Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

As to my grasp of the UDA I think I understood it at one time well 
enough for my purpose but that will become clearer as I progress 
through my model.   There are not too many more steps.

Examining the complete list of possible properties of objects we 
should find "Empty of all information".

This would on a sub list.   It would from at least part of the sub 
list that could be assigned the name "The Nothing" or just "Nothing".

The Nothing would also be incomplete if there was a meaningful 
question it must answer.  The question would be "Can The Nothing 
sustain its of property of being empty of information?"  It can not 
answer this question so it is incomplete.  However, it must answer 
this question so its incompleteness is unstable.  It must eventually 
eat its way into the rest of the list so to speak - eventually having 
an countably infinite number of properties.  This is the source of my 
model's dynamic.

The list itself has properties and these are on a sub list.

We actually do not need the list if we allow for simplicity that the 
objects it and its sub lists define are themselves the sufficient 
elements of the model.  The list is then an object and contains 
itself.  It is infinitely nested.  Each nesting has its unstably 
incomplete Nothing.  An infinite nesting of dynamic potential.

If the list is complete which seems certain then it should be [I 
believe] inconsistent [will answer all questions all ways] which we 
have touched on before.  The inconsistency is inherited by the 
dynamic so the dynamic  has a random content.

All levels of randomness of trips to completeness are allowed.

A UD trace if I understand it correctly would be equivalent to a 
Nothing on a reasonably monotonic trip to completeness.

Yours

Hal Ruhl



At 12:10 PM 2/20/2007, you wrote:

>Hi Hal,
>
>You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no
>theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then
>"the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing
>Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or
>variants, testable.
>
>I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just
>listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics
>with empirical physics.
>
>Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.
>
>Regards,
>
>Bruno


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John Mikes]

Thanks, Bruno, lots of remarkable notions in your remarks (I mean: I can
write remarks to them 0 sorry for the pun). Let me interject in Italics
below.
John

On 2/5/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
>
> Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :
>
> > Stathis, Bruno,
> >
> >  This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a
> > way to
> >  'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without
> > the
> >  'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?
>
>
> I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform
> can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about
> them.


Before discussing, I want to 'understand' - definitely without first
'accepting' the platform I may discuss. One has to be able to express ideas
for people who do not know them in advance.

>  There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and
> > over again?, BUT
> >  at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
> > another vista' ,
> >  like
> >
> >  (absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the
> > figment that
> >   if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?
>
>
> This is inductive inference, not probability.


There are probability-discussions going on on  2 lists. aLL FALL into your
term. Do you have an example for probability (as pointed out from a
muiltitude of possible occurrences)?

> combined with
> >   the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited
> > group the version
> >   'A' models and assuming its 'probability'?
>
>
> That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have
> to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the
> sake of some argument.


I do not accept 'axioms', they are postulated to make a theoretical position
feasible. I will come back to this at your 'numbers'.

>
> >  observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
> > time-concept
> >   in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying
> > 'conscious')
>
>
> The expression "observer moment" has originated with Nick Bostrom, in
> context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them "first
> person observer moment". I will try to explain how to translate them in
> comp.


Translate it please first into plain English. Without those symbols which
may be looked up in half an hour just to find 8 other ones in the
explanation which then can be looked up to find 5-6 further ones in each and
so on.
this is the reason for my FIRST par question.

>
> >  number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are
> > the 'non-Arabic'
> >   numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages
> > alp[habetical or not?
> >   Is zero a number? Was not in "Platonia" - a millennium before its
> > invention(?!)
>
>
> Number, by default are the so called "natural number": 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
> ...
> They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of
> sets:
> { }, { I }, { II }, { III }, {  }, { I  }, { II  }, {
> III  }, {   }, etc.


Does that mean that you cannot distinguish whether 3, 30, 101010, 120, 1002,
etcetera, ALL SYMBOLISED BY {III}   (plus the unmarked zeroes)
(You did not include the hiatus and position, as number, as I see).
Which would nicely fit into the "Number=God" statement, as infinite
variations of infinite many meanings..

Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of
> definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective
> "numerous" still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.


Like Teen(ager) starts at 13. Early development counted to 5, (fingers?)
above that it was "many". In Russian there is a singular and a  dual case,
then a 'small plural' for 3,4,5, then comes the big plural 6-10 in every
decimal size repeatedly.  Ancient Hungarian etc. music was pentatonal. Now
we are decimalic (for practical reasons, except for some backward countries,
e.g. USA) - our toddler computers are binary. So I presume (induction-wise)
that there will be developed other number-systems as well in the future,
unless we accept humbly to be omniscient and sit at the top of the epistemic
enrichment.

>
> >  The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like
> > comp into the nondigital
>
>
>
> ? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point
> of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).


Do you deny the analogue computing? or(!!) transcribe the participants of
any analogy into numbers? I called above the digital computing  "toddler".

In "english" I would define a "universal (digital) machine", by a
> digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly)
> any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers
> and interpreters are typical example of such "hard" and soft
> (respectively) univers

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Hal,

You say my theory is a subset of yours. I don't understand. I have no 
theory, just a deductive argument that IF we are (digital) machine then 
"the physical world" is in our head. Then I show how a Universal Turing 
Machine can discover it in its own "head". This makes comp, or 
variants, testable.

I have no theory (beside theory of number and machine), I'm just 
listening to the machine. That's all. Then I compare the comp-physics 
with empirical physics.

Do you grasp the Universal Dovetailer Argument? Ask if not.

Regards,

Bruno



Le 20-févr.-07, à 04:42, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

>
> Hi Bruno:
>
> At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote:
>
>
>> Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Hi Bruno:
>>>
>>> In response I will start with some assumptions central to my 
>>> approach.
>>>
>>> The first has to do with the process of making a list.
>>>
>>> The assumption is:
>>>
>>> Making a list of items [which could be some of
>>> the elements of a set for example] is always a
>>> process of making a one to one mapping of the
>>> items to some of the counting numbers such as:
>>>
>>> 1 - an item
>>> 2 - an item not previously on the list
>>> 3 - an item not previously on the list
>>> .
>>> .
>>> .
>>> n - last item and it was not previously on the list
>>
>>
>> I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
>> existence of things capable of being put in a list.
>
> What I am trying to do is establish what making a
> list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence.
>
> I make it an assumption because some may believe
> that "make a list" means something different.
>
>> Effectively? then
>> why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
>> provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or 
>> try
>> to be just informal.
>>
>
> See below
>
>
>
>
>>>
>>> My second assumption is:
>>>
>>> Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.
>>
>>
>> You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
>> axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
>> arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and 
>> garden".
>
> Did you mean class not "glass"?
>
>> You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended
>> for states of universes,
>
> I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above.
>
>>  but recall the goal is to provide an
>> explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes".
>
> If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model
>
>>  In general
>> properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive 
>> set
>> theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean.
>>
>
> See below
>
>
>
>>>
>>> My third assumption is:
>>>
>>> All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be 
>>> listed.
>>
>>
>> I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
>> properties.
>>
>
> To me at this point the Church Thesis is an
> ingredient in some of the possible state
> succession sequences allowed in my model.
>
> I mean all properties I do not know if that is
> the same as your "effective" properties.
>
>
>>>
>>> My fourth assumption is:
>>>
>>> The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.
>>
>>
>> ? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).
>>
>
> This is my point above - "to list" inherently a
> countably infinite [as max length] process.
>
> I would add that my third assumption becomes more
> important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic.
>
>
>
>>>
>>> Conclusions so far:
>>> [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
>>> list.]
>>> [The number of objects is uncountably infinite]
>>
>> What is the full list?
>
> The list of all possible properties of objects.
>
>
>>>
>>> I will stop there for now and await comments.
>>>
>>> As to the remainder of the post:
>>>
>>> In the above I have not reached the point of
>>> deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
>>> focusing on computations when I say that any
>>> succession of states is allowed.  Logically
>>> related successions are allowed.  Successions
>>> displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.
>>
>>
>> I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
>> person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.
>>
>
> Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one
> of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set 
> of mine.
>
> I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a
> level in my model where I could even begin to use
> an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience.
>
>>>
>>> I would like to finish the walk through of my
>>> model before discussing white rabbits and observation.
>>
>>
>> I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
>> formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.
>
> I have read that it takes 10 years of focused
> prac

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote:


>Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> >
> > Hi Bruno:
> >
> > In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.
> >
> > The first has to do with the process of making a list.
> >
> > The assumption is:
> >
> > Making a list of items [which could be some of
> > the elements of a set for example] is always a
> > process of making a one to one mapping of the
> > items to some of the counting numbers such as:
> >
> > 1 - an item
> > 2 - an item not previously on the list
> > 3 - an item not previously on the list
> > .
> > .
> > .
> > n - last item and it was not previously on the list
>
>
>I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming
>existence of things capable of being put in a list.

What I am trying to do is establish what making a 
list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence.

I make it an assumption because some may believe 
that "make a list" means something different.

>Effectively? then
>why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have
>provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try
>to be just informal.
>

See below




> >
> > My second assumption is:
> >
> > Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.
>
>
>You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an
>axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by
>arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and garden".

Did you mean class not "glass"?

>You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended
>for states of universes,

I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above.

>  but recall the goal is to provide an
>explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes".

If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model

>  In general
>properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set
>theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean.
>

See below



> >
> > My third assumption is:
> >
> > All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.
>
>
>I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective
>properties.
>

To me at this point the Church Thesis is an 
ingredient in some of the possible state 
succession sequences allowed in my model.

I mean all properties I do not know if that is 
the same as your "effective" properties.


> >
> > My fourth assumption is:
> >
> > The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.
>
>
>? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).
>

This is my point above - "to list" inherently a 
countably infinite [as max length] process.

I would add that my third assumption becomes more 
important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic.



> >
> > Conclusions so far:
> > [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full
> > list.]
> > [The number of objects is uncountably infinite]
>
>What is the full list?

The list of all possible properties of objects.


> >
> > I will stop there for now and await comments.
> >
> > As to the remainder of the post:
> >
> > In the above I have not reached the point of
> > deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
> > focusing on computations when I say that any
> > succession of states is allowed.  Logically
> > related successions are allowed.  Successions
> > displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.
>
>
>I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first
>person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.
>

Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one 
of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set of mine.

I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a 
level in my model where I could even begin to use 
an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience.

> >
> > I would like to finish the walk through of my
> > model before discussing white rabbits and observation.
>
>
>I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and
>formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.

I have read that it takes 10 years of focused 
practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline.

At this point in my practice of engineering I am 
on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline.

I hope you can understand why I must continue to 
find a path to the development and expression of 
my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming 
an expert in mathematical expression.

I appreciate your help and perhaps with a little 
more of it I can reach what you are asking for.

Perhaps it is also a good idea to exhaust the 
idea of whether or not your approach is or is not 
a sub set of another approach.

Yours

Hal Ruhl





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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

>
> Hi Bruno:
>
> In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.
>
> The first has to do with the process of making a list.
>
> The assumption is:
>
> Making a list of items [which could be some of
> the elements of a set for example] is always a
> process of making a one to one mapping of the
> items to some of the counting numbers such as:
>
> 1 - an item
> 2 - an item not previously on the list
> 3 - an item not previously on the list
> .
> .
> .
> n - last item and it was not previously on the list


I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming 
existence of things capable of being put in a list. Effectively? then 
why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have  
provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try 
to be just informal.




>
> My second assumption is:
>
> Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.


You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an 
axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by 
arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and garden". 
You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended 
for states of universes, but recall the goal is to provide an 
explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes". In general 
properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set 
theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean.



>
> My third assumption is:
>
> All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.


I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective 
properties.



>
> My fourth assumption is:
>
> The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.


? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)).



>
> Conclusions so far:
> [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full 
> list.]
> [The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

What is the full list?


>
> I will stop there for now and await comments.
>
> As to the remainder of the post:
>
> In the above I have not reached the point of
> deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not
> focusing on computations when I say that any
> succession of states is allowed.  Logically
> related successions are allowed.  Successions
> displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.


I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first 
person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much.


>
> I would like to finish the walk through of my
> model before discussing white rabbits and observation.


I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and 
formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say.


Bruno


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John Mikes]

Bruno,

I appreciate your 'belated' reply (although some points stayed open)
and I will resort at the "belated" myself.
I found your points a Leporello from the "Hochprimitive" all the way
to the extreme technical (not included now), so I have to do some
equilibrating in my own mind. I hate to go back to 0.1.2.3. - or to
the level of 1+1=2. When we are talking about human problems (I
mean: thought, existence, etc) it is denigrating,
Will consider, will post.

John

On 2/5/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
>
> Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :
>
> > Stathis, Bruno,
> >
> >  This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a
> > way to
> >  'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without
> > the
> >  'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?
>
>
> I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform
> can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about
> them.
>
>
>
> >  There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and
> > over again?, BUT
> >  at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
> > another vista' ,
> >  like
> >
> >  (absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the
> > figment that
> >   if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?
>
>
> This is inductive inference, not probability.
>
>
>
>
> > combined with
> >   the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited
> > group the version
> >   'A' models and assuming its 'probability'?
>
>
> That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have
> to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the
> sake of some argument.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >  observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
> > time-concept
> >   in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying
> > 'conscious')
>
>
> The expression "observer moment" has originated with Nick Bostrom, in
> context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them "first
> person observer moment". I will try to explain how to translate them in
> comp.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >  number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are
> > the 'non-Arabic'
> >   numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages
> > alp[habetical or not?
> >   Is zero a number? Was not in "Platonia" - a millennium before its
> > invention(?!)
>
>
> Number, by default are the so called "natural number": 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
> ...
> They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of
> sets:
> { }, { I }, { II }, { III }, {  }, { I  }, { II  }, {
> III  }, {   }, etc.
>
> Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of
> definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective
> "numerous" still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >  The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like
> > comp into the nondigital
>
>
>
> ? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point
> of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).
>
> In "english" I would define a "universal (digital) machine", by a
> digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly)
> any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers
> and interpreters are typical example of such "hard" and soft
> (respectively) universal machines. Now a universal digital machine is
> lobian when she "knows" that she is universal. Defining "knows" has to
> be a bit technical. This is not at all an official definition. Look at
> my SANE04 paper for a more offical definition. It is related to a sort
> of placebo phenomenon. If we continue this conversation there will be
> plenty of time to make this clear. But you are right to ask for
> definition, or for more explanations.
>
>
>
>
> >   and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been
> > interpreted (unknowable).
>
>
> Don't hesitate to come back on this? Out of context I could say to much
> things and then have to repeat it.
>
>
>
>
> >
> >  Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for
> > the rest of the world
>
>
> Make a list, and send it. So we can think about. Not all
> conversation-threads ask for the same level of precision.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >  John M
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > wrote:Bruno Marchal writes:
> >>
> >> > What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
> >> > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
> >> > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are
> >> all
> >> > well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this
> >> is
> >> > something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago,
> >> but
> >> > without much success. This does not make much sense in 

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi John:

This is what brought me to the idea that while 
all objects have "simultaneous" existence they 
also can have degrees of hyper existence. Hyper 
existence is like a tag that indicates states 
that "are", those that are "becoming", and those 
that have recently "been" [so to speak].

Hal Ruhl




At 04:26 PM 2/15/2007, you wrote:
>Hal:
>you seem to have mastered the problem I got 
>stuck with in the 'timelessness' speculation
>(Any succession of states is allowed. )
>  I could not handle successions in reverse, if 
> time (as an indicator of succession) is cut out.
>I did not want to resort to an atemporal system 
>where ALL steps of processes (what is a process???) live side by side together.
>
>John M
>- Original Message -
>From: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Hal Ruhl
>To: <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>everything-list@googlegroups.com
>Sent: Sunday, February 11, 2007 9:37 PM
>Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>
>
>Hi Bruno:
>
>I was using some of the main components of my
>model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
>all degree.  Any succession of states is
>allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
>successions requires a certain family of white
>rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.
>
>Hal Ruhl
>
>At 04:23 AM 2/9/2007, you wrote:
>
>
> >Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
> >
> > >  Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
> > > countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
> > > number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
> > > model.  As I said above "Our World" can be as precisely as random as
> > > it needs to be.
> >
> >
> >I don't understand.
> >
> >Bruno
> >
> >
> >
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>No virus found in this incoming message.
>Checked by AVG Free Edition.
>Version: 7.5.441 / Virus Database: 268.17.36/681 
>- Release Date: 2/11/2007 6:50 PM
>
>
>
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach.

The first has to do with the process of making a list.

The assumption is:

Making a list of items [which could be some of 
the elements of a set for example] is always a 
process of making a one to one mapping of the 
items to some of the counting numbers such as:

1 - an item
2 - an item not previously on the list
3 - an item not previously on the list
.
.
.
n - last item and it was not previously on the list

My second assumption is:

Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties.

My third assumption is:

All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed.

My fourth assumption is:

The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite.

Conclusions so far:
[All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full list.]
[The number of objects is uncountably infinite]

I will stop there for now and await comments.

As to the remainder of the post:

In the above I have not reached the point of 
deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not 
focusing on computations when I say that any 
succession of states is allowed.  Logically 
related successions are allowed.  Successions 
displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed.

I would like to finish the walk through of my 
model before discussing white rabbits and observation.

Yours

Hal Ruhl

At 09:49 AM 2/12/2007, you wrote:

>Hi Hal,
>
>
>Le 12-févr.-07, à 03:37, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> >
> > Hi Bruno:
> >
> > I was using some of the main components of my
> > model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
> > all degree.  Any succession of states is
> > allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
> > successions requires a certain family of white
> > rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.
>
>
>Well, thanks for the white rabbit, but the current goal consists in
>explaining why we don't see them. When you say any succession of states
>is allowed, are you talking about computations? In computations the
>states are logically related, and not all succession of states can be
>allowed, or you talk about something else, but then what exactly?
>What are your assumption, and what are your conclusion? I know you have
>made an effort in clarity, but in your last definitions you adopt the
>axiomatic way of talking, but not the axiomatic way of reasoning. This
>makes your talk neither informally convincing (granted some sharable
>intuition) nor formally clear. I have always been willing to attribute
>to you some intuition, I continue doing so, and I have suggested to you
>some books capable of providing helps toward much clarity, which is
>what is needed to communicate to others, especially when working on
>extremely  hard subject like what we are discussing.
>I hope that Jason, who kindly proposes some act of systematization,
>will be able to help you to develop your probably interesting ideas,
>
>Regards,
>
>Bruno
>
>
>
>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Hal:
you seem to have mastered the problem I got stuck with in the 'timelessness' 
speculation
(Any succession of states is allowed. )
 I could not handle successions in reverse, if time (as an indicator of 
succession) is cut out. 
I did not want to resort to an atemporal system where ALL steps of processes 
(what is a process???) live side by side together.

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Hal Ruhl 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, February 11, 2007 9:37 PM
  Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds



  Hi Bruno:

  I was using some of the main components of my 
  model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of 
  all degree.  Any succession of states is 
  allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain 
  successions requires a certain family of white 
  rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

  Hal Ruhl

  At 04:23 AM 2/9/2007, you wrote:


  >Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
  >
  > >  Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
  > > countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
  > > number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
  > > model.  As I said above "Our World" can be as precisely as random as
  > > it needs to be.
  >
  >
  >I don't understand.
  >
  >Bruno
  >
  >
  >
  >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
  >
  >
  >

  


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Hal,


Le 12-févr.-07, à 03:37, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

>
> Hi Bruno:
>
> I was using some of the main components of my
> model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of
> all degree.  Any succession of states is
> allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain
> successions requires a certain family of white
> rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.


Well, thanks for the white rabbit, but the current goal consists in 
explaining why we don't see them. When you say any succession of states 
is allowed, are you talking about computations? In computations the 
states are logically related, and not all succession of states can be 
allowed, or you talk about something else, but then what exactly?
What are your assumption, and what are your conclusion? I know you have 
made an effort in clarity, but in your last definitions you adopt the 
axiomatic way of talking, but not the axiomatic way of reasoning. This 
makes your talk neither informally convincing (granted some sharable 
intuition) nor formally clear. I have always been willing to attribute 
to you some intuition, I continue doing so, and I have suggested to you 
some books capable of providing helps toward much clarity, which is 
what is needed to communicate to others, especially when working on 
extremely  hard subject like what we are discussing.
I hope that Jason, who kindly proposes some act of systematization, 
will be able to help you to develop your probably interesting ideas,

Regards,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

I was using some of the main components of my 
model to indicate that it allows white rabbits of 
all degree.  Any succession of states is 
allowed.  If the presence of SAS in certain 
successions requires a certain family of white 
rabbit distributions then these distributions are present.

Hal Ruhl

At 04:23 AM 2/9/2007, you wrote:


>Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> >  Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a
> > countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite
> > number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my
> > model.  As I said above "Our World" can be as precisely as random as
> > it needs to be.
>
>
>I don't understand.
>
>Bruno
>
>
>
>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

You, of all people should know that information is non-additive. We've
been over this a number of times.

My point is that the non-additive behaviour of information
mathematically looks like the interference effects of wave
phenomena. Someone will need to do the maths to check this out - I
just don't have time right now.

I'm also not sure that this is a really original suggestion. Deutsch
has looked at information theory based approaches to QM for
example. Again, sadly, I don't have the time or interest to follow up.

Cheers

On Fri, Feb 09, 2007 at 10:21:37AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 06-févr.-07, à 03:06, Russell Standish a écrit :
> 
> > The informatic "destructive effects" are due to conflicting
> > information reducing the total amount of information.
> 
> Perhaps you could expand?
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 07-févr.-07, à 02:45, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

>  Given an uncountably infinite number of objects generated from a 
> countably infinite list of properties and an uncountably infinite 
> number of UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with this re my 
> model.  As I said above "Our World" can be as precisely as random as 
> it needs to be.


I don't understand.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 06-févr.-07, à 03:06, Russell Standish a écrit :

> The informatic "destructive effects" are due to conflicting
> information reducing the total amount of information.

Perhaps you could expand?

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John Mikes]

Hi, Hal:
and you really think there would be an end? Look at this list with allegedly
like-minded chaps and no end of picking on 'everything'. Include
"like-minded" lists - meaning 'unlike' really - and the internet would fill
up.
Does it make a difference to argue here, or at another site?
Our (meaning the potential scientific crowd) views are so diversified (what
a nice expression for 'underdeveloped') with diverse angles to look at it
FROM, that a wider agreement is IMO hopeless. Even with the reason of 'a'
George Levy's clarity. I introduced this list to a friend from another list
(complexity) who is math-phys minded and his refusal came: these guys are
'too' Platonistic for me.
I think Jason's idea is great, if he can do it we will have a  maybe wider
sortiment of ideas, I doubt a possibility of crystallized-out agreed upon
identifications. But I am a skeptic.
Best regards
John

On 2/7/07, Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Hi John:
>
> I think the idea before was to provide an acronym list and also give each
> person or like minded group a limit of a few pages in the FAQ document in
> which to present a summary of their point of view.
>
> Hal Ruhl
>
> At 11:59 AM 2/7/2007, you wrote:
>
> Hal:
> you really believe that anybody could provide responses acceptable for all
> others? (I did not say understandable")
> Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his own scientific religion
> (=scientific belief system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again)
> Russell or not.]
> We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
> Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice.
> John
>  - Original Message -----
> From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
> Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>
> Hi John:
>
> Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for the list.  Perhaps we
> should give it another try.
>
> Hal Ruhl
>
>
>
>
> At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:
>
> Hal and list:
> I do not think anybody "fully understands" what other listers write, even
> if one thinks so.
> Or is it only my handicap?
> John M - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To:
> everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM 
> Subject:
> Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>
> Hi Bruno:
> I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
> Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its evolving universes -
> meaning I take it that all successive states are fully logical
> consequences of their prior state.
> I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
> Lets us say that you are correct about this result re your model, this
> just seems to reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order to avoid
> the information generating selection in the full set.
> Yours
> Hal Ruhl
>
> At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:
>
> >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit : > > >  As far as I can tell
> from this, my model may include Bruno's model as > > a subset. > > >This
> means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person) >white
> rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does >not
> reintroduce new one. > >Bruno > > > 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >
> > >
>
>
> --
> No virus found in this incoming message.
> Checked by AVG Free Edition.
> Version: 7.5.432 / Virus Database: 268.17.29/673 - Release Date: 2/6/2007
> 5:52 PM
>
>
>
> >
>

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi John:

I think the idea before was to provide an acronym 
list and also give each person or like minded 
group a limit of a few pages in the FAQ document 
in which to present a summary of their point of view.

Hal Ruhl

At 11:59 AM 2/7/2007, you wrote:
>Hal:
>you really believe that anybody could provide 
>responses acceptable for all others? (I did not say understandable")
>Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his 
>own scientific religion (=scientific belief 
>system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again) Russell or not.]
>We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
>Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice.
>John
>- Original Message -
>From: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Hal Ruhl
>To: <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>everything-list@googlegroups.com
>Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
>Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>
>Hi John:
>
>Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ 
>for the list.  Perhaps we should give it another try.
>
>Hal Ruhl
>
>
>
>
>At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:
>>Hal and list:
>>I do not think anybody "fully understands" what 
>>other listers write, even if one thinks so.
>>Or is it only my handicap?
>>John M
>>- Original Message -
>>From: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Hal Ruhl
>>To: 
>><mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
>>Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>>
>>Hi Bruno:
>>I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
>>Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
>>evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
>>successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.
>>I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
>>Lets us say that you are correct about this
>>result re your model, this just seems to
>>reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
>>to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.
>>Yours
>>Hal Ruhl
>>
>>At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:
>>
>> >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>> >
>> > >  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
>> > > a subset.
>> >
>> >
>> >This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person)
>> >white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
>> >not reintroduce new one.
>> >
>> >Bruno
>> >
>> >
>> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>
>
>
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>No virus found in this incoming message.
>Checked by AVG Free Edition.
>Version: 7.5.432 / Virus Database: 268.17.29/673 
>- Release Date: 2/6/2007 5:52 PM
>
>
>
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Hal:
you really believe that anybody could provide responses acceptable for all 
others? (I did not say understandable") 
Everybody sits in his own mindset and speaks his own scientific religion 
(=scientific belief system) - [said so, whether I aggraveted  now (again) 
Russell or not.]  
We are in a pretty liquid exchange-state (liquid OM).
Otherwise the idea is excellent, with multiple choice. 
John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Hal Ruhl 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 8:49 PM
  Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds


  Hi John:

  Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for the list.  Perhaps we 
should give it another try.

  Hal Ruhl 




  At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:

Hal and list:
I do not think anybody "fully understands" what other listers write, even 
if one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M

  - Original Message - 

  From: Hal Ruhl 

  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 

  Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM

      Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds



  Hi Bruno:


  I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.


  Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its 

  evolving universes - meaning I take it that all 

  successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.


  I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.


  Lets us say that you are correct about this 

  result re your model, this just seems to 

  reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order 

  to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.


  Yours


  Hal Ruhl



  At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:



  >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

  >

  > >  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as

  > > a subset.

  >

  >

  >This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person)

  >white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does

  >not reintroduce new one.

  >

  >Bruno

  >

  >

  > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

  >

  >

  >





  



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5:52 PM

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Just to clarify - in the metaphor a UD trace that assigns a Hyper 
Existence of say 0.2 does so to all states it "lands" on because the 
UD is that type of UD.

Hal Ruhl


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi John:

Long ago there was some effort to write a FAQ for 
the list.  Perhaps we should give it another try.

Hal Ruhl




At 11:30 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:
>Hal and list:
>I do not think anybody "fully understands" what 
>other listers write, even if one thinks so.
>Or is it only my handicap?
>John M
>- Original Message -
>From: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Hal Ruhl
>To: <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>everything-list@googlegroups.com
>Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
>Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>
>
>Hi Bruno:
>
>I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
>
>Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
>evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
>successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.
>
>I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
>
>Lets us say that you are correct about this
>result re your model, this just seems to
>reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
>to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.
>
>Yours
>
>Hal Ruhl
>
>
>At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:
>
>
> >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
> >
> > >  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
> > > a subset.
> >
> >
> >This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person)
> >white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
> >not reintroduce new one.
> >
> >Bruno
> >
> >
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

At 06:23 AM 2/6/2007, you wrote:

>Le 06-févr.-07, à 05:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>>Hal Ruhl writes:
>>
>> > Hi Bruno:
>> >
>> > I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
>> >
>> > Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
>> > evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
>> > successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.
>>
>>You mean "physical consequences" or something 
>>similar, don't you? I don't see anything 
>>logically inconsistent about a talking white 
>>rabbit or even the atoms of my keyboard 
>>reassembling themselves into a fire-breathing dragon.
>

My model taps the inconsistency of a complete 
collection of information to give the dynamic of 
its universe state to state succession at least 
some random content.  There is no conflict in my 
approach with talking white rabbits or uncommonly 
evolving keyboards.  What I indicated is that all 
I needed to encompass our world in a UD metaphor 
of a sub set of my model was a compatible ongoing 
intersection of a set [an infinite set most likely] of UD traces.

The picture is a set of say twenty traces all 
arriving at twenty "Our World" compatible 
successive states simultaneously.  If the traces 
assign a compatible degree of hyper existence to 
their respective states then the result is twenty 
immediately successive states with a rising then 
falling degree of Hyper existence.  The 
intersecting traces are not even necessarily 
logically related just compatibly coincident for 
one of "Our World's" "ticks" so to speak.  At the 
next "tick" of our world a completely different 
set of twenty traces can be involved.  "Our 
World" can be precisely as random as it needs to be.

>I agree with Stathis. Much more, I can prove to 
>you that the sound lobian machine agrees with Stathis!
>It is a key point: there is nothing inconsistent 
>with my seeing and measuring white rabbits (cf 
>"dreams, videa, ...). Both with QM and/or comp, 
>we can only hope such "events" are relatively rare.
>Now, a naive reading of the UD can give the 
>feeling that with comp white rabbits are not 
>rare at all, and that is why I insist at some 
>point that we have to take more fully into 
>account the "objective constraints" of 
>theoretical computer science and mathematical 
>logic (some of which are counter-intuitive and even necessarily so).
>
>
>Hal Ruhl continued:
>
>
>>I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
>>
>>Lets us say that you are correct about this
>>result re your model, this just seems to
>>reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
>>to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.
>
>
>
>It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics 
>a case can be given that it *is* the contrary. 
>It is by taking the full set of (relative 
>histories) that the quantum phase randomization 
>can eliminate the quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths).
>It works with the QM because of the existence of 
>destructive interferences, and somehow what the 
>computationalist has to justify is the (first 
>person plural) appearance of such destructive effects.
>
>Bruno

Given an uncountably infinite number of objects 
generated from a countably infinite list of 
properties and an uncountably infinite number of 
UD's in the metaphor I can not see an issue with 
this re my model.  As I said above "Our World" 
can be as precisely as random as it needs to be.

Hal Ruhl


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Feb 06, 2007 at 12:23:19PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics a case can be given 
> that it *is* the contrary. It is by taking the full set of (relative 
> histories) that the quantum phase randomization can eliminate the 
> quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths). 
> It works with the QM because of the existence of destructive 
> interferences, and somehow what the computationalist has to justify is 
> the (first person plural) appearance of such destructive effects. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 

The informatic "destructive effects" are due to conflicting
information reducing the total amount of information.

If I have the sentence "the sheep is totally black and the sheep is
totally white", then I have rather less information about the sheep
than if I had (say) "the sheep is totally black".

Addition of information obeys the triangle inequality

  I(a+b) \leq I(a) + I(b)

Curiously, addition of wave amplitudes in QM also obey the triangle
inequality. I suspect there is more to this connection than mere
coincidence, although I haven't spent too much time trying to work out
the details.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Hal and list:
I do not think anybody "fully understands" what other listers write, even if 
one thinks so.
Or is it only my handicap?
John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Hal Ruhl 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 10:24 PM
  Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds



  Hi Bruno:

  I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

  Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its 
  evolving universes - meaning I take it that all 
  successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

  I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

  Lets us say that you are correct about this 
  result re your model, this just seems to 
  reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order 
  to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

  Yours

  Hal Ruhl


  At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:


  >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
  >
  > >  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
  > > a subset.
  >
  >
  >This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person)
  >white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
  >not reintroduce new one.
  >
  >Bruno
  >
  >
  >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
  >
  >
  >


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 06-févr.-07, à 05:25, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> Hal Ruhl writes:
>   
>  > Hi Bruno:
> >
> > I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.
> >
> > Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its
> > evolving universes - meaning I take it that all
> > successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior 
> state.
>
>  You mean "physical consequences" or something similar, don't you? I 
> don't see anything logically inconsistent about a talking white rabbit 
> or even the atoms of my keyboard reassembling themselves into a 
> fire-breathing dragon.


I agree with Stathis. Much more, I can prove to you that the sound 
lobian machine agrees with Stathis!
It is a key point: there is nothing inconsistent with my seeing and 
measuring white rabbits (cf "dreams, videa, ...). Both with QM and/or 
comp, we can only hope such "events" are relatively rare.
Now, a naive reading of the UD can give the feeling that with comp 
white rabbits are not rare at all, and that is why I insist at some 
point that we have to take more fully into account the "objective 
constraints" of theoretical computer science and mathematical logic 
(some of which are counter-intuitive and even necessarily so).


Hal Ruhl continued:


> I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.
>
> Lets us say that you are correct about this
> result re your model, this just seems to
> reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order
> to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.



It *could* be the contrary. In quantum mechanics a case can be given 
that it *is* the contrary. It is by taking the full set of (relative 
histories) that the quantum phase randomization can eliminate the 
quantum aberrant histories (cf Feynman paths).
It works with the QM because of the existence of destructive 
interferences, and somehow what the computationalist has to justify is 
the (first person plural) appearance of such destructive effects.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Hal Ruhl writes:
 
> Hi Bruno:> > I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.> > 
> Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its > evolving universes - meaning 
> I take it that all > successive states are fully logical consequences of 
> their prior state.
You mean "physical consequences" or something similar, don't you? I don't see 
anything logically inconsistent about a talking white rabbit or even the atoms 
of my keyboard reassembling themselves into a fire-breathing dragon.
 
Stathis Papaioannou
 > I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.> > Lets us say 
 > that you are correct about this > result re your model, this just seems to > 
 > reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order > to avoid the information 
 > generating selection in the full set.> > Yours> > Hal Ruhl> > > At 11:30 AM 
 > 2/5/2007, you wrote:> > > >Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :> >> > 
 > > As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as> > > 
 > a subset.> >> >> >This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all 
 > (1-person)> >white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset 
 > does> >not reintroduce new one.> >> >Bruno> >> >> 
 > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> > 
 > _
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi Bruno:

I do not think I fully understand what you are saying.

Suppose your model bans white rabbits from its 
evolving universes - meaning I take it that all 
successive states are fully logical consequences of their prior state.

I would see this as a selection of one possibility from two.

Lets us say that you are correct about this 
result re your model, this just seems to 
reinforce the idea that it is a sub set in order 
to avoid the information generating selection in the full set.

Yours

Hal Ruhl


At 11:30 AM 2/5/2007, you wrote:


>Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
>
> >  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as
> > a subset.
>
>
>This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person)
>white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does
>not reintroduce new one.
>
>Bruno
>
>
>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

So now we have to find some way sto tackle the problem of finding the 
right level of abstraction to pursue ...

Bruno


Le 03-févr.-07, à 10:05, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>  Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
> > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
> > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are 
> all
> > well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this 
> is
> > something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, 
> but
> > without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA 
> approaches,
> > but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute 
> probability
> > of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
> > probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close 
> of
> > saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It 
> is
> > like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
>
> I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem 
> is not
> a problem when considering abstract machines.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> Live Search: Better results, fast Try it now!
>  >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 05-févr.-07, à 00:46, Hal Ruhl a écrit :

>  As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as 
> a subset.


This means that even if "my theory" makes disappear all (1-person) 
white rabbits, you will still have to justify that your overset does 
not reintroduce new one.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi jason,


Le 05-févr.-07, à 17:05, Jason a écrit :

>
> On Feb 2, 10:03 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us
>> write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
>> One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at
>> least) with a sequence like:
>> (comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp
>> 777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9
>> 24) (comp 777 10 24) 
>> This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th 
>> partial
>> recursive function on input 24.
>> Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD
>> has to dovetetail. So the order of the "states" generated by the UD is
>> not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
>> Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777
>> has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be 
>> that
>> the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent
>> (same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but
>> actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation
>> between computation an states.
>> I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it is not obvious
>> to define computations and order on them.
>> Then, from a first person point of view, the difficulty is made 
>> bigger.
>> It could be, that although F_a and F_b computes different function 
>> (and
>> thus follows completely different algorithm), it could be that (comp a
>> 234 24) and some sub-state of (comp b 34 1000), say, are equivalent
>> from a first person point of view, which needs to take into account 
>> all
>> the infinity of computations going through my "current state".
>> So I'm afraid that at some point we have to take a more abstract route
>> (like with the combinators, which better represent possible
>> computations, or like with the lobian interview).
>> What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
>> eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
>> abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
>> well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
>> something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
>> without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA 
>> approaches,
>> but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
>> of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
>> probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close 
>> of
>> saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It 
>> is
>> like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
>>
>
> Bruno,
>
> Let me begin with saying that I believe in a form of computationalism
> in that ultimate ensemble, or plato's heaven contains a turing machine
> running every possible program.  I also beleive this universe is, on a
> small enough scale, purely digital.  My question to you is, without
> accepting some form of fundamental probability, how can the Universal
> Dovetailer be preferred over Jürgen Schmidhuber's program?  Both the
> UD and JS's iterative counting program will produce all possible
> output states.  The difference to me is that every state is equally
> likely under JS's program, while the UD will prefer some states and
> evolutions of states.


JS "great programmer", well I take it as an informal version of the UD. 
I think Wei Dai proposed the counting algorithm as a sort of UD.
Whatever. As you describe the UD, it should be clear it renders justice 
to the "relative computational state", and is coherent with RSSA 
(relative self-sampling assumption).
But the main difference between the UD, as it has to be used with comp, 
and JS approach is that the UD Argument relies on the distinction 
between first person and third person points of view (which is not done 
by JS: see my conversation with him in the archive).

And then a result is that "there is no primary physical universe", and 
the appearance of a physical universe has to be an appearance of 
something not entirely computable: If I am a machine then the UNIVERSE, 
or GOD or  is not a computable object.

Somehow, Schmidhuber develops a constructive physics. This can be 
interesting, and can have application, but is useless for a theory of 
evreything including the mind and persons.




> The multiplicity of some states, to me, creates
> a probability question.


For all of us, I think. Indeed, it was my purpose to show that if comp 
is correct, the mind body problem, actually its  body problem part,  is 
reduced partially into a relative probability question on first person 
computational states/history.



> Therefore it becomes meaningful to consider
> what programs will contain the largest number of observer moments, and
> how common will those programs be within

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason]

On Feb 2, 10:03 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us
> write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
> One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at
> least) with a sequence like:
> (comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp
> 777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9
> 24) (comp 777 10 24) 
> This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th partial
> recursive function on input 24.
> Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD
> has to dovetetail. So the order of the "states" generated by the UD is
> not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
> Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777
> has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be that
> the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent
> (same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but
> actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation
> between computation an states.
> I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it is not obvious
> to define computations and order on them.
> Then, from a first person point of view, the difficulty is made bigger.
> It could be, that although F_a and F_b computes different function (and
> thus follows completely different algorithm), it could be that (comp a
> 234 24) and some sub-state of (comp b 34 1000), say, are equivalent
> from a first person point of view, which needs to take into account all
> the infinity of computations going through my "current state".
> So I'm afraid that at some point we have to take a more abstract route
> (like with the combinators, which better represent possible
> computations, or like with the lobian interview).
> What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
> eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
> abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
> well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
> something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
> without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches,
> but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
> of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
> probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close of
> saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is
> like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
>

Bruno,

Let me begin with saying that I believe in a form of computationalism
in that ultimate ensemble, or plato's heaven contains a turing machine
running every possible program.  I also beleive this universe is, on a
small enough scale, purely digital.  My question to you is, without
accepting some form of fundamental probability, how can the Universal
Dovetailer be preferred over Jürgen Schmidhuber's program?  Both the
UD and JS's iterative counting program will produce all possible
output states.  The difference to me is that every state is equally
likely under JS's program, while the UD will prefer some states and
evolutions of states.  The multiplicity of some states, to me, creates
a probability question.  Therefore it becomes meaningful to consider
what programs will contain the largest number of observer moments, and
how common will those programs be within the UD.


Best Regards,

Jason


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,


Le 03-févr.-07, à 17:20, John Mikes a écrit :

> Stathis, Bruno,
>
>  This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a 
> way to
>  'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without 
> the
>  'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?


I am not sure. Avoiding technical acceptance of a theoretical platform 
can be done for presenting result, not really for discussing about 
them.



>  There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and 
> over again?, BUT
>  at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from 
> another vista' ,
>  like
>
>  (absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the 
> figment that
>     if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well?


This is inductive inference, not probability.




> combined with
>     the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited 
> group the version
>    'A' models  and assuming its 'probability'?


That is why to use probability and/or any uncertainty measure we have 
to be clear about the axioms we are willing to admit, at least for the 
sake of some argument.




>
>  observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a 
> time-concept
>    in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying 
> 'conscious')


The expression "observer moment" has originated with Nick Bostrom, in 
context similar to the doomsday argument. I would call them "first 
person observer moment". I will try to explain how to translate them in 
comp.




>
>  number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are 
> the 'non-Arabic'
>    numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages 
> alp[habetical or not?
>    Is zero a number? Was not in "Platonia" - a millennium before its 
> invention(?!)


Number, by default are the so called "natural number": 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
...
They correspond to the number of strokes in the following sequence of 
sets:
{ }, { I }, { II }, { III }, {  }, { I  }, { II  }, { 
III  }, {   }, etc.

Zero is a number by definition. But this is just a question of 
definition. For the Greeks number begins with three. Like the adjective 
"numerous" still rarely applies when only two things are referred too.




>
>  The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like 
> comp into the nondigital



? comp does not go out of the digital, except from a first person point 
of view (but that is an hard technical point, to be sure).

In "english" I would define a "universal (digital) machine", by a 
digital machine potentially capable of emulating (simulating perfectly) 
any other digital machine from a description of it. Today's computers 
and interpreters are typical example of such "hard" and soft 
(respectively) universal machines. Now a universal digital machine is 
lobian when she "knows" that she is universal. Defining "knows" has to 
be a bit technical. This is not at all an official definition. Look at 
my SANE04 paper for a more offical definition. It is related to a sort 
of placebo phenomenon. If we continue this conversation there will be 
plenty of time to make this clear. But you are right to ask for 
definition, or for more explanations.




>    and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been 
> interpreted (unknowable).


Don't hesitate to come back on this? Out of context I could say to much 
things and then have to repeat it.




>
>  Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for 
> the rest of the world


Make a list, and send it. So we can think about. Not all 
conversation-threads ask for the same level of precision.


Bruno



>
>  John M
>
>
>
>
>
> On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 
> wrote:Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
>> > What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
>> > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
>> > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are 
>> all
>> > well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this 
>> is
>> > something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, 
>> but
>> > without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA 
>> approaches,
>> > but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute 
>> probability
>> > of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
>> > probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is 
>> close of
>> > saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. 
>> It is
>> > like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
>>
>> I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem 
>> is not
>> a problem when considering abstract machines.
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>>
>
>
>  >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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"E

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

Hi John:

Sorry I did not respond earlier.
Lately I do not have time to read the list posts and respond during the week.


At 04:02 PM 1/29/2007, you wrote:
>Hal, a decade ago I 'read' your text easier than now: you firmed up 
>your vocabulary - gradually out of my understanding. Sorry.
>*
>You seem to accept 'observer moments' and their interaction - even 
>postulate one variable needed.
>

Observer moments and states of universes I take as being identical.

To say that they do not interact is a selection.  Selections create 
information and I prefer the point of view that the top level system 
should have zero net information.  The All [has many other names 
suppose] has zero net information because it contains all 
information.  I separate out of the information zero "All" for 
examination a list of all properties that an object can have.   That 
is I select a boundary in the All from among its infinite number of 
boundaries.  My list being a list can be countably infinite and the 
set of all its sub sets would then be uncountably infinite.  There 
are then an uncountably infinite number of objects which can be taken 
to be states of universes.

>How long is an OM? a million years (cosmology) or a msec?

States of universes have permanent uniform existence.  The question 
is how "long" can they have a non zero hyper existence.  The answer 
is all values [to avoid more selection].

>Even if it is a portion of the latter, it makes the existence quite 
>discontinuous - with all the difficulties in it. If it is 
>continuous, then how can we talk about 'moments'? Should we assign 
>an equal rate change to all existence (meaning: ONE selection for 
>the OM length)? If it can be ANY, varying from the infinitely short 
>to the other extreme, it would 'wash away' any sense of the meaning 
>of an Observer MOMENT concept.

My flow of hyper existence with its possible non binary pulse shapes 
could make consciousness "continuous" for some sequences of 
states.  SAS might find a universe state sequence in which the pulse 
rises from zero to 1 and then back to zero in a many step stair case 
fashion user friendly.

>I think the OM is the figment of us, human observers, who want to 
>use an 'understandable' model. [Like: numbers (in the human logic sense).]
>
>Then, in view of the resulting 'unfathomable', we 'complicate' these 
>models - originally created FOR comprehension - into 
>incomprehensibility. [The way as e.g. to bridge Bohm's Explicate to 
>the Implicate (by Nic de  Cusa's 2nd principle, left out by Bohm: 
>the "Complicate" - what I like to assign as math).]
>*
>That 'one' variable property you mention as needed for state- 
>interaction is IMO not necessarily  o n e  within our (present) comprehension.

I identify my list's sub sets as states of universes.  The 
interaction variable I call hyper existence could be compared with a 
UD trace.  When the trace lands on a state it gets a non zero hyper 
existence.  You could have UDs that assign a 0.1 hyper existence, UDs 
that assign a 0.2 value,  UDs that assign a 0.8 value,  UDs that 
assign a 1.0 value etc. etc.  Now all my model would ask for next is 
for a sting of universe states that look like ours is in lasting 
[infinite] compatible set of UD trace intersections.  Since all UDs 
are infinitely nested, an infinite set of such trace intersection 
sets would be obtained.  My model has a dynamic originated in the 
incompleteness of some of the list sub sets and this dynamic has a 
random content due to the internal and external inconsistency of some 
of the list's sub sets.

As far as I can tell from this, my model may include Bruno's model as a subset.

Yours

Hal Ruhl


- Original Message -
From: <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Hal Ruhl
To: <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 11:02 PM
Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds



One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common
holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of
universes [which are a sub set of possible "objects"]] is that they
are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some
extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent
different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual
moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer
moment are fixed for that observer moment.

This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that
selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed
properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero
information ensemble.

Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact -
that is also a selectio

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John Mikes]

Stathis, Bruno,

This summary sounds fine if I accept to 'let words go'. Is there a way to
'understand' (=use with comprehension) the 'words' used here without the
'technical' acceptance of the theoretical platform?
There are sacrosanct 'words' used without explaining them (over and over
again?, BUT
at least once for the benefit of that newcomer 'alien' who comes from
another vista' ,
like

(absolute?) probability - is there such a thing as probability, the figment
that
   if it happend x times it WILL happen the (X+one)th time as well? combined
with
   the statistical hoax of counting from select members in a limited group
the version
  'A' models  and assuming its 'probability'?

observer moment (observer, for that matter), whether the moment is a
time-concept
  in it and the 'observer' must be conscious (btw: identifying 'conscious')

number (in the broader sense, yet applied as real integers) (Btw: are the
'non-Arabic'
  numbers also numbers? the figments of evolutionary languages alp[habetical
or not?
  Is zero a number? Was not in "Platonia" - a millennium before its
invention(?!)

The 'extensions' of machine into (loebian etc.) [non?]-machine, like comp
into the nondigital
  and mixing our mental interpretations with what has been interpreted
(unknowable).

Just some picked examples promoting a not-so-technical glossary for the rest
of the world

John M





On 2/3/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is that comp
> > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take all
> > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all
> > well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is
> > something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but
> > without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches,
> > but, like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability
> > of being me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a
> > probability can be given the value one (said George) but it is close of
> > saying that the universe is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is
> > like answering "who are you?" by I am me".
>
> I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation problem is
> not
> a problem when considering abstract machines.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Bruno Marchal writes:> What is correct, and has been singled out by Stathis, is 
that comp > eludes the "material implementation" problem, given that we take 
all > abstract possible relationship between those objects, and they are all > 
well defined as purely number theoretical relations. Note that this is > 
something I have tried to explain to Jacques Mallah sometimes ago, but > 
without much success. This does not make much sense in ASSA approaches, > but, 
like George Levy I think, I don't believe in absolute probability > of being 
me, or of living my current "observer moment". Such a > probability can be 
given the value one (said George) but it is close of > saying that the universe 
is here, which tells us nothing, really. It is > like answering "who are you?" 
by I am me".I'm satisfied with this summary. The physical implementation 
problem is not a problem when considering abstract machines. Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 01-févr.-07, à 18:46, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :



> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise 
> discrete
> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It
> was
> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided 
> by a
> series of disjoint states.



 Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to 
 be
 related by a computation for making sense.

 So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a
 computation.
 You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for 
 all
 a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
 that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
>>> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and
>>> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic
>>> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of
>>> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming
>>> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy
>>> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?
>>
>>
>> OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens
>> here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is
>> just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell).
>> I will come back on this.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
 Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
 computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have
 to
 take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
 universal number.

 This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
 computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
 related to the continuum of computations going through our states 
 (it
 includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
 histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
>>> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious 
>>> states
>>> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of
>>> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is
>>> relative to different  goedel numberings?
>>
>>
>> I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the
>> idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the
>> conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined
>> by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first
>> person future" could be implemented before some internal first person
>> past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical
>> order. OK?
>> I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= 
>> the
>> partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it
>> would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) 
>> you
>> mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be
>> related to infinities of computational histories, right?
>
> I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. 
> One is the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a 
> computer simulating me.


Assuming some primitive existence of "real world" or "brain processes", 
hypotheses whose coherence is put in doubt with the comp hypothesis.




>  The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD.


This is a bit ambiguous. The UD dovetails on all computations. Let us 
write (comp i k j) for k-th step of computation i on input j.
One computation can then be identified (in a first approximation at 
least) with a sequence like:
(comp 777 1 24) (comp 777 2 24) (comp 777 3 24) (comp 777 4 24) (comp 
777 5 24) (comp 777 6 24) (comp 777 7 24) (comp 777 8 24) (comp 777 9 
24) (comp 777 10 24) 
This represents the computation of F_777(24), that is the 777th partial 
recursive function on input 24.
Now we know that F_777(24) could be undefined, and that is why the UD 
has to dovetetail. So the order of the "states" generated by the UD is 
not, strictly speaking the order of states defining a computation.
Also, the UD is infinitely redundant: in particular the function F_777 
has other code, for example , i.e. F_777 = F_. It could be that 
the computation (comp 777 i 24) and (comp  i 24) are equivalent 
(same algorithm) or completely different (different algorithm), but 
actually it is not easy at all to define such equivalence relation 
between computation an states.
I mean, even from a pure third person point of view, it i

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > 
> > Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> > 
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
>  OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>  "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>  their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>  process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It 
>  was
>  my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>  series of disjoint states.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
> >>> related by a computation for making sense.
> >>>
> >>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a 
> >>> computation.
> >>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
> >>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
> >>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
> >> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
> >> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic 
> >> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of 
> >> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming 
> >> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy 
> >> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?
> > 
> > 
> > OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens 
> > here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is 
> > just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). 
> > I will come back on this.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
> >>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have 
> >>> to
> >>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
> >>> universal number.
> >>>
> >>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
> >>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
> >>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
> >>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
> >>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
> >> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states 
> >> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of 
> >> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is 
> >> relative to different  goedel numberings?
> > 
> > 
> > I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the 
> > idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the 
> > conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined 
> > by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first 
> > person future" could be implemented before some internal first person 
> > past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical 
> > order. OK?
> > I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the 
> > partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it 
> > would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you 
> > mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be 
> > related to infinities of computational histories, right?
> 
> I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is 
> the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer 
> simulating me.  The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD.  
> I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either 
> case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to 
> be ordered by inherent properties of the states.
> 
> If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a 
> "computational state".  It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in 
> the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an 
> "observer moment".  It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot 
> subdivide a conscious state very finely in time.  If you could then the finer 
> you divided it, the less information it contained, then the more histories it 
> would be consistent with.  So how do you decide how big a computational state 
> is?  If you make it big enough it may pick out a unique history, or at least 
> one that is unique over a significant time span (say many seconds)?

You seem to be using "computational state" and "mental state" interchangeably. 
Even if the physical computation is necessary and sufficient for the mental 
state, this not the same as saying the two are identical. One point of 
difference between them is that the subjective order of the mental states may 
be unrelated to the actual order of the physical st

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason]

On Feb 1, 11:46 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>  OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>  "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>  their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>  process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It
>  was
>  my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>  series of disjoint states.
>
> >>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
> >>> related by a computation for making sense.
>
> >>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a
> >>> computation.
> >>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
> >>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
> >>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
> >> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and
> >> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic
> >> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of
> >> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming
> >> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy
> >> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?
>
> > OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens
> > here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is
> > just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell).
> > I will come back on this.
>
> >>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
> >>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have
> >>> to
> >>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
> >>> universal number.
>
> >>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
> >>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
> >>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
> >>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
> >>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
> >> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states
> >> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of
> >> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is
> >> relative to different  goedel numberings?
>
> > I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the
> > idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the
> > conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined
> > by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first
> > person future" could be implemented before some internal first person
> > past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical
> > order. OK?
> > I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the
> > partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it
> > would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you
> > mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be
> > related to infinities of computational histories, right?
>
> I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is 
> the time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer 
> simulating me.  The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD.  
> I understand from your answer above that the order of generation, in either 
> case, is regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to 
> be ordered by inherent properties of the states.
>
> If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a 
> "computational state".  It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in 
> the state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an 
> "observer moment".  It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot 
> subdivide a conscious state very finely in time.  

Is an observer any less conscious from one planck time to another?
Although two consecutive planck times contain observer brains in
nearly identical states, I see this as meaning over the course of a
second, many subjectively indistinguishable observer moments are
produced, it is only when there is a significant enough change in the
state of the brain that one is able to notice it.  This I think, is
what sets our perceived speed of time (distinguishable observer
moments/second).

A simple thought experiment to determine if consciousness can be
infinitely divided:  If you were to freeze an observer in time, would
that observer stop being conscious?  I believe the representation of a
mind in a certain state is conscious even if not actively changing, as
it still contain

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>>
>>>
>>>
 OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
 "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
 their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
 process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It 
 was
 my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
 series of disjoint states.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
>>> related by a computation for making sense.
>>>
>>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a 
>>> computation.
>>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
>>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
>>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
>> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
>> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic 
>> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of 
>> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming 
>> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy 
>> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?
> 
> 
> OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens 
> here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is 
> just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). 
> I will come back on this.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
>>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have 
>>> to
>>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
>>> universal number.
>>>
>>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
>>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
>>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
>>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
>>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
>> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states 
>> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of 
>> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is 
>> relative to different  goedel numberings?
> 
> 
> I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the 
> idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the 
> conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined 
> by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first 
> person future" could be implemented before some internal first person 
> past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical 
> order. OK?
> I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the 
> partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it 
> would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you 
> mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be 
> related to infinities of computational histories, right?

I'm not sure.  I was considering two kinds of order of computation. One is the 
time order in the real world of processes in my brain or a computer simulating 
me.  The other was the order of generation of "states" by the UD.  I understand 
from your answer above that the order of generation, in either case, is 
regarded as contingent and that 1st person experience is supposed to be ordered 
by inherent properties of the states.

If this is correct, it leads back to the question of how big is a 
"computational state".  It seems that for the inherent order to be coded in the 
state, the state must be much bigger than what one is conscious of in an 
"observer moment".  It also implies, contra Stathis, that one cannot subdivide 
a conscious state very finely in time.  If you could then the finer you divided 
it, the less information it contained, then the more histories it would be 
consistent with.  So how do you decide how big a computational state is?  If 
you make it big enough it may pick out a unique history, or at least one that 
is unique over a significant time span (say many seconds)?

Brent Meeker

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 29-janv.-07, à 18:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>
>>
>>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>>> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It 
>>> was
>>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>>> series of disjoint states.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be
>> related by a computation for making sense.
>>
>> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a 
>> computation.
>> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all
>> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
>> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
>
> That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
> "universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic 
> expressions.  Do we then represent the computation by a sequence of 
> goedel numbers, each number corresponding to a mental state (assuming 
> the computation is a simulation at a sufficient level to satisfy 
> comp)?  But what number is "universal"?


OK, remind me if I forget to comment this, but to explain what happens 
here I do say a little more on the Fi and Wi. A universal number is 
just the code of a universal machine or "interpreter" (in a nutshell). 
I will come back on this.






>
>>
>> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
>> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have 
>> to
>> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all
>> universal number.
>>
>> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view,
>> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be
>> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it
>> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained
>> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.
>
> OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states 
> (which may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of 
> experience); it is not inherent in the states.  And this order is 
> relative to different  goedel numberings?


I am not sure to understand the relation of your quote of me and the 
idea that the order of the computations provides the order of the 
conscious state, unless you are refering to the logical order defined 
by each computational state. If you run the UD, some "internal first 
person future" could be implemented before some internal first person 
past, buut this has nothing to do with the logical or arithmetical 
order. OK?
I intend to explain a bit more through the use of the Fi and Wi, (= the 
partial recursive functions and their domain of definition), but it 
would help me if you could explain what exactly (or more precisely) you 
mean by "order of computation". First person experiences have to be 
related to infinities of computational histories, right?

Bruno


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Stathis,

If you answer better your own question than me, I  will lose my job 
here :-)

You put your finger on the very reason why "primary matter" is 
incompatible with computationalism.
Concreteness can make histories singular only by adding actual 
infinities into it. Then from inside we have to take into account all 
interpretations, which, with church thesis, can be defined through one 
interpretation, and it can be shown it does not matter which one (for 
reason quite similar to those justifying that notions like Kolmogorov 
complexity are "machine independent").

I was preparing an answer to your post, but your own is clearer than 
mine. I will say more in an answer to Brent I intend to write tomorrow 
or this week-end.

Hope the others will read and meditate this post ...

Bruno



Le 31-janv.-07, à 14:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>  On second thoughts, my objection below is invalid. My argument has 
> been that under the right interpretation, any string or any physical 
> system could be seen as implementing any meaning or computation: you 
> reverse the usual order and write the dictionary to match the symbols. 
> This only appears strange when the interpretation is not available: 
> however erratic-seeming the internal workings of a physical machine, 
> if it interacts with the environment in an appropriate way, and if it 
> follows the same protocols interacting with a virtual environment, we 
> can accept that it is carrying out a computation. But what if we 
> chanced upon the inputless version of this same computer in ignorance 
> of its function? We might discern patterns in its behaviour (provided 
> that it had not been deliberately designed to obscure pattern, like a 
> message encoded with a one-time pad) but we could attribute any 
> interpretation to these patterns that the designers *might* have 
> chosen, as there is no way to favour one over another. This means that 
> a given physical computer cannot be fixed as implementing one 
> computation unless taken in conjunction with a particular 
> interpretation, which is problematic when multiple interpretations 
> exist or might exist; that is, it shouldn't make any difference to an 
> inputless machine if the interpretation is contained in a printed 
> manual that is waved in front of it or if it exists as an abstract 
> possibility.
>
> The problem is solved in the case of abstract machines because there 
> is no mismatch between a single physical device and all the possible 
> interpretations. We can, as you say, fix an abstract machine or string 
> against a particular environment and consider just that combination. 
> In the physical world, someone may come along at any time and insist 
> that "cat" means "dog" in his language, but in Platonia you can simply 
> consider the cat-string/ cat-meaning combination, as it would be 
> logically inconsistent to say that the combination might mean 
> something else.
>
> Stathsi Papaioannou
>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>> Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>> Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:49:00 +1100
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>   
>>  > Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> >
>> > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>> > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity 
>> of
>> > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise 
>> discrete
>> > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It 
>> was
>> > > my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided 
>> by a
>> > > series of disjoint states.
>> > 
>> > Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to 
>> be
>> > related by a computation for making sense.
>> >
>> > So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a 
>> computation.
>> > You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for 
>> all
>> > a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number
>> > that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.
>>
>>  This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, 
>> then you set their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How 
>> can you "fix once and for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do 
>> you exclude all the other possible interpretations? 
>>
>> > Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which
>> > computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we 
>

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On second thoughts, my objection below is invalid. My argument has been that 
under the right interpretation, any string or any physical system could be seen 
as implementing any meaning or computation: you reverse the usual order and 
write the dictionary to match the symbols. This only appears strange when the 
interpretation is not available: however erratic-seeming the internal workings 
of a physical machine, if it interacts with the environment in an appropriate 
way, and if it follows the same protocols interacting with a virtual 
environment, we can accept that it is carrying out a computation. But what if 
we chanced upon the inputless version of this same computer in ignorance of its 
function? We might discern patterns in its behaviour (provided that it had not 
been deliberately designed to obscure pattern, like a message encoded with a 
one-time pad) but we could attribute any interpretation to these patterns that 
the designers *might* have chosen, as there is no way to favour one over 
another. This means that a given physical computer cannot be fixed as 
implementing one computation unless taken in conjunction with a particular 
interpretation, which is problematic when multiple interpretations exist or 
might exist; that is, it shouldn't make any difference to an inputless machine 
if the interpretation is contained in a printed manual that is waved in front 
of it or if it exists as an abstract possibility.The problem is solved in the 
case of abstract machines because there is no mismatch between a single 
physical device and all the possible interpretations. We can, as you say, fix 
an abstract machine or string against a particular environment and consider 
just that combination. In the physical world, someone may come along at any 
time and insist that "cat" means "dog" in his language, but in Platonia you can 
simply consider the cat-string/ cat-meaning combination, as it would be 
logically inconsistent to say that the combination might mean something 
else.Stathsi PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: RE: ASSA 
and Many-WorldsDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 09:49:00 +1100






Bruno Marchal writes:
 
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means 
> "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their 
> continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I 
> don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the 
> UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed 
> consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes. 
> But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related 
> by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a 
> sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal 
> environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is 
> only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be 
> counted as a computation.
This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set 
their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and 
for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other 
possible interpretations? 
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation 
> we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all 
> equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal 
> number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > 
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related 
> to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the 
> infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to 
> our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person 
> notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person 
> computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete 
> states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal 
> number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable 
> ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of 
> self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable* 
> computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > > 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > http://get.live.com/search/overview
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:
 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> > > > > > > I don't 
> disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st> > > > > person, 
> pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order> > > > > other 
> than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience> > > > > 
> corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and > > can't be> 
> > > > > chopped finer than some limit.> > > >> > > > The order of a pair of 
> experiences is set by the fact that one is> > > > considered first and the 
> other second, perhaps because there is a> > > > subjective sense of the 
> passage of time, perhaps because the second> > > > experience contains a 
> memory of the first, perhaps due to some other> > > > subtle aspect of the 
> content of the experiences.> > >> > > But on this view an experience is a 
> complex thing, far from the > > atomic perception of a red flash, and even 
> includes parts that are not > > conscious. This comports with my speculation 
> that a conscious atom is > > fairly complex and has a significant duration 
> such that it overlaps the > > conscious atoms before and after. This overlap 
> provides the ordering and > > the sense of time and continuity.> > > > No 
> doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, > > 
> containing at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, > > 
> an understanding of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a > > 
> subjective duration because however long a perception is, it can't be > > 
> instantaneous. However, I don't see why it is necessary to speculate > > that 
> there must be overlap, or even what overlap could possibly mean in > > this 
> context. Static frames in a film and the infinitesimals studied in > > 
> calculus give the impression of continuous motion without the need for > > 
> overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in a film, I > > would 
> say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states > > P1,P2,P3 
> such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not > > give rise 
> to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. > > This defines 
> an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap.> > > > > > In the 
> real world, the> > > > subjective content reflects brain activity which in 
> turn reflects> > > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order 
> evolved in the > > first> > > > place), but this relationship is only a 
> contingent one.> > >> > > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, 
> but comp also > > leads to strange if not absurd conclusions.> > >> > > > If 
> the pair of> > > > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no 
> way for the> > > > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated 
> in the > > order AB> > > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the 
> content in some> > > > significant way.> > >> > > That assumes the 
> experiences can be discretely separated with not > > overlap. Certainly there 
> are instances like that: the experience just > > before you lose 
> consciousness due to a concussion and the experience > > just as you regain 
> it are disjoint in this way. You only recover > > continuity through 
> accessing memories and there is a gap even in that > > memory. But in 
> ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent > > in the overlap of 
> conscious atoms.> > > > I don't think actual situations where you lose 
> consciousness are a good > > example, because for technical reasons the "cut" 
> cannot be clean and > > instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are 
> useful. If you were > > instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and 
> later reconstituted > > with every atom in exactly the same configuration, so 
> that e.g. every > > action potential travelling down an axon continues where 
> it left off, > > then I don't see how it is possible that you would 
> experience a > > discontinuity.> > I agree that you would not. But it is 
> because of the underlying continuity of the brain physics which has neural 
> messages in transit from here to there which are not part of consciosuness - 
> but will become so. Note that things like nerve potentials obey second order 
> differential equations and so require initial conditions that include a rate 
> of change which defines a time direction. > > > > > > > This means there is 
> no natural order of physical states (or abstract> > > > machine states): the 
> order can be anything, and the subjective > > order of> > > > experience will 
> be unchanged. It also means there is no natural > > order of> > > > 
> subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which> > > > 
> seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on> > > > 
> any theory or assumption about consciousness.> > >> > > No natural order of 
> physical states? Are you denying causality?> > > > I meant that you can't 
> necessa

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>  
>  > > > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st
>  > > > person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order
>  > > > other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience
>  > > > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and 
> can't be
>  > > > chopped finer than some limit.
>  > >
>  > > The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is
>  > > considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a
>  > > subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second
>  > > experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other
>  > > subtle aspect of the content of the experiences.
>  >
>  > But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the 
> atomic perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not 
> conscious. This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is 
> fairly complex and has a significant duration such that it overlaps the 
> conscious atoms before and after. This overlap provides the ordering and 
> the sense of time and continuity.
> 
> No doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, 
> containing at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, 
> an understanding of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a 
> subjective duration because however long a perception is, it can't be 
> instantaneous. However, I don't see why it is necessary to speculate 
> that there must be overlap, or even what overlap could possibly mean in 
> this context. Static frames in a film and the infinitesimals studied in 
> calculus give the impression of continuous motion without the need for 
> overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in a film, I 
> would say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states 
> P1,P2,P3 such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not 
> give rise to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. 
> This defines an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap.
>  
>  > > In the real world, the
>  > > subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects
>  > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the 
> first
>  > > place), but this relationship is only a contingent one.
>  >
>  > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also 
> leads to strange if not absurd conclusions.
>  >
>  > > If the pair of
>  > > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the
>  > > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the 
> order AB
>  > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some
>  > > significant way.
>  >
>  > That assumes the experiences can be discretely separated with not 
> overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the experience just 
> before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the experience 
> just as you regain it are disjoint in this way. You only recover 
> continuity through accessing memories and there is a gap even in that 
> memory. But in ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent 
> in the overlap of conscious atoms.
> 
> I don't think actual situations where you lose consciousness are a good 
> example, because for technical reasons the "cut" cannot be clean and 
> instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are useful. If you were 
> instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and later reconstituted 
> with every atom in exactly the same configuration, so that e.g. every 
> action potential travelling down an axon continues where it left off, 
> then I don't see how it is possible that you would experience a 
> discontinuity.

I agree that you would not.  But it is because of the underlying continuity of 
the brain physics which has neural messages in transit from here to there which 
are not part of consciosuness - but will become so.  Note that things like 
nerve potentials obey second order differential equations and so require 
initial conditions that include a rate of change which defines a time 
direction.  

>  
>  > > This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract
>  > > machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective 
> order of
>  > > experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural 
> order of
>  > > subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which
>  > > seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on
>  > > any theory or assumption about consciousness.
>  >
>  > No natural order of physical states? Are you denying causality?
> 
> I meant that you can't necessarily work back from the mental states to 
> determine the order of the physical states underpinning them.

Probably not from the conscious part of the mental state - but as above it 
seems that for your thought experiment you need to include more than wha

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:
 
> > > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st > > > 
> > > person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order > > > 
> > > other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience > > > 
> > > corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be 
> > > > > > chopped finer than some limit.> > > > The order of a pair of 
> > > experiences is set by the fact that one is > > considered first and the 
> > > other second, perhaps because there is a > > subjective sense of the 
> > > passage of time, perhaps because the second > > experience contains a 
> > > memory of the first, perhaps due to some other > > subtle aspect of the 
> > > content of the experiences. > > But on this view an experience is a 
> > > complex thing, far from the atomic perception of a red flash, and even 
> > > includes parts that are not conscious. This comports with my speculation 
> > > that a conscious atom is fairly complex and has a significant duration 
> > > such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and after. This overlap 
> > > provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity.
No doubt even a red flash experience is more than just a red flash, containing 
at least a vague sense of personal identity, past experience, an understanding 
of what "red" means, etc. Also, it must have a subjective duration because 
however long a perception is, it can't be instantaneous. However, I don't see 
why it is necessary to speculate that there must be overlap, or even what 
overlap could possibly mean in this context. Static frames in a film and the 
infinitesimals studied in calculus give the impression of continuous motion 
without the need for overlap, so why not perception? By analogy with frames in 
a film, I would say that machine states S1,S2,S3 give rise to perceptual states 
P1,P2,P3 such that a single state (analogous to a single frame) does not give 
rise to an experience, but a pair of states P1,P2 or P2,P3 does. This defines 
an apparent overlap, but without a need for actual overlap.
 
> > In the real world, the > > subjective content reflects brain activity which 
> > in turn reflects > > environmental input (that's why the sense of order 
> > evolved in the first > > place), but this relationship is only a contingent 
> > one. > > Well that's the question isn't it. Comp assumes it, but comp also 
> > leads to strange if not absurd conclusions. > > > If the pair of > > 
> > experiences are experienced in the order AB there is no way for the > > 
> > experiencer to know whether they were actually generated in the order AB > 
> > > or BA, unless reversing the order changes the content in some > > 
> > significant way.> > That assumes the experiences can be discretely 
> > separated with not overlap. Certainly there are instances like that: the 
> > experience just before you lose consciousness due to a concussion and the 
> > experience just as you regain it are disjoint in this way. You only recover 
> > continuity through accessing memories and there is a gap even in that 
> > memory. But in ordinary circumstances the continuity might be inherent in 
> > the overlap of conscious atoms.
I don't think actual situations where you lose consciousness are a good 
example, because for technical reasons the "cut" cannot be clean and 
instantaneous. This is where thought experiments are useful. If you were 
instantaneously disintegrated in mid-thought and later reconstituted with every 
atom in exactly the same configuration, so that e.g. every action potential 
travelling down an axon continues where it left off, then I don't see how it is 
possible that you would experience a discontinuity.
 > > This means there is no natural order of physical states (or abstract > > 
 > > machine states): the order can be anything, and the subjective order of > 
 > > > experience will be unchanged. It also means there is no natural order of 
 > > > > subjective states: that which seems first, seems first and that which 
 > > > > seems second, seems second. This is good, because it doesn't depend on 
 > > > > any theory or assumption about consciousness.> > No natural order of 
 > > physical states? Are you denying causality?
I meant that you can't necessarily work back from the mental states to 
determine the order of the physical states underpinning them.
 > > > I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in > > 
 > > > arithmetic Platonia. Are we to imagine that some large number > > 
 > > > 3875835442... is a single, atomic experience and another number > > 
 > > > 3876976342... is another single, atomic experience and they have no > > 
 > > > other relation than their natural order? In that case, they would be > > 
 > > > experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness just in > > 
 > > > virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or > 
 > > > > what? Or are we to imagine another Pla

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Bruno Marchal writes:
 
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :>> > OK, but that means 
> "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > "illusion" of their 
> continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > their underpinning. But I 
> don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > process as contemplated in the 
> UD can provide that continuity. It was > > my understanding that it assumed 
> consciousness could be provided by a > > series of disjoint states.> > Yes. 
> But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be > related 
> by a computation for making sense.> > So it makes no sense to say that a 
> sequence of number is a computation. > You have to fix a "universal 
> environment". Let us fix once and for all > a godel numbering. Then it is 
> only relative to some universal number > that a sequence of number can be 
> counted as a computation.
This sounds a bit strange, as if you have the sequence of numbers, then you set 
their meaning, and thereby create the computation. How can you "fix once and 
for all a Godel numbering" in Platonia? How do you exclude all the other 
possible interpretations? 
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which > computation 
> we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to > take all 
> equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all > universal 
> number.> > This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, > 
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be > related 
> to the continuum of computations going through our states (it > includes the 
> infinity of computations describing finer grained > histories with respect to 
> our comp level of substitution.> > Consciousness is typically a first person 
> notion. Strictly speaking it > cannot be associated to one third person 
> computation. Only this one can > be described by a sequence of discrete 
> states (more or less arbitrarily > from a choice of a universal 
> number/system). First person consciousness > is associated with a uncountable 
> ("continuous") third person > computation.> > That is why all notion of 
> self-correctness can make sense only > relatively to the most *probable* 
> computational histories. OK?> > > Bruno> > > 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > 
> _
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Hal, a decade ago I 'read' your text easier than now: you firmed up your 
vocabulary - gradually out of my understanding. Sorry.
*
You seem to accept 'observer moments' and their interaction - even postulate 
one variable needed.

How long is an OM? a million years (cosmology) or a msec? Even if it is a 
portion of the latter, it makes the existence quite discontinuous - with all 
the difficulties in it. If it is continuous, then how can we talk about 
'moments'? Should we assign an equal rate change to all existence (meaning: ONE 
selection for the OM length)? If it can be ANY, varying from the infinitely 
short to the other extreme, it would 'wash away' any sense of the meaning of an 
Observer MOMENT concept. 
I think the OM is the figment of us, human observers, who want to use an 
'understandable' model. [Like: numbers (in the human logic sense).] 

Then, in view of the resulting 'unfathomable', we 'complicate' these models - 
originally created FOR comprehension - into incomprehensibility. [The way as 
e.g. to bridge Bohm's Explicate to the Implicate (by Nic de  Cusa's 2nd 
principle, left out by Bohm: the "Complicate" - what I like to assign as 
math).] 
*
That 'one' variable property you mention as needed for state- interaction is 
IMO not necessarily  o n e  within our (present) comprehension. 
I like your 'abhorring' a selection: we could select only from within 
boundaries of our *present* epistemic cognitive inventory. (Or: from a much 
narrower one dating back 2500+ years or any time in between).

John Mikes


  - Original Message - 
  From: Hal Ruhl 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 11:02 PM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds




  One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common 
  holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of 
  universes [which are a sub set of possible "objects"]] is that they 
  are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some 
  extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent 
  different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual 
  moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer 
  moment are fixed for that observer moment.

  This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that 
  selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed 
  properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero 
  information ensemble.

  Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact - 
  that is also a selection.

  I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one 
  variable property through which universe states can interact.  The 
  idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence 
  property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable 
  that one could call hyper existence through which they can 
  interact.  They interact by mutually altering each others hyper 
  existence property.  This variable property should not have just a 
  binary set of values as a possibility but should also have many 
  discrete levels as a possibility - again to avoid selection.  In 
  other words a universe state could experience a non square pulse of 
  hyper existence which could span many of the "this particular state" 
  to other state interactions.  This would be like a "wave" of hyper 
  existence propagating through some succession of universe 
  states.  Non binary, non square pulses of propagating hyper existence 
  could be a basis for what is called "consciousness" - a "flow" of 
  modulated awareness.

  Given a random component to the underlying dynamic [which I have also 
  discussed ] some such wave propagations with non binary, non square 
  pulses of hyper existence would be through infinite strings of 
  successive states that would all be "life" - and even beyond that - 
  "SAS" friendly.

  Hal Ruhl




  


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
> 
> 
>> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the 
>> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of 
>> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete 
>> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It was 
>> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a 
>> series of disjoint states.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be 
> related by a computation for making sense.
> 
> So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation. 
> You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all 
> a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number 
> that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.

That sounds good - but I don't understand "universal environment" and 
"universal number".  We adopt a goedel numbering of arithmetic expressions.  Do 
we then represent the computation by a sequence of goedel numbers, each number 
corresponding to a mental state (assuming the computation is a simulation at a 
sufficient level to satisfy comp)?  But what number is "universal"?

> 
> Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which 
> computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to 
> take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all 
> universal number.
> 
> This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, 
> computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be 
> related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it 
> includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained 
> histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.

OK. So the order of computation provides the order of conscious states (which 
may really be very complex and include more than just atoms of experience); it 
is not inherent in the states.  And this order is relative to different  goedel 
numberings?

Brent Meeker

> 
> Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it 
> cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can 
> be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily 
> from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness 
> is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person 
> computation.
> 
> That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only 
> relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800
>  > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>  > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>  >
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > > Brent Meeker writes:
>  > >
>  > > > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>  > > > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>  > > > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise 
> discrete
>  > > > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It
>  > > was my
>  > > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>  > > > > series of disjoint states.
>  > > > > >
>  > > > > > Brent Meeker
>  > > > >
>  > > > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete 
> computational
>  > > > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
>  > > > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
>  > > > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
>  > > > > continuity of consciousness.
>  > > >
>  > > > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.
>  > > >
>  > > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them
>  > > in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a
>  > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as 
> the 1s
>  > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the
>  > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order 
> as in
>  > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped 
> arbitrarily
>  > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of 
> conscious states.
>  > > >
>  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >
>  > > I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly
>  > > in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia.
>  >
>  > Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3... But in arithmtic 
> Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal 
> order that can conflict with the inherent order.
> 
> But "1 2 4 7 6 3..." is a string in Platonia, always "there" even if you 
> don't explicitly state it (as you must do in the real world), and it 
> doesn't manage to confuse the order of the counting numbers.
>  
>  > >It's not as
>  > > if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other:
>  > > they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a
>  > > sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. 
> Explicit
>  > > ordering in the physical world is important from a third person
>  > > perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person 
> experience, and
>  > > the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first 
> person
>  > > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no
>  > > external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is 
> sufficient to
>  > > create the first person impression of continuity.
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > I don't disagree with that. But that means that a conscious, 1st 
> person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order 
> other than the inherent order of the numbers. And if an experience 
> corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and can't be 
> chopped finer than some limit.
> 
> The order of a pair of experiences is set by the fact that one is 
> considered first and the other second, perhaps because there is a 
> subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the second 
> experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other 
> subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. 

But on this view an experience is a complex thing, far from the atomic 
perception of a red flash, and even includes parts that are not conscious.  
This comports with my speculation that a conscious atom is fairly complex and 
has a significant duration such that it overlaps the conscious atoms before and 
after. This overlap provides the ordering and the sense of time and continuity.

> In the real world, the 
> subjective content reflects brain activity which in 

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 29-janv.-07, à 00:11, Jason Resch a écrit :

> Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many 
> people find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always 
> assuming the worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or 
> bad, I look at the variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock 
> unturned and no path untread, it realizes every possibility and to me 
> this is an amazing and beautiful result.


Yes. Although it makes sense in QM only because QM justifies that some 
possibility have more weight than others.

Now a universal turing machine (in the mathematical sense) cannot 
distinguish ersatz linguistic worlds (cf David Lewis) from "real" one, 
and this asks already for a "MWI" interpretation of arithmetic.

It less clear that some world will be less weighted (and that is what 
we call the hunting of white rabbits).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 28-janv.-07, à 20:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :



> OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the 
> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of 
> their underpinning.  But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete 
> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity.  It was 
> my understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a 
> series of disjoint states.




Yes. But a series of discrete states (or their godel number) has to be 
related by a computation for making sense.

So it makes no sense to say that a sequence of number is a computation. 
You have to fix a "universal environment". Let us fix once and for all 
a godel numbering. Then it is only relative to some universal number 
that a sequence of number can be counted as a computation.

Now, from a first person point of view, we don't know in which 
computation we belong. So from a first person point of view, we have to 
take all equivalent computations (number sequence) relative to all 
universal number.

This is enough to explain why from first person points of view, 
computations seem to require a continuum. In a sense we have to be 
related to the continuum of computations going through our states (it 
includes the infinity of computations describing finer grained 
histories with respect to our comp level of substitution.

Consciousness is typically a first person notion. Strictly speaking it 
cannot be associated to one third person computation. Only this one can 
be described by a sequence of discrete states (more or less arbitrarily 
from a choice of a universal number/system). First person consciousness 
is associated with a uncountable ("continuous") third person 
computation.

That is why all notion of self-correctness can make sense only 
relatively to the most *probable* computational histories. OK?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2007 21:57:15 -0800> From: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: ASSA and 
Many-Worlds> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> >  > >  > 
> > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the> >  > > 
"illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of> >  > > 
their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete> >  > > 
process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It > > was my> > 
 > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a> >  > > 
series of disjoint states.> >  > > >> >  > > > Brent Meeker> >  > >> >  > > 
It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational> >  > > 
steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an> >  > > 
assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of> >  > > 
implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve> >  > > 
continuity of consciousness.> >  >> >  > Maybe that assumption is 
inconsistent.> >  >> >  > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In 
implementing them > > in the material world, as in a computer, the 
sequentiallity (is that a > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying 
physics just as the 1s > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the 
continuity of the > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, 
inherent order as in > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be 
chopped arbitrarily > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream 
of conscious states.> >  >> >  > Brent Meeker> > > > I don't see how it is 
possible to mix up something any more thoroughly > > in the real world than it 
is already mixed up in Platonia. > > Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 
7 6 3...  But in arithmtic Platonia (a small part of the kingdom) there's no 
spacial or temporal order that can conflict with the inherent order.But "1 2 4 
7 6 3..." is a string in Platonia, always "there" even if you don't explicitly 
state it (as you must do in the real world), and it doesn't manage to confuse 
the order of the counting numbers. > >It's not as > > if God has to explicitly 
put the integers in line one after the other: > > they just naturally form a 
sequence, and they would no less form a > > sequence if they were written on 
cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit > > ordering in the physical world is 
important from a third person > > perspective. If the putative sequence has a 
first person experience, and > > the substrate of its implementation is 
transparent to that first person > > experience (eg. an entity in a virtual 
reality environment with no > > external input) then the implicit ordering in 
Platonia is sufficient to > > create the first person impression of 
continuity.> >  > > Stathis Papaioannou> > I don't disagree with that.  But 
that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair of experiences, i.e. pair of 
numbers can have no order other than the inherent order of the numbers.  And if 
an experience corresponds to just a number, then experiences are discrete and 
can't be chopped finer than some limit.  The order of a pair of experiences is 
set by the fact that one is considered first and the other second, perhaps 
because there is a subjective sense of the passage of time, perhaps because the 
second experience contains a memory of the first, perhaps due to some other 
subtle aspect of the content of the experiences. In the real world, the 
subjective content reflects brain activity which in turn reflects environmental 
input (that's why the sense of order evolved in the first place), but this 
relationship is only a contingent one. If the pair of experiences are 
experienced in the order AB there is no way for the experiencer to know whether 
they were actually generated in the order AB or BA, unless reversing the order 
changes the content in some significant way.This means there is no natural 
order of physical states (or abstract machine states): the order can be 
anything, and the subjective order of experience will be unchanged. It also 
means there is no natural order of subjective states: that which seems first, 
seems first and that which seems second, seems second. This is good, because it 
doesn't depend on any theory or assumption about consciousness. > I guess I 
need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic Plato

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>  
>  > > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the
>  > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of
>  > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete
>  > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It 
> was my
>  > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a
>  > > series of disjoint states.
>  > > >
>  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >
>  > > It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational
>  > > steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an
>  > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of
>  > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve
>  > > continuity of consciousness.
>  >
>  > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.
>  >
>  > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them 
> in the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a 
> word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s 
> and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the 
> substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in 
> Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily 
> finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious states.
>  >
>  > Brent Meeker
> 
> I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly 
> in the real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia. 

Sure. In the real world I can write 1 2 4 7 6 3...  But in arithmtic Platonia 
(a small part of the kingdom) there's no spacial or temporal order that can 
conflict with the inherent order.

>It's not as 
> if God has to explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: 
> they just naturally form a sequence, and they would no less form a 
> sequence if they were written on cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit 
> ordering in the physical world is important from a third person 
> perspective. If the putative sequence has a first person experience, and 
> the substrate of its implementation is transparent to that first person 
> experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment with no 
> external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to 
> create the first person impression of continuity.
>  
> Stathis Papaioannou

I don't disagree with that.  But that means that a conscious, 1st person, pair 
of experiences, i.e. pair of numbers can have no order other than the inherent 
order of the numbers.  And if an experience corresponds to just a number, then 
experiences are discrete and can't be chopped finer than some limit.  

I guess I need a more explicit idea of how experiences occur in arithmetic 
Platonia.  Are we to imagine that some large number 3875835442... is a single, 
atomic experience and another number 3876976342... is another single, atomic 
experience and they have no other relation than their natural order?  In that 
case, they would be experiences in a certain bundle of streams of consciousness 
just in virtue of having some digits in common or having factors in common or 
what?  Or are we to imagine another Platonic object, a Turing machine, that 
generates both these numbers in a certain sequence (maybe the reverse of their 
natural order) - and that's what makes them parts of the same experience bundle?

Brent Meeker

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:
 
> > > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the > > 
> > > "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of > > 
> > > their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete > > 
> > > process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was my 
> > > > > understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a > 
> > > > series of disjoint states.> > >> > > Brent Meeker> > > > It's an 
> > > assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational > > steps 
> > > will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an > > 
> > > assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of > > 
> > > implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve > > 
> > > continuity of consciousness.> > Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.> > 
> > > Computational steps have an order in Platonia. In implementing them in 
> > > the material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a 
> > > word?) of the steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s 
> > > and 0s are provided by switches. But without the continuity of the 
> > > substrate it seems the states need some axiomatic, inherent order as in 
> > > Platonia. So then it is not clear that states can be chopped arbitrarily 
> > > finely and still function as computations - or a stream of conscious 
> > > states.> > Brent Meeker
I don't see how it is possible to mix up something any more thoroughly in the 
real world than it is already mixed up in Platonia. It's not as if God has to 
explicitly put the integers in line one after the other: they just naturally 
form a sequence, and they would no less form a sequence if they were written on 
cards and thrown to the wind. Explicit ordering in the physical world is 
important from a third person perspective. If the putative sequence has a first 
person experience, and the substrate of its implementation is transparent to 
that first person experience (eg. an entity in a virtual reality environment 
with no external input) then the implicit ordering in Platonia is sufficient to 
create the first person impression of continuity.
 
Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Hal Ruhl]

One thing that I do not agree with is what seems to me to be a common 
holding regarding observer moments [by this I mean discrete states of 
universes [which are a sub set of possible "objects"]] is that they 
are each so far assumed to have a set of properties that are to some 
extent the same as other observer moments and to some extent 
different from all other observer moments [to distinguish individual 
moments] but nevertheless the properties of an individual observer 
moment are fixed for that observer moment.

This to me is not logical since it is a selection and why that 
selection?  Why not have some blend of variable properties and fixed 
properties as a possibility?  This seems more in accord with a zero 
information ensemble.

Further, if it is also held that observer moments can not interact - 
that is also a selection.

I have proposed in other posts that there should be at least one 
variable property through which universe states can interact.  The 
idea is that all possible universe states have a uniform existence 
property, but also can have an addition property that is a variable 
that one could call hyper existence through which they can 
interact.  They interact by mutually altering each others hyper 
existence property.  This variable property should not have just a 
binary set of values as a possibility but should also have many 
discrete levels as a possibility - again to avoid selection.  In 
other words a universe state could experience a non square pulse of 
hyper existence which could span many of the "this particular state" 
to other state interactions.  This would be like a "wave" of hyper 
existence propagating through some succession of universe 
states.  Non binary, non square pulses of propagating hyper existence 
could be a basis for what is called "consciousness" - a "flow" of 
modulated awareness.

Given a random component to the underlying dynamic [which I have also 
discussed ] some such wave propagations with non binary, non square 
pulses of hyper existence would be through infinite strings of 
successive states that would all be "life" - and even beyond that - 
"SAS" friendly.

Hal Ruhl

  


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting Jason Resch):
>  
>  > > If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories
>  > > lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now. The
>  > > universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold
>  > > numbers of times each second, for billions of years before you were
>  > > born. While not every branch contains you, once you appeared in one
>  > > history line, a new copy of you has been created for every possible
>  > > outcome of every quantum event that happens anywhere in this
>  > > universe.
>  >
>  > I don't think this is the way to look at it. It's true that QM 
> predicts an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an 
> universe containing only a single unstable particle. But these 
> branchings don't produce different copies of Stathis. As a big 
> macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density matrix that has 
> only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity against 
> these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified so as to 
> change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a geiger 
> counter click. The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his 
> reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.
>  >
>  > You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton" 
> which is available online:
>  >
>  > ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html
>  >
>  > Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to 
> want to take it seriously, let alone personally." So he wrote a story in 
> which it is taken personally.
>  >
>  > Brent Meeker
> 
> Doesn't "a little fuzz" in an infinite number of branchings result in 
> every possibility actually manifesting an infinite number of times?

I don't think so.  Part of the trouble is that QM is based on continuum 
mathematics: in time, space, and probability.  So when we imagine it being 
simulated on a digital computer we're led to think of all these being integer 
valued (in suitable units).  So we think we can just talk about discrete states 
at discrete times.  But in fact I think we are implicitly relying on the time 
continuity in the computer; it that actually causes the computational process 
to occur.

The standard form of QM being based on real numbers can accommodate an infinite 
number of "branchings" with none of them significantly diverging from the 
classical result.  If you did a QM analysis of the orbit of the Earth you would 
not find the Earth diffusing away into space outside the solar system.  You 
would find its position to become infinitesimally uncertain about it's orbit 
and macroscopically uncertain in its position along its orbit.  It would only 
branch off into a truly different path if it were hit by an asteroid or 
similar.  Then QM would show two almost orthogonal histories.  Something 
similar would apply to a human life: it would proceed mostly as a classical 
system with occasional branches.  But exactly how the classical world arises 
from the quantum foundation is an unsolved problem

Brent Meeker


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> Brent Meeker writes:
>  
>  > > > Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows
>  > > just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that
>  > > there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing 
> - it
>  > > might be that "seeing the flash" spans some time interval.
>  > >
>  > > That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning
>  > > consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the 
> list
>  > > have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small time 
> slices,
>  > > even though you can't actually observe anything during one of them.
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the 
> "illusion" of their continuity may be provided by the continuity of 
> their underpinning. But I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete 
> process as contemplated in the UD can provide that continuity. It was my 
> understanding that it assumed consciousness could be provided by a 
> series of disjoint states.
>  >
>  > Brent Meeker
> 
> It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational 
> steps will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an 
> assumption of computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of 
> implementation (i.e. from brain to digital computer) will preserve 
> continuity of consciousness.

Maybe that assumption is inconsistent.

Computational steps have an order in Platonia.  In implementing them in the 
material world, as in a computer, the sequentiallity (is that a word?) of the 
steps is provided by the underlying physics just as the 1s and 0s are provided 
by switches.  But without the continuity of the substrate it seems the states 
need some axiomatic, inherent order as in Platonia. So then it is not clear 
that states can be chopped arbitrarily finely and still function as 
computations - or a stream of conscious states.

Brent Meeker


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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes (quoting Jason Resch):
 
> > If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories> > lines 
> > (and copies of you) must have been created by now. The > > universe had 
> > been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold > > numbers of times 
> > each second, for billions of years before you were > > born. While not 
> > every branch contains you, once you appeared in one> > history line, a new 
> > copy of you has been created for every possible> > outcome of every quantum 
> > event that happens anywhere in this> > universe. > > I don't think this is 
> > the way to look at it. It's true that QM predicts an uncountably infinite 
> > number of branchings, even for an universe containing only a single 
> > unstable particle. But these branchings don't produce different copies of 
> > Stathis. As a big macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density 
> > matrix that has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable 
> > entity against these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified 
> > so as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a geiger 
> > counter click. The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his reduced 
> > density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.> > You might 
> > be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton" which is 
> > available online:> > 
> > ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html> > 
> > Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to 
> > take it seriously, let alone personally." So he wrote a story in which it 
> > is taken personally.> > Brent Meeker
Doesn't "a little fuzz" in an infinite number of branchings result in every 
possibility actually manifesting an infinite number of times?
 
Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:
 
> > > Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows > > 
> > > just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that > > 
> > > there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it 
> > > > > might be that "seeing the flash" spans some time interval.> > > > 
> > > That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning > > 
> > > consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the list > 
> > > > have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small time 
> > > slices, > > even though you can't actually observe anything during one of 
> > > them.> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > OK, but that means "observer moments" 
> > > are not fundamental and the "illusion" of their continuity may be 
> > > provided by the continuity of their underpinning. But I don't see how a 
> > > strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD can provide 
> > > that continuity. It was my understanding that it assumed consciousness 
> > > could be provided by a series of disjoint states.> > Brent Meeker
It's an assumption of computationalism that the discrete computational steps 
will lead to continuity of consciousness. Moreover, it's an assumption of 
computationalism that a discontinuity in substrate of implementation (i.e. from 
brain to digital computer) will preserve continuity of consciousness.
 
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Jan 28, 2007 at 04:42:48AM -, Jason wrote:
> I agree that regardless of the creation or destruction of other 
> copies, there is no reason for there ever to be any effect on first 
> person experience, that means no funny feelings, no loss of 
> consciousness, etc.
> 
> RSSA Proponents:
> Many-worlds implies there are always branched histories where an 
> observer survives to experience another observer-moment.
> 
> ASSA Proponents:
> Observer-moments that find themselves as extremely and abnormally long-
> lived observers should be exceedingly rare.
> 
> I fail to see how the above descriptions are mutually exclusive.  I 

These are not characterisation of the ASSA and RSSA. The one you label
RSSA is known as the "No cul-de-sac assumption". The one you label as ASSA
is a consequence of the ASSA, and some relatively minimal assumptions
on measure.

> The reason I started this thread was to discuss the possibility that 
> Many-Worlds is a property of this universe for purely ASSA reasons, I 
> see no reason for it to exist for any anthropic reasons, but due to 
> the exponential growth in observer moments defined by many-world 
> universes, it makes great sense.
> 
> Jason
> 

Occams razor would favour Multiverses for Anthropic Reasons.

I never really understood your point about the ASSA, as the relevant
*SSA for understanding what world we live in is the original SSA
(birth moment sampling) which both the ASSA and the RSSA satisfy.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Jan 28, 2007 at 03:36:24PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> Russell Standish writes:> There is good reason to suppose that the absolute 
> measure of an> observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential 
> of the> OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a> 
> case, newborn OM's have vastly greater likelihood of being experienced> than 
> (say) 40 year old adult OMs.But was is the relevance of this from a first 
> person perspective? It's like saying you are vastly more likely to find 
> yourself a bacterium than a human. This is the case if you consider youself 
> standing ouside of the universe, trying to predict whether you will end up a 
> bacterium, human neonate or 40 year old - which I guess is what you mean when 
> you say the ASSA is a predictor of birth order - but obviously if you have 
> any stance at all, you are already embedded in the universe, not a 
> disembodied mind contemplating its possible futures.Stathis Papaiaonnou
> _


The SSA relates to sampling births. The SSSA extends this to observer
moments, and had some utility in reasoning about certain
paradoxes. But neither the SSA nor SSSA deals with time.

The ASSA and the RSSA refer to specifically subjective expectations,
given you are who you are. I know you are firmly in the "RSSA camp",
so probably find the ASSA a little incomprehensible, but it really is
a consistent position (although the evidence that we're not
experiencing babyhood is little hard to explain in the ASSA picture).

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Jason Resch wrote:
> On 1/28/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM 
> predicts an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an 
> universe containing only a single unstable particle.  But these 
> branchings don't produce different copies of Stathis.  As a big 
> macroscopic object he is described by a reduced density matrix that 
> has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity 
> against these microscopic quantum events unless they are amplified so
> as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a 
> geiger counter click.  The microscopic events just add a little fuzz 
> to his reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical
> world.
> 
> 
> 
> Although microscopic quantum events don't immediatly produce
> macroscopic changes, I think the butterfly effect implies that given
> sufficient time, they certainly do.  

Maybe.  But it is also the case that there is no chaos in QM.  And even if 
Stathis evolves in a way sensitive to initial conditions it doesn't imply that 
the chaotic evolution carries him far from his classical path - even in chaos 
the deviations may be bounded.

>Consider how brownian motion
> could effect which sperm results in a pregnancy.  

Sure, but this is an example of amplification of microscopic randomness. I 
agree that produces a split.  

What do you say to the prediction that the decay of an unstable atom must 
produce a *continuum* of splittings?

> Considering this, I
>  think that if you looked at two histories that branched a century
> ago, you would find two Earths inhabited by entirely different sets
> of individuals. 



> Even if Stathis's brain itself were never effected
> directly by quantum events, the fact that he ends up in branchings
> that produce different sensory input will no doubt produce new
> distnguishable observer moments.
> 
> 
> 
> You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton"
> which is available online:
> 
> ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html
> 
> 
> Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to 
> want to take it seriously, let alone personally."  So he wrote a 
> story in which it is taken personally.
> 
> 
> 
> Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many
>  people find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always 
> assuming the worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or
>  bad, I look at the variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock
>  unturned and no path untread, it realizes every possibility and to
> me this is an amazing and beautiful result.

It's not a result yet - just a speculation.  I don't think it's even a well 
defined theory yet.

Brent Meeker


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason Resch]

On 1/28/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM predicts
> an uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an universe
> containing only a single unstable particle.  But these branchings don't
> produce different copies of Stathis.  As a big macroscopic object he is
> described by a reduced density matrix that has only extremely tiny
> off-diagonal terms. So he is a stable entity against these microscopic
> quantum events unless they are amplified so as to change his macroscopic
> state - as for example if he heard a geiger counter click.  The microscopic
> events just add a little fuzz to his reduced density matrix - and the same
> for all of the classical world.



Although microscopic quantum events don't immediatly produce macroscopic
changes, I think the butterfly effect implies that given sufficient
time, they certainly do.  Consider how brownian motion could effect
which sperm results in a pregnancy.  Considering this, I
think that
if you looked at two histories that branched a century ago, you would
find two Earths inhabited by entirely different sets of individuals.
 Even if Stathis's brain itself were
never effected directly by quantum events, the fact that he ends up in
branchings that produce different sensory input will no doubt produce
new distnguishable observer moments.


You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton" which
> is available online:
>
> ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html
>
> Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to
> take it seriously, let alone personally."  So he wrote a story in which it
> is taken personally.
>


Thanks, that was an interesting read.  I find it surprising how many people
find MWI so disturbing, perhaps it is the pessimists always assuming the
worst is happening.  Instead of focusing on the good or bad, I look at the
variety it produces.  Many worlds leaves no rock unturned and no path
untread, it realizes every possibility and to me this is an amazing and
beautiful result.

Jason

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Jason Resch wrote:
> On 1/28/07, *Stathis Papaioannou* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if at a fundamental level
> time or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I agree that
> there is no necessary connection between observer moments, there
> *seems* to be a connection, in that almost by definition I won't
> suddenly find myself turning Chinese in the next moment even though
> there are 50 times as many Chinese as Australians in the world. If
> the feeling that I remain the same person from moment to moment is an
> illusion, then I am interested in how that illusion can be
> maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of consciousness,
> time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on.
> 
> 
> 
> I think the reason the illusion is maintained is rather trivial, 
> whenever your brain has the thought: "How come I was born as Stathis
> Papaioannou, and only ever remember being Stathis Papaioannou?"  Your
> brain is limited to the memories contained within it.  And since
> there is no way for your brain to have integrated memories of what it
> is like to be other observers, your illusion of personal identity is
> maintained.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Either I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they 
> are one of many, more are going to be right than if everyone guesses 
> that they are one of few. Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of 
> many. Is that what you are suggesting?
> 
> 
> Yes, and once we assume we are probably one of many similar or
> identical observer-moments, we should ask "Why should there be many?"
> 
> 
> 
> The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to 
> favour guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack 
> of evidence against something does not necessarily mean that thing is
> likely or even possible. As it happens there is perhaps some evidence
> for MW from quantum mechanics, but were it not for this, we could
> easily class MW along with pink elephants as something very unlikely
> which cannot be rescued by the ASSA.
> 
> 
> If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many histories
> lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now.  The 
> universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold 
> numbers of times each second, for billions of years before you were 
> born.  While not every branch contains you, once you appeared in one
>  history line, a new copy of you has been created for every possible
>  outcome of every quantum event that happens anywhere in this
> universe. 

I don't think this is the way to look at it.  It's true that QM predicts an 
uncountably infinite number of branchings, even for an universe containing only 
a single unstable particle.  But these branchings don't produce different 
copies of Stathis.  As a big macroscopic object he is described by a reduced 
density matrix that has only extremely tiny off-diagonal terms. So he is a 
stable entity against these microscopic quantum events unless they are 
amplified so as to change his macroscopic state - as for example if he heard a 
geiger counter click.  The microscopic events just add a little fuzz to his 
reduced density matrix - and the same for all of the classical world.

You might be interested in Greg Egan's excellent SF story "Singleton" which is 
available online:

ttp://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/MISC/SINGLETON/Singleton.html

Egan says "People who professed belief in the MWI never seemed to want to take 
it seriously, let alone personally."  So he wrote a story in which it is taken 
personally.

Brent Meeker

>I would be astonished if many-worlds turned out to be
> false, not only because of ASSA, but also due to due to the paradoxes
> that exist in other interpretations, and David Deutsch's reasoning
> that the computations of a quantum computer must be done somewhere,
> and single-world views cannot explain, for example, how Shor's
> algorithm works.



> 
> From a mathematical/computational perspective a many-world universe
> has only marginally more complicated description (program) than a
> universe that has a one-to-one mapping of states.
> 
> For a simple example of how this is possible, consider the Fibonacci
>  sequence, defined as: F(0) = 1 F(1) = 1 F(n>1) = F(n-1) + F(n-2)
> 
> But a sequence that defines an exponentially growing number of states
> can be made just by changing the + to a plus or minus: F(0) = 1 F(1)
> = 1 F(n>1) = F(n-1) ± F(n-2)
> 
> Therefore mathematical descriptions of universes like our own should
> be common, and only slightly rarer than universes that lack the
> property of many-worlds.  However, many-worlds universes define so
> many more states, and so many more observers that most of reality
> should be generated by short programs that define massive numbers of
> states before halting.  An interesting question: What about programs
> that loop, would observers and states in such a 

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > > Brent Meeker writes:
>  > >
>  > > > > > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum 
> duration of a
>  > > > > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
>  > > > > coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses 
> for that
>  > > > > 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. 
> There's not
>  > > > > much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
>  > > > > hundreds of times over in different brains.
>  > > > > >
>  > > > > > Brent Meeker
>  > > > >
>  > > > > I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of 
> the order
>  > > > > of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least
>  > > this
>  > > > > long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum 
> duration
>  > > > > for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
>  > > > > arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments)
>  > > leaving
>  > > > > the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. 
> Suppose you
>  > > > > are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a
>  > > distant
>  > > > > place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their
>  > > processing
>  > > > > of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 
> msec
>  > > > > after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, 
> suppose that
>  > > > > you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving
>  > > station
>  > > > > from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec 
> ago.
>  > > > > Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1
>  > > msec and
>  > > > > then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case 
> you have
>  > > > > only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the 
> experiment to
>  > > > > make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an
>  > > observer
>  > > > > moment can actually be instantaneous?
>  > > > >
>  > > > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  > > >
>  > > > This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian
>  > > theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the
>  > > really real you) perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in
>  > > "Consciousness Explained". The perception must be the processing and
>  > > even if the flash is very short and it's perceived duration is very
>  > > short, the brain processes producing that perception can be much 
> longer.
>  > > >
>  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >
>  > > Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case 
> where you
>  > > have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember
>  > > seeing the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will 
> survive
>  > > division into arbitrarily small intervals.
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows 
> just from the continuity of the physics. But it doesn't follow that 
> there is some experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it 
> might be that "seeing the flash" spans some time interval.
> 
> That's true, but it still allows that the process underpinning 
> consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think others on the list 
> have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small time slices, 
> even though you can't actually observe anything during one of them.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

OK, but that means "observer moments" are not fundamental and the "illusion" of 
their continuity may be provided by the continuity of their underpinning.  But 
I don't see how a strictly stepwise discrete process as contemplated in the UD 
can provide that continuity.  It was my understanding that it assumed 
consciousness could be provided by a series of disjoint states.

Brent Meeker

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason Resch]

On 1/28/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if at a fundamental level time
> or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I agree that there is no
> necessary connection between observer moments, there *seems* to be a
> connection, in that almost by definition I won't suddenly find myself
> turning Chinese in the next moment even though there are 50 times as many
> Chinese as Australians in the world. If the feeling that I remain the same
> person from moment to moment is an illusion, then I am interested in how
> that illusion can be maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of
> consciousness, time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on.
>


I think the reason the illusion is maintained is rather trivial, whenever
your brain has the
thought: "How come I was born as Stathis Papaioannou, and only ever
remember being Stathis Papaioannou?"  Your brain is limited to the
memories contained within it.  And since there is no way for your
brain to have integrated memories of what it is like to be other
observers, your illusion of personal identity is maintained.




> Either I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they are
> one of many, more are going to be right than if everyone guesses that they
> are one of few. Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of many. Is that what
> you are suggesting?
>

Yes, and once we assume we are probably one of many similar or identical
observer-moments, we should ask "Why should there be many?"


The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to favour
> guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack of evidence
> against something does not necessarily mean that thing is likely or even
> possible. As it happens there is perhaps some evidence for MW from quantum
> mechanics, but were it not for this, we could easily class MW along with
> pink elephants as something very unlikely which cannot be rescued by the
> ASSA.
>

If many-worlds is true, consider for a second how many
histories lines (and copies of you) must have been created by now.  The
universe had been branching into untold numbers of copies, untold numbers of
times each second, for billions of years before you were born.  While not
every branch contains you, once you appeared in one history line, a new copy
of you has been created for every possible outcome of every quantum event
that happens anywhere in this universe.  I would be
astonished if many-worlds turned out to be false, not only because of ASSA,
but also due to due to the paradoxes that exist in other interpretations,
and David Deutsch's reasoning that the computations of a quantum computer
must be done somewhere, and single-world views cannot explain,
for example, how Shor's algorithm works.

From a mathematical/computational perspective a many-world universe has only
marginally more complicated description (program) than a universe that has a
one-to-one mapping of states.

For a simple example of how this is possible, consider the Fibonacci
sequence, defined as:
F(0) = 1
F(1) = 1
F(n>1) = F(n-1) + F(n-2)

But a sequence that defines an exponentially growing number of
states can be made just by changing the + to a plus or minus:
F(0) = 1
F(1) = 1
F(n>1) = F(n-1) ± F(n-2)

Therefore mathematical descriptions of universes like our own should be
common, and only slightly rarer than universes that lack the property of
many-worlds.  However, many-worlds universes define so many more states, and
so many more observers that most of reality should be generated by short
programs that define massive numbers of states before halting.  An
interesting question: What about programs that loop, would
observers and states in such a universe have an infinite measure or should
looping be treated the same as halting?

Jason

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > Brent Meeker writes:> > > > 
 > > > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a> >  
> > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a> >  > > 
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that> >  > > 
5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not> >  > > 
much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring> >  > > 
hundreds of times over in different brains.> >  > > >> >  > > > Brent Meeker> > 
 > >> >  > > I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the 
order> >  > > of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at 
least > > this> >  > > long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a 
minimum duration> >  > > for an observer moment, although the interval can be 
divided up> >  > > arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought 
experiments) > > leaving> >  > > the experience intact. However, this raises a 
difficulty. Suppose you> >  > > are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are 
teleported to a > > distant> >  > > place. Once you materialise, your neurons 
will continue their > > processing> >  > > of the red flash for another 1 msec 
and at that point (i.e. 100 msec> >  > > after being shown the flash) you will 
perceive it. Next, suppose that> >  > > you have no past but are created at the 
teleportation receiving > > station> >  > > from information *as if* you had 
been shown a red flash 99 msec ago.> >  > > Your newly-created brain will 
process information for another 1 > > msec and> >  > > then you should perceive 
the red flash. However, in this case you have> >  > > only been alive for 1 
msec, and we can easily change the experiment to> >  > > make this interval as 
short as we want. Does this mean that an > > observer> >  > > moment can 
actually be instantaneous?> >  > >> >  > > Stathis Papaioannou> >  >> >  > This 
example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian > > theatre in which 
the brain does some processing *and then* you (the > > really real you) 
perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in > > "Consciousness 
Explained". The perception must be the processing and > > even if the flash is 
very short and it's perceived duration is very > > short, the brain processes 
producing that perception can be much longer.> >  >> >  > Brent Meeker> > > > 
Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case where you > > 
have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember > > seeing 
the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will survive > > division 
into arbitrarily small intervals.> > > > Stathis Papaioannou> > Assuming that 
consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows just from the continuity 
of the physics.  But it doesn't follow that there is some experience 
corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it might be that "seeing the 
flash" spans some time interval.That's true, but it still allows that the 
process underpinning consciousness can be arbitrarily divided up. I think 
others on the list have used "observer moment" to mean these arbitrarily small 
time slices, even though you can't actually observe anything during one of 
them.Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Jason Resch writes: > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: 
everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds> Date: Sun, 
28 Jan 2007 04:42:48 +> > > On Jan 27, 9:02 pm, Stathis Papaioannou > 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:> > It's true that if every entity assumes it is 
common, more entities overall are going to be correct. However, what is the 
relevance of this to first person experience? The ASSA has been used on this 
list as an argument against quantum immortality, on the grounds that since the 
measure of versions of you under 100 in the multiverse will be much greater 
than the measure of versions over 1000, you are unlikely to make it to 1000. 
But this is simply looking at the situation from the third person perspective, 
and QTI explicitly aknowledges that you are unlikely to live forever from 
someone else's point of view.  The point is, the ASSA has no effect on your 
first person experience. You can expect to experience your 33rd, 50th and 
1000th year with absolute certainty as long as there is a single copy of you 
extant, and they will subjectively last exactly one year regardless of the 
number of copies. Stathis Papaioannou> > I agree that regardless of the 
creation or destruction of other > copies, there is no reason for there ever to 
be any effect on first > person experience, that means no funny feelings, no 
loss of > consciousness, etc.> > RSSA Proponents:> Many-worlds implies there 
are always branched histories where an > observer survives to experience 
another observer-moment.> > ASSA Proponents:> Observer-moments that find 
themselves as extremely and abnormally long-> lived observers should be 
exceedingly rare.> > I fail to see how the above descriptions are mutually 
exclusive.  I > would say if one finds themself experiencing an observer moment 
of a > 1,000 year old human they should consider such an experience to be > 
extremely rare.  I believe he point of dispute is centered on the > nature of 
consciousness, I think some RSSA proponents are tied to the > idea that 
consciousness is continuous, or otherwise tied to each > observer.  However, if 
consciousness can be simulated by a digital > machine, then there must be 
discrete time intervals representing each > state, and if time is discrete, how 
can consciousness be continuous?  > Some ASSA proponents seem to believe that 
consciousness is like taking > random samples among all observer moments, with 
the exceedingly rare > observer moments never experiencing consciousness.  This 
too is an > error in my opinion.Consciousness *seems* to be continuous even if 
at a fundamental level time or brain processes are discrete. Also, although I 
agree that there is no necessary connection between observer moments, there 
*seems* to be a connection, in that almost by definition I won't suddenly find 
myself turning Chinese in the next moment even though there are 50 times as 
many Chinese as Australians in the world. If the feeling that I remain the same 
person from moment to moment is an illusion, then I am interested in how that 
illusion can be maintained, regardless of the underlying mechanisms of 
consciousness, time, whether or not there exists a real world, and so on. > I 
see reality's first person as the set of all observer moments.  > Every 
experience that can exist does, and by definition is > experienced.  The fact 
that some of these experiences exist in greater > numbers than others has no 
consequence on any of the individual > subjective experiences, but it does mean 
that most observer-moments > can use their existance to make reasonable 
estimates regarding what > types of observer moments are likely to be most 
probable.  ASSA might > be applicable in determing properties of universes that 
observers are > likely to find themselves in.  The difficulty in this regard is 
> separating what properties of this universe are here due to necessary > 
anthropic reasons, and what properties of this universe are here only > because 
they increase the measure of its inhabitant observer moments.> > The reason I 
started this thread was to discuss the possibility that > Many-Worlds is a 
property of this universe for purely ASSA reasons, I > see no reason for it to 
exist for any anthropic reasons, but due to > the exponential growth in 
observer moments defined by many-world > universes, it makes great sense.Either 
I'm one of few or one of many. If everyone guesses that they are one of many, 
more are going to be right than if everyone guesses that they are one of few. 
Therefore, I should guess that I'm one of many. Is that what you are 
suggesting? The argument has some appeal assuming we have no other reason to 
favour guessing that we are one of many or one of few. However, lack of 
evidence against

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > > > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a
>  > > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a
>  > > coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that
>  > > 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not
>  > > much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring
>  > > hundreds of times over in different brains.
>  > > >
>  > > > Brent Meeker
>  > >
>  > > I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order
>  > > of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least 
> this
>  > > long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration
>  > > for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up
>  > > arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments) 
> leaving
>  > > the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you
>  > > are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a 
> distant
>  > > place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their 
> processing
>  > > of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec
>  > > after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, suppose that
>  > > you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving 
> station
>  > > from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec ago.
>  > > Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1 
> msec and
>  > > then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case you have
>  > > only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the experiment to
>  > > make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an 
> observer
>  > > moment can actually be instantaneous?
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian 
> theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the 
> really real you) perceives it. This is the idea Dennett criticizes in 
> "Consciousness Explained". The perception must be the processing and 
> even if the flash is very short and it's perceived duration is very 
> short, the brain processes producing that perception can be much longer.
>  >
>  > Brent Meeker
> 
> Do you doubt that you would perceive the red flash in the case where you 
> have not had 100 msec to process it? At the least you would remember 
> seeing the flash, implying that the stream of consciousness will survive 
> division into arbitrarily small intervals.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

Assuming that consciousness supervenes on the physics, this follows just from 
the continuity of the physics.  But it doesn't follow that there is some 
experience corresponding to 1msec of brain processing - it might be that 
"seeing the flash" spans some time interval.

Brent Meeker

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason]

On Jan 27, 9:02 pm, Stathis Papaioannou 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It's true that if every entity assumes it is common, more entities overall 
> are going to be correct. However, what is the relevance of this to first 
> person experience? The ASSA has been used on this list as an argument against 
> quantum immortality, on the grounds that since the measure of versions of you 
> under 100 in the multiverse will be much greater than the measure of versions 
> over 1000, you are unlikely to make it to 1000. But this is simply looking at 
> the situation from the third person perspective, and QTI explicitly 
> aknowledges that you are unlikely to live forever from someone else's point 
> of view.  The point is, the ASSA has no effect on your first person 
> experience. You can expect to experience your 33rd, 50th and 1000th year with 
> absolute certainty as long as there is a single copy of you extant, and they 
> will subjectively last exactly one year regardless of the number of copies. 
> Stathis Papaioannou

I agree that regardless of the creation or destruction of other 
copies, there is no reason for there ever to be any effect on first 
person experience, that means no funny feelings, no loss of 
consciousness, etc.

RSSA Proponents:
Many-worlds implies there are always branched histories where an 
observer survives to experience another observer-moment.

ASSA Proponents:
Observer-moments that find themselves as extremely and abnormally long-
lived observers should be exceedingly rare.

I fail to see how the above descriptions are mutually exclusive.  I 
would say if one finds themself experiencing an observer moment of a 
1,000 year old human they should consider such an experience to be 
extremely rare.  I believe he point of dispute is centered on the 
nature of consciousness, I think some RSSA proponents are tied to the 
idea that consciousness is continuous, or otherwise tied to each 
observer.  However, if consciousness can be simulated by a digital 
machine, then there must be discrete time intervals representing each 
state, and if time is discrete, how can consciousness be continuous?  
Some ASSA proponents seem to believe that consciousness is like taking 
random samples among all observer moments, with the exceedingly rare 
observer moments never experiencing consciousness.  This too is an 
error in my opinion.

I see reality's first person as the set of all observer moments.  
Every experience that can exist does, and by definition is 
experienced.  The fact that some of these experiences exist in greater 
numbers than others has no consequence on any of the individual 
subjective experiences, but it does mean that most observer-moments 
can use their existance to make reasonable estimates regarding what 
types of observer moments are likely to be most probable.  ASSA might 
be applicable in determing properties of universes that observers are 
likely to find themselves in.  The difficulty in this regard is 
separating what properties of this universe are here due to necessary 
anthropic reasons, and what properties of this universe are here only 
because they increase the measure of its inhabitant observer moments.

The reason I started this thread was to discuss the possibility that 
Many-Worlds is a property of this universe for purely ASSA reasons, I 
see no reason for it to exist for any anthropic reasons, but due to 
the exponential growth in observer moments defined by many-world 
universes, it makes great sense.

Jason


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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Russell Standish writes:> There is good reason to suppose that the absolute 
measure of an> observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential of 
the> OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a> case, 
newborn OM's have vastly greater likelihood of being experienced> than (say) 40 
year old adult OMs.But was is the relevance of this from a first person 
perspective? It's like saying you are vastly more likely to find yourself a 
bacterium than a human. This is the case if you consider youself standing 
ouside of the universe, trying to predict whether you will end up a bacterium, 
human neonate or 40 year old - which I guess is what you mean when you say the 
ASSA is a predictor of birth order - but obviously if you have any stance at 
all, you are already embedded in the universe, not a disembodied mind 
contemplating its possible futures.Stathis Papaiaonnou
_
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Jan 27, 2007 at 04:11:00AM -0800, William wrote:
> 
> Your replys are really difficult for me to read, something seems to go 
> wrong in their formatting.

Me too!

> 
> ASSA predicts you are most likely to be thinking that you are 50, and 
> if any random consciousness thinks he is 50 years of age, he will be 
> correct in zillion/(zillion+99) cases, but there is no way to actually 
> know to know this no ... The real question is what happens if an 
> infinite number of copies are created, then ASSA states you will 
> actually be thinking you are 50 for sure, and RSSA may avoid this 
> paradox in this case ... That is the paradox I was referring to and 

There is good reason to suppose that the absolute measure of an
observer moment is inversely proportional to the exponential of the
OM's complexity (this is discussed elsewhere in my book). In such a
case, newborn OM's have vastly greater liklihood of being experienced
than (say) 40 year old adult OMs.

Now of course if you throw in a mischievous deity and you can make up whatever
scenario you like. This is a favourite pastime of the "God moves in
mysterious ways" folk. However, there is no reason for me take any such
proposal seriously until such time as there is some evidence
supporting such mechanisms.

> there are similar paradoxes which are not avoided by the above 
> definition RSSA sampling your birth moment.
> 

Which paradoxes? The Adam and Eve paradox has been dealt with in a
Multiverse context in other everything-list postings, and the original
Doomsday Argument is not a paradox AFAICT.

> 
> 
-- 


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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

John, It's not a scientific question, it's a philosophical question. Early 
Christian thinkers such as Augustine considered preservation of personal 
identity when you died and went to heaven. The fact that there is no heaven 
does not invalidate the *philosophical* point any more than the scientific 
impossibility of teleportation would invalidate conclusions drawn from such 
thought experiments. So, suppose God destroyed your body at A and then created 
a perfect copy at B: would you survive the procedure? If not, then in what 
sense have you survived the last few years given that all the atoms in your 
body have been replaced by natural processes?Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007 
17:00:11 -0500








Stathis,
 
maybe it is a postulate that (in my mind) what you write 
does not make sense? 
 
A Cc generated/operated by tissue - partially transferred 
to parts unknown  without (the?) tissue and still 
functions? I am a simpleminded primitive peasant, cannot condone that you, a 
'thinking' person (no insult meant) accept the drawing of final conclusions 
upon 
our present insufficient knowledge base. 50 years ago everything was explained 
as a telephone switchboard, 150 years ago as a steam-engine.
Always by metaphors we did not (yet) quite know and 
science was happy. Even things like phlogiston or vitality survived for some 
time. Today it is comp on equipment and process exceeding the present technique 
and things borrowed from sci-fi. And people take it SSOOO seriously! 

E.g. your calculation of the speed of thought upon the 
physical registrations of visual measurements. It is the inertia of the tool we 
use. Thought,  by all metaphors, is timeless/spaceless, you can 
experimentally proove it to yourself by 'thinking' of Dzhingis Kahn, Cleopatra 
and Hitler around a table in South america. Or: on the  Moon. 
 
You wrote:(I added the asterisks)
"... *if I found myself* 
continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, ..." -- what 
I would read as  corrected into::
"... *if I think about myself as*"  making a 
difference for me in drawing conclusions. And you emphasized this in your 
subsequent sentence in
"IF... THEN" -  by the capitalization. So: if 
not, not.  A typical 'sowhat'. 
 
I was hoping that you refer a bit to my ideas, not just repeat yours. 

But, alas, so are the lists
 
Have a good weekend
 
John

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  
  Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 10:55 
  PM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
  John, I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, 
  but I regard this as a contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I 
  experience, and if I found myself continuing to have similar experiences 
  despite teleportation, brain transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, 
  then I would have survived as me. Note that I am not saying these things are 
  possible (perhaps this is where you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), 
  just that IF in these situations I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso 
  facto, I would still be me, despite losing the original body and 
  brain.Stathis Papaioannou
  

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and 
Many-WorldsDate: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500
Stathis:
interesting.  See my additional question after your 
reply
John

  - 
  Original Message - 
  From: 
  Stathis Papaioannou 

  To: 
  everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  
  Sent: 
      Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
  Subject: 
  RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
  
  John Mikes writes: > Stathis:> your 
  concluding sentence is> " But my brain just won't let me think this 
  way."> *> Have you been carried away?> Who is "your 
  brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the 
mechanism 
  of your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, is not 
  predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?> 
  More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  
  brain?> How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your 
  brain) when 'your brain' won't let it happen?> OK, let's introduce 
  "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and your 'brain' did 
  not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - as a reason 
  for "won't let me".> With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this 
  way"? How many people are you indeed?> *> I am asking these 
  stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

It's true that if every entity assumes it is common, more entities overall are 
going to be correct. However, what is the relevance of this to first person 
experience? The ASSA has been used on this list as an argument against quantum 
immortality, on the grounds that since the measure of versions of you under 100 
in the multiverse will be much greater than the measure of versions over 1000, 
you are unlikely to make it to 1000. But this is simply looking at the 
situation from the third person perspective, and QTI explicitly aknowledges 
that you are unlikely to live forever from someone else's point of view. The 
point is, the ASSA has no effect on your first person experience. You can 
expect to experience your 33rd, 50th and 1000th year with absolute certainty as 
long as there is a single copy of you extant, and they will subjectively last 
exactly one year regardless of the number of copies. Stathis PapaioannouJason 
Resch writes:On 1/27/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you turn 50. Given 
that you are already alive, you are going to experience the moments of your 
life in order and each one will last the same amount of time, however 
many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if in the 
next moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and 2n 
copies which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance of 
experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any difference; 
if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating your absolute 
measure at each stage of life.
I don't think ASSA (At least my understanding of it) predicts there would be 
any noticeable difference to the observer on their 50th birthday.  It does not 
predict for example, that none of the prior or later years are experienced, in 
fact they certainly are experienced because they exist with a postive measure.  
What ASSA implies is that simply a statistical argument, which is this: The 
observer moment you currently experience is more likely a common one than an 
uncommon one.  For example, at 33 this observer could think according to ASSA, 
I am experiencing this observer moment, therefore I am likely to be a common 
observer moment.  At 33 this would be false, but then statistics are never 100% 
accurate.  Now consider the observer holds on to ASSA and so when he is 50 he 
still assumes that his currently perceived observer moment is probable.  At 
this time there are zillions of him, and zillions of him are correct.  This 
large number of observer moments that are correct vastly outweigh the number of 
observer moments that were incorrect, and hence ASSA is a reasonable belief, as 
it leads to a true conclusion more often than not.
Jason

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> >  > This raises the question again of "what is the 
minimum duration of a > > conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long 
time for a > > coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for 
that > > 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not > 
> much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring > > hundreds 
of times over in different brains.> >  >> >  > Brent Meeker> > > > I think the 
minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order > > of 100 msec, so 
if you are shown a red flash it will take at least this > > long before you 
perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration > > for an observer 
moment, although the interval can be divided up > > arbitrarily (for example, 
in teleportation thought experiments) leaving > > the experience intact. 
However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you > > are shown a red flash and 99 
msec later you are teleported to a distant > > place. Once you materialise, 
your neurons will continue their processing > > of the red flash for another 1 
msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec > > after being shown the flash) you will 
perceive it. Next, suppose that > > you have no past but are created at the 
teleportation receiving station > > from information *as if* you had been shown 
a red flash 99 msec ago. > > Your newly-created brain will process information 
for another 1 msec and > > then you should perceive the red flash. However, in 
this case you have > > only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the 
experiment to > > make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that 
an observer > > moment can actually be instantaneous?> > > > Stathis 
Papaioannou> > This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian 
theatre in which the brain does some processing *and then* you (the really real 
you) perceives it.  This is the idea Dennett criticizes in "Consciousness 
Explained".  The perception must be the processing and even if the flash is 
very short and it's perceived duration is very short, the brain processes 
producing that perception can be much longer.> > Brent MeekerDo you doubt that 
you would perceive the red flash in the case where you have not had 100 msec to 
process it? At the least you would remember seeing the flash, implying that the 
stream of consciousness will survive division into arbitrarily small 
intervals.Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Stathis,

maybe it is a postulate that (in my mind) what you write does not make sense? 

A Cc generated/operated by tissue - partially transferred to parts unknown  
without (the?) tissue and still functions? I am a simpleminded primitive 
peasant, cannot condone that you, a 'thinking' person (no insult meant) accept 
the drawing of final conclusions upon our present insufficient knowledge base. 
50 years ago everything was explained as a telephone switchboard, 150 years ago 
as a steam-engine.
Always by metaphors we did not (yet) quite know and science was happy. Even 
things like phlogiston or vitality survived for some time. Today it is comp on 
equipment and process exceeding the present technique and things borrowed from 
sci-fi. And people take it SSOOO seriously! 
E.g. your calculation of the speed of thought upon the physical registrations 
of visual measurements. It is the inertia of the tool we use. Thought,  by all 
metaphors, is timeless/spaceless, you can experimentally proove it to yourself 
by 'thinking' of Dzhingis Kahn, Cleopatra and Hitler around a table in South 
america. Or: on the  Moon. 

You wrote:(I added the asterisks)
"... *if I found myself* continuing to have similar experiences despite 
teleportation, ..." -- what I would read as  corrected into::
"... *if I think about myself as*"  making a difference for me in drawing 
conclusions. And you emphasized this in your subsequent sentence in
"IF... THEN" -  by the capitalization. So: if not, not.  A typical 'sowhat'. 

I was hoping that you refer a bit to my ideas, not just repeat yours. 
But, alas, so are the lists

Have a good weekend

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 10:55 PM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds


  John, 

  I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, but I regard this as a 
contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I experience, and if I found 
myself continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, brain 
transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, then I would have survived as 
me. Note that I am not saying these things are possible (perhaps this is where 
you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), just that IF in these situations 
I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso facto, I would still be me, despite 
losing the original body and brain.

  Stathis Papaioannou




From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
    To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500


Stathis:
interesting.  See my additional question after your reply
John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
      Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds




  John Mikes writes:
   
  > Stathis:
  > your concluding sentence is
  > " But my brain just won't let me think this way."
  > *
  > Have you been carried away?
  > Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only 
that the mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, 
is not predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
  > More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  brain?
  > How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 
'your brain' won't let it happen?
  > OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way 
and your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to 
comply - as a reason for "won't let me".
  > With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people 
are you indeed?
  > *
  > I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF 
("I"), vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the 
rest of the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such 
respect.
  > John

  "I" am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in 
the same way as "walking" is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, 
my legs. "I" am not identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to 
my legs. Now, of course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and 
of course "I can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these 
statements are not tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I 
can think" or "I can only walk wher

Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason Resch]

On 1/27/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you turn 50.
> Given that you are already alive, you are going to experience the moments
> of
> your life in order and each one will last the same amount of time, however
>
> many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if in
> the next
> moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and 2n
> copies
> which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance of
> experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any
> difference;
> if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating your
> absolute
> measure at each stage of life.
>


I don't think ASSA (At least my understanding of it) predicts there would be
any
noticeable difference to the observer on their 50th birthday.  It does
not predict for example, that none of the prior or
later years are experienced, in fact they certainly are experienced because
they exist with a postive measure.  What ASSA implies is that simply a
statistical argument, which is this: The observer moment you currently
experience is more likely a common one than an uncommon one.  For example,
at 33 this observer could think according to ASSA, I am experiencing this
observer moment, therefore I am likely to be a common observer moment.  At
33 this would be false, but then statistics are never 100% accurate.  Now
consider the observer holds on to ASSA and so when he is 50 he still assumes
that his currently perceived observer moment is probable.  At this time
there are zillions of him, and zillions of him are correct.  This
large number of observer moments that are correct vastly outweigh the
number of
observer moments that were incorrect, and hence ASSA is a reasonable belief,
as it leads to a true conclusion more often than not.

Jason

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > > Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are
>  > > specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a
>  > > superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence,
>  > > you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched 
> that of
>  > > a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would
>  > > be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were
>  > > being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be
>  > > impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were
>  > > implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.
>  > >
>  > > Stathis Papaioannou
>  >
>  > Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your 
> consciousness.
>  >
>  > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a 
> conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a 
> coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 
> 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not 
> much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring 
> hundreds of times over in different brains.
>  >
>  > Brent Meeker
> 
> I think the minimum duration of a conscious experience is of the order 
> of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will take at least this 
> long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum duration 
> for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up 
> arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments) leaving 
> the experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you 
> are shown a red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a distant 
> place. Once you materialise, your neurons will continue their processing 
> of the red flash for another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec 
> after being shown the flash) you will perceive it. Next, suppose that 
> you have no past but are created at the teleportation receiving station 
> from information *as if* you had been shown a red flash 99 msec ago. 
> Your newly-created brain will process information for another 1 msec and 
> then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this case you have 
> only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the experiment to 
> make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an observer 
> moment can actually be instantaneous?
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

This example implicitly assumes a kind of dualism or cartesian theatre in which 
the brain does some processing *and then* you (the really real you) perceives 
it.  This is the idea Dennett criticizes in "Consciousness Explained".  The 
perception must be the processing and even if the flash is very short and it's 
perceived duration is very short, the brain processes producing that perception 
can be much longer.

Brent Meeker

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John Mikes]

Thanks, Russell.
I believe "my slip is showing" that I did not follow the Mallah related
posts.
If someone concentrates on just certain topics, may miss something.
You are very kind
John


On 1/24/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:
> >
> >   PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining
> the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J
> >
>
> It is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:
>
> \section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}
>
> In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
> Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
> disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
> difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
> assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
> applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
> absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
> selected at random from that distribution.
>
> Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
> birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
> assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
> determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
> rule\index{Born rule}
> (\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
> person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no
> cul-de-sac conjecture} is
> true.
>
> The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
>   Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
>   refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
>   Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph}
> for the version I use.  Since this
>   debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
>   the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
>   Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
>   Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the
> ``relative'' camp which includes
>   Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
>   Papaioannou, and myself.
>
> \index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}
>
> Both of these ``camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
> The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
> strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
> strong self sampling assumption.
>
>
>
> 
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
> 
>
> >
>

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

William Vandenberghe writes:[SP]>Suppose for simplicity that there is only one 
world: you live your life
from birth to death and that's it. God reveals to you that you will
live to be 100, but on your 50th birthday he will create a zillion
copies of you which will all run in parallel for one minute and then
all but one of the copies will be instantly destroyed. This means that
almost all of your measure will be contained in that one minute on your
50th birthday. You can add variations to this thought experiment: God
planned this before you were born; God will not decide to do this until
you are 45; God will wait until the eve of your 50th birthday and toss
a coin to decide whether he will make the copies or not; God does not
tell you of his decision and you have to come up with a method to test
whether he makes the copies or not. I claim that it will be impossible
to notice anything unusual happening at any point in your life as a
result of God's action or inaction. The first minute of your 50th
birthday will last exactly one minute and will feel exactly the same as
the preceding and the following minute. What do you think the ASSA
predicts you will experience? Can you design a test to see what God is
up to if he doesn't tell you? [WV]> ASSA predicts you are most likely to be 
thinking that you are 50, and > if any random consciousness thinks he is 50 
years of age, he will be > correct in zillion/(zillion+99) cases, but there is 
no way to actually > know to know this no ... The real question is what happens 
if an > infinite number of copies are created, then ASSA states you will > 
actually be thinking you are 50 for sure, and RSSA may avoid this > paradox in 
this case ... That is the paradox I was referring to and > there are similar 
paradoxes which are not avoided by the above > definition RSSA sampling your 
birth moment.You're 45 and God suddenly decides to make the copies when you 
turn 50. Will you suddenly find yourself turning 50 or will you live through 
the years 45-49 first? Once you get to 50 how fast will your clock run? What 
will you experience as the end of the minute approaches - will you loop back to 
the start of the minute or somehow stay suspended at the end? Will you get a 
funny feeling in your head as the minute of zillionfold copying starts and 
ends? If God decides to make 2 zillion copies at age 51 will you be twice as 
likely to find yourself aged 51 as 50, and if so what testable consequences 
might this have? If it has no testable consequences then in what sense is it 
meaningful? According to the RSSA, *nothing* happens from your POV when you 
turn 50. Given that you are already alive, you are going to experience the 
moments of your life in order and each one will last the same amount of time, 
however many copies of you are extant. The significance of measure is that if 
in the next moment there will be n copies of you who will have experience x and 
2n copies which will have experience y, then you will have twice as much chance 
of experiencing y as of experiencing x. The value of n cannot make any 
difference; if it did, then an empirical test would be possible demonstrating 
your absolute measure at each stage of life.Stathis Papaioannou 
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[William]

On Jan 27, 12:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> William Vandenberghe writes:> On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL 
> PROTECTED]> wrote:> > On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M 
> wrote:> >> > >   PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text 
> explaining the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the 
> relevant excerpt:> >> > \section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self 
> Sampl\-ing Assumption}> >> > In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated 
> debate between Jacques> > Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always 
> arguing from> > disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of 
> our> > difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling> > 
> assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be> > applied. 
> Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an> > absolute positive 
> measure, and that our current observer moment is> > selected at random from 
> that distribution.> >> > Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME 
> postulate} only the> > birth moment is selected at random, according to the 
> self sampling> > assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can 
> be> > determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's> > 
> rule\index{Born rule}> > (\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of 
> observer measure, first> > person immortality follows provided the no 
> cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no cul-de-sac conjecture} is> > true.> >> > The 
> Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling> >   
> Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to> >   refer to 
> Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative> >   Self 
> Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for the 
> version I use.  Since this> >   debate took place, other debates have taken 
> place between members of> >   the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such 
> names as Jacques> >   Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}> >   Saibal 
> Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the 
> ``relative'' camp which includes> >   Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} 
> Stathis> >   Papaioannou, and myself.> >> > \index{Papaioannou, 
> Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}> >> > Both of these ``camps'' appear to 
> have internally consistent pictures.> > The fact that I'm not currently 
> experiencing childhood, is for me> > strong evidence that the ASSA is an 
> incorrect application of the> > strong self sampling assumption.> >> > 
> ---­­->
>  > A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)> > 
> Mathematics  > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Australia
> http://www.hpcoders.com.au> > 
> ---­­->
>  > I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)> > How does the fact that 
> you're not experiencing childhood provide> evidence that ASSA is incorrect, 
> as chances of experiencing childhood> or adulthood are both significant so I 
> don't see why that would rule> out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different 
> definition for RSSA as this> definition does not even solve any of the crazy 
> paradoxes ASSA has ...> Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate 
> :)Suppose for simplicity that there is only one world: you live your life 
> from birth to death and that's it. God reveals to you that you will live to 
> be 100, but on your 50th birthday he will create a zillion copies of you 
> which will all run in parallel for one minute and then all but one of the 
> copies will be instantly destroyed. This means that almost all of your 
> measure will be contained in that one minute on your 50th birthday. You can 
> add variations to this thought experiment: God planned this before you were 
> born; God will not decide to do this until you are 45; God will wait until 
> the eve of your 50th birthday and toss a coin to decide whether he will make 
> the copies or not; God does not tell you of his decision and you have to come 
> up with a method to test whether he makes the copies or not. I claim that it 
> will be impossible to notice anything unusual happening at any point in your 
> life as a result of God's action or inaction. The first minute of your 50th 
> birthday will last exactly one minute and will feel exactly the same as the 
> preceding and the following minute. What do you think the ASSA predicts you 
> will experience? Can you design a test to see what God is up to if he doesn't 
> tell you? Stathis 
> Papaioannou_
> Live Search: Better results, fasthttp://get.live.com/search/overview

Your replys are really difficult for me to read, something seems to go 
wrong in their formatting.

ASSA

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

William Vandenberghe writes:> On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL 
PROTECTED]> wrote:> > On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:> 
>> > >   PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining 
the essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:> 
>> > \section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}> 
>> > In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques> > 
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from> > disparate 
positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our> > difference of opinion 
was how the strong self sampling> > assumption\index{self sampling 
assumption!strong|emph} should be> > applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each 
observer moment had an> > absolute positive measure, and that our current 
observer moment is> > selected at random from that distribution.> >> > Since I 
accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the> > birth moment is 
selected at random, according to the self sampling> > assumption. Thereafter, 
each observer moment's measure can be> > determined {\em relative} to its 
predecessor by means of Born's> > rule\index{Born rule}> > (\ref{proj-prob}). 
Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first> > person immortality 
follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no cul-de-sac conjecture} 
is> > true.> >> > The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self 
Sampling> >   Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to> >   
refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative> >   Self 
Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for the 
version I use.  Since this> >   debate took place, other debates have taken 
place between members of> >   the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such names 
as Jacques> >   Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}> >   Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, 
Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the ``relative'' camp which includes> 
>   Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis> >   Papaioannou, and myself.> 
>> > \index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}> >> > Both of these 
``camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.> > The fact that I'm 
not currently experiencing childhood, is for me> > strong evidence that the 
ASSA is an incorrect application of the> > strong self sampling assumption.> >> 
> 
---­-> 
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)> > 
Mathematics  > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052   
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Australia
http://www.hpcoders.com.au> > 
---­-> 
> I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)> > How does the fact that you're 
not experiencing childhood provide> evidence that ASSA is incorrect, as chances 
of experiencing childhood> or adulthood are both significant so I don't see why 
that would rule> out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different definition for 
RSSA as this> definition does not even solve any of the crazy paradoxes ASSA 
has ...> Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate :)Suppose for 
simplicity that there is only one world: you live your life from birth to death 
and that's it. God reveals to you that you will live to be 100, but on your 
50th birthday he will create a zillion copies of you which will all run in 
parallel for one minute and then all but one of the copies will be instantly 
destroyed. This means that almost all of your measure will be contained in that 
one minute on your 50th birthday. You can add variations to this thought 
experiment: God planned this before you were born; God will not decide to do 
this until you are 45; God will wait until the eve of your 50th birthday and 
toss a coin to decide whether he will make the copies or not; God does not tell 
you of his decision and you have to come up with a method to test whether he 
makes the copies or not. I claim that it will be impossible to notice anything 
unusual happening at any point in your life as a result of God's action or 
inaction. The first minute of your 50th birthday will last exactly one minute 
and will feel exactly the same as the preceding and the following minute. What 
do you think the ASSA predicts you will experience? Can you design a test to 
see what God is up to if he doesn't tell you? Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> > Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your 
experiences are > > specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone 
else in a > > superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing 
coincidence, > > you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly 
matched that of > > a stranger on the other side of the world? During that 
period it would > > be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where 
you were > > being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be 
> > impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were > > 
implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.> > > > Stathis 
Papaioannou> > Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your 
consciousness.> > This raises the question again of "what is the minimum 
duration of a conscious state"?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a 
coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I 
think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness 
in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in 
different brains.> > Brent MeekerI think the minimum duration of a conscious 
experience is of the order of 100 msec, so if you are shown a red flash it will 
take at least this long before you perceive a red flash. This implies a minimum 
duration for an observer moment, although the interval can be divided up 
arbitrarily (for example, in teleportation thought experiments) leaving the 
experience intact. However, this raises a difficulty. Suppose you are shown a 
red flash and 99 msec later you are teleported to a distant place. Once you 
materialise, your neurons will continue their processing of the red flash for 
another 1 msec and at that point (i.e. 100 msec after being shown the flash) 
you will perceive it. Next, suppose that you have no past but are created at 
the teleportation receiving station from information *as if* you had been shown 
a red flash 99 msec ago. Your newly-created brain will process information for 
another 1 msec and then you should perceive the red flash. However, in this 
case you have only been alive for 1 msec, and we can easily change the 
experiment to make this interval as short as we want. Does this mean that an 
observer moment can actually be instantaneous?Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[William]

On Jan 25, 3:50 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:
>
> >   PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the 
> > essence of ASSA (RSSA?). JIt is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:
>
> \section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}
>
> In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
> Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
> disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
> difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
> assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
> applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
> absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
> selected at random from that distribution.
>
> Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
> birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
> assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
> determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
> rule\index{Born rule}
> (\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
> person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no 
> cul-de-sac conjecture} is
> true.
>
> The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
>   Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
>   refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
>   Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for 
> the version I use.  Since this
>   debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
>   the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
>   Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
>   Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the 
> ``relative'' camp which includes
>   Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
>   Papaioannou, and myself.
>
> \index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}
>
> Both of these ``camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
> The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
> strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
> strong self sampling assumption.
>
> ---­-
> A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics  
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ---­-

I think you can add me to the ASSA camp :)

How does the fact that you're not experiencing childhood provide
evidence that ASSA is incorrect, as chances of experiencing childhood
or adulthood are both significant so I don't see why that would rule
out ASSA ... I kind of expected a different definition for RSSA as this
definition does not even solve any of the crazy paradoxes ASSA has ...
Well, anyway, time to look up the time postulate :)

Also, do you believe one can convince oneself of MWI (versus CI) by
performing a quantum suicide ?


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason]

> > Brent meeker writes:
> This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a 
> conscious state"?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental 
> match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), 
> but what about 300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness in 
> 100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in 
> different brains.

Human brains, and the consciousness they produce are both very complex.
 I've heard it said that human vision processes the quivalent of
hundreds of millions of  pixels and can distinguish millions of colors.
 The optic nerves transfer information at a rate of about 1 Gbps.  So
for thought experiments and examples I find it useful to reduce qualia
to more simple cases.  Imagine a creature with very primitive sight,
capable of only distinguishing between white and black, and with visual
acuity so poor it is only able to perceive one pixel.  Sight for such a
creature would be equivalent to perceiving one of two states:
brightness or darkness.

When this creature "sees" white, it would be equivalent to that
creature having an involuntary and vivid thought about white.  That
thought is objectively nothing more than the activation of a certain
group of neurons that react when having the thought about white.
Subjectively, the creature perceives an indescribable quale, and may
say that white is like warmth (in the same way humans rescribe red as
being hot).  This is likely due to links in the neural tissue between
the neurons that process seeing white and the ones that process the
sensation of warmth.

Using this simplified example, it becomes easier to attack the question
of "what is the minimum duration for a conscious state?", or "How long
is an obsever moment?"  One could say that for every planck time, there
an observer moment.  While those neurons are active there will be
observer moment's experiencing the quale of white at each instant.
However, since brain chemistry is so slow (compared to the speed of
light and plank scales) there will be a massive number of observer
moments that are subjectively indistinguishable.  So in this regard one
could also say that new observer moments are only created when the
state of the neural tissue changes, since otherwise they were
indistingushable from the observer's perspective.

In this regard, there is no minimum amount of time an observer moment
must span, all that is required for the observer moment to exist is for
a brain in a certain state to exist.  Note however, that our brains do
not only contain information collected from a single instant, but
rather they contain and are in the middle of processing sensory
information collected over the course of perhaps a 10th - 20th of a
second.  This could explain why a flip book appears to have smooth
motion if you see more than 10 to 20 frames per second, and why a low
frequency sound below 10-20 Hz sounds like individal beats as opposed
to a tone.

Jason


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
> 
>  > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the
>  > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure
>  > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
>  > > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my 
> consciousness is
>  > > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
>  > > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
>  > > long-term memories.
>  > > >
>  > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that
>  > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital 
> computation
>  > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
>  > >
>  > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
>  > > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time 
> only
>  > > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same
>  > > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less
>  > > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such
>  > > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be
>  > > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such 
> that
>  > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience 
> continuity of
>  > > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone
>  > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
>  > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only
>  > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my
>  > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, 
> motivations,
>  > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously
>  > > accessed) makes me, me.
>  >
>  > Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from 
> anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the 
> meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who 
> shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be 
> because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere 
> potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a 
> multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really 
> be in trouble.
> 
> Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are 
> specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a 
> superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, 
> you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of 
> a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would 
> be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were 
> being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be 
> impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were 
> implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your consciousness.

This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a conscious 
state"?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental match (would 
there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), but what about 
300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness in 100msec; so little that 
it may be occuring hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

Brent Meeker

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent meeker writes:> >  > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are 
all the > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly 
sure > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > 
> other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is > > 
accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > > 
forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > > 
long-term memories.> >  >> >  > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent 
with supposing that > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A 
digital computation > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.> > > 
> Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > > 
content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only > > a 
small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > > person 
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > > than this 
when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > > sufficiently vague 
moments, my consciousness may even be > > indistinguishable with that of many 
other people in the world, such that > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I 
would still experience continuity of > > consciousness as if nothing had 
happened, piggy-backing on someone > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer 
moments are internally > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a 
thing could only > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect 
on my > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, 
motivations, > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not 
continuously > > accessed) makes me, me.> > Yes I understand that you would 
eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, have some memories unique to 
Stathis Papaioannou.  But in the meantime I think you are still you - and not 
all those other people who shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room.  
And it can't be because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere 
potentiality not a state.  If we start to reify potentialities in a multi-verse 
where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really be in 
trouble.Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are 
specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a 
superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, you had 
a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of a stranger on 
the other side of the world? During that period it would be impossible to say 
(from a 1st person perspective) where you were being run or which person you 
were, in the same way as it would be impossible to say where you were being run 
if your consciousness were implemented on two computers running in perfect 
lockstep. Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Moreover, even if we constrain the definition of computer to include only the 
operations of factory-made devices plugged in and appropriately programmed, the 
fact that a digital computation at any instant does not access all of memory 
and data allows for the computation to be distributed over multiple machines in 
a network which accidentally have the appropriate configuration for that part 
of the computation. The only requirement is that the network be large enough in 
space and time to provide these configurations: from its point of view, the 
computation cannot be aware that the various steps of its implementation are 
disjointed and not causally connnected.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: RE: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Sat, 27 Jan 2007 
14:41:07 +1100






Brent Meeker writes:> >  > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be 
more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some 
other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of 
"your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your 
consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can 
it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is 
the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists 
> > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can 
expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. 
For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of 
your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, 
does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% 
or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments 
or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people 
in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find 
> > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As 
I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent 
continuations" of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a 
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing 
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction 
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term 
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.  > > Basing identity on 
memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of 
consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that 
isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the 
entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only 
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person 
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when 
I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my 
consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in 
the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience 
continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on 
someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally 
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen 
momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is 
here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. 
instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis 
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > > > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable 
> that
>  > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of 
> the
>  > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile 
> body.
>  > > This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness
>  > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to
>  > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the
>  > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the 
> Bhuddists
>  > > who are right.
>  > >
>  > > Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to 
> experience
>  > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, 
> if you
>  > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories
>  > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this 
> mean
>  > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1%
>  > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the
>  > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in
>  > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will 
> find
>  > > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?
>  >
>  > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the 
> "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure 
> what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something 
> other than just sharing memories. At any given time my consciousness is 
> accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually 
> forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some 
> long-term memories.
>  >
>  > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that 
> identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital computation 
> doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
> 
> Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire 
> content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only 
> a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same 
> person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less 
> than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such 
> sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be 
> indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such that 
> if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience continuity of 
> consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone 
> else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally 
> indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only 
> happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my 
> situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, motivations, 
> personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously 
> accessed) makes me, me.

Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from anesthesia, 
have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou.  But in the meantime I think 
you are still you - and not all those other people who shared those vague 
thoughts in the recovery room.  And it can't be because your memories are 
"instantly accessible"; that's a mere potentiality not a state.  If we start to 
reify potentialities in a multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit 
problem, we'll really be in trouble.

Brent Meeker

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

John, I guess my brain is generating my consciousness, but I regard this as a 
contingent fact. My conciousness is that which I experience, and if I found 
myself continuing to have similar experiences despite teleportation, brain 
transplant, resurrection in Heaven or whatever, then I would have survived as 
me. Note that I am not saying these things are possible (perhaps this is where 
you are scornful of the fantastic scenarios), just that IF in these situations 
I continued to think I was me, THEN ipso facto, I would still be me, despite 
losing the original body and brain.Stathis PapaioannouFrom: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: ASSA and Many-WorldsDate: Fri, 26 Jan 2007 15:54:32 -0500








Stathis:
interesting.  See my additional question after your 
reply
John

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  
  Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 
  AM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds
  
  John Mikes writes: > Stathis:> your 
  concluding sentence is> " But my brain just won't let me think this 
  way."> *> Have you been carried away?> Who is "your 
  brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the mechanism of 
  your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, is not 
  predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?> More 
  importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  brain?> How 
  do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your 
  brain' won't let it happen?> OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, 
  who wants to think some way and your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication 
  of the design (yet?) to comply - as a reason for "won't let me".> With 
  what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you 
  indeed?> *> I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my 
  search for SELF ("I"), vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal 
  existence with 'the rest of the world'. I expect that you may provide useful 
  hooks for me in such respect.> John"I" am the product of a 
  consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the same way as "walking" is 
  the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my legs. "I" am not 
  identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my legs. Now, of 
  course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of course "I 
  can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements are not 
  tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think" or "I 
  can only walk where I can walk" are. Stathis 
Papaioannou---
  JM:
   
  so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell 
  initiated) BRAIN the origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from 
  'matter' - which is the figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and 
  incompletely observed impact received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested 
  so many posts into the (partial) teleportation and copying into other 
  universes - did you really MEAN
  the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the 
  multiple  'copying' of matter?  How can you duplicate the atoms for 
  copying? StarTrek had only 1 copy and that, too, by 'physical' 
  transfer.
  Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I 
  find it unreal and just mention the position of yours and others on this list 
  for argument's sake. 
  I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains 
  (see: the multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave 
  like mental clones in accepting very similar "3rd person views" into their 
1st 
  person ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that 
  is, which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we 
  all (and the world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves? 

   
  Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by 
  the brain may be very close to personality, self, the "I" we are talking 
  about. Which would close the loop:  "there must be the 'primitive matter' 
  forming the brain and out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the 
  mental complexity and all"??? 
   
  I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive 
  matter concept. IMO 
  It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's 
  consciousness activity to order the part of the system we so far detected. 
  Together with space-time and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model' 
  ordering.
   
  John
   
  PS I 

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> >  > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be 
more probable that > > a continuation of your consciousness arises in some 
other branch of the > > multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of 
"your" erstwhile body. > > This would seem particularly more probable as your 
consciousness > > simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can 
it be to > > find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is 
the > > consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists 
> > who are right.> > > > Then we come up against the question of what we can 
expect to experience > > in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. 
For example, if you > > are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of 
your memories > > while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, 
does this mean > > that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% 
or the 1% > > version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments 
or the > > MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people 
in > > the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find 
> > myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?> > As 
I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent 
continuations" of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a 
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing 
memories.  At any given time my consciousness is accessing only a tiny fraction 
of my memories.  Further I'm continually  forming and forgetting short-term 
memories as well as forgetting some long-term memories.  > > Basing identity on 
memory seems inconsistent with supposing that identity is some property of 
consciousness alone.  A digital computation doesn't depend on memory/data that 
isn't accessed.Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the 
entire content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time only 
a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same person 
continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less than this when 
I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such sufficiently vague moments, my 
consciousness may even be indistinguishable with that of many other people in 
the world, such that if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience 
continuity of consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on 
someone else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally 
indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only happen 
momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my situation, and it is 
here that having a store of memories, motivations, personality style etc. 
instantly accessible (even if not continuously accessed) makes me, me.Stathis 
Papaioannou 
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Jan 26, 2007 at 03:54:32PM -0500, John M wrote:
> 
>   PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the 
> essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J
> 

It is in my book. Here is the relevant excerpt:

\section[ASSA vs RSSA]{Absolute vs Relative Self Sampl\-ing Assumption}

In the course of a lengthy, and at times heated debate between Jacques
Mallah and myself, it became clear we were always arguing from
disparate positions\cite{Mallah-Standish}. At the heart of our
difference of opinion was how the strong self sampling
assumption\index{self sampling assumption!strong|emph} should be
applied. Jacques Mallah assumed that each observer moment had an
absolute positive measure, and that our current observer moment is
selected at random from that distribution.

Since I accept the TIME postulate,\index{TIME postulate} only the
birth moment is selected at random, according to the self sampling
assumption. Thereafter, each observer moment's measure can be
determined {\em relative} to its predecessor by means of Born's
rule\index{Born rule}
(\ref{proj-prob}). Arguing with this notion of observer measure, first
person immortality follows provided the no cul-de-sac conjecture\index{no 
cul-de-sac conjecture} is
true.

The Everything List adopted the term {\em Absolute Self Sampling
  Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!absolute|emph} to
  refer to Mallah's use of strong self sampling, and the {\em Relative
  Self Sampling Assumption}\index{self sampling assumption!relative|emph} for 
the version I use.  Since this
  debate took place, other debates have taken place between members of
  the ``absolute'' camp, which includes such names as Jacques
  Mallah,\index{Mallah, Jacques}
  Saibal Mitra,\index{Mitra, Saibal} Hal Finney\index{Finney, Hal} and the 
``relative'' camp which includes
  Bruno Marchal,\index{Marchal, Bruno} Stathis
  Papaioannou, and myself.

\index{Papaioannou, Stathis}\index{Standish, Russell}
  
Both of these ``camps'' appear to have internally consistent pictures.
The fact that I'm not currently experiencing childhood, is for me
strong evidence that the ASSA is an incorrect application of the
strong self sampling assumption.



A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Stathis:
interesting.  See my additional question after your reply
John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Friday, January 26, 2007 9:03 AM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds




  John Mikes writes:
   
  > Stathis:
  > your concluding sentence is
  > " But my brain just won't let me think this way."
  > *
  > Have you been carried away?
  > Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that 
the mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, is 
not predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
  > More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  brain?
  > How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 
'your brain' won't let it happen?
  > OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and 
your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - 
as a reason for "won't let me".
  > With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are 
you indeed?
  > *
  > I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"), 
vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of 
the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
  > John

  "I" am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the 
same way as "walking" is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my 
legs. "I" am not identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my 
legs. Now, of course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of 
course "I can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements 
are not tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think" 
or "I can only walk where I can walk" are. 

  Stathis Papaioannou
  ---
  JM:

  so you consider the biologic tissue-grown (stem-cell initiated) BRAIN the 
origin of a thinking person? Life growing out from 'matter' - which is the 
figment of our explanatory effort to poorly and incompletely observed impact 
received from parts unknown? Funny: you invested so many posts into the 
(partial) teleportation and copying into other universes - did you really MEAN
  the transfer of tissues (like in StarTrek?) How 'bout the multiple  'copying' 
of matter?  How can you duplicate the atoms for copying? StarTrek had only 1 
copy and that, too, by 'physical' transfer.
  Save the wrong conclusion: I am not defending this line, I find it unreal and 
just mention the position of yours and others on this list for argument's sake. 
  I find it 'interesting, but amazing' that different brains (see: the 
multiplicity of humans and other animals among themselves) behave like mental 
clones in accepting very similar "3rd person views" into their 1st person 
ideas, to form images of the 'material world' etc. Mental images, that is, 
which, however you would make into their own origination? Are we all (and the 
world, the existnce etc.) only fiction of ourselves? 

  Then again I feel that the 'consciousness' you generate by the brain may be 
very close to personality, self, the "I" we are talking about. Which would 
close the loop:  "there must be the 'primitive matter' forming the brain and 
out of that comes the 'not-so-primitive' matter, the mental complexity and 
all"??? 

  I agree withBruno to disagree in the absolute primitive matter concept. IMO 
  It is only an explanatory imaging in this universe's consciousness activity 
to order the part of the system we so far detected. Together with space-time 
and OUR pet-causality - the 'within model' ordering.

  John

  PS I still would appreciate to be directed to a short text explaining the 
essence of ASSA (RSSA?). J




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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
> 
>  > Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800
>  > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>  > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>  > Subject: Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
>  >
>  >
>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > >
>  > > Johnathan Corgan writes:
>  > >
>  > >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > >>
>  > >>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of 
> argument we
>  > >>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every 
> moment terrible things
>  > >>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we 
> should be constantly
>  > >>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we 
> *will* be struck by lightning.
>  > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
>  > >> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an 
> interesting
>  > >> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.
>  > >>
>  > >> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
>  > >> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most
>  > >> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their
>  > >> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
>  > >> perspective, we don't worry about them.
>  > >>
>  > >> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
>  > >> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a
>  > >> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
>  > >> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
>  > >> they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our
>  > >> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
>  > >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
>  > >> possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
>  > >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)
>  > >>
>  > >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low 
> individual
>  > >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them
>  > >> comes out.
>  > >
>  > > It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), 
> it's suffering. Final death
>  > > would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. 
> I take comfort in the
>  > > speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most 
> likely this will be as a result
>  > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science 
> understands the brain
>  > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by 
> comparison to ensure that I
>  > > am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur 
> mostly by chance and would
>  > > be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes.
>  >
>  > I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that 
> a continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the 
> multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body. 
> This would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness 
> simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to 
> find a continuation of a near coma. Perhaps this continuation is the 
> consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists 
> who are right.
> 
> Then we come up against the question of what we can expect to experience 
> in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For example, if you 
> are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your memories 
> while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this mean 
> that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% 
> version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the 
> MWI to ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in 
> the world each with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find 
> myself becoming one of these people either now or after I have died?

As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the "consistent 
continuations" of your consciousness.  I'm not exactly sure what constitutes a 
consistent continuation, but it must be something other than just sharing 
memories.  At

RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

John Mikes writes:
 
> Stathis:
> your concluding sentence is
> " But my brain just won't let me think this way."
> *
> Have you been carried away?
> Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the 
> mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, is not 
> predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)?
> More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  brain?
> How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your 
> brain' won't let it happen?
> OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and 
> your 'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply 
> - as a reason for "won't let me".
> With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you 
> indeed?
> *
> I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"), 
> vs. the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of 
> the world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect.
> John

"I" am the product of a consciousness-generating mechanism, my brain, in the 
same way as "walking" is the product of a locomotion-generating mechanism, my 
legs. "I" am not identical to my brain just as "walking" is not identical to my 
legs. Now, of course "I can only think what my brain will let me think", and of 
course "I can only walk where my legs will let me walk", but these statements 
are not tautologies in the way that saying "I can only think what I can think" 
or "I can only walk where I can walk" are. 

Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[John M]

Stathis: 
your concluding sentence is
" But my brain just won't let me think this way."
*
Have you been carried away?
Who is "your brain" to make decisions upon you? (maybe you mean only that the 
mechanism of your brain, the main tool "YOU"  use in mental activity, is not 
predesigned for such action?) So: is there a pre-design (ha ha)? 
More importantly: who is that "me" in conflict with 'your'  brain? 
How do you 'want' to 'think' something (which involves your brain) when 'your 
brain' won't let it happen?
OK, let's introduce "you", the homunculus, who wants to think some way and your 
'brain' did not reach the sophistication of the design (yet?) to comply - as a 
reason for "won't let me". 
With what 'tool' did "you" WANT to "think this way"? How many people are you 
indeed? 
*
I am asking these stupid qiestions in the line of my search for SELF ("I"), vs. 
the total interconnectedness of our personal existence with 'the rest of the 
world'. I expect that you may provide useful hooks for me in such respect. 

John
 

  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2007 7:08 AM
  Subject: RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds




  Jason Resch writes:

  > > Jason Resch writes:
  > >
  > >My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
  > >my conclusion:
  > >Positive spared lives = Take replication
  > >Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
  > >Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

  [SP]
  > This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will 
increase
  > the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question, 
what
  > should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't 
worry
  > me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured 
because
  > I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't 
affect me
  > if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same 
psychology
  > up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

  [JR]
  > I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of 
consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer 
moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of that 
observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider that to 
be an illusion caused by memory.  i.e. "We remember past observer moments so we 
must be moving into the future."
  > I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve 
someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer 
moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience the 
fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all time.  
Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable from 
selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside of brain 
states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are experienced, 
no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience.  Therefore it 
is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of which every 
observer moment is a part.
  > It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's 
future observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase 
the average quality of all future observer moments.  I'm not advocating we all 
become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no more 
(or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's observer 
moments.

  I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes 
up 
  in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of 
my 
  memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during 
the night 
  and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or 
anyone 
  else, because I "die" every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very 
attached to 
  the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I 
know how it 
  is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same 
as I do myself, 
  but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or 
even with 
  everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way. 

  Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Meeker writes:> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 17:00:11 -0800> From: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com> Subject: Re: ASSA and 
Many-Worlds> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > > > Johnathan Corgan writes:> > 
> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> >>> >>> If some multiverse theory happens to 
be true then by your way of argument we > >>> should all be extremely anxious 
all the time, because every moment terrible things > >>> are definitely 
happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be constantly > >>> be 
worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck by 
lightning. > >> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of> >> 
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting> >> 
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.> >>> >> While one branch always 
exists which continues our consciousness> >> forward, indeed we are constantly 
"shedding" branches where the most> >> brutal and horrific things happen to us 
and result in our death.  Their> >> measure is extremely small, so from a 
subjectively probability> >> perspective, we don't worry about them.> >>> >> 
I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to> >> experience 
an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a> >> relatively high 
measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung> >> cancer (if you're a 
smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though> >> they still happen in some 
branch.)  Others, like having all our> >> particles spontaneously quantum 
tunnel into the heart of a burning> >> furnace, are so low in measure, we can 
blissfully ignore the> >> possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some 
branch where this has> >> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability 
quantum.)> >>> >> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low 
individual> >> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all 
of them> >> comes out.> > > > It's not death that is the problem (you always 
get out of that), it's suffering. Final death > > would be better than a living 
hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take comfort in the > > speculation 
that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this will be as a 
result > > of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science 
understands the brain > > well enough to do that, it would be a relatively 
simple matter by comparison to ensure that I > > am content. I think the 
hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by chance and would > > be of 
much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. > > I think Bruno 
already remarked that it may well be more probable that a continuation of your 
consciousness arises in some other branch of the multiverse "by chance", rather 
than as a state of "your" erstwhile body.  This would seem particularly more 
probable as your consciousness simplifies due to deterioration of your brain - 
how hard can it be to find a continuation of a near coma.  Perhaps this 
continuation is the consciousness of a fish - and it's the Hindus rather than 
the Bhuddists who are right.Then we come up against the question of what we can 
expect to experience in the case of duplication with partial memory loss. For 
example, if you are duplicated 101 times such that one copy has 100% of your 
memories while the other 100 copies each have 1% of your memories, does this 
mean that you have an even chance of ending up as either the 100% or the 1% 
version of yourself? We need not invoke duplication experiments or the MWI to 
ask this question either. Suppose there are a billion people in the world each 
with 1/billion of my memories: does this mean I will find myself becoming one 
of these people either now or after I have died? Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> Johnathan Corgan writes:
> 
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument 
>>> we 
>>> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible 
>>> things 
>>> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be 
>>> constantly 
>>> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be 
>>> struck by lightning. 
>> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
>> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
>> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.
>>
>> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
>> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most
>> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
>> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
>> perspective, we don't worry about them.
>>
>> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
>> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
>> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
>> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
>> they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
>> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
>> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
>> possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
>> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)
>>
>> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
>> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them
>> comes out.
> 
> It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's 
> suffering. Final death 
> would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take 
> comfort in the 
> speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this 
> will be as a result 
> of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science 
> understands the brain 
> well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison 
> to ensure that I 
> am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by 
> chance and would 
> be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. 

I think Bruno already remarked that it may well be more probable that a 
continuation of your consciousness arises in some other branch of the 
multiverse "by chance", rather than as a state of "your" erstwhile body.  This 
would seem particularly more probable as your consciousness simplifies due to 
deterioration of your brain - how hard can it be to find a continuation of a 
near coma.  Perhaps this continuation is the consciousness of a fish - and it's 
the Hindus rather than the Bhuddists who are right.

Brent Meeker

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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Jason Resch writes:

> > Jason Resch writes:
> >
> >My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
> >my conclusion:
> >Positive spared lives = Take replication
> >Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
> >Negative spared lives = Take coin flip

[SP]
> This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will 
> increase
> the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question, what
> should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't 
> worry
> me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured 
> because
> I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't 
> affect me
> if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same 
> psychology
> up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.

[JR]
> I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of 
> consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer 
> moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of 
> that observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider 
> that to be an illusion caused by memory.  i.e. "We remember past observer 
> moments so we must be moving into the future."
> I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will improve 
> someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's future observer 
> moments. Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience 
> the fruits of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all 
> time.  Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable 
> from selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside of 
> brain states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are 
> experienced, no one can say by who or by what, their existance is experience. 
>  Therefore it is in everyone's interest to improve reality's first person, of 
> which every observer moment is a part.
> It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's future 
> observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to increase the 
> average quality of all future observer moments.  I'm not advocating we all 
> become like Mother Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no 
> more (or less) our future observer moments than we are other individual's 
> observer moments.

I completely agree with your view of observer moments: the person who wakes up 
in my bed tomorrow won't be me-now, he'll just be someone who shares most of my 
memories and believes he is me. In fact, if I were killed with an axe during 
the night 
and replaced with an exact copy, it wouldn't make any difference to me or 
anyone 
else, because I "die" every moment anyway. But the problem is, I am very 
attached to 
the illusion of continuity of conscious and personal identity even though I 
know how it 
is generated. If I give in to it, I might decide to treat everyone the same as 
I do myself, 
but just as likely I might decide to be completely reckless with my life, or 
even with 
everyone else's life. But my brain just won't let me think this way. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Johnathan Corgan writes:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> > If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument 
> > we 
> > should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible 
> > things 
> > are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be 
> > constantly 
> > be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be 
> > struck by lightning. 
> 
> If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
> probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
> corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.
> 
> While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
> forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most
> brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
> measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
> perspective, we don't worry about them.
> 
> I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
> experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
> relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
> cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
> they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
> particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
> furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
> possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
> just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)
> 
> If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
> measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them
> comes out.

It's not death that is the problem (you always get out of that), it's 
suffering. Final death 
would be better than a living hell, but QTI denies you final death. I take 
comfort in the 
speculation that if I'm still alive in a few hundred years, most likely this 
will be as a result 
of some advanced medical or cybernetic intervention, and if science understands 
the brain 
well enough to do that, it would be a relatively simple matter by comparison to 
ensure that I 
am content. I think the hellish routes to immortality would occur mostly by 
chance and would 
be of much lower total measure than the deliberate, happy routes. 

Stathis Papaioannou 
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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Jason Resch]

On 1/24/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> > Jason Resch writes:
> >
> >My appologies to those on this list, this is how I should have worded
> >my conclusion:
>
> >Positive spared lives = Take replication
> >Neutral spared lives = Take coin flip
> >Negative spared lives = Take coin flip
>
> This is an analysis from an altruistic viewpoint, i.e. which choice will
> increase
> the net happiness in the world. What I am asking is the selfish question,
> what
> should I do to avoid being tortured? If I choose the replication it won't
> worry
> me from a selfish point of view if one person will definitely be tortured
> because
> I am unlikely to be that person. Indeed, after the replication it won't
> affect me
> if *all* the other copies are tortured, because despite sharing the same
> psychology
> up to the point of replication, I am not going to experience their pain.



I think our disagreement stems from our different conceptions of
consciousness.  You seem to believe that once you experience an observer
moment, that you are destined to experience all future observer moments of
that observer.  While this is the way most people see the world, I consider
that to be an illusion caused by memory. i.e
. "We remember past observer moments so we must be moving into the future."

I believe that its is just as beneficial to do something that will
improve someone else's observer moments as it is to improve one's
future observer moments.
Just think: your current observer moment never gets to experience the fruits
of its current labors, it remains in that observer moment for all
time.  Yet we still go to work.  That is why altruism is indistinguishable
from selfish behavior in my philosophy.  There is no consciousness outside
of brain states, brain states are consciousness, since they exist they are
experienced, no one can say by who or by what, their existance is
experience.  Therefore it is in everyone's interest to improve reality's
first person, of which every observer moment is a part.

It's easy to see how evolution taught us to work for one individual's
future observer moments, we defer gratification all time in order to
increase
the average quality of all future observer moments.
 I'm not advocating we all become like Mother
Teresa, but I think we should understand that we are no more (or less)
our future observer moments than we are other individual's observer
moments.


If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we
> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment
> terrible things
> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be
> constantly
> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be
> struck by lightning.
> But normally we don't worry about this because being struck by lightning
> in 1/million
> actual worlds is subjectively equivalent to being struck by lightning in a
> single world
> with probability 1/million.


I wouldn't worry about things we have no control over.  But I often
consider, whenever I get into a car
or a
plane, there are copies of me that never make it home but by the same
measure there are also always copies that
do.  Just do what you can to make things better for yourself and others and
you will be improving reality's first person perspective.  When you help
others, it is not necessarily a zero sum game.  We, as humans, often feel
positive emotions when we
do something good for others, so in a way when you help someone as
opposed to yourself, your net effect on all observer moments is more
positive than if you had
simply helped yourself.

Jason

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Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds

[Johnathan Corgan]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we 
> should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible 
> things 
> are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be 
> constantly 
> be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck 
> by lightning. 

If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of
probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting
corollary to the quantum theory of immortality.

While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness
forward, indeed we are constantly "shedding" branches where the most
brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death.  Their
measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability
perspective, we don't worry about them.

I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to
experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live.  Some have a
relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung
cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though
they still happen in some branch.)  Others, like having all our
particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning
furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the
possibility.  Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has
just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.)

If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual
measure, I wonder how the "integral of the measure" across all of them
comes out.

-Johnathan

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