subject:"RE\: COMP refutation paper \- finally out"

On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
wrote:

I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth
would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any
way*

(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?

Ben,

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its
value is inconsequential because that level of precision will never
make a difference in any equation we work with. Euler's identity:
e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without each of the infinite
digits of Pi having a definite and certain value. These values
that are unknown to use, but nonetheless must be there.

Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being there, it's a
matter of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition. So why
does the putative digit of pi have the value it does, because it
satisfies certain propositions which we infer from other
propositions we are pleased to hold hypothetically true as axioms.

Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but
not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
chains of propositions.

Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.

Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?

If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.

What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?

QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to
the wave function. String theory has nothing in it which rules out
other universes with different physical laws.

Why believe only the math of string theory has been blessed with
phyical existence? You might say because we cannot see those other
universes.

This is not evidence against the theory because the theory explains
why you would not observe them. Occam also fails here, for the
proposition that all possible structures exist has fewer assumptions
than the idea that only these structures exist and no others are
possible.

The fine tuning of the universe confirms to a high probability that
something is wrong with the following proposition:
There is only one set of physical laws with physical existence and
these laws were not intelligently chosen.

So I ask you, where is the error in that statement?

The only way to escape it is to say the idea of fine tuning itself is
flawed, but this is a last ditch attempt to stick to the model of a
single universe. The bulk of evidence points strongly to the idea
that intelligent life would not arise in the majority of possible
structures.

Use baysian analysis to consider the following possibilities:
1. There is one set if laws not intelligently selected.
2. The laws were intelligently selected or there is more than one set
of physical laws.

Since we have evaluated no other evidence at this time, let's assign a
50% chance to each.

Now let's say we determine the probability of any given set of laws
having the right properties for life is one in 100. What would
baysian analysis say of the new probability that proposition 1 is
correct?

Faced with proposition 2, would you be more likely to accept
intelligent design or the existence of other (or all) mathematical
structures?

Mathematical existence isn't sone fuzzy abstract form if existence.
Look around yourself. You are in it.

Jason

Brent
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread benjayk

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?

Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
this universe at least) be conscious of it? If I assert the digit happens
to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?
If
so, where does this truth exist?
Yeah, I think the 10^10^100th digit has certain value, and I agree we will
probably never know it explicitly. But I don't think that we could never
know it in any way. Consciousness just had no reason to focus on this digit
in particular. It wants to know itself as a whole, and not every specific of
the infinite abitrary facts about itself. It wants to compress everything
that can be known into an efficient format of perception. Because we know
the algorithm of determining the digits of PI, we already know all digits of
PI in an abstract way, as a potential of knowing. This sense of knowing is
included in what I meant with in any way. Maybe I should have said
conceived.

This is the difference. I conceive that there is a 10^10^100th digit of PI,
but I can't conceive of arithmetic without consciousness, because the very
act of conceiving needs consciousness.

benjayk
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



 You fail to explain how the truth of 17 is prime depends on
 consciousness. You confuse the truth of 17 is prime with the individual
 belief or knowledge that 17 is prime.  Mathematicians believes that 17 is
 prime is far more objective than any other proposition like the moon
 exists, or the big bang exists.
 You should be the one explaining to me why 17 would no more be prime in
 case humans or life disappear from the physical universe.


Indeed, nature discovered the primality of 13 and 17 (in the reproductive
cycles of the 13-year and 17-year cicadas).  I doubt nature or the cicadas
were ever conscious of this mathematical property, at least in the sense
that humans can be conscious of it.

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread meekerdb


On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:



On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com 
mailto:benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:




I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly
your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on
earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in
any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value 
even though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will 
ever (in this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert 
the digit happens to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be 
either true or false?  If so, where does this truth exist?


Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its 
value is inconsequential because that level of precision will never 
make a difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: 
e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without each of the infinite 
digits of Pi having a definite and certain value.  These values that 
are unknown to use, but nonetheless must be there.


Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being there, it's a matter 
of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the 
putative digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies 
certain propositions which we infer from other propositions we are 
pleased to hold hypothetically true as axioms.


Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but 
not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?


In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through 
chains of propositions.


Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach 
it through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.





Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.



If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one 
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean 
the Seven Dwarves exist.  To understand mathematically just means to 
have a mathematical model that works.




What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?


I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of 
our minds dependent on language.  They made be said to exist in Platonia 
or in some other way, but I think it is a confusion to suppose they 
exist in the sense of physical objects.




QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to 
the wave function.


It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that 
asserts that.


 String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes with 
different physical laws.


Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as ruling it in.



Why believe only the math of string theory has been blessed with 
phyical existence?


I don't believe that.


You might say because we cannot see those other universes.

This is not evidence against the theory because the theory explains 
why you would not observe them.


That's what my Christian friends say: You rule out a supernatural God.  
And our theology explains why you can't observe Him.


Occam also fails here, for the proposition that all possible 
structures exist has fewer assumptions than the idea that only these 
structures exist and no others are possible.


The fine tuning of the universe confirms to a high probability that 
something is wrong with the following proposition:
There is only one set of physical laws with physical existence and 
these laws were not intelligently chosen.


So I ask you, where is the error in that statement?


First it assumes there is something called fine tuning (c.f. Vic 
Stenger's The Fallacy of Fine Tuning).  Second physical laws are 
models we make up.  Third, all experience shows that improbable things 
happen all the time.




The only way to escape it is to say the idea of fine tuning itself is 
flawed, but this is a last ditch attempt to stick to the model of a 
single universe.  The bulk of evidence points strongly to the idea 
that intelligent life would not arise in the majority of possible 
structures.


Use baysian analysis to consider the following possibilities:
1. There is one set if laws not intelligently selected.
2. The laws were intelligently selected or there is more than one set 
of physical laws.


Since we have evaluated no other evidence at this time, let's assign a 
50% chance to each.


Now let's say we determine the probability of any given set of laws 
having the right

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 **
 On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
 benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



  I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
 theory
 is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
 I
 believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
 (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


 Ben,

 Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
 though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
 this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
 to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
 so, where does this truth exist?

 Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value
 is inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a
 difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 =
 0, would be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a
 definite and certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but
 nonetheless must be there.


 Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being there, it's a matter of
 satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the putative
 digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies certain
 propositions which we infer from other propositions we are pleased to hold
 hypothetically true as axioms.


  Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but not
 provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

  In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
 chains of propositions.


 Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach it
 through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.


So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a doorway
or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same way
mathematical truth is independent of axioms.




  Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


  Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


 I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.


This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical object
as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from the inside?




  If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one example
 of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


 Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean the
 Seven Dwarves exist.  To understand mathematically just means to have a
 mathematical model that works.


Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between a
perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical universe.
 If there is no difference that makes a difference why consider them
different?




  What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?


 I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of
 our minds dependent on language.


Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object.  Who
invented it?


   They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but I think
 it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of physical objects.


This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a
physical universe and a mathematical universe having the same structure
and properties.



  QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to the
 wave function.


 It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that asserts
 that.


Everett's interpretation is the most preferable according to Occam's
principle.  Do you have a reason to prefer the CI or some other
interpretation?



   String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes with
 different physical laws.


 Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as ruling it
 in.


To rule something out requires additional information.  Consider that in a
block of marble, it contains all possible statues inside it until
information is added, to whittle down from all possibility down to one
actuality.  Or consider that you are awaiting an e-mail message (perhaps
from me).  Until you receive that message, all possibilities exist for what
message I might send you.  Only the addition of the information determines
which of all possible messages I sent.  Information is not needed to create
possibilities, information eliminates possibilities.  If string theory
enables all possibilities, and contains no prohibition against their
reality, the default should be to consider those other universes implied by
the theory just as real as our own.





  Why believe only the math

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-09 Thread meekerdb


On 8/9/2011 1:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
mailto:benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:



I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but
honestly your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why
on earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known
in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to
consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain
value even though we can never know what it is and no one has
ever or will ever (in this universe at least) be conscious of
it?  If I assert the digit happens to be 8, would you agree
that my assertion must be either true or false?  If so, where
does this truth exist?

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that
its value is inconsequential because that level of precision
will never make a difference in any equation we work with. 
Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would be false without

each of the infinite digits of Pi having a definite and certain
value.  These values that are unknown to use, but nonetheless
must be there.


Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being there, it's a
matter of satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So
why does the putative digit of pi have the value it does,
because it satisfies certain propositions which we infer from
other propositions we are pleased to hold hypothetically true as
axioms.


Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true
but not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

In that case there is something that is true but not reachable
through chains of propositions.


Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I
reach it through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.


So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a 
doorway or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same 
way mathematical truth is independent of axioms.


Notice that you switched predicates from exists to true.






Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.


This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical 
object as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from 
the inside?


It is not clear to me what it means to see a mathematical object from 
the inside.






If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one
example of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't
mean the Seven Dwarves exist.  To understand mathematically just
means to have a mathematical model that works.


Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between 
a perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical 
universe.  If there is no difference that makes a difference why 
consider them different?


The physical one is here.  There is no perfect representation of the 
universe and it is certainly not a given that such could exist.






What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects
exist?


I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are
inventions of our minds dependent on language.


Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object. 
 Who invented it?


  They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but
I think it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of
physical objects.


This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a 
physical universe and a mathematical universe having the same 
structure and properties.




QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions
to the wave function.


It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that
asserts that.


Everett's interpretation is the most preferable according to Occam's 
principle.  Do you have a reason to prefer the CI or some other 
interpretation?


By Occam's principle I would prefer Asher Peres or Roland Omnes.




 String theory has nothing in it which rules out other universes
with different physical laws.


Indeed.  But not having ruled out something is not the same as
ruling it in.


To rule something out requires additional information.  Consider

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 5:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 **
 On 8/9/2011 1:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 2:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/9/2011 7:37 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Aug 9, 2011, at 1:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/8/2011 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk 
 benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



  I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
 theory
 is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
 I
 believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
 (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


 Ben,

 Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
 though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
 this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
 to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
 so, where does this truth exist?

 Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value
 is inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a
 difference in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 =
 0, would be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a
 definite and certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but
 nonetheless must be there.


 Mathematical existence isn't a matter of being there, it's a matter of
 satisfying, making true, a certain proposition.  So why does the putative
 digit of pi have the value it does, because it satisfies certain
 propositions which we infer from other propositions we are pleased to hold
 hypothetically true as axioms.


  Then what is the ontological status of propositions that are true but
 not provable in ones set of hypothetitcally held axioms?

  In that case there is something that is true but not reachable through
 chains of propositions.


  Why is that a problem.  There's a refrigerator in my kitchen.  I reach it
 through a doorway, not a chain of propositions.


  So you refridgerator exists, not because it is reachable through a
 doorway or not.  It's existence is independent of doorways in the same way
 mathematical truth is independent of axioms.


 Notice that you switched predicates from exists to true.


The truth that 9 is composite depends on the existence of its factor 3.







  Existence in the usual sense never enters into it.


  Do you think our universe is mathematical or magical?


  I think it's physical -- I'm just not sure what that means.


  This is the crux of the issue.  What is different between a physical
 object as seen from the inside and a mathematical object as seen from the
 inside?


 It is not clear to me what it means to see a mathematical object from the
 inside.



What I mean is: Assume there is an object in Plato's heaven which is
identical to the 4D structure of this physical universe.  Could the Brent
inside that object determine he is in an object in Plato's heaven, rather
than a physical universe?  If he can't then what additional information is
added by the label physical?






  If our universe can be understood mathematically then it is one example
 of a mathematical object that has physical existence.


  Can understand that the number of dwarves is seven.  That doesn't mean
 the Seven Dwarves exist.  To understand mathematically just means to have
 a mathematical model that works.


  Again, take into account what I asked above, on the difference between a
 perfect mathematical representation of our universe and a physical universe.
  If there is no difference that makes a difference why consider them
 different?


 The physical one is here.


Maybe you are the Brent inside the object in Plato's heaven, and you are
confusing here for over there, where the real physical universe is.


   There is no perfect representation of the universe and it is certainly
 not a given that such could exist.


How can something exist if it can't be represented in any theory by any one?



 What more evidence would you need to believe mathematical objects exist?


  I haven't seen any evidence yet.  Mathematical objects are inventions of
 our minds dependent on language.


  Then what about the physical universe, it is a mathematical object.  Who
 invented it?


   They made be said to exist in Platonia or in some other way, but I think
 it is a confusion to suppose they exist in the sense of physical objects.


  This could make sense, if you can explain what is different between a
 physical universe and a mathematical universe having the same structure
 and properties.



  QM shows the existence of perhaps an infinite number of solutions to the
 wave function.


  It doesn't show that - it's consistent with an interpretation that
 asserts that.


  Everett's interpretation is the most preferable according to Occam's

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread benjayk

John Mikes wrote:

benjayk wrote:

*Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of
consciousness
**and then want an origin for it?*

I see you did not follow me... I asked for some identification to that
mystical noumenon we are talking about exactly* to make it acceptable for
discussion*. T H E N - I F it turns out to BE acceptable, we may well
contemplate an origination for it - if???...
Better followable now?
Sorry for not having been clearer.
Ah, OK. As I see it, (what I mean when I say) consciousness is simply
self-evident, obvious - you might even say it's obviousness itself. There
can be no remotely exact definition of it, as it is too simple (it can't be
cut into analyzable pieces) and complex (it has many different facets) for
that. It is that in which definitions arise. Just as one sentence in a book
cannot capture the whole book, no definition can capture consciousness.
To define consciousness and talk about it's properties means labeling and
representing it. It's not wrong, but we should clear that it's ultimately
undefinable and not even understandable.

If you ask me what consciousness is, then I can just invite you too look at
what already is obvious. In order to become more aware of how obvious it
really is, it might be useful to not conceptualize it, and not jump to the
conclusion It's trivial that I am conscious.. If we always search for
consciousness as something concretely graspable (by the mind) we will miss
the obvious fact that we simply are conscious and that the mind can't really
grasp it.

You might say that if we don't know what exactly we are talking about it
makes no sense to talk about it. But I don't think that's necessarily true.
When we first learn about something, we don't know what exactly we talk
about and then learn more about it through asking questions, or
contemplating.

John Mikes wrote:

benjayk
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,

How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
already
assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at
some
level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
about its origin.

That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to
have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent
parts. In the
past, it was already there as a possibility.


OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did
already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this
below.
Yeah, the problem is that consciousness emerging from arithmetics  
means

just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory.


Er well, OK. But arithmetic explains also why it exist, why it is  
undoubtable yet non definable, how it brings matter in the picture, etc.





We have no
reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that  
is, that
consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't  
even

know how to interpret this literally.



It means that the arithmetical reality is full of conscious entities  
of many sorts, so that we don't have to postulate the existence of  
consciousness, nor matter, in the ontological part of the TOE. We  
recover them, either intuitively, with the non-zombie rule, or  
formally, in the internal epistemology canonically associated to self- 
referring numbers.






Bruno Marchal wrote:




But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it
emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.
Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of
itself
doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived  
from.


To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after
consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there
before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was
there
before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were  
implicitly

there).


OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the
arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For  
example

I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in
Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are  
the
sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently  
on

any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =
3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite
many people have searched for it.
I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or  
some

thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on
anything (but the definitions).
My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with  
what you
said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there  
in some
form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily  
true, but

so is everything else.


The theory must explains why and how relative contingencies happen,  
and it has to explain the necessities (natural laws), etc.





Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,


That is ambiguous. If you accept that some proposition can be true  
independently of us, it can mean that some meanings are true  
independently of us. If not you need some one to observe the big bang  
to make it happen, or the numbers to make them existing.




and ultimately is equivalent to it (IMO), so we derive from the  
meaning in

numbers that meaning exist. It's true, but ultimately trivial.


No, we derive from numbers+addition+multiplication a theory of  
meaning, consciousness, matter. You should not confuse a theory, and  
its meaning, interpretation, etc.
I happens that we can indeed explain how numbers develop meanings for  
number relations, etc.






Either everything is independently true, which doesn't really seem  
to be the
case, or things are generally interdependent. 1+1=2 is just true  
because
2+2=4 and I can just be conscious because 1+1=2, but 1+1=2 is just  
true
because I am conscious, and 1+1=2 is true because my mouse pad is  
blue,

etc...

This view makes sense to me, because it is so simple. One particular
statement true statement is true, only because every particular  
statement
true statement is true, and because what is true is true. In this  
sense

every statement is true because of every other statement. If we derive
something, we just explain how we become aware of the truth (of a
statement). There is no objective hierarchy of emergence (but  
apparently
necessarily a subjective progression, we will first

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
 explains how
 consciousness emerges from numbers,
 How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
 already
 assumed at the start?

 In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at
 some
 level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
 about its origin.
 That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to
 have a
 past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent
 parts. In the
 past, it was already there as a possibility.

 OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did
 already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this
 below.
 Yeah, the problem is that consciousness emerging from arithmetics  
 means
 just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory.
 
 Er well, OK. But arithmetic explains also why it exist, why it is  
 undoubtable yet non definable, how it brings matter in the picture, etc.
Well, if I try to interpret your words favourably I can bring myself to
agree. But I will insist that it only explains why it exists (ultimately
because of itself), and does not make sense without consciousness.

I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would I
believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
(namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 We have no
 reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that  
 is, that
 consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't  
 even
 know how to interpret this literally.

 
 It means that the arithmetical reality is full of conscious entities  
 of many sorts, so that we don't have to postulate the existence of  
 consciousness, nor matter, in the ontological part of the TOE. We  
 recover them, either intuitively, with the non-zombie rule, or  
 formally, in the internal epistemology canonically associated to self- 
 referring numbers.
But what you do is assuming consciousness (you have to!) and then formulate
a theory that claims itself to be primary and ontologically real that
derives that consciousness is just epistemlogically true, by virtue of
hiding the assumption that consciousness already exists!
It seems you are just bullshitting yourself by not mentioning consciousness
as an assumption in the theory and then claim it follows without assuming
it.

What you call ontological part of the theory are just the axioms you make
explicit. I don't see how this make them ontological, and the implicit
assumption epistemological. If anything, it would be the opposite. What is
implicit in everything, ie that which cannot be removed, is ontological, and
what can (apparently) be removed (or not mentioned) is epistemological. We
can be conscious without any notion of numbers, but there is no notion of
numbers without consciousness.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the
 arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For  
 example
 I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in
 Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are  
 the
 sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently  
 on
 any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
 Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =
 3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite
 many people have searched for it.
 I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or  
 some
 thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on
 anything (but the definitions).
 My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with  
 what you
 said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there  
 in some
 form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily  
 true, but
 so is everything else.
 
 The theory must explains why and how relative contingencies happen,  
 and it has to explain the necessities (natural laws), etc.
OK. It can theoretically explain that, no doubt about that. But from this it
doesn't follow that the means of explanation (numbers) are primary. I can
explain with words why humans have legs, this doesn't mean my words are the
reason that humans have legs.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,
 
 That is ambiguous. If you accept that some proposition can be true  
 independently of us, it can mean that some meanings are true  
 independently of us. If not you need some one to observe the big bang  
 to make it happen, or the numbers to make them existing.
Well, independently of

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-08 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



 I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your theory
 is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would I
 believe in the truth of something that *can never be known in any way*
 (namely, that arithmetics is true without / prior to consciousness)?


Ben,

Do you think that the 10^10^100th digit of Pi has a certain value even
though we can never know what it is and no one has ever or will ever (in
this universe at least) be conscious of it?  If I assert the digit happens
to be 8, would you agree that my assertion must be either true or false?  If
so, where does this truth exist?

Note that one cannot say it has an indefinite or value, or that its value is
inconsequential because that level of precision will never make a difference
in any equation we work with.  Euler's identity: e^(Pi * i) + 1 = 0, would
be false without each of the infinite digits of Pi having a definite and
certain value.  These values that are unknown to use, but nonetheless must
be there.

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:



Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in  
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't  
take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just  
not in

the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.


There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your  
post.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and  
explains how

consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is  
already

assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at some  
level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories  
about its origin.




It's a bit like assuming A, and because B-A is true if A is true,  
we can

claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.


This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in  
a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.






Consciousness is simply a given. Every explanation of it will just  
express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would  
need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be  
prior to it,

as this would already require consciousness.


In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes consciousness  
as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are  
completely correct about this. Yet, consciousness is not assumed as  
something primitive in the TOE itself. You can define it by the  
number's first person belief in some reality, like you can explain the  
belief in matter by a sort of border of that belief. From this the  
math explains the qualia and the quanta as completely as any possible  
theory can ever explain (perhaps not correctly, because comp might be  
false, but then comp is refutable/scientific).






The only question is what systems are able to express that  
consciousness

exists,


And the comp answer is machine, or number, or universal numbers, or  
Löbian universal numbers.






and what place consciousness has in those systems.


And the comp answer is monumental. Universal number consciousness is  
at the origin of the laws of physics, even if it looks like a  
selection/projection inan richer arithmetical reality. This really  
needs to be understood by yourself.  I guess it makes no sense without  
understanding, because it *is* counterintuitive.

We might come back on this once you are in the mood again.







Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included,  
and

this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories.  
Theoretically

it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of  
everything.


Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).

They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
everything.


For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
(like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very  
different

makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
thing.


And proving the same things, with equivalent explanation.





Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it makes sense to  
treat them

as different theories.


But the goal here is a conceptual understanding, not direct practical  
application.




In theory, even one symbol can represent every statement in any  
language,


That does not make sense for me. (or it is trivia).




but still it's not as powerful as the language it represents.

Similarily if you use just natural numbers as a TOE, you won't be  
able to

directly express important concepts like dimensionality.



Why? If you prove this, I abandon comp immediately. From comp you can  
derive the whole of physics, and this should be easy to understand if  
you get the UDA1-7. Comp remains incomplete on God, consciousness and  
souls, and can explain why, but physics, including

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:
 

 Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in  
 general),
 so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't  
 take it as
 total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just  
 not in
 the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.
 
 There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your  
 post.
 
Of course not, I am interested in your comments. I just wanted to make clear
why I responded briefly.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and  
 explains how
 consciousness emerges from numbers,
 How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is  
 already
 assumed at the start?
 
 In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at some  
 level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories  
 about its origin.
That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent parts. In the
past, it was already there as a possibility.

But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time. Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of itself
doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.

To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was there
before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
there).


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 It's a bit like assuming A, and because B-A is true if A is true,  
 we can
 claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.
 
 This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in  
 a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.
I am not saying it's the same. I just don't see that because we can formally
deduce A from B, this mean that A in reality emerges from B.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 

 Consciousness is simply a given. Every explanation of it will just  
 express
 what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would  
 need to be
 independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be  
 prior to it,
 as this would already require consciousness.
 
 In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes consciousness  
 as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are  
 completely correct about this.
OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Yet, consciousness is not assumed as  
 something primitive in the TOE itself.
But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's primitive,
because we use it before we can even formulate anything. You can't just
ignore what you already know, by not making your assumptions explicit in
your theory.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 



 Bruno Marchal wrote:




 Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
 picture of
 almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included,  
 and
 this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
 I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
 the
 possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories.  
 Theoretically
 it may
 be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
 then we can
 represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
 encoding
 scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
 So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of  
 everything.

 Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
 enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
 They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
 everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
 numbers, so
 there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
 everything.

 For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
 is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
 (like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
 numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
 I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very  
 different
 makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
 thing.
 
 And proving the same things, with equivalent explanation.
Sure, we can write indistinguishable programs (to the user) with different
programming languages as well. Still they are different programming
languages, and they are only equivalent with respect to what they can
compute, not at all practically.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
 may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Aug 2011, at 15:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:



Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't
take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just
not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.


There is no problem, Ben. I hope you will not mind if I comment your
post.

Of course not, I am interested in your comments. I just wanted to  
make clear

why I responded briefly.


OK. Thanks for letting me know. I have to brief also, because I am  
overwhelmed by summer  work. I enjoy very much your attempt to  
understand what I try to convey.



Bruno Marchal wrote:





Bruno Marchal wrote:


Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,

How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
already
assumed at the start?


In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at  
some

level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
about its origin.
That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to  
have a
past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent  
parts. In the

past, it was already there as a possibility.


OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did  
already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this  
below.






But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it  
emerges
from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.  
Otherwise we
are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of  
itself

doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.

To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after  
consciousness has
been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there  
before,
but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was  
there

before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
there).


OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the  
arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For example  
I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in  
Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are the  
sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently on  
any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =  
3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite  
many people have searched for it.
I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or some  
thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on  
anything (but the definitions).








Bruno Marchal wrote:



It's a bit like assuming A, and because B-A is true if A is true,
we can
claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.


This confirms you are confusing two levels. The level of deduction in
a theory, and the level of implication in formal logic.
I am not saying it's the same. I just don't see that because we can  
formally

deduce A from B, this mean that A in reality emerges from B.


What I say is more subtle. I will make an attempt to be clearer below.






Bruno Marchal wrote:




Consciousness is simply a given. Every explanation of it will just
express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would
need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be
prior to it,
as this would already require consciousness.


In the comp theory it can be explained why machine takes  
consciousness

as a given, and that from their first person points of view, they are
completely correct about this.

OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Yet, consciousness is not assumed as
something primitive in the TOE itself.
But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's  
primitive,

because we use it before we can even formulate anything.


We already assumed it exists, sure. But why would that imply that it  
exists primitively? It exist fundamentally: in the sense that once you  
have all the true arithmetical relation, consciousness exists. So,  
consciousness is not something which appears or emerges in time or  
space, but it is not primitive in the sense that its existence is a  
logical consequence of arithmetical truth (provably so when we assume  
comp and accept some definition).


Sometimes I sketch this in the following manner. The arrows are logico- 
arithmetical deduction:


NUMBERS = CONSCIOUSNESS = PHYSICAL REALITY = HUMANS = HUMANS'  
NUMBERS




You can't just
ignore what you already know, by not making your assumptions  
explicit in

your theory.


It is just not an assumption in the theory, but a derived existence.  
With comp, consciousness is implicit in the arithmetical truth.

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread John Mikes

Dear benjamin if this is your name (benjayk?) if the unsigned text is
yours, of course:
I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
Benjayk wrote:
*Consciousness is simply a given*
OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then the
* 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
prerequisite to a prerequisite).
I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire concept
- what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else we
may not even know about today..
Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.

* ---EXISTS?---* as WHAT?
I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:* response
to relations, *
(originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
indeed.
Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
John M

(PS please excuse me if I pond on open doors in a discussion the ~100 long
posts of which I barely studied. I wanted to keep out and just could not
control my mouse. JM)

On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 5:14 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and explains
how
consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is already
assumed at the start?
It's a bit like assuming A, and because B-A is true if A is true, we can
claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.

Consciousness is simply a given. Every explanation of it will just
express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would need to
be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be prior to
it,
as this would already require consciousness.

The only question is what systems are able to express that consciousness
exists, and what place consciousness has in those systems.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes
the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically
it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.

Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as
numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of
everything.

For any theory, you have infinities of equivalent formulations. This
is not a defect. What is amazing is that they can be very different
(like cellular automata, LISP, addition+multiplication on natural
numbers, quantum topology, billiard balls, etc.
I agree. It's just that in my view the fact that they can be very different
makes them ultimately different theories, only theories about the same
thing. Different theories may explain the same thing, but in practice, they
may vary in their efficiency to explain it, so it makes sense to treat them
as different theories.
In theory, even one symbol can represent every statement in any language,
but still it's not as powerful as the language it represents.

Similarily if you use just natural numbers as a TOE, you won't be able to
directly express important concepts like dimensionality.
--
View this message in context:
http://old.nabble.com/Mathematical-closure-of-consciousness-and-computation-tp31771136p32209984.html
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 


 Bruno Marchal wrote:



 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
 explains how
 consciousness emerges from numbers,
 How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
 already
 assumed at the start?

 In science we assume at some meta-level what we try to explain at  
 some
 level. We have to assume the existence of the moon to try theories
 about its origin.
 That's true, but I think this is a different case. The moon seems to  
 have a
 past, so it makes sense to say it emerged from its constituent  
 parts. In the
 past, it was already there as a possibility.
 
 OK, I should say that it emerges arithmetically. I thought you did  
 already understand that time is not primitive at all. More on this  
 below.
Yeah, the problem is that consciousness emerging from arithmetics means
just that we manage to point to its existence within the theory. We have no
reason to suppose this expresses something more fundamental, that is, that
consciousness literally emerges from arithmetics. Honestly, I don't even
know how to interpret this literally.



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 

 But consciousness as such has no past, so what would it mean that it  
 emerges
 from numbers? Emerging is something taking place within time.  
 Otherwise we
 are just saying we can deduce it from a theory, but this in and of  
 itself
 doesn't mean that what is derived is prior to what it is derived from.

 To the contrary, what we call numbers just emerges after  
 consciousness has
 been there for quite a while. You might argue that they were there  
 before,
 but I don't see any evidence for it. What the numbers describe was  
 there
 before, this is certainly true (or you could say there were implicitly
 there).
 
 OK. That would be a real disagreement. I just assume that the  
 arithmetical relations are true independently of anything. For example  
 I consider the truth of Goldbach conjecture as already settled in  
 Platonia. Either it is true that all even number bigger than 2 are the  
 sum of two primes, or that this is not true, and this independently on  
 any consideration on time, spaces, humans, etc.
 Humans can easily verify this for little even numbers: 4 = 2+2, 6 =  
 3+3, 8 = 3+5, etc. But we don't have found a proof of this, despite  
 many people have searched for it.
 I can see that the expression of such a statement needs humans or some  
 thinking entity, but I don't see how the fact itself would depend on  
 anything (but the definitions).
My point is subtle, I wouldn't necessarily completly disagree with what you
said. The problem is that in some sense everything is already there in some
form, so in this sense 1+1=2 and 2+2=4 is independently, primarily true, but
so is everything else. Consciousness is required for any meaning to exist,
and ultimately is equivalent to it (IMO), so we derive from the meaning in
numbers that meaning exist. It's true, but ultimately trivial.

Either everything is independently true, which doesn't really seem to be the
case, or things are generally interdependent. 1+1=2 is just true because
2+2=4 and I can just be conscious because 1+1=2, but 1+1=2 is just true
because I am conscious, and 1+1=2 is true because my mouse pad is blue,
etc...

This view makes sense to me, because it is so simple. One particular
statement true statement is true, only because every particular statement
true statement is true, and because what is true is true. In this sense
every statement is true because of every other statement. If we derive
something, we just explain how we become aware of the truth (of a
statement). There is no objective hierarchy of emergence (but apparently
necessarily a subjective progression, we will first understand some things
and later some other things).
That's why it makes little sense to me to say consciousness as such arises
out of numbers. Subjectively we first need consciousness to make sense of
numbers. But certainly understanding of numbers can lead us to become more
conscious.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Yet, consciousness is not assumed as
 something primitive in the TOE itself.
 But this doesn't really matter, as we already assume that it's  
 primitive,
 because we use it before we can even formulate anything.
 
 We already assumed it exists, sure. But why would that imply that it  
 exists primitively? It exist fundamentally: in the sense that once you  
 have all the true arithmetical relation, consciousness exists. So,  
 consciousness is not something which appears or emerges in time or  
 space, but it is not primitive in the sense that its existence is a  
 logical consequence of arithmetical truth (provably so when we assume  
 comp and accept some definition).
 
 Sometimes I sketch this in the following manner. The arrows are logico- 
 arithmetical deduction:
 
 NUMBERS = CONSCIOUSNESS = PHYSICAL REALITY = HUMANS = HUMANS'  
 NUMBERS
I accept this deduction.

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread benjayk

John Mikes wrote:

Dear benjamin if this is your name (benjayk?)

Yep.

John Mikes wrote:

I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
Benjayk wrote:
*Consciousness is simply a given*
OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then
the
* 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
prerequisite to a prerequisite).
I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire
concept
- what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else we
may not even know about today..
Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.
Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of consciousness
and then want an origin for it?

John Mikes wrote:

* ---EXISTS?---* as WHAT?
I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:*
response
to relations, *
(originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
indeed.
Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
???

benjayk

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-07 Thread John Mikes

benjayk wrote:

*Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of
consciousness
**and then want an origin for it?*

BTW I never said that I do not accept the term consciousness - if it is
identified in a way that makes sens (to me). I even worked on it (1992) to
apply the word to something *more general* than e.g. awareness or similar
'human' peculiarities. This is how I first formulated my ID for
it:*Acknowledgement of and response to information
*. During these 2 decades I attempted to clear the words into newer terms of
advanced meaning (changing to and extending them beyond our limits of
knowledge in my agnosticism like 'relations' etc.)

John M

On Sun, Aug 7, 2011 at 4:01 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

John Mikes wrote:

Dear benjamin if this is your name (benjayk?)

Yep.

John Mikes wrote:

I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
Benjayk wrote:
*Consciousness is simply a given*
OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given'.
Your(?) logic seems alright that if it is 'originated' upon numbers then
the
* 'consciousness-based' *numbers are a consequence of a consequence (or
prerequisite to a prerequisite).
I am not decrying the 'origin' of consciousness, rather its entire
concept
- what it may contain, include, act with, by, for, result in, - or else
we
may not even know about today..
Then I may stipulate about an origin for it.
Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of consciousness
and then want an origin for it?

John Mikes wrote:

* ---EXISTS?---* as WHAT?
I volunteered on many discussion lists a defining generalization:*
response
to relations, *
(originally: *to information*, which turned out to be a loose cannon). In
such general view it is not restricted to animates, in-animates, physical
objects, ideas, or more, since the 'relations' are quite ubiquitous even
beyond the limited circle of our knowledge. In such sense:* it exists*,
indeed.
Not (according to me) in *THOSE *systems, but everywhere.
???

benjayk

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Aug 2011, at 07:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus  
on computations. From comp it is easy to derive indeterminacy/ 
uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the apparent  
primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of knowledge you  
get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are  
reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such  
symmetries).


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies  
a limited speed of signaliing.


?

Comp is not local from the first person point of view, because if a  
Boltzmann brain, for example, generates a next state of myself out  
of my light cone, I have still to take it into account to predict what  
I will experience in the next second. The presence of the UD makes  
that worst. Of course the generated physical reality can still be  
local, but this would need a justification. Formally comp is not local  
because the comp-physics (given by the Z1* and X1* logics) satisfies  
(most plausibly) an abstract Bell-like inequality (very plausibly: not  
enough people have verified the argument. I used the theorem prover  
for G* to assist the derivation).
It is a form of logical, conditional, non locality, given that we have  
not yet a notion of space, still less of speed.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread meekerdb


On 8/6/2011 12:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 06 Aug 2011, at 07:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus 
on computations. From comp it is easy to derive 
indeterminacy/uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the 
apparent primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of 
knowledge you get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws 
are reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such 
symmetries).


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies a 
limited speed of signaliing.


?

Comp is not local from the first person point of view, because if a 
Boltzmann brain, for example, generates a next state of myself out 
of my light cone, I have still to take it into account to predict what 
I will experience in the next second. The presence of the UD makes 
that worst. Of course the generated physical reality can still be 
local, but this would need a justification. Formally comp is not local 
because the comp-physics (given by the Z1* and X1* logics) satisfies 
(most plausibly) an abstract Bell-like inequality (very plausibly: not 
enough people have verified the argument.


Satisfying a Bell-inequality implies consistency with locality?   Did 
you mean to write violates an abstract Bell-like inequality?


Brent


I used the theorem prover for G* to assist the derivation).
It is a form of logical, conditional, non locality, given that we have 
not yet a notion of space, still less of speed.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-06 Thread benjayk

Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is already
assumed at the start?
It's a bit like assuming A, and because B-A is true if A is true, we can
claim for any B that B is the reason that A true.

Consciousness is simply a given. Every explanation of it will just express
what it is and will not determine its origin, as its origin would need to be
independent of it / prior to it, but could never be known to be prior to it,
as this would already require consciousness.

The only question is what systems are able to express that consciousness
exists, and what place consciousness has in those systems.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal




On 04 Aug 2011, at 20:38, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which  
can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that  
you

will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.

OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.


Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation
to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which
help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving
it as far as possible.

OK.



Bruno Marchal wrote:



Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical
laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?


Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a
comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred
from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution  
level.

Alright. So which form would the physics derived from COMP take?


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus on  
computations. From comp it is easy to derive indeterminacy/ 
uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the apparent primitive  
matter. From comp + the classical theory of knowledge you get also  
symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are reversible, and  
'particles' comes from invariance from such symmetries).




I can
hardly imagine that one / a few equation describes the physics for  
all of

the omniverse.


Why? That is a bet also done by many physicists, and comp shows the  
necessity of the existence of such an equation. Newton's laws already  
explains a lot, and the quantum laws seems to be universal.  
Empirically this is plausible, but again comp shows that it has to be  
like that. Only geography and history can be very different, and needs  
some amount of non trivial, and non deductible, purely contingent,  
information.
I am not sure you are aware of how much QM (and Hamilton, or Maxwell)  
already explains things.




There would probably be an infinity of laws with approximate
and local validity. How could this be formulated (let alone derived,  
but I

probably would understand none of your explanations regarding that?).


You need to study a minimal amount of mathematical logic and  
theoretical computer science. But with UDA alone, you can understand  
all the points above, except the symmetry and what comes from the  
classical theory of knowledge.







Bruno Marchal wrote:






Bruno Marchal wrote:



So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there  
being

a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory  
of

almost everything.

Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at
all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever
explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!).


Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it
explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and
sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely
understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad
normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,
without assuming anything physical.
Well, OK, saying it explains almost nothing might be too harsh.  
There is
probably no objective way to say how much it explains, as the  
unexplainable

part is (largly?) unmeasurable. But I don't see why it would be almost
nothing, so it's not a TOAE either.


I would say that comp explains almost everything. The only things  
which it does not explain is not explainable in *any* theory. It is  
the existence of numbers, and the befuddling aspect of consciousness.  
But it explains why consciousnes must be befuddling, and why and how  
machines get befuddled by it. In a (paradoxical) sense, the soul of  
the machine will correctly NOT believe she is a machine, and perhaps  
even correctly believe she is not a machine (once she identifies  
herself with the 'inner god').







Bruno Marchal wrote:



Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's
not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist
materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and
honest
seems more important to me.


The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying yes to the
doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest
follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.
It seems to me we postulate the ineffeable at the start by saying  
yes, and
so it's

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-05 Thread meekerdb


On 8/5/2011 9:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp already shows that it take the form of an uncertainty calculus on 
computations. From comp it is easy to derive 
indeterminacy/uncertainty, non locality, non clonability of the 
apparent primitive matter. From comp + the classical theory of 
knowledge you get also symmetry at the observable bottom (the laws are 
reversible, and 'particles' comes from invariance from such symmetries). 


How does comp imply non-locality?  I don't even see that it implies a 
limited speed of signaliing.


Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-04 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.

A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.
OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.

Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation
to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which
help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving
it as far as possible.
OK.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical
laws
from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?

Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a
comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred
from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution level.
Alright. So which form would the physics derived from COMP take? I can
hardly imagine that one / a few equation describes the physics for all of
the omniverse. There would probably be an infinity of laws with approximate
and local validity. How could this be formulated (let alone derived, but I
probably would understand none of your explanations regarding that?).

Bruno Marchal wrote:

So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
a gap.

Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it
explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and
sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely
understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad
normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,
without assuming anything physical.
Well, OK, saying it explains almost nothing might be too harsh. There is
probably no objective way to say how much it explains, as the unexplainable
part is (largly?) unmeasurable. But I don't see why it would be almost
nothing, so it's not a TOAE either.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's
not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist
materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and
honest
seems more important to me.

The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying yes to the
doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest
follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.
It seems to me we postulate the ineffeable at the start by saying yes, and
so it's not really a conclusion of the theory, but we just give it a place
in a theoretical framework.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent
picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically
it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an
encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.

Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are
enough, and very simple (despite mysterious).
They are enough, but they are not the only way to make a theory of
everything. As you say, we can use everything as powerful as numbers, so
there is an infinity of different formulations of theories of everything.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The many more powerful theories are internal views *in* the number realm,
but strictly
speaking they are introducing the complexity, and should be compared
to event taken place in the number realm.
How do you know the more powerful theories are just internal views, and not
implicit in the yes (consciousness)? We might just get what we
(implicitly) assume at the start, and give it a place in the theory.

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-08-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:




The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.

OK. But what is predictable may be quite limited in the end.


Predicting is not the goal of the TOE. It is just a little obligation  
to be accepted as a scientific theory, so as to be refutable.
The goal is more like searching a bigger picture, rational, and which  
help, first in formulating the mind-body problem, and then in solving  
it as far as possible.





Is there a
result showing that it is possible at all to derive precise physical  
laws

from COMP and a bet on our substitution level?


Yes. And you don't need to know the substitution level, although a  
comparison of the physics derived from comp, and the physics inferred  
from measurement might suggest higher bounds for our substitution level.








Bruno Marchal wrote:



I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be
predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?


The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in
'perspective' (Aristotle - Plato), but the discovery of a creative
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make  
it

less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.

Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.


Comp leads first to a ROE (Realm of everything: the ontologic part of  
the TOE, which here is given by the truth of elementary (sigma_1)  
statements).


Then it shows that we can only scratch the truth, concerning that ROE.
Concerning the UMs and the LUMs, they are born universal dissident:  
they can refute *all* theories about themselves, unless they are too  
fuzzy (which makes them allergic to fuzzy theories too).







Bruno Marchal wrote:



So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at  
all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever  
explain,

as there is infinitely much to explain!).


Well, you have admitted not having study the details, but normally it  
explains a lot: indeed God, belief, knowledge, observation and  
sensation, and all this including all reason why we cannot completely  
understand what happens to be introspectively unexplainable. Ad  
normally, in principle, it explains the origin of the physical laws,  
without assuming anything physical.




If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.


Theories, or machines. Those are terrestrial finite creatures. It is  
he tree of arithmetical life, if you want. It is transfinite, very big.



Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's  
not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist  
materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and  
honest

seems more important to me.


The modesty is in the reiterared act of faith of saying yes to the  
doctor, and accepting the classical Church thesis. All the rest  
follows from that: from the explainable to the ineffable.







Bruno Marchal wrote:


But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We  
use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best  
we can

ever do - how exciting!


You are right. It is like that. Numbers hides and partially single out  
a very deep mystery.






Bruno Marchal wrote:


And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent  
picture of

almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically  
it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but  
then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an  
encoding

scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.


Not really. Once you assume comp, the numbers (or equivalent) are  
enough, and very

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
just have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and
logically.

You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen
Robinson Arithmetic.

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers project
realities. With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend
on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a
lot, which are equivalent for the fundamental matter. They lead all
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of
knowledge (Theaetetus).

We can debate the terms. I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch. The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything. I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena.
I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the
axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which really
means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable. So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being a gap.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-31 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 Jul 2011, at 16:14, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order  
logical

specification of any universal machine, will do.

Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.
You
just have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and
logically.



You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen
Robinson Arithmetic.

The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and  
the

axioms:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers project
realities. With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not  
depend

on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a
lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of
knowledge (Theaetetus).



We can debate the terms.


OK.




I think calling universal systems a TOE is a bit of
a stretch.



Just to be precise, the TOE is not the universal system, but some  
first order classical logic, with equality, extension of the chosen  
universal system. OK. (the UMs and the LUMs are more like hero and  
heroin in the dramas the TOE allows)






The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.


A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is  
predictible, in the right condition. No one asks for a TOE which can  
predict things which are not predictible. No TOE can predict that you  
will feel to be, just after the duplication, in W or in M.





I don't think this can be
done through universal systems. It appears to me COMP allows for
uncomputable, and therefore unpredictable phenomena.


A lot. All surprises hide surprises.



I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much  
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be  
predicted

precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?


The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in  
'perspective' (Aristotle - Plato), but the discovery of a creative  
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We  
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it  
less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not  
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.






COMP shows, as you said, that there are unbridgeable gaps, which  
really

means there is something left unexplained, and unexplainable.


Absolutely so (assuming comp). comp = CT + yes doctor. CT subsumes  
arithmetic.





So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being  
a gap.


OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of  
almost everything.


But, you know, it is more than the necessity for a gap, it is the  
discovery that the gap 'kick back', it has a geometry, it is  
something and machines have access to it, they can point  
mathematical telescope on it, also.


Comp leads to a generalization of Everett's idea to apply QM to the  
observer. Comp applies arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (a part of  
arithmetic by Post, Gödel, Kleene  Co.) to the 'body' of the  
mathematician, or at least the one who say yes doctor to a doctor  
which serendipitously opts for the correct level, in a mathematical  
precise sense: in this case it inherits of the hypostases, and the  
logic of it determine the views you can have from inside. But the  
simplest thing you can say on those views is that they all make us  
more ignorant. The concrete relative Löbian machines get interesting  
on the border of the computable and non computable, where very deep  
sharable histories develop, in all case, from all views some mysteries  
subsists, and some key mystery, the gap, have a quasi life of its own.  
But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery. And  
in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of  
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and  
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.

And the point is not that this is true, but that this is testable.
Comp, not so much unlike salvia perhaps, put you

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an epistemological view on that is a very narrow
interpretation.

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including consciousness exists, in
order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-31 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),

but for me it seems like this is the case.

It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car. You can reify the epistemological truth in some
ontology, but there is no need to do that, and it makes the MB problem
more difficult. In science, you can never proof that a theory is
wrong, by changing ad-hocly the way you interpret the data. The
epistemological view are secondary because they are recovered by the
way machine looks at the arithmetical reality. The simplest ontology
are the numbers, and the internal view, including the physical, are
given by the arithmetical modalities, like Bp and Bp Dp, or the less
arithmetical one, like Bp p, Bp Dp p, etc. At least in the toy
theology based on the Theaetetus definition of knowledge (justified
opinion which happens to be God's opinion (I mean which happens to be
true)).

Bruno

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am critical of the very notion of a TOE. It doesn't make much
sense. Even
current physics clearly shows that results of experiments can't be
predicted
precisely. So is the TOE supposed to give a perfect probability
distribution? But what is this even supposed to mean?

The exact contrary. Comp is not just a change in
'perspective' (Aristotle - Plato), but the discovery of a creative
bomb (the UM).
With comp we begin to know that we don't know what we are doing. We
can (machines can) understand that by trying to control it, we make it
less controllable. A bit like a mother with a baby. That is not
something entirely new, but here it appears in the 3-theories.
Right. That's why we could almost say COMP is an anti-TOE.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

So no theory
can explain everything. But we can show the necessity of there being
a gap.

OK. You are right. I will abandon the label TOE, for TOAE. Theory of
almost everything.
Well, but the part that is unexplainable doesn't seem to be small at all.
Frankly it explains almost nothing (which is the most we will ever explain,
as there is infinitely much to explain!). If anything, it shows there is an
infinite hierarchy of ever more efficient theories.
Which is quite an astounding result, don't get me wrong, but let's not make
the mistake of adjusting to the immodesty of the reductionist materialists.
This way you may not be taken as seriously, but being modest and honest
seems more important to me.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

But *that* fact, that there are mysteries, is no more a mystery.
At the cost that the very foundation of our theory is mysterious! We use a
mystery to explain that there are more mysteries. Which is the best we can
ever do - how exciting!

Bruno Marchal wrote:

And in that sense, comp provides, I think, the first coherent picture of
almost everything, from God (oops!) to qualia, quanta included, and
this by assuming only seven arithmetical axioms.
I tend to agree. But it's coherent picture of everything includes the
possibility of infinitely many more powerful theories. Theoretically it may
be possible to represent every such theory with arithmetic - but then we can
represent every arithmetical statement with just one symbol and an encoding
scheme, still we wouldn't call . a theory of everything.
So it's not THE theory of everything, but *a* theory of everything.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are
secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it
could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including consciousness
exists, in
order to say yes, doctor) are in some sense equivalent to the
epistemological points of view whose existence we derive from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.

It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car.

True, but consciousness is there without being assumed. The theory cannot
just ignore that.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex emulation
bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical entities,
and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly complex,
so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch the
arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.
I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.

That is a consequence of comp. If we are machine at some level, then
it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than
arithmetical truth.
The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth
can be seen as internal epistemological views. In arithmetic there
are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x x (x
arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for example)
My point is that this truth has little to do with arithmetic in particular.
Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it. All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number relations exist
and all else is an epistemological view on that is a very narrow
interpretation.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread benjayk

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get tired
of it.

If that can happen.
I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at
some
point.

Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of life,
or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big
bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected
situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable
conflict between security and freedom).
I think both Conway's game of life and convential computer progamming will
become boring at some point. The insights gained through them and most
importantly, their fun, are quite limited. I cannot imagine having boundless
creative blissful fun with Conway's game of life or C++, and I think
boundless creative bliss is where we want to go, and will go.

Conway's game is just too mechanical. There are much better/efficient views
on the computations that Conway's game can represent then Conway's game
itself.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 27 Jul 2011, at 15:50, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get  
tired

of it.


If that can happen.

I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at
some
point.



Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of  
life,

or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big
bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected
situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable
conflict between security and freedom).
I think both Conway's game of life and convential computer  
progamming will

become boring at some point. The insights gained through them and most
importantly, their fun, are quite limited. I cannot imagine having  
boundless

creative blissful fun with Conway's game of life or C++, and I think
boundless creative bliss is where we want to go, and will go.

Conway's game is just too mechanical. There are much better/ 
efficient views
on the computations that Conway's game can represent then Conway's  
game

itself.


OF course. In that sense you are right. But I count as Conway's game  
the games that you can represent in in*one* infinite game, like  
biological life is usually seen as chemistry.


Bruno

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Jul 2011, at 15:36, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly
complex,
so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch
the

arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.

I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.

That is a consequence of comp. If we are machine at some level,
then

it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than
arithmetical truth.
The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth
can be seen as internal epistemological views. In arithmetic there
are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x x (x
arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for
example)
My point is that this truth has little to do with arithmetic in
particular.

Indeed, any first order specification of a universal system will do.
They are ontologically equivalent: with the combinators you have the
numbers, and with the numbers, you have the combinators. So
combinatoric truth and arithmetical truth, and Conway-game-of-life
truth are all the same truth, with different shape or implementations.

Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist

and all else is an epistemological view on that is a very narrow
interpretation.

Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
So, arithmetic is made into a theory of everything, and arithmetical
truth does play the role of the big unameable things. If you take
fortran programs as ontology, exactly the same can be said. Once you
search a theory of everything, comp does confuse truth and
arithmetical truth, or Truth and fortranic truth, etc. When number
relation exist, all other universal system exist in a similar
ontological sense. In arithmetical truth the fortranic truth is
automatically given, you don't need to introduce points of view,
unlike the analytical and the physical, for which you need the
epistemology (to interview the fortran program or the numbers).

Bruno

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Jul 2011, at 19:11, benjayk wrote:




Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hi benjayk,

I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and
business, I will just go on some points.

No problem, comment on what you want and when you feel like doing it.


OK.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be  
*that*
simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should like  
that

the theory is a little theory of numbers (and that the observers is
that same theory + the induction axioms). All what I explain in the
quote can be defined precisely in that theory.

It's interesting, but I can't wrap my head around it so easily and I
am just
too lazy to study it. I don't think it would be much use for me.


The whole approach is not instrumental.
OK, but this has not much too do with whether studying the theory  
feels

useful for me personally.


There are different level of use. A return to Plato and scientific   
might indirectly help physician and pharmaceutics coming back to  
seriousness in medicine, and that might save your life. The practice  
of comp might be used to explore the galaxy, and the whole theory give  
a reservoir to counterexample for invalid use of Gödel and the quantum  
in philosophy of mind. I think that there is a lot of things there  
which can be enjoyed both by your little ego and your higher self (if  
that makes sense).
But it is fundamental science: the main use if for the fun when we are  
interested in such questions.






Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Shit happens, provably so in the comp theory. We can practice harm
reduction, but we cannot eliminate the bad. And, indeed it has its
role in the big picture.
Yep. But harm reduction often does not work that well. You know,  
like

reducing harm by illegalizing drugs. It easily leads to
authoritarianism.
And it may easily be anti-progress. Progress means also great new
dangers.


The harm-reduction philosophy comes from anti-prohibitionism. The  
idea
is to inform people. It really comes from, I think, the fact that  
oral

tobacco is much safer that smoking tobacco, which was hard to accept
for those who are 'religiously' against tobacco. It is known that it
is prohibition which makes the drug dangerous, so harm reduction
really means the stopping of prohibition, and sending strongly
addicted people to the hospital instead of jail (like we do with
alcohol).
Basically HARM REDUCTION = ANTI-PROHIBITION.

Sure, from your and my perspective this is clear.


Harm reduction is not a personal label. It is a label used again those  
who want to eliminate the roots of the harm, instead of ameliorating  
the condition of those who are in contact with such harmful things. It  
is an approach like putting security belt in cars, filter on  
cigarette, given clean needles to heroin user, and basically to stop  
prohibition of drugs, which is recognized by the experts are much more  
harmful than the drugs. They do not advocate explicitly anti- 
prohibition, because they try to be more concrete than that and to  
teach by examples. You can look at:


http://www.harmreduction.org/section.php?id=62

or the journal

http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/

(Harm Reduction Journal is an open access, peer-reviewed, online  
journal whose focus is on the prevalent patterns of psychoactive drug  
use, the public policies meant to control them, and the search for  
effective methods of reducing the adverse medical, public health, and  
social consequences associated with both drugs and drug policies. We  
define 'harm reduction' as 'policies and programs which aim to reduce  
the health, social, and economic costs of legal and illegal  
psychoactive drug use without necessarily reducing drug consumption'.)





But from some people's
perspective, it's seems clear we need prohibtion to save people from
themselves.


This is harm elimination philosophy: the opposite of harm reduction,  
which consists in helping people instead of condemning them for their  
behavior (unless they harm other people).




The point is, we can never really be sure if harm reduction
really reduces harm. We never know.


We know that immediately. It is the difference between going in jail  
and going in a center for helping you.





Harm reduction is especially critical in this respect because some  
form of
harm reduction may be extremely catastrophic. Some people might  
say we
need to stop technological progress for reducing harm, and indeed  
their are
some relatively plausible arguments that technological progress may  
create
massive harm. But it may equally be true that technology may create  
heaven
on earth and solve many absolutely critical problems, and without  
it, we are

doomed. In this case stopping progress would create disastrous harm.


Harm reduction has no long run strategies. It is a pragmatic concern  
for helping suffering people here and now.







Bruno Marchal wrote:



But

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out


Hi benjayk,

I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and  
business, I will just go on some points.



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:

You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be *that*
simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should like that
the theory is a little theory of numbers (and that the observers is
that same theory + the induction axioms). All what I explain in the
quote can be defined precisely in that theory.
It's interesting, but I can't wrap my head around it so easily and I  
am just

too lazy to study it. I don't think it would be much use for me.


The whole approach is not instrumental.


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Shit happens, provably so in the comp theory. We can practice harm
reduction, but we cannot eliminate the bad. And, indeed it has its
role in the big picture.

Yep. But harm reduction often does not work that well. You know, like
reducing harm by illegalizing drugs. It easily leads to  
authoritarianism.
And it may easily be anti-progress. Progress means also great new  
dangers.


The harm-reduction philosophy comes from anti-prohibitionism. The idea  
is to inform people. It really comes from, I think, the fact that oral  
tobacco is much safer that smoking tobacco, which was hard to accept  
for those who are 'religiously' against tobacco. It is known that it  
is prohibition which makes the drug dangerous, so harm reduction  
really means the stopping of prohibition, and sending strongly  
addicted people to the hospital instead of jail (like we do with  
alcohol).

Basically HARM REDUCTION = ANTI-PROHIBITION.




But the ultimate soul (God), does
not fall, as in a accident. It falls, because this it what it always
does.
It falls into itself.


All right. But not always, only one half eternity (so to speak,  
again).

Hm... When exactly does he not fall?


When heart and reason makes peace.



In my mind the creatures are God,


[you are probably not supposed to say this. Enlightened people  
already

know, and lost souls cannot grasp]

You can say things like I love logic, or I love this or that  
plant.
I think you are a bit too anxious about saying the forbidden things.  
But you
are right, it won't really help. But then, a soul that's really lost  
cannot

be helped. It has to find it's way on its own.


It is worst than that. By telling incommunicable truth, you aggravate  
the situation of the soul, or you make it fall.
In comp there are many such statement X which are not provable, but  
where comp - X is provable. Comp itself is like that, and that is why  
I insist that comp is a bet. It cannot even be made into an axiom,  
only a meta-axiom. It *is* delicate.




Well, in my mind inconsistent things are just labels that we can't  
attach

some precise meaning to. If I say 1+1=3 is true in the usual natural
numbers, you just don't know what I mean. You might say I am  
wrong. But
maybe I just have another conception of the usual natural numbers as  
you do,

or pretend so.  :P We can always play this game of relativizing
descriptions.


Yes, like you can always visit France with a map of Germany.
Inconsistency is a Löbian machine's right.
But you were the one mentioning use! And a map of Germany, in  
France, is of no use (unless you are planning an invasion, of course).





Well, with comp, all the rest is just 0, 1, 2, ... plus two
operations. I don't ask to assume a lot. But with less than that, the
hypostases becomes trivial, and you can no more see how the Soul
emanates from the Noùs which emanates from God, and you cannot see of
the soul is led to the building of matter appearances.
I just think we don't need the assumption of the existence  
0,1,2,3,... We

can use it without pretending it exists out there.



If you say that we can use it, you already accept it is out there in  
the weak sense I am using.





Because we need to study the relation between a truth, like 1+1=2,  
and

a belief by a terrestrial little ego B(1+1=2).

But we can use different levels of epistemological truth for that.


OK. Then 1+1 =2 means God believes that 1+1 = 2.
B(1+1=2) means benjayk (or some other machine) believes that 1+1=2.

I have to go,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-26 Thread benjayk



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Hi benjayk,
 
 I might comment other paragraphs later, but for reason of time and  
 business, I will just go on some points.
No problem, comment on what you want and when you feel like doing it.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 You can expect that a theory which unify all force will not be *that*
 simple. Now, with comp, if you like simplicity, you should like that
 the theory is a little theory of numbers (and that the observers is
 that same theory + the induction axioms). All what I explain in the
 quote can be defined precisely in that theory.
 It's interesting, but I can't wrap my head around it so easily and I  
 am just
 too lazy to study it. I don't think it would be much use for me.
 
 The whole approach is not instrumental.
OK, but this has not much too do with whether studying the theory feels
useful for me personally.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Shit happens, provably so in the comp theory. We can practice harm
 reduction, but we cannot eliminate the bad. And, indeed it has its
 role in the big picture.
 Yep. But harm reduction often does not work that well. You know, like
 reducing harm by illegalizing drugs. It easily leads to  
 authoritarianism.
 And it may easily be anti-progress. Progress means also great new  
 dangers.
 
 The harm-reduction philosophy comes from anti-prohibitionism. The idea  
 is to inform people. It really comes from, I think, the fact that oral  
 tobacco is much safer that smoking tobacco, which was hard to accept  
 for those who are 'religiously' against tobacco. It is known that it  
 is prohibition which makes the drug dangerous, so harm reduction  
 really means the stopping of prohibition, and sending strongly  
 addicted people to the hospital instead of jail (like we do with  
 alcohol).
 Basically HARM REDUCTION = ANTI-PROHIBITION.
Sure, from your and my perspective this is clear. But from some people's
perspective, it's seems clear we need prohibtion to save people from
themselves. The point is, we can never really be sure if harm reduction
really reduces harm. We never know.
Harm reduction is especially critical in this respect because some form of
harm reduction may be extremely catastrophic. Some people might say we
need to stop technological progress for reducing harm, and indeed their are
some relatively plausible arguments that technological progress may create
massive harm. But it may equally be true that technology may create heaven
on earth and solve many absolutely critical problems, and without it, we are
doomed. In this case stopping progress would create disastrous harm.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 But the ultimate soul (God), does
 not fall, as in a accident. It falls, because this it what it always
 does.
 It falls into itself.

 All right. But not always, only one half eternity (so to speak,  
 again).
 Hm... When exactly does he not fall?
 
 When heart and reason makes peace.
I am not sure if this works. Peace really only comes when you get
comfortable with falling - otherwise you will only feel at peace when you
feel (potentially illusorily) safe.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 In my mind the creatures are God,

 [you are probably not supposed to say this. Enlightened people  
 already
 know, and lost souls cannot grasp]

 You can say things like I love logic, or I love this or that  
 plant.
 I think you are a bit too anxious about saying the forbidden things.  
 But you
 are right, it won't really help. But then, a soul that's really lost  
 cannot
 be helped. It has to find it's way on its own.
 
 It is worst than that. By telling incommunicable truth, you aggravate  
 the situation of the soul, or you make it fall.
This may be true. But then, it's critical souls that souls learn not to
believe what other people say and trust themselves. So it really does not
ultimately matter what you say. The more they believe a thing you said that
they really shouldn't believe, the more they will realize the consequences
of blind faith.
I acknowledge that this may be used to justify saying anything, and I am
okay with that.
Telling incommunicable truth may still inspire people to find what the
communcation hints at. I can't communicate the feeling at looking at my
screen, but I can still say I see a screen. Do you see the screen in front
of your eyes, too?


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Well, in my mind inconsistent things are just labels that we can't  
 attach
 some precise meaning to. If I say 1+1=3 is true in the usual natural
 numbers, you just don't know what I mean. You might say I am  
 wrong. But
 maybe I just have another conception of the usual natural numbers as  
 you do,
 or pretend so.  :P We can always play this game of relativizing
 descriptions.
 
 Yes, like you can always visit France with a map of Germany.
 Inconsistency is a Löbian machine's right.
 But you were the one mentioning use! And a map of Germany, in  
 France, is of no use (unless you are planning an invasion, of course).
Sure.



Bruno

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Well, bad luck. Then you have to play this game until you get tired
of it.


If that can happen.
I hope so! Playing is great, but every particular game is boring at  
some

point.



Not the infinite games. In infinite games (like Conway's game of life,  
or like with programming computers, or plausibly other life and big  
bangs ...) there are always new participants, and unexpected  
situations. It is both fun and scary. (leading to the unavoidable  
conflict between security and freedom).


Ah! benjayk!  I can understand your reticence for betting on a theory.
Someone said that there is only two certainties in life: taxes and  
death.

Comp is the understanding that there is only one certainty: taxes.

But this does not concern you (the higher self) at all. It concerns  
only you (the ego). Infinite games have exit doors too, but taxes is  
the price of any of its local relative incarnations.


What we can try is a slow persistent decrease of taxes, by genuine  
realist investment and speculation.

Harm reduction again. We can tend to zero taxes, for some period.

What would be even more helpful for all little ego, would be a  
reappraisal of the spiritual values, but this will take the time  
needed for the heart to recover reason, and for the reason to recover  
the heart. This needs a complex mixture of security and freedom, and,  
on earth, is a problem with billions of unknowns. It is an infinite  
game by itself.


I would appreciate a bigger respect for contemplation, and meditation,  
and even sleep and holiday, but I am realist: we are living the  
prohibition era, human fears themselves still to much and many  
politicized or romanticize spiritual values. As long as drugs are  
prohibited, I can't help myself to think we are partially, but  
internationally  governed by mafia, that is: not democratic state. And  
confusing democracy with that power, gives it power. I think.


To kill the little ego, and coming back, you need to give it not just  
love, but food and water too. Not coming back is the usual clinical  
death.


Bruno


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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't really exist.  
You
just have a theory that manages to state this very clearly, and  
logically.



You might try to take literally what I say. I was saying that each  
universal numbers (like FORTRAN, Conway's game of life, LISP, prolog,  
Robinson arithmetic, etc.) are TOE. To fix the things I have chosen  
Robinson Arithmetic.


The theory of everything is basically a bit of classical logic and the  
axioms:


0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Another one is mainly

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

That gives rich ontologies in which internal observers project  
realities. With comp we have to embed the mathematician (the little  
ego!) in arithmetics, and the laws of mind and matter does not depend  
on the choice of the first initial universal system.
All computations contains all computations by all universal systems,  
that is why the tehological matter (including physics) does not depend  
on the initial choice. It does not mean that there is no TOE. Only a  
lot, which are equivalent  for the fundamental matter. They lead all  
to the same hypostases, once you accept the classical theory of  
knowledge (Theaetetus).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-26 Thread meekerdb


On 7/26/2011 10:11 AM, benjayk wrote:

Peace really only comes when you get
comfortable with falling


As an old motorcycle racer, I agree completely.

Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


And once the observer is defined by the LUM (Löbian universal
machine), we can extract from addition and multiplication, the whole
UP-theology (GOD, NOÙS and UNIVERSAL SOUL, and the down-theology:
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER and SENSIBLE MATTER. This gives indirectly a
theory of consciousness,  matter and qualia. It is scientific in  
the

sense of being testable, by comparing our observable matter, and the
matter that machines can observe in arithmetic. It is elegant, I dare
to say, because we can take as TOE elementary arithmetic (already
taught in school!), and then everything else including GOD and why  
GOD

has no name (Oops!), appears (not in time, by logic and arithmetic.
OK. It seems to be elegant, indeed. Not sure how useful it'll be,  
though.

Extracting laws of physics out of it seems to me like computing the
mandelbrot on a pocket calculator.
Just looking and using empirical science seems to be more practical  
to me

(even though we won't get that exact results this way).


It is not a question of being useful, but a question of being  
consequent with the assumption we do.
Comp does not needed to be used to study the physical (except Everett  
uses it, note, but don't mind this), but it makes computer science  
capable of explaining where the physical laws come from, and by the  
Solovay G/G* splitting and the intensional variants we get the picture  
already at a testable level, and it already explains some weird  
quantum features. That is my job, you don't need to be interested.


Would I have search all that would I have discovered salvia in my  
youth? Perhaps. I have a craving for reasoning from hypothesis  
(arguing).


I think that in the long run, being serious (and thus modest) in  
theology is the best remedy against fundamentalism and authoritarism.  
Now, being serious here might consisted in recognizing the incredible  
machine's theology (a branch of computer science), and even number  
theory.


... but we are not even serious on health ... sigh

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Exercise:
1) show that 1 has 8 clothes. (easy) example of clothes for 1
(1^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, 0^2+1^2+0^2+0^2, (-1)^2+0^2+0^2+0^2, ...)
2) show that 2 has 24 clothes (easy but longer)
3) show that all numbers have clothes (very difficult)
4) well Jacobi result: show that the male's number of clothes is 8
times the number of their divisors, and show that the female's  
number

of clothes is, well a bit more complex, it is 24 times the number of
their *male* divisors.  (super extremely difficult).
I recall male number = odd number, and female number = even number.

Take it easy. Jacobi' result illustrates beautiful number's pattern.
Its proof lead to the notion of modular form, which are really crazy
object in math, and physics. They play a key role in Wiles proof of
Fermat theorem.

That poetry reminds us that the very little numbers like 0, 1, 2,  
are

very important.
Interesting. I'm not really interested in mathematical excercise  
right now.
I just finished my exams (including math) and just want to relax  
from this

stuff ;).


And I just sent two mathematical theories! Apology. Relax. I wish you  
good Holiday.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out



On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:



Yes. A tiny part of arithmetic is already sufficiently rich to
implement (in the original mathematical sense) very complex emulation
bearing entities much powerfull than that tiny arithmetical entities,
and those can become lucid on the web of arithmetical dream, which
will be, as seen from inside (the points of view), terribly complex,
so that paradoxically, the whole of mathematics can only scratch the
arithmetical truth. Analytical truth and physical truth are
simplification of the arithmetical truth by arithmetical creatures.

I think you confuse arithmetical truth with TRUTH.


That is a consequence of comp. If we are machine at some level, then  
it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than  
arithmetical truth.
The analytical truth and the physical truth and the theological truth  
can be seen as internal epistemological views. In arithmetic there  
are defined by Bp, or variants, or by by scheme B_n x  x (x  
arithmetical formula, B_n being some other Löbian machine, for example)






Arithmetics just is able
to point to what is beyond it,


You mean PA? OK. That is just a LUM, or Plotinus man.




so from this perspective you can call it
arithmetical truth.


The LUM itself cannot. The LUM will call it God (and get rather  
miserable for that blasphem).





But you could call it german truth as well, because
german can be used to do this as well (obviously, because it can state
everything arithmetic can).


Err.. Yes, but computationalism makes it reciprocal.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-23 Thread benjayk


I just thought about this statement:

He might just play the game of pretending to want to keep control to see
how ludicrous and futile this is.

Well, I'd like to contradict this. It's futile and ludicrous if taken as the
ultimate truth. Being and becoming is beyond control. But on a relative
level, we can recognize the necessity of keeping control. Just not through
the ego. This is futile.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-22 Thread terren


Hey Bruno,

I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our ongoing
discussion.

To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to human
consciousness. I now have an argument that I think formalizes this
intuition. 

First, I grant that the computation at the neuron-level is at least
universal, since neurons are capable of addition and multiplication, and as
you say, these are the only operations a machine is required to be able to
perform to be considered universal. I could even see how neural computation
may be Löbian, where the induction operations are implemented in terms of
synaptic strengths (as 'confidence' in the synaptic connections that mediate
particular 'beliefs'). Furthermore, I grant that a kind of consciousness
might be associated with Löbianity (and perhaps even universality).

I will argue however that that is not the consciousness we as humans
experience, and we cannot know - solely on the basis of abstract logical
machines - how to characterize human consciousness. 

The critical point is that human psychology (which I will refer to
henceforth as 'psy') emerges from vast assemblages of neurons. When we talk
about emergence, we recognize that there is a higher-order level that has
its own dynamics which are completely independent (what I refer to as
'causally orthogonal') to the dynamics of the lower-order level. The Game of
Life CA (cellular automata) has very specific dynamics at the cell level,
and the dynamics that emerges at the higher-order level cannot be predicted
or explained in terms of those lower-order dynamics. The higher order is an
emergence of a new 'ontology'.

The neural correlates of psy experiences can indeed be traced down to the
firings of (vast numbers of) individual neurons, in the same way that a
hurricane can be traced down to the interactions of (vast numbers of) water
and air molecules. But I'm saying the dynamics of human psychology will
never be understood in terms of the firings of neurons. Psy can be thought
of as 'neural weather'. True understanding of psy may one day be enabled by
an understanding of the dynamics of the structures that emerge from the
neuronal level, in the same way that weather forecasters understand the
weather in terms of the dynamics of low/high pressure systems, fronts,
troughs, jet-streams, and so on.

To put this in more mathematical terms, propositions about psy are not
expressible in the 'machine language' of neurons. Propositions about 'psy'
are in fact intrinsic to the particular 'program' that the neural machinery
runs. It is a form of level confusion, in other words, to attribute the
human consciousness that is correlated with emergent structures to the
consciousness of neural machinery. 

What I think is most likely is that there are several levels of
psychological emergence related to increasingly encompassing aspects of
experience. Each of these levels are uniquely structured, and in a form
follows function kind of way, each correspond with a different character of
consciousness. Human consciousness is a sum over each of those layers
(including perhaps the base neuronal level).

Given that the only kind of consciousness we have any direct knowledge of is
human consciousness, we cannot say anything about the character of the
consciousness of abstract logical machines. To truly explain
consciousness, we're going to have to understand the dynamics that emerge
from assemblages of (large) groups of neurons, and how psy phenomenon
correlate to those dynamics. 

A little more below...


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 If no, do you think it is important to explain how
 biological machines like us do have access to our beliefs?
 
 That is crucial indeed. But this is exactly what Gödel did solve. A  
 simple arithmetical prover has access to its belief, because the laws  
 of addition and multiplication can define the prover itself. That  
 definition (the Bp) can be implicit or explicit, and, like a patient  
 in front of the description of the brain, the machine cannot recognize  
 itself in that description, yet the access is there, by virtue of its  
 build in ability. The machine itself only identifies itself with the  
 Bp  p, and so, will not been able to ever acknowledge the identity  
 between Bp and Bp  p. That identity belongs to G* minus G. The  
 machine will have to bet on it (to say yes to the doctor).
 

This seems like an evasive answer because Gödel only proved this for the
logical machine. 

I am saying that we can assume comp but still not have access to the
propositions of a level that emerges from the computed substrate.


Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 For the qualia, I am using the classical theory of Theaetetus, and its  
 variants. So I define new logical operator, by Bp  p, Bp  Dt, Bp   
 Dt  p. The qualia appears with Bp  p (but amazingly enough those  
 qualia are communicable, at least between Löbian

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Terren,

On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:51, terren wrote:



I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our  
ongoing

discussion.

To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand  
how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to  
human

consciousness.


Well, this should follow (intuitively) from the UDA. Humans are  
abstract being themselves.






I now have an argument that I think formalizes this
intuition.

First, I grant that the computation at the neuron-level is at least
universal, since neurons are capable of addition and multiplication,  
and as
you say, these are the only operations a machine is required to be  
able to
perform to be considered universal. I could even see how neural  
computation
may be Löbian, where the induction operations are implemented in  
terms of
synaptic strengths (as 'confidence' in the synaptic connections that  
mediate
particular 'beliefs'). Furthermore, I grant that a kind of  
consciousness

might be associated with Löbianity (and perhaps even universality).

I will argue however that that is not the consciousness we as humans
experience, and we cannot know - solely on the basis of abstract  
logical

machines - how to characterize human consciousness.


I agree with this. No machine can know its level of substitution.

Löbian consciousness is to human consciousness like the Escherichia  
Coli genome is to human genome. Humans and mammals are *much* more  
complex.







The critical point is that human psychology (which I will refer to
henceforth as 'psy') emerges from vast assemblages of neurons.



But vast assemblage of neurons are still Turing emulable, and that is  
what counts in the reasoning.





When we talk
about emergence, we recognize that there is a higher-order level  
that has

its own dynamics which are completely independent (what I refer to as
'causally orthogonal') to the dynamics of the lower-order level.


Yes. Bp is already at a higher level than numbers and + and *. There  
are many levels. The logic does not depend on the level, but of the  
correct choice of *some* level.





The Game of
Life CA (cellular automata) has very specific dynamics at the cell  
level,
and the dynamics that emerges at the higher-order level cannot be  
predicted
or explained in terms of those lower-order dynamics. The higher  
order is an

emergence of a new 'ontology'.

The neural correlates of psy experiences can indeed be traced down  
to the
firings of (vast numbers of) individual neurons, in the same way  
that a
hurricane can be traced down to the interactions of (vast numbers  
of) water
and air molecules. But I'm saying the dynamics of human psychology  
will

never be understood in terms of the firings of neurons.


That's comp! You are completely right. Note that this is already true  
for the chess player machine DEEP BLUE. It makes no sense to explain  
its high level strategy, heuristic and program in terms of NAND gates  
behavior.





Psy can be thought
of as 'neural weather'.


Yes. Or much above. Psy is not anything capable of being entirely  
described by 3-things in general, given that it refers to person  
points of view, like the Bp  p is not describable in the whole of  
arithmetic.





True understanding of psy may one day be enabled by
an understanding of the dynamics of the structures that emerge from  
the
neuronal level, in the same way that weather forecasters understand  
the

weather in terms of the dynamics of low/high pressure systems, fronts,
troughs, jet-streams, and so on.


That is what psychologists try to do. They are 100% right in their  
critics of neuronal reductionism.






To put this in more mathematical terms, propositions about psy are not
expressible in the 'machine language' of neurons.


Nor is any of the arithmetical hypostases, except for Bp and Bp  Dt.  
Those are exceptional, and no machine can recognize them in those  
views. That is why the 1-I (Bp  p) has to make a risky bet when  
saying yes to the doctor. The machine will bet on some level where  
Bp is equivalent with Bp  p. That bet is probably counter-intuitive  
for the machine.






Propositions about 'psy'
are in fact intrinsic to the particular 'program' that the neural  
machinery
runs. It is a form of level confusion, in other words, to attribute  
the

human consciousness that is correlated with emergent structures to the
consciousness of neural machinery.


The neural machinery is not conscious, and if it is, such  
consciousness might have nothing to do with my consciousness.





What I think is most likely is that there are several levels of
psychological emergence related to increasingly encompassing aspects  
of
experience. Each of these levels are uniquely structured, and in a  
form
follows function kind of way, each correspond with a different  
character of

consciousness. Human consciousness is a sum over each of those layers
(including perhaps the base neuronal

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-18 Thread benjayk

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 5:17 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

benjayk wrote:

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So,
if
you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
realism;
I
don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer.
1+1=2
is
still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2
makes
sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a
subject
that intuits what truth is.
This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody
else,
but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
necessarily
am.
My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness /
I
am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
expressions
of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1
being
itself as 2.
This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as
it
is.
The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just
expressions
of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it
is,
but
never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations,
seeing
itself through explanations.

Ben,

Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
approximately equal to 1?
Yes.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent
existence
of
infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious
being
anywhere (due to their infinite nature).
I don't believe they exist independently. We don't need to grasp
numbers
to be the fundament to their existence. We can't grasp ourselves. Yet
here
we are. So the same goes for numbers.

Even 1+1=2 is not graspable, because we can't grasp what 1 is. There
are
infinitely many possibilities what 1 may be, dependent on various
contexts.

I don't think anything can fully grasped. The most simple things cannot
be
grasped because they have infinite contexts (and they cannot be taken
out
of context, eg a square just exists because there is space that it
exists
in). The more complex cannot be grasped because of the same reason and
because they are... well, to complex to grasp.
We can describe / put labels on reality and make good theories, but we
can't grasp any part of it in an ultimate way. It all grows and melts
as
soon as we become aware of it.

So, with your argument, everything has independent existence (as a
whole).
Which actually makes sense, so I am okay with that.

To put it in another way: Consciousness (=God) is everything (and
nothing),
but it doesn't know and can't know everything, because what it is cannot
be
completely known, as it is absolutely infinite. God *is* everything, yet
infinitely ignorant about everything.

Ben,

These ideas are reminiscient of the Hindu concept of Parabrahman and
Atman:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parabrahman#Conceptualization
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atman#Advaita_Vedanta

The Absolute Truth is both subject and object, so there is no qualitative
difference.
The Atman or self, he claimed, is indistinguishable from the supreme
reality from which it derives.

Jason

Yeah, in general I like these concepts (not necessarily the further
interpretations of it, eg the claim that everything is illusory that is not
pure, unmanifest brahman).
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



  But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
  subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So, if
  you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
 I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical realism;
 I
 don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer. 1+1=2
 is
 still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2 makes
 sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a subject
 that intuits what truth is.
 This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody else,
 but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
 necessarily
 am.
 My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
 am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well, expressions
 of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1 being
 itself as 2.
 This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as it is.
 The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just expressions
 of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it is, but
 never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
 itself through explanations.


Ben,

Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
approximately equal to 1?

If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent existence of
infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious being
anywhere (due to their infinite nature).

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-17 Thread meekerdb


On 7/17/2011 10:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk 
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com 
mailto:benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:




 But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
 subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2.
So, if
 you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
realism; I
don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its
observer. 1+1=2 is
still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2
makes
sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a
subject
that intuits what truth is.
This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for
somebody else,
but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
necessarily
am.
My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
expressions
of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of
1+1 being
itself as 2.
This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be
as it is.
The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just
expressions
of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what
it is, but
never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
itself through explanations.


Ben,

Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than 
approximately equal to 1?


If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent 
existence of infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have 
never been fully grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped 
by any conscious being anywhere (due to their infinite nature).


Jason


That seems to turn on a certain meaning of grasped.  Looking at a 
finite decimal representation might be one meaning of grasp but it 
seems like an artificially impoverished one.  Pi is the ratio of the 
length of the circumference to the diameter of a plane circle. is also 
a finite representation and one that I find easier to grasp than , say, 
10^10^100.


Brent

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 1:34 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 **
 On 7/17/2011 10:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk 
 benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:



   But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
  subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So, if
  you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
  I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
 realism; I
 don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer. 1+1=2
 is
 still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2 makes
 sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a subject
 that intuits what truth is.
 This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody
 else,
 but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
 necessarily
 am.
 My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
 am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
 expressions
 of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1
 being
 itself as 2.
 This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as it
 is.
 The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just expressions
 of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it is,
 but
 never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
 itself through explanations.


  Ben,

  Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
 approximately equal to 1?

  If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent existence
 of infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
 grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious being
 anywhere (due to their infinite nature).

  Jason


 That seems to turn on a certain meaning of grasped.  Looking at a finite
 decimal representation might be one meaning of grasp but it seems like an
 artificially impoverished one.  Pi is the ratio of the length of the
 circumference to the diameter of a plane circle. is also a finite
 representation and one that I find easier to grasp than , say, 10^10^100.


For Euler's identity to hold, Pi must exist in its infinitely precise form,
but Pi does not exist in its infinitely precise form anywhere in this
universe.  Ben believes mathematical truth only exists in our minds, but
does Pi really exist in our minds, or only the notion that it can be derived
as the ratio between a plane circle and its diameter?  Pi is so big that its
digits contain all movies and all books ever created, surely this is not
present within our minds, but it is exactly what must exist for e^(2*Pi*i) =
1.

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 3:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 **
 On 7/17/2011 1:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 2:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 7/17/2011 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

 For Euler's identity to hold, Pi must exist in its infinitely precise
 form, but Pi does not exist in its infinitely precise form anywhere in this
 universe.


  You don't know that, since space may well be a continuum (c.f. the recent
 paper by Feeney et al).


 Pi is a number, that space may be a continuum doesn't make this number
 appear anywhere in the universe.  We can point to two electrons and say that
 is an instance of the number 2, but where would we see a physical instance
 of the number Pi?


 I didn't say I knew where there was a physical instance - I said you didn't
 know that there wasn't one.


That's fair.








  Ben believes mathematical truth only exists in our minds, but does Pi
 really exist in our minds, or only the notion that it can be derived as the
 ratio between a plane circle and its diameter?


  But that's the characteristic of mathematics, its statements are notions
 and notions are things in minds.  So there is no difference between the
 notion of pi existing in our minds and pi really existing in our minds.


 Is there no difference between the notion of the moon existing in our minds
 and the moon really existing?  We say the moon exists because it has
 properties which are objectively observable.  Mathematics, like physics i a
 source of objective observations and therefore part of reality.  What makes
 the moon more real than the number 5?  If you say it is because the moon is
 some place we can go to or see with our eyes, then what makes the number 5
 less real than the past, or that beyond the cosmological horizon, or other
 branches of the wave function?


 One thing that makes them different is that you can know everything there
 is to know about the number 5 (as a place in the structure of integers),
 because it is a concept we invented.


My question was what makes 5 less real than those other concepts.

Also, I would disagree that we know everything there is to know about 5,
there are an infinite number of facts about the number five and we do not
know all of them.  For example, there was a time when humans knew 5 was
between 4 and 6, but did not know that 5 is an element of the smallest
pythaogream triple.







  Pi is so big that its digits contain all movies and all books ever
 created, surely this is not present within our minds,


  Expressing pi as a sequence of digits is a notion in our minds.


 That Pi takes an infinite number of bits to describe, and an infinite
 number of steps to converge upon, is more than a notion in our minds, it is
 an incontrovertible fact.


 But that fact is a finite notion.  It's a consequence of a non-constructive
 argument.



It sounds as though you are saying I can provide a finite description of how
to compute Pi, and thus define it without having to actually execute its
infinite steps on a Turing machine.  Is this an accurate statement?






  The sequence is no more in our minds than is 10^10^100.


 Pi is not special, there are many numbers which exists that are beyond the
 physics of this universe.  I consider this further evidence of mathematical
 realism.


 So you simply have adopted a certain Platonic idea of real.


Are you saying numbers like 10^10^100 do not exist?  Are you a finitist?

I think if one is not a finitist, they must a platonist.





  If you say a Googolplex exists, then where is it?  There are not a
 Googolplex things in this universe to count.  Therefore if you think a
 Googleplex exists, then numbers exist independently of physical things to
 count.  Even if there was a universe with nothing in it at all, the numbers
 would still exist.


 So you say.


That is the conclusion if you believe 10^10^100 is real.








  but it is exactly what must exist for e^(2*Pi*i) = 1.


  I disagree.  For Euler's identity to hold just means that if follows
 logically from some axioms we entertain.



 There are other ways to prove Euler's identity, but for that equation to be
 true, those irrational numbers (e and Pi) must be used with infinite
 precision.


 Only to check the equation by computing the value on a Turing machine.



For the left hand side of the equation to equal 1 and not some other number,
the exact values must be used.  I don't see how to get around that.

The equation doesn't require validation by a Turing machine to be true, any
more than a turing machine has to validate 1 + 1 for it to equal 2.



   True is just a value that is preserved in the logical inference from
 axioms to theorem.  It's not the same as real.


True is more than inference from axioms.  For example, Godel's theorem is a
statement about axiomatic systems, it is not derived from axioms.

Objectively true or false statements are properties of objective objects.
What leads you

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-17 Thread benjayk

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So, if
you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
realism;
I
don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer. 1+1=2
is
still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2 makes
sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a subject
that intuits what truth is.
This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody
else,
but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
necessarily
am.
My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
expressions
of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1
being
itself as 2.
This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as it
is.
The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just
expressions
of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it is,
but
never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
itself through explanations.

Ben,

Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
approximately equal to 1?
Yes.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent existence
of
infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious being
anywhere (due to their infinite nature).
I don't believe they exist independently. We don't need to grasp numbers to
be the fundament to their existence. We can't grasp ourselves. Yet here we
are. So the same goes for numbers.

Even 1+1=2 is not graspable, because we can't grasp what 1 is. There are
infinitely many possibilities what 1 may be, dependent on various contexts.

I don't think anything can fully grasped. The most simple things cannot be
grasped because they have infinite contexts (and they cannot be taken out of
context, eg a square just exists because there is space that it exists in).
The more complex cannot be grasped because of the same reason and because
they are... well, to complex to grasp.
We can describe / put labels on reality and make good theories, but we can't
grasp any part of it in an ultimate way. It all grows and melts as soon as
we become aware of it.

So, with your argument, everything has independent existence (as a whole).
Which actually makes sense, so I am okay with that.

I am just opposed to the notion that parts of truth are totally seperate /
independent from *each other*. If they were, there would be no truth that
connects them, but there is, if it is only the truth that they both exist.
--
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-17 Thread benjayk

benjayk wrote:

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:

But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So, if
you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
realism;
I
don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer.
1+1=2
is
still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2 makes
sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a subject
that intuits what truth is.
This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody
else,
but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
necessarily
am.
My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
expressions
of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1
being
itself as 2.
This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as it
is.
The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just
expressions
of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it is,
but
never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
itself through explanations.

Ben,

Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
approximately equal to 1?
Yes.

Jason Resch-2 wrote:

If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent existence
of
infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious
being
anywhere (due to their infinite nature).
I don't believe they exist independently. We don't need to grasp numbers
to be the fundament to their existence. We can't grasp ourselves. Yet here
we are. So the same goes for numbers.

Even 1+1=2 is not graspable, because we can't grasp what 1 is. There are
infinitely many possibilities what 1 may be, dependent on various
contexts.

I don't think anything can fully grasped. The most simple things cannot be
grasped because they have infinite contexts (and they cannot be taken out
of context, eg a square just exists because there is space that it exists
in). The more complex cannot be grasped because of the same reason and
because they are... well, to complex to grasp.
We can describe / put labels on reality and make good theories, but we
can't grasp any part of it in an ultimate way. It all grows and melts as
soon as we become aware of it.

So, with your argument, everything has independent existence (as a whole).
Which actually makes sense, so I am okay with that.

To put it in another way: Consciousness (=God) is everything (and nothing),
but it doesn't know and can't know everything, because what it is cannot be
completely known, as it is absolutely infinite. God *is* everything, yet
infinitely ignorant about everything.

Which doesn't mean that nothing is known, just that all knowledge is always
incomplete. It doesn't matter what the knowledge is about, since all
knowledge is contextual, and the context ultimately is everything.
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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 5:17 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:




 benjayk wrote:
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 8:51 AM, benjayk
  benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
 
 
 
   But with comp, you are using 1+1=2, and much more, to tackle the
   subjective truth of a universal number thinking about 1+1=2. So, if
   you reject arithmetical truth, comp makes no much sense.
  I didn't write I reject arithmetical truth. I reject arithmetical
  realism;
  I
  don't think arithmetical truth exists seperately from its observer.
  1+1=2
  is
  still true, just not independently of us. The reason is that 1+1=2
 makes
  sense because it is true, and truth is fundamentally linked to a
 subject
  that intuits what truth is.
  This doesn't mean that 1+1=2 is true for me and not true for somebody
  else,
  but that is necessarily true because I (=consciousness, not ego)
  necessarily
  am.
  My hypothesis is that truth is equal to awareness / consciousness / I
  am-ness and all kind of expressions of truth are just... well,
  expressions
  of the truth and not independent of it. 1+1=2 is an expression of 1+1
  being
  itself as 2.
  This hypothesis makes everything mysterious, but this may just be as it
  is.
  The truth is necessarily mysterious. All explanations are just
  expressions
  of its mysterious nature, that allow us to look deeper into what it is,
  but
  never giving an explanation *for* it. It's beyond explanations, seeing
  itself through explanations.
 
 
  Ben,
 
  Would you say that e^*(2 * Pi * i) is exactly equal to 1, rather than
  approximately equal to 1?
  Yes.
 
 
 
  Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
  If you believe that it is, you are believing in the independent
 existence
  of
  infinitely long numbers e and Pi, numbers which have never been fully
  grasped by any human, and potentially never grasped by any conscious
  being
  anywhere (due to their infinite nature).
  I don't believe they exist independently. We don't need to grasp numbers
  to be the fundament to their existence. We can't grasp ourselves. Yet
 here
  we are. So the same goes for numbers.
 
  Even 1+1=2 is not graspable, because we can't grasp what 1 is. There are
  infinitely many possibilities what 1 may be, dependent on various
  contexts.
 
  I don't think anything can fully grasped. The most simple things cannot
 be
  grasped because they have infinite contexts (and they cannot be taken out
  of context, eg a square just exists because there is space that it exists
  in). The more complex cannot be grasped because of the same reason and
  because they are... well, to complex to grasp.
  We can describe / put labels on reality and make good theories, but we
  can't grasp any part of it in an ultimate way. It all grows and melts as
  soon as we become aware of it.
 
  So, with your argument, everything has independent existence (as a
 whole).
  Which actually makes sense, so I am okay with that.
 
  I am just opposed to the notion that parts of truth are totally seperate
 /
  independent from *each other*. If they were, there would be no truth that
  connects them, but there is, if it is only the truth that they both
 exist.
 

 To put it in another way: Consciousness (=God) is everything (and nothing),
 but it doesn't know and can't know everything, because what it is cannot be
 completely known, as it is absolutely infinite. God *is* everything, yet
 infinitely ignorant about everything.

 Which doesn't mean that nothing is known, just that all knowledge is always
 incomplete. It doesn't matter what the knowledge is about, since all
 knowledge is contextual, and the context ultimately is everything.
 --



Ben,

These ideas are reminiscient of the Hindu concept of Parabrahman and Atman:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parabrahman#Conceptualization
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atman#Advaita_Vedanta

The Absolute Truth is both subject and object, so there is no qualitative
difference.
The Atman or self, he claimed, is indistinguishable from the supreme
reality from which it derives. 

Jason

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-07-17 Thread meekerdb


On 7/17/2011 2:35 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 3:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 7/17/2011 1:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 2:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 7/17/2011 11:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

For Euler's identity to hold, Pi must exist in its
infinitely precise form, but Pi does not exist in its
infinitely precise form anywhere in this universe.


You don't know that, since space may well be a continuum
(c.f. the recent paper by Feeney et al).


Pi is a number, that space may be a continuum doesn't make this
number appear anywhere in the universe.  We can point to two
electrons and say that is an instance of the number 2, but where
would we see a physical instance of the number Pi?


I didn't say I knew where there was a physical instance - I said
you didn't know that there wasn't one.


That's fair.






Ben believes mathematical truth only exists in our minds,
but does Pi really exist in our minds, or only the notion
that it can be derived as the ratio between a plane
circle and its diameter?


But that's the characteristic of mathematics, its statements
are notions and notions are things in minds.  So there is no
difference between the notion of pi existing in our minds and
pi really existing in our minds.


Is there no difference between the notion of the moon existing in
our minds and the moon really existing?  We say the moon exists
because it has properties which are objectively observable. 
Mathematics, like physics i a source of objective observations

and therefore part of reality.  What makes the moon more real
than the number 5?  If you say it is because the moon is some
place we can go to or see with our eyes, then what makes the
number 5 less real than the past, or that beyond the cosmological
horizon, or other branches of the wave function?


One thing that makes them different is that you can know
everything there is to know about the number 5 (as a place in the
structure of integers), because it is a concept we invented.


My question was what makes 5 less real than those other concepts.

Also, I would disagree that we know everything there is to know about 
5, there are an infinite number of facts about the number five and we 
do not know all of them.  For example, there was a time when humans 
knew 5 was between 4 and 6, but did not know that 5 is an element of 
the smallest pythaogream triple.


Of course our present view, since Peano, is that the natural numbers are 
a structure and so within that context 5 has infinitely many relations.  
But when you know it is the successor of 4 you in principle know 
everything there is to know about it.  Note that I wrote can know, not 
does know.









Pi is so big that its digits contain all movies and all
books ever created, surely this is not present within our
minds,


Expressing pi as a sequence of digits is a notion in our minds.


That Pi takes an infinite number of bits to describe, and an
infinite number of steps to converge upon, is more than a notion
in our minds, it is an incontrovertible fact.


But that fact is a finite notion.  It's a consequence of a
non-constructive argument.



It sounds as though you are saying I can provide a finite description 
of how to compute Pi, and thus define it without having to actually 
execute its infinite steps on a Turing machine.  Is this an accurate 
statement?




 The sequence is no more in our minds than is 10^10^100.


Pi is not special, there are many numbers which exists that are
beyond the physics of this universe.  I consider this further
evidence of mathematical realism.


So you simply have adopted a certain Platonic idea of real.


Are you saying numbers like 10^10^100 do not exist?  Are you a finitist?

I think if one is not a finitist, they must a platonist.




If you say a Googolplex exists, then where is it?  There are not
a Googolplex things in this universe to count.  Therefore if you
think a Googleplex exists, then numbers exist independently of
physical things to count.  Even if there was a universe with
nothing in it at all, the numbers would still exist.


So you say.


That is the conclusion if you believe 10^10^100 is real.






but it is exactly what must exist for e^(2*Pi*i) = 1.


I disagree.  For Euler's identity to hold just means that if
follows logically from some axioms we entertain.



There are other ways to prove Euler's identity, but for that
equation to be true, those irrational numbers (e and Pi) must be
used with infinite precision.


Only

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out