subject:"\"Re\\\: Against Mechanism\""



On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:


Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for  
one reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference  
whether "you" will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your'  
undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence  
then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1  
while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s  
inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE"  
passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon  
yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it  
will not be "YOU".


I think the conclusion is that there is no "you" in the sense of  
unique.


But there is: the content of all diaries determined each time, in all  
situations, such a "you".




  It's like talking about "the" dollar coin.  If it's duplicated or  
multiplied it's not unique and "you" is ambiguous - which is what  
John Clark complains about.


Because John introduce "ambiguous" to avoid "indeterminate", but with  
the definition of the 1-view, there is no ambiguity at all, just  
indetermination. Ambiguity is taking care of by the 1-3 distinction.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

On 15 Dec 2012, at 00:07, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:

Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I
think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is
proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a
transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w
goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again andit
sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and
repeats this process many times. Eventually
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be
random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with
probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in
Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of
Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general
feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but
only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed
the button two whole universes were created, separated by more
than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in
the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only
seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and
how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being
told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the
probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right.

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence
"wmwwmwmmmww...mwm " is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit
assumption of a "book keeper at infinity' here!

No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported
also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to
Helsinki.

Exactly.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 14 Dec 2012, at 21:54, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,  
alias comp), there are two first person points of view

Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after  
the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of  
view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only  
one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked  
about the future state of "you" and demands are made for one and  
only one answer.

Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a  
future first person points of view, which is single (as the two copies  
can handled only one diary and put only a definite result in there).
To confirm the probabilities, with such a definition of 1-view, you  
have to interview all copies.

John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal  
pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now,  
and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those  
pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just  
cannot help themselves.

If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for  
a whole. I use "H-man, W-man, M-man, and you have agreed on the key  
points:

- the M and W men are both the H-man
- the M and W men are different.
this gives sense to the first person indeterminacy lived by the H-man  
before the duplication.
Your problem is that you keep the 3p view throughout the experience,  
in which case everything is deterministic, but this avoids the  
question asked, simply.

The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas  
without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some  
insight into the nature of those aforesaid ideas.

I have no more used pronouns, to help yopu, as this was pure red  
herring once you label them correctly with respect to the 1/3  
distinctions.

> you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in  
the shoes of the reconstituted person,

And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person  
points of view "you" should put feet into

Wong. I told you: all of them. It is easy, they all agree that they  
get a result that they was unable to predict, so the 1p-indeterminacy  
is a certainty for the "original" candidate.

and which first person viewpoint "you" should not. Bruno Marchal  
simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words  
are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always  
clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would be  
unnecessary.

pfft You are discouraging as you don't even read the comments. You  
get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.

Nobody can teach anything to people who does not the homework.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 15 Dec 2012, at 04:25, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:

Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I
think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno
is proposing to explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps
in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno,
Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and
it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and
repeats this process many times. Eventually
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to
be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random
with probability 1/2. This is hailed as a great discovery...in
Copenhagen. But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of
Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general
feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, but
only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view of
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed
the button two whole universes were created, separated by more
than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in
the other he went to Bruno_m. And so there was no probability
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time. It only
seemed like probability and randomness. Some people thought this
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and
how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by being
told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the
probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right.

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence
"wmwwmwmmmww...mwm " is recorded and passed along. There is a
tacit assumption of a "book keeper at infinity' here!

No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported
also and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back
to Helsinki.

Brent
--

Hi Brent,

OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too?

It is the only difference between 1p and 3p used in the UDA. For the
3p the diary are outside the teleportation boxes, and for the 1p, the
diary are inside, and thus gets copy and pasted too.

Bruno

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread meekerdb

On 12/15/2012 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

> Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.

John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true.

> I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is 
proposing to
explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it 
sends him
to Washington. 

As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to express vague 
flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be used to hide their vacuous 
nature at their heart. John Clark is going to rephrase the above by excising the 
cancerous pronouns "suppose Bruno is in Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and 
it sends Bruno to Washington". Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much 
clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter. If the 
transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno is no longer in 
Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating machine then when Bruno goes to 
Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki.

> That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again 
and it
sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this 
process
many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems
to be random and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with 
probability 1/2.

Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND Moscow many 
times,

Once for each start from Helsinki.

and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says that the machine would send Bruno 
to Washington OR Moscow;

I wrote, "Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and 
just sends him to Washington or Moscow."

and if Bruno had seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND 
Moscow. Of course this absurdity

What's absurd about visiting Washington and Moscow many times, always starting from 
Helsinki.   I'll bet there are several Finnish airline pilots who have done exactly that.  
I think you must be listening to voices in your head, instead reading what's written.

can be covered up, and that's where personal pronouns come in, although John Clark 
thinks the disguise doesn't work very well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life 
and personal pronouns can't give focus to bad ideas.

And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one should look to 
understand this issue, from the present to the past or from the present to the future. 
John Clark believes that the important thing is that no matter how many iterations are 
done all those Bruno's remember being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen 
a duplicating chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other, 
are all equally Bruno.

Did I say there was a duplicating chamber??

Brent

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/12/15 John Clark 

> On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >> Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of
>>> it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all
>>> probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and
>>> just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I
>>> would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in
>>> Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world
>>> you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason
>>> existed.
>>>
>>
>> >Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a
>> 50% chance it would transport you.
>>
>
> So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would
> simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would
> remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin
> was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch
> would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew
> all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance
> that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will
> remain in Helsinki.
>
>>
>>>  >>> as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your
 comfort.

>>>
>>> >> Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most
>>> people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all
>>> "first person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying "I dunno".
>>>
>>
>> >It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
>> cannot know.
>>
>
> John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington)
> causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see
> Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn
> into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep
> but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental
> causes, and "first person indeterminacy" is just a pompous way of saying "I
> dunno" about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark.
>
>
>> > Even if you are God you cannot know.
>>
>
> Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense.
>
>
>>  > Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why:
>> You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the
>> skyline and find it includes the Kremlin.  The experimental setup says your
>> duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington
>> monument.  One of you saw the Kremlin and became the "saw the Kremlin man"
>> and the other saw the Washington monument and became the "saw the
>> Washington monument man".  Through the duplication and observance of
>> something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of
>> observing a random unpredictable event.
>>
>
> The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual
> involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw
> the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he
> saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then
> he's be the Washington man. And he's not.
>
>   John K Clark
>


So in your world, it is impossible to assign probabilities for subjective
feeling in a duplication experiment, yet still in your vision, you can in a
MWI context and you see absolutely no contradiction with that, agreed ?

If you agree, then I think we can spare electrons from now on.

Quentin

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Dec 15, 2012 at 3:16 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>> Subjective probability depends on the amount of information, or lack of
>> it, the person involved has; and if Many Worlds is correct then all
>> probabilities are subjective. If you told me nothing about the machine and
>> just said walk into the chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I
>> would have no way of knowing that there was another John Clark in
>> Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world
>> you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason
>> existed.
>>
>
> >Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50%
> chance it would transport you.
>

So a coin would be flipped and if it was heads then Jason Resch would
simply allow the duplicating machine to do it's work and John Clark would
remain in Helsinki and John Clark would go to Washington, but if the coin
was tails then one second after the machine finished its work Jason Resch
would put a bullet into John Clark's brain in Helsinki. If John Clark knew
all of this beforehand John Clark would conclude there is a 100% chance
that John Clark will go to Washington and a 0% chance John Clark will
remain in Helsinki.

>
>>  >>> as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your
>>> comfort.
>>>
>>
>> >> Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people
>> want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all "first
>> person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying "I dunno".
>>
>
> >It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
> cannot know.
>

John Clark knows with certainty that if something (like seeing Washington)
causes John Clark to turn into the Washington Man then John Clark will see
Washington and if something (like seeing Moscow) causes John Clark to turn
into the Moscow Man then John Clark will turn into the Moscow Man. Not deep
but true. So it all boils down to uncertainties in external environmental
causes, and "first person indeterminacy" is just a pompous way of saying "I
dunno" about what changes the external world will cause in John Clark.

> > Even if you are God you cannot know.
>

Which should give a hint that the question makes no sense.

>  > Tell me whether you disagree with the following and if so why:
> You open the door to emerge from a duplication chamber, observe the
> skyline and find it includes the Kremlin.  The experimental setup says your
> duplicate in the other city found the skyline included the Washington
> monument.  One of you saw the Kremlin and became the "saw the Kremlin man"
> and the other saw the Washington monument and became the "saw the
> Washington monument man".  Through the duplication and observance of
> something different, each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of
> observing a random unpredictable event.
>

The subjective feeling would be depended entirely on the individual
involved , I'm only a expert on John Clark and John Clark would say he saw
the Kremlin because he's the Moscow man and he's the Moscow man because he
saw the Kremlin and he did not see the Washington monument because then
he's be the Washington man. And he's not.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

 > Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.
>

John Clark is happy to read that but is somewhat skeptical it is true.

> I think it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is
> proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a
> transporter and it sends him to Washington.

As John Clark has said people just can not help themselves, in order to
express vague flabby philosophical ideas personal pronouns simply must be
used to hide their vacuous nature at their heart. John Clark is going to
rephrase the above by excising the cancerous pronouns "suppose Bruno is in
Helsinki and Bruno steps into a transporter and it sends Bruno to
Washington". Already much of the mystery is gone and things are much
clearer, but there is still ambiguity about the nature of the transporter.
If the transporter is a airplane then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno
is no longer in Helsinki, however if the transporter is a duplicating
machine then when Bruno goes to Washington Bruno remains in Helsinki.

> That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again
> and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats
> this process many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that
> the transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or
> Moscow at random with probability 1/2.
>

Brent Meeker just said that the machine would send Bruno to Washington AND
Moscow many times, and then in the very next sentence Brent Meeker says
that the machine would send Bruno to Washington OR Moscow; and if Bruno had
seen wmwwmwmmmww...mwm then Bruno has certainly seen Washington AND Moscow.
Of course this absurdity can be covered up, and that's where personal
pronouns come in, although John Clark thinks the disguise doesn't work very
well, lipstick can't brink a corpse back to life and personal pronouns
can't give focus to bad ideas.

And John Clark is confused about what direction Brent Meeker believes one
should look to understand this issue, from the present to the past or from
the present to the future. John Clark believes that the important thing is
that no matter how many iterations are done all those Bruno's remember
being Bruno in Helsinki long before Bruno had even seen a duplicating
chamber, and that's why all of them, although different from each other,
are all equally Bruno.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-15 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:25 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 "heres" and 2 "not
>>> theres".  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the
>>> experimenter enter into the lab notebook??
>>>
>>
>> > You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.
>>
>
> Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason
> #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter,
> so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one
> and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word "Washington" or the one
> next to the word "Moscow"?
>
>
>> > Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or
>> people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of
>> the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations?
>>
>
> That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the
> amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many
> Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me
> nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so
> and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was
> another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the
> cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even
> know that a reason existed.
>

Well say you knew there was a 50% chance it would duplicate you and a 50%
chance it would transport you.  Are the one or two John Clark's any wiser
following this protocol about which it was?  If they aren't then
subjectively duplication produces an experience indistinguishable from the
random selection of a single course.  Do you agree?

>
> > My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore
>> this question
>>
>
> You loose.
>
>

>
>  > as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort.
>>
>
> Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people
> want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all "first
> person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying "I dunno".
>

It's more than simple ignorance though.  Even with perfect knowledge you
cannot know.  Even if you are God you cannot know.  This type of
uncertainty only comes about in regards to first person duplication of
minds, and is altogether unlike other forms of uncertainty (save perhaps
quantum uncertainty, which may be related to or explained by it).

>
>
> > And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

>>>
>>> I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?
>>>
>>
>> And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?
>
>
> I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?
>

Yes.  First you start with the integers.  Then you sit back and let their
interrelations and connections build upon each other, and watch as some
form infinitely recursive relations, some of which proceed for very long
times if not indefinitely.  Some of these numbers, with each iteration,
develop internal patterns which multiply and divide themselves, some of
those patterns through mostly random processes adapt to their local
environment of  more stable patterns in the series of numbers, some develop
what we would call brains, some learn to build planes they call 747's, and
some build networks of computers to communicate on e-mail lists and discuss
the possible nature of reality.  All of these things can be found among the
relations between the integers.

>
>
>
>> >> If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the
>>> ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the
>>> question.
>>
>>
>>
> > Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of
>> questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about
>> pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.
>>
>
> Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with
> abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating
> machines as it is in our world without them.
>
>> >>So both are "you" but "you only see through the eyes of one of them".
>>> So which one is blind.
>>>
>> >Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.
>>
> OK.
>
> > You (subjectively) survived
>>
>
> Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure
> what objective survival means.
>
>  >as one of them,
>>
>
> One? Which one?
>
>
>> >>  if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one
>>> photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;
>>
>>
>
>>  > Not in the cosmological form of MWI.
>>
>
> Bullshit.
>

Then you ought to tell Anthony Aguirre and Max Tegmark what the error is in
their paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

>
> > As I said before, no information is gai

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/14/2012 6:09 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one 
reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference 
whether "you" will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' 
undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then 
- my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you 
consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge 
so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE" 
passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon 
yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will 
not be "YOU".


I think the conclusion is that there is no "you" in the sense of 
unique.  It's like talking about "the" dollar coin.  If it's 
duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and "you" is ambiguous - 
which is what John Clark complains about.


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

Isn't this the concept of "fungibility" that D. Deutsch goes on and 
on about?


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/14/2012 6:07 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think 
it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is 
proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a 
transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes 
back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to 
Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process 
many times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or 
Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper 
reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a 
general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the 
world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different 
view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he 
pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by 
more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in 
the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability 
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only 
seemed like probability and randomness.  Some people thought this 
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how 
could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being told 
the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability 
theory without probabilities, so it must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence 
"wmwwmwmmmww...mwm " is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit 
assumption of a "book keeper at infinity' here!


No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also 
and he just writes down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki.


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

OK, so the notebook gets copy and pasted too?

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread meekerdb


On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether "you" will 
CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes 
into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of 
self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so 
you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE" passing several 
locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to 
return to a former one, it will not be "YOU".


I think the conclusion is that there is no "you" in the sense of unique.  It's like 
talking about "the" dollar coin.  If it's duplicated or multiplied it's not unique and 
"you" is ambiguous - which is what John Clark complains about.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread meekerdb


On 12/14/2012 2:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it needs to put 
in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is 
Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, 
Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to 
Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  
Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random 
and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is 
hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper 
reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that 
randomness can never be a property of the world, but only a quantification of 
ignorance.  So there a different view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that 
every time he pushed the button two whole universes were created, separated by more 
than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to 
Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing happened 
every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some people thought this 
was a little extravagant and asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory 
be tested.  But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the same 
things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence "wmwwmwmmmww...mwm " is recorded 
and passed along. There is a tacit assumption of a "book keeper at infinity' here!


No, each Bruno takes his notebook with him which get transported also and he just writes 
down where he arrived before heading back to Helsinki.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread John Mikes

Brent,
I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one
reason:
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether
"you" will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self.
However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what
happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2
location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE" passing
several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1)
and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be "YOU".

You can dismiss my problem by "you did not follow the suvject".
John M

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>  > In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,
>> alias comp), there are two first person points of view
>>
>
> Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the
> duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but
> the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person
> point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of
> "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer.
>
> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal
> pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet
> those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as
> frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves.
> The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without
> using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into
> the nature of those aforesaid ideas.
>
>   > you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the
>> shoes of the reconstituted person,
>>
>
> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of
> view "you" should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you"
> should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5
> to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it
> was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would
> be unnecessary.
>
>
> Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it
> needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to
> explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it
> sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in
> the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back
> to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually
> Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random
> and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.
> This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington
> (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random
> things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the
> world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view
> of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the
> button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble
> radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to
> Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing
> happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some
> people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy
> conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by
> being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability
> theory without probabilities, so it must be right.
>
> Brent
> Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them
> where they cannot be seen.
> --- Stephen W. Hawking
>
> --
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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/14/2012 4:50 PM, meekerdb wrote:


Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think 
it needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing 
to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter 
and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to 
Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. 
That Bruno_wm goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many 
times.  Eventually Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the 
transporter seems to be random and just sends him to Washington or 
Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper 
reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random things and a 
general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the world, 
but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view of 
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the 
button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the 
Hubble radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he 
went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly 
the same thing happened every time.  It only seemed like probability 
and randomness.  Some people thought this was a little extravagant and 
asked how was energy conserved and how could this theory be tested.  
But they were silenced by being told the theory predicted exactly the 
same things as the probability theory without probabilities, so it 
must be right.


--

Hi,

Great post! I would like to know how the sequence 
"wmwwmwmmmww...mwm " is recorded and passed along. There is a tacit 
assumption of a "book keeper at infinity' here!


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Craig Weinberg

If this were done in real life, my guess is that Bruno_w dies in the 
transporter (sorry Bruno), and a disoriented amnesiac identical twin is 
born at every transporter location. I don't know if these clones would even 
survive, I think they would be brain dead and lacking a heartbeat but maybe 
could be resuscitated as infants in adult bodies. They might have odd 
discoveries of recovered memories of a past life as Bruno.

On Friday, December 14, 2012 4:50:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: 
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
>
>  > In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, 
>> alias comp), there are two first person points of view
>>
>
> Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the 
> duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but 
> the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person 
> point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of 
> "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer.  
>
> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal 
> pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet 
> those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as 
> frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. 
> The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without 
> using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
> the nature of those aforesaid ideas. 
>  
>   > you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
>> shoes of the reconstituted person,
>>  
>
> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of 
> view "you" should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you" 
> should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 
> to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it 
> was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would 
> be unnecessary.
>  
>
> Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it 
> needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to 
> explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it 
> sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in 
> the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back 
> to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually 
> Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random 
> and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  
> This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington 
> (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random 
> things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the 
> world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view 
> of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the 
> button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble 
> radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to 
> Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing 
> happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some 
> people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy 
> conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by 
> being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability 
> theory without probabilities, so it must be right.
>
> Brent
> Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them 
> where they cannot be seen.
> --- Stephen W. Hawking 
>  

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread meekerdb

On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:

> In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias 
comp),
there are two first person points of view

Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the duplication 
there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that 
before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the 
question is asked about the future state of "you" and demands are made for one and only 
one answer.

John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world 
with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John 
Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people 
just cannot help themselves. The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express 
ideas without using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
the nature of those aforesaid ideas.

> you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
shoes of the
reconstituted person,

And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view "you" 
should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you" should not. Bruno Marchal 
simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 to 10% of the words are personal 
pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it was always clear what those pronouns referred 
to this entire debate would be unnecessary.

Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it needs to put in 
the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki 
and he steps in a transporter and it sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes 
back to Helsinki, gets in the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm 
goes back to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually 
Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random and just sends 
him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.  This is hailed as a great 
discovery...in Copenhagen.  But in Washington (state) near the upper reached of Puget 
Sound there is a dislike of random things and a general feeling that randomness can never 
be a property of the world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different 
view of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the button two 
whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble radius, and in one Bruno 
went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability 
involved, exactly the same thing happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and 
randomness.  Some people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy 
conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by being told the 
theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability theory without probabilities, 
so it must be right.

Brent
Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them
where they cannot be seen.
--- Stephen W. Hawking

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Craig Weinberg

So if there is a brain conjoined twin (Adam & Ben) in Albuquerque and they 
are duplicated once in Buffalo and once in Cleveland, but in Cleveland 
something goes wrong and Adam does not get duplicated. 

What are you both saying happens to Adam & Ben in Albuquerque and to Ben in 
Cleveland?

Craig


On Friday, December 14, 2012 3:54:44 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > wrote:
>
>
> > In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, alias 
>> comp), there are two first person points of view
>>
>
> Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the 
> duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but 
> the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person 
> point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of 
> "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer.  
>
> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal 
> pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet 
> those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as 
> frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. 
> The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without 
> using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into 
> the nature of those aforesaid ideas. 
>
> > you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the 
>> shoes of the reconstituted person,
>>
>
> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of 
> view "you" should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you" 
> should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 
> to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it 
> was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would 
> be unnecessary.
>
>   John K Clark 
>
>

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 13 Dec 2012, at 22:25, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch   
wrote:
Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 "heres" and 2 "not  
theres".  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the  
experimenter enter into the lab notebook??

> You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.

Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and  
Jason #2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one  
experimenter,

In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,  
alias comp), there are two first person points of view, and the  
question concerns them, not the 3p view. As J	ason said, you just  
limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the shoes of  
the reconstituted person, as asked in the protocol.
You stuck yourselves in the corner quasi deliberately, to avoid to  
proceed in the reasoning.

Bruno

so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in  
that one and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word  
"Washington" or the one next to the word "Moscow"?

> Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only  
person (or people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported  
randomly to one of the two locations, or duplicated to two different  
locations?

That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on  
the amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has;  
and if Many Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective.  
If you told me nothing about the machine and just said walk into the  
chamber and I did so and found myself in Moscow I would have no way  
of knowing that there was another John Clark in Washington, nor  
would I have any idea why of all the cities in the world you chose  
to transport me to Moscow, I would not even know that a reason  
existed.

> My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely  
ignore this question

You loose.

 > as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your  
comfort.

Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most  
people want to know what the future will hold but we don't; and  
that's all "first person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying  
"I dunno".

> And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?

And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?

>> If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the  
ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand  
the question.

> Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line  
of questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse  
about pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.

Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns  
with abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with  
duplicating machines as it is in our world without them.
>>So both are "you" but "you only see through the eyes of one of  
them". So which one is blind.

>Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.
OK.

> You (subjectively) survived

Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even  
sure what objective survival means.

 >as one of them,

One? Which one?

>>  if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one  
photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;

 > Not in the cosmological form of MWI.

Bullshit.

> As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one  
who enters the duplication chamber.

And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally  
squeeze through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the  
electrons job, nevertheless he can learn something from just  
watching it. Nothing is learned from watching Bruno's experiment.

> You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find  
it is left.  MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it  
was right.  One of you saw the left-state and became the "saw the  
left-state man" and the other saw the right-state and became the  
"saw the right-state man".  Through the split, duplication, and  
observance of something different, each duplicate has acquired the  
subjective feeling of observing a random unpredictable event.

Yes.

>  Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves.

I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread  
and there is not much to show for their sacrifice.

 John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/13/2012 3:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/13/2012 11:46 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2012/12/13 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and
apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's
significant that his AI is conscious


No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked
to him about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither
choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do
with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to
devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds
makes better predictions than other interpretations where mind
is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
the experiment.


Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed
to test the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the
wave-function.  Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he
dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI.

Brent


Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ?


No it just proves wrong theories that say the conscious knowledge of 
the quantum computer, which is not erased, collapses the wf. That's 
why I say I'd like to see the experimental setup or at least the 
theoretical Hamiltonian.  Suppose the interference fringes are 
observed - then we say OK erasing the which-way, but keeping the 
some-way, information is possible.  Suppose the interference fringes 
aren't observed - then we say it isn't really possible (with the given 
experiment anyway) to erase the which-way information and keep the 
some-way information.  Although the AI doesn't know which-way, the 
information is 'out there' just like in the buckyball Young's slit 
experiment.


Brent

Hi Brent,

Wait... For the the hypothetical quantum computer, what plays the 
role of the environment (that is an effectively infinite heat reservoir) 
that the IR radiation of the buckyball's couples to such that they (at 
some temp) behave classically? Here are a couples of on-line articles:


http://www.julianvossandreae.com/Work/C60article/c60article.pdf
http://www.flayrah.com/3351/physicist-mulls-double-slit-cat-cannon-experiment

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 3:18 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> Yes, and there are two of them and so there are 2 "heres" and 2 "not
>> theres".  So what ONE and only ONE thing does John Clark the 
>> experimenterenter into the lab notebook??
>>
>
> > You are hopeless.  I've answered this at least 10 times.
>

Avoided the question at least 10 times. Jason #1 says Washington and Jason
#2 says Moscow, there is only one lab notebook and only one experimenter,
so what one and only one check mark should the experimenter put in that one
and only one lab notebook, the one next to the word "Washington" or the one
next to the word "Moscow"?

> > Can anyone (the 1 or 2 remaining John Clarks, being the only person (or
> people) left on Earth) say whether he was transported randomly to one of
> the two locations, or duplicated to two different locations?
>

That depends on how much is known. Subjective probability depends on the
amount of information, or lack of it, the person involved has; and if Many
Worlds is correct then all probabilities are subjective. If you told me
nothing about the machine and just said walk into the chamber and I did so
and found myself in Moscow I would have no way of knowing that there was
another John Clark in Washington, nor would I have any idea why of all the
cities in the world you chose to transport me to Moscow, I would not even
know that a reason existed.

> My bet: you will find some excuse for not answering or merely ignore this
> question
>

You loose.

 > as it brings too close to first person indeterminacy for your comfort.
>

Well of course I'm uncomfortable with it, most people are, most people want
to know what the future will hold but we don't; and that's all "first
person indeterminacy" is, a pompous way of saying "I dunno".

> And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?
>>>
>>
>> I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?
>>
>
> And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

I don't know how to fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747. Do you?

> >> If pronouns are not ambiguous John Clark may or may not have the
>> ability to provide answers, but at least John Clark will understand the
>> question.
>
>
>
> Or if John Clark is uncomfortable with where he perceives the line of
> questions and reasoning to be heading be may make up some excuse about
> pronouns or answer a different question than was asked.
>

Then simply call John Clark's bluff and stop using personal pronouns with
abandon as it their meaning was as clear in a world with duplicating
machines as it is in our world without them.

> >>So both are "you" but "you only see through the eyes of one of them". So
>> which one is blind.
>>
> >Neither is blind, but each sees through only one pair of eyes.
>
OK.

> You (subjectively) survived
>

Yes, and subjective survival is all I'm interested in, I'm not even sure
what objective survival means.

 >as one of them,
>

One? Which one?

> >>  if MWI is true in each universe there is one and only one
>> photographic plate and one and only one spot on it;
>
>

>  > Not in the cosmological form of MWI.
>

Bullshit.

> As I said before, no information is gained unless you are the one who
> enters the duplication chamber.
>

And that's the difference, a physicist doesn't have to personally squeeze
through those 2 tiny slits to do the experiment, that's the electrons job,
nevertheless he can learn something from just watching it. Nothing is
learned from watching Bruno's experiment.

> You measure the spin state of an electron on the x-axis and find it is
> left.  MWI says your duplicate in the other branch found it was right.  One
> of you saw the left-state and became the "saw the left-state man" and the
> other saw the right-state and became the "saw the right-state man".
>  Through the split, duplication, and observance of something different,
> each duplicate has acquired the subjective feeling of observing a random
> unpredictable event.
>

Yes.

>  Enough time and electrons have been wasted repeating ourselves.

I agree, many free electrons have given their lives for this thread and
there is not much to show for their sacrifice.

 John K Clark

>

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread meekerdb

On 12/13/2012 11:46 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/12/13 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

> Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently
Deutsch
agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is
conscious

No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him
about it. In
the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in
general
have anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order
to
devise a experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better
predictions than other interpretations where mind is important it is
obviously
necessary to incorporate mind into the experiment.

Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the
Wigner
theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function. Rejecting Wigner's
interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving
MWI.

Brent

Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ?

No it just proves wrong theories that say the conscious knowledge of the quantum computer,
which is not erased, collapses the wf. That's why I say I'd like to see the experimental
setup or at least the theoretical Hamiltonian. Suppose the interference fringes are
observed - then we say OK erasing the which-way, but keeping the some-way, information is
possible. Suppose the interference fringes aren't observed - then we say it isn't really
possible (with the given experiment anyway) to erase the which-way information and keep
the some-way information. Although the AI doesn't know which-way, the information is 'out
there' just like in the buckyball Young's slit experiment.

Brent

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/12/13 meekerdb 

>  On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>
>  > Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently
>> Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is
>> conscious
>
>
> No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him
> about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor
> consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws
> of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to
> prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations
> where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
> the experiment.
>
>
> Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test
> the Wigner theory that consciousness collapses the wave-function.
> Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which he dropped later anyway) is not
> the same as proving MWI.
>
> Brent
>

Isn't that prove wrong any collapse explanations ?

Quentin

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread meekerdb


On 12/13/2012 10:46 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently 
Deutsch
agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious


No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him about it. In the 
many worlds interpretation neither choice nor consciousness nor mind in general have 
anything to do with the way the laws of physics work, however in order to devise a 
experiment that attempts to prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other 
interpretations where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind 
into the experiment.


Which agrees with my point that the experiment is only designed to test the Wigner theory 
that consciousness collapses the wave-function.  Rejecting Wigner's interpretation (which 
he dropped later anyway) is not the same as proving MWI.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread meekerdb

On 12/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

>>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

>> Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible
computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are
theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

> Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
computer
that is conscious.

Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
difficult
to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the
conventional view says that conscious observers obey different laws of
physics,
Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that
uses
quantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
other
than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal
plate that
has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer
has
detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went
through. The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed
each
and every electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is
very
important that the document does not say which slit the electrons went
through,
it only says that they went through one slit only, and the mind has
knowledge of
which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the
memory of
what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and the
document
remains undamaged.

But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual
mechanism or
Hamiltonian that allows this.

And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic
plate. Now
develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference
bands then
the many world interpretation is correct.

No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is
incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.

If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what
does?

Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no
collapse then you have the MWI.

MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or
what chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately
orthogonal and what is the significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the
choice is made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he
thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious. Decoherence theory hopes to show it
is some objective feature of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and
purification has been proposed

http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you
assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as
Omnes says.

That works FAPP.
But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms, given that they can
play role physically testable. It is instrumentalist.

But MWI has the same problem. There are superpositions of conscious states too, but the
cross trems are ignored FAPP just as in an instrumentalist interpretation. It essentially
boils down to the problem of explaining the classical worlds emergence from the quantum.

If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then the linearity of
the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product entails the existence of the many
worlds. The many worlds is just the literal reading of QM applied to our world including us.

How I define a world's in a model only effects the model. There is no 'literal reading'
of QM that works in this world except FAPP. Maybe a successful theory of consciousness
will change that, but so far I see CTM as relying on the same FAPP diagonalization of
density matrices in a basis which is chosen - not predicted.

Brent

And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of arithmetic by itself,
... but I can't convince people who believes in Something or Someone selecting their
realities and not the others.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

> Copenhagen said the choice is made by the experimenter and apparently
> Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant that his AI is
> conscious

No Deutsch does not agree with this, I know because I've talked to him
about it. In the many worlds interpretation neither choice nor
consciousness nor mind in general have anything to do with the way the laws
of physics work, however in order to devise a experiment that attempts to
prove that Many Worlds makes better predictions than other interpretations
where mind is important it is obviously necessary to incorporate mind into
the experiment.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 13 Dec 2012, at 04:39, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

>>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

>> Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible
computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and
MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and differentiated.
> Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
computer that is conscious.

Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason
it's so difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault,
the reason is that the conventional view says that conscious
observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do
not, so to test who's right we need a mind that
usesquantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many
worlds other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots
electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does
this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each
slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through.
The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed
each and every electron and knows what slit each electron went
through. It is very important that the document does not say which
slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went
through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one.
Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory
of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories
and the document remains undamaged.

But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the
actual mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this.

And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the
photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at
it, if you see interference bands then the many world
interpretation is correct.

No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function'
theory is incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.

If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function
then what does?

Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.
And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to
ignore it): How or what chooses the basis in which the reduced
density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and what is the
significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the choice is
made by the experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this
because he thinks it's significant that his AI is conscious.
Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature of the
experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been
proposed

http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of
orthogonality, but once you assume you can ignore the off diagonal
terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes says.

That works FAPP.
But there is no conceptual reason to ignore the off diagonal terms,
given that they can play role physically testable. It is
instrumentalist.

If you define a world by the transitive closure of interactions, then
the linearity of the SWE and the linearity of the tensor product
entails the existence of the many worlds. The many worlds is just the
literal reading of QM applied to our world including us.

And I think QM itself, the wave, is already a literal reading of
arithmetic by itself, ... but I can't convince people who believes in
Something or Someone selecting their realities and not the others.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Jason Resch

Craig,

If in your theory sense is fundamental, a hence explains everything,  
how could your theory explain concepts like:

Gravity
Quantum mechanics
Fine tuning

It seems you need some formal laws and definitions concerning sense in  
order to build from it as a basis of understanding.

What might those laws of sense be?

Jason

On Dec 13, 2012, at 7:51 AM, Craig Weinberg   
wrote:

On Thursday, December 13, 2012 5:22:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
> On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> >
> > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Your servitor:
> > >
> > > 1) Arithmetic (comp)
> > >
> > > :)
> > >
> > > Bruno
> > >
> > > To which I add:
> > >
> > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives  
rise

> > > to comp.
> >
> >
> > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding  
comp.

> >
> > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
> > granted.
>
> Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running  
existence,

> are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.
>
> Tiny compared to what though?

Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.

But if the universe contains no K to begin with, then it is  
insurmountably un-tiny, no?

> As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from
> nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory-
> motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.

First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them,

That's what I keep telling you though, I have already done this.  
Numbers cannot be assumed and they can be explained as epiphenomenal  
protocols within sense.

if only to make sense
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.

Now sensory-motor really cannot be explained with less than sensory- 
motor. That's because it is the legitimate universal primitive.  
That's why 'seeing is believing' and 'there is no substitute for  
experience' and 'you had to be there' and 'it's lost in  
translation'. Experience is trans-rational. Logic arises from  
experience, not the other way around. It isn't numbers who dream, it  
is dreams who count. See? You are experiencing sensory-motor now -  
it is all that anything has ever experienced. All 'explanations'  
arise through it, from it, and to it as isomorphisms of sense- 
making. Juxtapostion of like experiences on different levels, from  
the concrete and personal to the abstract and generic.

Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.

That's what I'm saying. In sense, everything has lots of  
explanations. New explanations all the time. Explanations are made  
of sense.

> Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of  
experiences

Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain.

That's circular. Explanation is already an experience. You are  
trying to put the shoebox into the shoe.

> which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in
> arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of
> frustration.

In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.

Any machine that physically exists must be executed through some  
material which, on some level of description, has some level of  
awareness - molecules if nothing else. That doesn't mean though, if  
you make a walking machine out of PVC pipes (which are fantastic  
btw) that the walker as a whole hosts a unified awareness. Whatever  
awareness we project onto it is ultimately a reflection of our own  
sensory expectations and the sensory-motive intentions of the  
engineer(s) who created it. We watch TV, but the TV doesn't watch  
TV. We use a computer, but the computer doesn't use it's own  
computations to make sense. It reminds us very much of  
consciousness, but ultimately that reminder is a sculpture made of  
collections of metal pins and glassy films rather than living cells  
divided from a mammalian sexual syzygy event.

> It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all
> it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete
> sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the
> Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure
> capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?
>
>
>
>
>
> > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
> > necessary in the first place.
>
> By postulating what we want to explain.
>
> There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain
> arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Thursday, December 13, 2012 5:22:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote: 
> > > 
> > > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal   
> > wrote: 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Your servitor: 
> > > > 
> > > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) 
> > > > 
> > > > :) 
> > > > 
> > > > Bruno 
> > > > 
> > > > To which I add: 
> > > > 
> > > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise 
> > > > to comp. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. 
> > > 
> > > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for 
> > > granted. 
> > 
> > Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence, 
> > are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. 
> > 
> > Tiny compared to what though? 
>
> Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described. 
>

But if the universe contains no K to begin with, then it is insurmountably 
un-tiny, no?

>
>
>
> > As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from   
> > nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- 
> > motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. 
>
> First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or   
> Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them,

That's what I keep telling you though, I have already done this. Numbers 
cannot be assumed and they can be explained as epiphenomenal protocols 
within sense.

> if only to make sense   
> of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor. 
>

Now sensory-motor really cannot be explained with less than sensory-motor. 
That's because it is the legitimate universal primitive. That's why 'seeing 
is believing' and 'there is no substitute for experience' and 'you had to 
be there' and 'it's lost in translation'. Experience is trans-rational. 
Logic arises from experience, not the other way around. It isn't numbers 
who dream, it is dreams who count. See? You are experiencing sensory-motor 
now - it is all that anything has ever experienced. All 'explanations' 
arise through it, from it, and to it as isomorphisms of sense-making. 
Juxtapostion of like experiences on different levels, from the concrete and 
personal to the abstract and generic.

> Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation. 
>

That's what I'm saying. In sense, everything has lots of explanations. New 
explanations all the time. Explanations are made of sense.

>
>
>
> > Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences 
>
> Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain. 
>

That's circular. Explanation is already an experience. You are trying to 
put the shoebox into the shoe.

>
>
>
>
> > which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in   
> > arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of   
> > frustration. 
>
> In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness. 
>

Any machine that physically exists must be executed through some material 
which, on some level of description, has some level of awareness - 
molecules if nothing else. That doesn't mean though, if you make a walking 
machine out of PVC pipes (which are fantastic btw) that the walker as a 
whole hosts a unified awareness. Whatever awareness we project onto it is 
ultimately a reflection of our own sensory expectations and the 
sensory-motive intentions of the engineer(s) who created it. We watch TV, 
but the TV doesn't watch TV. We use a computer, but the computer doesn't 
use it's own computations to make sense. It reminds us very much of 
consciousness, but ultimately that reminder is a sculpture made of 
collections of metal pins and glassy films rather than living cells divided 
from a mammalian sexual syzygy event.

>
>
> > It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all   
> > it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete   
> > sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the   
> > Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure   
> > capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers? 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't 
> > > necessary in the first place. 
> > 
> > By postulating what we want to explain. 
> > 
> > There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain   
> > arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of   
> > arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense   
> > which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. 
>
> If you sa

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 12 Dec 2012, at 20:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

>
> On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

> >
> >
> > Your servitor:
> >
> > 1) Arithmetic (comp)
> >
> > :)
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> > To which I add:
> >
> > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise
> > to comp.
>
>
> OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.
>
> No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for
> granted.

Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,
are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.

Tiny compared to what though?

Tiny in the sense of needing few K to be described.

As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of arithmetic truth from  
nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of a sensory- 
motor primitive, which has no possible explanation.

First we cannot explain the numbers with less than the number (or  
Turing equivalent). So we have to assume them, if only to make sense  
of any theory in which you can define what you mean by sensory-motor.

Then in arithmetic many things have no possible explanation.

Arithmetic is easily explained as one of the many types of experiences

Keep in mind that "experiences" is what I want explain.

which allow us to refer to other experiences, but nothing in  
arithmetic will ever point to the taste of a carrot or a feeling of  
frustration.

In your theory which deprived machine of having consciousness.

It may leave room for undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all  
it is: room. Nothing points positively to realism and concrete  
sensory participation, only simulations...but what simulates the  
Turing machine itself? What props up the stability and erasure  
capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to detect numbers?

> Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't
> necessary in the first place.

By postulating what we want to explain.

There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain  
arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of  
arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense  
which persists in spite of having no arithmetic value.

If you say so ...

>
> You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.
>
> It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If
> you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-
> ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other
> beings in public space.

You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.

The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and  
solutions.

Well, the cosmos is a problem with comp, and which makes comp  
interesting.

That's the god-
of-the-gap mistake.

No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos -  
beneath all gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is  
sense itself.

We don't even know if there is one.

We have of course already discuss this. You are
just saying "don't search".

You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the  
only answer that can ever be universally true.

Hmm...

It looks *you* are talking everything for
granted at the start, in the theory.

I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down  
into any more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down  
to sense.

The CTM + classical theory of knowledge can explain that feeling.

>
> With the CTM ( a
> better name for comp), that which perceives, understands,  
participates

> and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its
> consciousness) by the only two laws:
>
> Kxy = x
> Sxyz = xz(yz)
>
> Laws? What are those? How do they govern?

Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first
equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x.

So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in
eleimnainating the left parentheses):
KKK = K.

For the same reason

KSK = S
KSS = S
K(S K) K = (S K)
etc.

For example SKK is an identity operator:

SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation.

S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a
Turing universal language/system/machine.

Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems  
don't appear without some capacity to generate and participate in  
them which exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a  
Law, but when I ask what you mean by that, you give more details on  
this specific proposition. I'm asking about the proposition itself  
though? What Turing universal language allows S and K to 'behave',  
or to exist or to relate to each other?

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb


On 12/12/2012 5:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote:


On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then 
what
does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not 
happen.  And if
there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

Jason

Hi,

It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a 
local sense
even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result, no the 
process. No?

Correct.  But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement without the wave 
function collapsing.  Actually it was never entirely defined when the collapse happened, 
or what did it, but it was supposed that for any observer to know a result it must have 
collapsed.


For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are definitely 
measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and yet the observer recalled 
measuring a definite result.


I'm not clear on what you mean by two definite results.  In order to detect an 
interference pattern you need to send many particles through Young's slits.  So I assume 
the two results must be an ensemble for which there was no which-way observation by the 
conscious AI and another ensemble for which the observation was made for each particle, 
but then quantum-erased.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb

On 12/12/2012 4:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

>>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

>> Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible
computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are
theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

> Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
computer that
is conscious.

Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
difficult
to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the
conventional
view says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many
Worlds says
they do not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum
properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
other
than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal
plate that
has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer
has
detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went
through.
The quantum mind now signs a document saying that it has observed each and
every
electron and knows what slit each electron went through. It is very
important that
the document does not say which slit the electrons went through, it only
says that
they went through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one.
Now the
mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits the
electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains
undamaged.

But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual
mechanism or
Hamiltonian that allows this.

No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is
incorrect. It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.

If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what
does?

Creating a record of it.

I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen. And if there is no
collapse then you have the MWI.

MWI has the same problem as decoherence theory (except it tries to ignore it): How or what
chooses the basis in which the reduced density matrix becomes approximately orthogonal and
what is the significance of it not being exact. Copenhagen said the choice is made by the
experimenter and apparently Deutsch agrees with this because he thinks it's significant
that his AI is conscious. Decoherence theory hopes to show it is some objective feature
of the experiment, e.g. the Schmidt decomposition and purification has been proposed

http://ipg.epfl.ch/lib/exe/fetch.php?media=en:courses:2009-2010:qit:lect5quantinfo0910.pdf

Neither has really said how to deal with the inexactness of orthogonality, but once you
assume you can ignore the off diagonal terms then QM just predicts probabilities, as Omnes
says.

Brent

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>> If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then
>> what does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not
>> happen.  And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.
>>
>> Jason
>>
> Hi,
>
> It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in a
> local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end result,
> no the process. No?
>
> Correct.  But the CI says you can't learn the result of a measurement
without the wave function collapsing.  Actually it was never entirely
defined when the collapse happened, or what did it, but it was supposed
that for any observer to know a result it must have collapsed.

For DD's experiment to work, there must be two definite results which are
definitely measured and observed., since the collapse never occurred and
yet the observer recalled measuring a definite result.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Stephen P. King


On 12/12/2012 7:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then 
what does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not 
happen.  And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.


Jason

Hi,

It seems to me that we would not observe any sign of a collapse in 
a local sense even if there actually was one. We only observe the end 
result, no the process. No?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Dec 12, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>
>   On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>  >>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.
>>>
>>
>>  >> Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible
>> computation and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus
>> they are theories which can be tested and differentiated.
>>
>>  > Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
>> computer that is conscious.
>>
>
> Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
> difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is
> that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different
> laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we
> need a mind that uses quantum properties.
>
> In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
> other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
> metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
> quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
> various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document
> saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit
> each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not
> say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went
> through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the
> mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits
> the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains
> undamaged.
>
>
> But why should I think this is possible?  I'd like to see the actual
> mechanism or Hamiltonian that allows this.
>
>
>  And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic
> plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if you see
> interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct.
>
>
> No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory
> is incorrect.  It doesn't follow that MWI is correct.
>
>
If observing a definite result doesn't collapse the wave function then what
does?  I think the experiment is meant to show collapse does not happen.
 And if there is no collapse then you have the MWI.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread meekerdb

On 12/12/2012 9:25 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

>>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

>> Not quite. Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation
and an AI
yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which
can be
tested and differentiated.

> Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer
that is
conscious.

Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so difficult to
test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is that the conventional view
says that conscious observers obey different laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do
not, so to test who's right we need a mind that uses quantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds other than
this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a metal plate that has 2 small
slits in it. It does this one at a time. The quantum computer has detectors near each
slit so it knows which slit the various electrons went through. The quantum mind now
signs a document saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit
each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not say which
slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went through one slit only, and
the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the mind uses quantum erasure to completely
destroy the memory of what slits the electrons went through. But all other memories and
the document remains undamaged.

But why should I think this is possible? I'd like to see the actual mechanism or
Hamiltonian that allows this.

And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the photographic plate. Now develop
the photographic plate and look at it, if you see interference bands then the many world
interpretation is correct.

No, it only means the 'consciousness collapses the wave-function' theory is incorrect. It
doesn't follow that MWI is correct.

Brent

If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one and the
conventional interpretation is correct.

Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of a
measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function collapses, in
effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace so you get no
interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds will converge back into one
universe when the electrons hit the photographic film because the two universes will no
longer be different (even though they had different histories), but their influence will
still be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron went
through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only, and that's what
causes interference.

John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:49:16 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Your servitor: 
> > > 
> > > 1) Arithmetic (comp) 
> > > 
> > > :) 
> > > 
> > > Bruno 
> > > 
> > > To which I add: 
> > > 
> > > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise 
> > > to comp. 
> > 
> > 
> > OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp. 
> > 
> > No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for   
> > granted. 
>
> Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,   
> are theorem in the tiny arithmetic. 
>

Tiny compared to what though? As far as I'm concerned, the appearance of 
arithmetic truth from nothing is an oceanic gulf - far greater than that of 
a sensory-motor primitive, which has no possible explanation. Arithmetic is 
easily explained as one of the many types of experiences which allow us to 
refer to other experiences, but nothing in arithmetic will ever point to 
the taste of a carrot or a feeling of frustration. It may leave room for 
undefined, non-comp 1p content, but that's all it is: room. Nothing points 
positively to realism and concrete sensory participation, only 
simulations...but what simulates the Turing machine itself? What props up 
the stability and erasure capacities of it's tape? What allows numbers to 
detect numbers?

>
>
>
> > Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't   
> > necessary in the first place. 
>
> By postulating what we want to explain. 
>

There is no more need to explain it than there is a need to explain 
arithmetic truth. The difference is that we have no experience of 
arithmetic truth outside of sense, but we are surrounded by sense which 
persists in spite of having no arithmetic value. 

>
>
> > 
> > You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. 
> > 
> > It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If   
> > you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- 
> > ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other   
> > beings in public space. 
>
> You take the problem, and then say it is the solution.

The cosmos isn't a problem, it is the source of all problems and solutions. 

> That's the god- 
> of-the-gap mistake. 

No, it's the recognition of the superlative nature of cosmos - beneath all 
gods and gaps, beneath all problems and solutions, is sense itself.

> We have of course already discuss this. You are   
> just saying "don't search".

You are welcome to search, I only say that I have already found the only 
answer that can ever be universally true.

> It looks *you* are talking everything for   
> granted at the start, in the theory. 
>

I take only sense for granted because sense cannot be broken down into any 
more primitive elements. Everything else can be broken down to sense.

>
>
>
>
> > 
> > With the CTM ( a 
> > better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates 
> > and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its 
> > consciousness) by the only two laws: 
> > 
> > Kxy = x 
> > Sxyz = xz(yz) 
> > 
> > Laws? What are those? How do they govern? 
>
> Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first   
> equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x. 
>
> So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in   
> eleimnainating the left parentheses): 
> KKK = K. 
>
> For the same reason 
>
> KSK = S 
> KSS = S 
> K(S K) K = (S K) 
> etc. 
>
> For example SKK is an identity operator: 
>
> SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation. 
>
> S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a   
> Turing universal language/system/machine. 
>

Axioms are philosophical. They don't make things happen. Systems don't 
appear without some capacity to generate and participate in them which 
exists first. You presume that there is such a thing a Law, but when I ask 
what you mean by that, you give more details on this specific proposition. 
I'm asking about the proposition itself though? What Turing universal 
language allows S and K to 'behave', or to exist or to relate to each 
other? It's consistent within a particular frame of generalized truth but 
it has no proprietary traction. It doesn't move eyeballs and cross streets, 
it just equals or increments.

>
>
> > How do these formulas become perception, understanding,   
> > participation, and discovery? 
>
> By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,   
> understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- 
> reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps   
> by the

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

 On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>  >>> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.
>>
>
>  >> Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation
> and an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are
> theories which can be tested and differentiated.
>
>  > Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum
> computer that is conscious.
>

Yes but Deutsch argues, convincingly I thought, that the reason it's so
difficult to test is not the Many World's theory's fault, the reason is
that the conventional view says that conscious observers obey different
laws of physics, Many Worlds says they do not, so to test who's right we
need a mind that uses quantum properties.

In Deutsch's experiment to prove or disprove the existence of many worlds
other than this one a conscious quantum computer shoots electrons at a
metal plate that has 2 small slits in it. It does this one at a time. The
quantum computer has detectors near each slit so it knows which slit the
various electrons went through. The quantum mind now signs a document
saying that it has observed each and every electron and knows what slit
each electron went through. It is very important that the document does not
say which slit the electrons went through, it only says that they went
through one slit only, and the mind has knowledge of which one. Now the
mind uses quantum erasure to completely destroy the memory of what slits
the electrons went through. But all other memories and the document remains
undamaged. And then the electrons continue on their way and hit the
photographic plate. Now develop the photographic plate and look at it, if
you see interference bands then the many world interpretation is correct.
If you do not see interference bands then there are no worlds but this one
and the conventional interpretation is correct.

Deutsch is saying that in the Copenhagen interpretation when the results of
a measurement enters the consciousness of an observer the wave function
collapses, in effect all the universes except one disappear without a trace
so you get no interference. In the many worlds model all the other worlds
will converge back into one universe when the electrons hit the
photographic film because the two universes will no longer be different
(even though they had different histories), but their influence will still
be felt. In the merged universe you'll see indications that the electron
went through slot X only and indications that it went through slot Y only,
and that's what causes interference.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 12 Dec 2012, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Your servitor:
>
> 1) Arithmetic (comp)
>
> :)
>
> Bruno
>
> To which I add:
>
> 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise
> to comp.

OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.

No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for  
granted.

Not at all. The machine existence, and its relative running existence,  
are theorem in the tiny arithmetic.

Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't  
necessary in the first place.

By postulating what we want to explain.

You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.

It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If  
you don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non- 
ordinary state of consciousness which does not commute to other  
beings in public space.

You take the problem, and then say it is the solution. That's the god- 
of-the-gap mistake. We have of course already discuss this. You are  
just saying "don't search". It looks *you* are talking everything for  
granted at the start, in the theory.

With the CTM ( a
better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates
and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its
consciousness) by the only two laws:

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Laws? What are those? How do they govern?

Kxy is a shorhand for ((K x) y), and you are told by the first  
equation above that for all x and y, ((K x) y) = x.

So ((K K) K) = K, or to use again the shorthand (which consists in  
eleimnainating the left parentheses):

KKK = K.

For the same reason

KSK = S
KSS = S
K(S K) K = (S K)
etc.

For example SKK is an identity operator:

SKKx = Kx(Kx), by the second equation,  = x, by the first equation.

S and K behavior is ruled by the two axioms above, and gives already a  
Turing universal language/system/machine.

How do these formulas become perception, understanding,  
participation, and discovery?

By comp, it exist an SK- combinator which emulates my perception,  
understanding, participation and discovery. How? By explorartion, self- 
reference, memorisation, ... that kind of things. Why qualia? Perhaps  
by the fact that combinators, or numbers, machines, programs, when  
looking inward, get unjustifiable bunch of information, including  
unexpressible one.

I know what sense is, because everything that I can experience makes  
some kind of sense with in some sensory experience or is itself a  
sensory experience.

OK. But if we can use the directly obvious at the metalevel, does not  
mean we can't explain that very use from a simpler level.

'Two Laws' is an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no  
presence or effect without a participant who is in some way subject  
to that presence or effect. Being present and subject to an effect  
is sense.

I can't agree more. I appreciate your intuition on the first person.  
What you say here is the base of defining knowledge of p by a belief  
in p in case p is true.  Kp = Bp & p, with p arithmetical, and B too.  
So any particular knowlegde will be arithmetical, despite Kp is not  
definable in one strike, in arithmetic. This entails that no machine  
can know who she "really" is. She can only give a 3p description of  
herself or a summary of it (like an identity card).

or if you prefer:

x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

  x *0 = 0
  x*(y + 1) = x*y + x

By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an
unnecessary magic.

The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove.

Keep is mind that I am a scientist, or if you prefer, I am simple  
minded. I expect a theory to be given by what we assume. The theorems  
will show what is emerging from what we have assumed. If you do not  
add the perceiver, then tell me precisely what you assume, and how you  
derive the perceiver from it.

In such complex subject, it is very useful to put ALL the cards on the  
table. That is why I assume a bit of logic, the natural numbers,  
addition and multiplication, and then, using comp at the metalevel, I  
show that we need nothing more, and that adding anything more is a  
sort of treachery, which can deprive the natural quanta/qualia  
distinction to get derived from self-reference.

You are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a  
doorway to a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of  
counting. Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers.  
Computers require sense.

I continue to be,
Craig

You continue to be a good phenomenologist and a bad metaphysician, imo.

I would not care so much if you didn't become a consciousness- 
eliminativist with respect to material and imma

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 4:03:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > Your servitor: 
> > 
> > 1) Arithmetic (comp) 
> > 
> > :) 
> > 
> > Bruno 
> > 
> > To which I add: 
> > 
> > 0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise   
> > to comp. 
>
>
> OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.   
>

No, it reveals that comp takes the machine that it runs on for granted. 
Comp doesn't need to be avoided when you realize that it isn't necessary in 
the first place.

> You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back.

It isn't a problem, it is the fundamental symmetry of Universe. If you 
don't have a mind-body distinction, then you are in a non-ordinary state of 
consciousness which does not commute to other beings in public space. 

> With the CTM ( a   
> better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates   
> and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its   
> consciousness) by the only two laws: 
>
> Kxy = x 
> Sxyz = xz(yz) 
>

Laws? What are those? How do they govern? How do these formulas become 
perception, understanding, participation, and discovery? I know what sense 
is, because everything that I can experience makes some kind of sense with 
in some sensory experience or is itself a sensory experience. 'Two Laws' is 
an idea which makes intellectual sense but has no presence or effect 
without a participant who is in some way subject to that presence or 
effect. Being present and subject to an effect is sense.

>
> or if you prefer: 
>
> x + 0 = x 
> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 
>
>   x *0 = 0 
>   x*(y + 1) = x*y + x 
>
> By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an   
> unnecessary magic. 
>

The perceiver does not have to be added, it is impossible to remove. You 
are looking at a blackboard in the sky and deciding that it is a doorway to 
a world in which actual experience comes from the idea of counting. 
Counting is an experience. Computing requires computers. Computers require 
sense.

I continue to be,
Craig

>
> I think, 
>
> Regards, 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-12 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 11 Dec 2012, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Your servitor:

1) Arithmetic (comp)

:)

Bruno

To which I add:

0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise  
to comp.



OK. But this is just to make things more complex for avoiding comp.  
You get the whole unsolved mind-body problem back. With the CTM ( a  
better name for comp), that which perceives, understands, participates  
and discovers comp is explained entirely (except 1% of its  
consciousness) by the only two laws:


Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

or if you prefer:

x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

 x *0 = 0
 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x

By adding the perceiver, we put marmalade on the (red) pill, an  
unnecessary magic.


I think,

Regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:40:58 PM UTC-5, William R. Buckley wrote:
>
> Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
> (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from 
> theories already extrapolated. 
>
>  
>
>  
>
> Bruno has it down!
>
>  
>
Agreed, but experiencing a single "reality" is not the same as experiencing 
qualities of realism - which are a significant aspect of our experience and 
one which is not supported by a universe of arithmetic phantoms.
 

>  
>
>  
>

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RE: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread William R. Buckley

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
theories already extrapolated. 

 

 

Bruno has it down!

 

 

 

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/11/2012 9:53 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born 
rule." a
good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to 
make
the probabilities "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike 
me as
any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not 
well
defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse
needed to get one physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is 
actualized
and others aren't.


How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems 
you need
to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
proposed experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate 
spin
state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a 
Stern-Gerlach
apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another 
axis, as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the 
atom is
then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the 
perspective of
an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This 
superposition
travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided 
with two
options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The 
AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach 
predicts
that this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate 
state, with
either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') 
spin. The
Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one 
mind
will record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 
'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which 
result
it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other 
memories
however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be 
in a
definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the 
entrance of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts 
that it
will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with 
equal
probability.



I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information 
(which
I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or 
otherwise)
will leave the atom in an up/down state.


Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?


Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from 
the
world.  Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies 
entanglement
with the world and after that the result can't be quantum erased.


What theory of consciousness are you operating under?  CTM or something else?

I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was which-way
information even though the which-way information was quantum erased.  But 
I find
that doubtful.  And even if it's true, the 'reversal' may bring the atom 
back to 'left'.


That is the proposed result that would prove MWI.


It doesn't prove MWI, it disproves "consciousness causes collapse"; which is a theory no 
one holds anymore.


If the "left" state is restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a 
difference was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then all 
information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two universes recombine 
(the split was undone, even though it should have collapsed because the difference was 
observed).


Only in a Wignerian theory of collapse where 'observed' means by some magic (AI) 
consciousness.






Why do you think

Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/11/2012 9:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.


Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and an AI yields 
different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories which can be tested and 
differentiated.


Except his proposed experiment relies on a hypothetical quantum computer that is 
conscious.  If there is a form of the experiment in which the 'a definite up/down value 
was measured' is recorded objectively but the atom still comes out pointing 'left' then 
I'd say it's a theory; although I don't see how that would necessitate multiple worlds.  
It would just be a refutation of the idea that consciousness collapses the wave function.  
Is there any explicit calculation of how this quantum computer would work, and why it 
would matter whether it was conscious?


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 1:07:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> Your servitor:
>
> 1) Arithmetic (comp)
>
> :)
>
> Bruno
>

To which I add:

0) That which perceives, understands, participates, and gives rise to comp.

:)

Craig 

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/11/2012 9:23 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And 
Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view 
is
that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density 
matrix
(either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) 
then
you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so
predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the 
world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we 
thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The "shut 
up
and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing
questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the 
planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting 
planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible 
worlds
- which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is 
in his
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am 
not
sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will never, Omnès
believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself."  To 
me, it
almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean
more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good 
explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of 
the
MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have 
to be
irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really 
cosmo-solipsism, and
makes QM indeed no more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able to 
give
coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 
'selecting' one
reality - we experience one reality.


But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat 
earth, we see
the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same 
speed, etc.


And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later, more
comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is not 
the same as
'always right'.



Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong


We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's
extrapolations.



(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in
experiment ...).

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
(consciousness,
mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already 
extrapolated.


I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. 
 We
don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that.


We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago.  Would you 
reject the idea that "the universe is a 4-dimensional static structure with no objective 
present" on this basis?


No, but I would expect a theory of conscious experience to include that.

Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:09, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born
rule." a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating
an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic"
in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not
well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the
collapse needed to get one physical reality).

That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.

Only against theories which postulate "objective" indeterminacy
(and what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.

The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.
The interference happens in one world. As Omnes says, you don't
need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have
calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some
state is actualized and others aren't.

That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as
first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,

It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an
ignorance of ensemble samples form,

It is only realist on what our best theories describe. Both QM-Everett
and CTM cannot avoid those "ensembles". And they are not just
ensemble. In QM Everett its is a universal wave, a solution of the SWE
(or Dirac, or deWitt-Wheeler, ...), and in CTM it is a tiny part of
the arithmetical reality (which after Gödels appears as something
*very* big, and structured in many-ways, with many different inside
views.

but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the
two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent

CTM illustrates the contrary. It is made testable, and up to now the
two quantum logic resemble enough. of course it might be a
coïncidence, but it is a strong point, imo, that where the UDA tells a
quantum probability should appear, we get indeed an arithmetical
quantization making something quite quantum like, formally, where we
expected it to be, by UDA.

in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.

Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

I disagree on this, despite most would agree with you. But perhaps not
Everett itself who talks only about a formulation. And indeed
Everett's main contribution in QM is the formulation of a new QM which
is just the old QM without the collapse postulate. Everett explains
why the observers, in any base in which they can have memories, will
believe in probabilities, until they explain this by the wave itself,
and a notion of first person (called Subjective by Everett).
Then my point is just that if CTM is correct, we have to pursue that
move in the whole arithmetic, not just the wave, which is itself
selected through a similar self-selection process. I show that it
works, thanks to incompleteness, which both makes equivalent all the
points of view, p, Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, Bp & Dt & p, yet prevent the
machines to ever know that, which makes the logics behaving very
differently, and giving different views on arithmetical truth, from
arithmetical truth.

Look at the progress in conceptual elegance of those different
theories of reality:

Old QM:

1) Wave
2) collapse
3) Unintelligible theory of mind

Everett:

1) Wave
2) Arithmetic (comp)

Your servitor:

1) Arithmetic (comp)

Bruno

Brent

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 12:48 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>  But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule."
>>> a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
>>> deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
>>> the probabilities "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
>>> improvement.
>>>
>>>
>>>  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
>>> defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
>>> to get one physical reality).
>>>
>>>
>>> That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
>>> interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
>>> interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
>>> 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
>>> That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.
>>>
>>>
>>  How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems
>> you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.
>>
>>  Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for
>> Deutsch's proposed experiment:
>>
>>   In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
>> state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
>> apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
>> either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
>> then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
>> an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
>> travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
>> options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
>> conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
>> this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
>> either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
>> Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
>> record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').
>>
>>  The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
>> entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
>> it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
>> however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
>> definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
>> the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
>> will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
>> probability.
>>
>>
>>  I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information
>> (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or
>> otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state.
>>
>
> Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?
>
>
> Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from
> the world.  Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies
> entanglement with the world and after that the result can't be quantum
> erased.
>

What theory of consciousness are you operating under?  CTM or something
else?


> I know Deutsch supposes a quantum computer AI can 'know' there was
> which-way information even though the which-way information was quantum
> erased.  But I find that doubtful.  And even if it's true, the 'reversal'
> may bring the atom back to 'left'.
>

That is the proposed result that would prove MWI.  If the "left" state is
restored always then the universe never collapsed, it split a difference
was observed, and a record of observing that difference was stored, then
all information pertaining to the result is erased such that the two
universes recombine (the split was undone, even though it should have
collapsed because the difference was observed).


>
>
>  Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the
> result and then have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?
>
>
> Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical.  Consciousness
> needs stable memory and it needs to interact with its environment -
> together I think that implies it must be essentially classical as a
> computer.
>

In this case it has stable memory, and is able to interact with its
environment, but then all traces of its memory of the which-way result are
erased.  We operate with unstable memories and forget things, and yet are
still conscious.


> That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft repeated assertion that he
> has proven that

Re: Against Mechanism

On 11 Dec 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among
working
physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His
view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the
the density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or
just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.
QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is
all you can ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding
the world? I would argue that science would not progress so
far as it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all
and end all of science. The "shut up and calculate" mindset
can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is
the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do
the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the
sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be
probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree
with him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in
our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this
statement is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s
says: "We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense
interpretation of quantum law itself." To me, it almost seems
as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean
more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding
good explanations.

Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or
chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and
select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM
indeed no more rational at all.

What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means
'being able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good
coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one
reality.

But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a
flat earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need
of force to keep the same speed, etc.

And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that
later, more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.
Rational is not the same as 'always right'.

OK. But I was pointing of the fact that there was a pattern in the
mistake, which consists in extrapolating from our experience. Progress
along the path Galileo, Einstein, Everett always come from a better
distinction between what is, and how it can appear to us.
Then in the search of a TOE, we need to use coherent reasons, but we
need also a coherent big picture.

I agree I tend to use "rational" is an unusually restricted sense:
going from "the earth look flat" to the "earth looks round" is
rational. Going from "the earth looks flat" to "the earth *is* round"
is irrational.

Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong

We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about
it's extrapolations.

OK. That is what I meant.

(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention
experience in experiment ...).

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and
from theories already extrapolated.

I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with
experience. We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must
include that.

But we do experience many worlds. We see those interference that we
can see, and without collapse, that we don't see, this is a sort of
experiencing the many worlds. Like we do experience the roundness of
the earth, through travel, media, pictures, etc. If not, we never
experience anything physical to start with. We are just more and more
conscious of the assumptions we make.

Being rational we prefer to explain the complex from the simple than
the simple from the complex. But the understanding of t

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, December 11, 2012 12:23:08 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb 
> > wrote:
>
>>  On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb 
>>> > wrote:
>>>
  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 

  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
> Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),
>  

  That's not an interpretation at all.

  
 Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
 that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
 (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then 
 you 
 have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so 
 predicting 
 probabilities is all you can ask of it.

  
>>> Is science just about its applications or about understanding the 
>>> world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if 
>>> we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The 
>>> "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask 
>>> embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.
>>>
>>> Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the 
>>> planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
>>> Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting 
>>> planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!
>>>
>>> Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.
>>>  
>>>
>>>  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be 
>>> probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible 
>>> worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.
>>>
>>>  
>> It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is 
>> in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  
>> I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary 
>> source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We 
>> will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum 
>> law itself."  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying 
>> to find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is 
>> about finding good explanations.
>>  
>>
>>  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and 
>> defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he 
>> insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This 
>> is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.
>>  
>>
>> What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able 
>> to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 
>> 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.
>>  
>>
>>  But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat 
>> earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to 
>> keep the same speed, etc. 
>>  
>>
>> And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later, 
>> more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is 
>> not the same as 'always right'.
>>
>>
>>  Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong 
>>  
>>
>> We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's 
>> extrapolations.
>>
>>
>>  (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention 
>> experience in experiment ...).
>>
>>  Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something 
>> (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from 
>> theories already extrapolated.
>>  
>>
>> I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with 
>> experience.  We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include 
>> that.
>>
>
> We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes 
> ago.  Would you reject the idea that "the universe is a 4-dimensional 
> static structure with no objective present" on this basis?
>

We know by special relativity that there is no objective present. 
Simultaneity is relative.

We do typically experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago, unless we 
have Dementia or some other physiological condition which inhibits memory.

The idea that the ordinary world which we experience of visible, tangible 
phenomena is an unexplained side-effect of an invisible, intangible set of 
formulas is in no way an improvement on even Cartesian dualism. Descartes, 
flawed as he was, was light years ahead of all of QM and Information 
Science in terms of explainin

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:09 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a
> good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
> deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
> the probabilities "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
> improvement.
>
>
>  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
> defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
> to get one physical reality).
>
>
> That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.
>
>
>  Only against theories which postulate "objective" indeterminacy (and
> what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.
>
>
>
>  The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
> interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
> 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
> That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.
>
>
>  That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first
> person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,
>
>
> It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an
> ignorance of ensemble samples form, but with not possible way of resolving
> the ignorance, so that the two 'explanations' are strictly equivalent
>
>
>
>  in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.
>
>
> Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.
>

Not quite.  Deutsch's proposed experiment with reversible computation and
an AI yields different results for the CI and MWI, thus they are theories
which can be tested and differentiated.

"Talking about many worlds as a interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is like
talking about dinosaurs as an interpretation of the fossil record." --
David Deutsch

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-11 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Dec 11, 2012 at 11:05 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

>>>
>>>  That's not an interpretation at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
>>> that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
>>> (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
>>> have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
>>> probabilities is all you can ask of it.
>>>
>>>
>> Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
>> I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
>> thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
>> "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask
>> embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.
>>
>> Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
>> planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
>> Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
>> motion, so shut up and calculate!
>>
>> Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.
>>
>>
>>  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
>> probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
>> worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.
>>
>>
> It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
> in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
> I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
> source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will
> never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
> itself."  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
> find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is
> about finding good explanations.
>
>
>  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense
> of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that
> we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really
> cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.
>
>
> What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able
> to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for
> 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.
>
>
>  But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat
> earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to
> keep the same speed, etc.
>
>
> And all those inferences were perfectly rational.  The fact that later,
> more comprehensive theories were found doesn't change that.   Rational is
> not the same as 'always right'.
>
>
>  Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong
>
>
> We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's
> extrapolations.
>
>
>  (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention
> experience in experiment ...).
>
>  Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
> (consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
> theories already extrapolated.
>
>
> I agree.  But the model of reality we build should comport with
> experience.  We don't experience many worlds, so a valid model must include
> that.
>

We don't (in this present) experience our conscious state of 5 minutes ago.
 Would you reject the idea that "the universe is a 4-dimensional static
structure with no objective present" on this basis?

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/11/2012 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a good 
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  
But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities 
"deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined 
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one 
physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


Only against theories which postulate "objective" indeterminacy (and what is that?) to 
avoid a simpler theory.




The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference 
happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept 
that you have calculated probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is 
actualized and others aren't.


That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as first person 
indeterminacy explains their appearance completely,


It only 'explains' it by recasting the inherent probability into an ignorance of ensemble 
samples form, but with not possible way of resolving the ignorance, so that the two 
'explanations' are strictly equivalent




in simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Everett's QM is not a theory; it's just an interpretations.

Brent




Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Against Mechanism

On 12/11/2012 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is
that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
(either
by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The "shut up
and
calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions",
it
is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be probabilistic?
So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to

mimic a probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure
how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will never, Omnès believes,
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself." To me, it almost seems as
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more towards David
Deutsch who says science is about finding good explanations.

Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI,
except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be
irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes
QM indeed no more rational at all.

What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give
coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one
reality - we experience one reality.

But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat earth, we see the
Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force to keep the same speed, etc.

And all those inferences were perfectly rational. The fact that later, more comprehensive
theories were found doesn't change that. Rational is not the same as 'always right'.

Usually when we refer to experience we are wrong

We're not wrong about the experience, although we may be wrong about it's
extrapolations.

(and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot mention experience in experiment
...).

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something (consciousness, mainly)
and we extrapolate reality from that, and from theories already extrapolated.

I agree. But the model of reality we build should comport with experience. We don't
experience many worlds, so a valid model must include that.

Brent

Re: Against Mechanism

On 10 Dec 2012, at 19:54, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:

> From whose perspective is there a single unique result?

From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike  
experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it  
hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always  
see a single unique result. After the experiment I, the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, can always say the photon hit right there on  
the plate and it did not hit way over there on the other side of the  
plate.

The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely  
but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if  
the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the  
plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's  
experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked?  Should  
the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow man or  
both? If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing.

 > From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a  
single outcome.

Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get  
the job.

  >Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment  
but not for the 2-slit experiment.

No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing, I the  
simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a equal  
right to call themselves Bruno always check both the Washington box  
and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned. And I don't care  
what God sees because this simple non-godlike experimenter does not  
believe in God.

You need only to believe that both the W-man and the M-man have a  
first person experience. And both confirms that sometimes they see W,  
sometimes they see M, and never both.

>> it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the  
square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at  
a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of  
finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This  
prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many  
many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter.

> But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of  
Bruno's first person indeterminacy

No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by  
actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different  
probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics  
predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's  
prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of  
what "you" means, the experiment produces no result.

> In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very  
big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable.

It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact  
copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far  
away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if  
I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years  
to do it.  Due to the expansion of the universe that other John  
Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light  
away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is  
moving away even faster every day.

> If I remember correctly you are a Platonist.

I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't  
understand why people keep saying I have a big head.

 > Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns  
complex enough to be conscious?

You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be  
implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is  
as good as another so its the information that's important.

>  Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence against the CTM.

It took me long time to figure out that acronym and I'm still not  
sure, I considered Computational Turing Machine but that seemed  
redundant, then with Google's help I thought about Central Texas  
Mountaineers and Children's Theater of Madison and Classic Tile and  
Mosaic, now my best guess is Computer Theory of Mind but I could be  
wrong.

> Say there are 2 computers and both are running the Microsoft Word  
program. I tell you that I am about to type the word "red" into one  
computer and the word "green" into the other computer. The two  
computers are never connected so  each computer outputs a single  
definite result. Do you agree that there is a 100% chance that  
Microsoft Word will input the word "red" from a keyboard and display  
those ASCII characters on a screen and a 100% chance that Microsoft  
Word will input the word "green" from a keyboard and display those  
ASCII characters on a screen?

> Yes I do.  But that explains things from the God's-eye view.

Unfortunately I am

Re: Against Mechanism



On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born  
rule." a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better  
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But simply postulating an  
ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic" in  
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not  
well defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the  
collapse needed to get one physical reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.


Only against theories which postulate "objective" indeterminacy (and  
what is that?) to avoid a simpler theory.




The interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.   
The interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't  
need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated  
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is  
actualized and others aren't.


That sort of probability seems quite magic to me. And useless, as  
first person indeterminacy explains their appearance completely, in  
simpler theories, like the CTM or Everett QM.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

On 10 Dec 2012, at 17:25, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And
Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His
view is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the
density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just
assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a
probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can
ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding the
world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as
it has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end
all of science. The "shut up and calculate" mindset can be
translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the
antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do
the planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be
probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our
understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement
is, since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s
says: "We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense
interpretation of quantum law itself." To me, it almost seems as
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer. I lean more
towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good
explanations.

Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter,
he insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one
reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no
more rational at all.

What's not rational about it? I think 'rational' just means 'being
able to give coherent reasons'. There's a perfectly good coherent
reason for 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.

But there is no reason to extrapolate from this. We experience a flat
earth, we see the Sun turning around Earth, we feel the need of force
to keep the same speed, etc. Usually when we refer to experience we
are wrong (and from this some extrapolate wrongly that we cannot
mention experience in experiment ...).

Also, we do not experience a reality. We experience something
(consciousness, mainly) and we extrapolate reality from that, and from
theories already extrapolated.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

On 12/10/2012 10:01 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule."
a good
explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
deterministic
one. But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the
probabilities
"deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
defined
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to
get one
physical reality).

That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The
interference is
inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens
in one
world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to
accept that
you have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means -
some state
is actualized and others aren't.

How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you
need to
give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
proposed
experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
state in
one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus which
has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin
'up' or
spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is then in a
superposition
of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of an observer who has
not yet
become entangled with it. This superposition travels to the AI's
artificial
'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two options, it may be detected
as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's conscious mind then records
the
result. The collapse approach predicts that this will cause the atom to
collapse into one determinate state, with either a determinate 'up' or
'down'
(but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett approach predicts that
the mind
will branch into two, one mind will record up and one down (but neither
will
record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance
to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it
recorded.
This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories however,
including
the memory that they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a
'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach
apparatus
then the collapse approach predicts that it will be detected as being
in either
a 'left' or 'right' state with equal probability.

I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information
(which I
think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise)
will
leave the atom in an up/down state.

Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?

Quantum erasure requires that the which-way information be eliminated from the world.
Once an AI consciousness gets the result I think that implies entanglement with the world
and after that the result can't be quantum erased. I know Deutsch supposes a quantum
computer AI can 'know' there was which-way information even though the which-way
information was quantum erased. But I find that doubtful. And even if it's true, the
'reversal' may bring the atom back to 'left'.

Why do you think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then have
that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?

Because I think consciousness must be quasi-classical. Consciousness needs stable memory
and it needs to interact with its environment - together I think that implies it must be
essentially classical as a computer. That's one of my reservations about Bruno's oft
repeated assertion that he has proven that matter doesn't exist. When pressed he allows
that it may exist, but only derivatively within the computations of the UD. But it seems
to me likely that it, or something very like it, must exist (derivatively of not) in order
that consciousness exist; that 'matter' is necessary for consciousness of a human kind to
exist.

You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is
not the
same as Omnes epistemic collapse.

I am sorry. I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the distinction
is.

Omnes looks at it as a mathematical operation used in predicting experimental results.

Re: Against Mechanism

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 1:35 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>  But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule."
>> a good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
>> deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
>> the probabilities "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
>> improvement.
>>
>>
>>  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
>> defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
>> to get one physical reality).
>>
>>
>> That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
>> interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
>> interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
>> 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
>> That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.
>>
>>
>  How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems
> you need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.
>
>  Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
> proposed experiment:
>
>   In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
> state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
> apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
> either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
> then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
> an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
> travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
> options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
> conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
> this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
> either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
> Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
> record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').
>
>  The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
> entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
> it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
> however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
> definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
> the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
> will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
> probability.
>
>
> I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information
> (which I think is actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or
> otherwise) will leave the atom in an up/down state.
>

Isn't that exactly what the quantum erasure experiment shows?  Why do you
think it is impossible for a conscious process learn the result and then
have that result erased as in the quantum eraser experiment?



> You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse is
> not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse.
>
>
I am sorry.  I don't feel I have a good understanding of what the
distinction is.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

On Dec 10, 2012, at 12:54 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:

> From whose perspective is there a single unique result?

From my perspective! Whenever I, the simple non-godlike  
experimenter, send a photon (or electron) through 2 slits and it  
hits a photographic I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, always  
see a single unique result.

As do the duplicates.

After the experiment I, the simple non-godlike experimenter, can  
always say the photon hit right there on the plate and it did not  
hit way over there on the other side of the plate.

And each duplicate can say I ended up here and not there.

The outcome of the 2 slit experiment cannot be predicted precisely  
but once it is performed and the experimenter knows for certain if  
the left hand side of the plate box or the right hand side of the  
plate box should be checked in the lab notebook. After Bruno's  
experiment should the Washington or Moscow box be checked?

It depends which duplicate you are.

  Should the experimenter believe the Washington man or the Moscow  
man or both?

You forget, the experimenter is the one duplicated.  He listens only  
to his local self, after the duplication.

Just as you check the box corresponding to where the photon was  
observed in your local history.

If it's both then the experimenter has learned nothing.

It's not, each duplicate has only one local self to listen to.

 > From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a  
single outcome.

Perhaps, but I am not God; I applied but unfortunately did not get  
the job.

Maybe you did but forgot.

  >Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment  
but not for the 2-slit experiment.

No. In Bruno's experiment from my perspective, I the simple non- 
godlike experimenter, always see exactly the same thing,

The experimenter is duplicated.  Sometimes he finds himself in Moscow  
other times Washington.

I the simple non-godlike experimenter always see 2 people who have a  
equal right to call themselves Bruno always check both the  
Washington box and the Moscow box and thus nothing is learned.

That's the third person omniscient view.  Pretend there is only one  
person in the world, John Clark, and he is duplicated.  What would  
that experience seem like?

Could you rule out whether you were randomly transported to either  
Washington or Moscow or if you were duplicated to both (without  
looking for your duplicate at the other location)?

And I don't care what God sees because this simple non-godlike  
experimenter does not believe in God.

>> it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the  
square of the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at  
a point on a photographic plate will be the classical probability of  
finding the photon at that point when you develop the plate. This  
prediction of Quantum Mechanics has been proven to be correct many  
many times and according to SUAC that's the end of the matter.

> But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of  
Bruno's first person indeterminacy

No it is not. Quantum Mechanics could have been disproved by  
actually performing the 2 slit experiment and obtaining a different  
probability distribution, but as it happens Quantum Mechanics  
predicted correctly. However there is no way to check Bruno's  
prediction about which city you will see due to the inconsistency of  
what "you" means, the experiment produces no result.

> In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very  
big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable.

It doesn't matter. If our universe is big enough to have a exact  
copy of me in the way that Tegmark talks about then he is so far  
away that I can never meet him or detect him in any way, not even if  
I had a infinite (and I DON'T just mean very large) number of years  
to do it.  Due to the expansion of the universe that other John  
Clark is already moving much much faster than the speed of light  
away from me, and due to the acceleration of the universe he is  
moving away even faster every day.

So far away duplication leads to definite results?  That's good you  
think so.  Uue those two far away locations (instead of W and M) and  
you make step 3 work for yourself.  Now you can go on to step 4.

> If I remember correctly you are a Platonist.

I prefer to think of Plato as being a Clarkist, and I don't  
understand why people keep saying I have a big head.

 > Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns  
complex enough to be conscious?

You can't fly to Tokyo on the blueprints of a 747 they need to be  
implemented with matter, but matter is generic, one aluminum atom is  
as good as another so its the information that's important.

And you proved matter is something not found in mathematics how?

>  Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence against the CTM.

It took me long

Re: Against Mechanism

On 12/10/2012 10:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a
good
explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.
But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities

"deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
defined
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get
one
physical reality).

That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories. The
interference is
inherent in the complex Hilbert space states. The interference happens in
one
world. As Omnes says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept
that you
have calculated probabilities. That's what probability means - some state
is
actualized and others aren't.

How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse? It seems you need to give
up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's proposed
experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
state in one
axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which
has the
possibility of measuring it in another axis, as either spin 'up' or spin
'down' in
this case. This means that the atom is then in a superposition of 'up' and
'down'
states from the perspective of an observer who has not yet become entangled
with it.
This superposition travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is
provided
with two options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'.
The AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
this
will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with either a
determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The Everett
approach
predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will record up and
one down
(but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance to the
Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result it recorded. This
process
does not erase any of the AI's other memories however, including the memory
that
they did record the atom to be in a definite state. If a 'left-right'
detector was
placed at the entrance of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse
approach
predicts that it will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right'
state with
equal probability.

I think it is wrong in saying that the erasure of which-way information (which I think is
actually impossible for a consciousness, artificial or otherwise) will leave the atom in
an up/down state. You keep asking me about 'collapse', but Copenhagen's physical collapse
is not the same as Omnes epistemic collapse.

Brent

If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in the same state
that it
was in before the measurement, it will still have a 'left' spin.

--- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html

Jason
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Re: Against Mechanism

On 12/10/2012 5:41 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And
Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view
is that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
(either
by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
have
predicted probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so
predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding the
world? I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science. The "shut
up and
calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing
questions", it
is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting
planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be
probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
worlds -
which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is
in his
belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am
not sure
how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will never, Omnès
believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself." To
me, it
almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.

Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, "We will never find a common sense
interpretation of
the sphericity of the Earth." He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we
changed
'common sense'.

I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJA&t=1m19s

I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good
explanations.

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a
good
explanation.

It is worse than that. From:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/

"All right," says Nohr. He sighs. "Look, if this theory of yours were actually true—if
whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously vanished—it would be... let's
see. The only law in all of quantum mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary,
non-differentiable and discontinuous. It would prevent physics from evolving locally,
with each piece only looking at its immediate neighbors. Your 'collapse' would be the
only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis and a preferred
space of simultaneity. Collapse would be the only phenomenon in all of physics that
violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's Theorem, and Special Relativity. In your original
version, collapse would also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was
inherently mental. Have I left anything out?"

The page also asks:

But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized immediately
following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s. And suppose that no one had
proposed collapse theories until 1957. Would decoherence now be steadily declining in
popularity, while collapse theories were slowly gaining steam?

I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But
simply
postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic"
in
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain no mention
of collapse or only applying only at certain scales.

No it doesn't. It is no more than decoherence, which means that in a selected basis the
reduced density matrix becomes approximately diagonal. At that point Everett says the
different diagonal eigenvalues are the probabilities of projections onto orthogonal
subspaces, w

Re: Against Mechanism

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:30 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a
> good explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a
> deterministic one.  But simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make
> the probabilities "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any
> improvement.
>
>
>  It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
> defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed
> to get one physical reality).
>
>
> That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The
> interference is inherent in the complex Hilbert space states.  The
> interference happens in one world.  As Omnes says, you don't need
> 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated probabilities.
> That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.
>
>
How does Omnes explain the EPR experiment without collapse?  It seems you
need to give up not only determinism, but also locality.

Also, what do you think Omnes would predict as the outcome for Deutsch's
proposed experiment:

In Deutsch's thought experiment, an atom, which has a determinate spin
state in one axis, 'left' for example, is passed through a Stern-Gerlach
apparatus which has the possibility of measuring it in another axis, as
either spin 'up' or spin 'down' in this case. This means that the atom is
then in a superposition of 'up' and 'down' states from the perspective of
an observer who has not yet become entangled with it. This superposition
travels to the AI's artificial 'sense organ'. Here it is provided with two
options, it may be detected as either spin 'up' or spin 'down'. The AI's
conscious mind then records the result. The collapse approach predicts that
this will cause the atom to collapse into one determinate state, with
either a determinate 'up' or 'down' (but not 'left' or 'right') spin. The
Everett approach predicts that the mind will branch into two, one mind will
record up and one down (but neither will record 'left' or 'right').

The whole process is then reversed so that the atom emerges from the
entrance to the Stern-Gerlach apparatus and the mind forgets which result
it recorded. This process does not erase any of the AI's other memories
however, including the memory that they did record the atom to be in a
definite state. If a 'left-right' detector was placed at the entrance of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus then the collapse approach predicts that it
will be detected as being in either a 'left' or 'right' state with equal
probability. If the Everett approach is correct then the atom will be in
the same state that it was in before the measurement, it will still have a
'left' spin.

  --- http://www.thestargarden.co.uk/EvidenceOfParallelWorlds.html

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 10:25 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

>>>
>>>  That's not an interpretation at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
>>> that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
>>> (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
>>> have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
>>> probabilities is all you can ask of it.
>>>
>>>
>> Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
>> I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
>> thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
>> "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask
>> embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.
>>
>> Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
>> planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
>> Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
>> motion, so shut up and calculate!
>>
>> Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.
>>
>>
>>  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
>> probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
>> worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.
>>
>>
> It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
> in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
> I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
> source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will
> never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
> itself."  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
> find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is
> about finding good explanations.
>
>
>  Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense
> of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that
> we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality. This is really
> cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational at all.
>
>
> What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able
> to give coherent reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for
> 'selecting' one reality - we experience one reality.
>
>
It is as rational as clinging to geocentric theories on the basis that we
don't feel the Earth moving when Newtonian mechanics fully explains not
only the motions of the planets but also why we don't feel the Earth move.

Everett argued this point best
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/manyworlds/orig-02.html :

A crucial point in deciding on a theory is that one does not accept or
reject the theory on the basis of whether the basic world picture it
presents is compatible with everyday experience. Rather, one accepts or
rejects on the basis of whether or not the experience which is predicted by
the theory is in accord with actual experience.

Let me clarify this point. One of the basic criticisms leveled against the
Copernican theory was that "the mobility of the earth as a real physical
fact is incompatible with the common sense interpretation of nature." In
other words, as any fool can plainly see the earth doesn't really move
because we don't experience any motion. However, a theory which involves
the motion of the earth is not difficult to swallow if it is a complete
enough theory that one can also deduce that no motion will be felt by the
earth's inhabitants (as was possible with Newtonian physics). Thus, in
order to decide whether or not a theory contradicts our experience, it is
necessary to see what the theory itself predicts our experience will be.

Now in your letter you say, "the trajectory of the memory configuration of
a real physical observer, on the other hand, does not branch. I can testify
to this from personal introspection, as can you. I simply do not branch." I
can't resist asking: Do you feel the motion of the earth?

In another place: "...Everett's theory contains all possible branches in it
at the same time. In the real physical world we must be content with just
one branch. Everett's world and the real physical world are therefore not
isomorphic." Yet another: "But the real world does not branch, and therein
lies the flaw in Everett's scheme."

I must confess that I do not see this "branching process" as the "vast
contradiction" that you do. The theo

Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/10/2012 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a good 
explanation.  I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But 
simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic" in 
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.


It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well defined 
(apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse needed to get one physical 
reality).


That sounds like prejudice against probabilistic theories.  The interference is inherent 
in the complex Hilbert space states.  The interference happens in one world.  As Omnes 
says, you don't need 'collapse' you just need to accept that you have calculated 
probabilities.  That's what probability means - some state is actualized and others aren't.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/10/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics
among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is 
that
once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix 
(either by
eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
probabilities is all you can ask of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I 
would
argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought 
finding the
equation was the be all and end all of science.  The "shut up and calculate"
mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the
antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets 
merely
appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary 
motion,
so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be 
probabilistic?  So
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to 
mimic a
probabilistic world.


It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is in his belief 
that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.  I am not sure how 
accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will never, Omnès believes, 
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself."  To me, it almost seems as 
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more towards David Deutsch 
who says science is about finding good explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and defense of the MWI, 
except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he insist that we have to be irrational, 
in fine, and select one reality. This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no 
more rational at all.


What's not rational about it?  I think 'rational' just means 'being able to give coherent 
reasons'.  There's a perfectly good coherent reason for 'selecting' one reality - we 
experience one reality.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:32 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
 Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

>>>
>>>  That's not an interpretation at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is
>>> that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix
>>> (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you
>>> have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
>>> probabilities is all you can ask of it.
>>>
>>>
>> Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?
>> I would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we
>> thought finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The
>> "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask
>> embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.
>>
>> Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
>> planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
>> Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
>> motion, so shut up and calculate!
>>
>> Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.
>>
>>
>>  So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be
>> probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible
>> worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.
>>
>>
> It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with him is
> in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it.
> I am not sure how accurate this statement is, since it is a secondary
> source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will
> never, Omnès believes, find a common sense interpretation of quantum law
> itself."  To me, it almost seems as if he says it is not worth trying to
> find an answer.
>
>
> Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, "We will never find a common sense
> interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth."  He'd have been right; we
> didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.
>
>
I don't know, I think Sagan's explanation fits most people's common sense:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jwr8CLX3NJA&t=1m19s

>
>  I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good
> explanations.
>
>
> But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a
> good explanation.
>

It is worse than that.  From:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/

"All right," says Nohr.  He sighs.  "Look, if this theory of yours were
actually true—if whole sections of the wavefunction just instantaneously
vanished—it would be... let's see.  The only law in all of quantum
mechanics that is non-linear, non-unitary, non-differentiable and
discontinuous.  It would prevent physics from evolving locally, with each
piece only looking at its immediate neighbors.  Your 'collapse' would be
the only fundamental phenomenon in all of physics with a preferred basis
and a preferred space of simultaneity.  Collapse would be the only
phenomenon in all of physics that violates CPT symmetry, Liouville's
Theorem, and Special Relativity.  In your original version, collapse would
also have been the only phenomenon in all of physics that was inherently
mental.  Have I left anything out?"

The page also asks:

But suppose that decoherence and macroscopic decoherence had been realized
immediately following the discovery of entanglement, in the 1920s.  And
suppose that no one had proposed collapse theories until 1957.  Would
decoherence now be steadily declining in popularity, while collapse
theories were slowly gaining steam?

> I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one.  But
> simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities
> "deterministic" in arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.
>

MWI follows directly from a literal reading of the equations, which contain
no mention of collapse or only applying only at certain scales.  Even
better, the Born rule falls out as Everett himself noticed.  If anyone is
performing a stretch (postulating new things), it is those in the collapse
camp who add new conjectures to the theory in an unjustified effort to
preserve the notion of a single universe.  The theory itself explains why
the other universes are not observed, so pretending we have to augment the
theory by adding new postulates (observers, collapse, born rule) to make it
agree with our observations is somewhat absurd.

In the history of science efforts to keep humanity on the center stage seem
to always fail ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 10 Dec 2012, at 07:32, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view
is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the
density matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just
assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities. QM is a
probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can
ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding the
world? I would argue that science would not progress so far as it
has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all
of science. The "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated
as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of
scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the
planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be
probabilistic? So instead there must be infinitely many
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our
understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate this statement is,
since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s
says: "We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense
interpretation of quantum law itself." To me, it almost seems as
if he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.

Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, "We will never find a common sense
interpretation of the sphericity of the Earth." He'd have been
right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.

I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding
good explanations.

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born
rule." a good explanation. I'm all for finding a better
explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But simply postulating an
ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic" in
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

It is, as it explains interference, without adding something not well
defined (apparatus, observer) not obeying QM (like with the collapse
needed to get one physical reality).

Bruno

Brent
"As to the fable that there are Antipodes, that is to say,
men on the opposite side of the earth where the sun rises
when it sets to us, men who walk with their feet opposite
ours, that is on no ground credible. Even if some unknown
landmass is there, and not just ocean, "there was only one
pair of original ancestors, and it is inconceivable that
such distant regions should have been peopled by Adam's
descendants."
--- St. Augustine

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 10 Dec 2012, at 02:03, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum  
Mechanics among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view  
is that once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density  
matrix (either by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per  
Bohr) then you have predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic  
theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask of it.



Is science just about its applications or about understanding the  
world?  I would argue that science would not progress so far as it  
has if we thought finding the equation was the be all and end all  
of science.  The "shut up and calculate" mindset can be translated  
as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of  
scientific thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the  
planets merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting  
planetary motion, so shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be  
probabilistic?  So instead there must be infinitely many  
inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a probabilistic world.



It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory.  Where I disagree with  
him is in his belief that we can never go beyond that in our  
understanding of it.  I am not sure how accurate this statement is,  
since it is a secondary source, but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s 
 says: "We will never, Omnès believes, find a common sense  
interpretation of quantum law itself."  To me, it almost seems as if  
he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.  I lean more  
towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good  
explanations.


Omnes is very special. His many books gives the best account and  
defense of the MWI, except that in the last paragraph, or chapter, he  
insist that we have to be irrational, in fine, and select one reality.  
This is really cosmo-solipsism, and makes QM indeed no more rational  
at all.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Against Mechanism

On 12/9/2012 5:03 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 6:51 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics
among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),

That's not an interpretation at all.

Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes. His view is
that once
you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by
eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
predicted
probabilities. QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
probabilities is
all you can ask of it.

Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world? I
would
argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought
finding the
equation was the be all and end all of science. The "shut up and calculate"
mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the
antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets
merely
appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
motion,
so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

So what's your objection to Omnes? That the world just can't be
probabilistic? So
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to
mimic a
probabilistic world.

It is fine if QM is a probabilistic theory. Where I disagree with him is in his belief
that we can never go beyond that in our understanding of it. I am not sure how accurate
this statement is, since it is a secondary source, but
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roland_Omn%C3%A8s says: "We will never, Omnès believes,
find a common sense interpretation of quantum law itself." To me, it almost seems as if
he says it is not worth trying to find an answer.

Suppose he'd said in 1400CE, "We will never find a common sense interpretation of the
sphericity of the Earth." He'd have been right; we didn't, instead we changed 'common sense'.

I lean more towards David Deutsch who says science is about finding good
explanations.

But why isn't "It's a probabilistic world and it obeys the Born rule." a good
explanation. I'm all for finding a better explanation, i.e. a deterministic one. But
simply postulating an ensemble of worlds to make the probabilities "deterministic" in
arbitrary way doesn't strike me as any improvement.

Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/9/2012 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics among
working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),


That's not an interpretation at all.


Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is that 
once you
can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either by 
eigenselection,
dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have predicted 
probabilities.  QM
is a probabilistic theory - so predicting probabilities is all you can ask 
of it.


Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I would argue 
that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought finding the equation was 
the be all and end all of science.  The "shut up and calculate" mindset can be 
translated as "don't ask embarrassing questions", it is the antithesis of scientific 
thinking.


Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets merely appear 
to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary motion, so 
shut up and calculate!


Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.


So what's your objection to Omnes?  That the world just can't be probabilistic?  So 
instead there must be infinitely many inaccessible worlds - which happen to mimic a 
probabilistic world.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-12-09 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>  And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
>> among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate),
>>
>
>  That's not an interpretation at all.
>
>
> Well for a more philosophical statement of it see Omnes.  His view is that
> once you can explain the diagonalization of the the density matrix (either
> by eigenselection, dechoherence, or just assumed per Bohr) then you have
> predicted probabilities.  QM is a probabilistic theory - so predicting
> probabilities is all you can ask of it.
>
>
Is science just about its applications or about understanding the world?  I
would argue that science would not progress so far as it has if we thought
finding the equation was the be all and end all of science.  The "shut up
and calculate" mindset can be translated as "don't ask embarrassing
questions", it is the antithesis of scientific thinking.

Student in the 1500s: Does the earth move about the sun, or do the planets
merely appear to move as if earth moved about the sun?
Professor in the 1500s: We have all the formulas for predicting planetary
motion, so shut up and calculate!

Fortunately, Copernicus wasn't satisfied with that answer.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism


On 12/9/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


This reminded me a bit of "The Presumptuous Philosopher" thought experiment:


It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of 
everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using 
considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very,  very

big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in  
the
cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and  
there
are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry  
considerations
seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The  physicists 
are
planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify  one of the 
theories.
Enter the presumptuous philosopher: "Hey guys, it is  completely 
unnecessary for you
to do the experiment, because I can already show  to you that T2 is about a 
trillion
times more likely to be true than T1  (whereupon the philosopher runs the 
God’s Coin
Toss thought experiment and  explains Model 3)!"

One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding 
the
presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution.



Which is why the anthropic principle is useless until you have something else determine 
the ontology.


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism