is not computable. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right arrangements. Obviously the result would be a fully functioning human being with normal human consciousness and experience. One doesn't need to add any mysterious metaphysical soul, consciousness or anything to that constructed biological robot to make it human. It is the actual physical components, acting together that gives it its humanness. Therefore any robot of sufficient complexity with sufficient self-monitoring circuits will be conscious according to the design of its form structure, just as the human robot is, and just as WE are. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:39:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if they can help us categorize systems of thought they can be helpful. And I would certainly categorize your theory in the pansychist realm. That aside, I gather that if you built a robot that had the proper mental simulation of its world, based on its own sensory apparatus, with the complex feedback systems necessary, that robot would EXperience as well? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:29 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and independent theory. The way it works starting from the beginning: At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of being. Every form can be said to 'experience' the other forms with which it interacts via changes in its own form. At the
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 09 Jan 2014, at 19:58, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! I too made this claim recently. I assumed that an infinity of computations producing all possible experiences would include experiences of different physical laws (e.g. the speed of light 1 km/ hr faster). Why wouldn't it? Does comp uniquely determine c? Just consider the FPI on UD*. If comp does not uniquely determine c, we will access to situation where c is different, and c is no more a constant. (from my physicist intuition about the quantum vacuum and the photon, I think that h and c might be constant). Where does such constants come from? Well some arithmetical relation can depend on them for getting the right measure. We are of course a long way to solve this, to say the least. My point is just that the comp people *have to do* this to figure out the correct 1p/3p relationship and target better the mind-body problem. By using the self-referential G/G* distinction, we can handle the many different sort of person points of view, both on the rationally justifiable and the true but non rationally justifiable. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. We know what reality math is by studying what actually computes real natural processes. It is NOT at all the same as human math. What actually computes real natural processes may be little more than the particle property interaction conservation laws, and the laws that bind particles in matter. Most of the (very small part) of human math that describes natural processes probably does not actually compute them. For example the laws of motion may describe natural processes but probably don't actually compute them. The actual computations likely take place only at the elemental level, and the mathematical descriptions at the aggregate levels are not computational but likely just aggregate consequences of the elemental laws. I attempt to describe reality itself in terms of what appear to be its self-evident attributes, such as actuality, realness, absoluteness (it is absolute because there is nothing else than what actually exists), its presence, its happening (things continually happen within it), its being, its existence... I call this OE to denote what has those attributes. There is obviously nothing else that does If there is a better way you can suggest than actually observing the real actual presence of reality and discerning its fundamental attributes and describing it by those attributes then what is it? Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 2:56:08 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, The yes doctor scenario is just a means of discovering whether you'd have faith that a digital copy of yourself, in principle, would still be you enough to perhaps avoid certain death. If you say yes, in principle I could be substituted, then you are betting that comp is true. My question for you is, how could you know what reality math is? Wouldn't the process of discovering the properties of reality math be identical to the processes mathematicians use to discover the properties of human math? At the end of the day it seems like a distinction that makes no difference... especially since it is clear that human math does a remarkable job of capturing the physical laws as we know them. I'm also not sure where your certainty about the fundamental nature of reality comes from... the way you express it leaves little room for doubt, which is an odd stance considering that it's something we would need to take on faith, regardless of what your theory is. It comes across as dogmatic or religious... is that your intent? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Terren, Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one. I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and therefore his conclusions, apply to human rather than reality math. Bruno's comp is most certainly NOT my computational reality. Lastly, it is self-evident that the physical world as we experience it IS computable. How else would it come about if it wasn't being computed by our minds? That should be obvious.. Everything that exists, everything in the entire universe, is computable because it IS being computed. Otherwise it would not exist If that's what Bruno claims, it's dead wrong... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:51:07 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Edgar, OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save you from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain that replicates your biological brain at some level. If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is not computable. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:04 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into standard categories. It's an entirely new theory. Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human simulating forms would approximate organismic consciousness sufficient to satisfy a Turing test, including questions about how it felt and what it was sensing of its environment. It's easy to understand by thinking of it this way. Imagine constructing a human biological robot piecewise by putting together all the actual purely inorganic chemicals of a human body in the right
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Edgar, It may not be necessary to produce an exact replica of the brain. I mean that is more or less implied by choosing a level of substitution... if you're substituting at a relatively coarse-grained level such as neurons, then you are betting that most of the intracellular details of a neuron are not important for capturing the essence of you. So if you won't say 'yes' to the doctor and the only reason is because he can't make something exactly you, then you are betting that comp is not true. In which case, you effectively sabotage your own theory, in which people are computed by an underlying reality. The requirement for exactness seems a bit argumentative, considering that the version of me today is not the exact me of yesterday, yet my consciousness and identity are not meaningfully impacted by that. I think what you miss by not actually attempting to understand Bruno's argument is that the laws of physics, including those elemental laws, are captured by computations in the universal dovetailer in much the same way that your theory expresses reality as a computation. We experience a physical world because we are embedded in those computations as well. AFAICT the only significant difference between your theory and the UDA is that you are positing one single, universal absolute computational reality as fundamental, while the UDA posits that there are an infinity of such computational realities that emerge from a fundamental ontology based on nothing more than natural numbers and the relationships between them. You are much closer to the UDA than you realize, I think. Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 3:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. We know what reality math is by studying what actually computes real natural processes. It is NOT at all the same as human math. What actually computes real natural processes may be little more than the particle property interaction conservation laws, and the laws that bind particles in matter. Most of the (very small part) of human math that describes natural processes probably does not actually compute them. For example the laws of motion may describe natural processes but probably don't actually compute them. The actual computations likely take place only at the elemental level, and the mathematical descriptions at the aggregate levels are not computational but likely just aggregate consequences of the elemental laws. I attempt to describe reality itself in terms of what appear to be its self-evident attributes, such as actuality, realness, absoluteness (it is absolute because there is nothing else than what actually exists), its presence, its happening (things continually happen within it), its being, its existence... I call this OE to denote what has those attributes. There is obviously nothing else that does If there is a better way you can suggest than actually observing the real actual presence of reality and discerning its fundamental attributes and describing it by those attributes then what is it? Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 2:56:08 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote: Edgar, The yes doctor scenario is just a means of discovering whether you'd have faith that a digital copy of yourself, in principle, would still be you enough to perhaps avoid certain death. If you say yes, in principle I could be substituted, then you are betting that comp is true. My question for you is, how could you know what reality math is? Wouldn't the process of discovering the properties of reality math be identical to the processes mathematicians use to discover the properties of human math? At the end of the day it seems like a distinction that makes no difference... especially since it is clear that human math does a remarkable job of capturing the physical laws as we know them. I'm also not sure where your certainty about the fundamental nature of reality comes from... the way you express it leaves little room for doubt, which is an odd stance considering that it's something we would need to take on faith, regardless of what your theory is. It comes across as dogmatic or religious... is that your intent? Terren On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Terren, Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic one. I don't know what that statement about Bruno's UDA actually says, and I don't think it's relevant, because his axioms, and
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:02 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: And as I've said, there is also the fact that if the laws of physics don't conserve phase space volume, the 2nd law wouldn't hold either. You've got it backwards, there is no fundamental law of physics concerning the conservation of phase space that forces matter to behave in certain ways, rather it's just a natural consequence of the FIRST law of thermodynamics and the statistical fact that if you make a change in a highly orders system you will probably make it more disordered because there are far fewer ordered states than disordered states. Liouville's equation is all about statistics, the variables in it determine the phase space distribution and that determines the PROBABILITY a system of things will be in a particular infinitesimal phase space volume. For example, in Life one could define macrostates in terms of the ratio of white to black cells [...] In the Game of Life the number of black cells is always infinite, so I don't see how you can do any ratios. Maybe that would be true for some ideal Platonic version of the Game of Life on an infinite board, but any real-world implementation of a cellular automaton involves a finite number of squares Maybe not. The universe is certainly a real world implementation and it might be infinite and it might be a cellular automation, that's what Stephen Wolfram thinks. usually this is done with a periodic boundary condition, so squares on the left edge of the finite grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the right edge, and squares on the top edge of the grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the bottom edge. Then the rules governing the game have been changed. Another alternative would be to imagine you do have an infinite grid, but with a starting state where there are only a finite pattern of black squares surrounded by an infinite number of white squares, So the ratio of white squares to black is a finite number divided by infinity. Perhaps that's what a Black Hole is, a place where God tried to divide by zero. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid. However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is *guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections. However, assuming that is true, and bearing in mind the no-cloning theorem, there is still at least one caveat -- namely that if the MWI is correct, this sort of duplication is happening all the time, and one can proceed with the analysis on that basis (in fact I believe the comp derivation of the FPI becomes the same as Everett's for this limiting case). Bruno's thought experiments with matter duplicators can be rephrased to involve MWI style duplication instead, and I believe the same conclusions can be reached via this route. Another caveat is the question of the continuation of consciousness through time. If the brain is at some level performing computations (as it must be in Edgar's theory, because in that theory everything is, at the fundamental level) then one has to ask what (in principle) links the computational state of a brain at time T1 with the state of the same brain at time T2? The state is constantly changing, so what makes it generate the same being, the same consciousness? This question is actually a version of Yes doctor, and any reasonable answer appears to involve the fact that the brain has stepped from one state to another state that is the closest possible continuation according to some measure - i.e. it's the most similar thing available in the universe (or multiverse), and that similarity is what creates the feeling of continuity. This seems to be the case, rather than simple physical continuity (assuming there is such a thing in reality) because we know about cases where the brain's next step has been drastically different - amnesia, brain damage, the Memento syndrome and so on - and the person often *doesn't* feel that they have continuity - or much continuity - with who they were before. (Over a longer timescale, none of us feel that we are the same person that we were years ago...) So suppose that, for example, as in Frank Tipler's Physics of immortality, our remote descendants create computers so powerful that they can simulate every possible brain state of everyone who has lived. Or if that seems a bit unlikely given the accelerated expansion of the univese, suppose that the universe is infinite and the initial conditions are random. In either of these cases, it's inevitable that any given brain state will be recreated (possible an infinite number of times). It's also the case in the MWI, and as we know, if AR is correct it's also happening in Platonia ... there are so many infinities of ur around the place, it's a wonder we know who we are! Oh. Anyhoo Duplication, therefore, certainly isn't ruled out by our present knowledge. There are various scenarios in which an infinite number of copies of any given brain state will occur. Can they all be considered a continuation of the brain's previous state? If not, why not? (This might be called the Heraclitean argument.) Any of the above scenarios may be invoked to make deductions about the nature of reality based on the possibility that consciousness is (at some level) digital, which leads us to Bruno's conclusion *unless* he can be shown to have made a mistake. (PS This gives a whole new meaning to the phrase thought experiment ...! ) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear LizR, There is an interdependency that should not be ignored between the objects that express the quantities and relations that are represented by the logic and arithmetic. A universe that does not contain any persistent entities would not be capable of expressing numbers or statements. See what I mean? By Necessary Possibility I am denoting the underlying (ontological) potential for objects to interact and perform actions and for representations to be about those objects, existence itself is featureless and without any particular property. It is purely isness. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 1:55 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 January 2014 03:04, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Edgar, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, I define 'Reality' in my book on the subject very simply as everything that exists. I denote everything that exist as 'the Total Universe' or simply Existence. The key is that such is independent of any contingency or property. Some have argued that existence = necessary possibility, a definition which I find most useful. That works for me, the only things that are necessarily possible appear to be the rules of logic and arithmetic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 1/9/2014 10:58 AM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! I too made this claim recently. I assumed that an infinity of computations producing all possible experiences would include experiences of different physical laws (e.g. the speed of light 1 km/hr faster). Why wouldn't it? Does comp uniquely determine c? I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI units. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI units. Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1. So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Brent, Kevin Knuth has been able to show how local Lorentz invariance emerges from relations between multiple observers! See his talk here http://pirsa.org/10050054/ (all the way to the end). The QA portion is amazing! On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:33 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/9/2014 10:58 AM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Bruno, I have to agree with Alberto on this point. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 09 Jan 2014, at 16:30, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But the UD argument predict that all the possible universes with all possible laws will be produced. Where? AR does not restrict the types of physical laws of universes that it can represent, so barring a separate mechanism I cannot see how Alberto's claim is false! I too made this claim recently. I assumed that an infinity of computations producing all possible experiences would include experiences of different physical laws (e.g. the speed of light 1 km/hr faster). Why wouldn't it? Does comp uniquely determine c? I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI units. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear LizR, That is the key question that remains, IMHO, unanswered. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is (locally) Lorentz invariant. If it is, then c is just a unit conversion factor between the + and - signature terms. It's value is arbitrary, like how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI units. Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1. So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net mailto:edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid. However, it isn't clear that this /is /the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't /guaranteed/ to be the same, while a quantum recreation is /guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical/. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections. But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty good approximation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 3:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 2:02 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: And as I've said, there is also the fact that if the laws of physics don't conserve phase space volume, the 2nd law wouldn't hold either. You've got it backwards, there is no fundamental law of physics concerning the conservation of phase space that forces matter to behave in certain ways, rather it's just a natural consequence of the FIRST law of thermodynamics and the statistical fact that if you make a change in a highly orders system you will probably make it more disordered because there are far fewer ordered states than disordered states. I never claimed Liouville's theorem was a fundamental law of physics in itself, rather it is derivable as a mathematical consequence of certain features of the fundamental laws. What I've read indicates that Liouville's theorem applies to any system that obeys Hamilton's equations (see the last paragraph on p. 549 of Taylor's Classical Mechanics at http://books.google.com/books?id=P1kCtNr-pJsCpg=PA549 for example), but I'm not sure if it's true that any logically possible laws that conserve energy (obeying the first law of thermodynamics) also obey Hamilton's equations...the Hamiltonian is not always equal to the total energy, see http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/11905/when-is-the-hamiltonian-of-a-system-not-equal-to-its-total-energy Liouville's equation is all about statistics, the variables in it determine the phase space distribution and that determines the PROBABILITY a system of things will be in a particular infinitesimal phase space volume. Liouville's theorem is derived in deterministic classical mechanics. If you take a volume of phase space, each point in that volume is a specific microstate, and if you evolve each microstate forward for some time T using the deterministic equations of physics, you get a later set of microstates which occupy their own volume in phase space. Liouville's theorem just says the two volumes must be equal. It only becomes statistical if you interpret the original set of microstates as representing your own uncertainty--if you just know the original macrostate, you may choose to consider the statistical ensemble of microstates compatible with that macrostate, then they will give the volume of phase space that you start with. But that's just an extra layer of interpretation, Liouville's theorem itself is not really statistical. For example, in Life one could define macrostates in terms of the ratio of white to black cells [...] In the Game of Life the number of black cells is always infinite, so I don't see how you can do any ratios. Maybe that would be true for some ideal Platonic version of the Game of Life on an infinite board, but any real-world implementation of a cellular automaton involves a finite number of squares Maybe not. The universe is certainly a real world implementation and it might be infinite and it might be a cellular automation, that's what Stephen Wolfram thinks. This line of discussion got started because I was disputing your statement that we can derive the 2nd law in a *purely* logical way like 2+2=5, with no need to invoke knowledge about the laws of physics that was based on observation. This would imply that *any* logically possible mathematical laws of nature would obey the 2nd law. So the question of whether space in *our* universe is infinite or finite is irrelevant to the discussion, because it's certainly logically possible to have a universe with finite space. If you did not mean to suggest that we can know a priori the 2nd law is true because it would be true in any logically possible universe whose behavior follows mathematical laws, please clarify. But I thought you were talking about logically possible universes as well, not just our universe--the very fact that you were willing to discuss the Game of Life suggested this, since even though it's possible our universe could be a cellular automaton, I think we can be pretty confident it's not a 2-dimensional cellular automaton like the Game of Life! usually this is done with a periodic boundary condition, so squares on the left edge of the finite grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the right edge, and squares on the top edge of the grid are defined to be neighbors of squares on the bottom edge. Then the rules governing the game have been changed. I think most any book or website that defines the rules of the Game of Life will just state the transition rules for how each cell's state depends on the state of that cell and its nearest neighbors on the previous time-step, they don't say anything about whether the topology of the board is that of a torus (which is topologically equivalent to a square with the edges identified in the way I described, as discussed at http://plus.maths.org/content/space-do-all-roads-lead-home )
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 10 January 2014 11:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid. However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is *guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections. But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty good approximation. I covered that topic (at some length) further down the post. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 10 January 2014 06:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: (Unless comp is false or that we are manipulated through a normal simulation). Physics is transformed into the study of a lawful precise arithmetical phenomenon of a type first person plural experience. Not unless we are only considering a solipsistic observer! To obtain physics we need some means to define interactions and communications between multiple separable observers. This is a Bodies (plural) problem. Each observer can be shown to have FPI by your argument, but that is about it. Everything else requires more assumptions, like maybe some kind of ASSA. I also agree with Stephen here. Comp does seem to imply solipsism, I think we've discussed this before but I don't recall the answer - is it an open problem? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 10 January 2014 06:58, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:11 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The equations of Newtonian dynamics are time-symmetric, I know. similarly for relativity both SR and GR - I know and quantum mechanics is, too. I know. The only thing in the entirety f physics that isn't based on time symmetric equations is thermodynamics, That and the equations of cosmology. And astrophysics. And meteorology. And [...] So stop pretending otherwise. As a lot of people have now pointed out, physics can be local and relistic if time symmetry is valid. Time symmetry appears to be valid, as you just agreed. Hence physics can be local and realistic. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 1/9/2014 2:26 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: Liouville's theorem is derived in deterministic classical mechanics. If you take a volume of phase space, each point in that volume is a specific microstate, and if you evolve each microstate forward for some time T using the deterministic equations of physics, you get a later set of microstates which occupy their own volume in phase space. Liouville's theorem just says the two volumes must be equal. It only becomes statistical if you interpret the original set of microstates as representing your own uncertainty--if you just know the original macrostate, you may choose to consider the statistical ensemble of microstates compatible with that macrostate, then they will give the volume of phase space that you start with. But that's just an extra layer of interpretation, Liouville's theorem itself is not really statistical. Right. And entropy, the log of the number of possible states, only increases when possible states is defined by some macroscopic constraint. There is always a finer microstate definition of possible states such that the number and the entropy don't increase. Entropy is a consequence of coarse-graining. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 13:14, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: The expansion of the universe is the most likely explanation for the entropy gradient - there are a number of ways in which it generates negative entropy, briefly some of these are... - Quarks can become nucleons when the universe expands and cools enough - Nucleons can become nuclei when the universe expands and cools enough - Plasma can become atoms when the universe expands and cools enough - Gas can become stars when the universe expands and cools enough ...and there are probably a few others I've missed. I don't think Price would agree with you there, since your argument tries to show that known dynamical laws alone guarantee entropy increases with expansion, and as I said he is talking about speculative ideas about unknown future theories (like the Hawking no boundary proposal which represents a speculation about quantum gravity) that might explain the boundary conditions themselves. Sure. My other half has corresponded with Prof Price on this, so I know he's operating at a higher level of speculation, and ultimately one comes down to the Big Bang, which isn't explained by the above of course. But it doesn't just come down to the basic fact that there was a Big Bang that started the universe expanding, it comes down to the fact that the Big Bang started off the universe in a very smooth and homogenous state, whereas we can easily imagine an alternate universe where the Big Bang still happens, but in a far more lumpy state which should correspond to higher entropy in a gravitational context (the highest-entropy Big Bang in general relativity would probably just create a bunch of black holes, or at least that's what Penrose argues when he discusses the arrow of time in the Emperor's New Mind). In general relativity the prediction is that in a Big Bang/Big Crunch universe where there was sufficient time between the two, the collapsing Big Crunch would in fact be a lumpy collection of black holes--the mystery of the thermodynamic arrow of time can then be thought of as why the Big Bang didn't look like a time-reversed version of how physicists would expect a Big Crunch to look (assuming no special future boundary condition), dominated by black holes. However, the above list is sufficient to show that something very like the thermodynamic arrow can be derived from universal expansion, simply through a series of relaxations of the cosmic fluid - i.e. through simple dynamical processes that become possible successively as the universe grows less dense. I don't think Price would object to this as far as it goes. I just looked over his book, and it seems that he would. Price talks a bunch about Penrose's arguments in Ch. 4 of Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point and endorses the view that the smoothness of the Big Bang is a puzzle, and that the arrow of time can only be explained in terms of this smoothness, not in terms of expansion alone. On p. 79 of my edition (second page of ch. 4 in case editions differ) he talks about how The 'natural' state for a system dominated by gravity is thus a clumpy one, in which case the gravitational force has caused the material in question to collect together in lumps. Then on p. 81 he specifically addresses the idea that the arrow of time could be wholly explained in terms of entropy, and says the idea doesn't work: An early suggestion was that the expansion itself might increase the maximum possible entropy of the universe, in effect by creating new possibilities for matter. The thermodynamic arrow might simply be the result of the process in which the universe takes up these new possibilities ... The idea that the arrow of thermodynamics is linked in this directed way to the expansion of the universe turns out to be untenable, however. The main objection to it is that the smooth early universe turns out to have been incredibly 'special,' even by the standards prevailing at the time. Its low entropy doesn't depend on the fact that there were fewer possibilities available, in other words. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Brent, This is precisely why it is impossible to exactly clone a mind. Because you are always trying to hit a moving target. That was included in what I meant by saying the histories would not be the same. Saying somebody is the 'same' person from day to day is just loose common speech using an imprecise definition which isn't really germane here. As you point out everybody's thoughts and states of mind are always changing Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid. However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is *guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections. But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty good approximation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 7:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 12:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 08:59, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Well, most physicists already agrees physics is time-symmetric (well, CPT-symmetric, but the implications are the same for Bell's inequality and thermodynamics), Yes, they do, but it doesn't appear to be taken into account when discussing Bell's inequality. but I don't see how this alone can explain violations of the Bell inequality. No, you need to work out the consequences mathematically, and I dare say that is quite difficult. This is simply a *logical* demonstration that Bell's inequality can be violated while retaining locality and realism, which is otherwise impossible. As I said in another comment, if you allow information about the state of complex systems like detectors to flow back in times as well as forwards, it's not clear that this really counts as preserving locality. Nothing is flowing either way in time. (Assuming a block universe, nothing *can* flow in time - the notion doesn't make sense). I think you're reading something into my talk about information flowing back in time that I didn't intend. I certainly didn't mean to deny the block universe view of time or suggest that an imaginary observer viewing all of spacetime from the outside (like we might observe 2D flatland) would see spacetime itself changing (as opposed to just a set of frozen worldines as one would expect in a block universe). But the notion of information flowing from one point in spacetime to another doesn't imply any such denial of the block universe, for example David Deutsch, who argues forcefully for the block universe view in his book The Fabric of Reality, wrote a paper at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906007 titled Information Flow in Entangled Quantum Systems. The notion of information flow just requires some type of logical ordering, with one point in spacetime being the event of the information first being transmitted and another point being the event of it being received. There might be no way to define transmission vs. reception of a message at a fundamental quantum level, but if we're dealing with macroscopic transmitters and receivers of some kind that have a local thermodynamic arrow of time, there shouldn't be a problem distinguishing them...for instance, the transmitter has to *first* compose the message (perhaps after observing some local event, like the outcome of an election, that the message is supposed to convey information about) and *then* transmit it, relative to the local thermodynamic arrow of time, while the receiver *first* has a sequence of bits come in which are *then* made sense of. So as long as we can locally define transmission vs. reception in this way, my talk of information flowing backward in time just means that the reception-event is on the past light cone of the transmission-event, and information flowing forward would just be the ordinary case of the reception-event being on the future light-cone of the transmission event. The point is that if both sorts of information-transmission are possible, then I should be able to transmit a message back to be received by a relay, then the relay can transmit a copy of the message forward to a friend light-years away from Earth, such that the friend receives the message on the same day I sent it (relative to our mutual rest frame), despite being light-years away. It's not obvious that a universe where such things were possible would really count as one that respects locality, even if each individual message travelled at the speed of light. Locality is preserved so long as no physical objects travel faster than light. I don't think physicists use such a narrow definition--if the equations of QM were modified so that the EPR experiment could be used to transmit *information* FTL, then even if no measurable particle or wave was observed to move FTL this would still probably be seen as a violation of locality. And the pilot wave in Bohmian mechanics is arguably just a sort of rule for coordinating the behavior of distant particles rather than a physical object, but its ability to coordinate them instantaneously is typically seen as a violation of locality. Unfortunately I have not been able to find any very precise definition of locality that would give a totally clear answer about cases like this, it tends to be stated in terms of imprecise terms like effects and influences. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Liz and Terren, I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions. Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course disagree. Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not. So what's the point? I forgot what it was... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote: On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Terren, I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis. The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid. However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is *guaranteed by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections. But a lot depends on what you mean by the same. As Terren points out, no one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day. They are similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby Gifford is still the same person to a pretty good approximation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 1/9/2014 4:19 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 7:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 12:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com mailto:laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 08:59, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com mailto:laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Well, most physicists already agrees physics is time-symmetric (well, CPT-symmetric, but the implications are the same for Bell's inequality and thermodynamics), Yes, they do, but it doesn't appear to be taken into account when discussing Bell's inequality. but I don't see how this alone can explain violations of the Bell inequality. No, you need to work out the consequences mathematically, and I dare say that is quite difficult. This is simply a /logical/ demonstration that Bell's inequality can be violated while retaining locality and realism, which is otherwise impossible. As I said in another comment, if you allow information about the state of complex systems like detectors to flow back in times as well as forwards, it's not clear that this really counts as preserving locality. Nothing is flowing either way in time. (Assuming a block universe, nothing /can/ flow in time - the notion doesn't make sense). I think you're reading something into my talk about information flowing back in time that I didn't intend. I certainly didn't mean to deny the block universe view of time or suggest that an imaginary observer viewing all of spacetime from the outside (like we might observe 2D flatland) would see spacetime itself changing (as opposed to just a set of frozen worldines as one would expect in a block universe). But the notion of information flowing from one point in spacetime to another doesn't imply any such denial of the block universe, for example David Deutsch, who argues forcefully for the block universe view in his book The Fabric of Reality, wrote a paper at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906007 titled Information Flow in Entangled Quantum Systems. The notion of information flow just requires some type of logical ordering, with one point in spacetime being the event of the information first being transmitted and another point being the event of it being received. There might be no way to define transmission vs. reception of a message at a fundamental quantum level, but if we're dealing with macroscopic transmitters and receivers of some kind that have a local thermodynamic arrow of time, there shouldn't be a problem distinguishing them...for instance, the transmitter has to *first* compose the message (perhaps after observing some local event, like the outcome of an election, that the message is supposed to convey information about) and *then* transmit it, relative to the local thermodynamic arrow of time, while the receiver *first* has a sequence of bits come in which are *then* made sense of. So as long as we can locally define transmission vs. reception in this way, my talk of information flowing backward in time just means that the reception-event is on the past light cone of the transmission-event, and information flowing forward would just be the ordinary case of the reception-event being on the future light-cone of the transmission event. The point is that if both sorts of information-transmission are possible, then I should be able to transmit a message back to be received by a relay, then the relay can transmit a copy of the message forward to a friend light-years away from Earth, such that the friend receives the message on the same day I sent it (relative to our mutual rest frame), despite being light-years away. It's not obvious that a universe where such things were possible would really count as one that respects locality, even if each individual message travelled at the speed of light. I don't think that follows. You're imagining yourself moving forward in cosmic entropic time and composing a message that you're going to transmit back in time. But that's inconsistent. What T-symmetry implies is that there is a message whose receipt by you entails that the transmitter in the past who sent it to you also had to send that message to your friend. In a block universe picture is just requires a certain consistency between the messages at the transmitter, you, and your friend. In EPR we're just sending a few particles one-at-a-time. They have to look random to you, which means the message you're sending to your friend is random. Of course for this to work there has to be determinism - it would look like this in a Newtonian universe - MWI is in principle deterministic but T-symmetry means
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 10 January 2014 12:58, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 13:14, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: The expansion of the universe is the most likely explanation for the entropy gradient - there are a number of ways in which it generates negative entropy, briefly some of these are... - Quarks can become nucleons when the universe expands and cools enough - Nucleons can become nuclei when the universe expands and cools enough - Plasma can become atoms when the universe expands and cools enough - Gas can become stars when the universe expands and cools enough ...and there are probably a few others I've missed. I don't think Price would agree with you there, since your argument tries to show that known dynamical laws alone guarantee entropy increases with expansion, and as I said he is talking about speculative ideas about unknown future theories (like the Hawking no boundary proposal which represents a speculation about quantum gravity) that might explain the boundary conditions themselves. Sure. My other half has corresponded with Prof Price on this, so I know he's operating at a higher level of speculation, and ultimately one comes down to the Big Bang, which isn't explained by the above of course. But it doesn't just come down to the basic fact that there was a Big Bang that started the universe expanding, it comes down to the fact that the Big Bang started off the universe in a very smooth and homogenous state, whereas we can easily imagine an alternate universe where the Big Bang still happens, but in a far more lumpy state which should correspond to higher entropy in a gravitational context (the highest-entropy Big Bang in general relativity would probably just create a bunch of black holes, or at least that's what Penrose argues when he discusses the arrow of time in the Emperor's New Mind). In general relativity the prediction is that in a Big Bang/Big Crunch universe where there was sufficient time between the two, the collapsing Big Crunch would in fact be a lumpy collection of black holes--the mystery of the thermodynamic arrow of time can then be thought of as why the Big Bang didn't look like a time-reversed version of how physicists would expect a Big Crunch to look (assuming no special future boundary condition), dominated by black holes. Yes, indeed. I didn't mean to make it just the BB - a fairly smooth BB is required. Inflation is one attempt to explain this, as well as to solve the horizon problem. However, the above list is sufficient to show that something very like the thermodynamic arrow can be derived from universal expansion, simply through a series of relaxations of the cosmic fluid - i.e. through simple dynamical processes that become possible successively as the universe grows less dense. I don't think Price would object to this as far as it goes. I just looked over his book, and it seems that he would. Price talks a bunch about Penrose's arguments in Ch. 4 of Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point and endorses the view that the smoothness of the Big Bang is a puzzle, and that the arrow of time can only be explained in terms of this smoothness, not in terms of expansion alone. On p. 79 of my edition (second page of ch. 4 in case editions differ) he talks about how The 'natural' state for a system dominated by gravity is thus a clumpy one, in which case the gravitational force has caused the material in question to collect together in lumps. Then on p. 81 he specifically addresses the idea that the arrow of time could be wholly explained in terms of entropy, and says the idea doesn't work: An early suggestion was that the expansion itself might increase the maximum possible entropy of the universe, in effect by creating new possibilities for matter. The thermodynamic arrow might simply be the result of the process in which the universe takes up these new possibilities ... The idea that the arrow of thermodynamics is linked in this directed way to the expansion of the universe turns out to be untenable, however. The main objection to it is that the smooth early universe turns out to have been incredibly 'special,' even by the standards prevailing at the time. Its low entropy doesn't depend on the fact that there were fewer possibilities available, in other words. I meant that I don't think he would object, GIVEN that the smoothness problem has been solved. One has to distinguish the problem of explaining the boundary conditions from the problem of explaining the AOT within a universe with the observed boundary conditions. A lot of people object to explaining the AOT *even on the basis of the observed boundary conditions + time symmetric laws of physics*, which is all that I have been arguing for. We don't have any explanation for the BCs, except for speculative ones like colliding branes, inflation
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 10 January 2014 13:19, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Locality is preserved so long as no physical objects travel faster than light. I don't think physicists use such a narrow definition--if the equations of QM were modified so that the EPR experiment could be used to transmit *information* FTL, then even if no measurable particle or wave was observed to move FTL this would still probably be seen as a violation of locality. And the pilot wave in Bohmian mechanics is arguably just a sort of rule for coordinating the behavior of distant particles rather than a physical object, but its ability to coordinate them instantaneously is typically seen as a violation of locality. Unfortunately I have not been able to find any very precise definition of locality that would give a totally clear answer about cases like this, it tends to be stated in terms of imprecise terms like effects and influences. Yes, sorry, I was tacitly assuming that information can only be transmitted by physical objects (including by light). I don't think there is any good evidence for any influences *not* being transmitted by some sort of fundamental particle? (Even gravity - which also travels at c, I believe). Time-symmetry arguments don't involve ANY influences travelling FTL. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: What are wavefunctions?
On 10 January 2014 13:19, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 7:57 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 12:53, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 4:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 8 January 2014 08:59, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Well, most physicists already agrees physics is time-symmetric (well, CPT-symmetric, but the implications are the same for Bell's inequality and thermodynamics), Yes, they do, but it doesn't appear to be taken into account when discussing Bell's inequality. but I don't see how this alone can explain violations of the Bell inequality. No, you need to work out the consequences mathematically, and I dare say that is quite difficult. This is simply a *logical* demonstration that Bell's inequality can be violated while retaining locality and realism, which is otherwise impossible. As I said in another comment, if you allow information about the state of complex systems like detectors to flow back in times as well as forwards, it's not clear that this really counts as preserving locality. Nothing is flowing either way in time. (Assuming a block universe, nothing *can* flow in time - the notion doesn't make sense). I think you're reading something into my talk about information flowing back in time that I didn't intend. Not exactly. I am just aware that some people will do so, so I was trying to make it very clear that you didn't mean what those people (they know who they are!) might read into it. Also, once you start thinking of things as flowing through time you can end up with an awfully complicated system (like the TI) which you shouldn't need, because the whole thing is quite simple, being fixed by logical constraints. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz and Terren, I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions. Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course disagree. Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not. So what's the point? I forgot what it was... The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle be replaced with a copy, Bruno's comp arguments follow, with various consequences (including reality being non-computable, I think - but check with Bruno). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe* ?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Liz, No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more convincing proof could there be? If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:12:46 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Liz and Terren, I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm still me by all reasonable definitions. Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course disagree. Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not. So what's the point? I forgot what it was... The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle be replaced with a copy, Bruno's comp arguments follow, with various consequences (including reality being non-computable, I think - but check with Bruno). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Liz, No, there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space. Saying there is a universal present moment is effectively the same as saying there is a single computational space in which all the computations of the universe occur. If all computations occur in a single universal computational space there has to be a single universal present moment in that computational space that provides the happening for those computations to occur. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:16:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe*?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear LizR, Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe*?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more convincing proof could there be? One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start. If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality. The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions. If the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct response is to throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno starts from the assumption that consciousness is a form of computation and draws certain inferences. This isn't what comp claims it's what the argument shows, given the assumptions. The only way to falsify it is to show that one of the assumptions is wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that leads to the conclusions. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz.. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe*?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:53:18 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Liz, No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of occasions, reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more convincing proof could there be? One that explains why that has to be so would be a good start. If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure nonsense that is conclusively falsified by the very existence of reality. The point is that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions. If the conclusions invalidate the assumptions, then the correct response is to throw out the original assumptions as invalid. Bruno starts from the assumption that consciousness is a form of computation and draws certain inferences. This isn't what comp claims it's what the argument shows, given the assumptions. The only way to falsify it is to show that one of the assumptions is wrong, or that there is a flaw in the reasoning that leads to the conclusions. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 1/9/2014 5:15 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, PPS: A computational universe, IF it computes clock times which it must, absolutely requires something besides clock time to be moving to provide the processor cycles for those computations to occur within. That something is a universal (extending across all of computational space) present moment time. No it doesn't, c.f. William K. Wooters Time Replaced by Quantum Correlations IJTP v223 n8 1984. It simply has to exist for comp to work You suffer from a severe lack of imagination. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. That doesn't work for comp, however, which doesn't assume a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler than that. I believe they are The Church-Turing thesis Elementary arithmetic That consciousness is a form of computation -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is *that *time? (whatever it should be called) On 10 January 2014 15:48, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Liz, Your comp is obviously not my comp. Don't tell me what my comp does or doesn't do... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:38:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. That doesn't work for comp, however, which doesn't assume a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler than that. I believe they are The Church-Turing thesis Elementary arithmetic That consciousness is a form of computation -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:51:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is *that *time? (whatever it should be called) On 10 January 2014 15:48, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Liz, Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
When I talk about comp, like everyone else on this list apart from you, I mean Bruno's theory. That's what I'm talking about here. May I respectfully suggest you call yours something else, to avoid confusion? On 10 January 2014 15:52, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, Your comp is obviously not my comp. Don't tell me what my comp does or doesn't do... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:38:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. That doesn't work for comp, however, which doesn't assume a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler than that. I believe they are The Church-Turing thesis Elementary arithmetic That consciousness is a form of computation -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it *is.* On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:51:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is *that *time? (whatever it should be called) On 10 January 2014 15:48, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Brent, That seems to assume a prior existence of quantum correlations in a non-computational universe. Anyway it's just another unproven speculative theory. Why post it as if it proves something? Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:35:44 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 1/9/2014 5:15 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, PPS: A computational universe, IF it computes clock times which it must, absolutely requires something besides clock time to be moving to provide the processor cycles for those computations to occur within. That something is a universal (extending across all of computational space) present moment time. No it doesn't, c.f. William K. Wooters Time Replaced by Quantum Correlations IJTP v223 n8 1984. It simply has to exist for comp to work You suffer from a severe lack of imagination. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Well, that's OK then. Now we've cleared that up, I can repeat my original point: On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. That doesn't work for [Bruno's] comp, however, which doesn't assume a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler than that. I believe they are The Church-Turing thesis Elementary arithmetic That consciousness is a form of computation -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, You wrote: there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space. As someone deeply involved in studying distributed computation from the inside and the outside, I have to tell you, there is no difference between a single computer and a myriad of processors that all cycle their computations together. That is a difference that does *not* make a difference. Unless you take concurrency into account (and it does not seem that you do) there is no distiction between a single processor running the universe as a computation or a huge number of processors running in parallel as you describe. The problem is that if the distribution of physical processors is wide enough in space and the processors have different associated velocities in their motions, there is no such a thing as a single frame of simultaneity for them all to be said to be cycling together in the same present moment. Nope. Add to that simultaneity problem the problem of resource allocation and one has a real mess! (Forget about the intractability issues...) There seems to be a lot of bad thinking when it comes to what exactly is a computation. Let me try a definition of computation: Any transformation of information. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 9:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz.. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe*?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under
Re: Tegmark's New Book
No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations. You seem to be nit picking... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it *is.* On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:51:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is *that *time? (whatever it should be called) On 10 January 2014 15:48, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The One
Bruno and Brent, please do not paint me as a Robert Rosen imitation. I have esteem for his mind, but tried to go on from SOME of his thoughts in my own way. He was a mathematician and a biologist, I am none of those. His untimely death cut his thoughts and I believe there would have been more to it if he continues and publishes not only what may be compatible with a reductionist audience, but ventures into agnosticism himself, beyond his 'model' limited to the presently(?) knowbles. At best I am a 'heretic' Rosenite, as I am a 'heretic Marchallite (if I may say so). Brent may be right with his leading nowhere, which may be the itinery of our present ignorance. John M On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 7:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/8/2014 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi John, On 07 Jan 2014, at 23:20, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, you made my day. Reminds me of a Hungarian humorous author (P. Howard) who wrote about a blind philosopher (The Sleepy Elephant) and his assistant living in the deep Sahara - showing the Elephant's Life Oeuvre in a BIG book, the assistant was supposed to write as the old Blind Elephant dictated. It was all empty and the assistant asked somebody to inscribe: I cannot write, but it makes him so happy when I pretend... - Lol When reading your remarks I wonder what REALLY mean 'machine', 'comp', 'universal', and some more of your words I got used to over the past 2 decades, yet are not clear(??) enough in my mind to automatically click-in when used. Do you have a *glossary *I could download, to refresh those (brief!) meanings? I have no glossary. Maybe I should do that. I use each term in the most standard sense used by the expert in the field. Computable is made ultra-standard, if I can say, thanks to the Church thesis. Let me try an explanation, below, for the notions mentioned above. (I am aware that you appreciate Robert Rosen critics of Church Thesis, but as you know I have some reservation that it is really a critics of Church thesis, as a critic of possible misuse of Church's thesis). I'd take Rosen as a cautionary example of holism leading nowhere. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, Your error here is assuming the computations take place in a single wide physical dimensional space. They don't. They take place in a purely computational space prior to the existence of physical dimensional spacetime. Physical dimensional spacetime is a product of the computations. They don't exist within it. Therefore there is no spacetime separation between computations. They exist in a purely logical space prior to dimensionalization which they compute. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:06:33 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, You wrote: there is not a single universal processor, there is a single processor CYCLE. All information states are effectively their own processors, so the computational universe consists of myriads of processors, as many as there are information states (more or less). But all these myriads of processors all cycle their computations together in the same present moment, i.e. in the SAME computational space. As someone deeply involved in studying distributed computation from the inside and the outside, I have to tell you, there is no difference between a single computer and a myriad of processors that all cycle their computations together. That is a difference that does *not* make a difference. Unless you take concurrency into account (and it does not seem that you do) there is no distiction between a single processor running the universe as a computation or a huge number of processors running in parallel as you describe. The problem is that if the distribution of physical processors is wide enough in space and the processors have different associated velocities in their motions, there is no such a thing as a single frame of simultaneity for them all to be said to be cycling together in the same present moment. Nope. Add to that simultaneity problem the problem of resource allocation and one has a real mess! (Forget about the intractability issues...) There seems to be a lot of bad thinking when it comes to what exactly is a computation. Let me try a definition of computation: Any transformation of information. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 9:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Stephen, There is NO such requirement. See my response to Liz.. Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 8:45:40 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, Exactly. That requirement of a single computer is deeply troublesome for me. On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 8:16 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On 10 January 2014 14:01, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Stephen, There is no single observer that can take in all events I never said that and don't believe it. However there has to be a single universal processor cycling for a computational universe to work. That single universal processor cycle is the present moment P-time. All computations occur simultaneously as these cycles occur. All individual observers, clock times etc. occur and are computed within this actual extant presence of the computational space of reality. There has to be a *single processor* computing *the state of the universe*?! I know that's possible in principle, what with the C-T thesis and all that, but it's a bit of a limitation to put on your ideas. (Or maybe it has 10^80 cores? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 step...@provensecure.com javascript: http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter
Liz, So? I'm not really interested in Bruno's comp as I don't think it actually applies to reality. I'll stick with my computational reality for the time being at least... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:05:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Well, that's OK then. Now we've cleared that up, I can repeat my original point: On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is conclusive proof. That doesn't work for [Bruno's] comp, however, which doesn't assume a computational universe. The assumptions it makes are a lot simpler than that. I believe they are The Church-Turing thesis Elementary arithmetic That consciousness is a form of computation -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations. You seem to be nit picking... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: No you spent them telling me what it /_does_/. I'd like to know what it /_is._/ On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript: wrote: Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations. It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing). The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called energy. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, Could you be more specific about the properties of computational space? What are its metrics, its topological properties, its parameters, etc.? On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 10:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations. You seem to be nit picking... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it *is.* On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:51:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Maybe I got confused. I thought you were talking about processor cycle time - the time that is prior to all the various times that occur in the computed reality. The question is, what is *that *time? (whatever it should be called) On 10 January 2014 15:48, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Obviously clock time is the time that clocks measure. What else would it be? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Brent, On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 11:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/9/2014 7:07 PM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: No Liz, I told you what it IS. It's the happening in computational space that enables computations to take place since something has to move for computations to occur. All it DOES is provide the processor cycle for computations. You seem to be nit picking... Edgar On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:56:19 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: No you spent them telling me what it *does*. I'd like to know what it *is.* On 10 January 2014 15:54, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Common Liz, I just spent the last number of posts telling you and Stephen what it is... Don't make me repeat myself... I don't know why there is this concern about Edgar's computations. It's seems very much like Bruno's, except Bruno's Universal computer is running all possible programs (by dovetailing). AFAIK, I agree. I see little difference except for semantics. The time that appears on clocks is a computed ordering relation which is conjugate to the conserved quantity called energy. I don't know how time (the flow of event to event) or its conjugate emerges from either Bruno or Edgar's proposed theories. Both seem to assume a timeless and static domain from which everything, literally, emerges. I would like to better understand the mechanism of the emergence. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
