date:20121105


On 11/5/2012 2:46 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi

I have heard it said that every year a certain mathematics
society gets together to celebrate the fact that not one of
their papers has proven to be useful.

Pragmatists on the other hand believe that only the useful is true.

Take your pick.


Laugh out loud! Such silly narcissistic elitism!




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 14:24:21
Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality


On 05.11.2012 16:21 Roger Clough said the following:

Hi Richard Ruquist

Engineering advantages ? A decade before the Wright brothers flew
their airplane, people would have said, "You're going to do WHAT ?"


I guess this is a very good example, as the Wright brothers have just
done it. I am not sure if they based this innovation on some theory.
Hence is the question, if a superstring theory is really necessary to
drive innovations.

Evgenii

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Re: The two types of truth


On 11/5/2012 2:41 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

There you go again. That's the same question that einstein raised,
but in a positive format. He wondered why and how the universe was
so conducive to reason and methematics.
Einstein seemed to assume that humans where the only entities in 
teh universe that where capable of conscious apperception. In my 
thinking, if a system has a separable QM wavefunction, then it can be an 
observer.






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 13:08:41
Subject: Re: The two types of truth


On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

I believe that truth is independent of mind,
but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how
to state what that criterion is.

Hi Roger,

  If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can
apprehend truth?

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Re: On hearsay


On 11/5/2012 2:36 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

No, they don't all have to had witnessed it, they can simply
be told about it. In court that is called "hearsay".


You are still thinking that my observers are only human...




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 11:20:01
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Good. That is another way to define objective (public).
Whereas 1p is personal and always private.

If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p.

Hi,

  It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed'
by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree.

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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 2:30 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

A tape recorder could prove your theory wrong.


A tape recorder is an example of an observer of sounds, so no, my 
theory stands.




Berkeley finally gave in and said that realism
was acceptable because God could see or hear it.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 11:10:06
Subject: Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook
explanation for realism is, "if a tree falls in a
forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it
make a sound?"

A realist (such as me) would say "yes."

  The logician in me would say "no!" Because a sound is something
that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around,
then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there
is not a sound.


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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 8:13 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Even with the Theaetetus' definition of truth, which I find to be highly original 
and amazingly ingenious, we are still left without an explanation as to how the 
accidental coincidence of a Platonic Truth and an actual fact of the world occurs. Your 
idea reminds me of Spinoza and Whitehead's attempt at an Occasionalist explanation of 
mind-body interactions. 


That's why most philosophers don't consider true belief to constitute knowledge.  
Gettier's paradox implies that something more is needed - usually a causal connection 
between the belief and the fact that makes it true.


Brent

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Re: Scott Aronson on free will



On Wednesday, October 31, 2012 12:25:12 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 , meekerdb > wrote:
>
>  >> John Clark should get a kick out of this:
>>>
>>> http://www.scottaaronson.com/talks/
>>>
>>
> >  In computer science, we deal all the time with processes that are 
>> neither deterministic nor random. 
>>
>
> BULLSHIT!
>


Hahhahahahahahha Ahhh hahahhahahahhahahahahahahhahahha

Aha ah aahahahha

dying... 

Craig

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RE: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements

2012-11-05 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi John:
 
See my 11/4/12 @ 4:43PM post on life re proposal "ii" - freewill precluded.
 
Hal Ruhl
 
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Monday, November 05, 2012 1:57 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out
of their movements
 
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012  Stephen P. King  wrote:
 
> The finding implies that free will is illusory.

Free will is not illusionary.  A illusion is a perfectly respectable
subjective phenomena, but free will is not respectable, free will is just
gibberish. 

  John K Clark
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Re: Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems

2012-11-05 Thread John Mikes

Dear Russell,

I have my doubts about "causality" as a *complete* term: our 'systems', cf:
ecosystem etc. include the up-to-date inventory of knowables as in our
existing "MODEL" of the world - which grows over the millennia
stepwise. (The 'cause' of the lightning is no more the "ire" of Zeus).

Whatever we include as 'causing' a change (whatever) is the portion of its
entailments selectable from said inventory (of yesterday). This causes the
uncertainty and occasional mishaps in our "world". Besides: our terms are
proportionate, content and qualia (may be) incomplete restricted to said
inventory, so the partial entailment we observe may seem satisfactory to
the actual 'model-item' we carry. (((How's THAT with AL?)))
--
 We had a little exchange on "random" earlier when you resorted to the term
(as I recall): as *provisonal (or conditional?) random* that may occur *under
the given conditions only*.
((I just wrote to Hal R. that a "random walk" in evolution could lead *us,
humans* (back???) - maybe - to *DE*-velop into trilobites. Why not?))

John Mikes


On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:59 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

> The distinction between correlation and causality occasionally comes
> up in this discussion group, so I thought this paper might be of
> interest.
>
> Disclaimer - I haven't read it, but it is published in Science, and
> one of the authors (Robert May) I have the utmost respect for.
>
> Let me know if you can't find a non paywalled version. I will probably
> be able to get it from my institution's e-library.
>
>
> - Forwarded message from Complexity Digest Administration <
> comdigad...@turing.iimas.unam.mx> -
>
>
>
> Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
>
>   Identifying causal networks is important for effective policy and
> management recommendations on climate, epidemiology, financial regulation,
> and much else. We introduce a method, based on nonlinear state space
> reconstruction, that can distinguish causality from correlation. It extends
> to nonseparable weakly connected dynamic systems (cases not covered by the
> current Granger causality paradigm). The approach is illustrated both by
> simple models (where, in contrast to the real world, we know the underlying
> equations/relations and so can check the validity of our method) and by
> application to real ecological systems, including the controversial
> sardine-anchovy-temperature problem.
>
>
> Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
> George Sugihara, Robert May, Hao Ye, Chih-hao Hsieh, Ethan Deyle, Michael
> Fogarty, Stephan Munch
>
> Science 26 October 2012:
> Vol. 338 no. 6106 pp. 496-500
>
> http://unam.us4.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=9e44b3450a&e=d38efa683e
>
> See it on Scoop.it (
> http://www.scoop.it/t/papers/p/3161484398/detecting-causality-in-complex-ecosystems)
> , via Papers (http://www.scoop.it/t/papers)
>
>
>
> --
>
>
> 
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>
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Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

2012-11-05 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 05.11.2012 21:49 meekerdb said the following:

On 11/5/2012 1:32 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 04.11.2012 22:03 meekerdb said the following:

On 11/4/2012 1:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 04.11.2012 00:47 Alberto G. Corona said the following:


: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and
which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part
of some scientific theory?"

Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know ,
and is not part

of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in
the reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We
directly know reality because we live within it.  Our
primary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is
_the_ reality.

A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that
approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism
with some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism
that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know
if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this
modelization is accurate.



Let us imagine that we have a mathematical model that
isomorphic with the whole reality. Let us say that this model
is before you as some computer implementation. The problem of
coordination still remains. To use this model, you need to find
out its particular part and relate it with reality. The model
of the whole reality does not do it by itself.


That seems like an impossible hypothesis.  Usually when one
talks about having a model it is a model that one created or
someone else created and the correspondence with whatever is
modeled is part of the creation of the model. If you were simply
presented with a model of all reality and you didn't know who
created this model so that you could ask them how it corresponded
to the thing modeled then you would be just like a scientist
faced with nature and you would proceed by creating a model of
the model in terms you understood.


What you say about a historical development is exactly what Van
Fraassen offers as a part of a solution to the coordination
problem.


What exactly is 'coordination' and why is it a problem?


An analogy would be using a map. One needs for example to locate oneself 
in a map. This could be generalized.


Let us consider how an engineer for example uses Maxwell equations. An 
engineer starts with a design. This design could be described by Maxwell 
equations but one needs an engineer to suggest the design. Maxwell 
equations on their own are not enough.






Yet, even after the theory has been developed (let us imagine that
the science has included in its model the dark energy, the dark
matter and have found a way to make GR and QM compatible), one
needs to take a decision what a particular part of the theory is
necessary to drive a particular innovation. Even a complete
scientific theory will not do it by itself. In this sense, it will
be still incomplete.


I don't understand the problem; are you simply saying the model of
reality is not reality itself?  That seems rather trivial.


In a way. A scientific model is after all a representation. And a 
representation is


p. 21 “Z uses X to depict Y as F”

Hence even a complete scientific theory does not contain "Z uses". This 
remains somehow outside of even a complete Theory of Everything.


In a way it is trivial, I agree. Yet, it seems for example Hawking in 
his Grand Design does not agree with such a trivial observation.


Evgenii

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Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements



On Monday, November 5, 2012 1:56:53 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 5, 2012  Stephen P. King >wrote:
>
> > The finding implies that free will is illusory.
>>
>
> Free will is not illusionary.  A illusion is a perfectly respectable 
> subjective phenomena, but free will is not respectable, free will is just 
> gibberish. 
>

A gibberish which has been clinically proven to become less gibberish if 
you believe it.

Craig
 

>
>   John K Clark
>

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Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality


On 11/5/2012 1:32 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 04.11.2012 22:03 meekerdb said the following:

On 11/4/2012 1:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 04.11.2012 00:47 Alberto G. Corona said the following:


: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and
which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of
some scientific theory?"

Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know , and is
not part

of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in the
reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly
know reality because we live within it.  Our  primary knowledge
is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality.

A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that
approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with
some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that
embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we
have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is
accurate.



Let us imagine that we have a mathematical model that isomorphic
with the whole reality. Let us say that this model is before you as
some computer implementation. The problem of coordination still
remains. To use this model, you need to find out its particular
part and relate it with reality. The model of the whole reality
does not do it by itself.


That seems like an impossible hypothesis.  Usually when one talks
about having a model it is a model that one created or someone else
created and the correspondence with whatever is modeled is part of
the creation of the model. If you were simply presented with a model
of all reality and you didn't know who created this model so that you
could ask them how it corresponded to the thing modeled then you
would be just like a scientist faced with nature and you would
proceed by creating a model of the model in terms you understood.


What you say about a historical development is exactly what Van Fraassen offers as a 
part of a solution to the coordination problem.


What exactly is 'coordination' and why is it a problem?



Yet, even after the theory has been developed (let us imagine that the science has 
included in its model the dark energy, the dark matter and have found a way to make GR 
and QM compatible), one needs to take a decision what a particular part of the theory is 
necessary to drive a particular innovation. Even a complete scientific theory will not 
do it by itself. In this sense, it will be still incomplete.


I don't understand the problem; are you simply saying the model of reality is not reality 
itself?  That seems rather trivial.


Brent

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Fwd: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

2012-11-05 Thread John Mikes

dear Hal and Stephen,
I wanted to complete my response to both of you when at the point below a
blip in the juice blanked out my internet-connection and kidnapped the text
I had to that point.
I don't complete it right away, read first whatever comes in - to
 facilitate a more comprehensive post.

I can include now that Hal stepped out of my 'domain' by - seemingly -
restricting the 'live' to this planet while I extend it to everything that
has a 'response' to relations (if you still think in a 'physical' world:
el. charges etc.)
I like to imply even the still unknown/unknowable infinite existence.
That's what I call "EVERYTHING". (I cannot, of course, but I accept my
ignorance).
John M

Dear Stephen,
I did not promise answers to questions arisen by my thoughts.
Agnosticism gives you such comfort. However I try...

First: I am not sure what to call the "Selective" aspect. In my view the
change (mutaton?) is selective in two ways:
1. In lieu of a RANDOM walk: The given circumstances provide a potential
(including those* we don't know about* as well) with unknown trend which to
accept and which not. (In this part I still hesitate with newer ideas (free
will, force of prayer and other widely believed marvels not picked up by
myself) whether a 'mental(?)' *urge* ('m-energy?) can influence even
facilitate the acceptance of one particular potential way over another?)
((random walk could include our *evolution* back into trilobites AGAIN.))
 -   a n d   -
2. Whether the variants i.e. results of the ongoing mutation are viable in
the circumstances they get into (= fit enough to survive?)

The 'shaping' of polymer molecules raised a question in my mind - even at
the time when I beleved in (and exercised) synthesis of such: kid peptalk
mentions 'secondary forces' (van der Waals?) of which we have vague ideas
but speak a lot. The multitude of carriers of such 'forces' MAY well
overwhelm the skeleton-firmness of primary valences - who knows?  In such
case the 'shaping' and 'form' is subject to effects still unknown: those
additional influences from outside our 'model' that seep in over the
millennia. (Mad Cow disease may be in such domain.)
I am very hesitant to make statements where the still unknowable effects
may have a role. Conventional science applies statistics of the KNOWN.

On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 12:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 11/4/2012 12:09 AM, John Mikes wrote:
>
>  snip
>>
>
>  ## to 9 I have objections. I cannot imagine (maybe my mistake) evolution
>> without a goal, a final aim which would require an intelligent design to
>> approach it. (I may have one: the re-distribution into the Plenitude). My
>> way (as of yesterday) is the ease-and-potential path of changes allowed by
>> the available configurations (relations) when a change occurs.
>> NO RANDOM, it would make a grits out of nature. Even authors with high
>> preference on random treatises withdrew into a "conditional random" when I
>> attacked the term. Conditionality kills random of course.
>> So in my terms: NO random mutations, (especially not FOR survival) I call
>> 'evolution' the HISTORY of our universe. The unsuccessful mutants die, the
>> successful go on - science detects them in its snapshots taken and explains
>> them religiously. (Survival of the fittest - the Dinosaur was fit when it
>> got extinct by the change in circumstances).
>> I accept ONE random (in mathematical puzzles): "take ANY number..."
>>
>> Your "lower, but not upper bound" is highly appreciable. Thanks.
>>
>> I apologize for my haphazard remarks upon prima vista reading. The
>> list-discussion is not a well-founded scientific discourse upon new ideas.
>> Most people tell what they formulated over years. A reply is many times
>> instantaneous.
>>
>>  snip
>
>> [HR] 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no
>> upper
>> bound.
>>
> snip
>
> Dear John,
>
> I wanted to make a remark on just this part of your post as I need to
> ask a question. Why is the Selective aspect of evolution almost completely
> ignored? It is easy to talk about mutations and models of them, such as
> random walks - which I favor!, but what about the selection aspect? what
> about how the Tree of Life is almost constantly pruned by events that kill
> off or otherwise blunt growth in some directions as opposed to others?
>
> My question to you is specific. How do polymers mold themselves to
> local parameters that influence their molecules? What determines their
> shape? Is there a deterministic explanation of the shape of a polymer?
> Would this explanation work for, say, DNA or peptite molecules?
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
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Re: Emergence of Properties


On 11/5/2012 12:51 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end,
all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote.

Dear Roger,

Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem 
 and the voting paradox ?


http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/

"The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at least 3 
options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences without violating some 
desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to accept that society will 
not act rationally like an individual would, or you have to accept that society's 
preferences will exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the 
individual a dictator."


Which is why science is successful in reaching agreements.  It seeks to persuade people by 
evidence instead of just aggregating opinions.


Brent

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Politics as tribal warfare-- and life as tribal warfare

Tribal warfare and the nature of man 

Politics is tribal warfare. It's ancient hatred between  
folks who don't even speak the same language.  

There's no remedy. Tribes have brought safety to man 
and so continue to this day. Tribes are anthropological.  

We join the various tribes unknowingly  
when trying to sort out who we are. It simplifies things. 
Tribal identification is thus very natural. 

(Note that capitalism or market trading is also anthropological. 
Cave men traded goods as needed and no doubt for sex. 
In a sense we still do that today.) 

Note that the nature of the split is also historically the same.  
There were liberals and conservatives in the  
time of Caesar's senate. Pretty much like today. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Re: Mind is life

Hi Stephen P. King  

I overlooked the most important attribute IMHO of mind, that being intelligence.
And indeed I may often seem to have a private language of terms,
although I try to use them as straight-forwardly as I can. 

Those attributes to my mind are obtained but what mind enables
us to do. Self-animation probably covers the whole list.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 14:16:08 
Subject: Re: Mind is life 


On 11/5/2012 1:33 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> A mind is the medium through which a self with an unchanging identity 
> or soul actively senses, thinks, knows, can choose, imagine, create, and 
> perceive, subjectively, all on its own, to whatever extent that is possible. 
> 
> Thus mind is the same as life. And not the organs of the brain per se, 
> but the life which lives in or is associated with the brain, and more 
> broadly with the whole body. While it still lives. I think, therefore I am. 
Dear Roger, 

 That definition seems to work for me. ;-) But I worry about the  
meanings of some of the words that you use. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King  

Thanks for the heads up. We ask that question every four
years in the USA-- namely should the popular vote or should
the votes from the individual states  (the electoral vote) decide 
who becomes president ?

In the first Bush election, Gore won the popular vote but Bush
at the last moment narrowly squeezed out the electoral vote and 
so won at least officially. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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- Receiving the following content -  
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Time: 2012-11-05, 13:51:48 
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties 


On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King   

In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end, 
all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote. 

Dear Roger, 

Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem and the voting 
paradox ? 

http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/
 

"The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and at 
least 3 options, it? impossible to aggregate individual preferences without 
violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You either have to 
accept that society will not act rationally like an individual would, or you 
have to accept that society? preferences will exactly mimic one person? 
preferences. In a sense, that makes the individual a dictator." 

I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so easily 
seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: "The moon still exists if I am not 
looking at it!" We always over-value our own individual contribution to the 
definiteness of properties that we observe in the physical universe. It also 
might have something to do with the problem of Free Will and the absurd 
implications of the Quantum Suicide argument. 


--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi  

I have heard it said that every year a certain mathematics
society gets together to celebrate the fact that not one of
their papers has proven to be useful. 

Pragmatists on the other hand believe that only the useful is true.

Take your pick.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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- Receiving the following content -  
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Time: 2012-11-05, 14:24:21 
Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality 


On 05.11.2012 16:21 Roger Clough said the following: 
> Hi Richard Ruquist 
> 
> Engineering advantages ? A decade before the Wright brothers flew 
> their airplane, people would have said, "You're going to do WHAT ?" 
> 

I guess this is a very good example, as the Wright brothers have just  
done it. I am not sure if they based this innovation on some theory.  
Hence is the question, if a superstring theory is really necessary to  
drive innovations. 

Evgenii 

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Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King  

Simple. All truths can probably only be known by the One who
it seems generated them (not sure). 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 13:43:57 
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties 


On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King  

I have no problem with that, although 
I do think that there are some eternal truths 
external to those minds. 

Dear Roger, 

OK, but what allows those 'external truths" to be knowable? Maybe they are 
unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? Think about 
what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds to infinity. Does 
the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary statement or not? Is it 
possible for an infinite number of minds to agree on the truth value of more 
than one sentence? 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties 


On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). 
The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be 
contradicted (necessary truths). 

Hi Roger, 

I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a priori fixed 
apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds 
in agreement. 


--  



--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King  

I don't think there's a better standard of truth.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Time: 2012-11-05, 13:39:57 
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 


On 11/5/2012 1:14 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Plato in the end confessed that the best he 
> could offer was a likely story. I see no reason 
> to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible, 
> for that matter. 
Dear Roger, 

 This tells me that you are OK with "arguments from authority". This  
saddens me! 

--  
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Stephen 


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Re: Re: The two types of truth

Hi Stephen P. King  

There you go again. That's the same question that einstein raised,
but in a positive format. He wondered why and how the universe was
so conducive to reason and methematics.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 13:08:41 
Subject: Re: The two types of truth 


On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> I believe that truth is independent of mind, 
> but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how 
> to state what that criterion is. 
Hi Roger, 

 If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can  
apprehend truth? 

--  
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Stephen 


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On hearsay

Hi Stephen P. King  

No, they don't all have to had witnessed it, they can simply 
be told about it. In court that is called "hearsay". 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 11:20:01 
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism 


On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Good. That is another way to define objective (public). 
> Whereas 1p is personal and always private. 
> 
> If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p. 

Hi, 

 It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed'  
by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree. 

--  
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Stephen 


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Re: Re: Can there be a private language ?

Hi Stephen P. King  

Yes, I had forgotten about many 1p. 

And your dismissal of the possibility of a private language
is exactly what Witgenstein concluded.

Great minds must think alike.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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- Receiving the following content -  
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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 11:18:48 
Subject: Re: Can there be a private language ? 


On 11/5/2012 10:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> You could see it that way, but I only meant that 1p is subjective 
> (as I see or know it (here,now)) while 3p is objective (as they 
> see or know whatever, whenever). 

Hi Roger, 

 OK, but isn't the "objectivity" of 3p exactly what many 1p could  
agree upon and nothing more? 

> 
> Which raises Wittgenstein's question, "Can there be a 
> private language ?" 
 No, because a language is a conversion of the signification of some  
set of signs between many communicators. 

--  
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Stephen 


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Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

2012-11-05 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 04.11.2012 22:03 meekerdb said the following:

On 11/4/2012 1:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 04.11.2012 00:47 Alberto G. Corona said the following:


: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and
which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of
some scientific theory?"

Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know , and is
not part

of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in the
reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly
know reality because we live within it.  Our  primary knowledge
is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality.

A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that
approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with
some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that
embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we
have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is
accurate.



Let us imagine that we have a mathematical model that isomorphic
with the whole reality. Let us say that this model is before you as
some computer implementation. The problem of coordination still
remains. To use this model, you need to find out its particular
part and relate it with reality. The model of the whole reality
does not do it by itself.


That seems like an impossible hypothesis.  Usually when one talks
about having a model it is a model that one created or someone else
created and the correspondence with whatever is modeled is part of
the creation of the model. If you were simply presented with a model
of all reality and you didn't know who created this model so that you
could ask them how it corresponded to the thing modeled then you
would be just like a scientist faced with nature and you would
proceed by creating a model of the model in terms you understood.


What you say about a historical development is exactly what Van Fraassen 
offers as a part of a solution to the coordination problem.


Yet, even after the theory has been developed (let us imagine that the 
science has included in its model the dark energy, the dark matter and 
have found a way to make GR and QM compatible), one needs to take a 
decision what a particular part of the theory is necessary to drive a 
particular innovation. Even a complete scientific theory will not do it 
by itself. In this sense, it will be still incomplete.


Evgenii

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Re: Re: Communicability

Hi Stephen P. King  

A tape recorder could prove your theory wrong. 

Berkeley finally gave in and said that realism
was acceptable because God could see or hear it.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
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Time: 2012-11-05, 11:10:06 
Subject: Re: Communicability 


On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook 
> explanation for realism is, "if a tree falls in a 
> forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it 
> make a sound?" 
> 
> A realist (such as me) would say "yes." 
 The logician in me would say "no!" Because a sound is something  
that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around,  
then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there  
is not a sound. 


--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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Re: Re: Communicability

Hi Stephen P. King  

Thanks for supporting the majesty of the One, 
but I think the One, like God, needs a theodicy. 
They both cause everything that happens, but for some
reason, all of the results down here are not perfect (are contingent).
I don't know why that happens, but I look all around
me and watch the news about Sandy and see it isn't so.

Plato adopted the imperfections of the world into his
cosmology (we only see a distorted view of reality), and 
Leibniz also offers the distortion and singular perspective
excuse. Leibniz in his theodicy also essentially says that God being good,
and although there is evil, God made the best possible world.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 11:07:17 
Subject: Re: Communicability 

On 11/5/2012 10:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 1) I don't understand your application of "infinite regress" 
> to the One. The One is something like an intellectual white hole 
> from which all comes, to invent a description. 
Hi Roger, 

 Let us think a bit about this. Does anything exist that could act  
to contradict something that the One might believe to be true? No, why?  
Because the One knows all things, thus there is no knowledge that it  
does not know. Nothing exists outside of it. Therefore the One is always  
truthful, no? How can the One know the difference between that it is and  
what it is not? Well, its seems to follow that the One has to particular  
location in space or time and thus has no particular "point of view".  
OK? So, we can ask: what about the statements by the One of itself? Are  
they always true? How could we know? We are left with an entity that: 
1) has no particular point of view 
2) only makes true statements 
3) cannot be contradicted. 
4) is unable to make any statements about itself. 

 Is this not an existential contradiction? 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 

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Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

2012-11-05 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 05.11.2012 16:21 Roger Clough said the following:

Hi Richard Ruquist

Engineering advantages ? A decade before the Wright brothers flew
their airplane, people would have said, "You're going to do WHAT ?"



I guess this is a very good example, as the Wright brothers have just 
done it. I am not sure if they based this innovation on some theory. 
Hence is the question, if a superstring theory is really necessary to 
drive innovations.


Evgenii

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Re: Mind is life


On 11/5/2012 1:33 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

A mind is the medium through which a self with an unchanging identity
or soul actively senses, thinks, knows, can choose, imagine, create, and
perceive, subjectively, all on its own, to whatever extent that is possible.

Thus mind is the same as life. And not the organs of the brain per se,
but the life which lives in or is associated with the brain, and more
broadly with the whole body. While it still lives. I think, therefore I am.

Dear Roger,

That definition seems to work for me. ;-) But I worry about the 
meanings of some of the words that you use.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: The two types of truth


On 11/5/2012 1:25 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/5/2012 12:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

I believe that truth is independent of mind,
but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how
to state what that criterion is.

Hi Roger,

If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can 
apprehend truth?


Confusion of categories.  Facts are independent of minds.


Hi Brent,

  I would like to get this right! Please tell us how minds can know 
of truths if truths are independent of minds.



True is an attribute of a proposition when it corresponds to a fact.


What is a fact?


Propositions are not independent of minds.


What relations hold between facts and propositions?


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Stephen


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Re: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

Hi meekerdb  

Love is a qualia and science cannot touch qualia.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: meekerdb  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 21:28:12 
Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality 


On 11/3/2012 6:47 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:  



: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not 
expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory?" 


Yes . "I love my mother" is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a 
scientific theory.  


But could it be is the question.  There could be a scientific theory that 
Alberto Corona loves his mother and you could know the theory. 



We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not approximate reality 
by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it.  Our  primary 
knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality.   


A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that approximate reality, 
maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with some-part-of reality, but certainly, 
not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know 
if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is 
accurate. 


The legitimate usage of the models is  to refine this intuitive knowledge. But 
at the worst, a model can  negate our direct knowledge and try to create an 
alternative reality. In this case the theorist reclaim the model as the 
reality. Thus the theorist .reclaim a complete knowledge of reality. In this 
case the theorist is outside of science, even if it is  within the science 
industry, and becomes a sort of gnostic preacher 


Yes, a model that includes everything is impossible (and not even useful), but 
it might still be that each thing you know is part of some model.

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Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King  

Hmmm. Spacetime is xyzt and so extended, 
1p is inextended and so not part of that.
Thus, contrary to you and Berkeley,
1p and the physical universe do not need
each other. xyzt does fine on its own.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
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Time: 2012-11-03, 13:35:50 
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties 


On 11/3/2012 9:18 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Yes, Aristotle's substances and their properties do not change with time. 
> But Leibniz's do very rapidly. And they are individual to each substance, 
> meaning to each monad (from his aspect). The actual properties are 
> collective data of the universe. 
Hi Roger, 

 I do not assume a single physical universe that is independent of  
entities with 1p. I call this idea the "Fish bowl" model. I see the  
physical universe as a dream that is the same for many 1p, a literal  
mass delusion! 

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Re: Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements

2012-11-05 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012  Stephen P. King  wrote:

> The finding implies that free will is illusory.
>

Free will is not illusionary.  A illusion is a perfectly respectable
subjective phenomena, but free will is not respectable, free will is just
gibberish.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 05 Nov 2012, at 04:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about  
that. But with the definition of 1p, it shows that something is  
indeterminate.


It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain -


yes. It is the 1-indterminacy , in Heslinki, of my future possible  
experience, in W or in M, but not in both of them.



which is John's complaint about pronouns.  So which 1p is  
indeterminate.


The "you" in Helsinki, before pushing on the annihilation/scan button,  
and concerning the future experience, which can only be "Oh I am in  
W" , or "Oh I am in M", but not both.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Emergence of Properties


On 11/5/2012 1:19 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end,
all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote.

Dear Roger,

Are you familiar with Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem 
 and the 
voting paradox ?


http://mindyourdecisions.com/blog/2008/02/12/game-theory-tuesdays-someone-is-going-to-be-unhappy-an-illustration-of-the-voting-paradox/

"The executive summary is that whenever there are at least 2 people and 
at least 3 options, it's impossible to aggregate individual preferences 
without violating some desired conditions, like Pareto efficiency. You 
either have to accept that society will not act rationally like an 
individual would, or you have to accept that society's preferences will 
exactly mimic one person's preferences. In a sense, that makes the 
individual a dictator."


I suspect that this impossibility might explain why people are so 
easily seduced by arguments like Einstein's quip: "The moon still exists 
if I am not looking at it!" We always over-value our own individual 
contribution to the definiteness of properties that we observe in the 
physical universe. It also might have something to do with theproblem of 
Free Will  and the absurd 
implications of the Quantum Suicide argument 
.


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Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen P. King  

Hmm, it's a fine point, but communicability implies symbols.
I believe that there were numbers before there were symbols for them. 
There have to be symbols if they are used to think with, 
but IMHO they were there before that in order for creation to 
happen systematically, according to some plan, and to have design.
I think that the One can do such things spontaneously or else
the One would be subservient to numbers.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:33:49 
Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic 


On 11/3/2012 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, 
> they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. 

 Yes, but not just discovered, they must be communicable. 

> 
> Arithmetic or had to exist before man or 
> the Big Bang woujld not have worked. 

 I do not restrict entities with 1p to humanity. 


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Re: Emergence of Properties


On 11/5/2012 1:17 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King
I have no problem with that, although
I do think that there are some eternal truths
external to those minds.


Dear Roger,

OK, but what allows those 'external truths" to be knowable? Maybe 
they are unknowable and if so what difference does their existence make? 
Think about what my claim below implies as we take the number of minds 
to infinity. Does the truth value increase to certainty of an arbitrary 
statement or not? Is it possible for an infinite number of minds to 
agree on the truth value of more than one sentence?



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Stephen P. King 
*Receiver:* everything-list 
*Time:* 2012-11-03, 13:31:14
*Subject:* Re: Emergence of Properties

On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts).
The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be 
contradicted (necessary truths).

Hi Roger,

I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a
priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be
contingent on _many minds_ in agreement.

-- 




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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-05 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Again the same main 1-3 confusion.
>

I see nothing I can be confused about because the only point of view I can
see is my own first person one, what your second or his third person point
of view may be is pure speculation on my part and so I will say nothing
about it.

> You can only say that [...]
>

You? John Clark has been duplicated so who "can only say that", me or that
fellow to my right who looks just like me?
You? John Clark has been duplicated so who "can only say that", me or that
fellow to my left who looks just like me?

> John Clark would be certain that *a* John Clark would die a painful
> death, not that it will necessarily ever matter from your (the unique John
> Clark before the experience) future point of view
>

A future experience NEVER matters to the unique person occupying the
present because its in the future, but when the future becomes the present
just before John Clark's last painful thought John Clark will remember
being John Clark of the past.

> Look at AUDA
>

According to Google "AUDA" is either a investment firm, a Bedouin Arab
leader, or a Latvian football club playing in the second-highest division
of Latvian football. I don't see the relevance in any of them.

> Avoiding the use of pronouns there would conflate even more easily the
> 1-3 key distinction.
>

I couldn't fail to disagree with you less. What you really mean by
"conflate" is to shine a bright light on your ideas to expose their errors
in stark relief. Pronouns are supposed to be used just for convenience,
instead of laboriously typing "Bruno Marchal" the pronouns "you" or "he"
can be used. But sometimes even in everyday experiences without the huge
complication of duplicating chambers pronouns can lead to ambiguity. We've
all had the experience of reading a very convoluted sentence and then
seeing at the end "and so I disagree with it" and not being certain what
"it" refers to and thus being unsure if the writer agrees with you or not.
Now if we introduce duplicating chambers pronouns are a billion times more
dangerous. To say that "you have been duplicated" and then to ask what
"you" will see feel or want is just begging for ambiguity and confusion.

  John K Clark

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/5/2012 1:14 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Plato in the end confessed that the best he
could offer was a likely story. I see no reason
to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible,
for that matter.

Dear Roger,

This tells me that you are OK with "arguments from authority". This 
saddens me!


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Mind is life

Hi Stephen P. King  

A mind is the medium through which a self with an unchanging identity
or soul actively senses, thinks, knows, can choose, imagine, create, and 
perceive, subjectively, all on its own, to whatever extent that is possible.  

Thus mind is the same as life. And not the organs of the brain per se, 
but the life which lives in or is associated with the brain, and more 
broadly with the whole body. While it still lives. I think, therefore I am.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:32:31 
Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism 


On 11/3/2012 9:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Although well-founded, solipsism still remains a psychological theory, 
> a fact, if you will. As such, it belongs to the contingent world, not the 
> world of necessary reason. There may be beings to which it does not hold. 
> Mystics claim to have merged with the mind of God. Or perhaps 
> some day a proof against it may be found. 
Hi Roger, 

 If you can find a consistent definition of a mind for me, I will  
give you that proof. ;-) 

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Re: The two types of truth


On 11/5/2012 12:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

I believe that truth is independent of mind,
but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how
to state what that criterion is.

Hi Roger,

If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can apprehend 
truth?


Confusion of categories.  Facts are independent of minds.  True is an attribute of a 
proposition when it corresponds to a fact.  Propositions are not independent of minds.


Brent

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Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King  

In the end, we must accept a truth, so in the end,
all truth is pragmatic. We must cast our own vote.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties 


On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). 
The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be 
contradicted (necessary truths). 

Hi Roger, 

I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a priori fixed 
apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds 
in agreement. 


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Re: Re: Emergence of Properties

Hi Stephen P. King 

I have no problem with that, although
I do think that there are some eternal truths
external to those minds.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties


On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts).
The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be 
contradicted (necessary truths).

Hi Roger,

I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a priori fixed 
apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds 
in agreement.


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Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

Hi Stephen P. King 

Plato in the end confessed that the best he  
could offer was a likely story. I see no reason
to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible,
for that matter. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 10:18:16 
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 


On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
>> On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? 
 
 Dear Bruno, 
 
 No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be  
 complete and consistent simultaneously, 
>>> 
>>> Why not? The One is not a theory. 
>> 
>> Why does it have to be "a theory"? The concept of the One is a  
>> fragment of a theory... 
> 
> You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same  
> as the concept of the One. 
> 
> 

 Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? 

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Re: The two types of truth


On 11/5/2012 12:48 PM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

I believe that truth is independent of mind,
but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how
to state what that criterion is.

Hi Roger,

If truth is independent of the mind, how is it that the mind can 
apprehend truth?


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Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their movements

Hi,

Let me throw something into the conversation. Craig may have linked
this previously, but it needs closed inspection IMHO. Attention John Clark!

"Debunking people's belief in free will takes the intention out of their
movements

Undermining a person's belief in free will alters the way their brain
prepares for a voluntary movement. Davide Rigoni and his colleagues, who
made the finding, aren't sure what the precise mechanism for this effect
is, but they speculated that bursting the free will bubble somehow
causes people to put less intentional effort into their movements.

Rigoni's team tested thirty participants on a version of Benjamin
Libet's classic task from the 1980s. This requires that participants
watch a dot proceed round a clock face, that they make a voluntary
finger movement at a time of their choosing (the current study had
participants press a button), and then make a mental note of the
position of the clock at the time they made their decision to move.
Libet's controversial discovery, replicated here, was that the brain
begins preparing for the finger movement several hundred milliseconds
prior to the conscious decision to move, as revealed by electrical
activity recorded via electrodes on the scalp. The finding implies that
free will is illusory.

For Rigoni's task, an additional detail was that half the participants
read a passage debunking our sense of free will (see comments for the
text) before they completed the Libet task. The other half acted as
controls and read a passage about consciousness that didn't mention free
will."

read more at
http://bps-research-digest.blogspot.com/2011/05/debunking-peoples-belief-in-free-will.html

These findings seem to me to be consistent with placebo
and nocebo effect
s. The point here is that
"belief" is not just a belief! It is a difference that makes a difference.

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Re: Re: The two types of truth

Hi Stephen P. King  

I believe that truth is independent of mind,
but we poor beggars cannot be sure of how 
to state what that criterion is. 


 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


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Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 10:17:02 
Subject: Re: The two types of truth 


On 11/3/2012 7:45 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, 
> 
> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html 
> 
> "Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: 
> truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either 
> true or false], and truths of fact [which are not always either true or 
> false]. 
> 
> Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. 
> Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are 
> contingent, empirical truths. 
> Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have 
> their 
> sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical 
> inconsistency 
> of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason 
> in 
> being more perfect than propositions which deny them." 
> 
Dear Roger, 

 Is truth, either of reason or of fact, independent of the mind or  
in the collective minds of all that could apprehend them? 

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Stephen 


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Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/5/2012 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Look at AUDA where all pronouns, for each points of view, are defined 
mathematically. But most people does not need that to get this for 
understanding the first indeterminacy notion. Avoiding the use of 
pronouns there would conflate even more easily the 1-3 key 
distinction. We need them to highlight the key difference between the 
1p and the 3p, which in natural language uses both the word "I", but 
one is the Gödelian Bp, and the other is the Grzegorczykian Bp & p.



Dear Bruno,

How many different hyperoperations 
 are allowed by the 
Grzegorczykian  Bp & 
p ? If there are more than one, what distinguishes them?


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Re: Against Mechanism

On 11/5/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 04 Nov 2012, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:

>>> As in the movie the Prestige, would you step into the 
duplicating
machine knowing that one of your duplicates would survive and one 
would drown?

>> Absolutely not! There was a delay between the copy being made and it 
being
destroyed, the delay might not have been long but it was more than long 
enough
to have a last thought, and a very painful one at that. Having a last 
thought
is death and that drowning man would have one. I would not be happy 
about my
body being destroyed unless a copy was made right now. How long is now? 
About a
second or two. I would step into the machine if the original John Clark 
was
instantly destroyed and the copy appeared on the other side of the 
stage. Of
course I can't claim that my choice in this matter represents any sort 
of
universal truth, I just happen to prefer life over death and I don't 
like pain
much, but your mileage may vary.

> What if there were not two copies but a million, one of which would be 
tortured

John Clark would not step into that duplicating chamber even if there were a billion 
copies made because John Clark would still be certain to die a painful death.

Again the same main 1-3 confusion. You can only say that John Clark would be certain 
that *a* John Clark would die a painful death, not that it will necessarily ever matter 
from your (the unique John Clark before the experience) future point of view (except by 
a form of solidarity with the other John Clarks).

Now with comp or just Everett, we have just no choice in the matter.

However it should be said that when thought experiments switch from "what you would 
observe" to "what you would prefer" they loose most of their power because in the one 
case it is universal and true for anyone but in the other case it also depends on the 
prejudices and trivial likes and dislikes of the particular person involved.

> Would you still say, like the mathematically innumerate who refuses 
potentially
life-saving surgery after being told of some extremely rare complication, 
"Yeah,
but what if I'm that one in a million?"

That is not a good analogy. In the one case John Clark knows for certain that John 
Clark will slowly drown, in the other case John Clark knows it is very unlikely that 
John Clark will have this rare complication.

It may sound a little stilted but questions of this sort which involve duplication of 
the self become far less confusing if pronouns are simply avoided, pronouns in which it 
is anything but clear as to whom or what they refer to.

Look at AUDA where all pronouns, for each points of view, are defined mathematically. 
But most people does not need that to get this for understanding the first indeterminacy 
notion. Avoiding the use of pronouns there would conflate even more easily the 1-3 key 
distinction. We need them to highlight the key difference between the 1p and the 3p, 
which in natural language uses both the word "I", but one is the Gödelian Bp, and the 
other is the Grzegorczykian Bp & p.

Bruno

What if, in addition to the duplicating transporter there were a transporter merger; one 
that would take JC-Moscow and JC-Washington and merge them into one JC-Istanbul.  What 
would JCI write in his diary?  And more interesting, what if JCM were drowned and then 
merged with JCW?

Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 04 Nov 2012, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:

>>> As in the movie the Prestige, would you step into the  
duplicating machine knowing that one of your duplicates would  
survive and one would drown?

>> Absolutely not! There was a delay between the copy being made and  
it being destroyed, the delay might not have been long but it was  
more than long enough to have a last thought, and a very painful one  
at that. Having a last thought is death and that drowning man would  
have one. I would not be happy about my body being destroyed unless  
a copy was made right now. How long is now? About a second or two. I  
would step into the machine if the original John Clark was instantly  
destroyed and the copy appeared on the other side of the stage. Of  
course I can't claim that my choice in this matter represents any  
sort of universal truth, I just happen to prefer life over death and  
I don't like pain much, but your mileage may vary.

> What if there were not two copies but a million, one of which  
would be tortured

John Clark would not step into that duplicating chamber even if  
there were a billion copies made because John Clark would still be  
certain to die a painful death.

Again the same main 1-3 confusion. You can only say that John Clark  
would be certain that *a* John Clark would die a painful death, not  
that it will necessarily ever matter from your (the unique John Clark  
before the experience) future point of view (except by a form of  
solidarity with the other John Clarks).

Now with comp or just Everett, we have just no choice in the matter.

However it should be said that when thought experiments switch from  
"what you would observe" to "what you would prefer" they loose most  
of their power because in the one case it is universal and true for  
anyone but in the other case it also depends on the prejudices and  
trivial likes and dislikes of the particular person involved.

> Would you still say, like the mathematically innumerate who  
refuses potentially life-saving surgery after being told of some  
extremely rare complication, "Yeah, but what if I'm that one in a  
million?"

That is not a good analogy. In the one case John Clark knows for  
certain that John Clark will slowly drown, in the other case John  
Clark knows it is very unlikely that John Clark will have this rare  
complication.

It may sound a little stilted but questions of this sort which  
involve duplication of the self become far less confusing if  
pronouns are simply avoided, pronouns in which it is anything but  
clear as to whom or what they refer to.

Look at AUDA where all pronouns, for each points of view, are defined  
mathematically. But most people does not need that to get this for  
understanding the first indeterminacy notion. Avoiding the use of  
pronouns there would conflate even more easily the 1-3 key  
distinction. We need them to highlight the key difference between the  
1p and the 3p, which in natural language uses both the word "I", but  
one is the Gödelian Bp, and the other is the Grzegorczykian Bp & p.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no 
claims about?


We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them 
being true or false.


Who are the "we" that you refer to?


The universal numbers, or better the Löbian one.

Bruno

Hi Bruno,

Are there many Löbian numbers? What is that which makes a 
difference between them?


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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi Bruno,

I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not 
any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there 
are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to 
widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important.


I don't understand how you reason.


I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word 
implies an action, such as "run" or "implement" or "interview", then 
there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or 
else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical 
consistency in semiotics.


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Re: Can there be a private language ? typo!


On 11/5/2012 11:18 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/5/2012 10:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

You could see it that way, but I only meant that 1p is subjective
(as I see or know it (here,now)) while 3p is objective (as they
see or know whatever, whenever).


Hi Roger,

OK, but isn't the "objectivity" of 3p exactly what many 1p could 
agree upon and nothing more?




Which raises Wittgenstein's question, "Can there be a
private language ?"


TYPO fixed

No, because a language is /a language is a _*convention*_ of the 
signification of some set of signs between many communicators. /


without mutual agreement and verification or witnessing, there is/are no 
facts or truths.

/
/

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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

2012-11-05 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 04 Nov 2012, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Dear Bruno,

No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even  
exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not  
exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity.


Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not  
need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth  
of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like "1+1=2".




Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement  
separable from any claim of that truth?


Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its  
being claimed or not.


Hi Bruno,

I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not  
any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there  
are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to  
widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important.


I don't understand how you reason.









What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no  
claims about?


We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them  
being true or false.


Who are the "we" that you refer to?


The universal numbers, or better the Löbian one.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/5/2012 10:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Good. That is another way to define objective (public).
Whereas 1p is personal and always private.

If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p.


Hi,

It is only 3p is that communication can be confirmed or 'witnessed' 
by a third party. 3p requires at least three 1p to agree.


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Re: Can there be a private language ?


On 11/5/2012 10:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

You could see it that way, but I only meant that 1p is subjective
(as I see or know it (here,now)) while 3p is objective (as they
see or know whatever, whenever).


Hi Roger,

OK, but isn't the "objectivity" of 3p exactly what many 1p could 
agree upon and nothing more?




Which raises Wittgenstein's question, "Can there be a
private language ?"
No, because a language is a conversion of the signification of some 
set of signs between many communicators.


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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 10:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook
explanation for realism is, "if a tree falls in a
forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it
make a sound?"

A realist (such as me) would say "yes."
The logician in me would say "no!" Because a sound is something 
that must be capable of being heard to exist. If no one is truly around, 
then the noise that the tree might make cannot be heard and thus there 
is not a sound.



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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 10:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) I don't understand your application of "infinite regress"
to the One.  The One is something like an intellectual white hole
from which all comes, to invent a description.

Hi Roger,

Let us think a bit about this. Does anything exist that could act 
to contradict something that the One might believe to be true? No, why? 
Because the One knows all things, thus there is no knowledge that it 
does not know. Nothing exists outside of it. Therefore the One is always 
truthful, no? How can the One know the difference between that it is and 
what it is not? Well, its seems to follow that the One has to particular 
location in space or time and thus has no particular "point of view". 
OK? So, we can ask: what about the statements by the One of itself? Are 
they always true? How could we know? We are left with an entity that:

1) has no particular point of view
2) only makes true statements
3) cannot be contradicted.
4) is unable to make any statements about itself.

Is this not an existential contradiction?

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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

Hi Stephen P. King  

Good. That is another way to define objective (public). 
Whereas 1p is personal and always private.

If 1p is communicated, it becomes 3p.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 10:35:20 
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism 


On 11/5/2012 10:11 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi meekerdb 
> 
> The dilemma is that 1p is subjective and hence solipsistic, but when spoken 
> about it is 
> objective (3p, 2p; he, or you). 
> 
> And as far as dualisms go, the only important one is subjective/objective. 
Hi Roger, 

 Think of a 3p as a 'confirm-able' agreement or synchrony between a  
pair of 1p's. 


> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: meekerdb 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-04, 22:07:22 
> Subject: Re: Against Mechanism 
> 
> 
> On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But 
> with the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate. 
> 
> It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain - which is John's complaint 
> about pronouns. So which 1p is indeterminate. 
> 
> Brent 
> 


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Can there be a private language ?

Hi Stephen P. King  

You could see it that way, but I only meant that 1p is subjective 
(as I see or know it (here,now)) while 3p is objective (as they 
see or know whatever, whenever).

Which raises Wittgenstein's question, "Can there be a
private language ?"


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 10:25:27 
Subject: Re: On objective and subjective forms of perceptions 


On 11/5/2012 9:22 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King   

No, the 3p view is what is there then, or there-then. 
Anything objective, such as some algorithm, 
could be spoke of as within the 3p.  

Dear ROger, 

'Where' and 'when' are meaningless unless specified. This renders 3p empty 
unless it can be a 1p of some entity. 



The 1p view is subjective (here, now or here-now). 
Thus the buddhists, yogis and mystics advise 
us to be "here now". Buddhists I think call that 
mindfulness.  

Yes, by definition. 



Leibniz treats 1p in a somewhat more complicated 
way as actually being objective, not only in 
the form of snapshots, but as snapshots taken  
from all the other monads in the universe, ie 
"perceptions". 


Yes, monads = percepts for Leibniz 


Leibniz also speaks of perceptions of the perceptions 
as "apperceptions", but I have not completely figured these out. 
The bottom line is that the apperceptions are what we  
"normally" see and identify of as actual in the usual sense. 


I think that L's apperceptions are "the process by which new experience is 
assimilated to and transformed by the residuum of past experience of an 
individual to form a new whole." and "the introspective or reflective 
apprehension by the mind of its own inner states." 
These are the internal dynamics of Monads. 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012   
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  



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Re: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Can the work really be said to be progressing if no conclusions are ever 
found? I agree that there seems to always be newer and greater 
understandings to be discovered, but in between those moments of discovery 
there can be thousands of years of relatively fixed ideas.

On Monday, November 5, 2012 9:29:12 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Craig Weinberg 
>  
> I must be a philosopher then, for everything seems to be
> a work in progress, if not immediately then afterwards.
> But I am for the truth and sometimes, temporarily, seem
> to have found it.
>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>  
>  
>
> - Receiving the following content - 
> *From:* Craig Weinberg  
> *Receiver:* everything-list  
> *Time:* 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body 
> problem
>
>  I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come 
> to a conclusion.
>
> Craig
>
> On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: 
>>
>> Hi Craig Weinberg   
>>
>> What they say about economists is also 
>> appropriate to say about philosophers: 
>>
>> "If all of the philosophers in the world were laid 
>> end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion." 
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
>> 11/5/2012   
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>>
>>
>> - Receiving the following content -   
>> From: Craig Weinberg   
>> Receiver: everything-list   
>> Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 
>> Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: 
>> Hi Craig Weinberg   
>> 
>> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take   
>> them too seriously.   
>>
>> But keep in mind:   
>>
>> IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid.   
>> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable   
>> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,   
>> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.   
>>
>> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith   
>> body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists   
>> hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,   
>> and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity.   
>>
>>
>> My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
>> idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
>> call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms 
>> of intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and 
>> public space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) 
>> which gives rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand 
>> reduction of what is actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) 
>> which extends ever deeper into literal public surfaces and private 
>> figurative depths. 
>>
>> Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it 
>> should be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is 
>> what the cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and 
>> thinks as well as what is felt and thought about. 
>>
>> Craig 
>>
>>
>>   
>>
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net   
>> 11/5/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen   
>>
>>
>> - Receiving the following content - 
>> From: Craig Weinberg 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41   
>> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p   
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:   
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:   
>>
>>
>> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. 
>>
>> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm 
>> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?   
>>
>> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain 
>> unless substance dualism is true.   
>>
>>
>> The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
>> infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
>> monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain 
>> in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and 
>> external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 
>> 
>>
>> Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are 
>> literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that 
>> your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. 
>>
>> It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of 
>> the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like 
>> saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pi

Re: Re: Communicability

Hi Stephen P. King  

Infallibility isn't involved. The typical textbook 
explanation for realism is, "if a tree falls in a 
forest and nobody is there to hear it, would it 
make a sound?" 

A realist (such as me) would say "yes."



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 10:17:26 
Subject: Re: Communicability 


On 11/5/2012 9:03 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Sirius was there before Paul was born. 
> 
> That position is called realism. 
Hi Roger, 

 What makes you so sure? Realism assumes infallibility! 

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/5/2012 10:11 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

The dilemma is that 1p is subjective and hence solipsistic, but when spoken 
about it is
objective (3p, 2p; he, or you).

And as far as dualisms go, the only important one is subjective/objective.

Hi Roger,

Think of a 3p as a 'confirm-able' agreement or synchrony between a 
pair of 1p's.







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: meekerdb
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-04, 22:07:22
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism


On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But with 
the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate.

It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain - which is John's complaint 
about pronouns.  So which 1p is indeterminate.

Brent




--
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Stephen


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Re: Re: Communicability

Hi Stephen P. King 


1) I don't understand your application of "infinite regress"
to the One.  The One is something like an intellectual white hole
from which all comes, to invent a description.

2) As far as E = mc^2 goes, yes, theory can change,
but the underlying phenomena do not.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-05, 10:20:30 
Subject: Re: Communicability 


On 11/5/2012 9:08 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King 


A truth exists dependent only on the One, who 
creates all truth. 

That is acceptable only if we allow it to have an infinite regress. I like 
infinite regress but we cannot have pathological regress (such as free lunches 
and free-floaters) and still have knowledge. 


 But not on other minds: 

E=mc^2 before man arrived, from the very getgo (and before), 
and will remain after man. 

And this depends for its truth on the belief in some future confirmation... 



Truth is foreign to us. 

Some people think otherwise! 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 



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Re: Nietzsche's ghost


On 11/5/2012 9:54 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King


Hmmm. I suppose there might be a multiple persons
understanding, but I am having enough problems right
now with one person up against the horrors of
Nietzsche's ghost.


 Hi,

It helps to recall that he died of some form of Meningioma. This is 
an interesting affliction of many genius.







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:19:18
Subject: Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth


On 11/5/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Depending on the existence of others is fine but incomplete.
A flood does not depend on the existence of others,
it's just contingent on too much rain.

  And the in/ability of the boundary to contain the addition of water...


And not enough time
passed by for the flood to drain down. Come back in a
month and the flood's gone. So time is important,
as well as immediate context.

  Of course!

Note that this follows Kant's definitions of existence:
consisting of two joined factors: time for when an event
occurs, and space (context) for what happens. By
themselves neither one is a substance.

  I agree, but these definition ignore plurality and mutual
exclusivity of points of view.


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen





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Re: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent

Hi Richard Ruquist  

There is not really any problem between free will and 
pre-determinism as long as the men did what they wanted to do. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 07:31:59 
Subject: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent 


On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 7:06 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as 
> the physical man must remain associated to its monad. 
> 
> But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the 
> supreme monad. 

You seem to be claiming that men do not have free will 
and that it is not because of predeterminism. 


> 
> So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. 
> Which is why we give thanks before a meal. 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 
> Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow 
> 
> 
> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
>> Hi Bruno Marchal 
>> 
>> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. 
>> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, 
>> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. 
> 
> OK. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or 
>> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because 
>> although its contents keep changing, it has 
>> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme 
>> monad would not know where to place the 
>> constantly adjusted perceptions. 
> 
> More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= 
> 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial 
> and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of 
> knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing 
> machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge 
> applied to ideally correct machine's provability. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions 
>> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such 
>> as we understand perception. An individual soul 
>> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own 
>> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions 
>> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees 
>> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. 
>> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. 
> 
> Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God 
>> who knows all. 
> 
> OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I 
> *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 11/3/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> - Receiving the following content - 
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 
>> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> 
>> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a 
>> concrete robust physical universe". 
>> 
>> 
>> ? 
>> 
>> 
>> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I 
>> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. 
>> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. 
>> 
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> 
>> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you 
>> still didn't understand... From: 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
>> 
>> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" 
>> "Actually the 8th present step will explain 
>> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the 
>> notion of concrete and 
>> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. 
>> It will follow that a much 
>> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that 
>> not only physics has 
>> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? 
>> matter? has been 
>> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the 
>> object study of fundamental 
>> machine psychology." 
>> 
>> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any 
>> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically 
>> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither 
>> and has no particular properties. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?

Re: On objective and subjective forms of perceptions


On 11/5/2012 9:22 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

No, the 3p view is what is there then, or there-then.
Anything objective, such as some algorithm,
could be spoke of as within the 3p.


Dear ROger,

'Where' and 'when' are meaningless unless specified. This renders 
3p empty unless it can be a 1p of some entity.




The 1p view is subjective (here, now or here-now).
Thus the buddhists, yogis and mystics advise
us to be "here now". Buddhists I think call that
mindfulness.


Yes, by definition.



Leibniz treats 1p in a somewhat more complicated
way as actually being objective, not only in
the form of snapshots, but as snapshots taken
from all the other monads in the universe, ie
"perceptions".


Yes, monads = percepts for Leibniz


Leibniz also speaks of perceptions of the perceptions
as "apperceptions", but I have not completely figured these out.
The bottom line is that the apperceptions are what we
"normally" see and identify of as actual in the usual sense.


I think that L's apperceptions 
 are "the process by which 
new experience is assimilated to and transformed by the residuum of past 
experience of an individual to form a new whole." and "the introspective 
or reflective apprehension by the mind of its own inner states."

These are the internal dynamics of Monads.



Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Hi Richard Ruquist  

Indeed, dualism is -- has to be-- science fiction. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 06:53:07 
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 


Roger says "that mind and body are completely contrary substances" 

Richard replies "what is dualism if not that?" 

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Craig Weinberg 
> 
> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take 
> them too seriously. 
> 
> But keep in mind: 
> 
> IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid. 
> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable 
> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances, 
> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem. 
> 
> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith 
> body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists 
> hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense, 
> and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity. 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Craig Weinberg 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41 
> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> 
> 
> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. 
> 
> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not 
> shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? 
> 
> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
> substance dualism is true. 
> 
> 
> The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
> infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
> monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain in 
> some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and external 
> in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 
> 
> Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are literally 
> internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that your brain 
> is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. 
> 
> It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of the 
> phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like saying 
> that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It is not 
> true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each other, 
> and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. 
> 
> This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
> human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
> non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which is 
> driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side of 
> the 'genuine leader'. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
> configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
> configuration is determined by physical factors. 
> 
> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I 
> am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way 
> street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but 
> ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, 
> then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the 
> universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could 
> say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think 
> it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules 
> themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a 
> fantasy. Incorrect. 
> 
> 
> That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is 
> eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. 
> 
> No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is so 
> absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture 
> right side up. 
> 
> If something looks like particles moving on the outside but feels like 
> remembering a fishing trip on the inside, that doesn't mean that the memory 
> is the epiphenomenon. The memory is the whole point of the particles. They 
> have nothing else to do sitting in your skull but to provide the grunt work 
> of organizing your access to your own human experiences. 
> 
> It is not eliminative materialism to say that object and subject are the same 
> thin

Re: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality

Hi Richard Ruquist 

Engineering advantages ? A decade before the Wright brothers
flew their airplane, people would have said, "You're going to do WHAT ?"  

Many if not all innovations like that seem at present to be crazy
or impossible. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 09:42:29 
Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality 


On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 8:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote: 
> On 04.11.2012 08:37 Richard Ruquist said the following: 
>> 
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 2:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi  
>> wrote: 
>>> 
>>> On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: 
>>> 
 On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ... 
>>> 
>>> 
> p. 210 "We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable 
> alternatives: 
> 
> o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is 
> mistaken, or 
> 
> o that scientific representation is not at bottom 
> mathematical representation alone, or 
> 
> o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know 
> it to be incomplete, or 
> 
> o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across 
> isomorphism, are illusory. 
> 
> In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to 
> opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on 
> the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological 
> question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, 
> and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part 
> of some scientific theory?" 
 
 
 
 It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science 
 is incomplete in a way we know. 
 
 Brent 
 
>>> 
>>> Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? 
>> 
>> 
>> String theory is an example of knowledge of incomplete science as 
>> for the most part string theory has not been verified/falsified 
>> experimentally. Richard 
> 
> 
> Let us imagine that the superstring theory is completed and even 
> experimentally verified. So what's then? How the superstring theory would 
> change engineering practice? 

I am unable to predict any engineering advantage to any proposed high 
energy theory even if it were to explain dark energy. That includes 
comp. What I can predict is that such a valid theory may change our 
conception of reality. In particular it may determine if a god is 
possible and exists and/or if a Many World multiverse exists. My 
personal prediction is that it is one or the other, either MWI or a 
god and a supernatural realm. Richard 

> 
> Evgenii 
> -- 
> p. 278 "... the regularities must derive from not just natural but logical 
> necessity. This sentiment is sometimes encountered still, not so much among 
> philosophers but in physicists' dreams of a final theory so logically 
> airtight as to admit of no conceivable alternative, one that would be 
> grasped as true when understood at all." 
> 
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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 9:08 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King


A truth exists dependent only on the One, who
creates all truth.


That is acceptable only if we allow it to have an infinite regress. 
I like infinite regress but we cannot have pathological regress (such as 
free lunches and free-floaters) and still have knowledge.



  But not on other minds:

E=mc^2  before man arrived, from the very getgo (and before),
and will remain after man.


And this depends for its truth on the belief in some future 
confirmation...




Truth is foreign to us.


Some people think otherwise!



Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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Re: Communicability


On 11/5/2012 9:03 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Sirius was there before Paul was born.

That position is called realism.

Hi Roger,

What makes you so sure? Realism assumes infallibility!

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-05 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> But you know in davance that whatever happen, you will live only one
> thing.
>

John Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see Washington, and
John Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see Moscow, and John
Clark knows with certainty that John Clark will see one and only one city,
and John Clark knows with certainty that this is not paradoxical because
JOHN CLARK HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. And after its all over and the dust has
settled John Clark can see that John Clark's Helsinki prediction, that was
made before all this started, was completely accurate.

> There are two 1p, as seen from the 3p view
>

A third party has only one view, the third party's own; John Clark can't
make any sense out of "two 1p as seen from the 3p view".

> but you know in advance that you will live, only one 1p view, from your
> next 1p view.
>

Just that short sentence contains "you know" and "you will live" and "your
next 1p view" with no clear understanding of who the "you" is that is
supposed to know or who the "you"  that will live or who the "you" is that
will view something because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. When "you" has been
duplicated stop using pronouns or all statements will be ambiguous! When
the self has been copied and pronouns continue to be used as before as if
nothing had happened then confusion always results.

> Again and again and again, you answer on the future 1views
>

And again and again Bruno Marchal says YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and then
gives them radically different experiences and then chastises John Clark
for giving a list rather than a single answer when the question "what will
"you" see?" is asked. But if 2 different questions are asked then one
should expect 2 different answers. If Bruno Marchal wants clearer answers
then Bruno Marchal should ask clearer questions by NOT USING PRONOUNS.

>>  if the 2 are identical I can't single out one and say this one will
>> have fate X while that one will have fate Y, and because they are identical
>> it would be a useless prediction even if I could.
>>
>
> > Irelevant as they are not identical.
>

If before they see either city the two are not identical then the
duplicating chamber is not working properly and Bruno Marchal's thought
experiments are convoluted enough without introducing poorly maintained
machinery into the mix.

> The question is about your future 1p.
>

John Clark does not know what the question is nor, with all these
duplicates running around, who "your" refers to, but John Clark does know
that John Clark's future point of view will continue to be John Clark's
point of view.

> One will say I feel to be only in W and the other will say I feel to be
> only in M, so BOTH will that they (John Clark) was wrong in Helsinki , or
> that he did not understand the question.
>

John Clark will feel to be only in Washington and John Clark will feel to
be only in Moscow and John Clark will know that was exactly what John Clark
predicted yesterday when John Clark was in Helsinki. And John Clark has a
far deeper understanding of the question than Bruno Marchal had.

  John K Clark

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Re: Re: Against Mechanism

Hi meekerdb  

The dilemma is that 1p is subjective and hence solipsistic, but when spoken 
about it is 
objective (3p, 2p; he, or you). 

And as far as dualisms go, the only important one is subjective/objective.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: meekerdb  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 22:07:22 
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism 


On 11/4/2012 11:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:  
No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But with 
the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate. 

It shows that the referent of "you" is uncertain - which is John's complaint 
about pronouns.  So which 1p is indeterminate. 

Brent

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Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Hi Stephen P. King  

But the course of true love never did run smooth :-)

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:22:15 
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 


On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 

I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a 
conclusion. 

Craig 

On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:  
Hi Craig Weinberg

What they say about economists is also  
appropriate to say about philosophers:  

"If all of the philosophers in the world were laid  
end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion."  


Hi, 

Philosophers are "lovers of knowledge"... if they are truly philosophers 
and not sophists. 

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Stephen

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Nietzsche's ghost

Hi Stephen P. King  


Hmmm. I suppose there might be a multiple persons 
understanding, but I am having enough problems right
now with one person up against the horrors of
Nietzsche's ghost.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:19:18 
Subject: Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth 


On 11/5/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Depending on the existence of others is fine but incomplete. 
> A flood does not depend on the existence of others, 
> it's just contingent on too much rain. 

 And the in/ability of the boundary to contain the addition of water... 

> And not enough time 
> passed by for the flood to drain down. Come back in a 
> month and the flood's gone. So time is important, 
> as well as immediate context. 

 Of course! 
> 
> Note that this follows Kant's definitions of existence: 
> consisting of two joined factors: time for when an event 
> occurs, and space (context) for what happens. By 
> themselves neither one is a substance. 

 I agree, but these definition ignore plurality and mutual  
exclusivity of points of view. 

> 
> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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Re: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?

Hi Stephen P. King  

That might be what I think Bruno referred to as 6 sigma truth,
namely truth that has a probability within std dev of 6 sigma of being true.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:08:03 
Subject: Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ? 


On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Bruno Marchal  

OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not  
yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point. 
In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is 
necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever 
is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions 
is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so ! 

I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure 
of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This 
is beginning to look like existentialism. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  
Hi Roger, 

Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a debt, then 
we have an effective free lunch! What you are thinking about with the concept 
of "propositions might have a contradiction but you might not yet have found 
the contradictions" is what is known as omega-inconsistent logical systems. ;-) 
Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement that is 
not consistent. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference in math 
assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. What about theories that 
are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us think about the shade 
of Nietzche a bit more. 


--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Hi Craig Weinberg 

I must be a philosopher then, for everything seems to be
a work in progress, if not immediately then afterwards.
But I am for the truth and sometimes, temporarily, seem
to have found it.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
Subject: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem


I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a 
conclusion.

Craig

On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg   

What they say about economists is also 
appropriate to say about philosophers: 

"If all of the philosophers in the world were laid 
end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion." 


Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012   
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -   
From: Craig Weinberg   
Receiver: everything-list   
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 




On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: 
Hi Craig Weinberg   

The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take   
them too seriously.   

But keep in mind:   

IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid.   
Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable   
issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,   
and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.   

Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith   
body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists   
hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,   
and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity.   


My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms of 
intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and public 
space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) which gives 
rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand reduction of what is 
actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) which extends ever deeper 
into literal public surfaces and private figurative depths. 

Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it should 
be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is what the 
cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and thinks as 
well as what is felt and thought about. 

Craig 


  

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net   
11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen   


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41   
Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p   




On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:   



On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:   


But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. 

So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not 
shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?   

You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
substance dualism is true.   


The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an infinite 
regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect monism, you 
don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain in some senses, 
external to my brain in some senses, both internal and external in some senses, 
and neither internal and external in some senses. 

Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are literally 
internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that your brain is 
identical to you. It has to be a two way street. 

It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of the 
phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like saying 
that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It is not true. 
Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each other, and the 
pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. 

This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which is 
driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side of the 
'genuine leader'.   






You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
configuration is determined by physical fact

On objective and subjective forms of perceptions

Hi Stephen P. King  

No, the 3p view is what is there then, or there-then.
Anything objective, such as some algorithm,
could be spoke of as within the 3p. 

The 1p view is subjective (here, now or here-now).
Thus the buddhists, yogis and mystics advise
us to be "here now". Buddhists I think call that
mindfulness. 

Leibniz treats 1p in a somewhat more complicated
way as actually being objective, not only in
the form of snapshots, but as snapshots taken 
from all the other monads in the universe, ie
"perceptions".

Leibniz also speaks of perceptions of the perceptions
as "apperceptions", but I have not completely figured these out.
The bottom line is that the apperceptions are what we 
"normally" see and identify of as actual in the usual sense.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 16:11:44 
Subject: Re: Communicability 

On 11/4/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> 
>>> The body problem *is* the result, and does constitute the conceptual  
>>> explantion of why we believe in bodies, despite the lack of it in  
>>> the ontology. 
>> 
>> Well, do you want this problem to be solvable? 
> 
> Sure. And AUDA is a beginning of the solution, in a manner which makes  
> possible to distinguish precisely the difference between  
> "terrestrial/objective" and "divine/subjective", that the the many 1p  
> and 3p views. 
Dear Bruno, 

 But there is no an absolute 3p view! Such would be the 'view' of  
God and the Kolmogorov minimum algorithm that specified it would be  
God's name! 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 

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Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem


On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have 
come to a conclusion.


Craig

On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg

What they say about economists is also
appropriate to say about philosophers:

"If all of the philosophers in the world were laid
end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion."


Hi,

Philosophers are "lovers of knowledge"... if they are truly 
philosophers and not sophists .


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth


On 11/5/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Depending on the existence of others is fine but incomplete.
A flood does not depend on the existence of others,
it's just contingent on too much rain.


And the in/ability of the boundary to contain the addition of water...


  And not enough time
passed by for the flood to drain down. Come back in a
month and the flood's gone. So time is important,
as well as immediate context.


Of course!


Note that this follows Kant's definitions of existence:
consisting of two joined factors: time for when an event
occurs, and space (context) for what happens. By
themselves neither one is a substance.


I agree, but these definition ignore plurality and mutual 
exclusivity of points of view.




Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



--
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Stephen


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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/5/2012 8:53 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Do you know of any comp outputs that we could
examine ? I myself worship data.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

Ask Bruno. I think that he has some code of programs that he can 
repost.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/5/2012 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Science is based on and produces facts.
I don't think you would want to call these facts opinions
unless they referred to global warming.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

I would state it differently but it doesn't matter so much as long 
as we understand that facts are not what we individually might choose to 
be true, they are that is necessarily true for all that can interact 
with each other. If we where free to choose our own facts we would not 
be able to know anything.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Re: Communicability

Hi Stephen P. King  


A truth exists dependent only on the One, who
creates all truth. But not on other minds:

E=mc^2 before man arrived, from the very getgo (and before),
and will remain after man.

Truth is foreign to us.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 16:09:39 
Subject: Re: Communicability 


On 11/4/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> But you are exactly missing the point that I have been repeating.  
>> Truth is independent of a particular mind but it is not independent  
>> of all minds. 
> 
> This is ambiguous, as Arithmetical Truth contains the existence of all  
> mind, and even in the "right" relations, once we assume comp. In that  
> sense Arithmetical truth depends on all minds, but it is more simple  
> and primary that all minds (again with comp, which relate  
> consciousness to the computations done by universal machines). 
> 
Dear Bruno, 

 You need to show the necessity of separability of the minds, not  
just the existence. This is because there does not exist a unique naming  
scheme of minds. We discussed this when we agreed that "god has no name". 

--  
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Stephen 


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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/5/2012 7:58 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen,

I wouldn't be too hard on Russell, at least as far as logic goes.
He had no way of knowing of Godel's proof. And Whitehead had
joined him in the principia project.  Certainly two of the brightest
minds that ever lived.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



Hi Roger,

Yes, we must never forget that we are fallible!

--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?


On 11/5/2012 7:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not
yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point.
In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is
necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever
is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions
is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so !

I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure
of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This
is beginning to look like existentialism.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

Hi Roger,

Great question! If we are allowed to take forever to pay back a 
debt, then we have an effective free lunch! What you are thinking about 
with the concept of "propositions might have a contradiction but you 
might not yet have found the contradictions" is what is known as 
omega-inconsistent logical systems 
. 
;-) Theories that are consistent right up until they produce a statement 
that is not consistent. By the way, the usual rules of logical inference 
in math assumes that truth theories are never inconsistent. What about 
theories that are only 'almost' never inconsistent? This might help us 
think about the shade of Nietzche a bit more.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth

Hi Stephen P. King  

Depending on the existence of others is fine but incomplete. 
A flood does not depend on the existence of others,
it's just contingent on too much rain. And not enough time
passed by for the flood to drain down. Come back in a
month and the flood's gone. So time is important,
as well as immediate context.

Note that this follows Kant's definitions of existence:
consisting of two joined factors: time for when an event
occurs, and space (context) for what happens. By
themselves neither one is a substance.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 12:24:05 
Subject: Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth 


On 11/4/2012 8:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King  

Necessary truths can't be contingent, because contingent  
truths by definition are contingent on circumstances  
and so may not always be true. Scientific truth, or 
any truth of this world, is such.  


Dear Roger, 

By contingent I mean dependent on the co-existence of others. Existence 
cannot be dependent on anything at all, thus is must be taken in our 
explanations to be ontologically fundamental. 



Pierce taught that consensus or pragmatic truth is  
supreme. What people believe in their hearts,  
what they believe subjectively. What they experience now.  


I love Peirce's cryptic sense of irony. ;--)  



Why is pragmatic truth supreme ? Even higher than 
a necessary truth? 1 + 1 = 2, a statement,  
is a necessary truith, but the higher truth is to  
know that 1 +1 =2, to personally accept and believe that.  
If many agree, that is even better.  


Can we reason outside of our explanations? Can we discuss the content of 
our discussions? Can we escape from the implications of regress? 



If many, such as the Christian church, accept  
a truth such as "God created the world", you 
might want to consider it. But it is only true 
if you pragmatically accept it as true. Lutherans 
call that acceptance "faith". 


So what about what the Hyperboreans call that acceptance? And what of the 
Ponies or the Mormons or the Blue People? Does it matter who it is? 



There are many forms of truth-- necessary and contingent 
truths, subjective and objective truths, truths by 
correspondence, or through coherency, pragmatic 
truth, eye witness truth, and so forth. In the end, one accepts 
the truth he has the most faith in. So faith 
again rules.  


Of course, because what is faith but the expectation of a future truth? 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
11/4/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14  
Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties  


On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote:  

The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts).  
The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be 
contradicted (necessary truths).  

Hi Roger,  

I do not assume that the "can't be contradicted" is an a priori fixed 
apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds 
in agreement.  





--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to 
a conclusion.

Craig

On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
> Hi Craig Weinberg   
>
> What they say about economists is also 
> appropriate to say about philosophers: 
>
> "If all of the philosophers in the world were laid 
> end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion." 
>
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
> 11/5/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -   
> From: Craig Weinberg   
> Receiver: everything-list   
> Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 
> Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: 
> Hi Craig Weinberg   
> 
> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take   
> them too seriously.   
>
> But keep in mind:   
>
> IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid.   
> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable   
> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,   
> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.   
>
> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith   
> body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists   
> hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,   
> and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity.   
>
>
> My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
> idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
> call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms 
> of intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and 
> public space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) 
> which gives rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand 
> reduction of what is actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) 
> which extends ever deeper into literal public surfaces and private 
> figurative depths. 
>
> Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it 
> should be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is 
> what the cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and 
> thinks as well as what is felt and thought about. 
>
> Craig 
>
>
>   
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net   
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen   
>
>
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Craig Weinberg 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41   
> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p   
>
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:   
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:   
>
>
> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. 
>
> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm 
> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?   
>
> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
> substance dualism is true.   
>
>
> The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
> infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
> monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain 
> in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and 
> external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 
> 
>
> Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are 
> literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that 
> your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. 
>
> It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of 
> the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like 
> saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It 
> is not true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each 
> other, and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. 
>
> This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
> human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
> non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which 
> is driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side 
> of the 'genuine leader'.   
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
> configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
> configuration is determined by physical factors. 
>
> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's 
> what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as 
> a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water 
> is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something hap

Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen P. King  

Do you know of any comp outputs that we could
examine ? I myself worship data.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 11:55:27 
Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic 


On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 



On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

Dear Bruno, 

No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the 
framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 
'truth' for a non-exitence entity. 



Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the 
existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a 
possible claim of that truth, like "1+1=2". 



Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from 
any claim of that truth?  


Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed 
or not. 

Hi Bruno, 

I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual 
instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such 
and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the 
potentials of acts is important. 








What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? 



We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true 
or false. 

Who are the "we" that you refer to? 





Bruno 




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Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen P. King  

Science is based on and produces facts.
I don't think you would want to call these facts opinions
unless they referred to global warming.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 11:37:58 
Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic 


On 11/4/2012 12:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:  
On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:  
On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: 

  Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any 
claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make 
no claims about? 

You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable 
from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so 
of course they are not seperable.  Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is 
NOT the same as the fact that makes it true.  "1+1=2" is a claim; it's the 
claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you 
claim it or not. 


It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual 
agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to 
the truth of a claim. 


Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of 
which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds 
to a fact. 

Brent 


It your claim is true then truth is unknowable,  

I don't see how that follows.  When everyone claimed the Earth was flat did 
that make it unknowable that it was round?  If so how did anyone ever come know 
it? 


as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. 


That's directly contrary to the meaning of 'fact'.  I think you want the word 
'opinion'. 

Brent 


Dear Brent, 

Try reasoning about this in a way that is not limited to the assumption 
that observations are not just what humans do or think about. Reality is not 
just people populated. 


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Onward! 

Stephen

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Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

Hi Hal Ruhl  


i) Is OK, except Cs isn't distributed, it's beyond spacetime, and so it's just 
"there".


ii) Is misleading, because an entity cannot move or do as it desires
without some degree of free will. If no free will, they're robots. 
If so, then who designed those robots and controls them ?
The term "self-determination" includes all of the constraints
you might imagine, at least those within an entities' skin,
for that is what constitutes the self.

iii) Is a political, not a scientific statement. Liberals
have for centuries forecast disaster, as it is a strong
motivation for accepting their own utopian diasters instead.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Hal Ruhl  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 15:39:44 
Subject: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum 


Hi Everyone: 

I would now like to expand the discussion re the two current conclusions in 
the slightly edited version of the first post [below] as follows:  

i) Consciousness: The origin and purpose of life herein leads me to believe 
that consciousness is distributed across life entities in accordance with 
their ability to act in accord with it. Even single celled entities would 
have a non zero degree of it to properly enable life's purpose. 

ii) Freewill: Life's purpose as given herein precludes it. 

iii) Species survival: Life on this planet is in the midst of a mass 
extinction [not a new idea] that can't be stopped because implementation of 
the purpose as given herein is the only priority for life. We can't exclude 
ourselves from the extinction. [There have been a number of mass extinctions 
but evolution has sometimes used these to produce new life entities with 
greater energy hang-up barrier busting ability than the extinguished ones - 
new life entities such as ourselves.  

 

Edited first post 

1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. 

2) There are several types of energy currently known or proposed: 

 a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M <=> E/(c*c)] 
 b) Gravitational 
 c) Electromagnetic 
 d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces] 
 e) Dark Energy 

3) Definition (2): Work (W) is the flow of energy amongst the various types 
by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or amount of 
mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force to a 
mass. 

4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can't 
be reestablished and the new configuration can't do as much work as the 
prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics] 

5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take 
place immediately. 

6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the 
possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. This is 
the "origin" of life herein. 

[If we look at the usual attempts to define "life", we find things such as 
grow, procreate,[Thanks John] etc. These require a flow of energy from an 
initial ability to do work to a lower ability to do work and through the 
life entity. Think of the life entity as a pipe or "conduit" for this 
flow.]  
  
7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as 
"Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers" such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, 
spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature 
requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc. ["Energy Flow Hang-up 
Barriers" is not my terminology - I think there was a twenty year or so old 
article in Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search 
found a discussion of the repulsion hang-up in "Cosmology The Science of the 
Universe" by Edward Robert Harrison. 

[Therefore "life" herein is just an energy flow conduit drilling holes in 
energy flow hang-up barriers as rapidly as possible for the particular 
entity to enable even more such energy flow.] 

8) Conclusion (2): Once life is present it will immediately punch as many 
holes in as many Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular 
life entity involved allows - this is how it realizes its energy flow 
conduit character. This is the "purpose" of life herein. In other words 
life's purpose is to hasten the heat death of its host universe. 

9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper 
bound. 




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Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem

Hi Craig Weinberg  

What they say about economists is also
appropriate to say about philosophers:

"If all of the philosophers in the world were laid
end to end, they'd never come to a conclusion."


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04 
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem 




On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: 
Hi Craig Weinberg  
   
The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take  
them too seriously.  

But keep in mind:  

IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid.  
Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable  
issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,  
and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.  

Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith  
body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists  
hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,  
and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity.  


My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms of 
intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and public 
space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) which gives 
rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand reduction of what is 
actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) which extends ever deeper 
into literal public surfaces and private figurative depths. 

Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it should 
be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is what the 
cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and thinks as 
well as what is felt and thought about. 

Craig 


  

Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  


- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41  
Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p  




On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:  



On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:  


But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it.

So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not 
shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?  

You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
substance dualism is true.  


The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an infinite 
regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect monism, you 
don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain in some senses, 
external to my brain in some senses, both internal and external in some senses, 
and neither internal and external in some senses.

Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are literally 
internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that your brain is 
identical to you. It has to be a two way street.

It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of the 
phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like saying 
that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It is not true. 
Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each other, and the 
pixels are there to help tell that storytelling.

This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which is 
driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side of the 
'genuine leader'.  






You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
configuration is determined by physical factors.

The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I 
am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way 
street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but ice 
is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, then 
that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the universe 
when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could say that 
groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think it's the 
'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules 
themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a 
fantasy. I

Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem



On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
> Hi Craig Weinberg 
>   
> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take 
> them too seriously. 
>
> But keep in mind: 
>
> IMHO all of those dualist positions are not logically valid. 
> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable 
> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances, 
> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem. 
>
> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith 
> body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists 
> hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense, 
> and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that absurdity. 
>

My model solves that. Leibniz (and his philosophy isn't the only form of 
idealism) was on the right track, but I take it further to say that what we 
call mind is descended from lesser forms of sensitivity and greater forms 
of intuition, and that in fact the symmetry itself between private time and 
public space is the dual aspect neutral monism (I call sense, or signal) 
which gives rise to both. This establishes that dualism is a shorthand 
reduction of what is actually an involuted monism (like a Mobius strip) 
which extends ever deeper into literal public surfaces and private 
figurative depths.

Dualism doesn't go far enough. It should not only be taken seriously, it 
should be taken as the supreme absolute. The capacity for discernment is 
what the cosmos is made of. It is subject and object. It is what feels and 
thinks as well as what is felt and thought about.

Craig

  
>
> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
> 11/5/2012   
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -   
> From: Craig Weinberg   
> Receiver: everything-list   
> Time: 2012-11-02, 08:05:41 
> Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p 
>
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote: 
>
>
> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it.   
>
> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm 
> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? 
>
> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
> substance dualism is true. 
>
>
> The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
> infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
> monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain 
> in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and 
> external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 
>   
>
> Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are 
> literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that 
> your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street.   
>
> It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of 
> the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like 
> saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It 
> is not true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each 
> other, and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling.   
>
> This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
> human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
> non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which 
> is driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side 
> of the 'genuine leader'. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular 
> configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that 
> configuration is determined by physical factors.   
>
> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's 
> what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as 
> a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water 
> is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in 
> my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an 
> event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and 
> see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok 
> too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical 
> reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no 
> independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect.   
>
>
> That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is 
> eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism.   
>
> No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is 
> so absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture 
> right side up.   
>
> If something looks like particles moving on the outside but fee

Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

Hi Stephen,

I wouldn't be too hard on Russell, at least as far as logic goes.
He had no way of knowing of Godel's proof. And Whitehead had 
joined him in the principia project.  Certainly two of the brightest 
minds that ever lived.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 12:51:59 
Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: 

> On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> Hi Stephen P. King 
>> 
>> Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not 
>> infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's 
>> metaphysics "an enchanted land" and confessed that 
>> he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. 
>> 
>> 
> Hi Roger, 
> 
> Yeah, his star fell today, for me. 


Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be  
wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. 

Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was  
preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with  
respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. 

Bruno 


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Re: (mathematical) solipsism

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Isn't strong AI just an assumption ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 09:43:16 
Subject: Re: (mathematical) solipsism 




On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:00, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 

[SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent 
and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value 
and the absence of all other possible values.  


In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism. 


Dear Bruno, 

How is it solipsism? Solipsism is: "Solipsism is the philosophical idea 
that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from the Latin solus 
(alone) and ipse (self). Solipsism as an epistemological position holds that 
knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and 
other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a 
metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world 
and other minds do not exist."   

My point is that numbers, by your notion of AR, are solipsistic as there is 
literally nothing other than the numbers. I reject AR because of this! Numbers 
alone cannot do what you propose. 



Comp entails Strong AI, which attributes consciousness to machines, and thus to 
others. You argument is not valid because it beg the question that number 
(related through the laws of + and *) emulated computation to which comp 
attribute consciousness. So comp is not solipsism. 


Bruno 









This post argues similar to my point: 
http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=5944965 

"Conventional solipsism is a logical philosophy whose underlying views 
apply equally to mathematical philosophies of neopythagoreanism and 
neoplatonism as well as mathematical realism and empiricism generally. 

The well established philosophical principle of solipsism is that only 
the individual is or can be demonstrated to exist. But the problem is 
that if this principle were actually demonstrably true it would also 
make it false because the "truth" established would ipso facto make 
the principle beyond control of any individual. 

Nobody really thinks solipsism is true. But the difficulty is no one 
can prove or disprove the concept because no one can prove the 
foundations of truth in absolute, necessary, and universal terms." 


This article 
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=philo
 argues against the claim that Intuitionism is solipsistic. I reject 
Intuitionism as a singular coherent theory of mathematics, but I do accept it 
as a member of the pantheon of "interpretations" of mathematics. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Re: The two types of truth

Hi Bruno Marchal  


Is sigma_6 truth truth with only a 6 sigma possibility of error ? 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 
Subject: Re: The two types of truth 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, 
> 
> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html 
> 
> "Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: 
> truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either 
> true or false], 

We can only hope that they are non contradictory. 
And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed  
of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. 




> and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. 

Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context  
in the higher structure level. 


> 
> Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. 
> Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are  
> contingent, empirical truths. 
> Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason  
> have their 
> sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and  
> logical inconsistency 
> of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their  
> sufficient reason in 
> being more perfect than propositions which deny them." 

Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable  
above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are  
not that simple. 

Bruno 




> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/3/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 
> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
> 
> 
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
>> On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way 
>> to physically implement them. 
> 
> Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation". 
 
 So your thinking about them is not a physical act? 
>>> 
>>> Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and  
>>> "no". 
>>> Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical 
>>> events. 
>>> No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by 
>>> platonic arithmetical truth. 
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> 
>> Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? 
> 
> It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid 
> the use of "platonic" there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In 
> that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from 
> arithmetic and comp. 
> 
> All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of "43 is 
> prime". 
> 
> 
> 
>> The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence 
> 
> Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a 
> prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a 
> proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable 
> with truth, and still less with existence. 
> 
> 
> 
>> but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with 
>> the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any 
>> coherence as an idea! 
> 
> Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and 
> observer. 
> 
> 
> 
>> We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts 
>> to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are 
>> possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. 
> 
> Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
> 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Is Nietzsche's shade wandering in platonia ?

Hi Bruno Marchal 

 OK, you say propositions might have a contradiction but you might not 
yet have found the contradictions. That's a profound point.
In other words, one can't ever be sure if a proposition is
necessarily true, because, as Woody Allen says, forever
is a long time. And the variety and number of possible copntradictions
is possibly vast. Shades of Nietzsche ! Tell me it isn't so !

I guess that's the same as saying that you can never be sure
of contingency either. I need to lie down for a while. This
is beginning to look like existentialism.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-04, 08:56:01 
Subject: Re: The two types of truth 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, 
> 
> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html 
> 
> "Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: 
> truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either 
> true or false], 

We can only hope that they are non contradictory. 
And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed 
of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. 




> and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. 

Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context 
in the higher structure level. 


> 
> Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. 
> Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are 
> contingent, empirical truths. 
> Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason 
> have their 
> sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and 
> logical inconsistency 
> of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their 
> sufficient reason in 
> being more perfect than propositions which deny them." 

Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable 
above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are 
not that simple. 

Bruno 




> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/3/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 
> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
> 
> 
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
>> On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way 
>> to physically implement them. 
> 
> Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation". 
 
 So your thinking about them is not a physical act? 
>>> 
>>> Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and 
>>> "no". 
>>> Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical 
>>> events. 
>>> No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by 
>>> platonic arithmetical truth. 
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> 
>> Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? 
> 
> It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid 
> the use of "platonic" there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In 
> that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from 
> arithmetic and comp. 
> 
> All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of "43 is 
> prime". 
> 
> 
> 
>> The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence 
> 
> Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a 
> prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a 
> proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable 
> with truth, and still less with existence. 
> 
> 
> 
>> but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with 
>> the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any 
>> coherence as an idea! 
> 
> Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and 
> observer. 
> 
> 
> 
>> We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts 
>> to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are 
>> possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. 
> 
> Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent

2012-11-05 Thread Richard Ruquist

On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 7:06 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as
> the physical man must remain associated to its monad.
>
> But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the
> supreme monad.

You seem to be claiming that men do not have free will
and that it is not because of predeterminism.


>
> So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad.
> Which is why we give thanks before a meal.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 11/5/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10
> Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow
>
>
> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same.
>> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice,
>> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same.
>
> OK.
>
>
>>
>> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or
>> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because
>> although its contents keep changing, it has
>> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme
>> monad would not know where to place the
>> constantly adjusted perceptions.
>
> More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (=
> 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial
> and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of
> knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing
> machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge
> applied to ideally correct machine's provability.
>
>
>>
>> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions
>> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such
>> as we understand perception. An individual soul
>> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own
>> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions
>> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees
>> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives.
>> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind.
>
> Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems.
>
>
>
>>
>> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God
>> who knows all.
>
> OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I
> *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 11/3/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> - Receiving the following content -
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25
>> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a
>> concrete robust physical universe".
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>>
>> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I
>> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.
>> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.
>>
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you
>> still didn't understand... From: 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
>>
>> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?"
>> "Actually the 8th present step will explain
>> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the
>> notion of concrete and
>> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.
>> It will follow that a much
>> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that
>> not only physics has
>> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ?
>> matter? has been
>> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the
>> object study of fundamental
>> machine psychology."
>>
>> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any
>> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically
>> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither
>> and has no particular properties.
>>
>>
>>
>> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?
>>
>> Dear Bruno,
>>
>> No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be
>> complete and consistent simultaneously,
>>
>>
>> Why not? The One is not a theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed
>> to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we
>> reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds
>>
>>
>> Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I
>> just prove this from comp. That's th

why IMHO arithmetic is not a theory

Hi Bruno Marchal 

IMHO arithmetic, unlike theory, does not make predictions
in the real world, so it has not contingency about it,
its truths are necessary, unchangeable. and always true. 
That disqualifies arithmetic as a theory, which is man-made
(invented) and therefore contingent. 

Theories are invented, but arithmetic is not,
arithmetic is discovered. It is most certainly a priori.


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote: 


Hi Bruno Marchal   


All theories are based on the a priori but  
can only give contingent results (this world  
results). 



Hmm OK.  







However, arithmetic is not a theory,  


Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important one in the 
comp setting is the "very elementary theory". Basically just the four 
equalities: 


x+0 = x 
x+s(y) = s(x+y) 


x*0=0 
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x 


This is already Turing universal.  


A richer theory (PA), which is L bian (knows she is universal), is the same 
four axioms + 


0 ? s(x) 
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y 


and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical formula F(x) 
: 


(  F(0)   &   Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))  ) ->  AxF(x) 


By G del 2, or by L b, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all* theories and 
machines. "Arithmetical Truth" cannot be defined by those machines, although 
they can build transfinite of approximation, and handles pointer on the notion. 








it is  
arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth. 



Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit and clear, 
and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than what we can conceive 
(provably so about the sound machines) and that it will have many contingent 
internal aspects when seen from "inside". Still both the necessary and the 
contingent obeys to (meta) laws, in the computer science setting. 


Bruno 







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
11/3/2012   
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  


- Receiving the following content -   
From: Bruno Marchal   
Receiver: everything-list   
Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33  
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism  




On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:  


On Fri, Nov 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:  




He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.  


People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for 
doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.  



Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else. but it 
implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for the global 
conception of reality.  







Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.  


I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many 
other things too,   


Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle metaphysics.  






things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution 
produced brains or  "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his 
consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".  



Let us go step by step.  









you are stuck in step 3  



And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3;   


Your "blunder" has been debunked by many people.  Then you have oscillate 
between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1-views with 3-views. 
Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1-views on 1-views.   
You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after pushing the 
button, but you have always given a list of what can happen, which is not a 
prediction.  








after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that fatally flawed 
foundation would be worth reading. 



You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p.  









the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H  


Yes.  



by definition of comp.  



I don't know what that is.   



See above.  









This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.  



You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and mysterious about 
that?   




OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if you agree. 
We have all the time to see where the reasoning will eventually lead us.  








I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my environment will 
include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of philosophical interest in 
that fact .   



This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of predicting the 
weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is not used in the first person 
indeterminacy.  









And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine,  



Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a  "L?ian machine" is.  



A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p -> 
Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape ExP(x), and P 
decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA,

The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as
the physical man must remain associated to its monad.

But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the 
supreme monad.

So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. 
Which is why we give thanks before a meal.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 
Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. 
> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, 
> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. 

OK. 


> 
> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or 
> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because 
> although its contents keep changing, it has 
> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme 
> monad would not know where to place the 
> constantly adjusted perceptions. 

More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (=  
4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial  
and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of  
knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing  
machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge  
applied to ideally correct machine's provability. 


> 
> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions 
> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such 
> as we understand perception. An individual soul 
> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own 
> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions 
> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees 
> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. 
> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. 

Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. 



> 
> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God 
> who knows all. 

OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I  
*guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. 

Bruno 


> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/3/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 
> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> 
> 
> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a  
> concrete robust physical universe". 
> 
> 
> ? 
> 
> 
> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I  
> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. 
> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. 
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you  
> still didn't understand... From: 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
> 
> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" 
> "Actually the 8th present step will explain 
> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the  
> notion of concrete and 
> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.  
> It will follow that a much 
> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that  
> not only physics has 
> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ?  
> matter? has been 
> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the  
> object study of fundamental 
> machine psychology." 
> 
> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any  
> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically  
> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither  
> and has no particular properties. 
> 
> 
> 
> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? 
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be  
> complete and consistent simultaneously, 
> 
> 
> Why not? The One is not a theory. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed  
> to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we  
> reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds 
> 
> 
> Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I  
> just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of  
> metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). 
> 
> Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable  
> aspects of multiple sheaves of c

1p=now, 3p = then