Le 04-sept.-06, à 16:12, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly
>>> experience)
>>> be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
>>> It's a question of consist
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> > Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
> > be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
> > It's a question of consistency.
>
> Attributing mind to others explains many t
Le 04-sept.-06, à 02:56, 1Z a écrit :
>
> Why should a belief in other minds (which I do not directly experience)
> be more reasonable thant a belief in unexperienced primary matter ?
> It's a question of consistency.
Attributing mind to others explains many things. There are rich (albeit
vagu
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
>
>
> > How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
>
>
>
>
> You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
> idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Why should a belief
Le 30-août-06, à 21:26, 1Z (Peter D. Jones) a écrit :
> How do you escape solipsism without embracing materialism ?
You can escape solipsism by embracing *any* kind of *objective*
idealism (inspired by mathematical structures or not).
Objective idealisms are not in fashion today, I know,
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > > > properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
> > > > > > > abou
Le Wednesday 30 Août 2006 21:26, 1Z a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> > > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > > properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking
> > > > > > about the real world. It may turn out th
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain
> > > > > properties is just a working
> > > > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn
> > > > > out that if we dig into
> > > > > quarks very d
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties
> > > > is just a working
> > > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > > that if we dig into
> > > > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" ther
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>Peter Jones writes:
>>>
>>>
>>>
By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
solipsism.
I choose metaphsyics.
We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>>>
>>>
>>>Solipsi
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> >
> >>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> >>solipsism.
> >>I choose metaphsyics.
> >>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
> >
> >
> > Solipsism is a metaphysical p
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
>>solipsism.
>>I choose metaphsyics.
>>We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
>
>
>>(BTW: it it is wrong
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "substant
Le 27-août-06, à 21:41, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I put "working assumption" in scare quotes because I think the fact
> that we can
> create models of the world that are successful over a wide domain of
> phenomena is
> evidence for an underlying reality. It's not conclusive evidence, but
> r
Le 27-août-06, à 19:41, 1Z a écrit :
> But you don't really address the existence question. You just loosely
> assume it is the
> same thing as truth.
I just assume that the "existence of a number" is equivalent with the
intended truth of an existential
proposition written in a theory about
Le 27-août-06, à 19:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
>>> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
>>> propertyless
>>> substrate. Why not jus
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> There is good reason to believe that there is some sort of reality out there
> as opposed to the
> solipsistic alternative, but there is less reason to believe that there is
> some basic material substrate
> on which the various properties of physical objects are h
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> > solipsism.
> > I choose metaphsyics.
> > We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
>
> Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
A minimal one, that refuses
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is nothi
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> >
> >>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> >>>just a working
> >>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> >>>that if we dig into
> >>>quarks very deeply ther
Peter Jones writes:
> By youur definitions, it's a straight choice between metaphysics and
> solipsism.
> I choose metaphsyics.
> We can posit the unobservable to expalint he observable.
Solipsism is a metaphysical position.
> (BTW: it it is wrong to posit an unobserved substrate, why is it
>
Peter Jones writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but solid
1Z wrote:
> > > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > > of the UD.
> >
> >
> > It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
>
> I am starting with the reality my own existence.
>
> That is
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Brent Meeker"
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM
Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "subst
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > of the UD.
>
>
> It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the r
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> > I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> > properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> > propertyless
> > substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> >
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is noth
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > > But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
> > > wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
> > > up,
> > > tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
>
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> propertyless
> substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> instantiated and
> some aren't.
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
> AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying
I don't know which theory.
>
> AR as a
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but sol
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
>
>>>But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
>>>wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up,
>>>tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
>>>then mayb
Brent meeker writes:
> > But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
> > wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
> > up,
> > tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
> > then maybe it is just an illusion.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>>Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
>>may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
>>dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
>>matter add to a merely a
Peter Jones writes:
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
> matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The ans
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>
> >>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
> >>
> >>
> >> I can hardly not agree with that.
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> If numbers do not expl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going
> through the
> first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no
> real basis for
> distinguishing between a recording and a program,
There is a basis for di
John,
Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental
> interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its
> validity). "My world" is a posteriori.
This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to transl
heerz
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 10:31
AM
Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS:
ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Mee
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
>>maintained
>>indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
>>endless
>>loop without external stimulus.
>
>
> That's an assumption,
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>> People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
>> relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
>> that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
>> is almost completely cut ou
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to translate number-monsters into
> "thought-monsters"?
In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers.
More explanation in the posts.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---
Brent Meeker writes:
> Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
> maintained
> indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
> endless
> loop without external stimulus.
That's an assumption, but even if true it would only say somethin
Le 21-août-06, à 22:20, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I thought the question was not about computation, but whether a
> program was
> intelligent or conscious. I think that intelligence means being able
> to respond to a
> variety of differenet inputs. So above |CODE| might be intelligent
> but
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
> > relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
> > that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
> > is almost completely cut out f
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>
>>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>>
>>
>> I can hardly not agree with that.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
>>> how a strucuture
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> > You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its
> > environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a
> > situation
> > where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you
> > start up
> > the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>>OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
>>environment are intelligent".
>>That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
>>beings, and you are left
>>with the prob
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 6:04 AM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
(See below)
Teach! -
I have a difference against your mathematical definition! (ha ha)
I thou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
> > environment are intelligent".
> > That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
> > beings, and you are left
> > with the pr
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 22, 2006 6:10
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit
:
- Original
Message --
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my
> environment are intelligent".
> That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent
> beings, and you are left
> with the problem of how to decide whether a
Brent meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones, Quentin Anciaux and SP):
> >>Hi,
> >>
> >>Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >>
> >>>Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> >>>
> >What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> >like a recording. Wo
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
skip
I already told you that I interpret
There ex
Le 19-août-06, à 21:13, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (John M.) a écrit :
> BTW I have a problem with the "perfect" 6:
> ITS DIVISORS are 1,2,3,6, the sum of which is 12, not 6 and it looks
> that
> there is NO other perfect number in this sense either.
I have define a number to be perfect when it is eq
- Original Message -
From:
Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 21, 2006 6:39
AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet
really...
skip
I already told you that I interpretThere exists a prime
number "in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
>
>> And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process.
>> But
>> that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process --
>> it
>> is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato'
Peter Jones writes:
> And such a universe could be emulated
> as a running, deterministic process. But
> that won't get you into Plato's heaven,
> because it is a *running* process -- it is still
> dynamic. A recording of the process could
> exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have
> all the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Right!
>
>
>
>
>
>>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
>>Date: Sun, 2
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>
>
> I can hardly not agree with that.
>
>
> >
> > If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> > how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> > a UD if a
Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
I can hardly not agree with that.
>
> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existenc
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single,
> > > > > deterministic, non-branching
> > > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
> > or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
> > well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
> >
> > But that depends on the assumption that there is such
Le 20-août-06, à 21:09, 1Z a écrit :
If minds are made of Platonically existing comptutations
or numbers, they don't need to be made of matter as
well. In that sense matter would we without purpose.
But that depends on the assumption that there is such
a thing as Platonic existence in the first
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > > non-branching
> > > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then
> > > > contingency in general
> > > > being du
Right!
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
> Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200
>
>
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
> understanding.
>
>
> >> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
> >>
> >>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> >>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can cla
Hi Peter,
I am no more sure you read the post, nor am I sure you really search
understanding.
>> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
>>> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
>>> the truth of mathematical
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> > >
> > > It would be a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > > non-branching
> > > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency
> > > in general
> > > being due to the fact that we don't know the
Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:
>> The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I
>> don't
>> think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.
I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of "internal" or
epistemological existence, build from
Hi,
Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically
> > > like a recording. Would that count as a program at all,
> >
> > It would be a trivial case.
>
> Trivial does not mea
Peter Jones writes:
> > Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> > non-branching
> > computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
> > general
> > being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program
> > will pl
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a
> > recording.
> > Would that count as a program at all,
>
> It would be a trivial case.
Trivial does not mean false.
> > and could it be a conscious program, given that
> > compu
Hi, Bruno
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, August 18, 2006 11:23 AM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno wrote:
Hi John,
Le 18-août-06, à 03:03, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Why has 6 'divi
Le 18-août-06, à 22:59, complexitystudies a écrit :
>>
>
> As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction.
> Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist,
> save as thoughts in our brains.
Don(t say this to a logician. there are as many notion of "causality"
tha
Le 18-août-06, à 19:01, 1Z a écrit :
> That is quite different from conjuring up existential conclusions
> from non-existential premises.
I believe there exist numbers, prime numbers, even numbers, etc. and in
relative universal numbers, ... (with Church Thesis "universal" need
not to be acco
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Günther writes:
>
> > Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
> > wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
> > of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
> > all humans have died, this universe will ha
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic,
> non-branching
> computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in
> general
> being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will
> play
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to
> > > occur,
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer programmes con
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
> > "exist".
> >
> > However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
> > (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> > The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
> > the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
> > but their existence isn't.
>
>
> "Their" ex
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit :
> That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence.
> The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that
> the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent,
> but their existence isn't.
"Their" existence ? Mathematical statements ne
Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
> It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by
> "exist".
>
> However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia,
> (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the
> existence we
> have and the existen
Le 19-août-06, à 08:48, Brent Meeker wrote quoting Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be
>> true relative to some
>> axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world,
>> or that it should
>> be discovered by some mathem
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> >>But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it
> >>true
> >>or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that
> >>a
> >>bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess
> >>exis
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
>>>independent of the
>>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
>>>Euclid's axioms
>>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclid
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
>>>independent of the
>>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
>>>Euclid's axioms
>>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclid
Günther writes:
> Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a
> wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent
> of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when
> all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form
> which pro
Brent Meeker writes:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> ...
> >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
> >
> >
> > I've explained that several times: computer program
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is
> > independent of the
> > real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from
> > Euclid's axioms
> > *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real
> >
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
>
> I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> if-then statements.
>
> > other th
>
>
>
> 1Z wrote:
>
>> Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid
>> syllogisms.
>>
>> Existence is availability for causal interaction
>> Numbers are not available for causal interaction
>> Numbers do not exist
>>
>> Platonism is the claim that numbers exist
>> Number
complexitystudies wrote:
>
>>I think it has been said several times :
>>
>>The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
>>existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
>>conscious beings capable of thinking of it.
>>
>>So the truth value of
complexitystudies wrote:
...
>
>
> Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects
> (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has
> been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your
> friend ;-)
> This ability has an evolutionary adv
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit :
> I recall it is just the belief that the
> propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you
> sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the
> square root of 2 can equal to a r
Hi,
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 22:17, complexitystudies a écrit :
> > I think it has been said several times :
> >
> > The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its
> > existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists
> > conscious beings capable o
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>1Z wrote:
> ...
> >>>If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
> >>>identical.
> >>
> >>I don't think I understand this either.
> >
> >
> > Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon.
>
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